History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment of Vl

That's French for "the ancient system," as in the ancient system of feudal privileges and the exercise of autocratic power over the peasants. The ancien regime never goes away, like vampires and dinosaur bones they are always hidden in the earth, exercising a mysterious influence. It is not paranoia to believe that the elites scheme against the common man. Inform yourself about their schemes here.

Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

Postby admin » Thu May 10, 2018 8:00 am

Part 1 of 2

II. The Old Believers

From the point of view of the universal church, the case of the Russian Old Believers was wrong [...]. But whether they were wrong in the historical sense [...] is another question. [1]


1. Introduction

The issue of the Old Believers, who formed the most important group of religious dissent in Russian Orthodoxy, touched upon several of Solov'ev's central preoccupations, namely 1) church reunion, 2) religious freedom, and 3) the moral role of the official church. In the first place, the Old Believers represented a major split within the Russian Orthodox Church, thus posing an internal obstacle to his project of church reunion. Solov'ev addressed these issues in his home environment, in Russia, which, before it could reconcile with the Catholic Church, had to make sure that its dissenters returned to the fold. Secondly, his concern with religious minorities in general, as well as the significant growth of the number of adherents, making it a national issue, also motivated him to speak out on the issue. Finally, he sympathised with the high demands that the Old Believers had with respect to the official church, which paralleled his own position.

Although there are numerous general works on the Old Believers, specific scholarship on the relationship between the Old Believers and the Russian state, the Orthodox Church, and public opinion in 1880-1900 is very scarce. [2] A recent valuable monograph is the study by O.P. Ersova on the relationship between the Old Believers and the state and church power from 1850 to 1905. [3] As for Vladimir Solov'ev's interventions on Old Believers specifically, they have been examined in their own right only briefly. [4]

a) Thesis

My argument consists of the following points. Firstly, when dealing with the issue of the Old Believers, Solov'ev primarily focused on the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church, so that he mostly investigated the Old Believers' conception of the church as well as their relationship to the church. As a result, he largely left out other issues concerning the living conditions of the Old Believers. He did defend religious freedom for the Old Believers, but only as part of his global commitment to freedom of conscience. Secondly, his treatment of the Old Believers turns out to be a unique case of lasting affinity with the Slavophiles, that is, not only in his early years, but also after he had turned towards the liberals. To this Slavophile stance he added his own critical points with respect to the Old Faith. Thirdly, contrary to other interventions concerning religious minorities, he engaged in a direct debate with the Old Believers, the underlying motivation of which relates to their conception of history. On the one hand, he shared their fundamental critique that the official church had ceased to act in a Christian manner, and approved of their bringing the simple folk to the fore as the representative of the church and of their theocratic ideal of a truly Christian tsar. On the other hand, he rejected their anathematisation of the tsars, the state and church since the schism, and accused them of delaying the coming of salvation by cutting themselves off from the church. As a matter of fact, he considered their secessionist attitude as an obstacle to his ideal of a harmonious society. Fourthly, his position with respect to the Old Believers was fundamentally ambiguous. He felt an attraction to and, at the same time, an aversion from their worldview. Last but not least, he viewed them as rivals who threatened his own prophetic mission among Russian society. This ambiguity can be best explained from the perspective of the three registers of history present in his texts.

Before embarking on my analysis, I would like to approach the problem of terminology. In official documents as well as in the press of Solov'ev's time, the religious current was referred to as that of the Old Believers [starovery] or Old Ritualists [staroobrjadcy]. [5] Both terms refer to one and the same religious current, Old Faith [staroverie] or Old Ritualism [staroobrjadcestvo] were and are used synonymously. [6] The term schismatics [raskol'niki], which refers to the schism [raskol] pronounced by the official church in 1667, is more problematic: raskol and raskol'niki referred to the event of the schism itself, to the religious current of the Old Believers up to Solov'ev's day, and more generally to all religious dissent from the Russian Orthodox Church, and as such had a negative connotation. [7] Although Catherine II had instructed that they no longer be used in official documents, they remained widely used. [8] Whenever needed, I try to distinguish between the event [the schism], the religious current [Old Faith or Old Ritualism], and the global term [religious dissent].

b) The historical context: the Old Believers in Russia up to 1900

The Old Believers emerged during a period of profound social upheaval, the late 17th century, as a reaction by Russian Orthodox believers to church reforms. As a religious current within Russian Orthodoxy, it developed throughout Russian history, and in the late 19th century represented by far the most important religious dissident group. [9] Between 1654 and 1666, the energetic patriarch Nikon received from tsar Alexis the leadership over reforms of the religious practices that radically transformed and renewed the Russian Orthodox Church. [10] These notably touched upon theological formulations and liturgical practice, originally taken from Byzantium, but wrongly transmitted by copyists in the course of time. Nikon came up against fierce resistance among both the clergy and numerous layers of the population, who saw themselves, and not the Greeks, as the holders of true faith. The land council [pomestnyj sobor] of 1667 nevertheless adopted the reforms and implemented them in the church. The most important of these reforms were the change in the spelling of Jesus' name (from 'Isus' to 'Iisus'), the number of repetitions of the word alleluia (from two to three), the translation of the creed from Greek to Church Slavonic, and the sign of the cross (from two to three fingers). The council condemned the opponents of the reforms as schismatics and heretics. This religious condemnation was completed by political condemnation through the Decree of 1685, in which the government declared the Old Believers enemies of the state, who had to be pursued and punished as such. This two-fold condemnation determined both the movement of the Old Believers, and the attitude of the state and the church towards them.

In their turn, the Old Believers, led by archpriest Avvakum (1620-1682), rejected the legitimacy of the Nikonian reforms and anathematised them as heretic. [11] The conviction spread rapidly that with the reforms, which had been adopted around 1666 and thus bore the cipher of the Beast (six), the new era of the reign of the Antichrist had begun, which the Old Believers henceforth identified with the patriarch and the tsar. Mass suicide, open rebellion, participation in popular uprisings, and flight in the less accessible parts of the empire were the only ways of opposing the immanent Antichrist. [12]

The Old Believers soon split into two main groups, On the one hand there were the priestless Old Believers [bezpopovcy], notably the sect of the Wanderers, who rejected the church as a whole, considered receiving any sacrament under the reign of the Antichrist impossible, refused all contact with the tsar, and thus rejected registration, passport, taxes and even money. [13] On the other hand, there were the priestly Old Believers [popovcy], who under certain conditions accepted Orthodox priests and on the whole sought integration in Russian society. [14] Some were highly active in merchandising, building industries, and families such as the Rjabusinskijs and Morozovs acquired colossal wealth through great energy, parsimony, appropriate financial operations and a spirit of enterprise, On the whole, their strict work ethic, sobriety, and effective organisation made them good professional partners and explain how they managed to integrate in Russian society. [15] In 1800, a third group called unified faith [edinoverie], which held an intermediary position between the Old Believers and the official church, was promulgated by the official church to lure Old Believers back to the fold, an act that to some extent succeeded. [16]

The Old Believers enjoyed relative toleration, until the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) who turned towards harsh repression and harassment of all Old Believers' communities, as they were considered a political and religious danger which should be eliminated. However, the aim to jugulate the movement yielded the opposite results. In the mid-1850s, searching for a legitimate church hierarchy, priestly Old Believers founded a centre in Bukovina, the hierarchy of Belaja Krinica (then under Austrian domination, now in Ukraine), which since then functioned as the official Old Believers church. [17] By 1863, the Old Believers were estimated at about a tenth of the population of Russia as a whole, or one sixth of the Orthodox population. [18] Many took steps towards integration in society and reconciliation with the official church, and often enjoyed tacit respect and support from the common Russian people. [19] Yet they were forbidden to publish and spread their own texts, were regularly repressed in the practice of their faith, and hardly had access to education and official functions.

From 1863 onwards, there were two conflicting tendencies in the government's relationship towards the Old Believers. [20] On the one hand, it maintained the system that had been installed in the 1850s to control the Old Believers by first counting and localizing, and then trying to suppress the Old Faith. In this task, it received the full support from the Holy Synod. [21] On the other hand, excommunication was not always applied strictly. Recognition of the full size of the religious current, contributed to a growing toleration towards the Old Believers. On the whole, Alexander II liberalized the situation by suspending the persecution of Old Ritualist clergy and permitted them to practice the old rites in private. The Old Believers were allowed to join merchant guilds in Moscow, were under certain conditions allowed to found their own schools, and in the 1870s were permitted to legally and civilly register their marriages and children, and to be employed in public positions.

The government of Alexander III was not unfavourable to the Old Believers. Contrary to the Polish Catholics and the Jews, their rights were not suppressed, and they were on the whole tolerated. The church behaved ambiguously towards them, at times supporting poor Old Ritualist monasteries and priests and attempting a rapprochement, while at other times sharply refusing to take any steps towards compromise, and even destroying Old Ritualist places of worship. [22] If nothing was done in favour of greater tolerance, this was due to the hate of Old Ritualism among the influential church circles, including general procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonoscev. In 1883, a law on religious dissent was passed, which attempted primarily to normalise its situation. [23] The Old Believers now had at least some defined rights, but were disappointed not to receive equality of rights with other Christian confessions, and it remains unclear whether in practice this law did much to alleviate their condition. [24] This situation was maintained under Nicholas II, until the Tolerance Act of 1905, which guaranteed freedom to all religious groups.

c) Debates on the Old Believers in the Russian press

By the end of the 1870s, the phenomenon of the Old Faith had invaded both secular and clerical press. [25] Apart from the official reports and statistics, a whole body of literature emerged, accessible for public opinion: many newspapers and journals devoted articles to the latest news about the growing popularity of Old Believers among the peasant population, their literacy, the prosecutions they were suffering (schools, publishing), and trials of Old Believers. [26] Two main questions dominated public debate, 'What was the cause of the schism?' And: 'How to relate to the Old Believers as a whole?' [27] Two main camps can be easily distinguished, one that resolutely opposed the attribution of any rights to the Old Believers (clerical conservatives), the other that claimed their right to practice their religion freely (Slavophiles, liberals, populists). [28]

The conservative clerical camp had a long tradition of a primarily denunciatory attitude with respect to the Old Believers. [29] On the one hand, Konstantin Pobedonoscev worked at eliminating that 'cancerous growth on the Russian body' by actively financing anti-Old Believers literature, an activity that Nikolaj Subbotin trustfully fulfilled. [30] Anti-Old Faith views were also common among the clergy. [31] They considered the governmental and clerical repression of the Old Believers to be fully justified since they were enemies of the state and of the church. On the other hand, professors of religious academies (I. Nil'skij, N.I. Ivanovskij, P.S. Smirnov), as well as church historians (E. Golubinskij and N. Kapterev) studied the Old Faith beyond the cliche of the ignorance and primitiveness of the Old Believers. [32] But even though they diversified the explanation of the schism, they too maintained an exclusively religious and critical approach to the phenomenon as an anomaly. [33]

In the 1880s, the Slavophiles (Ivan Aksakov, Nikita Giljarov-Platonov, Tertij Filippov) also interpreted the issue of the Old Faith primarily through the religious prism, but came to the opposite conclusions. They praised the Old Believers' way of life, which corresponded to their ideal of Russian society situated in the pre-Petrine times, and advocated full freedom for the Old believers to practice their rites. [34] Nevertheless, they ascribed the responsibility of the schism to both the church for its repressing the Old Faith and to the Old Believers for their passionate attitude. Aksakov and Filippov advanced that the only solution to this heated tone from both sides was to call together a council for a joint revaluation of the 1667 Council. In a more scholarly vein, Giljarov-Platonov advocated the investigation of the psychological and historical factors underlying the process of conversion and the religious life of the Old Believers as the only way to explain the existence and success of the Old Faith. [35]

Research indicates that this interest in the Old Believers was not prevalent in liberal circles. [36] The liberals advocated that every religious minority had a right to freedom of confession, hence also the Old Believers. But the convictions of the latter as well as their way of life, which the liberals often identified with isolated communities, were in their eyes the product of a primitive, fanatical and reactionary worldview and provoked horror and rejection on their part. [37]

The populists (Aleksandr Prugavin, losif Kablic) saw a revolutionary potential in the Old Believers' critical attitude with respect to the existing social and political structure, and thus approached the Old Faith as a social and political issue. [38] The Old Faith was a legitimate protest of the people against the suppression of its rights by the state, the church, and capitalist exploitation. [39] Despite state repression and church campaigns, it was becoming a threat. [40] By praising the Old Believers' healthy principles of life (honesty, family and domestic values, equality between men and women, solidarity), their remarkable erudition, their autonomous communities, individual freedom, and their anti- materialistic principles, the populists made the Old Believers' ideals coincide with those of the populist intelligentsia. Both groups shared a dissatisfaction and warned that, if the economic and legal conditions were not improved, it could lead to new waves of fanaticism, and revolutionary acts. [41]

