Part 2 of 2
The Significance of MettaIn the context of contemporary ethical discourse (and contemporary attitudes), the Abhidhamma analysis might seem rather bleak — almost heartless. If Abhidhamma Buddhist thought denies that euthanasia is ever a truly wholesome solution, does it offer an alternative approach — other than simply to sit and witness the death throes of some poor creature? I think in fact that an alternative approach is indeed taken for granted by the texts — but this approach, I would guess, is likely to appear at best somewhat idealistic and at worst hopelessly naive to modern sensibilities. For this alternative highlights what I think amounts to a crucial difference in perspective between the worldview of ancient Buddhist texts and contemporary ethical and philosophical discourse. Put simply,
in Buddhist discourse metta and karuna are regarded as potentially rather more powerful and effective responses to suffering than contemporary ethical discourse would normally allow.At the beginning of this article I quoted the Metta Sutta:
One should not wish another pain out of anger or a notion of enmity. Just as a mother would protect with her life her own son, her only son, so one should cultivate the immeasurable mind towards all living beings and friendliness towards the whole world.
What I want to suggest is that in the Buddhist (and to some extent general Indian religious) framework,
cultivating friendliness and compassion in the face of suffering is seen not simply as a question of the religious contemplative turning inward and refusing to act or intervene, but also in a certain sense as a very practical response to the problem of suffering brought about by sickness and old age.A recent essay by Lambert Schmithausen focuses on the Buddhist attitude towards the dangerous and fearful in nature, and considers how the cultivation of friendliness (maitri/metta) is presented as offering some kind of protection.61 Schmithausen’s study is primarily concerned with friendliness as a means of giving oneself protection from dangers rather than as a means of helping others. Having reviewed the “snake charm” of the Upasena Sutra and Khandha Paritta, followed by the Vedic background, he concludes that in its “typically Buddhist form” the cultivation of friendliness as a means of protection against potentially dangerous creatures “is the cultivation of a friendly mind with regard to them, which is supposed to engender a similar attitude in the addressee(s)” (p. 49). It seems to me that this entails a further dimension to the protective power of friendliness envisaged by traditional Buddhist texts. As Schmithausen notes, the cultivation of friendliness is seen as not only having the power to protect oneself, but as also having the power to engender friendliness in others. And if this is so it has the potential to engender its beneficial effects in others — such beneficial effects as those listed as the
eleven benefits that come to someone who develops the liberation of the heart through friendliness (mettaya cetovimutti): he sleeps happily; he wakes happily; he dreams no bad dreams; he is dear to human beings; he is dear to nonhuman beings; the gods protect him; fire, poison and weapons do not harm him; his mind easily attains concentration; the expression on his face is serene; he dies unconfused; and if he reaches no higher he is born in the world of Brahma.62 Of course, this old list of the benefits of friendliness is understood as presenting the benefits that come to one who cultivates metta as a subject of meditation practice (kammatthana), but the list assuredly points to an attitude that assumes friendliness to be generally beneficial to all concerned.
But there are in the canonical and commentarial texts incidents recounted where the power of friendliness and compassion is in effect employed to the benefit of those who are suffering and in pain. There is a story repeated in at least three places in the atthakatha literature that tells of what happened when a young boy’s mother fell seriously ill:
It is told that when he was still a boy Cakkana’s mother fell ill, and the doctor said that she needed fresh hare’s meat. So Cakkana’s brother sent him off to wander through the fields. Off he went and at that time a hare had come there to eat the tender young crop. When the hare saw him, it ran off fast and got caught in a creeper and cried out. Following the sound Cakkana grabbed the hare thinking that he could make the medicine for his mother. Then he thought, “It is not right that I should take the life of another for the sake of my mother’s life.” So he let the hare go, saying, “Go and enjoy the grass and water in the woods with the other hares.” When his brother asked him if he had caught a hare, Cakkana told him what had happened. His brother scolded him. Cakkana went to his mother and stood [by her] affirming a truth, “Since I was born I am not aware that I have intentionally taken the life of a living creature.” Immediately his mother recovered from her illness.63
Here then the boy’s firm, unwavering commitment to not harming a living creature provides the basis for an affirmation of truth (sacca-kiriya) that has the effect of curing his mother. It is worth noting that Cakkana’s unwavering commitment to avoiding killing is precisely not presented by the commentaries as a blind, uncompromising adherence to the first precept. In the commentarial understanding there are three ways in which one can refrain from unwholesome action through the arising of wholesome consciousness: (1) one can naturally refrain from wrong action, etc., when the opportunity for wrong action, etc. has arisen; (2) one can refrain because one has previously undertaken the precepts; or (3) one can refrain by cutting off all desire for wrong action, etc. by reaching the noble path. The story of Cakkana is told as an illustration of the first kind of circumstance.
