The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegations

Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

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PART 2 OF 2

II. COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY

Enforcement of Command Accountability


One of the most pervasive managerial failures the Commission has observed in the Department over recent years is its failure to maintain the system of command accountability. The cornerstone of the Department's anti-corruption strategy, command accountability requires a comprehensive commitment to successful corruption control throughout the Department, especially from field commanders. Ideally, the entire Department should be infused with values that discourage corruption. But at the very least, field commanders should be held responsible for the state of corruption within their commands. If corruption control fails, field commanders, as well as internal investigators, should answer for it. If it succeeds, they should be commended.

Successful command accountability is particularly important because it can, as it has in the past, change the organizational culture of the Department. Command accountability forces corruption control to be the responsibility of all the Department's managers and pushes anti-corruption priorities out into the field. Under this principle, protecting the integrity of police officers is vested not just in Internal Affairs but in every stationhouse in the City.

Without the principle of accountability becoming standard operating procedure throughout the Department, no system of corruption control, no matter how well devised and equipped, is likely to succeed. When the public sees groups of police officers arrested for crimes they committed while on duty and in uniform, it demands an answer to the question of how such corruption could possibly have occurred without police supervisors detecting it and making every effort to stop it. The Department must provide an answer to that question if it ever hopes to restore the public's confidence in its integrity and good faith. It also owes that answer to its own rank and file who feel they are the only targets in corruption probes, while the bosses are never called to account.

Some have argued that with the elimination of the FIAUs -- which, in theory, served as the investigative tool for field commanders to uncover corruption -- field commanders cannot fairly be held accountable for corruption on their watch.

We do not agree. As discussed in Chapter Four, the FIAUs were rarely used as a management tool by borough or precinct commanders to effectively fight corruption -- nor were they used by the Department as a basis for enforcing command accountability. We believe that command accountability need not depend solely on commanders investigating corruption through field units. Commanders can and should be held accountable for their efforts in preventing and detecting corruption, reporting it to IAD, and assisting with any ensuing investigation. They must make it clear to their subordinates that they will not tolerate corruption or the code of silence in their commands; that they will reward those who come forward to report corruption, and, when appropriate, sanction those who do not; they must insure that supervisors vigorously pursue and report their suspicions about corruption; and in particular they must use their Integrity Control Officers to monitor and identify corruption problems in the precinct, including through such means as monitoring the precinct radio, spot checking arrest scenes and identifying other corruption hazards and problem officers. When they want their suspicions pursued, commanders still have an investigative arm: the Internal Affairs Bureau. In sum, we believe the basis for fair and firm enforcement of command accountability exists -- even without the FIAUs -- if the recommendations that follow are carried out.

Enforcement of command accountability, however, is not easy. It does not simply mean that a superior officer's head must roll for every instance of corruption -- as the press and others often demand. After all, disclosure of corruption can be evidence of good, as well as poor, performance in fighting corruption. A strict liability standard -- imposing sanctions whenever corruption is uncovered -- is not only unfair but it creates incentives to conceal or transfer corruption rather than uproot it. On the other hand, subjective, conclusory decisions on liability made by commanders or chiefs is also unfair. The Department must make commanders understand that they will be judged fairly and regularly for their anti-corruption attitudes; that they will be rewarded or penalized on the basis of their actual performance in uncovering corruption -- not on the fact that corruption exists. But making such determinations requires time and effort. It requires factual inquiries and investigations, not just conclusory pronouncements on culpability or diligence. It requires an investigation into what commanders knew or should have known and the measures they took or failed to take to prevent or uncover corruption in their command. Without making such genuine determinations, command accountability will continue to be mere rhetoric rather than actual practice.

A major failure of the Department's past approach to command accountability has been that no mechanism was ever put into place to enforce it. No person or unit was ever responsible for determining when corruption disclosures reflected supervisory neglect or vigilance. Most people presume the Police Commissioner enforces command accountability, but no Commissioner ever instituted a mechanism to monitor commanders' performance and, when necessary, determine culpability. As a result, such determinations were rarely made.

Command accountability also requires that commanders understand that they will be judged regularly, not only during scandals, for their anti-corruption performance. A tool that was initially intended to help keep commanders accountable was the annual Corruption Assessment Report. Since the 1970s, precinct commanders and heads of police units have been required to report the state of corruption and corruption hazards within their commands by submitting this Report to the Police Commissioner. The Commission's inquiries showed that, over the last decade, what began as a possibly useful integrity control and command accountability tool has become useless boilerplate. Commanding officers file essentially the same report year after year with only superficial changes.

The Department should reform this potentially useful tool. It should require all commanding officers, including borough, precinct and unit commanders to participate in an annual Corruption Assessment Review; a face-to-face briefing session with Internal Affairs commanders to apprise Internal Affairs of the following information: (i) corruption hazards within their commands; (ii) intelligence information about corruption-prone officers; (iii) the level of supervision within the command; (iv) efforts to prevent corruption; (v) management problems that impede corruption control; and, (vi) any need for additional resources or assistance from IAB to deter or uncover corruption. We recommend that the commanding officer be required to memorialize the substance of the Corruption Assessment Review in a brief report that should be submitted to the First Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs.

We expect such personal briefing sessions will serve a number of important purposes. First, they will insure regular monitoring and evaluation of commanders' anti-corruption performance. Second, they will motivate Internal Affairs and field commanders to engage in productive relationships to control corruption and help overcome the isolation and mistrust that has long divided field commanders and Internal Affairs officers. They will help encourage commanders to view IAB as a management tool they can use to fight corruption rather than as potential trouble-makers. Third, they will compel commanders to take a more active and personal role in deterring and reporting corruption within their commands. Fourth, they will force commanding officers to give careful consideration to the corruption hazards in their commands and their plans to address them, rather than allowing them to rely on outdated and repetitive written reports. Finally, they will allow command accountability inquiries to focus not only on a commanding officer's knowledge and actions, but on the adequacy of Internal Affairs' response. In the event corruption comes to light in a command where a field commander or Internal Affairs commander failed to address the problem, they should be held equally to account for their omissions.

Commissioner Bratton has begun to make the importance of command accountability clear to police supervisors. In the wake of the 30th Precinct investigation and the Commission's findings on the collapse of command accountability, he has stated publicly that scrutiny of supervisors has been lax over the past decade and that police supervisors who turn a blind eye to corruption do so at great risk. The Commission has seen a considerable effort on the part of the Department to revitalize genuine command accountability. The challenge is to sustain and reinforce that effort over the years. To accomplish that, the Commission has concluded that the principle of command accountability must be completely reinvented. To help achieve this goal, we present the following recommendations:

• The Police Commissioner should make clear his total commitment to enforce the principle of accountability to all police commanders and supervisors.
• Establish a special Command Accountability Review Unit to conduct post-corruption disclosure investigations to identify the supervisors and commanders who knew or should have known about corruption within their commands and failed to take adequate measures to prevent and report it, as well as those who performed diligently in this area. The unit should also determine whether commanders provided appropriate assistance to internal investigators during a corruption investigation. The unit should operate under the direction of the First Deputy Commissioner and should include a representative from our recommended external independent monitor, should one be created.
• The performance of the Command Accountability Review Unit should be monitored by the independent external monitor.
• The Police Commissioner should provide for sanctions, including demotion or dismissal, for supervisors who failed in their duties, as determined by the Command Accountability Review Board.
• The Police Commissioner should publicly reward supervisors who have demonstrated their commitment to integrity, as determined by the Command Accountability Review Board, or by other means.
• The Department should factor superior corruption control performance in promotion and assignment practices.
• The Police Commissioner should require commanders to participate in yearly Corruption Assessment Reviews with Internal Affairs commanders which insures that commanders will be regularly monitored and assisted with their anti-corruption performance.
• Train police supervisors and commanders in the indications and conditions suggesting corruption is taking place so that they make accurate assessments of the corruption hazards in their commands.
• Internal Affairs should keep precinct commanders informed of the existence and developments of corruption investigations within their commands and require them to assist in investigations.
• The Command Accountability Review Unit should also review and determine the adequacy of Internal Affairs' response to information on corruption received from supervisors and commanders, as well as the adequacy of its assistance to supervisors and commanders. Internal Affairs commanders should be held accountable for poor performance in this area or rewarded for outstanding performance.

Supervision

In the course of the Commission's investigations into precincts where corruption existed, we found sparse and ineffectual supervision at every turn. The failure of effective supervision has been a major contributing factor not only to corruption but to the climate of tolerance that makes it possible. As we stated in our Interim Report, many supervisors of all levels acted as if it was better not to know about, much less, report corruption. If the Department has any hope of minimizing corruption in future years, that attitude must change. The Commission recognizes that the demands of police work inevitably make close supervision a very difficult goal. But effective corruption control must begin with strong supervision.

While the Commission found, in most instances, no hard evidence that most supervisors were directly engaged in corrupt acts, in precincts such as the 9th, 30th, 46th, 73rd and 75th, and where groups of police officers engaged in outright criminal activity, it is hard to believe that supervisors were ignorant of the corruption of their subordinates. In fact, a number of supervisors knew or should have known about corruption within their commands and did nothing to stop it.

Of all supervisory positions, sergeants, as first-line field supervisors, were in the best position to know about corruption. Unfortunately, in too many cases explored by the Commission, sergeants failed to serve as a deterrent to corruption. There are a number of reasons for this, not all of which reflect poorly on the abilities or commitment of individual sergeants and other supervisors. These reasons, plus additional findings on supervision failures were discussed in detail in Chapter Four. A brief summary of these deficiencies follows.

To begin, sergeants have suffered a dramatic dilution of authority in recent years. They are increasingly young, inexperienced, and often feel more loyal to their subordinates than to the Department's managers. They are eligible to take the sergeants' examination immediately after their term as a probationary officer expires, which means after only eighteen months' experience as a police officer. Establishing their credibility and authority is thus often difficult.

There is also a critical shortage of sergeants in many precincts within the Department causing an unmanageable span of supervision, or ratio of supervisors to patrol officers. While police experts have recommended a supervision ratio of one sergeant to ten officers, we found in some precincts, sergeants were responsible for supervising more than thirty officers in any given tour. It was not uncommon, furthermore, for sergeants to be assigned supervision of patrol officers in two separate precincts in the same tour. Under such conditions, it is practically impossible for sergeants to know what their subordinates are doing at any given time -- which is no secret to officers on the streets. Even in precincts with manageable numbers of subordinates to supervise, sergeants must perform a host of administrative duties that require them to devote more time to paperwork than to active field supervision.

In many high-crime precincts, sergeants do no supervising at all. Besides their supervisory and administrative duties, sergeants assigned to such precincts routinely handle calls for service during busy periods, which are the responsibility of patrol officers -- which further undermines their authority.

Department commanders often assigned sergeants and other supervisors without regard to prior experience, training or the needs of the particular command. Inexperienced probationary sergeants were often assigned to busy, corruption-prone precincts where experienced and proven supervisors were most needed.

Even more troubling, many supervisors and commanders do not perceive corruption control as part of their responsibility. In past years, the Department did little to suggest otherwise. It rarely trained supervisors on corruption control or held them responsible for their performance.

The Department also did little to support the precinct Integrity Control Officer ("ICO") who is responsible for assisting precinct and unit commanders with corruption issues. ICOs spend most of their time controlling paper rather than corruption. They are also isolated from IAD and are rarely provided with information about corruption in their commands. In sum, they have become clerks rather than corruption fighters.

To reverse the problem of ineffective supervision, the Department must first make clear to all supervisors that they have a critical role in preventing and detecting corruption. That message must start with training and must be reinforced by application of the principle of personal accountability. In the past, the Department's training of supervisors was inadequate. Most sergeants and lieutenants we interviewed harshly criticized the Department's management training courses. They claimed they taught them nothing about how to manage and supervise subordinates -- and were basically a mere patrol guide refresher course that failed to realistically address the practical problems supervisors face in today's environment. Moreover, supervisors, received no training in how to detect and prevent corruption on their watch or how to identify corruption-prone officers. They received no message about the importance of carrying out their anti-corruption duties.

The Department must also train supervisors on how to effectively communicate with a diverse patrol force. Such training, especially with a growing minority contingent is vital to any diverse group. It is especially important to groups that spend hours together. Our investigation revealed that certain minority officers sometimes feel themselves to be outsiders in a basically white Department. While it is not uncommon for minorities in any large group to feel this way, various studies suggest that human interaction training can heighten morale and loyalty and lessen alienation.

In recent months, the Department has moved swiftly to correct many of the supervision problems identified by the Commission. Recently, the Department promoted approximately four hundred new sergeants and has begun to reform supervisory training by establishing a Sergeants' Academy that provides anti-corruption training and in-service leadership seminars for supervisors of all ranks.

In light of the Commission's findings on police supervision, we offer the following reform recommendations:

• Require officers to have at least three years of service experience before becoming eligible for promotion to sergeant.
• The Department should reform its supervisory staffing model to insure that appropriate numbers of experienced and proven sergeants are assigned to the most corruption-prone precincts and that supervision in such commands be maintained at an appropriate ratio of sergeants to officers.
• In precincts where sergeants are required to perform patrol duties or nonsupervisory functions, a second sergeant should be assigned exclusively to supervise officers on patrol.
• The Department should increase the number of field supervisors during midnight tours of duty in corruption-prone precincts.
• The Department should not require sergeants to supervise more than one precinct during the same tour of duty.
• The Department should examine whether certain administrative tasks of patrol sergeants and ICOs can be eliminated or curtailed to allow them to devote more time to field supervision.
• The Department should promulgate a clear policy on the duties and responsibilities of ICOs that focuses on their responsibility for precinct integrity controls. ICOs should be used to reinforce professional values, detect evidence of corruption, and ferret out wrongdoing and inefficiency.
• ICOs should receive specialized integrity control training and the resources necessary to perform an active anti-corruption role in their commands by gathering intelligence, monitoring precinct corruption hazards, monitoring the precinct radio, spot monitoring arrest scenes, communicating with Internal Affairs, and investigating allegations of misconduct.
• ICOs should be required to conduct precinct corruption-prevention audits by reviewing arrest reports, requests for overtime pay, stop and frisk reports, declinations to prosecute, copies of criminal court complaints, and other documents to determine patterns of questionable arrests and identify other indications of corruption. ICOs should advise precinct commanders where levels of supervision need to be increased.
• The Internal Affairs Bureau should establish regular, in-command liaison with ICOs and use their services in intelligence-gathering and investigations.
• The Department's recently established Sergeants' Academy should include a course of instruction that emphasizes practical management skills, establishing command authority, integrity control methods, and leadership qualities necessary to be an effective first-line supervisor. The course of instruction should be based on interactive methods of instruction and field work in the City's busy, high-crime precincts. All new sergeants should be trained in identifying indicators of corruption, brutality, and substance abuse.
• Require periodic in-service training for all supervisory ranks in corruption, brutality, and substance abuse detection and prevention. The training should include realistic, interactive instruction based on profiles of corruption-prone officers and commands.
• The Department should establish regular in-service leadership seminars for all police supervisors, including racial and cultural diversity training.

III. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS

Internal Affairs Operations


Over the past two years, this Commission, the media, and recently, the Department itself have focused a great deal of attention on the litany of failures of the Department's internal anti-corruption apparatus. As the Commission has reported, our investigation revealed a corruption investigation system that often minimized and even concealed corruption rather than rooted it out. Oversight of Internal Affairs was virtually non-existent, intelligence-gathering efforts were negligible, corruption investigations were often deliberately limited and prematurely closed, and the appearance of integrity was more important than the reality. In short, genuine commitment to fighting corruption had virtually disappeared and Internal Affairs had abandoned its mission to remove serious corruption from the Department.

The Department has come to acknowledge the vast problems infecting Internal Affairs identified by the Commission, and the Department has begun to act. Under the leadership of Commissioners Kelly and Bratton, Internal Affairs has gone through many important changes. Internal Affairs operations have now been centralized into one Bureau headed by a civilian Deputy Commissioner, Walter Mack, an experienced and skillful former prosecutor who has done much to energize and expand the Department's internal investigations. The organizational structure of the Internal Affairs Bureau has changed a number of times as the Department seeks the best structure to support Internal Affairs' mission. A large turnover in personnel has occurred with many of the complacent and incompetent executives of Internal Affairs either having retired from the Department or been transferred from the Bureau. Some experienced and respected investigators have joined Internal Affairs and the Bureau has been allocated over two million dollars in advanced investigative equipment and a new computerized case-tracking system.

Most important, the Commission has detected a heightened commitment and assertiveness on the part of Internal Affairs investigators. While uncovering the largest police corruption case in recent history, Commission investigators worked side by side with investigators of the Internal Affairs Bureau. At every turn in the investigation, the Internal Affairs investigators worked tirelessly to uncover the full scope of corruption within that precinct and were unwaveringly committed to acquiring the necessary evidence to root it all out. We recognize that the Department acted in this manner under the light of outside scrutiny by this Commission. But the point is with such oversight it acted with skill and uncompromising zeal.

Fundamental problems, however, do remain. First, while we certainly detected an increased commitment and effectiveness on the part of Internal Affairs commanders and investigators with whom we worked, we cannot be certain that this new attitude has spread throughout the Bureau. We continue to see the need for continued emphasis on swift and efficient decision-making and the placement of operational authority in the hands of the investigators most familiar with case strategy, focus, and goals.

Second, most officers still have little trust or respect for Internal Affairs. Overwhelmingly, officers of all ranks interviewed by the Commission and the Department continue to view Internal Affairs as a group of petty, inexperienced, and incompetent investigators with no knowledge of the demands of real police work. They contemptuously describe Internal Affairs as a "white socks and no hats" operation that focuses on pestering hard-working officers with petty infractions rather than aggressively pursuing allegations of serious corruption and criminality. Officers express great concern that Internal Affairs' failure to investigate allegations fully and its tendency to close cases as "unsubstantiated" or by noting minor misconduct unfairly hurts their chances for choice assignments and promotion.

Even worse, officers remain very skeptical about Internal Affairs' handling of police informants and its ability and willingness to insure confidentiality to officers who report corruption. A great many officers believe that Internal Affairs will disclose the identity of complainants or turn the focus of an investigation toward the very officer who made the allegation. An officer willing to violate the code of silence to report corruption will hardly turn to investigators he believes to be incompetent, unsupportive, and even vindictive.

Internal Affairs must first and foremost re-establish its credibility among members of the Department if it hopes to fight corruption effectively. Only by regaining its credibility will it recruit respected investigators and proven commanders, overcome the code of silence, and help spread a climate of intolerance for corruption throughout the Department.

To do so, the Department must assure Internal Affairs sufficient personnel, resources and support to prove itself a serious and sophisticated investigations unit that focuses exclusively on serious corruption and criminality and gains a reputation for success in removing corrupt and criminal officers from the job and exonerating honest officers from baseless allegations. Internal Affairs must become an investigations unit that launches investigative initiatives based on intelligence and analysis without relying on a reactive, complaint-driven system. By its actions, Internal Affairs must make police officers understand that it will vigorously pursue officers involved in crimes and serious corruption even if their colleagues and associates remain silent. Successful self-initiated investigations will quickly convince officers that their reliance on silence as a shield for wrongdoing is gravely misplaced. In short, it is imperative that Internal Affairs earn the respect and support of the entire Department.

In light of our analysis of Internal Affairs' past failures and its urgent need to regain the confidence of the police and the public alike, the Commission offers the following recommendations for reform. We believe implementation of these reforms will go a long way in protecting the Department's system of internal investigations against future decay.

Recruitment of Qualified Investigators

• Internal Affairs must improve the quality and reputation of its investigators. The Department should offer incentives and rewards to attract the best investigators available. Until such time as Internal Affairs attracts highly qualified volunteers, the Department should continue its recent policy of allowing Internal Affairs first choice of supervisors seeking assignment to an investigative unit. Internal Affairs should continue its policy of rotating its staff to avoid stagnation and increase the number of supervisors with corruption investigation experience throughout the Department. Service in Internal Affairs should be viewed as a positive factor in the career path of a police officer.
• The Police Commissioner should make every effort to recruit as commanders of Internal Affairs officers who have a Department-wide reputation for varied experience, management and investigative skill and outstanding leadership ability.
• The Department should recognize the outstanding performance of Internal Affairs investigators with citations, commendations, and promotions as it does for officers assigned to other commands.