As far as debates among Old Believers are concerned, since the publication and distribution of Old Believers' views were prohibited, only illegal publications circulated. [42] In 1878, a major event occurred with the publication of the newspaper Staroobrjadec in Bukovina. [43] This journal encouraged Old Believers to overcome the divergence of views between the priestly and the priestless Old Believers, to foster education beyond local communities, and to set up public banks in order to provide loans to poor fellow believers. [44] Apart from this foreign publication, discussions took place in circles and fraternities [bratstva] that began to appear in the 1880s, notably in Moscow. [45] Even though the populists, liberals and Slavophiles supported their claim of full legal equality, it seems that they did not interact much with the rest of the Russian press. The Old Believers rather addressed the government directly with protest and the firm demand to be submitted to the same law as all other Russian subjects. [46] However, they had to wait until the Tolerance Act of 1905 to be officially allowed to have their own press mouthpieces, to found circles, to elect their religious leaders, to establish church meetings, and to play a more prominent role in Russian political life. [47]

The issue of the Old believers divided public opinion between detractors (clerical conservatives) and defenders of religious freedom and more civil and ecclesiastical rights for them (Slavophiles, liberals, populists). They were a significant target group of the government's official confessional policy as they represented a significant portion of the Russian population, were economically and socially important, and were a potential threat to the state and the church. The 1883 law provided clarity on the subject, confirming that they did not have freedom of speech and press, public cult or proselytising. Yet, the Old Believers enjoyed certain rights (free movement, trade and industry, some minor official functions, private practice of their rites at home or in special chapels), and they reached important positions, which strongly suggests that, despite their specific way of life, they were better integrated in Russian society than other religious minorities.

2. Solov'ev on the Old Believers

a) Solov 'ev 's texts


Solov'ev became interested in the issue of Old Ritualism in the early 1880s, and continued writing on the matter for the rest of his life. We can find many passages on the topic in the most varied texts, ranging from political publicistika to theological essays, columns, lectures, and his 'Kratkaja Povest' ob Antikhriste'. However, he devoted only one article entirely to the Old Believers, namely 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve' (About the Schism in the Russian People and Society]. [48] As a matter of fact, Solov'ev integrated this issue in his primary concerns, namely the attitude of the official church, the principle of freedom of confession, and his ideal of the reunification of the churches. The following three perspectives dictated his approach to the issue. Firstly, sharing their high demands with respect to the official church, he sympathised with their initial criticism of the official church and with their religiosity. Secondly, he defended their right to practice their faith freely. But, thirdly, he disapproved of their theological motives on the basis of which they persisted in refusing to return to the Russian Orthodox Church.

In the essay which inaugurated his career in political publicistika, 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii' [About Spiritual Power in Russia], published in Ivan Aksakov's journal Rus'. Solov'ev first approached the issue of the Old Believers in 1881 through the prism of a fierce criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his eyes, the latter had abandoned the Orthodox spirit since the reforms of Nikon, as four factors showed. [49] Firstly, it was Nikon who introduced religious persecution, a practice typical for Catholicism or latinism but not for Orthodoxy. [50] Secondly, the church itself organised the land council of 1667 in which the schism was declared. Thirdly, it related to Old Believers as despicably as the Jesuits did in Europe, that is, by remaining indifferent to the faith of the believers, as long as they professed allegiance to the official church. Fourthly, the tempering of persecutions was not due to the intercession of the church, which remained hostile to the Old Believers. In order to repair the damage caused by the council of 1667, Solov'ev called for the church to set up a new council, reject religious censorship as a coercing institution and influence the state to suppress all the repressive measures against all religious minorities. Globally, it was only by giving up external, 'policist' power that the church could show its faith and convince others to join it. [51]

However, not only the church, but also the Old Believers were partly guilty of the schism, as he showed in his subsequent publications. In Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika (1883), he denounced the exclusive patriotism of the church as well as of Russian believers that had led to these breaches in history. [52] From 1882 to 1885, Solov'ev worked on the only article that focussed primarily on the Old Believers and which he published several times in different versions and under different titles. [53] For my analysis the most relevant version is the one that most comprehensively discusses the main theological points of Old Ritualism, namely 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve' [About the Schism in the Russian People and Society], published in Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie in 1884. [54] Considering Old Ritualism as a form of sectarianism, he sharply condemned it for its exclusive attachment to the human component of religion-additions and transformations brought about by man in the course of time-at the expense of the divine component. He tried to show the inconsistency of the Old Believers' interpretation of the name of Christ and the symbol of faith. [55] Besides, to the positions of both priestly and priestless Old Believers, he opposed his own definition of the underlying concepts of divine grace [blagodat'] (dependent, not independent of human behaviour), tradition [predanie] (universal, not national), and the visible church (concrete institution, not the substitution or negation of it), arguing that next to liturgy, the church as an institution was a moral condition for the realisation of Christianity.

Passages in texts from the following years testify to Solov'ev's concern for the Old Believers' situation in Russia. His foreword to Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii [History and Future of Theocracy, 1885-1887] opened with the central significance of the schism. [56] Beyond the particular points of dissent, the essence of the schism came down to the substantial question whether 'religious truth has to be determined by a decision of the church power or by the faithfulness of the people to the ancient piety.' [57] While acknowledging the positive aspect of each position, he pointed to the exclusive character of the solutions chosen by the church and the Old Believers respectively. As a result, the separation of the latter from the official church was tantamount to a break of the religious order, whereas this order demanded solidarity between the priests and the people in order to implement a reunification with the West.

On two occasions during his stay in Paris in 1888, Solov'ev mentioned the Old Believers in front of a French audience. First, in his lecture L 'idee russe he alluded to the 'millions of our Old Believers' as 'the true representatives of traditional Russia, of Russia of the past.' [58] Secondly, in Saint Vladimir et l'Etat chretien [St. Vladimir and the Christian State], published in the journal L 'Univers in August 1888, he agreed with the content of the Old Believers' revolt because they denounced the cesaro-papist state and the official church. [59] In his eyes, their movement testified to the fact that the soul of the Russian people was truly Christian.

One year later, in 1889, his comprehensive theological work La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, contained few yet significant pages that combined his positive valuation with his criticism of the schism. [60] He repeated his main points: the weak church power as one cause of the schism; the merit of the Old Believers in having denounced the church's deficiencies; the Old Believers' incapacity to move towards solutions to the schism; their central significance in manifesting the religious feeling of the Russian people, as a prefiguration of the regeneration of Orthodoxy. However, contrary to their conviction, the people alone could not realise its ideal, but should be supported by moral regeneration that comes from higher and supra-national instances.

In 1889, he also published the article 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo' [A Few Words in Defence of Peter the Great] in Vestnik Evropy, which contains a few pages on the Old Believers. [61] Solov'ev considered the schism as the 'main fact of our history' and regarding it from an 'exclusively historical' standpoint, he concluded that although its criticism of the official church was justified, it was not capable of realising its ambition to be the true national church, as demonstrated by its endless fragmentation. [62]

After a silence of seven years on the issue, he came back to a more positive appreciation of the Old Believers. [63] In 'Vizantizm i Rossija' [Byzantinism and Russia, 1896], he recapitulated the sins of Nikon (clericalism, narrow-mindedness, and violence against the people). [64] He also broached the issue twice in his Voskresnye Pis 'ma) [Sunday Letters, 1897-1898]. In Letter IV, entitled 'Cto takoe Rossija' [What is Russia?), he addressed the question of how to define Russia. [65] He put the views of official Orthodoxy and its believers on one side and, on the other, those of the Old Believers on an equal footing. Unity between the two had to be restored, and for this purpose, he advanced one practicable solution, namely a free and all-sided discussion on the burning religious and clerical issues. Unfortunately, so far, Solov'ev concluded, Russia could only be defined in terms of division between its Orthodox believers. Further, in Letter XXII entitled 'Dukhovnoe sostojanie russkogo naroda' [The Spiritual State of the Russian People], he countered the common opinion that the Russian people was growing indifferent to religious matters by referring to two remarkable phenomena: mass suicides among Old Believers as an attempt to escape the census, and the proliferation of sects. [66] He concluded that the effects of persecutions of religious dissenters, like those of Old Believers, were disproportionate with their errors.

Finally, in his' Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste' [Short Story about the Antichrist] in which he presented his vision of the end of times featuring the ascension, triumph and ruin of the Antichrist, the Old Believers receive a privileged place. [67] The majority of them return to the Orthodox Church and represent a renewed Orthodoxy. Half of them do not give in to the Antichrist's temptation, and remain faithful to the Orthodox leader, starec loan. [68] This element indicates a sign of recognition on Solov'ev's part of the integrity of the Old Believers. [69]

To summarise, Solov'ev felt the issue of Old Believers to be sufficiently important to express himself on it recurrently. However, these interventions were nearly always integrated into the perspective of a criticism of the official church, a commitment to the reunification of the churches, starting with reconciliation within the Orthodox community, and to religious tolerance, to be applied equally to Orthodox, Jews, Catholic Poles, Old Believers and other religious minorities alike.

His views display both continuity and change. A remarkable continuity can be observed in his commitment to religious freedom as applied to the Old Believers. His valuation of the historical role of the Old Faith, particularly with respect to the fundamental question that it addressed to the church, also returns in his charge against the official organs of the Orthodox Church. Equally firm and continuous, however, is his criticism of the movement. He denounced their attachment to rituals as inconsistent and sharply condemned the existence of a parallel church in the Austrian empire (Belaja Krinica), as well as the radical rejection of the church tout court by the priestless Old Believers.

A perceptible change can be discerned towards his abandoning the idea of their reconversion and a growing respect for their position. After 1885, Solov'ev no longer addressed the Old Believers directly, perhaps because he did not expect any rapprochement from them. Nevertheless, he voiced his admiration for the sincerity of their religious feeling. The Old Believers perhaps also obtained a new 'value' once Solov'ev, beyond his aversion for their reactionary stance, could connect them well with his religious ideal of a Christian society. Without abandoning his criticism of these representatives of the Russia of the past, he valued their firm religiosity.

b) Solov 'ev's views and the history of the Old Believers and their situation in his time

In this section I want to show to what extent Solov'ev's concern with the church had an impact on his approach to the issue of the Old Believers as a whole, emphasising some aspects while leading him to distance himself from others that were perhaps crucial to their condition in his time.

Before embarking on this investigation, a first question that arises from his direct address to the Old Believers in the press is whether he had contacts with some of them. I can only advance hypotheses on this issue. While it is highly improbable that he visited Old Believers communities in the countryside, he was certainly informed regarding the priestly centre of Rogozkoe and the priest less centre of Preobrazenskoe, both in Moscow, and it is likely that he knew, at least by name, prominent figures in Moscow such as Ivan Morozov and Pavel Rjabusinskij. The question then arises from which sources Solov'ev drew his information to write on the Old Believers. First, it is most likely that the many press articles that appeared in the 1880s on the Old Believers formed Solov'ev's most direct source. Secondly, he used official reports, at least those by the general procurator, which he quoted explicitly. [70] Thirdly, although there is no evidence that he read specific literature on the Old Believers, he most probably knew the works of Aksakov and Giljarov-Platonov referred to above. [71] Fourthly, there is reason to believe that his main work of reference was the History of Russia from the Oldest Times written by his father Sergej Solov'ev. Without referring to its source, he quoted in passing words by the 17th century Old Believer Pavel Danilovec to patriarch Joachim, which can be found literally in his father's work. [72] All this might suggest that he was satisfied with secondary literature. However, according to two testimonies, Solov'ev was informed about sources related to the Moscow 1667 council, as well as interviews of Old believers and wanted to use them. [73] Finally, he was informed about the oral disputations occurring between representatives of the official church and of Old Ritualism in Kazan', Kaluga and foremost in Moscow. [74] As for terminology, he followed the common use and indifferently used the terms 'starovery', 'staroobrjadcy', 'raskol'niki', sometimes meaning with the latter not only the Old Believers but also all the other groups that literally 'cut themselves off' from the official church, i.e. the sects. [75] With respect to all of them, he disapproved of their exclusive particularism.