Interestingly Cakkana’s words here echo almost precisely another famous affirmation of truth, that of the serial murderer “reborn” as an arahat, Angulimala. Wandering in Savatthi for alms, Angulimala comes across a woman struggling with the pains of birth. He is moved, saying to himself, “How beings suffer! How beings suffer!” A little later he tells the Buddha who instructs him to return to Savatthi and utter the words: “Lady, since I was born into the noble birth I am not aware that I have intentionally taken the life of a living creature. By this truth may you be safe, may your child be safe.” And indeed the woman was safe, the child was safe.64 These two stories show the power of what is in effect metta — a commitment to not harming living creatures — being employed by means of an affirmation of truth to help someone who is sick and in pain by in one case an arahat and in the other just a boy.65
Beyond the Theravada: The Sarvastivada and the Upayakausalya SutraWhile it goes beyond the scope of the present paper (and of my competence) to attempt to explore in depth the issue under discussion in the Sarvastvadin-Vaibhasika Abhidharma, it is perhaps worth pointing out that its understanding of the principles involved seems to be for the most part consonant with the Theravada. Thus the Abhidharmakosa distinguishes two types of “origin” for acts: the general cause (hetu-samutthana) and the immediate cause (tatksana-samutthana); the latter seems to correspond more or less to the Theravada notion of the decisive intention (sanitthapaka-cetana). The Kosa also distinguishes between the courses of action (karma-patha) proper and preliminary (samantaka) or preparatory (prayoga) acts.66 On this basis the Kosa goes on to point out that the acts that form the preliminary to each of the ten akusala-karma-patha may be motivated by any of the three basic unwholesome causes: greed (lobha), hatred (dvesa), or wrong-view (mithya-drstti), and gives examples of this in the case of killing a living being.67 However, the karma-patha proper of killing a living being is exclusively accomplished by hatred.68 An understanding that corresponds more or less to the Theravada account of the five necessary conditions (sambhara) for the course of action is also found.69
Having considered the Abhidhamma and commentarial analysis of the act of killing a living being, it is perhaps worth briefly turning to a well known story where the bodhisattva is represented as killing a living being apparently out of compassionate motives.
The Upayakausalya Sutra tells the story of how the bodhisattva in a life when he is indeed called “Great Compassion” kills a man in order to prevent him from killing 500 others — also bodhisattvas.70 The motivation for this act is thus compassionate on two accounts: by killing the man he prevents him from killing others and thus prevents him from committing an unwholesome act that would result in his being reborn and suffering in hell; the bodhisattva also by his act saves the lives of the 500 others. Interestingly the way in which the bodhisattva’s act of killing is presented seems to accept the basic outlook that I have presented above: acts of killing are instances of unwholesome karma. Thus in deciding to kill the man the bodhisattva is presented as accepting that this is an unwholesome act, the unpleasant consequences of which he will have to suffer in hell. Thus the Sutra does not, initially at least, try to justify the act as one that is kusala. However, the Sutra goes on to relate how the bodhisattva in fact avoided the sufferings of rebirth in hell; much later, as a Buddha, he lets his foot be pierced by a thorn in apparent retribution for this act of killing. There are perhaps two ways of reading this: (1) the bodhisattva’s compassion was such that it was able to transform the unwholesome nature of the act and render it an entirely wholesome act such that it had no unpleasant results whatsoever; (2) alternatively the compassionate component of the act was strong enough to override its unwholesome elements such that their ripening was indefinitely delayed allowing the bodhisattva to avoid the karmic fruit despite the fact that certain aspects of the act were in actual fact akusala.71
Whichever way we read it though, it seems to me that the story should be understood in the context of the kind of Abhidhamma and commentarial analysis of the act of killing that I have tried to set out above. For while I have been presenting the details of the specifically Theravada viewpoint, I think the evidence of the Abhidharmakosa is sufficient for us to conclude that it represents the mainstream approach of Indian Buddhist thought to the act of killing.