Intelligence-Gathering Operations

• Internal Affairs must immediately strengthen its intelligence-gathering analysis operations. All witnesses, complainants, and informants must be assured absolute confidentiality or anonymity. This is particularly crucial for police officer complainants or informants. Any Internal Affairs officer who breaches confidentiality must be sanctioned severely.
• Debriefing informants and cooperating defendants on police corruption should become a regular practice among all investigative units within the Department, such as the Detective Bureau and the Organized Crime Control Bureau. Such investigators must actively pursue information on police corruption. All such information should be promptly reported to Internal Affairs.
• Internal Affairs must recruit and operate a cadre of undercover officers in the most corruption-prone precincts and commands. Their role should be to gather information on corruption within their commands and provide the basis for integrity tests, electronic surveillance, and other pro-active investigative measures. Members of the Internal Affairs undercover squad must be prepared to testify and swear to court affidavits or warrant applications if necessary.
• The Internal Affairs Action Desk personnel must be trained and regularly evaluated on being courteous and encouraging to complainants. The Language Line translation service must be made available to the Action Desk, as it has been to other commands within the Department.
• The Voluntary Assistance Program, better known as the Field Associate Program, must be reinvigorated, expanded, and placed under the direct control of the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs. All reports from Field Associates should be recorded and regularly reviewed for appropriate action by Internal Affairs.
• All information from complainants, informants, undercovers, field associates, and other sources should be made available to the Internal Affairs Corruption Prevention and Analysis Unit. That unit should use this information to insure effective case tracking, and produce complaint correlations, corruption trend and subject analysis, and corruption profiles that will be used as a basis to commence pro-active investigations of corrupt officers.

Investigative Approach

• Internal Affairs must focus exclusively on cases of serious corruption and crime. Internal Affairs must pursue police officers suspected of crimes and serious corruption with the same intensity as any other criminal activity outside the Department.
• Internal Affairs must adopt a chiefly pro-active investigative approach. While continuing to respond to complaints of corruption, the bulk of Internal Affairs investigations should be self-initiated and targeted where intelligence analysis suggests serious corruption exists.
• Complaints received by Internal Affairs should not be investigated in isolation. The focus of Internal Affairs investigations should expand beyond isolated allegations against an individual officer to focus on groups of potentially miscreant officers and patterns of corrupt activity.
• In pursuing corruption investigations, Internal Affairs must employ the full panoply of investigative techniques used in every other investigative division within the Department. Internal Affairs must use, as appropriate, undercover officers, criminal informants, and court-ordered electronic surveillance.
• Internal Affairs must never be reluctant to turn one corrupt officer against another. Because of aspects of police culture that conceal corruption, Internal Affairs should design their investigations to achieve the cooperation of corrupt officers against others, both to acquire evidence and to help undermine the code of silence on which corruption relies.
• Internal Affairs must increase the number, regularity and quality of targeted and random integrity tests. These tests must be carefully administered under the guidance of a prosecutor, well devised and tailored to the type of corruption under investigation, and aimed at officers or commands exhibiting a reasonable basis for suspecting corruption.
• Integrity tests should focus only on acquiring evidence of serious corruption and criminality. Tests that result only in minor infractions should be referred to local commanders.
• Internal Affairs must seek the assistance and legal counsel of the appropriate prosecutor at the earliest stages of a corruption investigation. The Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs should insure notification of prosecutors when internal investigators conduct field operations in their jurisdictions.
• Patrol Guide Procedure No. 118-9 should be amended to allow internal investigators to interrogate police officers under oath and with penalties for perjury.
• Investigations of serious corruption should not be closed until all evidence of corruption is uncovered or determined to be baseless. Cases with no investigative merit should be disposed of swiftly to avoid unnecessary backlog. All closings of cases of serious corruption should be reviewed by the Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs and his staff. Any Internal Affairs officer who prematurely closes a case or approves such a closing, or has failed to employ sufficient investigative measures and resources, should be held to account. The basis for case closings should be regularly reviewed by the external independent monitor should one be created.
• Every allegation of corruption that is reported should immediately be recorded and receive a log number.
• District Attorneys should get copies of all corruption case logs on a daily basis.

Organizational Structure

• Internal Affairs' organizational structure should adopt the module team structure used by the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The structure must allow for more efficient decision-making authority and a more streamlined chain of command. Investigators actually conducting the case must be allowed operational authority. Investigative teams should be assigned to investigate geographic areas and special commands so that investigators acquire expertise in local corruption conditions and develop productive, trusting relationships with prosecutors. The final decision-making authority should reside with the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Affairs.

Command Liaisons

• To rehabilitate its reputation within other commands of the Department and educate the Department about its reformed philosophy and goals, Internal Affairs commanders with particularly strong reputations and experience in other commands should address police commanders, integrity control officers, and roll calls about corruption, civil rights violations, and the objectives of Internal Affairs.

Civil Rights Investigations

• Internal Affairs should immediately establish a Civil Rights Investigations Unit dedicated to the investigation of brutality, perjury, false arrests, and other types of civil rights violations. This unit should conduct its own self-initiated investigations as well as assist the Civilian Complaint Review Board in investigating force allegations lodged with that agency.
• Internal Affairs must examine correlations between corruption complaints and complaints of excessive force lodged with Internal Affairs and the Civilian Complaint Review Board.
• Command accountability must extend to acts of excessive force and civil rights violations. Corruption Assessment Reviews must include civil rights violation as a corruption hazard category.
• Recruit and In-Service integrity training must address excessive force and civil rights violations. Instruction must include alternatives to the use of force in policing and not merely instruction when force is justified as characterizes current training.

IV. SANCTIONS AND DETERRENCE

Effective sanctions and deterrence are also crucial components of corruption control. In the past, deterrence has been lacking from the Department's integrity controls, both because of the Department's own negligence as well as the obstacles imposed by existing laws. Many of the reforms we recommend throughout this chapter will heighten deterrence by increasing the risk of detection of corrupt activities. But there are a number of legislative and other reforms that can help strengthen the Department's detection and sanctioning efforts. Before leaving office, former Police Commissioner Kelly recommended a number of proposals designed to make discipline more effective. The Commission strongly endorses these proposals as sensible measures to insure that legal technicalities do not allow corrupt officers to "beat the system." These proposals, along with the Commission's recommendations in this area, are as follows:

Discipline

• Amend New York City Administrative Code, Section 13-246 to provide for a minimum period of ninety days notice to the Department before an officer is permitted to retire with full pension. The current minimum period of thirty days fails to allow the Department sufficient time to complete disciplinary proceedings before an officer retires and escapes the consequences of misconduct.
• Amend Public Officers Law Section 30(e) to allow for the revocation of lifetime pension benefits for officers convicted of a felony or federal law equivalent committed while in the performance of their duties. Corrupt officers should not be allowed to retain such benefits after such convictions.
• Amend Criminal Procedure Law Sections 160.50 and 160.55 to allow the Department statutory access to the sealed records of police officers who have been the subject of criminal proceedings. Such access is currently allowed with respect to police applicants and should not be denied in the case of sworn police officers who have been accused of crimes. In addition, Section 296 of the Executive Law should be amended to exempt such access and use as a discriminatory practice under the Human Rights Law.
• Amend Civil Service Law Section 75, Subdivision 4 to restore the statute of limitations for Department disciplinary proceedings to three years from the current eighteen months. The current statute of limitations defeats the goals of long-term corruption investigations.
• Amend Civil Service Law to allow for the demotion in rank and salary of sergeants, lieutenants and captains who have engaged in corruption or failed to carry out their supervisory duties. Current law precludes such demotions.
• Amend New York City Administrative Code Section 14-115 to provide the Police Commissioner with additional penalty options after an officer is found guilty in a Department disciplinary proceeding. Current law forces the Police Commissioner to choose between two narrow options: forfeiture of thirty days pay or dismissal from the Department. This problem can be corrected by permitting the Police Commissioner to impose the following penalties:
o 1. Suspension without pay for a period up to one year (the current maximum is thirty days)
o 2. A monetary fine of up to $25,000 (no monetary fine provision currently exists in the Administrative Code)
o 3. Demotion in grade or title, with a commensurate reduction in salary ( currently no demotion provision exists in the Administrative Code)
• On-Line Booking Sheets should be revised to require arresting officers to attest to the circumstances of the arrest under the penalties of Penal Law Section 210.45 relating to false written statements.
• The Deputy Commissioner for Internal Affairs should have an opportunity to submit recommendations to the Department Advocate's Office on the appropriate disposition of charges and sanctions for officers involved in Departmental disciplinary proceedings.

Disability Pension Abuse

The Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund has the authority to approve lifetime pension benefits to any police officer who is found to be physically or mentally unable to perform police duty. A police officer retired in this manner is entitled to a tax-free annual pension. If the officer is found to have sustained a total permanent disability in the line of duty, the amount of the annual tax-free pension benefit is no less than three-quarters of the officer's annual salary at the date of retirement. [19]

The Commission inquired, and learned from police officers, doctors, and other sources about the potential for abuse in the area of disability pensions. They painted a picture of a police pension system flawed by vaguely defined standards and overtones of favoritism. A police officer who is legitimately injured in the line of duty and suffers a disability should receive the full extent of the pension benefits available. However, evidence reveals that the law governing police pensions and related procedures does not reward only those who deserve it.

Officers told us that they were aware of officers who deliberately injured themselves to apply for disability pensions. Commission investigators were also told of occasions in which officers who received off-duty injuries falsely claimed that they were received while on duty. The Commission also detected a widespread perception among rank and file police officers that the Police Pension Board fails to aggressively investigate disability pension applications of high-ranking officers. They view the pension system as providing superior officers with a tax-free "brass parachute" when they retire from the Department.

Although the public is understandably disturbed when they see seemingly able-bodied officers receive tax-free lifetime pensions, it does not necessarily constitute corruption. As the pension laws are currently written the standard for determining whether an officer is disabled is vague. Recently the Department's Deputy Chief Surgeon, Dr. Gregory Fried, has undertaken a review of officers deemed disabled from 1991 to the present. In an interview with a Commission staff member, Dr. Fried stated that he found significant flaws in the current system of awarding disability pensions. Because there are no well defined medical criteria, he described the entire system as a "crapshoot." Because the standards are so vague, he believes they fail both to support legitimate claims and to winnow out fraudulent ones. As Dr. Fried put it, "Liars have a better chance of getting a disability pension. It creates police welfare for the phoney."

According to Dr. Fried, there is currently no coordination of effort among Internal Affairs, the Department Surgeon's Office, and the Department Advocate's Office to detect police officers who submit fraudulent disability pension claims. While it was beyond the mandate of this Commission to conduct an investigation of the police pension system, we note this as an area of concern for future inquiry.

V. COMMUNITY OUTREACH

Community Policing and Community Outreach


As the Department expands the implementation of community policing, many law enforcement officials, including police officers, have expressed their concern that officers' close relationship with citizens required for successful community policing will also expand the opportunities and incidence of police corruption. We believe that community policing may increase opportunities for corruption. Nonetheless, the value of the program to effective law enforcement and its commensurate benefits to the community far outweigh the risks involved. Community policing will, however, require that Internal Affairs be ever vigilant of the risks community policing presents.

Officers determined to engage in corruption will seek and find opportunities to do so whether or not they are community policing officers. Recent investigations conducted by the Commission and other agencies turned up corrupt officers assigned to a variety of commands, such as patrol, anti-crime, and the Organized Crime Control Bureau. The predominant forms of corruption we found, furthermore, offer opportunities to all officers working in drug-infested, cash-laden precincts regardless of their assignments. The police attitudes and pressures that foster and conceal corruption apply equally to all officers regardless of their particular assignment. In light of these circumstances, police corruption controls must be applied equally to whatever commands or individuals are susceptible to corruption.

Nonetheless, there are specific corruption control measures the Department should adopt in light of the characteristics of community policing. In particular, these measures should focus on educating the community about corruption hazards that officers face and their role in identifying and reporting suspected wrongdoing among the police officers on their beat. Having an educated and watchful community is particularly important for reducing the corruption risks of community policing. Because community policing must allow officers to have flexible tours of duty and sufficient discretion to determine the time and manner of their patrol, it presents special problems for close supervision. Consequently, the Department must achieve partnership with citizens to oversee the conduct of community policing officers.

To accomplish this, the Department must teach the public about what constitutes police corruption, how to report corruption they may observe or suspect, and support them when they make a valid complaint. More than anything else -- through its precinct commanders, precinct councils, and community affairs programs -- the Department must overcome the public's cynicism about the Department's commitment to integrity and its willingness to take their complainants seriously. If community policing is to succeed, mutual respect and cooperation between the police and the community must be achieved.

On the other hand, the Department must also educate citizens that police corruption does not exist in a vacuum and that those who solicit corrupt acts from police officers or assist them in engaging in corruption will be arrested and prosecuted. The 30th Precinct investigation demonstrated that citizens, whether they be drug dealers, shop owners, building superintendents, or local residents, participate in and assist officers in corruption schemes. Through arrests, prosecutions, and community outreach, the Department must put such people on notice that corruption investigations will focus on their activities as well as on the corrupt officers with whom they associate. As in the 30th Precinct case, the Department must show the public that it will arrest and prosecute citizens who are accomplices to police corruption.

In light of these observations, the Commission recommends the following measures:

• Expand and promote the Citizen's Police Academy program and other community outreach efforts, to educate citizens about corruption hazards and the role of the community in minimizing corruption.
• Community policing supervisors should provide information to local residents and businesses about corruption hazards and how to report corruption to the Department.
• Community policing supervisors should regularly interview local residents and business persons about the performance of the officers in their units.
• Commanding officers and Internal Affairs representatives should address precinct community councils on police corruption, the community's role in reducing corruption risks, and the means of reporting corruption to the Department.
• Internal Affairs should conduct pro-active investigations, including integrity tests, against individuals who create corruption opportunities or assist officers in engaging in corruption.
• Precinct numerals and other identifying marks on radio motor patrol cars should be made larger and more easily recognizable to citizens and police supervisors.
• Internal Affairs investigations and intelligence-gathering should focus on individuals who act as accomplices to officers in corruption schemes.

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The Commission believes that the implementation of these procedural and policy reforms will considerably strengthen the Department's integrity controls and help insure the public's confidence in the Department's ability to police itself.

No integrity controls, however, will last forever without the demand of the public and the commitment of the Department to insure that they remain effective. We cannot, as we have done too often in the past, place absolute faith in any set of reforms to insure integrity and defeat complacency for the next generation and beyond. Too often, our faith turned out to be blind. Without integrity controls rooted in the Department's own pride and commitment, no set of reforms -- no matter how creative and well devised -- can work. History has taught us that the Department cannot sustain reform efforts without incentive and support from the outside. Thus, an external entity independent of the Department must provide continual monitoring and pressure to insure that the Department makes successful integrity controls a high priority now and in the future. The Department and the public deserve no less.

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Notes:

16. The total number of officers in the study was four hundred thirteen. Fewer officers are sometimes referred to for particular aspects of the study. This is because for certain areas we examined, information on all the officers was not available.

17. The probationary period consists of six months of Police Academy training and twelve months in a field training unit.

18. This procedure requires the Department to confer immunity from criminal prosecution before interrogating officers.

19. New York City Charter and Administrative Code Section 13-206.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 3:32 am

CHAPTER SIX: HELPING THE POLICE TO POLICE THEMSELVES: THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT, EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT

"A considerable momentum for reform has been generated .... After previous investigations, the momentum was allowed to evaporate. The question now is: Will history repeat itself? Or does society finally realize that police corruption is a problem that must be dealt with and not just talked about every twenty years?"

-- Knapp Commission Report, December 26, 1972


Since the creation of this Commission, the Department has made important progress toward correcting its fundamental problems of corruption and corruption control. An anticorruption apparatus that had been allowed to collapse is being resurrected for the first time in a generation. On the investigative front, the Department has aggressively assisted this Commission recently in a number of cases we brought to its attention. In the 30th Precinct case, for example, Internal Affairs investigators worked side-by-side with Commission investigators, and federal and local prosecutors, to ferret out extensive corruption in the 30th Precinct. Commitment to uncovering the full extent of corruption there was unflinching. The Department now seems to recognize that the appearance of integrity is no longer more important than its reality.

The question now is -- as twenty years ago -- will this momentum for reform continue after this Commission has disbanded and public attention turns away from issues of police reform? History strongly suggests that there is little chance for an affirmative answer to that question unless the momentum for reform becomes institutionalized within and without the Department. The erosion of the Department's corruption controls is an inevitable consequence of its recurring reluctance to uncover corruption -- unless some countervailing pressure compels the Department to do what it naturally strays from doing. As happened in the wake of the Knapp Commission, the mere establishment of this Commission created such a pressure and commitment that improvement resulted. But the findings of this Commission also show that the vigilance of the last generation failed to survive the Department's natural desire to protect itself from scandal. Our challenge is to preserve the Department's new-found vigilance and commitment from the inimical forces of history.

For the past century, police corruption scandals in New York City have run in a regular twenty-year cycle of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal. In 1894, a New York State Senate Committee, known as the Lexow Committee, found systematic extortion and bribery among New York City police. Almost twenty years later, the Curran Committee, appointed by the New York City Board of Aldermen, found systemic police extortion of gambling and prostitution houses. Twenty years later, in 1932, Samuel Seabury, counsel to a State legislative committee, conducted an investigation that found widespread police extortion of gamblers and bootleggers. Two decades later, on September 15, 1950, the Kings County District Attorney's Office arrested Harry Gross, the leader of a large-scale gambling racket, who cooperated with the District Attorney and inculpated seventy-eight police officers for participating in an intricate and lucrative bribery scheme that included high-ranking members of the Department. In 1972, the Knapp Commission issued its Final Report that declared police corruption to be a standardized and Department-wide phenomenon.

How to break this cycle has been the focus of much of the Commission's deliberations. The Commission carefully considered a number of proposals aimed at institutionalizing a lasting commitment to integrity. Underlying our consideration of these proposals was our firm belief that the Department must remain chiefly responsible for policing itself if lasting reform is ever to be achieved. The fundamental principle that guided our deliberations is that the Department must deliver itself from the scourge of corruption. To allow otherwise will only renew complacency, diminish institutional accountability, and scuttle commitment to integrity.

We believe it is impossible for the Department to bear that responsibility without the help of independent external oversight. As history has taught us, the Department will always be vulnerable to the powerful internal pressure to avoid uncovering corruption. Only independent oversight will compel the Department to accomplish what it naturally wants to avoid: uncovering corruption among its own ranks. Only the existence of an independent, external, effective corruption control monitor outside the Department's chain of command will serve as a continuing pressure upon the Department to purge itself of corruption. At the same time such an independent monitor will serve to assure the public that corruption disclosures signal a vigilant Department rather than a wholesale failure of its integrity. Only such a permanent institutional structure, we believe, will break the historical cycle of scandal, reform, and backslide.

In determining the appropriate model for independent oversight, the Commission considered and rejected several models.

I. DEFICIENCIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE STATE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR MODEL

One such model was the Office of the State Special Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor's Office was established at the recommendation of the Knapp Commission in September 1972. Contrary to the perception of many who have advocated reestablishing that office, the Special Prosecutor's functions were, in practice, limited primarily to prosecutions. It had no responsibility -- or authority -- to oversee or assess the effectiveness of the Department's corruption controls, and the conditions that allow corruption to flourish.

The Knapp Commission premised its recommendation of a Special Prosecutor on its fundamental belief that a principal concern in the fight against police corruption was the prosecutors. They found that because the District Attorneys depended largely on police officers to conduct investigations and prosecutions, they suffered from an inherent conflict of interest in bringing prosecutions against corrupt officers. That Commission also found that the close alliance between the Department and the District Attorneys caused great distrust among the public and honest police officers about the willingness of the District Attorneys to entertain and investigate allegations of police corruption.

This Commission does not believe that local or federal prosecutors are reluctant to investigate and prosecute corrupt police officers today. Nor have we found that the public typically questions prosecutors' ability to aggressively pursue such cases. On the contrary, we found that both federal and local prosecutors were eager for us to refer evidence of police corruption to their offices for prosecution and that they are moving forward based on our evidence.

Indeed, since the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor's Office in October 1990, the District Attorneys have committed resources and personnel to special corruption units dedicated exclusively to investigating and prosecuting official corruption. Some of the District Attorneys have even housed these units in locations away from their main office to encourage complainants and assure confidentiality. The District Attorneys have financed these measures from their own budgets despite not having received the additional funding that was to be redistributed to them from the budget of the Special Prosecutor's Office.