His treatment of the issue of the Old Believers is scattered across many texts and has to be reconstructed. One priority clearly dominated, namely that of the Christian church. This focus informs his whole approach of the history of the schism, of which he discussed the following moments: the roots of the schism, the excessive attitude of the church and of the Old Believers around the 1667 Moscow council, the unified faith, and the hierarchy of Belaja Krinica. The role of the state is also approached as a welcome antidote to the church's excess.

Solov'ev identified the roots of the Old Faith in the Russian context of the 16th century and claimed that the principles to which the Old Believers adhered had actually taken shape in Russia at the time of the Stoglav. [76] They had started to dominate the field of faith and piety, so that 'the universal church disappeared in front of a national or a popular [narodnyj] habit, took the appearance of a universal truth.' [77] This preference for a particular form above all others, in other words, this particularism, was the start of 'all this illness.' [78] However, this was not the main cause of the schism, which was rather provoked by the lack of moral authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 17th century. In particular its reaction to the refusal by Orthodox believers to adopt the reform betrayed this weakness. Solov'ev incessantly emphasised the authoritarianism and persecutions decided upon by the church hierarchy and its leader Nikon, which showed that the church had ceased to exert religious authority over its believers, and had to turn to an instrument of the lay power of the state, namely force. [79] He also disapproved of the fact that the Old Believers had separated themselves from the official church. Nonetheless he came to value their defence of religious freedom, as is clear from his admiration for Avvakum as 'the fearless and turbulent leader of the Old Believers, the true representative of the religious freedom of the Russian people.' [80] Worth mentioning at this stage is Solov'ev's use of an invalid historical argument, which he suppressed in a later version of 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve'. The Old Believers allegedly reacted to the evil acts of the church and state against them, by leaving the universal church. [81] In this argument on the history of the schism, Solov'ev made two connected mistakes. Historically, the exclusion came from the official powers: it was the church, and then the state, which excluded them from the church and made them enemies of the state. Consequently, the Old Believers decided to go their own way not as a result of repression, as Solov'ev seems to suggest, but as a reaction to the very reforms introduced by the church. [82]

In his historical account of the development of the schism, the official church still occupied the central position. The issue of the cultural and intellectual production of the Old Believers is not dealt with. [83] Solov'ev condemned the attitude of the 'hierarchy of the Russian church' from 1667 until his time as revealing a spirit that was not Orthodox. [84] He rightly emphasised that the church did all it could to obstruct new laws that would improve the condition of the Old Believers. Tolerance came from the side of the state, he stated, and repressions were tempered only thanks to the secular power. Peter the Great replaced persecutions by fiscal measures and Peter III, Catherine II, Alexander I, and Alexander II also contributed to the tempering of religious persecutions. [85] In his short account, however, Solov'ev omitted, probably for the sake of argument, the famous counter-example of Nicholas I, who reintroduced repressive laws against the Old Believers. An interesting argument with respect to tsar Peter the Great is the two-fold cause-effect link that Solov'ev systematically made between the schism and the reign of Peter. First, the tsar reacted to the despotic attitude of the Church in the 17th century by reducing its power and creating the Holy Synod. Secondly, thanks to the limited influence of the Old Faith, cultural and intellectual progress was possible, initiated and realised by Peter. [86] However, here again Solov'ev left aside two historical factors. First, he neglected the measures taken by Peter against the Old Believers, such as fiscal measures as well as direct struggle against them: they represented the backward society Peter strove to eradicate, hindered his reforms and even took part in political opposition. [87] Secondly, it was precisely because the Old Believers had seceded from the official church and thus weakened it that Peter's church reforms towards a state church could be made more easily. [88]

With respect to the 18th century, again, a church issue retained Solov'ev's attention, namely the creation of the unified faith [edinoverie]. He approved of the initiative and defended its propagation in his own time, but lamented the fact that despite correct action of the church power to institute unified faith, the 'abnormal' separation of the Old Believers from the church remained.89 However, the refusal by many Old Believers to join even the unified faith also revealed a more profound cause of the schism. The issue at stake was not the rituals, which they were allowed to practice freely within unified faith, but faith itself. [90]

Far more radical was his criticism of the decision by the priestly Old Believers to install a church hierarchy in Belaja Krinica. He convincingly showed that together with the acceptance of 'fugitive priests' [see footnote 14] this revealed a positive element, i.e. their attachment to the divine foundation of the church. [91] However, this hierarchy was established 'according to anti-canonical processes.' [92] It was most difficult for Solov'ev to accept that they had detached themselves from the church whereas they obviously needed it badly. [93] He argued that in order to be consistent, they had to either reject the church as a whole (fugitive priests and Austrian bishop included), or, if they believed in it, join it. One could object that this was precisely what the priestless Old Believers did, on whom, however, he did not pass any milder judgement.

As far as the situation of the Old Believers in his own time was concerned, Solov'ev did not elaborate on it much, and was rather disinterested in empirical data. He alluded to the recently promulgated law (1883) that tempered the former rules against the schismatics, and briskly concluded that 'they have little reason to complain.' [94] How did he value the social composition and the cultural characteristics of the Old Believers? He only repeated many times his judgement on the ignorance of Old Believers, thereby neglecting the rich cultural heritage, which he perhaps regarded as primitive; only one example shows his positive valuation of their rhetoric, argumentative and theological skills in the disputations between members of the clergy and the Old Believers. [95] He also ignored the Old Believers' economic success in business and industry. Although these features, linked to a strict ethics, could well be compared to those of the Jews, Solov'ev did not make this point. [96] Had he done so, the question then arises whether he would have been able to claim (as he did with respect to the Jews [see case study III]) the Old Believers' ability to form the urban industrial class that Russia was missing. Other evidence testifies to Solov'ev's understanding of Old Ritualism as a religious current of mainly the prostoj narod, the simple and ignorant folk. In the title of the second article 'On the Schism in the Russian People and Society', the expression 'schism in the Russian people' refers to the dissident movement of the Old Believers, whereas the 'schism in Russian educated society' is about other, new sects. While it may be generally true that Old Ritualism attracted mostly peasants, Solov'ev did not take into account the highly cultivated figures among the Old Believers, such as art collector Ivan Morozov, as well as the Muscovite bankers and industrialists. The horrifying mass suicides of Old Believers during the 1897 census only confirmed his impression of a group steeped in confusion and ignorance.

Worth mentioning, finally, is his only attempt at an ethnographic approach, made in a footnote. It is very hasty and his interpretation, assimilating the Old Believers to the Finnish ethnic group, is highly dubious. [97] His demographic considerations were more realistic. He rightly estimated the population of Old Believers at 12-15 million, and, over the years, took them increasingly seriously as a significant group of the Orthodox community. [98] This movement also had to be taken seriously because it arose out of free will, not under constraint. With respect to the future, Solov'ev first dreamt of the Old Believers rejoining the Orthodox Church, but with due time gave up on this thought. As his apocalyptic' Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste' suggests, the Old Believers would remain separated from the official church until the coming of the Antichrist.

While dealing with the issue of the Old Believers, Solov'ev primarily focused on topics related to the church, namely the attitude of the official church, the separation of the Old Believers from it, the unified faith, and the hierarchy of Belaja Krinica. Most striking about this expert in theological issues is that he neither examined the writings of Old Believers, nor discussed particular authors such as Avvakum, Denisov or Nikodim, whose works he knew. His criticism of the 'official church' in his time raises the question as to who precisely he condemned in the 'official church': this most certainly included Pobedonoscev, who indeed played a central role in determining the policy with respect to the Old Believers, possibly included the bishops, but is unlikely to have included the lower clergy. Surprisingly, he did not comment on the missionary works initiated by the church among Old Ritualist communities, even though it aimed at the same goal as he did, namely reintegration of the Old Believers in the Orthodox Church.

Solov'ev did not broach the issue of the role of the state in the repression of the schism, except in order to emphasise the positive role of Peter the Great in muzzling the church and in fostering cultural progress against the stagnation of the Old Believers. On the one hand, this was because violence was a part of secular power and hence justified. On the other hand, this related to the fact that he essentially focused on the church, the attitude of which had to change thoroughly. As for the 1883 law, it is unclear whether he perceived its ambiguity. Finally, Solov'ev hardly commented on the development of Old Believers's communities (religious centres, living conditions, cultural and economic role in Russian society). Obviously, the Old Believers counted as an abnormal religious minority that deserved freedom, rather than as a cultural, economic, social or political force. In the following section it becomes obvious to what extent this perception of the Old Believers tried to overcome the limitations of various positions in Russian public opinion.

c) Solov 'ev's views and the ongoing debates in his time

His two-fold position of rejecting the theological motives of the Old Believers on the one hand, while acknowledging the historical significance of their protest for a discussion on the church and defending their right to religious freedom on the other, seems unique and ensured that he could not be ranged under one of the main camps. This was also his explicit intention. Between the rejection by the official church and the defenders of 'the Russian idea', on the one hand, and the protective attitude of 'our liberal and radical "Westernisers'" on the other, Solov'ev aimed to give an 'objective' valuation of the schism devoid of the simplifications that he encountered in the two camps. [99] Since he had 'no motive either to depreciate or to overly praise' it, he considered himself capable of achieving this task. [100] However, his ideal of church reunion perhaps made him more sensitive to the existence of the schism than he was ready to admit. As a matter of fact, one can doubt whether his position was so independent after all.

i) The Slavophiles

Although with the years he increasingly sought to distinguish himself from the Slavophiles, his treatment bore great affinity with theirs. He shared their overwhelmingly religious approach of the issue, as well as the emphasis on the Old Believers' moral integrity and justified condemnation of the official church and state. He explicitly referred to Filippov's work as an authority on the historical justification of the Old Believers' position. [101] Like him, and like Aksakov, he advocated a free council between the official church and the Old Believers to reconsider the Moscow 1667 council. Interestingly, he initially distinguished his position from the Slavophiles' idealisation of the Old Believers as the true bearers of the Orthodox faith and fighters for Christian conscience and spiritual freedom. [102] However, in his later, in general less Slavophile period, he came closer to their position on this point, as we see for instance in 'Kratkaja povest". [103] The issue of the Old Believers turns out to be the very point in which Solov'ev showed most affinity with the Slavophile standpoint through the years, whereas on other issues he had clearly distanced himself from them.

The fact that Ivan Aksakov supported him and was willing to publish his first articles on the issue in his own journal attests to their kinship, He praised the young philosopher's article 'O cerkvi i raskole' as a pioneering work that dealt with the problem of the relationship between the Old Believers and the church correctly and with utmost observation, [104] Besides, in the correspondence between Pobedonoscev and Subbotin, Solov'ev was associated with Aksakov, Their critical publications on church policy in Rus' in 1881, in particular against the repression of the schism, were mentioned together. [105] Years later, Solov'ev quoted largely from Aksakov's criticism of the church in his French lecture. [106] The reaction in the church journal Strannik on Solov'ev's writings on the schism was also positive. [107] The anonymous author praised Solov'ev's theological and philosophical analysis as a unique method that allowed fundamental discussion of the schism.