The Upayakausalya Sutra thus perhaps represents a deliberate challenge to mainstream Buddhist ethics.ConclusionIn the course of this paper I have tried to show, taking the act of killing a living being as an example, how an appreciation of the Abhidhamma framework is crucial in assessing the Pali commentarial approach to ethical questions. I have argued, contrary to Keown’s claim, that for Theravada Buddhist thought the motivation underlying the intention or will to act is sufficient to determine an act as “moral” (kusala) or “immoral” (akusala).
In the particular case of killing a living being, I have argued that for Theravada Buddhist thought — and probably mainstream Indian Buddhist thought—intentionally killing a living being can never be considered wholly an act of compassion. Although the Abhidhamma model of the way in which the mind works can accommodate a set of circumstances where genuine compassion might play some part in an act of killing a living being, it does not allow that the decisive intention leading to the killing of a living can ever be other than unwholesome and associated with some form of aversion (dosa).
I have suggested two reasons why such an outlook should be characteristic of the Buddhist perspective on ”mercy killing.” The first is that the very idea that killing a living being might be the solution to the problem of suffering runs counter to the Buddhist emphasis on dukkha as the first of the four truths. As the first truth, its reality must be fully understood (parinneyya). The second is that
the cultivation of friendliness and compassion in the face of suffering is seen as an appropriate and even practical alternative that can bring beneficial effects for self and others in a situation where it might seem that compassion should lead one to kill.I would like to finish with a general comment about the nature of Buddhist ethics. Abhidhamma — and hence I think mainstream Buddhist ethics — is not ultimately concerned to lay down ethical rules, or even ethical principles. It seeks instead to articulate a spiritual psychology focusing on the root causes that motivate us to act: greed, hatred, and delusion, or nonattachment, friendliness, and wisdom. Thus
that intentionally killing a living being is wrong is not in fact presented in Buddhist thought as an ethical principle at all; it is a claim about how the mind works, about the nature of certain mental states and the kinds of action they give rise to. It is a claim that when certain mental states (compassion) are in the mind it is simply impossible that one could act in certain ways (intentionally kill). For the Theravada Buddhist tradition there is in the end only one question one has to ask to determine whether an act is wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala): is it motivated by greed, hatred, and delusion, or is it motivated by nonattachment, friendliness, and wisdom. So if one were to respond to the Abhidhamma claim that an act of intentional killing motivated by compassion is a psychological impossibility, that it simply runs counter to actual experience, then what the Abhidhamma analysis offers is a kind of psychoethical puzzle or riddle. If you can intentionally kill out of compassion, then fine, go ahead. But are you sure? Are you sure that what you think are friendliness and compassion are really friendliness and compassion? Are you sure that some subtle aversion and delusion have not surfaced in the mind? In the end ethical principles cannot solve the problem of how to act in the world. If we want to know how to act in accordance with Dhamma, we must know our own minds. In the words of the Dhammapada, “ceasing to do all that is bad, accomplishing what is wholesome, and purifying the mind — this is the teaching of the buddhas.”72
AbbreviationsUnless otherwise stated editions of Pali texts are those of the Pali Text Society, Oxford.
A
Anguttara Nikaya
Abhidh-k-bh
Abhidharmakosa-bhas.ya: edited by P. Pradhan (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967). Abhidh-s
Abhidhammatthasangaha.
Abhidh-s-mht.
Abhidhammatthasangaha-mahatika (= Abhidhammatthavibhavini-tika).
As
Atthasalini (= Dhammasangani-atthakatha)
Be
edition in Burmese script
CPD
V. Trenckner et al., A Critical Pali Dictionary (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy, 1924-).
CSCD
Chattha Sangayana CD-ROM, Version 3.0 (Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1999).
D
Digha Nikaya
Dhp
Dhammapada
Dhs
Dhammasangani
Dhs-a
Dhammasangani-atthakatha (= As)
DPPN
G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names (London: PTS, 1974).
It-a
Itivuttaka-atthakatha
Kkh
Kankhavitarani
Kkh-t.
Vinayatthamanjusa (Be CSCD)
M
Majjhima Nikaya
Mil
Milindapanha
Moh
Mohavicchedani
Mp
Manorathapurani
Nidd-a
Niddesa-atthakatha
Palim
Palimuttakavinayavinicchayasangaha (Be CSCD)
Patis-a
Patisambhidamagga-atthakatha
Ps
Papancasudani
S
Samyutta Nikaya
Sn
Suttanipata
Sp
Samantapasadika
Sp-t.