Some have suggested that the prosecutors' interest in police corruption cases began only after the creation of this Commission -- and only after police corruption cases became the center of public and media attention. While it is true that the number of police corruption prosecutions in our City increased after the establishment of this Commission, it does not appear that prosecutors ever refused to pursue corrupt police officers. We do not believe it necessary or desirable to supplant the authority of local prosecutors with yet another prosecutorial agency. We do believe it essential to devise a mechanism to sustain and heighten prosecutors' interest in police corruption after this Commission completes its work. The independent oversight model we recommend will help accomplish just that.

We would further note the fundamental problem with reinstituting the Special Prosecutor's Office is that it will not remedy the principal corruption control deficiencies we have identified. It is a tough-sounding idea that will not cure the problem. A Special Prosecutor's Office will -- by dint of its mandate -- do just as its name signifies, and no more: prosecute. While no one disputes that successful prosecutions of corrupt officers is a vital component of corruption control, it is not the exclusive one. As we have shown throughout this Report, effective corruption control must penetrate all operations of the Department and cannot depend solely on prosecutions. Quality prosecutions will do little to improve commitment, recruitment, screening, training, supervision, accountability and all the many other necessary ingredients of successful corruption control.

To achieve that goal, there must be continuous, external scrutiny of the patterns and causes of corruption, and the policies and procedures the Department employs to combat them. There must be regular inquiries and audits of such areas as recruitment, screening, training, supervision, police culture, and command accountability as well as methods of prevention and deterrence. The Department does not merely need more surgery to root out the cancer of corruption, it needs large doses of preventive medicine to insure that its commitment to integrity does not again atrophy. A prosecutor's office, by nature, simply cannot provide that kind of therapy. Since its mandate -- as well as its public reputation and budget -- will inevitably focus on its prosecution record, it will be dedicated to prosecuting rather than providing what the Department really needs. A Special Prosecutor will not insure that the Department conducts regular and aggressive integrity tests; that supervisors effectively oversee their subordinates; that commanders are held accountable for their willful blindness; or that conditions of police culture that nurture and conceal corruption disappear. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the best remedy to deal effectively with the problem of police corruption would not be the recreation of a Special Prosecutor's office.

II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL MODEL

Another model that the Commission considered was the establishment of an Inspector General's Office to replace Internal Affairs in the investigation of corruption within the Department. Some urge that the Department has consistently demonstrated its inability and unwillingness to police itself successfully -- and should therefore no longer have the responsibility or authority to do so. The creation of an inspector general, many asserted, was the only way to root out corruption that the Department naturally prefers to minimize or conceal. All levels of government, they point out, have recognized the value of an independent inspector general. Virtually all federal, state, and local agencies are investigated by an inspector general's office that is independent from the agency it oversees. In New York City, in particular, the Department of Investigation employs a cadre of independent inspectors general responsible for investigating corruption in every City agency -- except the Police Department. It is urged that the Department no longer remain the exception to the rule of independent investigative oversight.

While we are convinced of the necessity of independent oversight, we rejected the Inspector General proposal because it wholly strips the Department of its capacity -- and, most important, its responsibility -- to investigate itself. We believe that the Police Department is the entity best able to prevent and investigate corruption among its members. It is the Department that best understands the corruption hazards facing cops, the culture that protects it, and the methods that can most effectively uncover it. The challenge is to devise a structure that compels the Department to do just that. The Inspector General model does just the opposite: it lets the Department off the hook in the battle against corruption, and eliminates its accountability for battling it successfully. Corruption would no longer be the Department's problem, but the Inspector General's problem. The fight against corruption can only be won if the Department itself is committed to aggressively investigate and uproot corruption on all fronts. We believe the dual-track model that we propose will insure that the Department does just that.

III. THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT MODEL

Combining these two necessary principles of lasting reform -- independent oversight and command accountability -- was the challenge we faced in formulating a means to make vigilance and zeal enduring features of the Department's internal integrity controls. An effective program of reform must both heighten the Department's ability and will to combat corruption internally, and must create an external independent mechanism to insure that such ability and will do not meet a quick demise.

The Commission therefore urges a dual-track strategy for improving police corruption controls. The first track, addressed in Chapter Five, focuses on strengthening the Department's entire anti-corruption apparatus with equal emphasis on improving the quality of recruits, enhancing police training, strengthening supervision, upgrading methods of prevention, strengthening internal investigations, enforcing command accountability, and attacking the root causes and conditions that spawn corrupt acts.

The second track urges the creation of a permanent external Police Commission, independent of the Department to: (i) perform continuous assessments and audits of the Department's systems for preventing, detecting, and investigating corruption; (ii) assist the Department in implementing programs and policies to eliminate the values and attitudes that nurture corruption; (iii) insure a successful system of command accountability; and (iv) conduct, when necessary, its own corruption investigations to examine the state of police corruption. This Police Commission would make recommendations for improving the Department's integrity and will deliver periodic reports of its findings and recommendations to the Mayor and the Police Commissioner for appropriate action. In essence, the Police Commission would serve as a management tool for the Mayor and Police Commissioner, and a watchdog for the public. It would identify problems of police corruption and corruption control that need immediate attention and insure that the Department will not again fall victim to the pressures that work to corrupt its anti-corruption systems.

The Police Commission must have its own investigative capacity to carry out its mission of gauging the state of corruption, assessing corruption controls, and identifying corruption hazards. It must be empowered to conduct its own intelligence gathering operations, self-initiated investigations, and integrity tests. But, unlike a traditional inspector general, this capacity is not meant to replace the Department's or other law enforcement corruption efforts. On the contrary, it is designed to insure that the Department continues to police itself effectively by aggressively pursuing corruption where it likely exists and that it becomes -- for the first time -- accountable for doing so to an authority outside its own chain of command. At the same time, such an arrangement leaves the responsibility for corruption control clearly with the Department, without the risk of blurred responsibility or institutional buck-passing that might result from the creation of a special prosecutor or inspector general.

The power to undertake investigations is crucial to the Police Commission's task of insuring the high performance of integrity controls and the swift identification of corruption trends. During the course of this Commission's work, for example, we observed a number of police commands with substantial corruption hazards that Internal Affairs had made little or no effort to investigate. Having an investigative staff allowed us to probe some of those commands and thereby compel Internal Affairs to undertake a full-blown investigation or risk having the Commission bring a case to fruition without its participation. We found that this strategy quickly motivated the Department's anti-corruption machinery. Without such a capacity, we believe it unlikely that the Department would have responded to the Commission's evidence -- or attempted to generate its own -- as quickly or aggressively as it did. The new Police Commission, moreover, will insure that evidence of corruption is promptly referred to the appropriate prosecutor with whom it would cooperate and monitor the progress of the prosecution. In that way, it will help produce swift and certain prosecution of corruption without the need for a special prosecutor.

The Police Commission's investigative capacity, furthermore, is necessary to provide the Mayor and the Police Commissioner with the ability to call upon an independent agency to assist in conducting special projects or investigations. For example, if a high-ranking member of the Department or an Internal Affairs official is implicated in wrongdoing, the Mayor or Police Commissioner could call for the participation of Police Commission investigators to insure the integrity of the investigation. The Police Commission should also assist the Department to conduct command accountability inquiries in the wake of corruption disclosures, such as in the 30th Precinct, and insure that favoritism and Department politics play no role in determining the management or supervisory failures of police commanders. By having an investigative arm, therefore, the Police Commission can provide the Mayor and Police Commissioner with an independent look at a variety of corruption issues without having to depend exclusively on information from within the Department's own chain of command.

At the same time, we are mindful of the fiscal restraints under which the City must operate. We do not recommend the creation of a large and costly bureaucracy. We recommend that the new Police Commission be headed by five reputable and knowledgeable citizens appointed by the Mayor who will serve pro bono. We further recommend that the Commissioners have a limited, staggered term of office to guarantee turnover, avoid staleness, and prevent the development of a long-term bureaucratic relationship with the Department that could compromise the Police Commission's independence.

To accomplish its tasks, the Police Commission should have unrestricted access to the Department's records and personnel. It should have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents; the power to administer oaths and take testimony in private and public hearings; and the power to grant use immunity.

With the aforementioned powers, the Police Commission could perform its work, as did this Commission, with a small staff of approximately ten to fifteen people with varied expertise, including attorneys, investigators, police management experts, and organizational and statistical analysts. To the extent additional personnel is required, the Police Commission should be free to draw upon the resources of other agencies on an as needed basis, as this Commission has done.

The Police Commission must cooperate with and assist the Police Commissioner to implement and evaluate integrity programs and policies, neutralize the corruptive effects of police culture, maintain strong accountability among commanders, and enhance productive relationships with the community.

As we set forth in our Interim Report, the Police Commission should assume a variety of functions in overseeing the policies and procedures for preventing and detecting police corruption. The Police Commission's oversight and reporting duties will focus primarily on the following three areas:

Monitoring Performance or Anti-Corruption Systems

The Police Commission should:

• undertake studies and analyses to assess the quality of the Department's corruption controls;
• insure that the Department has effective methods for receiving and recording corruption allegations and assuring the confidentiality of complainants and witnesses;
• insure that the Department performs regular and effective corruption trend analyses that are used to identify areas for self-initiated investigations;
• assess the quality of investigative resources and personnel, and insure that the Department employs effective methods and management in conducting corruption investigations;
• insure that the Department consistently uses pro-active investigatory techniques and no longer relies on a reactive investigative system that narrowly focuses corruption investigations on isolated complaints and individual officers;
• insure that the Department has successful intelligence-gathering systems in place, such as effective undercover, field associate, and integrity testing programs;
• evaluate Department policy concerning command accountability and supervision, including levels and quality of first-line supervision, training of supervisors and integrity history in determining assignments and promotions;
• insure the Department involves field commanders, supervisors, and integrity control officers in corruption investigations and enlists their assistance;
• insure that the Department successfully enforces a system of command accountability;
• insure that Internal Affairs maintains a productive liaison with field commanders about corruption hazards and corruption prevention within their commands;
• require the Department to produce reports on police corruption and corruption trends including, analysis of the number of complaints investigated and the disposition of those complaints, the number of arrests and referrals for prosecution, and the number of Department disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions imposed; and
• conduct performance tests and inspections of the Department's anti-corruption units and programs to guarantee that the Department continually enhances its capacity to police itself.

Monitoring Cultural Conditions

The Police Commission should:

• undertake studies and analyses of the impact of police culture on matters of integrity;
• insure that the Department acknowledges and makes efforts to reform the conditions and attitudes that nurture and perpetuate corruption;
• assess the effectiveness of recruit education, integrity training, field training operations, in-service training programs, and the integrity standards set by supervisors;
• insure that the Department works to eliminate corruption tolerance and the code of silence;
• evaluate the Department's efforts to overcome police attitudes that isolate them from the public and often create the appearance of a hostile and corrupt police force;
• evaluate Department efforts to pursue and uncover brutality and other civil rights violations and their connection to corruption;
• investigate whether the Department routinely assigns officers with discipline problems to only certain commands within the Department, such as high-crime, minority precincts;
• evaluate the effectiveness of the Department's drug and alcohol abuse policies, prevention treatment, and detection efforts; and
• maintain liaison with community groups and precinct community councils to provide the Department with input from the public about their perception of police corruption and to obtain information for the Commission's recommendations for reform.

Monitoring Corruption Trends

The Police Commission should:

• identify through intelligence sources and integrity tests patterns of corruption and corruption-prone officers and commands;
• evaluate and report to the Department the extent of complicity in detected police corruption among fellow officers and supervisors, either by their participation in corrupt acts or by their silence; and
• conduct any investigation or inquiry into corruption or corruption-related issues as requested by the Mayor or Police Commissioner.

Conclusion

The consequences of police corruption are devastating for our police officers, our government, and our society. When charges of corruption are levelled at the police, we as a society are justifiably alarmed and become cynical about the rule of law. And rightly so. With crime uppermost on the minds of citizens today, we look to our police more than ever as our primary protectors. When the integrity and commitment of the police are called into question, the community is doubly harmed. When police credibility is tarnished, officers' ability to enforce the law is hampered on the streets and in the courtrooms. Cooperation and mutual respect between the public and the police are vital to effective law enforcement. When that erodes, so too does the Department's ability to fight crime. A foundation of our criminal justice system thus begins to crumble.

The community is further harmed because we lose the peace of mind we depend on law enforcement to provide, especially when crime and violence are rampant. When we learn that police officers are more interested in profiting from the community than protecting it, our confidence in the Department's ability to protect us understandably wanes.

And so it is incumbent on the public to continue to demand that the Department and our elected officials do everything necessary to insure the integrity of our police. The creation of a permanent independent police monitor will fulfill that responsibility.

But it is still the Department's vast majority of honest and dedicated officers who have the greatest incentive -- and ability -- to insure the Department's lasting integrity. It is they who know where corruption might exist; it is they who suffer the most immediate consequences of their colleagues' corruption; and it is they who can best help uproot it. For these reasons, the honest officer, most of all, must work to stop corruption or be prepared to feel the quiet pain expressed by lieutenant Robert McKenna during the Commission's public hearings:

But you know what really hurts? It's when he [the honest officer] goes to pick up his kids from school. Because parents talk, kids listen; they're at school, they talk among themselves. A little kid comes in, he sits in the back seat. He's got bright eyes and he looks at his Daddy. He says, 'Daddy, do you steal money?' The cop's stomach tightens. Some cops cry silently. Others just wish it was a bad dream, and it'll go away.


It is the Commission's hope, and belief, that this Report's findings and recommendations will put an end to that bad dream for the people of our City, for our police officers, and for our children -- both today and in generations to come.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:01 am

APPENDIX

Exhibit One


Executive Order No. 42 issued by The Honorable David N. Dinkins. Mayor of the City of New York, on July 24, 1992, Appointing the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department

Exhibit Two

Opening Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen, Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993

Exhibit Three

Mid-Hearings Statement by The Honorable Milton Mollen. Commission Public Hearings, October 4, 1993

Exhibit Four

Exhibits presented at the Commission Public Hearings, September 27, 1993 through October 7, 1993

Exhibit Five

Letter dated December 27, 1993 to Mayor David N. Dinkins from The Honorable Milton Mollen

Exhibit Six

Commission's Interim Report and Principal Recommendations, dated December 27, 1993

Exhibit Seven

New York City Police Department, Map of Patrol Precincts

Exhibit Eight

The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd: The Dowd Case Revisited

• The Failure to Apprehend Michael Dowd
• Sergeant Trimboli and the Brooklyn North FIAU
• Trimboli and the 75th Precinct
• The R&T Grocery Store Robbery
• Corruption in the 75th Precinct
• The Trimboli Investigation
• The Pro-Active Plan
• The 79th Precinct Investigation
• The Yurkiw Investigation
• Final Developments
• Comments

EXHIBIT ONE

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE MAYOR NEW YORK, N. Y. 10007

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 42

July 24, 1992

COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI -CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

WHEREAS, an honest and efficient police force is essential to the well-being of the City and the implementation of the Police Department's innovative community policing strategies; and

WHEREAS, during the next two years the Safe Streets, Safe City Program will add more than two thousand officers to the Police Department of the City of New York, most of whom will be assigned to patrol the streets of the City; and

WHEREAS, allegations of corruption have been made against some members of the Police Department, and the effectiveness of the practices, procedures and methods used by the Police Department to prevent and detect misconduct and to maintain integrity have been questioned; and

WHEREAS, an investigation by the Police Department of those allegations would be subject to question by the public; and

WHEREAS, the misdeeds of a few must not be allowed to sully or taint the reputations and sacrifices of the vast majority of honest and dedicated men and women who serve on the police force;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the power vested in me as Mayor of the City of New York, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Establishment of Commission. There is hereby established a Commission to (1) inquire into and evaluate the existing

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practices, procedures and methods for investigating specific allegations of corruption and the existing practices, procedures and methods designed to prevent corruption and maintain integrity; (2) recommend improvements in these practices, procedures and methods and make any additional recommendations that will ensure the integrity of the Police Department and prevent corruption; (3) take evidence and hold whatever hearings, public and private, the Commission may deem appropriate to ascertain the necessary facts.

Section 2. Members. The Commission shall consist of the following persons, who shall serve without compensation, and who are hereby appointed as members thereof: Milton Mollen, Chairperson; Harold Baer, Jr. [1]; Herbert Evans; Roderick C. Lankler; and Harold Tyler.

Section 3. Powers. (a) The Commission, its Chair and such agents as the Chair shall designate, shall have all powers necessary to conduct as complete an investigation as it finds necessary, including but not limited to the powers to administer oaths and affirmations, to examine witnesses in public or private hearings, to receive evidence and to preside at or conduct such hearings and investigations.

(b) The Commission, its Chair and such agents as the Chair shall designate shall be designated by the Commissioner of Investigation as agents of the Department of Investigation, pursuant to Section 805 of the City Charter, with all powers to conduct investigations as provided therein.

(c) The Chair of the Commission shall be appointed a Deputy Commissioner of Investigation, pursuant to Section 802 of the City Charter, with all powers pertaining to that office, including but not limited to those specified in Section 805(a) of the City Charter.

(d) The Commission may also cooperate with any criminal investigation, as may become necessary, pursuant to its powers under this Order.

(e) Within the scope of the general responsibility of the Commission set forth in Section 1 of this Order, the Commission shall have authority to examine and copy any document or other record.
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Notes:

1. Upon his retirement as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

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prepared, maintained or held by the Police Department of the City of New York, and any other agency of the City, except those documents or other records which cannot be so disclosed according to law.

(f) The Commission shall have authority to require any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee or any former member of the uniformed force or any other former officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City to attend an examination or hearing concerning any matter related to the performance of his or her official duties, and to require any person dealing with, or who has dealt with, the Police Department of the City of New York or its officers and employees to attend any examination or hearing concerning such dealings, and to require any person who has or may have knowledge relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission to attend any examination or hearing concerning such matter. If any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City, or any person dealing with the Police Department of the City of New York declines to answer any question which is put to him or her, the Commission shall have the authority to advise the person that neither his nor her answer nor any information or evidence derived therefrom will be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution other than for perjury arising from such testimony. The refusal of any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department of the City of New York or of any other agency of the City of New York to answer questions on the condition described in this paragraph shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty. The refusal of any person dealing with the Police Department of the City of New York to answer questions on the condition described in this paragraph shall, pursuant to the appropriate provision of any contract, constitute cause for cancellation or termination of such contract with the Police Department of the City of New York or the City and its agencies that said person or any firm, partnership or corporation of which he or she is a member, partner, director or officer has entered into. The Police Department of the City of New York and the City and its agencies shall not incur any penalty or damages because of such cancellation or termination.

Section 4. Cooperation with Investigation. (a) Pursuant to my power as Mayor all heads of departments or agencies of the City shall make every reasonable effort to insure the full cooperation of all persons employed or supervised by them with investigations or inquiries conducted by the Commission.

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(b) All departments or agencies of the City shall make available to the Commission such facilities, services, personnel and other assistance as may be necessary for the conduct of its investigations.

(c) All departments or agencies of the City shall provide to the Commission upon request any and all documents, records, reports, files or other information relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of tile Commission, except such documents as cannot be so disclosed according to law. To insure full availability of such documents, records, reports, files or other information to the Commission, all City departments and agencies shall make and retain copies of any documents, records, reports, files or other information provided to state or federal prosecutors, or other investigative bodies, pursuant to subpoena or otherwise.

(d) All officers and employees of the City shall cooperate fully with the Commission. Interference with or obstruction of the Commission's investigations or other functions shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty.

(e) All officers and employees of the City shall have the affirmative obligation to report, directly and without undue delay, to the Commission, any and all information concerning conduct which they know or should reasonably know to involve corrupt or other criminal activity (i) by any member of the uniformed force or any other officer or employee of the Police Department, which concerns his or her office or employment, or (ii) by persons dealing with the Police Department, which concerns their dealing with the Department, and shall proceed in accordance with the Commission's directions. The knowing failure of any officer or employee to so report shall constitute cause for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty.

(f) The obligation to report information regarding corruption or criminal activity to the Commission shall be in addition to the reporting obligations imposed on City officers and employees to report such information to the Department of Investigation, pursuant to Executive Order No. 105, dated December 20, 1986.

Section 5. Construction with Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall he construed to limit the powers and duties of any department or agency under the City Charter or as otherwise provided by law.

***

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page -5-

Section 6. Effective Date. This order shall take effect immediately.