A similarity of his views with Giljarov-Platonov can also be attested. Solov'ev knew about his publications, but there is no evidence that they discussed the issue together. On the whole, the latter's affinity with the Slavophiles, and at the same time his trust in social progress, his opposition to revolution, his distinction between Christianity and true Orthodoxy and his defence of religious freedom, bring him close to Solov'ev in many respects. However, his treatment of the Old Believers shows more inside knowledge than is present in Solov'ev's dogmatic criticism.

ii) The liberals

With the liberals, Solov'ev shared a defence of religious freedom, as well as other views. For example his aversion with respect to the Old Believers as reactionary and ignorant people bears a liberal influence, arguably that of his father. But his exclusively religious approach differed from that of the liberals. An interesting specimen of their reaction to his approach is a review in Vestnik Evropy of Solov'ev's 1882 article in Rus' on the schism. [108] The anonymous author denounced Solov'ev's exhortation that the Old Believers unify freely with the Orthodox Church as not realistic and tactless. The lack of factual considerations, notably the unequal condition of the Old Believers with respect to the Orthodox believers, as well as Solov'ev's superior tone as the possessor of truth, made his position naive. The practical result of the philosopher's call could be easily predicted: instead of a rapprochement, the existing positions would be reinforced, and would leave the problem intact.

iii) The populists

As for Solov'ev's relationship to the populists, he explicitly rejected their protective attitude towards the Old Believers and their perception of 'the hint of a better future for the Russian people' in the Old Believers' way of life. [109] His use of the cliche of the Old Believers' ignorance, as well as his complete silence about their political, let alone revolutionary potential, showed that he was quite remote from the populist valuation of the Old Believers. Interestingly, like the populists he nevertheless perceived ultra-democratic tendencies and a rebellious spirit in the religious current. Only their interpretation diverged: he denounced it as detrimental to church unity, whereas the populists exalted it as bearing the germ of a future, tsarless society.

iv) The clerical conservatives

Solov'ev saved his fiercest criticism for the clerical conservatives. [110] The Old Believers had to receive the right to practice their religion freely. Besides, the church, that this camp tried to protect from criticism, had acted and still was acting in an un-Christian manner with respect to them. Against the clerical conservatives' overall denigrating attitude, he also argued that it was too easy to see in the Old Believers' attachment to 'orthography rather than to Orthodoxy' the action of 'ignorant and stupid fanatics.' [111] Although he himself repeatedly stressed the ignorance of the Old Believers, he saw both ignorance and fanaticism as accompanying circumstances of the schism, not as its true basis. [112] The mouthpiece of the clerical conservatives Pobedonoscev did not spare his scorn of the philosopher who openly dared to criticise the institution of the church. He called him a 'crazy man' and wrote about 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii': 'What rubbish he talked [Cto on nagorodil]!' [113]

v) The Old Believers

Lack of documentary evidence excludes an elaborate answer on Solov'ev's direct confrontation with the Old Believers. While his thorough discussion of their main claims (spelling of Jesus Christ and sign of the cross) testifies to the fact that he took the religious minority seriously, other statements that he made seem reductive. Firstly, he misunderstood the Old Ritualist movement by associating it too easily with Protestantism. He claimed that the Russian schism "has within itself the germ of Protestantism', and that, in the Old Believers' eyes, only the individual remains the keeper of the tradition. [114] That salvation is an individual matter, concerns only the individual, and excludes participation of the church, is indeed an element that can be found in some currents within Protestantism. However, this can hardly be applied either to the priestless Old Believers, who had a strong feeling of community, or to the priestly Old Believers, who believed in the fundamental role of the church in religious life. [115] He might also have been wrong when claiming that the Old Believers rejected the idea of a universal church. They did not reject it as such, but the priestless Old Believers did not identify it with the visible church of their time, while the priestly adherents identified it with another hierarchy, namely that of Belaja Krinica.

Secondly, one could argue that Solov'ev was as dogmatic as the Old Believers were themselves. For him, the principle of the authority of the church was as untouchable as the body of the liturgical texts and the religious rituals to the Old Believers. Modern developments in cultural anthropology have shown that the distinction between 'symbolic and concrete structures' is fruitless for a proper approach to the phenomenon of Old Belief. [116] 'For the faithful, pre-Nikonian rituals realised rather than represented heaven on earth.' [117] In the eyes of the Old Believers, liturgy plays a central role in religious life, forming a solid link between the believer and the church, to the extent that during liturgy a fusion of ritual and belief takes place. A change in spelling in religious texts and modification of ritual gestures such as crossing oneself have a profound impact on faith itself. From this perspective, the Old Believers' dogmatic attachment to ancient rituals and liturgy are perhaps more understandable now than one century ago. Quite in conformity with the ideals of his time, Solov'ev reacted in a dogmatic way, which differed from that of the Old Believers inasmuch as it was dictated by rationalist considerations, and condemned the Old Believers' particularism. But he missed, or chose to disregard, essential features of their religious practice, which were after all those of Orthodoxy until the Nikonian reforms. [118] His combination of a defence of religious freedom for the Old Believers with a thorough criticism of their theological assumptions and a direct exhortation to return to the official church, was likely to provoke disapprobation no less than recognition among the Old Believers. [119]

As to a reaction of the Old Believers themselves to Solov'ev's writings, we have one indirect testimony. Aksakov seems to suggest that Old Believers had read his criticism of the official church in 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii', and appreciated that this criticism came, for a change, not from a 'sectarian' but from an Orthodox thinker. [120] However, he declared that the Old Believers had to distinguish between (their own) dishonest criticism and that of Solov'ev. A few decades later, Old Believer Vladimir Rjabusinskij criticised the initially schematic approach of Solov'ev as too formal, which reminded him of a decision by the court of appeal [kassacionnoe resenie], but appreciated that the philosopher had come to a growing understanding of the Old Faith. [121] Besides, in his concluding words, he approvingly quoted from Solov'ev's Dukhovnye osnovy zizni a passage on intellectual strictness to demonstrate that on that point the philosopher had repeated ideas central to the Old Faith. [122] These comments suggest that Rjabusinskij saw some affinity between Solov'ev's views and those of his fellow Old Believers.

On the whole, Solov'ev's treatment of the issue of the Old Believers is typical for his time in three main respects. Firstly, the religious perspective that he adopted, though with an atypical depth and width of perspective, was present in the debates among the clerical conservatives and the Slavophiles. Secondly, when he later moved this perspective to the background, taking a more general stance in favour of freedom of conscience, he shared this position not only with the Slavophiles, but also with the liberals and the populists. Thirdly, Solov'ev shared with the liberals and the clerical conservatives the cliche of the Old Believers' overall ignorance, and regarded their religious practice as symptomatic for their primitivism. At the same time, however, his approach also had specific features that make his interventions a unique contribution to the debate: he engaged in a thorough critical discussion of their theological claims, which he combined with a positive valuation of their historical role.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

Postby admin » Thu May 10, 2018 8:00 am

Part 2 of 2

d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history

Solov'ev reacted to a significant extent to the Old Believers's attitude with respect to history, and it is therefore relevant at this stage to include a survey of the perception of history of the Old Believers themselves. Apocalyptic thought is often mentioned as a central feature of this perception. In the eyes of the Old Believers, Nikon's reforms were tantamount to a 'falling off of the Muscovite church from its mission to maintain the only right faith until the apocalyptic return of Christ for the world.' [123] The end was therefore imminent. This was the starting point of a 'chiliastic expectation of the decay of the world.' [124] The Old Believers anathematised Nikon as (precursor to) the Antichrist. However, tsar Alexis, under whose reign the schism took place, was also guilty for having allowed the reforms. He had thereby failed as 'the final and supreme authority in matters of faith, of rituals, of the church', in other words as 'theocratic tsar', and also deserved anathematisation. [125] Later, because of Peter's reforms, the Old Believers went a step further and interpreted the tsar himself as the Antichrist, and from that point onwards the entire state and society were the target of their opposition. [126] However, this applied only to some Old Believers and to a specific period. The priestless subdivision of the Wanderers developed the most radical apocalyptic thought, by fleeing the state and society, by refusing passports, registration, money, in short any contact with the Russian state. [127] According to some analyses, these 'politics of apocalypse' reached their apogee between 1700 and 1740. [128] By Solov'ev's time, the Old Believers unanimously rejected the official Orthodox Church, but only the most radical currents such as the Wanderers rejected tsar, state and society as a whole, while the more open-minded representatives of the Old Faith acted with utter pragmatism and successfully integrated in urban centres.

Solov'ev felt deep affinity as well as an equally deep repulsion with respect to the Old Believers' views of history in particular. This created a fruitful tension that returns in the three registers that I have identified as underlying Solov'ev's views on history. In this way, the three registers allow to explain the ambiguity of Solov'ev's position with respect to the Old Believers.

From the perspective of theology of history, he was utterly critical, but on some points approved of their position. From the perspective of the universal church, he claimed that the Old Believers were mistaken and had displayed the same exclusive patriotism as the instigators of the 1094 schism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. [129] The Old Believers denied that the official church still had a historical role to play, and Solov'ev devoted much energy to demonstrating the necessity of believing in the church as an institution given by Christ and possessing a divine as well as a human element. In his eyes it was vital to participate in it as the primary actor to bring about a Christian society. The Old Believers, by rejecting the official church, contested three principles that were dear to him, namely church unity, its universal dimension, and its role in shaping a truly Christian future. [130] However, he praised the fact that they had 'the true idea of the church', an allusion to their moral integrity and high expectations of the church. [131] Besides, they had put the finger on the sore spot in Russian history: they had uttered the truth, albeit a 'negative truth', that 'there is no truly spiritual government in the Greek-Russian church.' [132] Their views on Nikon were also to a certain extent similar to his own. His criticism of the church was that, from Nikon onwards, it had turned its back on its higher function. [133] He therefore approved of their uncompromising criticism and high demand with respect to the institution, while rejecting their concrete separation from the church.

His philosophical approach to history prompted a total rejection of the Old Ritualist worldview. If one defends, as they did, an 'unconditionally negative relationship to the reforms of Peter the Great, this means to admit that Russian history does not have a meaning, it means to refuse the principles of universal enlightenment and of the tasks of the future.' [134] Here the reader feels the strength of Solov'ev's conviction that Peter represented the very turning point where Russian history shifted to the side of progress. Their rejection of the institution of the state as such also clashed with his conception of the state as a necessary instrument for realising progress. More generally, this quotation also shows that he missed the specifically philosophical motive of enlightenment, universalisation, and the continuity of history along a progressive line. Their attachment to tradition and refusal of change in particular provoked his fierce reaction. He called their worldview 'kitajscina' [stagnation, identified with Chinese civilisation], hereby joining the perception of the Old Believers by officials and liberals as backward people. [135] But his own view distinguished itself from the latter as his belief in progress and his universalism were cast in an anti-modern mould of theocratic development.

The question arises as to a kinship of their views on the relationship between history and salvation. As a matter of fact, as Robson states, the Old Believers 'worried that ritual change could undermine the possibility of deification. For them, the church schism of the 17th century not only broke tradition, but also subverted the chance for salvation.' [136] This way of thinking in terms of obstacles to salvation was not alien to Solov'ev himself, who repeatedly warned his contemporaries that, if the right path was not chosen immediately, Russia would subvert its own chances for salvation. And, significantly, he saw the existence of the Old Faith precisely in the same terms: 'since the 17th century the schism paralyses the action of the church principle in Russian national life.' [137] Moreover, he did not broach the issue of the Wanderers' apocalyptic thought, although he himself was increasingly subject to apocalyptic feelings towards the end of the 1890s. One could have expected a discussion of their views at this point. His silence may be explained by the fact that he totally disapproved of their identification of Peter the Great and the state with the Antichrist. A more pro- found reason perhaps is that he, in line with 20th century theologians such as Florovsky, saw an attempt 'to get out of history' in the apocalyptic tendency of the Old Faith, a view that was contrary to his ideals. [138] Solov'ev therefore perhaps shared more than he himself might be ready to admit with the Old Believers. But there is a difference of degree. Solov'ev perceived temporary obstacles, whereas they regarded 1667 as the definitive rupture of the line from Jesus Christ to the kingdom of God. For him, therefore, their very attitude was one of those temporary obstacles. It had tremendous effects even on the universal scale, as they, like all sects, 'retard mankind on the path of salvation', 'do not achieve anything themselves and hinder the others.' [139]

Hindering others -- here Solov'ev may also have meant hindering him in his task to reconcile the churches, but also in his task as a prophet. From the sophiological perspective of history, and especially from the perspective of Solov'ev's own prophetic mission with respect to the Russian people, the Old Believers were a competitor. He praised their conviction that the essence of the church was in the people, but arguably it was precisely their claim to the people that challenged his role as a prophet. Although he did not strive to guide the people directly, he attempted to establish a moral leadership over educated society, in order for the latter to educate the people. [140] Solov'ev was sensitive to the fact that Old Believers were highly successful among the peasants, and perhaps sensed his own powerlessness to counter the Old Faith with other than theological arguments. About their view of the future, he had contradictory statements. On the one hand he objected to their passivity, their non-participation in progress, their exclusive focus on the people, and their anathematisation of significant historical actors, namely the church and state. More generally, he interpreted that what we saw as their persisting isolation from Russian society as a major obstacle to the unified society he was dreaming of. On the other hand, their faith and religiosity gave him hope for the regeneration of the Russians: 'with its thousands of martyrs the schism manifests - and here lies its great significance -- the depth of the religious feeling in the Russian people, the living interest which the theocratic idea of the Church incites in them'; and it 'makes us foresee the regeneration of our ecclesiastical life.' [141] They were a sign that the third power besides the church and state, or in other words the people, had started to regenerate. There is no reason to believe that with the expression 'theocratic idea' he referred to his own ideal of 'free theocracy.' Most probably he simply meant the representative organs of the power of God on earth. No answer had yet been found as to the fundamental question, raised by the schism, of whether the essence of the church was in church power or in the people. But perhaps the Old Believers would playa future role in solving it. At least they had already prefigured the regeneration of the people. The Old Ritualists believed in the divine mission of the church and their way of life as a whole followed religious principles. These two factors brought them very close to his own ideal. He came to realise this only later in his career.