Saratthadipani (Be CSCD)
Spk
Saratthappakasini
Sn
Suttanipata
Sv
Sumangalavilasini
Vibh-a
Sammohavinodani
Vin
Vinaya
Vism
Visuddhimagga
NOTES* Centre for Buddhist Studies, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Bristol, E-mail:
Rupert.Gethin@bristol.ac.uk 1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Fourth Chung-Hwa International Conference on Buddhism held in Taipei in January 2002. I am grateful to the organizers of this conference for their invitation and for permission to publish the revised version. I am also grateful to Peter Harvey, Rita Langer and Mudugamuwe Maithrimurthi for their comments on and criticisms of the earlier version.
2 D i 3-4: panatipatam pahaya panatipata pativirato [. . . ] nihita-dando nihita-sattho lajjidayapanno sabba-pana-bhuta-hitanukampi viharati. This passage is repeated throughout the Silakkhandha-vagga of the Digha Nikaya, and in the extended accounts of the path in the Majjhima Nikaya, e.g. M i 345.
3 Sn 394: panam na hane na ca ghatayeyya na canujanna hanatam paresam / sabbesu bhutesu nidhaya dandam. ye thavara ye ca tasanti loke. Translation adapted from K. R. Norman (trans.), The Group of Discourses, 2nd edition (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992).
4 M iii 203: ekacco itthi va puriso va panatipati hoti luddo lohitapani hatapahate nivittho adayapanno pana-bhutesu so tena kammena evam samattena evam samadinnena kayassa bheda param marana apayam duggatim vinipatam nirayam upapajjati.
5 Sn 148-150: vyarosana patigha-sanna nannam annassa dukkham iccheyya // mata yatha niyam puttam ayusa ekaputtam anurakkhe / evam pi sabba-bhutesu manasam bhavaye aparimanam // mettan ca sabba-lokasmim manasam bhavaye aparimanam (Translation adapted from Norman, Group of Discourses.)
6 See, for example: Tessa Bartholomeusz, “In Defence of Dharma: Just- War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 1-11; Peter Harvey, “Vinaya Principles for Assigning Degrees of Culpability,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 271-91, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1992), Buddhism and Bioethics (London: Macmillan, 1995), (ed.), Buddhism and Abortion (London: Macmillan, 1998), “Attitudes to Euthanasia in the Vinaya and Commentary,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 260-70 ,(ed.), Contemporary Buddhist Ethics (Richmond: Curzon, 2000); Lambert Schmithausen, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991), Maitrii and Magic: Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude Toward the Dangerous in Nature (Vienna: Oseterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude to War” in Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History, edited by J. E. M. Houben and K. R. van Kooij (Leiden: Brill, 1999), p. 45-67.
7 C. A. F. Rhys Davids (trans.), Buddhist Psychological Ethics (London: PaliText Society, 1900).
8 On the etymology and original meaning of parajika, see Oskar von Hin¨uber, A Handbook of Pali Literature (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), p. 10; Juo-Hs¨ueh Shih, Controversies over Buddhist Nuns (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2000), p. 126-128.
9 Vin iii 73: yo pana bhikkhu sancicca manussa-viggaham jivita voropeyya sattha-harakam va’ssa pariyeseyya marana-vannam va samvanneyya maranaya va samadapeyya, ambho purisa, kim tuyh’ imina papakena dujjivitena, matam te jivita seyyo ti, iti citta-mano citta-sam kappo aneka-pariyayena marana-vannam.va sam vann eyya, maranaya va samadapeyya, ayam pi parajiko hoti asamvaso. Translation adapted from William Pruitt (ed.) and K. R. Norman (trans.), The Patimokkha (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001), p. 9.
10 Vin iv 124: yo pana bhikkhu sancicca panam jivita voropeyya, pacittiyam. Translation from Pruitt Norman, Patimokkha, p. 69.
11 A iii 415: cetanaham bhikkhave kammam. vadami. cetayitva kammam karoti.
12 cf. Peter Harvey, “Vinaya Principles for Assigning Degrees of Culpability,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 271-291.
13 Vin iii 73-74; a human being is defined as existing from the first arising of consciousness in the mother’s womb (yam matukucchismim pathamam cittam uppannam pathamam vinnanam patubhutam, yava maranakala etthantare eso manussaviggaho nama); cf. Vin i 97, Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 313.
14 The commentarial analysis of the five precepts (Vibh-a 381ff; Moh (Be) 254ff) covers some of the same ground.
15 Vin iii 68-86; cf. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, The Buddhist Monastic Code (Metta Forest Monastery: Valley Center, Calif., 1994), p. 66-78.