David N. Dinkins
MAYOR
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:09 am

EXHIBIT TWO

THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION

17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10004 (212) 487-7350 FAX 487-7361

MILTON MOLLEN, CHAIR
HAROLD BAER, JR.
HERBERT EVANS
RODERICK C. LANKLER
HAROLD TYLER

JOSEPH P. ARMAO, CHIEF COUNSEL

Opening Statement by Judge Milton Mollen, Chair at Public Hearings

Monday, September 27, 1993

On August 3, 1972, the Knapp Commission published the first installment of its final report. In describing the momentum for Police Department reform that existed at the time, that Commission issued a prescient challenge to future generations:

"The present situation is quite like that existing at the close of previous investigations. A considerable momentum for reform has been generated, but not enough time has elapsed to reverse attitudes that have been solidifying for many years in the minds of both the police and the public. After previous investigations, the momentum was allowed to evaporate.

The question now is: Will history repeat itself? Or does the society finally realize that police corruption is a problem that must be dealt with and not just talked about once every twenty years?"


Unfortunately, almost precisely twenty years later, it has become clear that the Police Department is still grappling with the corruption problem. On the basis of information brought to his attention, Mayor Dinkins found it essential, in the public interest, to appoint this Commission, with a mandate to ascertain the extent of corruption and to determine and recommend the best means to deal with it most effectively.

For over a century, the history of police corruption investigations in New York has run in twenty-year cycles of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal. Despite what some cynics may say, we believe that this cycle is not inevitable, and should not, and cannot be accepted as inevitable. While it is imperative that we learn from history, we must be determined not to repeat its mistakes. Although no commission could hope to totally eliminate corruption among police -- or I should point out, in any other profession or occupation -- much can be done to deal more effectively with the problem.

For the last twelve months, the Commission and its staff have studied thousands of documents and interviewed hundreds of police and civilian witnesses in an effort to analyze the nature and causes of the corruption problem facing the Department in the past, the procedures the Department uses to combat it, and recommendations for lasting improvement in those procedures. The purpose of these hearings is to present our findings to the public. Thereafter, we will present a report with our recommendations to Mayor Dinkins and the public.

It is of critical importance that the public be made aware of the corruption hazards which confront the Police Department, its managers, its officers, and the citizens of New York City.

The Police Department is not a private business. It is a public trust that must always remain accountable to the public it is sworn to serve and protect. For most of us, a police officer is the law and a symbol of justice. In a civilized society, it is imperative that the members of the public have confidence and faith in the integrity of the members of the Police Department. As a society, we have given the police officer special powers, not the least of which is the power to arrest and deprive someone of his liberty. Everyday, we allow our police to judge our conduct as citizens and, consequently, we citizens expect their conduct to adhere to the highest standards. When charges of corruption are levelled at the police, the public has a right to be alarmed and to demand an accounting and a solution. That is what this Commission, through its hearings and final report, intends to provide. We hope that by focusing the public's attention on the nature and causes of corruption and on the Department's performance in addressing the problem, the public will give its support to official action taken to insure a lasting remedy to the problem.

For its part, the public owes an obligation of respect and support for the police. Despite recent revelations of police corruption, this Commission can confidently report that each day throughout the year the vast majority of police officers throughout this city perform one of society's most important, sensitive and dangerous jobs with efficiency and integrity. The public can also be reassured by the fact that Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has focused a great deal of his time and attention on addressing problems of corruption and discipline within the Department. Since the publication of his report on the Michael Dowd investigation, the Commissioner has implemented a number of important reforms that, we expect, will strengthen the Department's corruption controls. He is to be commended for his diligence and commitment to improvement. We believe that the Commission's public hearings and recommendations will provide the Commissioner with further impetus and guidance in continuing his campaign of reform and will encourage the public to support him in putting his reforms into effect.

However, as the Commissioner noted in his Dowd report, this Commission's mandate is to provide a broader analysis of corruption-related problems than the Police Department has provided so far. To that end, the Commission divided its work into three phases: an investigation of the nature and causes of corruption as they exist today, an analysis of the Police Department's systems for detecting, rooting out and preventing corruption, and a formulation of recommendations to remedy the problems that our investigations and analysis have disclosed.
These hearings, accordingly, will be divided into three segments. The first segment will focus on the nature and causes of police corruption and the failure of the Department during past years to aggressively investigate and prevent it. You will hear testimony from a number of former and current police officers, and others who, for the first time, will publicly disclose the full extent of their experiences and knowledge of the kinds and causes of corruption that afflict the Department and the Department's inability to deal with the problem effectively. The witnesses will relate their individual experiences and observations in matters of police corruption and corruption investigations. The Commission has selected these witnesses to appear at this hearing not solely to focus the public's attention on their individual experiences, but because their individual experiences illustrate the broader issues of corruption and corruption control that confront the Department.

The second segment will address the failure of the Department's anti-corruption controls in past years. You will hear testimony from former and current police officers who have served the Department as internal affairs investigators, as supervisors, and as integrity training instructors. These officers have made the courageous decision to come forward to reveal for the first time their insider's view of the failures of the Department's anticorruption controls and their judgment about why such conditions were allowed to exist.
These officers, who, in the public interest, are demonstrating great moral courage, should be highly commended by the Police Commissioner, by the vast majority of police officers who are honest and incorruptible, and by the public at large, for stepping forward and breaching the traditional blue wall of silence.

The third segment will present recommendations for reform and more effective means of combatting corruption. The Commission unequivocally believes that the prime responsibility for insuring the integrity of the police rests unconditionally with the Department and its Commissioner who must retain the ultimate authority in order to be effective. The Department must remain responsible for keeping its own house in order but, at the same time, with that responsibility comes a total obligation to the public to perform its job honestly and efficiently. Thus, institutional reforms necessary to keep the Department's corruption controls ever-vigilant and accountable to the public will be the focus of the third segment. Furthermore, the Commission, on the basis of its investigation and analysis, has concluded that in order to assure the effectiveness and long duration of the reforms in combatting corruption instituted by Commission Kelly, as well as the additional steps he may take as a result of these hearings, thought must be given, by the Mayor and the public, as to the necessity for some form of outside independent oversight of the effectiveness of the Department's efforts in deterring and combatting corruption within the Department. Such outside entity may take one of several forms. Toward that end, we have examined the necessity for a dual track approach, namely, improved effectiveness of internal policing within the Department on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an independent outside entity. We will hear testimony from a variety of people including former and current law enforcement officers, public officials and academic experts who will present their recommendations as to the best means to ensure that the Department's internal corruption controls become and remain effective for the long haul and do not again fall victim to the Department's historical enemies of backslide and scandal.

At the outset, I must provide a word of caution. The Commission's investigations and analysis were not primarily aimed at disclosing individual acts of wrongdoing or proving the guilt of individual police officers. In fact, one of our fundamental findings is that the problem of police corruption will not be solved solely by focusing exclusively on individual acts of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, particularly during the first segment, you will hear about crimes and acts of corruption committed by police officers. Though this evidence may arouse your concern, as it should, it by no means reflects the state of the Department as a whole. Quite the contrary. Our inquiries have shown that the New York City Police Department is one of the most honest and effective police forces in the world. The public and the media must not lose sight of that fact as the testimony unfolds. These hearings are not meant to be an indictment of the Department as a whole, but an exposition of the nature and causes of a Department problem that is a necessary step toward laying the groundwork for successful remedies to overcome the kind of problem we face.

When these hearings conclude, the Commission's work will continue. The evidence you will hear over the next several days will be presented in greater detail in the Commission's final report which is now in preparation and will be released as soon as it is ready.

But for now, as you listen to the evidence presented at these hearings, I ask you to keep in mind a fundamental point. Police corruption is a problem that cannot be solved exclusively by investigations and prosecutions that temporarily attract the public's attention through newspaper headlines. It is a condition that must be addressed on all fronts and in the daily operations of the Police Department: through appropriate recruiting, effective training, supervision, strict internal audits and procedures, effective corruption detection techniques, management accountability, public accountability, and most important, an unflagging commitment within the Department to deal with the problem of corruption candidly and effectively. That is the challenge that confronts the Police Department and the public -- to devise a system of corruption control that will operate with vigilance, commitment, and public accountability, not only when public attention has focused on the problem of police corruption as it has during the past year, but with constant vigor, well after ephemeral pressure for reform has faded away.

This Commission's best hope is that the result of its work will give a final answer to the questions asked by the Knapp Commission twenty years ago, so that twenty years from now a new police corruption commission will not be asked to ponder the same questions.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:15 am

EXHIBIT THREE

THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION

17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10004 (212) 487-7350 FAX 487-7361

MILTON MOLLEN, CHAIR
HAROLD BAER, JR.
HERBERT EVANS
RODERICK C. LANKLER
HAROLD TYLER

JOSEPH P. ARMAO, CHIEF COUNSEL

Opening Statement by Judge Milton Mollen, Chair at Public Hearings

Monday, October 4, 1993

For four days, the Commission has presented its evidence of the nature and causes of police corruption through the testimony of police officers who committed corrupt acts and honest police investigators who were frustrated in their attempts to root it out. We have learned from the evidence that the type of police corruption we face today has changed from the type of corruption that existed in the days of the Knapp Commission. We can take heart from the fact that the Commission has found no evidence that the systemic and highly organized bribery "pads" of the 1970s and earlier years persist today. Nonetheless, it is distressing when we hear that the form police corruption takes today exhibits a truly invidious character: police officers associating with and profiting from drug traffickers, committing robberies, larceny, perjury, conducting warrantless searches and seizures, and assaulting citizens. Moreover, the evidence shows that these officers committed their crimes repeatedly and, most distressingly with impunity. It is clear that the consequences of police corruption reach beyond the individual act of wrongdoing to undermine the confidence of the public in its police force and the safety and reputation of the overwhelming majority of police officers who are honest.

Police corruption undoubtedly plays a role in encouraging the process of juror nullification, whereby juries refuse to convict defendants, who in many instances are truly guilty, because the jurors doubt the credibility of police officers. Public confidence and faith in the integrity of police officers is imperative if community policing is to be effective in deterring crime and in aiding in the apprehension of criminals.

Thus the evidence set forth in the first part of these hearings inevitably leads to the central question of this next segment of our hearings: why did the Department's corruption controls fail to prevent and apprehend police officers who broke the law?

We have heard the answer to this important question suggested by some of the witnesses we have already heard. Over a long period of time the Department's commitment and capacity to prevent, detect, and prosecute police corruption has seriously eroded. In arriving at this unhappy conclusion, the Commission has spent considerable time and effort in analyzing the systems and procedures the Department has used since the time of the Knapp Commission to foster integrity and investigate corruption, and in assessing the Department's commitment to insure that its system of corruption control functioned effectively. These sessions will be devoted to presenting these findings to the public.

I ask the Commission's Chief Counsel to call the next witness.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 4:53 am

EXHIBIT FOUR

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'86-0449 -- Officer Dowd and partner steal money from drug dealers, prisoners, and deceased persons
'86-0039 -- Officer Dowd and other officers used excessive force against a prisoner
'87 -2608 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers frequent a drug location
'87-2712 -- Officer Dowd and partner accept $8,000 per week from drug dealers
'87-2525 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers drink and use drugs in "Auto Sound City"
'88-0094 -- Officer Dowd deals drugs
'88-1396 - Armed robbery of R&T grocery store
'88-966 -- F.I.A.U. self-generated case into precinct-wide corruption within the 75th precinct
'88-1554 -- Officer Dowd's P.B.A. card recovered from known criminal
'88-2352 -- 75th Precinct Police Officers purchase and sell drugs
'88-2060 -- Dowd's former partner sells drugs
'89-2385 -- Former police officer alleges that several 75th Precinct Police Officers engage in drug use and other forms of corruption
'89-2617 -- D.E.T.F. Informant alleges that he observed Officer Dowd use drugs
'91-2456 -- Federal informants allege that Officer Dowd worked for a drug ring
'91-2126 -- Officer Dowd and partner accepted liquor from bar owner
'92-0522 -- Suffolk County drug ring

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NYPD EVALUATION OF MICHAEL DOWD, 1987 (75TH PRECINCT)
RATER COMMENTS: This officer has excellent street knowledge: relates well with his peers and is empathetic to the community. This officer could excel within the New York City Police Department and easily become a role model for others to emulate if he maximized his inner drive to fulfill job responsibilities to the fullest. Must improve attendance and arrest activity. Good career potential.

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9TH PRECINCT POLICE CORRUPTION NETWORK INVESTIGATION
MARCH 25: Mr. X contacts MS/FIAU about police corruption network and barbecue MARCH 28: High level meeting at IAD with MS/FIAU
APRIL 3: IAD closes 9th precinct case as unsubstantiated
MAY 13: Buy #1: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown
JUNE 4: Buy #2: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown
JUNE 14: Buy #3/Arrest: Mr. X buys drugs from P.O. Brown and P.O. Brown arrested
22 DAYS LATER
JULY 6: Barbecue Scheduled Cancelled After Arrest

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9TH PRECINCT CORRUPTION NETWORK CASE

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IAD INVESTIGATOR SURVEY
QUESTION : Do you believe the NYPD is committed to aggressively identifying and rooting out corruption?
54% responded "NO" or "unclear"
COMMENTS: "Politically sensitive cases were not always as aggressively pursued."
QUESTION: Are you so overloaded with work that you do not have sufficient time to devote to serious corruption cases?
61% responded "NO"
COMMENTS: "You must be kidding with me!!"
"I should have taken a typing course."
"In fact, I hardly work. You must understand, a detective here is not used as a detective should be used."
QUESTION: What portion of your time is spent doing:
• Investigation related activity in the field: 16%
• Investigation related activity in the building: 37%
• Non-investigation related activity: 46%
• Did not respond to the question: 1%
QUESTION: Have you ever felt that you were discouraged from fully investigating allegations of corruption?
73% responded "OFTEN" or "SOMETIMES"
COMMENTS: "Depending on the supervisor and if he would rather settle for 'white socks' or if he wants to go all the way to the serious part of the allegation."
"I've been told, 'Let's get what we came for, nothing else.'"

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TICKLER FILE CASE
DANIEL F. SULLIVAN, Chief of Inspectional Services
Chief Beatty: Bob -- Don't enter this one in any records until later. Assign to whoever you think is best fit to handle it. -- D.S.

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IAD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

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LIFE OF A CORRUPTION ALLEGATION ("C CASE)

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Of approximately 2,700 police corruption allegations filed with the N.Y.P.D. on average each year:
ASSIGNED TO FIAU: 95%
RETAINED BY IAD: 5%
Of the 5% retained by IAD from 1988-1991 approximately 30% are minor misconduct /abuse of department regulations including:
• Free pizza
• Off-post
• Personal use of department vehicle
• Misusing police parking
permit to avoid paying tolls
• Off -duty employment as security guard
• Working out while on duty
• Drinking on duty
• Sleeping on duty
• Spends time in restaurant on duty

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IAD & FIAU TOTAL CORRUPTION CASES/INVESTIGATORS 1988-1992 AVERAGE

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IAD & FIAU TOTAL OPEN CORRUPTION CASES/INVESTIGATORS UNDERLOAD vs. OVERLOAD

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IAD CASE DISPOSITIONS, 5 YEAR AVERAGE 1988-1992

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IAD AND FIAU TOTAL OPEN CORRUPTION CASES/BACKLOG

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FIAU CASE DISPOSITIONS, 4 YEAR AVERAGE 1988-1991

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% OF "ABUSE OF DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS" CASES RETAINED BY IAD
Oversight Commission established (mid 1992), 40% decline in abuse of Department Regulation cases from 4 year average (1988-1991)

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POLICE CORRUPTION & FORCE ALLEGATIONS
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 5:09 am

EXHIBIT FIVE

THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED POLICE CORRUPTION

17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10004 (212) 487-7350 FAX 487-7361

MILTON MOLLEN, CHAIR
HAROLD BAER, JR.
HERBERT EVANS
RODERICK C. LANKLER
HAROLD TYLER

JOSEPH P. ARMAO, CHIEF COUNSEL

December 27, 1993

Honorable David N. Dinkins
Mayor
City Hall
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Mayor:

I am herewith submitting the Interim Report and Recommendations of the Commission To Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department which you created by Executive Order No. 42 on July 24, 1992. This Interim Report reflects the preliminary findings and recommendations of the Commission.

I take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of my colleagues, my staff, and myself for the opportunity to serve you and our City in a matter of such great importance as the integrity of our Police Department. We appreciate your constant support and the total independence you provided us throughout the course of our investigation.

I am also pleased to note that, in accordance with your suggestion, we have had fruitful discussions with Mayor-elect Rudolph W. Giuliani, and we anticipate that positive and permanent remedial measures will be undertaken by the Mayor-elect to deal effectively with this serious problem.

Again, I convey our thanks and appreciation and our best wishes for your success and happiness in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

Milton Mollen
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 5:45 am

EXHIBIT SIX

Commission To Investigate Allegations Of Police Corruption And The Anti-Corruption Procedures Of The New York City Police Department

Interim Report And Principal Recommendations

Milton Mollen, Chair
Harold Baer, Jr.
Herbert Evans
Roderick C. Lankier
Harold Tyler

Joseph P. Armao, Chief Counsel
Leslie U. Cornfeld, Deputy Chief Counsel

December 27, 1993

INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Table of Contents:


• Preface
• I. The State of Police Corruption
o The Nature and Extent of Police Corruption: An Overview
o Police Culture
o Forms of Corruption
 Narcotics-Related Corruption
 Police Violence
 Perjury, False Statements and Records
• II. The Failures of the Department's Corruption Controls
o The Department Abandoned Its Responsibility to Ensure Integrity
o The Department Failed to Address Aspects of Police Culture That Foster Corruption
o The Department Had a Fragmented Approach to Corruption Control
o The System of "Command Accountability" Collapsed
o The Department Allowed the FIAUs to Collapse
o The Internal Affairs Division Abandoned Its Mission
o The Department Used a Badly Flawed Investigative Approach for Police Corruption
o Corruption Cases Were Concealed
o The Department's Intelligence Gathering Efforts Were Flawed
o Supervision Was Diluted and Ineffective
o Recruit and In-Service Integrity Training Was Neglected
o Effective Deterrence Was Absent
o Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policies Were Ineffective
• III. Principal Recommendations
o The External Monitor
• Conclusion

INTERIM REPORT AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Preface


For the past century, police corruption inquiries into the New York City Police Department have run in twenty-year cycles of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal. The creation of this Commission followed the same historical pattern.

In May 1992, six New York City police officers assigned to two different Brooklyn precincts were arrested not by the New York City Police Department's Internal Affairs Division ("IAD"), but by Suffolk County Police. The officers were charged with narcotics crimes that arose from their association with a drug ring in Suffolk County.

Shortly thereafter, the press disclosed that one of the arrested officers, Michael Dowd, had been the subject of fifteen corruption allegations received by the New York City Police Department over a period spanning six years -- and that not a single allegation ever had been proven by the Department, despite substantial evidence that Dowd regularly and openly engaged in serious criminal conduct. Questions arose as to whether Dowd was an aberration or whether corruption had once again become a serious problem within the Department, and whether the Department was able and willing to police itself.

In July 1992, Mayor David N. Dinkins responded by establishing this Commission and assigning it three tasks of deep public concern: to investigate the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate the Department's procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to recommend changes and improvements in those procedures.

In September 1992, with a twenty-person staff of attorneys and investigators, the Commission began its work. We embarked upon a wide-ranging investigation to determine whether the corruption of Michael Dowd and the Department's failure to apprehend him illustrated deeper problems about police corruption and culture, and about the Department's competence and commitment to control corruption.

To carry out our mandate, the Commission sought information from a wide variety of sources. We reviewed thousands of Department documents and case files; conducted hundreds of private hearings and interviews of former and current police officers of all ranks; audited, investigated, and conducted performance tests of the principal components of the Department's anti-corruption systems; analyzed hundreds of investigative and personnel files; interviewed private citizens, alleged victims of corruption, and criminal informants; conducted an extensive literature review on police corruption and prevention; and held a series of roundtable discussions and other meetings with a variety of police management and corruption experts including local, state and federal law enforcement officials, prosecutors, former and current police chiefs and commissioners, inspectors general, academics, and police union officials.

The Commission also initiated a number of its own field investigations, sometimes in conjunction with local and federal prosecutors, targeting areas where our analysis suggested police corruption existed.

The Commission received invaluable assistance from numerous police officers and supervisors who agreed to act as confidential sources of information about the state of the Department's corruption controls and investigations, including IAD investigators and supervisors, and undercover and field associate officers. Nine corrupt officers, including Michael Dowd, provided the Commission with detailed information about their own and other officers' corrupt activities. A number of honest officers also provided information about corruption in their commands.