3. Conclusion

The issue of the Old Believers was a challenge to Solov'ev in three respects. Firstly, their position, which had caused the most significant schism in the history of the Orthodox Church in Russia, clashed with his ideal of church unity. Also the fact that they still attracted large layers of Russian society made them a competitor to his own prophetic role in Russia. Secondly, their claims involved as much a discourse on history and an attitude to hold with respect to present developments as his own claims, only he fundamentally contested their interpretation of history, present included. They condemned certain historical events such as the Nikonian and Petrine reforms, and believed in the present spread of the activity of the Antichrist, and in the general imminence of the end of times. Their view did not allow for any commitment to the present, which was in conflict with his own call to activism. Thirdly, like himself, they were highly religious people, and it was precisely for his reason that he had to distinguish his position clearly from theirs. Solov'ev responded to this three-fold challenge, yet without going beyond his ambiguous relationship with the Old Believers.

In his eyes, what was at stake was not only the unity of the church, but also the tie between the people and the church. In this connection, he occupied a unique position among the authors who in the 1880-1890s put pen to paper to defend religious tolerance for the Old Believers. In order to get to the heart of the matter, he entered into a serious discussion of the Old Believers' theological claims while placing their religious current in a broad historical perspective. He developed a parallel criticism of the church and of the schism, which makes his contribution original, going beyond the Slavophile idealisation of the Old Faith and the liberal, essentially secular defence of religious freedom.

The Old Believers shared with Solov'ev Russian citizenship and the Otthodox faith, even though they were cut off from the official church. These were two reasons for him to be extra-committed, one could argue, and to make the Old Believers his number one target for conversion. Yet, his commitment does not display a concern deeper than that for the Jews or Poles. Even though it was the sole case of Solov'ev's addressing a religious minority directly, his attempts to convert them were short-lived. Arguably, his position evolved towards greater respect, perhaps under the influence of encounters, or on the basis of information gathered in the press, or as an exceptional counter-example to the disheartening lack of application of Orthodoxy in his own country's life. In contrast with his commitment to the Jews, Solov'ev, surprisingly, did not specifically engage in a struggle for more rights, such as access to education, which was a central issue for them and for officials.

The phenomenon of the Old Faith remained for him a major obstacle, which should be removed, to the realisation of his religious ideals, until he recognised in them a religious potential for the future regeneration of Russia. Yet this acknowledgement did not lead to a more specific commitment, probably because the Old Believers' worldview, despite the affinities which Solov'ev bore with it, did not seem to him reconcilable with his own conception of history, which implied the church and the state as main actors. Perhaps a rapprochement with the more moderate and relatively well-integrated priestly urban communities such as that of Moscow could have led to a fruitful dialogue. The fact remains, however, that Solov'ev did not seek their support for his religious projects on Russian society.

_______________

Notes:

1. Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika, p. 126.

2. Contemporary historical studies focus mainly on the early days after the schism, while the tremendous interest in religious studies and ethnography since perestrojka has generated many studies on local Old Believers communities, leaders, rituals and manuscripts over the whole Russian territory. See also (S.G. Vurgaft. I.A. Usakov (eds.). Staroobrjadcestvo: lica, predmety, sobytija i simvoly: Opyt enciklopediceskogo slovarja (Moskva: Cerkov', 1996). Among Western scholarship. Roy Robson's thorough study on the Old Believers in Russia after 1905 is a crucial contribution for the understanding of Old Faith in Russia up to the present day, and takes into account developments in anthropology (Roy Robson, Old Believers in Modern Russia (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995). Less strictly scientific, but just as captivating, is Leon Poliakov's fresco of the history of the Old Believers (Leon Poliakov, L'epopee des vieux-croyants: une histoire de la Russie authentique (Paris: Perrin, 1991). A work of more general interest, Igor Smolitsch's Geschichte der russischen Kirche contains a highly valuable chapter on the movement of the Old Faith in Russia (Igor Smolitsch, Geschichte der russischen Kirche, 2 vols., 1st publ. 1964. Gregory L. Freeze (ed.). Series Forschungen zur Osteuropalischen Geschichte, vol. 45 (Berlin & Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1991). vol. 2. pp. 116-166). For a survey of the literature on the Old Believers up to 1995, see Robson 1995. pp. 3-13. An informative study remains Markov's apology of the policy of the Holy Synod: V.S. Markov. K'istorii raskola-staroobrjadcestva vtoroj poloviny XIX stoletija: perepiska prof. N.I. Subbotina, preimuscestvenno neizdannaja, kak material dlja istorii raskola i otnosenij k nemu pravitel'stva (1865-1904 gg.) (Moskva: Izdanie Imperatorskogo Obscestva Istorii i Drevnostej Rossijskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete, 1914).

3. O.P. Ersova, Staroobrjadcestvo i vlast' (Moskva: Unikum-Centr. 1999).

4. Vladimir Rjabusinskij, Staroobrjadcestvo i russkoe religioznoe cuvstvo (1st publ. 1936: Moskva-Ierusalim: Mosty, 1999), pp. 79-79: Bernard Marchadier, 'Vladimir Soloviev et le raskol', in: de Guibert 1994. pp. 82-87.

5. Robson 1995, p. xi.

6. The term staroobrjadcestvo was coined in the 20th century and is widely used in scholarship. I follow Robson's transcription with capitals (Old Believers, Old Ritualists) as well as his translation of technical terms.

7. Gerhard Simon, Konstantin Petrovic Pobedunoscev und die Kirchenpolitik des Heiligen Sinod 1880-1905 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 165.

8. On this term, see Sander Brouwer, 'Avvakoem: de afscheiding van de Russische oudgelovigen', in: Emmanuel Waegemans et al. (eds.), Het leven van aartspriesler Avvakoem door hemzelf geschreven (Antwerpen: Benerus, 2001), pp. l-42: p. 9.

9. The following account is based on Robson 1995, pp. 14-24.

10. Nikon was patriarch from 1652 to 1658, while tsar Alexis reigned from 1645 to 1676.

11. Avvakum was burnt on the stake. His autobiography is arguably the most significant document on the Old Faith. The manuscript first circulated solely among Old Believers, and was only published in 1861.

12. Between 1672 and 1691 more than twenty thousand people burnt themselves to death in thirty-seven known collective suicides (Riasanovsky 1993, p. 199). Old Believers of the Soloveckij Monastery sustained an eight-year siege by imperial authority (1668-1676) (Michael Cherniavsky, 'The Old Believers and the New Religion', Slavic Review 25 (1966), 1. pp. 1-39: p. 18). The most famous uprisings in which they took part were those of Stenka Razin (1670-1671), the strelcy (1682), Bulavin (1707-1708) and Pugacev (1773- 775) (Sander Brouwer, 'De oudgelovige en de populist, reli-politick drama in enkele bedrijven', Tijdschrift voor Slavische Literatuur 31 (2002), 1. pp. 32-39: p. 33: on the strelcy see Cherniavsky 1966. p. 19). In an attempt to escape the persecutions, the Old Believers fled from the cities and settled in the north, in the forests along the Volga, in the Urals and in Siberia. They gained members mainly among peasants, the middle class and merchants.

13. The priestless Old Believers knew many subdivisions. The main priestless sects were the Pomorcy (or Danilovcy), the Fedoseevcy, the Filipovcy, the Netovcy, and the Stranniki [or Beguny, henceforth referred to as the Wanderers] (Smolitsch 1991 2, pp. 155-161). A number of priestless Old Believers settled in sparsely inhabited regions between Onega Lake and the White Sea. There they founded the community of Vyg, which flourished until it was confiscated under Nicholas I in 1854. They also founded religious centres in Moscow, the most famous of which was and is that of Preobrazenskoe.

14. They accepted Orthodox priests from the official church at their service as long as these acknowledged the old, non-revised books, and welcomed priests who fled from the official church [beglopopovcy] (Smolitsch 1991 2. pp. 150-151). They settled mostly in European Russia, namely in the Don region, in the provinces of Niznij Novgorod, Cernigov and Saratov. They also succeeded in acquiring a solid place in Moscow by managing a number of religious centres, notably the complex based at the Rogozskoe cemetery (Robson 1995, p. 31).

15. Brouwer 2001, p. 13.

16. Robson 1995, p. 29. According to the unified faith Old Believers could use their rules and books in the liturgy, on the condition that the priests of these unified faith parishes were placed by the diocesan authority (P.G. Ryndzjunskij, 'Cerkov' v dvorjanskoj imperii (XVIIIv.)', in A.I. Klibanov (ed.), Russkoe pravoslavie: vekhi istorii (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989), pp. 230-308: p. 308). In 1882, there were about 250 unified faith parishes, giving total number of some 250,000 adherents (Simon 1969, p. 185).

17. Robson 1995, p. 31.

18. Emanuel Sarkisyanz, Russland und der Messianismus des Orients: Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1955). p. 83; Smolitsch 1991 2, p. 183. There is no fully reliable data on the numbers of Old Believers. Smolitsch refers to the estimation of 10% Old Believers of the total Russian population in 1863 (Smolitsch 1991 2. p. 183). Poliakov advances that they were more than 10 million in 1897 (Poliakov 1991. p. 93). Simon mentions the exaggerated evaluation made by scholars of 20 million schismatics (Old Believers and all sects included) for 1897 (Simon 1969, p. 170, n. 18).

19. Ersova 1999, pp. 86-87; Rjabusinskij 1999, p. 87.

20. Except when another reference is mentioned, the following account is based on Ersova 1999, pp. 84-113.

21. Within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the department for general affairs [departament obscikh del] dealt with issues of the Old Believers and other sects. However, towards the end of the 19th century, both departments regularly consulted the general procurator or the Synod (Simon 1969, p. 167). This department was distinct from the department for religious affars of foreign confessions [depart ament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh ispovedanij]. This division between (Orthodox) sects and foreign confessions may explain the milder treatment of the Old Believers (especially the priestly) compared with that for other religious minorities analysed in the case studies, namely the Polish Catholics and the Jews.

22. Bribes, gins and donations were part of the solutions practised by Old Believers to increase the benevolence of the church towards them, or at least to soften its antagonism. Charity gifts were not only aimed at their own community, but also at poor Orthodox Russians. Notably during the famine of 1891-1892, Old Believers did not hesitate to make a donation of 25,000 roubles to the Special Committee for Famine Relief [for more information on this Committee, see case study V 'The Famine of 1891-1892']. On official occasions they also made donations to the local authorities with the request for instance to authorise poor Old Ritualist students to attend university courses.

23. Simon 1969, p. 175. 'The 1883 law gave all [Orthodox] schismatics [... ] the right to hold internal passports, to engage in trade and industry, and to hold minor offices. They were authorized to hold religious services in their homes and in their houses of prayer, but these buildings were not allowed to have bells or other distinguishing marks. No new places of worship could be built, and repairs of those that existed could be made only with the permission of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Synod. Funeral services could be held, but religious vestments could not be worn then or at any other time. Moreover, no public demonstration of worship or processions were allowed, and proselytising or missionary work was also forbidden' (Byrnes 1968, pp. 180-181). Also unsealing Old Ritualist monasteries and settlements was explicitly forbidden. Finally the state did not recognise Old Believer priests and starcy as religious (Simon 1969, p. 174).

24. Smolitsch 1991 2, p. 185; Robson 1995, p. 18. Obstruction and repression from the part of the church and the police remained a common practice (Simon 1969, pp.175-176).

25. Smolitsch 1991 2. pp. 146-201. In the 1860s, scholarly studies on the Old Believers were initiated in the religious academies. At the same time, ethnological interest motivated the first independent studies of Old Believers' traditions, rituals, way of life, such as the reports, short stories and novels by Pavel Mel'nikov (1819-1883). These studies were echoed widely in the press. See the two bibliographical works written in that period: A.S. Prugavin, Raskol-sektantstvo: materialy dlja izucenija religiozno-bytovych dzivenij russkago naroda, Book 1: Bibliografija staroobrjadcestva i ego razvetvlenij (Moskva: Tip. V.V. Isleneva, 1887): F.K. Sakharov, Literatura po istorii i obliceniju russkogo raskola: Sistematiceskij ukazatel' knig, brosjur i statej o raskole, nakhodjascikhsja v dukhovnykh i svetskikh periodiceskikh izdanijakh, Books 1-3 (Tambov: n.p., 18., 1887: Sankt-Peterburg: n.p., 1892, 1900).