16 These six means are discussed in full at Sp 439-441.
17 Sv 69-70 = Ps i 198 = Spk ii 144 = Nidd-a 115 = As 97: pano ti c’ ettha voharato satto, paramatthato jivitindriyam. tasmim pana pane panasannino jivitindriyupacchedaka-upakkama-samutthapika kaya-vaci-dvaranam annatara-dvara-ppavatta vadhaka-cetana panatipato. so guna-virahitesu tiracch ana-gatadisu panesu khuddake pane appa-savajjo mahasarire maha-savajjo. kasma. payoga-mahantataya. payoga-samattepi vatthu-mahantataya. gunavantesu manussadisu appa-gune pane appa-savajjo maha-gune maha-savajjo. sarira-gunanam pana samabhave sati kilesanam upakkamanan ca mudutaya appa-savajjo tibbataya maha-savajjo ti veditabbo. tassa panca sambhara honti pano pana-sannita vadhaka-cittam upakkamo tena maranan ti. cha payoga sahatthiko anattiko nissaggiyo thavaro vijjamayo iddhimayo ti.
18 Damien Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 96-100.
19 Sp 439: yaya cetanaya jivitindriyupacchedakam payogam samutthapeti sa vadhaka-cetana panatipato ti vuccati. panatipatiti vutta-cetana-samangi puggalo datthabbo.
20 Sv 1049 = Ps i 202 = Spk ii 148 = Patis-a I 223 = As 101: “By way of essential nature, the first seven are simply intention, the other three beginning with longing are associated with intention (dhammato [It-a ii 54: sabhavato] ti etesu hi patipatiya satta cetana-dhamma va honti abhijjhadayo tayo cetana-sampayutta).” The point here is that abhijjha, vyapada and miccha-ditthi are from the point of view of their essential natures (dhammato/ sabhavato) the cetasikas “greed” (lobha), “hate” (dosa) and “view” (ditthi) respectively and hence not themselves types of the cetasika “intention” (cetana) but rather associated with particular types of that cetasika.
21 Sv 1050 = Ps i 202 = Spk ii 148 = Pat.is-a I 223 = As 102: vedanato ti panatipato dukkha-vedano hoti. kincapi hi rajano coram disva hasamanapi gacchatha nam ghatetha ti vadanti, sannitthapaka-cetana pana dukkha-sampayutta va hoti.)(cf. It-a ii 54.)
22 Dhs 83 (§413), 85 (§421); Vism 454 (xiv 92); Abhidh-s 1.
23 These have been partially discussed by Oskar von Hin¨uber, “The Arising of an Offence: apattisamutthana,” Journal of the Pali Text Society 16 (1992), p. 55-69, and Juo-Hs¨ueh, Controversies over Buddhist Nuns, p. 60- 64. These categories appear in part at least to be derived from the Parivara, cf. Vin v 120, 206-207.
24 Kkh 24: “An offence which is void in the absence of full awareness of committing the transgression is one that is void by [absence of] full awareness, others are not void by [absence of] full awareness (yato vitikkamasannaya abhavena muccati ayam sannavimokkha, itara no sannavimokkha.).” This means not that one must be aware that a given act is an infringement of the Patimokkha but that one must be fully aware of what it is one is doing for certain acts to constitute offences.
25 Kkh 24: “In the category of offences that involve mind, those where the mind is exclusively unwholesome are universal faults, the rest are faults by designation (tattha yassa sacittaka-pakkhe cittam akusalam eva hoti, ayam loka-vajja, sesa pannatti-vajja).” Effectively the same distinction is found in the North Indian Buddhist sources, cf. Lambert Schmithausen, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991), p. 16. O. von Hinuber (“The Arising of an Offence,” p. 66-69) discusses a discrepancy between the Milindapanha and the Vinaya commentaries over the classification of udake hasadhammam. pacittiyam (Vin iv 22); the former (Mil 266) speaks of this offence as “not blameworthy in the world” (lokassa anavajjam), while the latter (Sp 861, Kkh 119) regards it as exclusively “blameworthy in the world” (lokavajja). In fact this disagreement would appear to hinge on the Abhidhamma understanding of which classes of consciousness one laughs with (see note 33): the Vinaya commentaries appear to be suggesting that in the context of playing in water one must inevitably be laughing and smiling with greed consciousness, though curiously the rule is classified as having three feelings, though perhaps the fact that the commentary glosses hasa in this context as kilika means that the commentary is not thinking exclusively in terms of laughing here: perhaps playing in water might occasion anger and unpleasant feeling too.