Throughout our work, we benefitted from the counsel of many people, including Mark H. Moore and David M. Kennedy of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Special Counsel Jonny J. Frank.

During the course of its investigation, the Commission developed extensive evidence about the state of police corruption in our City, the state of the Department's corruption-controls, and the Department's ability and willingness to control corruption. From September 27 through October 7, 1993, the Commission held two weeks of public hearings to present much of the information we had uncovered in the primary areas of our mandate.

***

From the beginning of our investigation, we were struck by the difference between what the Commission was uncovering about the state of corruption and corruption controls within the Department, and what the Department was publicly -- and privately -- stating about itself. The Department maintained that police corruption was not a serious problem, and consisted primarily of sporadic, isolated incidents. It also insisted that the shortcomings that had been disclosed about the Department's anti-corruption efforts reflected, at worst, insufficient resources and uncoordinated organization of internal investigations.

The Commission found that the corruption problems facing the Department are far more serious than top commanders in the Department would admit. We determined that police corruption and brutality are serious problems, and that narcotics-related corruption occurs, in varying degrees, in many high-crime, narcotics-ridden precincts in our City. We also found an anti-corruption apparatus that was totally ineffective and -- worse -- a Department that was unable and unwilling to acknowledge and uncover the scope of police corruption. As a result, the Department's anti-corruption efforts were more committed to avoiding disclosure of corruption than to preventing, detecting and uprooting it.

This institutional reluctance to acknowledge and uncover corruption is not surprising. Few organizations act otherwise. Police organizations in particular find it difficult to maintain an effective fight against corruption. It is unrealistic to expect the Department to exert a serious, effective, and sustained anti-corruption effort without outside help and oversight.

The very history of the Department lends weight to this conclusion. Despite cycles of scandal and reform spanning over a century, none has led to effective long-term remedies. The Commission is neither so naive nor optimistic to suggest that any reforms could ever entirely eliminate police corruption -- or corruption in any profession. But we are convinced that there are reforms that can permanently strengthen the Department's corruption controls, and that can help break the twenty-year cycles of scandal and reform to which the Department has been captive.

One such critical reform, which is the principal recommendation addressed in this report, is the creation of a permanent outside agency to monitor and improve the Department's capacity for preventing and pursuing corruption, and to ensure the Mayor, Police Commissioner, and the public that the Department's anti-corruption efforts do not again erode with time. Enhancing the Department's internal efforts to prevent and uncover corruption, of course, is also critical, and we will make recommendations as to how this can be done in our final report.

What follows is an interim report summarizing the Commission's findings and recommendations for external oversight. The Commission's basic findings have become sufficiently clear, its principal recommendations sufficiently well developed, and the situation in the Department and the City sufficiently serious that the Commission feels called upon to issue an interim report at this time. Detailed findings and recommendations, including evidence generated by the Commission's pending investigations, will be presented in our final report, which will be released in the coming months.

I. THE STATE OF POLICE CORRUPTION

The Nature and Extent of Police Corruption: An Overview


The corruption of Michael Dowd was not isolated or aberrational, but represents a new and serious form of corruption that exists in a number of precincts throughout our City. While the systemic and institutionalized bribery schemes that plagued the Department a generation ago no longer exist, the prevalent forms of police corruption today exhibit an even more invidious and violent character: police officers assisting and profiting from drug traffickers, committing larceny, burglary, and robbery, conducting warrantless searches and seizures, committing perjury and falsifying statements, and brutally assaulting citizens. [1] This corruption is characterized by abuse and extortion, rather than by accommodation -- principally through bribery -- typical of traditional police corruption.

Simply put, twenty years ago police officers took bribes to accommodate criminals -- primarily bookmakers; today's corrupt cop often is the criminal. Because of its aggressive and extortionate character, this form of corruption is particularly destructive to relations between the police and the public -- which is especially troubling as the Department expands the practice of community policing.

The vast majority of police officers throughout our City do not engage in corruption. They are honest, hard-working men and women who perform difficult and dangerous duties each day with efficiency and integrity, doing their best to protect the people of our City. The horror many officers expressed at the revelations of the Commission's hearings was heartfelt and sincere.

Nonetheless, the Commission determined that corruption, particularly narcotics-related corruption, exists in varying degrees in many high-crime, drug-infested precincts in the City. This is based on the consistent and repeated results of the Commission's investigations; on information from sources within and without the Department; and on our analysis of patterns of corruption complaints. This corruption is not limited to the isolated acts of a few rogue cops, as some have maintained. It is typically committed by groups of police officers assigned to the same command who commit crimes under color of law; through the abuse, and with the protection of their police powers; and often in the shelter of their fellow officers' silence.

Nor is corruption limited to spontaneous crimes of opportunity, as many believe. Corrupt officers create their own opportunities for corruption. They aggressively seek out sources of money, drugs and guns, and often employ sophisticated and organized methods to carry out their criminal activities.

The Commission also found that the most serious and abusive corruption is endemic to crime-ridden, narcotics-infested precincts with predominantly minority populations. These communities are thus doubly victimized: by active trafficking in drugs and guns by the police themselves; and by being denied the police protection and service they so badly need.

Victims of police corruption are often reluctant to complain to the Department, which makes it difficult to uncover, investigate and determine the extent of corruption. This difficulty is augmented by other factors which make police corruption particularly difficult to uncover and investigate, including corruption's often covert and sophisticated nature, and the close ties of loyalty among the officers who perpetrate or witness it.

The Commission found no evidence that this corruption reached high into the Department, or that supervisors were actively and directly involved. Some supervisors do, however, appear to condone perjury, falsification of police records, and acts of brutality. They also facilitate corruption by often closing their eyes to corruption in their commands. Some supervisors knew or should have known about corruption and failed to take the actions necessary to stop it. But even supervisors committed to fighting corruption could not always do so. The Department failed to give supervisors the tools or incentives required to fight corruption effectively, and supervision was notably sparse and ineffective in most precincts where corruption flourished.

Finally, the traditional idea that police corruption is primarily about illicit profit no longer fully reflects what the Commission found on the streets of New York. While greed is still the primary cause of corruption, a complex array of other motivations also spurs corrupt officers: to exercise power; to experience thrills; to vent frustration and hostility; to administer street justice; and to win acceptance from fellow officers. Officers stole guns and drugs not only for profit, but in some instances to show their power, express their frustrations and impose their brand of justice. Officers sometimes used force for legitimate self-defense reasons, but also to steal money or drugs, to teach a lesson that officers believed the courts would not provide, or simply for power and thrills.

What follows is a summary of police attitudes that foster and conceal corruption, and some of the most salient forms of corruption observed by the Commission.

Police Culture

The values and attitudes of police officers enormously influence the presence or absence of corruption and the ability to combat it. Certain tendencies promote corruption, or a tolerance for it. An intense group loyalty, fostered by pride, shared experiences, and a pervasive belief that police can rely only on other police in times of emergency, binds officers together. While loyalty and mutual trust are necessary and honorable aspects of police work, they can generate what is perhaps the greatest barrier to effective corruption control: the code of silence, the unwritten rule that an officer never gives incriminating information against a fellow officer.

The code of silence influences a vast number of police officers, even those who are otherwise honest. Officers who violate the code of silence often face severe consequences. They are ostracized and harassed; become targets of complaints and even physical threats; and fear that they will be left on their own when they most need help on the street. Consequently, many honest officers take no action to stop the wrongdoing they know or suspect is taking place around them. The code of silence also often extends to supervisors, who seek to protect their subordinates from charges of misconduct and their own careers from the taint of scandal.

Another aspect of police culture is the "Us versus them" mentality that many police display, and which is at its worst, in high-crime, predominantly minority precincts. This divisiveness makes many police officers feel isolated from, and often hostile toward, the community they are meant to serve. The Commission's inquiries show that this attitude starts as early as the police academy, where impressionable recruits learn from veteran police officers that the ordinary citizen fails to appreciate the police, and that their safety depends solely on fellow officers. This attitude is powerfully reinforced on the job. It creates strong pressures on police officers to ally themselves with fellow officers, even corrupt ones, and to disregard the interest they have in supportive, productive relationships with the communities and residents they serve.

Police unions and fraternal organizations can do much to change the attitudes of their members. Because of this, we were particularly disappointed when the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association ("P.B.A") declined our invitation to discuss this matter. Moreover, a variety of sources, including police officers and prosecutors, have reported that police unions help perpetuate the characteristics of police culture that foster corruption. In particular, the Commission learned that delegates of the P.B.A. have attempted to thwart law enforcement efforts into police corruption. Rather than acting to protect the legitimate interests of the vast majority of its honest members, the P.B.A. often acts as a shelter for officers who commit acts of misconduct.

The code of silence and the "us versus them" mentality were present wherever we found corruption. These characteristics of police culture largely explain how groups of corrupt officers, sometimes comprising almost an entire squad, can openly engage in corruption for long periods of time with impunity. Any successful system for corruption control must redirect police culture against protecting and perpetuating police corruption. It must create a culture that demands integrity and works to ensure it. The Commission believes such change is possible.

History proves that our optimism is warranted. In response to the Knapp Commission's revelations of systemic corruption and corruption tolerance, then-Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy made significant strides in transforming a culture that committed and tolerated corruption, into one that largely discouraged it. Then, as now, the Department could be divided into three camps: a few determined offenders, a few determined incorruptibles, and a large group in the middle who could be tilted either way, and who are, at the moment, tilted toward corruption tolerance. As it did twenty years ago, the Department must take a variety of steps to reverse this inclination by: emphasizing and spreading the system of "command accountability" and incentives for preventing corruption; strengthening the corruption prevention and investigations apparatus; and inculcating an ideology of pride and integrity throughout the Department.

Any successful plan for reform has to rely heavily on steps to create a culture that discourages corruption. If the culture of the Department tolerates corruption, or conceals it, no systems of prevention and investigation are likely fully to succeed. But if the culture demands integrity and works to ensure it, those systems will be more productive.

Forms of Corruption

Narcotics-Related Corruption:


The most serious corruption problems within the Department arise from the narcotics trade. The traditional unwritten rule of twenty years ago that narcotics graft is "dirty money" has disappeared. The explosion of the cocaine and crack trade that began in the 1980s provides police officers with plentiful opportunities to steal money, drugs, and other property from drug dealers who are unlikely to complain, and to associate with drug dealers who will pay handsomely for police protection.

Unlike a generation ago, when narcotics corruption was confined to units of plainclothes narcotics officers, today's narcotics corruption primarily involves the uniformed patrol force. Nonetheless, even the most elite units of the Department are not immune to narcotics corruption. For example, two detectives assigned to the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force recently pleaded guilty and were convicted of drug trafficking charges in connection with their attempt to sell narcotics lawfully seized in a large-scale narcotics investigation.

Police officers profit from the narcotics trade in a variety of ways, from petty thefts and shakedowns of street dealers to using their police powers to protect and assist large-scale drug organizations in return for sizeable payoffs. The primary forms of narcotics-related corruption we discovered -- which officers often carried out while on duty and in uniform -- include the following:

• Providing assistance and protection to narcotics organizations for payoffs, including selling confidential information, providing protection for transportation of drugs and drug money, harassing competitive dealers, and becoming active entrepreneurs in drug rackets;
• Thefts, sometimes violent, of drugs, money, and firearms from drug dealers;
• Thefts of drugs, money and property seized as evidence;
• Robberies of drug dealers;
• Burglaries of drug locations;
• Selling narcotics, which officers often obtained through theft or as payment from dealers, including sales to other officers, or dealers from whom the drugs were stolen; and
• Selling illegally seized weapons -- including sales of guns to drug dealers.

Narcotics corruption rarely involves a single police officer taking advantage of an isolated opportunity to "score" money, drugs, or both. Rather, it usually involves groups of police officers, acting with various degrees of organization, actively seeking opportunities to score from drug dealers through protection rackets, larceny, extortion, burglary, or robbery.

One Commission investigation, for example, revealed a group of ten to twelve patrol officers assigned to a Brooklyn precinct who, for at least two years, regularly broke into drug locations to steal money, drugs, and firearms. They communicated with each other by using code names over Department radios to arrange clandestine meetings and to plan their illegal raids. Once they had selected a location, they assigned each other roles to perform in the raid and later split stolen cash either in or around the stationhouse or at secret off-duty locations. Similar patterns exist in other precincts as well.

Narcotics corruption among police officers does not end with efforts to score from the drug trade. Personal drug use, especially the use of cocaine and steroids, has also become a significant problem among police officers, even those who may not otherwise engage in other kinds of wrongdoing. While the Commission continues to inquire into the extent of this problem, information from corrupt officers, honest officers, and Department health services officials indicates that the problem has grown over recent years, spurring the Department to significantly increase the frequency of random drug tests in 1993.

Police Violence:

Police corruption investigations typically ignore police violence. This Commission rejected that traditional course because we found that police violence is a serious problem confronting the Department, and may indicate an officer's willingness to engage in corruption. The traditional distinction between corruption and brutality, therefore, no longer applies. Thus any investigation of corruption would be remiss in overlooking brutality.

A number of officers have told us that they were "broken in" to the world of corruption by committing acts of brutality; it was their first step toward other kinds of corruption. A willingness to abuse people in custody or others who challenge police authority can be a way to prove that an officer is a tough cop who can be trusted and accepted by fellow officers. Brutality, like other kinds of misconduct, thus sometimes serves as a rite of initiation into aspects of police culture that foster corruption.

No one would deny that the use of force is often a necessity -- and indeed often crucial to protect an officer's life in the line of duty. We found, however, that the use of force sometimes exceeds the bounds of necessity. Some police officers use violence gratuitously: to demonstrate their preeminence on the streets; to administer on-the-spot retribution for crimes they believe will go unpunished by the courts; and for power and thrills. We also found that such behavior is widely tolerated in the Department.

The Civilian Complaint Review Board is responsible for investigating excessive force allegations. However, the Department has failed to carry out its duty to aggressively prevent and uncover acts of brutality, to hold supervisors accountable for failing to pursue signs of unnecessary violence on their watch, and to solicit information about brutality from other officers or the public.

Perjury, False Statements and Records:

Falsifying Department records and making false statements is not uncommon among certain police officers, even among those who do not engage in other kinds of misconduct. Most often, police falsifications are made to justify an unlawful arrest or search that would otherwise not survive in court, especially in cases of drug or firearms possession; to conceal other corrupt activities; or to excuse the use of excessive force.

Police officers also falsify records to inflate arrest numbers, to enhance arrest charges, to allow seizure of otherwise unseizable evidence, to increase overtime, and to defend their own conduct and the conduct of fellow officers in corruption and excessive force investigations. Superior officers often do little to deter these practices. Indeed, in at least one case, a superior officer went so far as to direct subordinates to falsify official reports for self-serving or, for what were believed to be, legitimate law enforcement purposes.

The consequence of perjury and falsification can be devastating. It can mean that defendants are unlawfully arrested and convicted, that inadmissible evidence is admitted at trial, and ultimately the public trust in even the most honest officer is eroded. This erosion of trust causes the public to disbelieve police testimony resulting in the guilty being set free after trial.

II. THE FAILURES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CORRUPTION CONTROLS

The Commission found a deep-rooted institutional reluctance to uncover corruption in the Department. This was not surprising. Powerful forces discourage the Department from sustaining efforts to uncover corruption -- which is why an external force is needed to maintain a sense of commitment and accountability.

Police managers ask a great deal of their officers. They ask them to be alert, ready, and available to respond to whatever citizens demand from them; to be courteous and fair no matter how offensive or provocative the behavior of the citizens they encounter; and to be ever willing to face danger to protect the people of our City. Because they must ask for so much from their officers, they rightly judge that they should offer trust, support and loyalty in exchange.

Unfortunately, one of the easiest ways that the Department can show trust and support for its officers is to be less than zealous in efforts to control and uncover corruption. Pursuing corruption -- taking the complaints of citizens (even drug dealers) seriously, using tough investigative methods to determine the truth of allegations, and using pro-active measures to search out corruption -- will be perceived by some as a lack of trust and thus lower morale.

The top management of the Department also understands that revelations of corruption will be dealt with harshly in the court of public opinion. When corruption is uncovered, the press and the public invariably take it as a symptom of a larger problem and a failure of management. Thus, police commanders perceive that their careers may be harmed, and that public confidence will erode, thus jeopardizing the Department's effectiveness in fighting crime.

As a result, top management believed that it would get no reward, and pay a heavy price, for vigilance against corruption. It is no wonder that over time the Department tends to relax its vigilance, and may even throw up roadblocks to uncovering corruption.

Without constant management attention to preventing corruption, however, corrupt officers feel they can act with impunity, honest officers are more vulnerable to the code of silence, and leadership is more easily drawn to other priorities.

This appears to have happened in the Department. From the top brass down to local precinct commanders and supervisors, there was a pervasive belief that uncovering serious corruption would harm careers and the reputation of the Department. There was a debilitating fear of the embarrassment and loss of public confidence that corruption headlines would bring.

As a result, avoiding scandal became more important than fighting corruption. Daniel Sullivan, the six-year chief of the Department's anti-corruption division, testified at the Commission's public hearings that:

... the Department [was] paranoid over bad press. Everything that IAD did reflected poorly on the rest of the Department and generated bad press. So when I went up with the bad news that two cops were going to be arrested ... I felt like they wanted to shoot me because I was always the bearer of the bad news. They were interested primarily in getting good press ... there was a message that went out to the field that maybe we shouldn't be so aggressive in fighting corruption because the Department just does not want bad press.


Numerous officers expressed similar fears of exposing serious corruption.

The reluctance to uncover and effectively investigate corruption infected the entire anti-corruption apparatus, from training, supervision and command accountability to investigations and intelligence gathering. Our investigation revealed an anti-corruption system that was more likely to conceal corruption than uncover it, and a Department often more interested in the appearance of integrity than its reality. Oversight of anti-corruption efforts was virtually non-existent; intelligence gathering efforts were negligible; corruption investigations were often deliberately limited and prematurely closed; and Integrity Control Officers and supervisors were denied the tools needed to uncover corruption and, in practice, played virtually no role in corruption control efforts.

And perhaps most alarming, in a Department known for its high levels of performance, investigative ingenuity, and managerial expertise, no one seemed to care. Despite the importance of its corruption-fighting mandate, the Department allocated little of its billion-dollar-plus budget to anti-corruption efforts. Moreover, although performance in most divisions in the Department is carefully scrutinized at several levels, neither IAD nor other units or supervisors responsible for fighting corruption were held accountable for their performance.

Nor did anyone in the Department know how the Department's anti-corruption efforts had been functioning until this Commission commenced its audit and investigation of the principal components of those anti-corruption efforts. What was known was that the Department's anti-corruption systems were not working well. But that was acceptable, if not preferable: ineffectiveness minimized the likelihood of embarrassment, scandal and a perceived loss of public confidence. Totally overlooked was the public's loss of confidence in the integrity of the Department and the debilitating impact upon the Department's moral fiber.

This is precisely why the past failures of the Department's anti-corruption efforts are so important -- and illuminating. They show the inevitable consequence of leaving anticorruption efforts and oversight solely within the control of the very Department that believes it will be embarrassed and harmed by the success of those efforts.

A brief summary of our preliminary findings on these failures follows.

The Department Abandoned Its Responsibility To Ensure Integrity: The Department failed to impress upon its members that fighting corruption must be one of the Department's highest priorities. The Department devoted insufficient resources, personnel, effort, and planning to preventing and uncovering corruption. Officers of all ranks told us that the general feeling in the Department was that it was better not to know about, much less report, corruption. A "see no evil, hear no evil" mentality often governed supervisors, patrol officers, and even corruption investigators.

The Department Failed to Address Aspects of Police Culture That Foster Corruption: Despite overwhelming evidence of a widespread tolerance of corruption and violence, the Department failed to address police attitudes and practices that foster corruption, and to inculcate attitudes that discourage it. Officers and supervisors were neither encouraged nor rewarded for taking stands against corruption; nor were penalties imposed for being silent or willfully blind to corruption; and officers and supervisors were rarely held accountable for corruption about which they were, or should have been, aware.

The Department Had a Fragmented Approach To Corruption Control: Combatting police corruption requires a coherent, integrated strategy, and coordinated effort and attention on several fronts. These would include, at a minimum, intelligent recruitment; thorough training; effective supervision; strong accountability; thorough investigations; effective intelligence gathering and analysis; meaningful discipline; and vigilant oversight. The Department had no such integrated strategy, and the various parts of what should have been a coordinated system were either non-existent or unproductive.