26. Information drawn from A.S. Prugavin, 'Znacenie sektenstva v russkoj narodnoj zizni', Russkaja Mysl', 1881. 1. pp. 301-363: and, 'Zaprosy o projavlenii umstvennoj zizni v raskole', Russkaja Mysl', 1884. 1. pp. 161-199. Most famous were the journalistic and literary descriptions of the way of life of Old Believers in the works of the writers Nikolaj Leskov (1831-1895), Vladimir Korolenko (1853-1921), Dmitrij Mamin (1852-1912). For an account of their literary and journalistic productions, see Viktoria Pleyer, Das russische Atglaugentum Geschichte, Darstellung in der Literatur (Munchen: Verlag Otto Sagner, 1961), pp.75-106.

27. I base my analysis whenever possible on primary sources and the abovementioned secondary literature.

28. About the position of the socialists and Marxists with respect to the Old Believers, no literature has been found. Besides, their opinion is not mentioned in the analysed debates, which strongly suggests that they were not interested in this issue.

29. Metropolite Filaret spoke about an 'obstinate illness' (1857) (quoted in A. V. Kostrov, 'Oficial"no-cerkovnaja koncepcija staroobrjadcestva v otecestvennoj istoriografii II poloviny XIX v.'. in: coll., Staroobrjadcestvo: istorija i sovremennost', mestnye tradicii, russkie i zarubeznye svjazi. Materialy Ill Mezdunarodnoj naucno-prakticeskoj konferencii 26-28 ijunija 2001, g. Ulan-Ude (Ulan-Ude: Izd. BNC SO RAN. 2001), pp. 16-18).

30. The second quote is from Pobedonoscev (Robert F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, His Life and Thought (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 178). His major weapons were public debates between Orthodox and Old Believers, bishop conferences, seminary courses on the Old Believers and anti-schism literature. All measures turned out to be a failure (Byrnes 1968, pp. 184-185). The historian Nikolaj Subbotin (1827-1905) was a specialist in the history of the schism who wrote more than four hundred articles and forty books on the Old Believers. He acted as the mouthpiece of the Holy Synod about the Old Believers (ex.: N.I. Subbotin, O suscnosti i znacenii raskola (Sankt-Peterburg: n.p. [probably ed. by the Holy Synod], 1881). Pobedonoseev provided Subbotin with official data and financial help, notably in setting up the missionary journal Bratskoe Slovo [The Fraternal Word] (1883-1899), which was openly hostile to the Old Believers (Simon 1969, p. 179). Their correspondence was published in Markov 1914.

31. According to a testimony of 1882, Cerkovnyj Vestnik, Moskovskie Cerkovnye Vedomosti, and several provincial Eparkhal'nye Vedomosti (Tula, Podol'sk, etc.) were also explicitly against religious freedom for the schismatics (I. Solov'ev, 'Vnutrennee obozrenie: o religioznoj svobode i grazdanskikh pravakh russkikh raskol'nikov', Ctenija v obscestve ljubitelej dukhovnogo prosvescenija, 1882, cast' III. sentjabr', ot. 2. pp. 303-332).

32. I. Nil'skij taught at St-Petersburg, N.I. Ivanovskij in Kazan', P.S. Smirnov in Rjazan, and E. Golubinskij and N. Kapterev in Moscow. Especially Golubinskij and Kapterev engaged in a violent polemic with Subbotin (Simon 1969, pp. 118-119).

33. Robson 1995, p. 4. As a cause of the schism they pointed to factors such as the faith of the Russians in rituals, the absence of enlightenment and the feeble development of literature in the country (Smirnov). Some were more critical of the church and attributed the schism to a complete misunderstanding, for which the Greeks who had taken part in the Nikonian reforms bore responsibility (Kapterev), and recognized some errors made by the offical clerical conception (Ivanovskij, Nil'skij).

34. Ivan Aksakov, 'Po povodu opredelenija Sv. Sinoda o dopolnenii nekotorykh punktov v pravilakh edinoverija', Rus', 26 sentjabrja 1881. Ed. used: Ivan Aksakov, Sobranie socinenij 4, pp. 175-189. See also Lukashevich 1965, p. 30. The philosopher, publicist and former lecturer at the religious academy Nikita Giljarov-Platonov (1824-1887) wrote the comprehensive article 'Logika raskola', first published in Rus' (1885, 7, 8, 10), with an addition in Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie, 1895, 10. Edition used: in: Sbornik socinenij, vol. 2 (Moskva: izd. K.P. Pobedonosccva, 1900) (1899), pp. 193-235. Giljarov-Platonov also concretely supported the Old Believers by printing their protest against the law of 1883 in his journal, arguably Sovremennye Izvestija (Smolitsch 1991 2. p. 189, Markov 1914, p. 346). The Slavophile-minded Tertij Filippov (1825-1899), a state controller from 1889 to 1899 and an expert on issues related to the church, was one of the very few officials who promoted a milder attitude towards the Old Believers and the unified faith believers in his works on Russian church issues. He wrote the authoritative book Sovremennye cerkovnye voprosy (Sankt-Peterburg: n.p., 1882) (see Smolitsch 1991 2. p. 178, Rjabusinskij 1999, pp. 69-70).

35. Giljarov-Platonov 1900, p. 198, 199, 213.

36. Golos and Porjadok were in favour of civil rights for the Old Believers (see I. Solov'ev, op. cit.). Vestnik Evropy did publish a piece by historian Nikolaj Kostomarov on the history of the Old Believers in 1871, but except for isolated articles, it seems that the journal did not devote much attention to the issue.

37. For instance Sergej Solov'ev, the historian and father of the philosopher, saw in them the symbol of immobile 17th century Russia, which only the muscled intervention by Peter the Great could shake up. See for instance his portrait of the nonetheless temperamental and courageous Avvakum as a representative of ancient Russia, a bogatyr' with his militia (S. Solov'ev 1988-1996 7, p. 157). The historian V. Kljucevskij (1841-1911) was no more positive and saw in their obstinate attachment to old practices a dry 'formalism', which led to the 'dying of the religious feeling' (Smolitsch 1991 2, p. 190).

38. They drew on the first authors who had dealt with the Old Faith from a social and political perspective, Afanasij Scapov (1830-1876) and Vasilij Kel'siev (1835-1872). Aleksandr Prugavin (1850-1920): Prugavin 1881 and Prugavin 1884; losif Kablic [pseudonym Juzov, 1848-1893]. 'Politiceskie vozzrenija staroverija', Russkaja Mysl', 1882. 5, pp. 181-214.

39. This view forms the core of Prugavin 1881 and Prugavin 1884.

40. Prugavin 1881, p. 335,

41. This explication of the solidarity between the intelligentsia and the Old Believers was fully explicit in Kablic 1882.

42. The absence of a comprehensive study or the debates among Old Believers necessitates cautiousness regarding any statement on their views and debates. A rough sketch is proposed here on the basis or secondary literature. The Old Believers mainly exposed their reaction to the Orthodox theses in a genre other than the press article, namely that of question-answer works (See E. V. Prokuratova, 'K voprosu ob izucenii voprosno-otvetnykh socinenij strannikov-statejnikov XIX-XX vv', in: Staroobrjadcestvo: Istorija, kult'ura, sovremennost' (Moskva: Muzej istorii i kul'tury staroobrjadcestva & Borovskij istoriko-kraevedceskij muzej, 2002), pp. 339-347).

43. This organ was probably supported by the hierarchy or Belaja Krinica, which was also settled in Bukovina.

44. Ersova 1999. pp. 96. 114. Prugavin 1881, p. 192. Another journal, Slovo Cerkvi [The Church's Word], existed at the start of the 20th century, and threatened to close in 1905 (Ersova 1999, p. 112). It is unclear when it began to appear and where it was published.

45. Old Believers discussed all kinds of issues, ranging from history and religion to practical social issues (Prugavin 1884, p. 196).

46. For instance in 1883, when the law on religious dissent was being prepared. Muscovite priestly Old Believers sent a protest to the Minister of Internal Affairs (published by Giljarov-Platonov), asking not to be defined as sectarians, to receive full equality for their schools with common schools, and to openly use Old Ritualist liturgy objects (Ersova 1999, p. 87).

47. Poliakov 1991, p. 147 ff., Ersova 1999, p. 91.

48. ‘O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve' (SS. 3. pp. 245-280).

49. First published in Rus', 1881, 56, pp. 10-14. Edition used: S. 1989 1, pp. 43-58. These four factors are not enumerated as such by Solov'ev, but they function as the main argument of the text, which justifies their presentation as a list.

50. As the biographer Sergej Solov'ev (nephew of Vladimir) remarks, this article was the apogee of Solov'ev's hostility to Catholicism (pp. 194-5, referred to in comment of the philosopher's text, S. 1989 1, p. 652). Later on, Solov'ev called the absorption of the spiritual power in secular power by Nikon a 'Byzantine' practice, or 'Greek nationalism' ('Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo', Nacianol 'nyj vopros 2, S. 1989 1, pp. 414-433: p. 421 ).

51. The same argument is applied to the Jewish case. Only an exemplary attitude on the part of Christians could make Jews eventually become Christians [see case study II 'The Jewish Question']. Solov'ev does not raise the issue whether Jews or Old Believers are willing to join, and whether their objections are not more fundamental than a temporary refusal of adhesion to Christianity.

52. Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika was first published in Rus' in 1883. The passage is drawn from 'Vizantizm i russkoe staroverie: narodnost' v cerkvi' (Edition used: S 1989 1. pp. 117-130: p. 126).

53. For the detailed account of these publications, see S. 1989 1.662-663.

54. Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie, 1884, 5. Edition used: SS 3. 245-280. This version is the most interesting for the case study for its most extensive discussion of theological points of the Old Believers.

55. The only Old Believer critical commentator that I have found. namely Rjabusinskij, unfortunately did not discuss the validity of these arguments for an Old Believer and contented himself with pointing to the too formal aspect of Solov'ev's analysis.

56. Written between 1885 and 1887, published in Zagreb in 1887. Edition used: SS. 4. pp. 245-261.

57. Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, p. 244.

58. L 'idee russe, p. 85.

59. First published in L'Univers, 4, 11, 19 August 1888. Edition used: E. 1978, pp. 103- 116. Written on the occasion or the ninth centenary of St. Vladimir's baptism, this piece is a reaction to the official celebrations of the Russian authorities and their interpretation or the history of the Russian church.

60. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, in particular pp. 162-166.

61. First published in Vestnik Evropy, 1889. 5. pp. 290-303. Edition used: S. 1989 1. pp. 414-432. This piece was a part of the second collection of Nacional'nyj vopros. On the Old Believers, see in particular pp. 422-429. The most important part of the passage (pp. 422- 427) had already been published in the foreword of Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii arguably to familiarise the Russian audience with his views on the schism.

62. 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo', p. 428.

63. The sole exception to these years of silence was a letter to Pobedonoscev written in 1892, in which Solov'ev evoked in passing the repression of religious dissent in various parts of the country and the 'cynical attitude of the official church ('Pis'mo K.P. Pobedonoscevu', S. 19892, pp. 419-420).

64. 'Vizantizm i Rossija', pp. 599-600. Pages 597-599 are a literal reproduction of a passage of Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika (pp. 126-128).

65. Dated 23 February 1897. First published in Rus' 1897, date unknown. Edition used: SS. 10. pp. 12-14. Wozniuk also uses this translation of this title, which originally does not contain a question mark (Wozniuk 2000, p. 73)

66. First published in Rus', date unknown. Edition used: SS. 10, pp. 75-80. The census was considered a way of gaining control over the whole population, and as such as a sacrilege. for only God has the right to such knowledge. The Old Believers saw the census as a manifestation of the coming of the Antichrist. and often preferred to die rather than fall into the hands of its agents.

67. Tri razgovora o mirnykh i voennykh delakh, first published in Knizki Nedeli, 1899, 10, 11, 1900, 1. Edition used: 'Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste', Tri razgovora, S. 1988 2. pp. 736-762.

68. Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste', p. 748 ff.

69. This hypothesis has also been suggested in Marchadier 1994, p. 87.

70. In 'Religiozno-nravstvennoe sostojanie russkogo obscestva pred reformoj Petra Velikogo' (n.p., 1877), he quoted at length from such a report on the years 1894-5 and published in 1898 [see chap. III 'Philosophy of History in Solov'ev', footnote 192 on this text].

71. He only referred to a work of the latter that dealt in passing with the Old Believers ('Vopros o "samocinnom umstvovunii'", S. 1989 2. pp. 466-472: p. 469).