26 Kkh 24: apattim apajjamano hi akusala-citto va apajjati kusalavyakatacitto va.
27 Kkh 24: tatha dukkha-vedana-samangi va itara-vedana-dvaya-samangi va.
28 Sp-t. (Be) ii 98 (CSCD): hasituppada-votthabbanehi saddhim attha mahakiriya- cittani. The inclusion of the kiriya mind-door adverting consciousness here should probably be seen as relating to the sense-door process with a “slight” (paritta) object that ends in two or three occurrences of mind-door adverting; cf. Abhidh-s 18 (iv 13); Abhidh-s-mht. 112.
29 Sp 271: atthi pana sikkha-padam kusalam atthi akusalam.atthi avyakatam. dvattims’ eva hi apatti-samautthapaka-cittani: attha kamavacara-kusalani dvadasa akusalani dasa kamavacara-kiriya-cittani kusalato ca kiriyato ca dve abhinna-cittani ti. tesu yam kusala-cittena apajjati, tam kusalam, itarehi itaram.
30 Sp 463-464 (re parajika 3): samutthanadisu idam sikkhapadam ti-samutthanam kaya-cittato ca vaca-cittato ca kaya-vaca-cittato ca samutthati, kiriyam, sanna-vimokkham, sacittakam, loka-vajjam, kaya-kammam, vaci-kammam, akusala-cittam, dukkha-vedanam. sace pi hi sirisayanam arulho rajja-sampattisukham anubhavanto raja coro deva anito ti vutte gacchatha nam maretha ti hasamano va bhanati, domanassa-citten’ eva bhanati ti veditabbo. sukhavokinnatta pana anuppabandhabhava ca dujjanam etam puthujjanehi ti. This passage is quoted at Kkh-t. (Be) 218 (CSCD); cf. Abhidh-s-mht. 134, 21: hasamana pi rajano dosa-citten’ eva pana-vadham anapenti.
31 Sp 864-865: imasmin ca sikkha-pade tiracchanagato yeva pano ti veditabbo. tam khuddakam pi mahantam pi marentassa apatti-nanakaranam natthi. mahante pana upakkama-mahantatta akusala-mahattam hoti. pane panasanni ti antamaso manca-pit.ham sodhento mangula-bijake pi pana-sanni nikkarunikataya tam bhindanto apaneti pacittiyam. tasma evarupesu thanesu karunnam upatthapetva appamattena vattam katabbam. sesam manussaviggahe vutta-nayen’ eva veditabbam saddhim samutthanadihi ti.
32 See note 22.
33 As 295.
34 Of course, it is possible to counter the Abhidhamma claim that it is simply wrong about this. But, lest there be misunderstanding, I am not concerned here with whether the Abhidhamma is right or wrong to make the claim it does, I am merely concerned to articulate a clearer understanding of the nature of the claim.
35 Their treatment of the issue is, perhaps, in part just to be seen as a working out and restatement of the old Nikaya tradition that it is straightforwardly impossible for an arahat to intentionally take the life of a living being: abhabbo khinasavo bhikkhu sancicca panam jivita voropetum. (D iii 235).
36 cf. Harvey, Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, p. 295.
37 Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, p. 60-64, 168-173; “Attitudes to Euthanasia in the Vinaya and Commentary,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 260-270; Harvey,Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, p. 292-305.
38 Vin iii 79: tena kho pana samayena annataro bhikkhu gilano hoti. tassa bhikkhu karunnena marana-vannam. samvannesum. so bhikkhu kalam akasi. tesam kukkuccam ahosi bhagavata sikkhapadam pannattam, kacci nu kho mayam parajikam apattim apanna ti. bhagavato etam attham arocesum. apattim tumhe, bhikkhave, apanna parajikan ti.
39 Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, p. 62-64; cf. Keown, Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 265-266.
40 Keown does not consider the possible relevance here of the fact that deciding whether a Vinaya rule has been broken is essentially a legal judgement rather than necessarily a moral judgement. But as we have seen, in this instance the commentaries agree, to break the third parajika is necessarily a “universal wrong” (loka-vajja).