The System of "Command Accountability" Collapsed: A prime component of the Department's capacity to prevent and uncover corruption is the principle of command accountability: that all commanders are responsible for pursuing corruption in their commands; that they will be evaluated firmly but fairly on their anti-corruption performance; and will be furnished with the tools and resources necessary to do so. In the past, field commanders had Field Internal Affairs Units ("FIAUs") to investigate corruption in their commands. The FIAUs were accountable both to the field commander and to IAD.

Only the skeleton of this system now remains. Its animating principle -- that all commanders must act, and will be held accountable for acting, against corruption -- has disappeared. There is a widespread perception among commanders and supervisors that uncovering corruption on their watch leads to punishment rather than reward.

We found a total lack of commitment to the principle of command accountability. This was allowed to happen because no formal institutional mechanisms were ever adopted to ensure its perpetuation and enforcement. Its success depended on the commitment of the Department's top commanders. When that commitment eroded, so too did the centerpiece of the Department's anti-corruption systems.

The Department Allowed the FIAUs to Collapse: Although the FIAUs were purportedly the backbone of the Department's investigative efforts, they were denied the resources and personnel required to do their job. Moreover, although the FIAUs depended largely on IAD's assistance and oversight, IAD rarely assisted or even cooperated with the FIAUs. In fact, IAD often thwarted FIAU investigations by withholding critical information and resources.

Even worse, the Department permitted IAD to use the FIAUs as a dumping ground for corruption allegations. IAD assigned the poorly resourced FIAUs a caseload that FIAU officers of all ranks testified was so overwhelming it was impossible to handle. As a result, a large number of corruption cases filed with the Department each year -- including over a dozen investigations involving Michael Dowd -- were closed as unsubstantiated without appropriate investigative steps ever having been taken.

The Internal Affairs Division Abandoned Its Mission: IAD abandoned its primary responsibilities to investigate serious and complex corruption cases; to uncover patterns of corruption through trend analysis and self-initiated investigations; and to oversee and assist the FIAUs. For example, IAD assigned itself a caseload of largely easy cases, including cases like sleeping on the job; failed to solicit significant information through its undercover program; initiated no self-generated investigations during at least the past five years, despite an entire unit purportedly dedicated to that task; and relied on a large number of investigators with no prior investigative experience, many of whom never took the required investigations training course.

Consequently, as the Commission uniformly heard from officers of a variety of ranks, IAD was viewed with contempt by members of the Department, and failed to serve as a deterrent to corruption.

The Department Used A Badly Flawed Investigative Approach For Police Corruption: Investigations into police corruption purposefully minimized the likelihood of uncovering the full extent of corruption. Interestingly, the Department's investigations excelled in every area except police corruption. The Commission uncovered a pattern of cases that were prematurely closed and failed to employ basic investigative techniques (like the use of undercovers, sting operations, and turn-arounds) that are routinely relied on in other investigative divisions of the Department. Moreover, IAD operated as a solely reactive investigative division that responded only to isolated complaints rather than patterns of corruption. IAD also fragmented what should have been large-scale investigations by sending out related allegations as separate investigations. Thus, IAD knowingly ignored opportunities to develop investigations of large-scale corruption.

Corruption Cases Were Concealed: IAD and the Inspectional Services Bureau Chief had unbridled discretion to control police corruption investigations and decide what allegations should be officially recorded and sent to prosecutors. We found evidence of abuse of that power. For example, certain corruption cases were kept out of IAD's regular filing system and concealed from prosecutors through a file called the "Tickler File."

The Department's Intelligence Gathering Efforts Were Flawed: The Department made virtually no effort to solicit information from the public, police officers, or other sources of information -- even though such efforts are crucial to uncovering information about police corruption. The Department made little effort to generate information about corruption in the absence of a complaint. It rarely used directed integrity tests and often failed to pursue information from its own field associates, one of the Department's best resources for reliable information about corruption. The Department's complaint in-take efforts also minimized the likelihood of obtaining information on corruption: The Department's "Action Desk" -- which receives and processes information on police corruption -- routinely discouraged individuals from providing information. Department statistics, therefore, vastly underestimate the nature and extent of corruption, and investigations reach only small portions of a much wider problem.

Supervision Was Diluted and Ineffective: Although effective first-line supervision is critical in the fight against corruption, few first-line supervisors perceived corruption control as an important responsibility. The Department did little to suggest otherwise. Even supervisors bent on ensuring integrity often lacked the resources or time to do so. In many precincts, supervisors were responsible for so many officers or so large an area that effective supervision was impossible. Department commanders often assigned supervisors without regard to prior experience, training, or the needs of the command. Inexperienced, probationary sergeants were often assigned to busy, corruption-prone precincts where experienced, proven supervisors are most needed. Thus, in many busy, crime-ridden precincts corrupt officers felt they had free rein. While no amount of supervision will stop all determined offenders, a reasonable level of committed supervision is essential to deter corruption.

Recruit and In-Service Integrity Training Was Neglected: Integrity training has been long neglected by the Department. Insufficient attention was devoted to integrity training at the Police Academy, and "required" in-service integrity training for officers and supervisors was often not provided. When training was offered, it relied largely on obsolete materials and films that remained largely unchanged since the days of the Knapp Commission, and rarely captured serious attention either from recruits or veteran officers.

Effective Deterrence Was Absent: Effective general and specific deterrence was lacking. The likelihood of detection and punishment was minimal, as was the severity of the sanction imposed. Indeed, one method of dealing with corruption was simply to transfer problem officers to unattractive assignments including, crime-ridden precincts. This "dumping ground" method of discipline punishes the community more than the problem officers by assigning them to the very precincts where the opportunities for corruption most abound, where the need for talented, committed officers is the greatest, and where minority populations often reside.

Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policies Were Ineffective: Despite evidence of a serious drug and alcohol problem confronting the Department, little was done to prevent, treat, or uncover the full extent of this problem. Abuse problems are often ignored or mishandled, certain drug tests are given too infrequently, many testing procedures are easy to circumvent, and effective drug treatment is non-existent.

III. PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Most of the failures of the Department's corruption controls could have been prevented, identified, or remedied years ago if the Department had been accountable to regular independent review of its anti-corruption systems. History strongly suggests that the erosion of the Department's corruption control efforts is an inevitable consequence of its institutional reluctance to uncover corruption -- unless some countervailing power forces the Department to do what it naturally strays from doing. This is true of many organizations. It is unrealistic to expect otherwise from the Department. The mere establishment of this independent Commission created such a countervailing pressure, as did the creation of the Knapp Commission twenty years ago. After the creation of this Commission, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly made a number of laudable reforms in the Department's anti-corruption apparatus. It is no coincidence that it was only under the scrutiny of oversight Commissions that there was a heightened vigilance and commitment to anticorruption efforts in the Department. Our challenge is to sustain that vigilance so that history does not again repeat itself.

The Commission believes that the Department must remain responsible for effectively policing itself and for keeping its own house in order. This requires that the Department have effective internal corruption controls to prevent and uncover corruption. The Commission also believes that it is impossible for the Department to bear that responsibility alone. The Department is subject to powerful internal pressures to avoid uncovering corruption, which are almost certain to prevail absent external scrutiny.

The Commission therefore urges a dual-track approach to improving police corruption controls. The first track focuses on the Department's entire internal apparatus for the control of corruption. Police Commissioner Kelly has made important inroads to strengthening this internal apparatus, and he should be commended for his efforts. His principal reforms, however, focus largely on strengthening and centralizing investigative efforts, rather than on prevention, root causes, and conditions. The Commission's final report will make detailed recommendations for internal reforms on a variety of fronts, including:

• improving screening and recruitment;
• improving recruit education and in-service integrity training;
• attacking corruption and brutality tolerance;
• challenging other aspects of police culture and conditions that breed corruption and brutality;
• revitalizing and enforcing command accountability;
• strengthening first-line supervision;
• enhancing sanctions and disincentives for corruption and brutality;
• strengthening intelligence-gathering efforts;
• preventing, detecting, and treating drug and alcohol abuse;
• soliciting police union support for anti-corruption efforts;
• minimizing the corruption hazards of community policing; and
• legislative reforms, including the issue of residency requirements.

The second track focuses on the creation of an independent, external monitor to ensure that the Department's commitment to preventing corruption is sustained and that its internal systems for pursuing corruption operate effectively. It is this external monitor that will be the focus of this interim report.

The External Monitor

The Commission urges the immediate establishment of a permanent external monitor, independent of the Department, to assess the effectiveness of the Department's systems for detecting, preventing, and investigating corruption; to evaluate Department conditions and values that affect the incidence of police corruption; to conduct continual audits of the state of corruption within the Department; and, when appropriate, to make recommendations for improvement. The monitor will issue periodic reports on its findings and recommendations to the Mayor and the Police Commissioner.

This monitor will also serve as a management tool for the Police Commissioner. It will ensure that the Department's anti-corruption systems work effectively -- and that under his or her tenure, the Department will not fall victim to the institutional pressures that erode anti-corruption efforts.

Monitoring Performance of Anti-Corruption Systems

The monitor will:

• ensure that the Department has effective methods for receiving and recording corruption allegations and analyzing corruption trends;
• assess the sufficiency and quality of investigative resources and personnel;
• ensure that the Department employs effective methods and management in conducting corruption investigations, including that it no longer solely relies on a reactive investigative system that narrowly focuses on isolated complaints and that rarely employs pro-active investigative techniques;
• ensure that the Department has successful intelligence-gathering efforts, including effective undercover, field associate, integrity testing, and community outreach programs;
• evaluate the Department's efforts to revitalize and enforce command accountability;
• ensure that the Department strengthens supervision, including levels and quality of first-line supervision, training of supervisors, and consideration of integrity history in determining assignments and promotions;
• require the Department to produce reports on police corruption and corruption trends including, analysis of the number of complaints investigated and the disposition of those complaints, the number of arrests and referrals for prosecution, and the number of Department disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions imposed; and
• conduct performance tests and inspections of the Department's anti-corruption units and programs to guarantee that the Department continually maximizes its capacity to police itself.

The monitor must also have its own investigative capacity to successfully carry out its audits of the Department's internal controls. It will conduct its own self-initiated corruption investigations, intelligence-gathering efforts, and integrity tests to the extent necessary to test the Department's performance. This capacity is not meant to replace the Department's or prosecutors' own investigations or to serve an enforcement purpose, but to ensure that the Department's intelligence-gathering and investigative efforts are focused on areas where corruption is likely to exist.

This investigative capacity is crucial to successfully carrying out the monitor's principal task of auditing and evaluating the Department's anti-corruption efforts. It was only by having such an investigative capacity that this Commission was able to uncover many of the deficiencies in the Department's intelligence gathering, investigative and supervisory efforts, and to determine that the nature and extent of corruption was far more serious than suggested by the Department's official position on corruption.

Monitoring Cultural Conditions

The monitor must also:

• ensure that the Department makes effective efforts to reform the conditions and attitudes that nurture and perpetuate corruption and brutality;
• assess the effectiveness of recruit education, integrity training, field training operation, and the integrity standards set by supervisors;
• ensure that the Department works to eliminate corruption and brutality tolerance and the code of silence;
• evaluate Department efforts to pursue and uncover brutality and its connection to corruption;
• determine whether the Department routinely assigns officers with discipline problems only to certain commands within the Department, such as high-crime, minority precincts, and to determine the impact of such practices;
• evaluate the effectiveness of the Department's drug and alcohol abuse policies, and prevention treatment, and detection efforts;
• evaluate the Department's efforts to overcome police attitudes that isolate them from the public and often create the appearance of a hostile and corrupt police force; and
• enhance liaison efforts with community groups and precinct community councils to provide the Department with input from the public about their perception and information about police corruption and to obtain information for the monitor's recommendations for reform.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Mayor establish a permanent Police Commission headed by three to five highly reputable and knowledgeable citizens appointed by the Mayor who would be willing to serve pro bono. We further recommend that the Commissioners have a limited, staggered term to guarantee turnover, avoid staleness, and prevent the development of a long-term bureaucratic relationship with the Department that could compromise the Commission's independence.

To accomplish its tasks, the Commission's powers should include: the power to subpoena witnesses and documents, unrestricted access to Department records and personnel; the power to administer oaths and take testimony in private and public hearings; and the power to grant use immunity. We do not recommend the creation of a large and costly bureaucracy. With the aforementioned powers, the Commission could perform its work with a small staff of people with varied expertise, including attorneys, investigators, police management experts, and organizational and statistical analysts.

The Police Commission should cooperate with the Police Commissioner in establishing a total commitment to maintaining integrity and the corruption fighting capacity of the Department. It should monitor the implementation of a system of accountability throughout the Department enforced by a program of incentives and disincentives. The Police Commission should cooperate with the Police Commissioner in redefining police culture to reflect the identity of interest between the members of the public and the Department with emphasis on the infusion of mutual respect.

Conclusion

It is the Commission's hope that this interim report will assist the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, and the people of New York City in addressing the problems of police corruption, and the reforms necessary to combat it effectively today and in the future.

Commission To Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption And The Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department

Commissioners

Milton Mollen, Chair
Harold Baer, Jr.
Herbert Evans
Roderick C. Lankler
Harold Tyler

Commission Staff

Joseph P. Armao, Chief Counsel
Leslie U. Cornfeld, Deputy Chief Counsel
Brian Carroll, Director of Investigations
Robert Machado & Frank O'Hara, Deputy Chief Investigators

Counsel

David A Burns
Edward Cunningham
Charles M. Guria
Jeffrey Zimmerman

Director of Media Relations

Torn Kelly

Support Staff

Nancy Levine
Anne Sherlock
Lourdes Sinisterra

Investigators and Analysts

Frances Alexander
Marilyn Coleman
Marcia DeLeon
Alfred Fernandez
Jose Guzman
Thomas Hopkins
Brian T. Kelly
Frank Luce
Samuel Nieves
Jody Pugach
Charmaine Raphael
Dorice J. Shea
Gregory A Thomas

Special Counsel

Jonny J. Frank
William Goodstein

Volunteer Attorneys

Charles King
Thomas M. Obermaier

_______________

Notes:

1. Corruption today is not limited to these types of crimes, as our final report will make clear. Some officers continue to accept and solicit gratuities from business owners, tow-truck operators and the like. These corrupt practices should not be ignored. As officers repeatedly told us, serious corruption often begins with more minor misconduct and corruption. This interim report, however, focuses only on the more serious forms of corruption we uncovered.
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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 5:52 am

EXHIBIT SEVEN

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Re: The City of New York: Commission to Investigate Allegati

Postby admin » Sun Jul 13, 2014 7:40 am

PART 1 OF 2

EXHIBIT EIGHT

THE FAILURE TO APPREHEND MICHAEL DOWD: THE DOWD CASE REVISITED

The question of how Michael Dowd and other police officers of the 75th Precinct could have perpetrated their corruption for so long with impunity provides a most glaring example of the recent failures of the Police Department's corruption controls. From 1986 through 1992, the Department's Internal Affairs Division ("IAD") received sixteen separate allegations implicating Michael Dowd and his associates. After six years of investigations, every case against Dowd was closed as unsubstantiated, despite the overwhelming evidence that Dowd often acted openly and notoriously and that large numbers of Dowd's fellow officers and supervisors were aware -- or at least strongly suspected -- that he was corrupt.

In November 1992, the Department provided its answer to the Dowd debacle. The Police Commissioner's Report into the conduct of the Dowd case blamed the Department's failure to apprehend Dowd on a flawed investigative organization that hindered communication and coordination between the Internal Affairs Division and the Brooklyn North Field Internal Affairs Unit ("FIAU").
This Commission came to a very different conclusion. In our view of the evidence, the Dowd case demonstrates a willful effort on the part of Internal Affairs commanders to impede an investigation that might have uncovered widespread corruption in the 75th Precinct. For reasons that cannot be attributed simply to a bad system of case management, in the course of the Dowd investigation, Internal Affairs fragmented corruption allegations, withheld critical information, denied access to crucial witnesses, and refused to provide essential resources to the FIAU. By doing so, Internal Affairs commanders doomed any hope of a successful investigation of Dowd and other corrupt officers of the 75th Precinct.

To understand how this could have happened, we must understand the attitude that afflicted IAD during the years following a notorious corruption scandal of the mid-1980s.

According to a number of police officers, police commanders, and ranking IAD officers who spoke to the Commission both on and off the record, the 77th Precinct scandal of 1986 -- and the Police Commissioner's response to it -- were the seedbed of the failures of the Department's corruption controls. These events sent a clear message that the Department's reputation could not afford to suffer another large-scale corruption scandal. Police commanders, who observed this scandal's consequences to the borough commander, Assistant Chief DeForrest Taylor and his subordinates, clearly understood that the disclosure of corruption on their watch could harm their careers. [1] A number of IAD officers we interviewed told us that after the 77th Precinct case an unwritten policy developed at IAD to avoid large-scale corruption investigations and publicized arrests that would embarrass the Department and ruin careers. According to these witnesses, this policy started at the top of the Department's command structure, in fact, with the Police Commissioner himself.

At the Commission's public hearings, Daniel F. Sullivan, the Department's Chief of the Inspectional Services Bureau from 1986 to 1992 confirmed what we heard from his subordinates. He testified that after the 77th Precinct case, a climate of reluctance infected internal investigators and field commanders causing them to avoid aggressive pursuit of corruption allegations. He testified that the Department had become "paranoid" about the bad press that revelations of corruption inevitably bring. He testified that the biggest hindrance to investigating corruption was the Department's unwillingness to suffer the negative publicity corruption cases inevitably bring.

That message filtered down from Sullivan to the Department's corruption investigators. IAD and FIAU investigators told the Commission about corruption investigations thwarted by the unwritten rule that patterns of corruption allegations reflecting potentially large-scale corruption problems should be fragmented into individual allegations reflecting isolated incidents. Lieutenant Lawrence Hotaling, for example, spent seven years as an IAD investigator and supervisor. He was an IAD officer during the 77th Precinct investigation and served as a supervisor of IAD's Staff Supervisory Unit, the unit that monitored the investigations of Michael Dowd and other corruption investigations in Brooklyn North. In July 1992, Hotaling told former Commissioner Kelly about IAD's reluctance to pursue broadly based corruption investigations. In a recorded interview Hotaling told Kelly:

What I feel happened is that, whether it was valid or not, it was running through Internal Affairs that the Police Commissioner was not too thrilled with the newspaper articles and everything about the 77 [Precinct]. And this, basically, this [Dowd's] crew had a 75 [Precinct] connection and there was a good possibility it [the 75th precinct investigation] could have blown up as big, if not bigger than the 77. It appeared from my perspective that they [IAD's commanders] were just trying to fragment the investigations so that it wouldn't all look like it's one big situation.


What made this unwritten policy even more dangerous to the public and the Department itself is that Commissioner Ward had reason to know that the 77th Precinct was not the only potentially widespread corruption problem facing the Department in the mid-1980s. Shortly before the 77th Precinct indictments were announced, the Special Prosecutor, Charles J. Hynes, met with Ward to discuss other commands where drug-related corruption might be flourishing. Hynes presented Ward with an analysis done by his office listing seventeen precincts in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, where the volume of drug corruption allegations indicated the need for additional IAD investigations. High atop the list was the 75th Precinct (See Exhibit A).

According to Hynes, Ward refused to approve any additional corruption investigations. In Hynes's view, Ward's response was not the result of a weak resolve to stop corruption, but arose from his unshakable belief that further corruption revelations would cripple the Department's ability to perform its job. Whatever the motivation, the Commission has concluded that Commissioner Ward and Chief Sullivan -- by their action or inaction -- created an unmistakable policy to avoid corruption scandals.

The Brooklyn North FIAU

Under these circumstances, Sergeant Joseph Trimboli joined the Patrol Borough Brooklyn North Field Internal Affairs Unit ("PBBN/FIAU") in 1986. As an FIAU investigator, Trimboli had the duty of conducting corruption investigations within the eleven precincts of the Brooklyn North Patrol Borough. His unit, like all FIAUs, reported to two separate supervisors: IAD and the borough commander.

Although the FIAU reported in the first instance to the borough commander, the bulk of its corruption case assignments came from IAD. IAD was supposed to act as the central intelligence-gathering and investigative body of the Department's internal investigations system. IAD received all complaints and allegations of corruption, processed them for administrative and intelligence purposes, and assigned the case for investigation. IAD's commanding officer, or executive officer, had the unbridled discretion to retain corruption allegations for investigation by IAD or to assign them out to the appropriate FIAU where they became the primary responsibility of the borough commander. Nonetheless, IAD was supposed to retain for investigation: (i) especially serious or complex allegations; (ii) allegations that crossed command lines; (iii) allegations against high-ranking police officials; (iv) allegations against members of IAD itself; and (v) any other allegation that involved particularly sensitive aspects of police work.