72. Danilovec was mentioned in 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii' (p. 50). Cf. Sergej Solov'ev, Istorija Rossii s drevnejscikh vremen (S. Solov'ev 1988-1996 7. p. 273).

73. Firstly, he referred to the notes of father Pafnutij during the council (Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika, p. 127 and 'V zantizm i Rossija', p. 599). Secondly, in a letter to Tertij Filippov, he wrote that he was at the edition of Golas Moskvy [The Voice of Moscow] and 'Vasil'ev found for me accounts of a conversation with Old Believers, which I used for the second letter: as to the topic which I told you about, I had to postpone it to the third letter (Pis 'ma 4, p. 167). Although the present state of Solov'ev's studies docs not allow a trace of precisely which 'letter' he meant -- if he wrote to Filippov in 1885, as the first edition of the correspondence mentions, it was not a Sunday letter -- this passage attests to Solov'ev's research of sources. About Golas Moskvy, see footnote 73.

74. He informed the French audience about the fact that the newspaper Golos Moskvy, after having published accounts of these disputations which were unfavorable for the official church, was punished and now no longer existed (La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 171).

75. For an example of indifferent use of staroverie and raskol, see on the same page in 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo' (p. 422). For an example of the use of raskol as embracing Old Believers and other sectarians, see 'P raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 255.

76. The Stoglav [literally hundred Chapters] was the name of the 1551 council in which law reforms, also concerning daily life, were undertaken. Formal submission to these established rules still governed the Old Believers' daily life (Poliakov 1991, p. 98). On another occasion Solov'ev interpreted the schism as a symptom for an international crisis. He declared that the schism had its causes in the general weakened state of the church due to the schism between Eastern and Western churches ('Ljubov' k narodu i russkij narodnyk ideal', Nacional'nyj vopros I, S. 1989 1, pp. 293-311: p. 294). This older schism thus served as the basis for this understanding of the Russian schism, perhaps under the influence of Krizanic, as Stremooukhoff argued (p. 130). However, Solov'ev did not elaborate on this line of interpretation.

77. 'O raskolc v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 251.

78. This claim that the Old Believers called themselves the true church is repeated in Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, p. 244.

79. Contrary to the common opinion. Nikon did not exaggerate the religious power, which is impossible, according to Solov'ev. Yet he did separate it from its divine content, let it become a 'hazardous [slucajnaja] historical force'. Nikon was called 'great lord' next to the tsar, intervened in diplomatic and military affairs. He posed the worldly and religious affairs on the same fool, whereas the latter has to lead the former. This is how it became an external power, lost its moral authority ('O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii', pp. 48-49).

80. Saint Vladimir et l'Etat chretien', p. 105. No other mention is made of Avvakum, and we have not found hints that Solov'ev ever read Avvakum's Zitie. Since the 1860s, when the Zitie was published for the first time, wide circles of the Russian intelligentsia read it (Vladimir Ronin,;" ... Tot de dood erop voigt!"' De Russische herinnering aan Avvakoem', in Waegemans et al. 2001. pp. 163-196: p. 164).

81. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 261.

82. He however knew this well, since he even mentioned this point earlier in the same text; he probably made this inaccurate statement for the sake of his criticism of their conception of the church.

83. However, Solov'ev was informed about Old Believers' writings such as the central work of the brothers Denisov Pomorskie Otvety (1722-1723) and that of monk Nikodim 'O predanijakh cerkovnykh' written in reaction to metropolite Plato's 'Uvescanie Vselenskoj Cerkvi ko vsem otlucivsimsja' (end 18th century) (Ibid., pp. 469, 471).

84. 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii', pp. 44-45, 48. In Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii he focused on the patriarchs Joakim, Adrian, and foremost Stefan Javorskij's -- despotic way of condemning the heretics (Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, pp. 247-248).

85. 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii', p. 51. See Brouwer 2001, pp. 13 ff. for a survey of the tsars' policies.

86. 'The complete victory or the schism, which is by principle hostile to any intellectual movement, would have deprived Russia or a necessary cultural and scientific preparation or its religious-historical task in the world' (Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, p. 246). In another text, however. the causal link did not appear so clearly: 'the religious protest or the 17th century was followed by the reform of Peter the Great which gave to Russia science and all means or intellectual development' (St. Vladimir et l'Etat chretien', p. 116).

87. Freeze 1977, pp. 29-30.

88. Sarkisyanz 1955, p. 74.

89. Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika, p. 126.

90. ‘Cto takoe Rossija', p. 13.

91. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 259.

92. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 164. This position also contradicted the Old Believers' conviction that the church sinned by introducing new dogmas. He criticised this position from a theological perspective, arguing that since the 8th century the church could not possibly issue new dogmas. Hereby Solov'ev showed a strictly Orthodox framework of reflection.

93. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 260. The only reason he could find that justified their attitude was that they ecmembercd the oaths of 1667, the persecutions and the later repressions (Ibid.).

94. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 260, note.

95. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 171.

96. The question arises whether one can argue, as Weber did with respect to Protestantism, that the Old Believers formed a prosperous middle-class precisely because of their strict work ethics. On this question, see Andreas Buss, Die Wirtschaftsethik des russisch- Orthodoxen Christentums (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1989). esp. chap. 3., devoted to the Old Believers (pp, 52-70).

97. 'Neskol'ko slov v zascitu Petra Velikogo', p. 428. This is also the opinion of the commentators of the 1989 edition who estimate the ethnic treatment or the phenomenon of the Old Faith to he highly dubious (S. 1989 1, p. 677).

98. 'Saint Vladimir et l’Etat chretien', pp, 115-116.

99. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 163. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 250.

100. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 163.

101. Velikij spor i khristianskajs politika, p. 126. His personal contact with Filippov and affinity with the latter's ecumenical preoccupations are also attested. Interestingly, the name of Filippov is dropped again in his fourth Sunday Letter 'Cto takoc Rossija' (p. 14): Solov'ev referred to Filippov as one of the fierce defenders of Orthodoxy who also advocated a council to solve the schism. Apart from the abovementioned pieces of correspondence [cf. n. 73] we know very little about Solov'ev's exact relationships with this official.

102. Solov'ev considered the Old Faith an 'illness' and argued that it was 'losing touch with the divine content of the church' ('O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 245).

103. Moreover, in 'Cto takoe Rossija', he said that old Slavophiles had tried to initiate a free and all-sided discussion of the religious issues at slake.

104. Ivan Aksakov, 'Po povodu stat'i V.S. Solov'eva "O cerkvi i raskole'", first published in Rus', 2 October 1882. Edition used: Sobranie socinenij 4, pp. 212-217: p.214.

105. Markov 1914, p. 227.

106. L 'idee russe, pp. 91-94.

107. Anonymous; 'Vnutrennee cerkovnoe obozrenie', Strannik, 1884, 11. pp. 477-502. It is unclear to which orientation this journal belonged, but the content indicates that it had an open-minded view with respect to religious issues.

108. Anonymous. 'Vnutrennee Obozrenie. Stat'i g. V. Solov'eva o raskole', Vestnik Evropy, 1882, 11. pp. 371-374. The reviewer referred to 'O cerkvi i raskole' (Rus' 1882), the first version of 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve’.

109. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 163.

110. He though did not conduct any direct polemic with Subbotin or other clerical conservatives.

111. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 250.

112. Ibid., p. 251.

113. Here Markov erroneously suggested that it was about Solov'ev's 'O russkom narodnom raskole' (Markov 1914, p. 224).

114. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', pp. 252- 253.

115. There is one more significant difference between the Old Faith and Protestant ism: the former never attracted so many adherents as the latter. there was no printed material in Russia, and theological rhetoric was rather lacking among the Old Relievers (Brouwers 2001, p. 38. n. 1).

116. Robson 1995, p. 7.

117. Ibid., p. 8.

118. This critical note on Solov'ev is not dictated by an anachronistic and retrospective judgement, but rather by a comparative perspective. inasmuch as Old Believers' practices were acknowledged and respected by some of his contemporaries who did research on them.

119. In order to get an insight into the Old Believers' potential reaction of Solov'ev, one would have to read the journal Staroobrjadec of 1882-1884. This, unfortunately, falls beyond the scope of the present study.

120. Aksakov 1882, p. 213.

121. Rjabusinskij 1999, p. 78-79. The author pointed to the last episodes of Solov'ev's 'Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste', where the half or the Old Believers did not give into the illusion of the goodness of the Antichrist. in contrast with the other Christian communities.

122. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

123. Sarkisyanz 1955, p. 73.

124. Ibid., p. 75.

125. Cherniavsky 1966, p. 12.

126. Peter's self-proclamation and anointment as emperor, his reforms for a new Westernised society, forcing Old Believers to cut their beards and to pay a tax per soul [podusnaja podat'], convinced them that he was the Antichrist.

127. The priestly searched a historical pre-Nikonian church in the Belaja Krinica hierarchy, whereas the priestless searched the '"coming" heavenly city' (Sarkisyanz 1955, p. 77).

128. Cherniavsky 1966, p. 23.

129. Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika, p. 126.

130. Also their very conservative rejection of the Catholic Church as one of the fallen Romes probably disturbed him. especially since the years he had been committed to church reunion.

131. 'Saint Vladimir et l'Etat chretien', p. 115.

132. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 163 (the last quote is emphasised in the text).

133. 'O dukhovnoj vlasti v Rossii', p. 49.

134. 'Cto takoe Rossija', p. 13.

135. Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, p. 246.

136. Robson 1995, p. 8.

137. 'Ljubov' k narodu i russkij narodnyj ideal', p. 294 [italics mine].

138. Florovsky referred to in Sarkisyanz 1955, p. 73.

139. 'O raskole v russkom narode i obscestve', p. 267.

140. This motive is central to his interventions on the famine of 1891-1892 [see case study V].

141. La Russie et l’Eglise universelle, p. 164.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

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Part 1 of 2

III. The Jewish Question

Providence has not settled the greatest and strongest part of Jewry in our fatherland for nothing. [1]


1. Introduction

At the end of the 19th century, the expression 'Jewish question' involved a broad set of issues, raised by the presence of a large Jewish population in Russia, ranging from theological discussions on the differences between Judaism and Christianity, to restrictive government policies and pogroms. [2] Today, it is still part of the debate in Russian thought, as recent literature testifies, notably Aleksandr Solzenicyn's comprehensive interpretation of the history of the Jewish question in Russia, eloquently entitled Dvesti let vemste [Two Hundred Years Together], and the tremendous scholarly work undertaken over the past ten years about the history of Jewry in Russia. [3] In addition, Solov'ev's central essay on the Jewish question has been republished in a recent collection of articles on the issue. [4] In this respect, it is all the more relevant to examine how Solov'ev attempted to find a solution for the nexus of problems related to the presence of Jews on Russian soil. For reasons that I will present below, his commitment was profounder and took much more various shapes than in other interventions.

There is particularly good documentation available on the issue thanks to Solov'ev's letters to the Russian Jew Fajvel' Gec (Faivel Goetz, 1853-1931], and the apologetic essays written by the latter on the philosopher. [5] Later scholarship on Solov'ev has unravelled the significance of Solov'ev's views, especially on Judaism, from various angles, and several scholars have examined the role of these views in Solov'ev's work as a whole. [6] Historical studies have situated Solov'ev's views with respect to the debates on the Jewish question and Judaism. [7] While these contributions highlight the complexity of Solov'ev's relationship to Judaism, the Jewry, and the Jewish question, it remains unclear what makes his treatment of the Jewish question unique, within the context of the debates of his contemporaries as well as within his own work. To clarify this point is the aim of this chapter.

a) Thesis

Based on a combined historical and philosophical approach, my thesis regarding Solov'ev's treatment of the Jewish question is three-fold, and formulated from three general perspectives.

First, against the background of the attitude of the government and publicistika towards the Jewish question, Solov'ev played a prominent role that can be ascribed to a combination of factors. These include: i) his unique and provocative leitmotiv 'the Jewish question is not a problem inherent to the Jewry, but to the Christians'; ii) his commitment to set up a manifest against anti-Semitism; and iii) his long-term interest and deep knowledge that made him a specialist in Jewish religious thought, a pioneer in Russian thought in this respect.