41 Id., p. 63
42 I do not mean to suggest by this that kusala and akusala straightforwardly mean “morally right” and “morally wrong” respectively, but rather that they are the two technical terms that best represent the Abhidhamma and Theravada exegetical tradition’s specific understanding of what it means for something to be a moral or an immoral act. On the problem of the meaning of kusala, see L. S. Cousins, “Good or skilful? Kusala in Canon and Commentary,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 3 (1996), p. 136-164.
43 Dhs 188-192; As 46; Abhidh-s 12-13 (hetusangaha); Abhidh-s-mht. 95-96 (hetusangaha-vannana).
44 When these three “good” roots operate in the mind of an arahat or buddha they are strictly speaking not to be classified as kusala, but as “undetermined” (avyakata); see Dhs 190-191.
45 Sp 464: karunnena ti te bhikkhu tassa mahantam gelanna-dukkham disva karunnam uppadetva silava tvam kata-kusalo, kasma miyamano bhayasi, nanu silavato saggo nama marana-matta-pat.ibaddho yeva ti evam maran. atthika va hutva maranatthika-bhavam ajananta marana-vannam. samvannesum. so pi bhikkhu tesam samvannanaya aharupacchedam katva antara va kalam akasi. tasma apattim apanna. vohara-vasena pana vuttam karunnena maranavannam. samvannesun ti. tasma idani pi panditena bhikkhuna gilanassa bhikkhuno evam marana-vanno na samvannetabbo. sace hi tassa samvannanam sutva aharupacchedadina upakkamena eka-javana-varavasese pi ayusmim antara kalamkaroti, imina va marito hoti. imina pana nayena anusitthi databba: silavato nama anacchariya magga-phaluppatti, tasma viharadisu asattim akatva buddha-gatam dhamma-gatam sangha-gatam kaya-gatan ca satim upatthapetva manasikare appamado katabbo ti. marana-vanne ca samvannite pi yo taya samvannanaya kan ci upakkamam akatva attano dhammataya yathayuna yathanusandhina va marati, tappaccaya samvannako apattiya na karetabbo ti. (Cf. Palim (Be) 428-429 (CSCD).)
46 CPD, s.v. antara, (d): “beforehand,” untimely.” Several examples of the usage of antara in this sense with verbs meaning “to die” are cited; at Ja iv 54 antara is juxtaposed with akala-marana.
47 Vism 229 (viii 2): yam pi c’ etam adhippetam, tam kala-maranam akala-maranan ti duvidham hoti. tattha kala-maranam punna-kkhayena va ayukkhayena va ubhaya-kkhayena va hoti. akala-maranam kammupacchedakakamma- vasena.
48 Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, p. 61, 191 (n. 102). cf. Keown, Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999), p. 266.
49 Sp-t. (Be) ii 272 and Palim-nt. (Be) ii 323: maranatthika-bhavam ajananta ti evam adhippayino maranatthika nama honti ti attano maranatthika-bhavam ajananta. na hi te attano citta-ppavattim na jananti.
50 Sp-t. (Be) ii 272: vohara-vasena ti pubbabhaga-vohara-vasena, maranadhippayassa sannitthapaka-cetana-kkhane karunaya abhavato karunnena pase baddhas ukara-mocanam viya na hoti ti adhippayo.
51 Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, p. 63.
52 Ibid.; quoted from Lord Robert Goff, “The mental element in the crime of murder,” Law Quarterly Review 104 (1988), 41-42.
53 Keown, Buddhism and Bioethics, p. 63: “The implication of this case for our present concerns could be summed up in the following principle: Karmic life must never be destroyed intentionally regardless of the quality of motivation behind the act or the good consequences which may be thought to flow from it.” I understand “mainstream” Buddhism in the manner of Paul Harrison and Paul Williams who both use it to refer to those elements of Buddhist thought and practice held in common by the schools of non- Mahayana Buddhism and in large part by Mahayana Buddhism itself.
54 I take it that this is what the commentary probably understands, rather than the change from wholesome consciousness with happy feeling to unwholesome with unhappy feeling, which is theoretically possible.
55 There are possible parallels with the attitude to death as a particular opportunity for spiritual progress presented in the Bar-do-thos-grol.
56 He translates (Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, p. 296), “as the paths and fruits have arisen, it is not surprising you are virtuous: therefore do not be attached to residence etc., setting up mindfulness in respect of the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha and the body, develop heedfulness in attention,” giving also a reference to the Chinese rendering of Samanatapasadika, see P. V. Bapat and A. Hirakawa, Shan-Chien-P’i-P’o-Sha: A Chinese Version by Sanghabhadra of Samantapasadika (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1970), p. 326.