In addition, if IAD assigned an investigation to an FIAU, it had the responsibility to insure the quality of the FIAU's investigation. Through its Staff Supervisory Unit, IAD was supposed to review and evaluate the FIAU's investigation and provide it with guidance and assistance. In fact, if IAD was dissatisfied with an FIAU's investigation, it had the power to take over the investigation, re-investigate the case on its own, or conduct a parallel investigation to insure the FIAU did a thorough and professional job.

When Trimboli joined the PBBN /FIAU, he knew he was in for a busy time. According to Trimboli and many other police officers interviewed by the Commission, the Brooklyn North Patrol Borough had a Department-wide reputation as a command filled with hardened cops, crime-ridden neighborhoods, and plentiful opportunities for corruption. Brooklyn North had, and continues to have, one of the highest volume of corruption complaints under investigation at any given time.

Despite this situation, the PBBN /FIAU had neither the personnel nor the resources to do its job effectively and yet IAD -- whose commanders were fully aware of these circumstances -- continued to assign it serious and complex corruption cases. In the period from 1986 to 1992, the PBBN/FIAU had an average of eighteen investigators, each handling an average of twenty-five cases at any one time -- an impossible task for any investigator. At the same time, IAD and FIAU supervisors pressured investigators to close cases and reduce backlog.

The basic equipment necessary to conduct police corruption investigations was simply not available. As Trimboli put it, in his seven years in PBBN/FIAU all he had available on a consistent basis was "a pair of binoculars, a camera and a paper shredder." Even more disturbing, no help or additional resources was ever forthcoming either from IAD or the borough commander. Simply put, the paltry resources and unmanageable workload of the FIAU indicated to Trimboli and other corruption investigators we interviewed that corruption fighting was plainly not a high priority of the Department's bosses. According to them, internal investigators were, for the most part, "paper pushers" -- getting investigations closed for the record-keepers -- rather than serious corruption fighters. And worse, no one seemed to care.

Trimboli and the 75th Precinct

Trimboli's first encounter with corruption in the 75th Precinct came in 1986. The subject of his investigation was Police Officer Michael Dowd.

On March 4, 1986, the PBBN/FIAU opened a case on Dowd and his partner Gerard Dubois (corruption case no. 86-0449) based on an allegation received from the 75th Precinct's commanding officer, Deputy Inspector Kevin Farrell, [2] that Dowd and Dubois stole money from drug dealers, prisoners, and deceased persons. The investigation was assigned to Sergeant Trimboli.

Although this was the first allegation against Dowd for drug-related corruption, Dowd already had a history of misconduct. In 1985, IAD assigned two investigations against Dowd to the PBBN/FIAU, one for harassing and threatening his girlfriend (who later became his wife) (corruption case no. 85-0183) and the other for engaging in sexual acts with prostitutes in Bailey's Bar (corruption case no. 85-2532) where Dowd and his colleagues often socialized and discussed their corrupt deeds. Both of those investigations were closed as unsubstantiated.

By Dowd's admissions to Commission investigators, by March 1986, Dowd and his "crew," including Officers Dubois, Henry "Chickie" Guevara, Jeffrey Guzzo, Brian Spencer, Walter Yurkiw, Henry Jackson, and others had for over a year already become routinely involved in drug corruption by stealing money and drugs from street dealers, radio run locations, and by "scoring" (stealing) almost every opportunity that presented itself. Yet, it took over a year for internal investigators to begin their first drug-related investigation of Dowd. In fact, just four days after the initiation of the Dowd and Dubois investigation, IAD assigned the PBBN/FIAU another investigation into allegations of brutality by Dowd, Guevara, Guzzo, and other 75th Precinct officers (corruption case 86-0039).

Obviously, the Department's intelligence-gathering system had fallen down on the job, even though suspicions about Dowd's and Dubois's conduct circulated among officers and supervisors of the 75th precinct, including the precinct's commanding officer, Deputy Inspector Farrell. After all, it was Farrell who reported Dowd and Dubois to IAD in March 1986; and in June 1986, he assigned both Dowd and Dubois to the Coney Island Summer Detail, a well-known "dumping ground" used by police commanders to get discipline problems out of their commands and beyond their responsibility -- at least for the summer. Interestingly, when questioned by Commission investigators, (now) Deputy Chief Farrell denied any knowledge of a corruption problem within the 75th Precinct during his tenure. Even when shown the corruption log documenting his report to IAD, Farrell still claimed to have no recollection of making any allegation against Dowd, Dubois, or any other officer in that command.

Trimboli's investigation into Dowd and Dubois continued when Dowd returned to duty in the 75th Precinct in September 1986. [3] The investigation was closed in April 1987. Although it failed to substantiate the original drug-related allegations, Trimboli observed Dowd and his new temporary partner, Walter Yurkiw, engage in several patrol violations while on duty. As a result, Yurkiw received a Command Discipline; [4] Dowd pleaded guilty to charges of being off post and failure to safeguard his Department radio. He received a penalty of eight forfeited vacation days. Despite his years of corruption and crime as a police officer, eight forfeited vacation days represents the only penalty -- other than a single command discipline -- that the Department ever imposed on Dowd until his arrest in May, 1992.

The R&T Grocery Store Robbery

Although Trimboli had not known Yurkiw before 1986, it was Yurkiw who put Trimboli back on Dowd's trail in the Summer of 1988. On the evening of July 1, 1988, Yurkiw along with 75th Precinct police officer, Jeffrey Guzzo, and former 75th Precinct police officer Chickie Guevara robbed at gun point the R&T Grocery Store, a drug location on Livonia Avenue in the 75th Precinct. After the robbery, Yurkiw reported for duty at the 75th Precinct leaving the car he and his accomplices used in a nearby parking lot with proceeds of the robbery sitting in plain view. Only hours later, officers of the 75th Precinct's Robbery Unit took Yurkiw into custody and the commanding officer of PBBN/FIAU, Captain (now Deputy Inspector) Stephen Friedland, responded to the precinct. The next morning, at the direction of IAD's commanding officer, Assistant Chief John Moran, an IAD investigations unit under the command of Captain (now Deputy Inspector) Thomas Callahan took over the investigation from the FIAU.

Unlike IAD, Friedland was not satisfied in treating this robbery as a discreet and isolated incident as IAD was to do. He suspected that the R&T Grocery Store robbery indicated wider and deeper problems of corruption within the 75th Precinct. On July 11, 1988, he directed that the FIAU initiate a self-generated investigation into corruption within the entire 75th Precinct and assigned Sergeant Trimboli to undertake that investigation. Thus began Trimboli's years of frustrated attempts to apprehend Michael Dowd and his accomplices.

Friedland had good reason to suspect extensive corruption within the 75th Precinct. Since Dowd returned from the Coney Island detail in 1986, he and his partners, such as Walter Yurkiw, Jeffrey Guzzo, and Kenneth Eurell, regularly engaged in corruption and crimes both on and off duty. By the Summer of 1987, Dowd and Eurell were on the payroll of a major drug organization, taking $8,000 a week in return for providing protection, information, and assistance. Off duty, Dowd, Yurkiw, Guzzo, and Guevara, with the aid of drug dealer accomplices, were committing armed robberies of drug locations in East New York, and Dowd and Eurell were selling cocaine in Suffolk County. By the Fall of 1987, only a year after the 77th Precinct scandal should have taught the Department a lasting lesson, Dowd was driving a new red Corvette sports car into the precinct every day, wearing expensive clothes, throwing lavish parties for friends, and taking limousines from the precinct on gambling jaunts to Atlantic City.

According to Dowd, he did not conceal his well-heeled lifestyle from fellow officers and supervisors, and not one of them ever confronted him to explain what were obvious indications of corruption. In fact, Dowd contends, the opposite was true. Some officers wanted to join him in making scores, and supervisors were content to avoid him rather than challenge him. Dowd knew his supervisors were not naive. Thus, their complacency not only failed to deter his criminal conduct but actually encouraged it.

As early as 1987, IAD's commanders must also have known that Dowd and other officers of the 75th Precinct were engaged in serious crimes. From November 1987 to January 1988, when Dowd and Eurell were at the depths of their corrupt activities, IAD received eight separate allegations involving Dowd, Eurell, and other officers of the 75th Precinct. By the end of 1988, Dowd alone had nine separate allegations of corruption lodged against him at IAD. By the end of 1991, IAD received four more corruption charges against Dowd.

Despite the incontrovertible indications of serious corruption on the part of Dowd and other officers of the 75th Precinct, IAD's commanders over six years, Chiefs Daniel Sullivan, John Moran, and Robert Beatty, never initiated a single investigation of Dowd, until they learned of Dowd's impending arrest by Suffolk County law enforcement officers. They never directed that a single integrity test be attempted; they never placed an undercover in the precinct; they never sought information from the Department's vaunted field associates; they never sought information from the Department's narcotics units. Instead, they directed that each one of the corruption complaints against Dowd and others be assigned as separate corruption cases to the overworked and unequipped PBBN /FIAU, where they became the responsibility of the borough commander and where these cases inevitably died a natural death. In the course of six years, IAD assigned to the PBBN/FIAU no less than twelve separate corruption cases involving Dowd. Every one of them was finally closed as unsubstantiated, and most of those case closings were approved by Brooklyn North's borough commander, Thomas Gallagher, and IAD's commanding officer, Robert Beatty.

What makes matters worse, the corruption complaints received by IAD over the years represented only a small part of IAD's knowledge about Dowd and other corrupt 75th Precinct police officers -- the investigation of the R&T Grocery Store robbery told much more.

Corruption in the 75th Precinct

After Yurkiw's arrest on July 1, 1988, IAD's Captain Thomas Callahan, Sergeant (now lieutenant) William Bradley, and other IAD officers of Complaint Investigation Unit 1 ("CIU 1") commenced their attempts to identify Yurkiw's accomplices. By this time, IAD was working the robbery investigation with attorneys of the Office of the State Special Prosecutor ("OSSP"). At every turn, they learned new information about Dowd.

On July 7, 1988, three weeks after the robbery, the 75th Precinct's commanding officer, Deputy Inspector John Harkins, informed Callahan that precinct rumor connected Dowd to the robbery. On July 11, 1988, Lieutenant Richard Armstrong, the precinct's Integrity Control Officer, told IAD investigators about Bailey's Bar, a hangout for Dowd and his crew. Armstrong told Callahan and his investigators that he had information that just before the time of the robbery Dowd was inside Bailey's Bar with Yurkiw, Guzzo, Guevara, and another 75th Precinct Officer, Kimberly Welles.

On July 28, 1988, just three weeks after the robbery, Bradley and OSSP attorney Daniel Landes interviewed two informants who were cooperating with the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. [5] These informants, like Dowd, worked for the Adam Diaz drug gang. They told Bradley and Landes that their drug organization paid Dowd $3,000 to $4,000 and an ounce of cocaine each week in return for police protection. One of the informants even picked out Dowd's and Guevara's photographs from photo arrays.

 Officer Took Drug Payoffs, U.S. Charges
By CRAIG WOLFF
Published: July 31, 1992
NEW YORK TIMES

Michael Dowd, the former New York City police officer whose arrest on cocaine trafficking charges spurred four separate investigations of corruption in the New York City Police Department, was arrested yesterday on Federal charges that he received huge weekly cash payments from drug gangs over a three-year period. In exchange, prosecutors said, he provided the gangs with protection against police raids as well as with stashes of guns and police badges.

Mr. Dowd was arrested in May by the Suffolk County police along with four other active officers and one retired officer on charges that they bought and sold cocaine, sometimes through their beats in Brooklyn. Mr. Dowd was arrested again yesterday at his home on Long Island following an investigation by United States Attorney Otto G. Obermaier. He had been out on bail and was dismissed from the department earlier this month.

Integral Part of Drug World

Although there had previously been suspicions and allegations that Mr. Dowd might be cooperating with drug gangs, his arrest yesterday represents the first time he was charged with actually assisting and protecting drug dealers. While Mr. Dowd and the five other officers had been considered rogue officers operating almost as private entrepreneurs, the new charges paint a broader picture of an officer who was an integral part of the drug world. Prosecutors also said informants had told them that other officers had also been receiving payoffs.

With the Police Department already under fire for its failure to detect and root out Mr. Dowd, who has been labeled by law enforcement officials as the mastermind among the arrested officers, the new charges are likely to raise yet more questions about the department's own internal safeguards against corruption.

It also raises questions about why Federal authorities did not decide to prosecute Mr. Dowd sooner. While their investigation began in earnest following Mr. Dowd's arrest, much of the evidence against him was learned by the United States Attorney's office as far back as 1988, when Mr. Dowd was an officer at the 75th Precinct in the East New York section of Brooklyn. He was later transferred to the 94th Precinct in Greenpoint, where prosecutors said he embarked on another drug scheme.

The Dowd case has come to symbolize the new focus on police corruption. In addition to the Federal investigation, Mayor David N. Dinkins appointed a special commission to investigate corruption, the first panel of its kind in New York City in 20 years. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes is investigating the case, and Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown, who has been conducting his own inquiry, has ordered changes in tactics used by the department's Internal Affairs Division.

U.S. Names a Middleman

Federal prosecutors said that they also arrested another man yesterday, Borrent Perez, whom they labeled as a middleman in the payment of money to Mr. Dowd. Mr. Perez was not named or implicated in the previous charges against Mr. Dowd.

The prosecutors said that much of the evidence against Mr. Dowd in the Federal case was learned through members of a Dominican drug gang known as the Company, who were arrested in March 1991, in addition to information learned through members of other drug gangs who said they did business with Mr. Dowd.

One of the gang members told investigators that Mr. Dowd was paid between $5,000 and $10,000 in an envelope that he picked up from Mr. Perez at Auto Sound City, an automobile stereo store on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn. The informant told investigators that Mr. Dowd provided advance warning on drug raids.

Shown a picture of Mr. Dowd in 1991, long before the arrest of Mr. Dowd, the informant identified him as "Michael," the officer whom he believed was getting money from Mr. Perez. Prosecutors said the informant was also able to identify Mr. Dowd's partner at the time, whom he said often accompanied Mr. Dowd to the stereo store.

Another member of the Company said that Mr. Dowd provided guns and badges and police radios to the gang. He also identified a photograph of Mr. Dowd in 1991 and said he was known as "Mike the cop."

Prosecutors said that members of another major gang, whose head, Adam Diaz, has been convicted for drug conspiracy, told them that Mr. Dowd also worked with Mr. Diaz's gang. One informant told investigators that Mr. Dowd "regularly received several thousand dollars" at a bodega run by Mr. Diaz at 2788 Atlantic Avenue in East New York, where other officers from the 75th Precinct also received payoffs.

And, prosecutors said, another member of Mr. Diaz's gang paid Mr. Dowd $4,000 weekly from the bodega. This gang member told investigators Mr. Dowd would signal an associate of Mr. Diaz's with a beeper that Federal agents were in the area and that they should stop dealing drugs for the moment. At some point, prosecutors said, Mr. Dowd was supplied with an ounce of cocaine a week by Mr. Diaz.

Asked why Mr. Dowd was not arrested earlier on Federal charges and why Mr. Dowd's partner was not also arrested, assistant United States Attorney David B. Fein said that he was not permitted to comment. Calls to Mr. Obermaier were not returned.

Mr. Dowd's attorney, Marvin Hirsch, said that given recent newspaper articles about Mr. Dowd's possible involvement with drug gangs, he was "not shocked" by the new charges.

But he said he was already thinking about a classic defense, designed to attack the credibility of the witnesses.

"I don't know who it is who is testifying against him," Mr. Hirsch said. "We could have a couple of guys who are in jail, doing 800 years to life, that are looking to better their situation. I'm curious to see how the Government intends to corroborate the statements of these kinds of people."

________________________________________

Arrests in New York Are Said to Cripple A Huge Drug Gang
By SETH FAISON
Published: September 9, 1994
The New York Times

Arsenio Diaz began his career in the drug business in Washington Heights as a corner lookout for a dealer after arriving from the Dominican Republic in 1984, according to law-enforcement officials. Ten years later, they say, he had become the biggest drug dealer in upper Manhattan, and one of the biggest in New York City.

Mr. Diaz, 37, was indicted yesterday, along with 63 of his employees, on murder, conspiracy and drug charges, prosecutors said. Officials said it brought an end to an efficient, $1 million-a-week operation that Mr. Diaz had named, simply, La Compania: The Company.

In a series of raids that began on Tuesday night, the police have arrested 36 Compania members so far. An additional six suspects, including Mr. Diaz, were already in custody. District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau of Manhattan said this was the second largest drug case ever brought by his office, surpassed by only the so-called French Connection-2 case last year, when 66 were charged.

The arrests, the culmination of a 16-month undercover operation, effectively dismantled the group, Mr. Morgenthau said. With 150 employees, working in two 12-hour shifts, La Compania packaged and sold both powdered and crack cocaine, and used violence and sophisticated electronics to protect its operations in six buildings near Amsterdam Avenue and 150th Street, he said.

That area falls within the 30th Precinct, where 14 police officers were arrested earlier this year in a major corruption scandal. The officers are charged with robbing and beating up drug dealers and with demanding protection money.

Police Commissioner William J. Bratton and Mr. Morgenthau said the possibility of a connection between La Compania and the rogue police officers in the 30th Precinct was under investigation. He would not comment further.

It was a coincidence, Mr. Morgenthau added, that a drug gang linked to Officer Michael Dowd -- whose arrest in 1992 sparked a wide inquiry into police corruption -- was also called La Compania and, sometimes, the Diaz Connection. In that case, the gang leader was believed to be Adam Diaz, who was based in the East New York section of Brooklyn, Mr. Morgenthau said.

At a news conference yesterday, Mr. Bratton appealed to residents of Harlem and Washington Heights, many of whom have expressed anger at the proliferation of drug activity hand-in-hand with corruption in the 30th Precinct, to view the Diaz case as a sign of more aggressive policing.

As with other prominent Manhattan drug gangs that have been knocked down in recent years -- the Jheri Curls, the Wild Cowboys and, most recently, the Young Talented Children -- law-enforcement officials proclaimed a victory in the war on drugs but could not say that it would affect the price or availability of drugs on the street.

Mr. Diaz's lawyer, Oswaldo Gonzales, could not be reached for comment yesterday.

A Complex System

La Compania, prosecutors said, used a complex system to avoid detection by the police. Working in two 12-hour shifts, lookouts used intercoms and cellular telephones to watch for the police, while sellers had remote-control devices to operate electronically controlled trap doors and removable wall panels to hide drugs whenever the police neared.

Walter Arsenault, chief of the Manhattan District Attorney's homicide investigation unit, said police officers with search warrants broke into buildings used by La Compania on numerous occasions, only to find them empty.

Mr. Diaz himself rarely carried drugs, Mr. Arsenault said. His arrest, in June, was something of a fluke.

An Alarm Sounded

A police sergeant and a detective were apparently spotted by Mr. Diaz's lookouts as they neared one of La Compania's buildings, Mr. Arsenault said. At the time, undercover officers from a separate police unit were inside an apartment in the building, trying to make an undercover cocaine purchase, but when an alarm was sounded, they fled with La Compania employees.

The sergeant and the detective found the apartment open and empty, but the door accidentally shut, locking them in, Mr. Arsenault said. Then someone unlocked the door from the outside, he said, and in walked Mr. Diaz with Alejandro Velez, also indicted yesterday, who officials said managed the building.

The officers arrested Mr. Diaz for drug possession after finding an eighth of an ounce of cocaine in the apartment, Mr. Arsenault said.

'We Got Lucky'

"He got sloppy on one occasion," Mr. Arsenault said. "And we got lucky."

Mr. Arsenault said undercover officers collected evidence in 25 separate cocaine purchases from La Compania, beginning in March. Mr. Diaz was held without bail after his arrest, but it took prosecutors three more months to complete the investigation needed to prepare indictments for all 64 suspects.
Mr. Diaz was charged with killing two former members of La Compania and another man at 147th Street and Amsterdam Avenue who were believed to be competing for La Compania's customers.

Mr. Diaz became known to law-enforcement officials as a suspected narcotics dealer shortly before 1990, Mr. Arsenault said, but kept his private life well guarded.