57 Harvey, Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, p. 296. Cf. the attitude to his own death of the Thai monk Buddhadasa as recounted in Pinit Ratanakul, “To Save or Let Go: Thai Buddhist Perspectives on Euthanasia” in Damien Keown (ed.), Contemporary Buddhist Ethics (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), p. 169-182.
58 D ii 305.
59 As examples of Buddhist narratives concerned with facing the reality of suffering one thinks of the story of the bodhisatta’s encounter with the first three sights (D ii 21-27) or that of Kisa Gotami (Dhp-a ii 270-275).
60 Ratanakul, “To Save or Let Go,” p. 175-176.
61 Lambert Schmithausen, Maitri and Magic: Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude Toward the Dangerous in Nature (Vienna: Oseterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997).
62 A v 342: mettaya kho bhikkhave ceto-vimuttiya asevitaya bhavitaya bahulikat aya yanikataya vatthukataya anutthitaya paricitaya susamaraddhaya ekadas anisam sa patikankha. katame ekadasa. sukham supati sukham patibujjhati na papakam supinam passati manussanam piyo hoti amanussanam piyo hoti devata rakkhanti nassa aggi va visam va sattham va kamati tuvatam cittam samadhiyati mukhavanno vippasidati asammulho kalankaroti uttarimappativijjhanto brahmalokupago hoti. These eleven benefits of the liberation of friendliness are explained in full at Vism 299 (ix 37), 311-314 (ix 60-76).
63 Ps i 203-204 = Spk ii 149-150 = As 103: tattha asamadinna-sikkhapadanam attano jati-vaya-bahusaccadini paccavekkhitva ayuttam amhakam evarupam papam katun ti sampattam vatthum avitikkamantanam uppajjamana virati sampatta-virati ti veditabba sihala-dipe cakkana-upasakassa viya. tassa kira dahara-kale yeva matuya rogo uppajji. vejjena ca alla-sasa-mamsam laddhum vattati ti vuttam. tato cakkanassa bhata gaccha tata khettam ahindahi ti cakkanam pesesi. so tattha gato. tasmin ca samaye eko saso tarunasassam khaditum agato hoti. so tam disva va vegena dhavanto valliya baddho kiri kiri ti saddam akasi. cakkano tena saddena gantva tam gahetva cintesi matu bhesajjam karomi ti. puna cintesi na metam patirepam yvaham matu jivita-karana param jivita voropeyyan ti. atha nam gaccha, aranne sasehi saddhim. tinodakam paribhunja ti munci. bhatara ca kim tata saso laddho ti pucchito tam pavattim acikkhi. tato nam bhata paribhasi. so matu-santikam gantva yato aham jato nabhijanami sancicca panam jivita voropeta ti saccam. vatva atthasi. tavad ev’ assa mata aroga ahosi. DPPN, s.v. Cakkana, mistakenly cites Ps I 165 for this story and comments that the Majjhima commentary’s version differs slightly, but in fact all three versions agree.
64 M ii 103: yato ’ham bhagini ariyaya jatiya jato nabhijanami sancicca panam jivita voropeta, tena saccena sotthi te hotu sotthi gabbhassa ti. atha khvassa itthiya sotthi ahosi sotthi gabbhassa.
65 According to DPPN, s.v. Cakkana, this story is all we know of Cakkana from the Pali texts.
66 Abhidh-k-bh iv 10, 68.
67 Abhidh-k-bh iv 68 d.
68 Abhidh-k-bh iv 70 a-b.
69 Abhidh-k-bh iv 73 a-b. Lamotte, Traite ii 784 cites sources from the northern tradition that give precisely the same five conditions.
70 See Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 144-145; Garma C. C. Chang, A Treasury of Mahayana Sutras (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), p. 456-457. The incident is said to have taken place during the era of Dipamkara, so is placed close to the bodhisattva’s vow. The notion that killing a being might be for the sake of yet another being is relevant to abortion: the argument is that the foetus is aborted for the sake of or in order to alleviate the mother’s suffering. The Upayakausalya Sutra story also contains a story of the bodhisattva having sex out of compassion (id. p. 433).
71 Harvey, Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, p. 135-137 discusses some of the problems associated with this story.
72 Dhp 183: sabba-papassa akaranam kusalassa upasampada / sacitta-pariyodapanam etam buddhana sasanam.