An Illegal Immigrant

Mr. Diaz, an illegal immigrant who arrived from the Dominican Republic in 1984, never applied for permanent-resident status in the United States, prosecutors said.

When he began earning money in the late 1980's, prosecutors said, Mr. Diaz bought a bodega and a beauty salon in Manhattan that operated as legitimate businesses.

After assuming control of La Compania by 1990, he sold the businesses and invested in property in his Dominican hometown, San Francisco de Marcois, which is known for producing talented major-league baseball players.

Mr. Diaz owns a high-price supper club, a disco and several other businesses in San Francisco de Marcois, Mr. Arsenault said, adding that Mr. Diaz could have moved money there so that United States law-enforcement officials would have difficulty seizing it.

'Known as the Mayor'

Mr. Morgenthau said Mr. Diaz's big-spending ways had made him a celebrity in his hometown, where he has spent most of his time since 1990.
"He's known as the mayor," Mr. Morgenthau said.

Mr. Morgenthau also said Mr. Diaz was a celebrity in upper Manhattan, and was widely known as the No. 1 drug dealer there.

Several residents interviewed near Amsterdam Avenue and 150th Street said the brutality and vindictiveness of drug gangs made them reluctant to discuss the gangs. Yet some acknowledged having heard of Mr. Diaz, and more than one expressed surprise at the arrests.

"This is the best thing they've done in all these years," said an elderly woman walking down Amsterdam Avenue. "If they didn't have all this corruption, then maybe it would have been sooner."

Map shows the locations of six La Compania buildings.


As procedure dictated, Bradley recorded this information on work sheets and relayed it to Callahan, CIU 1's commander, and up IAD's chain of command to Inspector Michael Pietrunti, the chief of IAD's Investigations Section, Deputy Chief William Carney, IAD's Executive Officer, and ultimately to IAD's commanding officer, Assistant Chief Moran. Although this information corroborated a number of corruption complaints about Dowd that IAD had received just months before, IAD did nothing with this crucial information other than to pass it on to Sergeant Trimboli -- six weeks later. IAD made no attempt to use this information to expand their robbery investigation to include Dowd. In fact, by Callahan's own admission, by August 1988, Dowd was not a target of IAD's investigation.

If Callahan and his superiors believed that all this information was not enough to justify a full-scale IAD investigation into Dowd and drug corruption in the 75th Precinct, even more information was to come.

On August 29, 1988, detectives of the 62nd Precinct arrested Yurkiw (who was out on bail on the robbery charges) for harassing his former girlfriend. After his arrest, Detective Gerard Wiser overheard Yurkiw on the precinct telephone stating: "If this [his arrest] isn't handled right, he would call Hynes's Office [the OSSP] and blow the whistle." Detective Wiser passed on this information to Bradley. Although no one at IAD bothered to check, Yurkiw's telephone call was to Michael Dowd. Yurkiw was attempting to pressure Dowd into coercing his girlfriend to drop the harassment charges. No one at IAD, moreover, ever asked Yurkiw what information he possessed about which he could "blow the whistle." In fact, attempting to turn Yurkiw or any of his accomplices (with the cooperation of the OSSP, of course) was not an investigative tactic ever attempted by IAD.

The next day, Bradley interviewed Yurkiw's girlfriend, an admitted cocaine user. She told Bradley that she knew Yurkiw was a corrupt cop. She told him that on a number of occasions, she had seen him in his apartment with Dowd, Guzzo, and Guevara in possession of large quantities of cocaine and money laid out on the kitchen table. IAD did nothing with this information other than record it in a worksheet and pass it on to the OSSP.

But that was not the end of Yurkiw's girlfriend's information. Three months later, on November 30, 1988, IAD arrested Yurkiw again on her complaint that Yurkiw had threatened her life to force her to act as an alibi witness for him at his robbery trial.

From November 30 to December 1, 1988, Sergeant Bradley interviewed Yurkiw's girlfriend four times. Her information confirmed that the 75th Precinct was in the throws of rampant drug corruption. She gave Bradley specific information. She reported that Yurkiw told her that there was a group of approximately twenty-five police officers in the 75th Precinct who were systematically robbing drug dealers and drug locations. She told Bradley that before the July 1988 robbery of the R&T Grocery Store at 923 Livonia Avenue, she had observed that address and others on a list of known drug locations in East New York that Yurkiw kept in the glove compartment of his car. She told Bradley that these robberies were taking place since February 1987 and that Yurkiw transported cocaine from drug locations in the 75th Precinct to Suffolk County for Michael Dowd and his brother, who was also a police officer.

When questioned by Commission investigators, Yurkiw's girlfriend stated that based on her conversations with Yurkiw and her observations of his activities with Dowd and other police officers, she knew that the 75th Precinct suffered a corruption problem of large dimensions. She said that she could tell that IAD investigators did not believe her. She was right. In his report of his November interviews with her, Bradley added a personal assessment of her credibility. In essence, Bradley stated that because she was an admitted drug user and had a romantic entanglement with Yurkiw, her "credibility and allegiances were suspect" (See Exhibit B). It is very curious, however, that her allegations and credibility were sufficient to constitute the basis of two additional arrests of Yurkiw in August and November 1988.

According to Bradley, he forwarded all of this information to his superiors: Callahan, Pietrunti, Carney, and Moran. Not one of them ever directed that IAD explore Yurkiw's girlfriend's allegations in any way. In fact, IAD never even assigned her information a corruption case number, as procedure dictates for every corruption allegation that comes to IAD's attention. Her information indicating large-scale corruption in the 75th Precinct was, in a word, buried.

On December 27, 1988, IAD's investigation of the R&T Grocery Store robbery was closed with a final report written by Bradley and Callahan, endorsed by Chief Moran and addressed to Chief Sullivan. Despite all the evidence IAD had obtained about his corrupt activities, the final report makes not a single mention of Michael Dowd. No one at IAD ever initiated a single investigation of Dowd or any other police officer of the 75th Precinct despite the extensive evidence.

Incredibly, neither Callahan, Bradley, nor any other IAD investigator communicated this vital information to Sergeant Trimboli, who, by this time, was conducting a one-man, precinct-wide investigation into corruption in the 75th Precinct. It was only in October 1989, when Trimboli was finally allowed to review IAD's case files, that he learned about Yurkiw's girlfriend's information, Yurkiw's telephone conversation overheard by Detective Wiser, and the fact that at the time of his sentencing Guzzo offered to provide information to IAD about other corrupt cops in the 75th Precinct -- all critical information that IAD had in its possession for months, never put to any use, and never told to Sergeant Trimboli.

The Trimboli Investigation

At the same time IAD was investigating the R&T Grocery Store robbery with a team of seven investigators, including two sergeants, two lieutenants, and a captain, Sergeant Trimboli alone was conducting the investigation that IAD should have undertaken: the investigation of potentially widespread corruption within the 75th Precinct. When questioned by former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly and later by Commission investigators about IAD's startling lack of action against Dowd during the R&T Grocery Store investigation, Callahan stated that he thought PBBN/FIAU was "hot on the trail of Michael Dowd." But Callahan and his superiors had reason to know otherwise.

When Trimboli launched the PBBN /FIAU's self-generated case (corruption case no. 88-966) in July 1988, IAD's Chief Moran or his executive officer, Chief Carney, ordered a "monitor" of the investigation, a relatively rare practice for IAD. The monitor required Trimboli to submit his worksheets to IAD on a weekly basis, allowing them to watch Trimboli's progress closely and keep a contemporaneous account of his investigation's developments. Placing a monitor on the case told Trimboli that, for better or for worse, IAD's commanders had a special interest in the progress of his investigation.

By the Fall of 1988, when IAD had already ruled out Dowd as a subject of their robbery investigation, Trimboli had acquired enough information to know that the 75th Precinct's corruption problems went far beyond even Michael Dowd. And, through its monitor of the case, so did IAD.

Two months into Trimboli's investigation, in September 1988, 75th Precinct detectives arrested Jorge Royos, [6] a drug dealer with connections to East New York drug traffickers Adam Diaz and Baron Perez. After his arrest, Royos, wanting to make a deal, told detectives he often socialized with police officers, including Michael Dowd, his brother, Guzzo, Guevara, and Kenneth Eurell. He informed the detectives that the Dowds used cocaine and associated with drug dealers at Auto Sound City, an East New York car stereo store. Trimboli knew that Auto Sound City was connected to Dowd. On two separate occasions Trimboli observed Dowd's red Corvette parked inside the location. On the second occasion, Trimboli actually had a conversation with Perez who admitted that he knew Dowd and that various cops from the 75th Precinct visited Auto Sound City.

While in jail awaiting trial, Royos telephoned Trimboli in October 1988, about a month after their first meeting. He told Trimboli that he was willing to give him more information about "the man with the red Corvette." After notifying IAD of the offer, Trimboli interviewed him.

Royos confirmed what Trimboli had already strongly suspected. Auto Sound City was a front for a large drug organization and was used as a center for the delivery and distribution of cocaine and the transportation of guns. He told Trimboli that someone named Adam (Adam Diaz) ran the operation and paid off Dowd for police protection and for special deliveries of cocaine in amounts of five kilograms or more. He told Trimboli that Yurkiw, Guzzo, and Guevara committed armed robberies of drug locations where Dowd informed them drugs had been delivered. He also told Trimboli that Eurell was a heavy drug user. Royos agreed to view photo arrays and assist Trimboli's investigation.

With Royos's help, Trimboli's investigation now showed promise of apprehending 75th Precinct officers who were involved in serious narcotics corruption. But he knew he could not do it alone. A case of such magnitude, he believed, required IAD's assistance and expertise. He also knew that at that very time, IAD's Captain Callahan was investigating the armed robbery of the R&T Grocery Store committed by Yurkiw, Guzzo, and Guevara, three of the 75th Precinct Police Officers Royos identified.

The day after he interviewed Royos, Trimboli telephoned IAD. He spoke to lieutenant Hotaling of IAD's Staff Supervisory Unit, briefed him on Royos's information, and requested IAD's participation and assistance. Hotaling, sensing that the case had reached a critical juncture, told Trimboli that he would consult Callahan.

When questioned by Commission investigators, Hotaling stated that in the Fall of 1988, the R&T Grocery Store robbery investigation was the most significant police corruption case IAD was conducting at that time. According to his testimony, IAD investigators and their superiors were well aware of the dimension of the corruption problems in the 75th Precinct, Dowd's central role in that corruption, and Trimboli's investigation. On occasion, he would inform Callahan of Trimboli's developments in an effort to persuade Callahan to expand his investigation to include Dowd and other 75th Precinct officers. Hotaling described Callahan's reaction to his attempts in a private hearing:

Question: Were you bringing Callahan the worksheets [of Trimboli's investigation]?

Hotaling: Oh yeah, I was bringing them to him let's say for the first three or four months. Captain Callahan wasn't thrilled with the fact that I was bringing him [Trimboli's] worksheets.

Question: What do you mean?

Hotaling: ... [I]t got to the point when he said to me one time -- I brought a worksheet to him -- and I said, 'Captain, I got a worksheet on Dowd.' And he got very upset and he said, 'What are you bringing this here for?' [I said,] 'I'm doing a monitor on it and its relevant to the 75 [precinct] and the case you are doing.' Then I was told by him, 'What does this have to do with my case? ... I don't know why you are bringing this. It has nothing to do with my case, so don't bring it to me.' So I didn't bring them [Trimboli's worksheets] to him anymore ....

Question: So you were basically told by Captain Callahan not to give him information on Dowd?

Hotaling: ... I wrote it off to the fact that Callahan ... didn't want more work and what I was bringing to him might broaden his investigation; you know, it was the old 'kill the messenger' syndrome.


Just hours after Trimboli's conversation with Hotaling about Royos's information, Sergeant Robert Rockiki, Hotaling's subordinate, telephoned Trimboli and informed him that Callahan declined to become involved with Trimboli's case and that Trimboli should continue with his own investigation. In response to IAD's refusal to assist Trimboli, the FIAU's commanding officer, Captain Friedland, telephoned IAD to reiterate the request for assistance. He was told by Captain (now Deputy Inspector) Martin Johnson, the commanding officer of the Staff Supervisory Unit, that IAD would provide no assistance and that the FIAU was free to contact any outside agency for assistance. Thereafter, Trimboli informed attorneys of the OSSP about the developments in his case.

In essence, Johnson's message was clear: IAD, the Department's central anticorruption division, refused to assist an investigation of potential large-scale corruption; that if the FIAU needed help, it could turn to any agency but the one it was supposed to. This would not be the last time IAD refused Trimboli's pleas for help.

As Trimboli's investigation continued in November 1988, yet another informant [7] surfaced who had information on police corruption in the 75th Precinct. In jail on charges of burglary, this informant told PBBN /FIAU's Sergeant Kenneth Carlson that several officers of the 75th Precinct regularly bought and sold narcotics. His information corroborated what Royos had told Trimboli. He told Carlson (who debriefed the informant in Trimboli's absence) that he knew of seven officers, including Dowd, who were engaged in narcotics trafficking and was able to identify three of the officers from photo arrays. As Royos told Trimboli, this informant told Carlson that the officer who "drives the red Corvette" (Dowd) is a "runner" for a drug organization and makes deliveries of narcotics out of Auto Sound City. Also consistent with Royos's information, he told Carlson that Dowd set up the robbery of the R&T Grocery Store in July.

Even in the face of this corroborating information, IAD still failed to initiate a case against Dowd or other officers in the precinct. In fact, this information came less than four weeks before Yurkiw's girlfriend informed IAD's Sergeant Bradley of extensive drug corruption in the 75th Precinct. Yet, despite this mounting information, IAD's commanders, Moran, Carney, Pietrunti, and Callahan -- as they had done in the past -- treated these new allegations as a separate and unrelated case, gave it a new corruption case number, and assigned the investigation to the PBBN /FIAU.

Of course, when Trimboli received these new allegations he knew his case was expanding rapidly. According to Trimboli, by the end of November 1988, he already had fifteen to twenty 75th Precinct officers as subjects of his investigation. And IAD knew it. They continued to receive his worksheets on a weekly basis and continued to refuse to offer any assistance.

But Trimboli was not through asking for help. In late November 1988, the commanding officer of the Whitestone Pound, where Dowd had been assigned since August after his release from an alcohol rehabilitation clinic, notified Trimboli that he observed Walter Yurkiw at the Pound. To Trimboli and Friedland, Yurkiw's presence at the Pound where his car was being held as evidence in the grocery store robbery, confirmed Dowd's continuing association with corrupt cops despite his transfer out of the 75th Precinct.

In light of this event and the rapidly accumulating information about Dowd and others, Trimboli and Friedland met with their borough commander, Assistant Chief Thomas Gallagher, to inform him of the developments in Trimboli's investigation. According to Trimboli, Friedland, and the records in Trimboli's case file, Gallagher ordered Friedland to arrange a meeting for him with IAD's commanders to discuss a joint investigation into the 75th Precinct. When questioned by Commission investigators, however, Gallagher testified he had no recollection of ever requesting such a meeting.

Despite Gallagher's lack of memory, Trimboli's worksheets show that on November 21, 1988, Friedland telephoned Captain Johnson and Captain Joseph Nakovics of IAD to communicate the request, on behalf of Chief Gallagher, for a meeting with IAD's commanding officer, Chief Moran, to discuss the FIAU's need for personnel and equipment to assist Trimboli's investigation. Nakovics returned Friedland's call and told him that IAD would not offer any assistance to the FIAU, that there was no personnel or equipment to spare, and that a meeting at IAD was not necessary.

Trimboli was dumbfounded. He could not believe that IAD would abruptly refuse a borough commander's request for a meeting on an important case of police corruption. This was the second occasion that IAD refused the FIAU's direct appeal for assistance. From then on, Trimboli knew that if he was ever to apprehend Michael Dowd, he would have to do it alone. In his view, IAD's inexplicable behavior could only be explained in one way: IAD simply did not want his investigation to succeed; or as he testified at the public bearings, "they did not want it to exist."

Of course, although IAD told the FIAU to go away, information about Dowd simply would not go away. In December 1988, Trimboli and OSSP attorneys debriefed Royos again and he gave even more details of his involvement with Dowd, Yurkiw, and other officers. Most significantly, he stated that he was involved with Yurkiw, Guzzo, Guevara, and Dowd, in a number of armed robberies of drug locations. He stated that he set up the first of several stickups at the R&T Grocery Store by tipping off Yurkiw when narcotics would be on the premises. He stated that Yurkiw, Guzzo, and Guevara robbed the place on a number of occasions, culminating with their arrests in July 1988. He told Trimboli and OSSP attorneys Dennis Hawkins and Daniel Landes that after the robberies, they would meet at Bailey's Bar to divide the proceeds, ranging from a half pound to a full pound of cocaine. At least ten police officers, including Michael Dowd, his brother, and Kenneth Eurell used and divided the drugs. Royos also indicated that Adam Diaz, the boss of the drug organization connected to Auto Sound City, rented his father's grocery store on Blake Avenue in East New York and used it as drug sale spot. During that time, Dowd and Eurell were in the store on a regular basis to collect their payoffs from Diaz. Trimboli passed on this information to IAD through its monitor of his case. Although Royos's latest information surfaced before CIU 1 closed its robbery investigation of the very same officers Royos identified, IAD still did not expand its robbery investigation to include these growing allegations.

Within a month, Trimboli got more news about Dowd. In late January 1989, he discovered that Dowd and a police officer, who was still assigned to the 75th Precinct, were taking a trip to the Dominican Republic, Adam's home country. The trip confirmed that Dowd continued his association with 75th Precinct officers who were subjects of Trimboli's investigation and made him suspect that Dowd might be delivering drugs for Adam across international borders. On his own initiative, Trimboli made arrangements with the Drug Enforcement Administration to keep track of Dowd's activities while in the Dominican Republic. Upon their return to New York, an FIAU investigator observed Walter Yurkiw at the airport to meet Dowd confirming their continuing association. This information was also delivered to IAD.

The Pro-Active Plan

During February 1989, Trimboli and the OSSP made plans to release Royos from prison so that he could make a drug buy from Diaz in an attempt to turn him against Dowd, Eurell, and any other officers involved with Adam's drug ring. Once the OSSP finalized the arrangements with Royos and his attorney, Friedland notified IAD. This time IAD consented to a meeting.

Trimboli was suspicious. For the past ten months of his investigation, IAD had done nothing but throw roadblocks across his path. Now that, despite the odds, his investigation had achieved the prospect of infiltrating the drug ring at the center of police corruption in the 75th Precinct, IAD wanted to be consulted. As he told Commission investigators, Royos's cooperation was the most promising development of his investigation. But he was not sure whether IAD really wanted to help or simply wanted to keep an eye on what might be the beginning of another police corruption scandal. On March 9, 1989, Friedland and Trimboli attended a meeting at IAD, represented by Deputy Chief Carney, Deputy Inspector Pietrunti, Captain Johnson, and Captain Callahan. Although recollections differ greatly about the discussion at this meeting, it apparently involved obtaining IAD's approval for the planned use of Royos as an operative in Trimboli's investigation. Curiously, neither Moran nor Sullivan attended the meeting -- although they were the only two in IAD's strict command structure with the authority to approve such an operation.

The results of the meeting, however, are clear. IAD refused to take any responsibility for removing Royos from prison to participate in the operation. According to Friedland, Moran had serious misgivings about removing Royos from prison for an operation with a "remote chance of success." Moran insisted that if Royos were used, OSSP would have to take full responsibility for Royos and the operation, and Trimboli was prohibited -- either on his own account or on behalf of the OSSP -- from signing Royos out of prison. According to Friedland's recollection, Captain Johnson stated that if these conditions were met, IAD would provide an undercover officer for the operation.

In Trimboli's view, IAD's response to the Royos plan was another attempt to impede his investigation at its most critical juncture. Since his investigation had finally produced a potentially productive opportunity, IAD's commanders were in no position to disapprove it outright. Instead, they imposed difficult conditions of approval they thought could not be met.

To Trimboli, Johnson's conditional offer of an undercover officer was also suspect, since only Moran or Sullivan had the authority to authorize it, and neither of them even attended the meeting or ever communicated their approval of the plan to Friedland or Gallagher. Trimboli's view has merit. During interviews with Commission investigators, neither Chief Moran nor Chief Sullivan recalled being consulted on a plan to use Royos, let alone approving the use of an IAD undercover.

In response to IAD's conditions, the OSSP agreed to accept full responsibility for Royos and the operation. But before Royos ever hit the street, Trimboli ran into another roadblock. But this time it came not from IAD, but from his own borough commander.
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