From a second perspective, internal to his work, I shall make the case that Solov'ev's primary motivation was his questioning of the roots of Christianity in Judaism. He developed a genuine interest in Judaism that prompted him to learn Hebrew in order to read the Old Testament and the Jewish Scripture in the original, as a result of which he became a specialist of Jewish religious thought. Although he was critical of the rejection of Jesus Christ by Judaism, he defended the view of continuity between the two religions. His highly positive valuation of Judaism prompted him to defend the Judaic body of rules about religious and civil life, the Talmud, against the widespread blame placed on it for what was perceived as the Jews' negative sides. It also affected his attitude towards the contemporary representatives of Judaism, namely the Jews living within the Russian empire in his time. In this respect, I retain the fruitful distinction made by Judith Deutsch Kornblatt between two interests that guided Solov'ev, namely theological issues concerning Judaism [iudejstvo] and the national character of ancient and contemporary Jewry [evrejstvo]. [8] However, his approach also bore an instrumental character to the extent that, in Judaism and the Jewry, he sought answers to what he considered Christian issues. In this way he reduced the Jewish question to his own priorities.

Thirdly, and in connection with the preceding point, I hold that the driving force of Solov'ev's constant and vivid interest in Judaism and his commitment in favour of rights for the Jewry stems from his conception of history. His claim of continuity and brotherhood between Judaism and Christianity was related to his conviction that sooner or later Christians and Jews would reunite through the Jews' conversion to Christianity, something he considered a historical necessity. He developed this main point equally in the three, theological, philosophical and sophiological registers of history, in contrast with other issues in which he always privileged one or two of them. The three registers even merge in his two claims regarding the Jews, namely the establishment of free theocracy with their help, and granting the Jews full rights. His view evolved from claiming both tasks to narrowing Russia's mission to the latter. Nevertheless, he unwaveringly perceived the Jewish question through the prism of Russian society as a whole. Striving to contribute to a greater cohesion of Russian society, he uttered a highly original claim: the Jews were able to form the cement of that society by developing what Russia still lacked, namely an urban middle-class. This view is perhaps Solov'ev's most refreshing and challenging contribution to the issue.

In order to posit these points in a comprehensive argument, I analyse the Jewish question as follows. First, in (1a), I give an account of the policies regarding the Jews, and, in (1b), of the debates in the St. Petersburg and Moscow press between 1881 and 1900. Secondly, in (2a), I turn to Solov'ev to present his publications and commitment to the Jews, in (2b) I analyse them against the background of the policies, and in (2c) I address the debates of his time. Finally, in (2d), I unravel the three registers of history in his texts on the Jewish question.

b) The Jewish question 1881-1900: pogroms and policies [9]

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Russian empire contained about five million Jews, which formed the largest Jewish community in the world as a result of the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century. From 1815 onwards, they were officially constrained to residence in one zone situated in southwest Russia, the Pale of Settlement [certa osedlosti], which more or less corresponded to the part of the Polish empire that Russia had laid its hand upon at the Congress of Vienna. Only an educated minority was allowed to continue to live in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

In the 1860s and 1870s, the boom of industrialisation and emancipation of the serfs were at the origin of new measures to further isolate the Jewish population. Mainly the enrichment of a small elite of emancipated Jews, but also their increasingly successful role in public life as doctors, lawyers and journalists, as well as their joining such revolutionary movements as Narodnaja Volja and Cernyj Peredel, provoked the hostility of the public and the government. [10] Notwithstanding the fact that Jewish masses were impoverished as a result of the emancipation of the serfs, 'Jewish exploitation' came to be seen as the greatest threat to peasant prosperity and urban trade, and to the foundations of Russian Christian society as a whole. The government issued increasing measures aimed at isolating the Jews from the native population in their elementary rights of movement, settlement, and education. The primary goal of isolating them from the native population may explain why there was no campaign to convert Jews to Christianity. On the attitude of the church with respect to the Jews, only little information is available, as this is an underdeveloped area of study. It seems that, apart from a few exceptions, the high clergy was mostly conservative, whereas the low clergy was more prone to stand up for the Jews. [11]

The year 1881 was marked by two tragic events which considerably hardened the government's attitude towards the Jews. Firstly, the succession to the throne of tsar Alexander III, son of tsar Alexander II who was murdered in March 1881 [see case study I], inaugurated a period of reaction and repression, which was particularly harsh with respect to the Jews. Secondly, in 1881-1883 in south-eastern cities such as Odessa, Rostov-on-the-Don, Kiev, and smaller towns, a series of pogroms, supported by the local population, occurred, causing rapes and death, and considerable material damage, such as the burning down of Jewish shops and houses. [12] The underlying view was that Jews were 'outside the law', and in some cases even that tsar Alexander II had been murdered by Jews, so that attacks on their goods would not only not be punished, but were a fair retribution for what the Jews had caused to Russian society. The initially slow reaction of officials, police and cavalry troops only confirmed this conviction. The Jews reacted to the pogroms with massive emigration and, for a small minority, by conversion to Christianity. [13]

Facing these outbursts of violence, and fearing they would extend to other religious minorities, the government decided to take measures to prevent further pogroms. Since the Jews' economic activity seemed to be the immediate cause of popular anger, a project of laws entitled Provisional Rules, adopted in 1882 by the Committee of Ministers, tried to further isolate the Jews and to limit this activity. [14] These rules remained 'provisional' until 1904, when an extension of the Jews' rights was decreed. Despite the will of some government members to work towards civic equality for the Jews, and the creation of the 'Commission Palen' (1883-1888), which together with influential Jewish members of the Commission worked at this goal, the government and public opinion as a whole saw the solution in further limiting the rights of Jews. [15] From 1888 onwards, the government introduced new limitations step by step with each new case.

From the end of the 1880s onwards, the reactionary attitude of public opinion and the repressive measures taken by the government intensified. In 1887, the Minister of Education Ivan Deljanov issued a numerus clausus for Jewish students in higher education against the high proportion of Jewish students and the propagation of Marxist ideas among them. [16] Other measures limited the access of Jews to the function of lawyer (1889), forbade Jews from taking part in local government (1890) and in city government (1892), and, most harshly, made expulsions the rule, as was the case for about 20,000 Jews from Moscow in 1892-1893. [17] Pobedonoscev, as advisor to the two tsars and a crucial figure in governmental circles, played a central role and influenced many measures taken in the government regarding Jews. Despite his resolute opposition to the pogroms, he was consistently hostile toward the Jews until his retirement in 1905. [18]

The civil status of the Jews stagnated in the Russian empire, which contrasted sharply with their condition in West European countries, where they had acquired full civil rights by the mid-1870s. [19] On the whole, the Jews had a unique status. They were one of the empire's ethnic minorities [inorodcy], yet did not enjoy the latter's right to self-government or exemption from certain fiscal or military obligations. Besides, their area of residence was reduced to the Pale, and even within the Pale did not enjoy the same rights as natives in terms of business and education opportunities. [20] As a matter of fact, the psychological pressure by the press contributed to worsening the condition of the Jews in Russia, which was worse than forty years earlier.

c) Debates in public opinion

Literature is scarce on this issue, which agitated public opinion in the last decades of the Russian empire. I base my analysis on published sources, anthologies, encyclopaedia articles and secondary literature. [21] In the period examined here (1881-1900), two main camps can be distinguished, namely the conservative camp, which was in favour of limiting rights, and the progressive camp, which advocated full rights for the Jews. Both these camps of Russian public opinion included various orientations, which are examined in the first section. Within the conservative camp, an overwhelming majority was explicitly Judeophobic or even anti-Semitic. [22] The progressive camp stood unanimously for giving the Jews full rights, whether from a liberal, religious, or revolutionary perspective. The year 1881 was also a turning point in the debates conducted in the Russian-Jewish community. The attitude of each camp with respect to the pogroms, the repressive policies and the solution advanced to the Jewish question are investigated below.

The representatives of the conservative party were almost unanimously in favour of the restrictive measures taken against the Jewish community in Russia. Their mistrust with respect to trade, monetary economy and more generally capitalism prompted them to express anti-capitalism through anti-Semitism; from there it was only a short step to accusing Jews of earning money without working, and to branding them as parasites and exploiters. [23] In their hostility to the Judaic religion, the conservatives found support notably in the work of metropolite of Kiev Illarion (1051-1054/5), who had opposed the Christian system of values to that of the Jews. [24] Generally, the cliche that the Jews were 'deicides', 'enemies of Christ' and 'a threat to the spiritual and physical well-being of the Christian population' was very widespread. [25] The conservatives also found inspiration in recent works of German and French authors. [26]

A whole scale of positions was held. The most explicit anti-Semites (Aleksej Suvorin in Novoe Vremja, Ivan Aksakov in Rus ') not only approved of the pogroms as 'fair wrath of the simple folk' against Jewish exploitation, but welcomed all measures isolating the Jews and limiting their activity. [27] Others (Konstantin Istomin's Vera i Razum) held the idea that such upsurges of popular anger were ultimately justified by Jewish exploitation. Istomin advised the Christians 'to force the Jews out by avoiding them and not trading with them.' [28] Stigmatising the Talmud like Aksakov and others had done before him, he saw the only solution in the rejection by the Jews of their own faith. [29] A minority of conservatives was resolutely opposed to pogroms and advocated civil rights, yet without opposing the Pale, as did Dmitrij Certelev in Russkoe Obozrenie. More powerfully, Mikhail Katkov criticised the government's policies as well as Judeophobic cliches in Moskovskie Vedomosti. [30]

The progressive camps went one step further than Katkov, and advocated that the Jews be granted full rights. Beyond this shared conviction, however, the liberals, the religious thinkers, and the radicals approached the Jewish question from very different perspectives.

In liberal journals (Matvej Stasjulevic's Porjadok, Mikhail Saltykov-Scedrin's Otecestvennye zapiski), the government was called upon to abolish the Pale of Settlement and all measures of isolation. [31] The authors unanimously expressed their indignation with respect to the pogroms, which were only a rough form of the discrimination inherent to the legislation with respect to religious and national minorities. Besides, specialist works by Nikolaj Gradovskij and by Andrej Subbotin, who both used their contacts with the government to try and influence its attitude towards the Jews, emphasised the legal and economic shortcomings of the actual policies. [32] Despite these multiple efforts, the pleading of the liberals did not gain broad public support until 1900.

A minority of progressive religious thinkers, including archbishop Nikanor and Lev Tolstoj, formulated a defence of Jews from an exclusively religious perspective. [33] Against the general lack of interest on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church in the lot of the Jews, both advocated the termination of all repression of the rights of Jews, and called for brotherhood between the two communities. [34] In those times of overwhelming violence, they provokingly interpreted the Jewish way of life as morally superior to that of the so- called Christian society. [35] They also attempted to bridge the gulf between the Judaic and the Christian moral teaching by showing the continuity between the two traditions. [36] However, they valued Christianity more highly: while Tolstoj disapproved of the prominent concept of a national mission in

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elite or 'Jewish St. Petersburg.' [43] Secondly, in more radical stance, many young educated Jews from prosperous families (Mark Natanson, and in the emigration Lev Dejc and Pavel Aksel'rod) who had already joined the ranks of the revolutionary circles in the 1870s, attempted to reformulate their goals in combination with the newly imported Marxist views. [44] A slow preparation developed towards the creation of the Bund, the General Jewish Workers' League in Russia and Poland, in 1897. [45] It was estimated that the 'Jews formed from one quarter to one third of all revolutionary parties.' [46] Thirdly, against the expansion of the radical tendency, other Jews distanced themselves from the Russian solutions to the Jewish question and claimed emigration and Palestinophilism, notably in the journal Rassvet [The Dawn, 1879-1883]. [47] The latter aimed at the conquest of territories in Palestine for the Jewish nation and gave rise to Zionism in the 1890s, decades prior to the rise of Zionism in Europe. [48]

To summarise, conservatives and partisans of russification on the whole expressed a Judeophobia that focused on religious and economic motives. In contrast, progressive public opinion tended to advocate full rights for the Jews, whether on legal and economic grounds, or on religious grounds, or as part of a revolutionary political programme. The gap between the Jewish community and the Russian population was therefore only bridged by partisans of assimilation or already assimilated Russian Jews.

2. Solov'ev and the Jewish question

a) Solov'ev 's commitment in publications and actions


Solov'ev initially developed a concern with the Jewish question in the context of his vivid interest in Judaism and its mystical legacy, the Kabbalah. [49] In the early 1880s, he undertook to learn Hebrew with the purpose of reading the Old Testament and other Jewish theological texts in the original language. His interest in Judaism evolved towards commitment for the Jewry in his own country as an integral part of Russian society, which integrated a positive valuation of Judaism. [50] He publicly intervened on Judaism, Jewry and the Jewish question on twelve different occasions.

Solov'ev first expressed himself on the historical meaning of Judaism in an as yet unpublished lecture 'Lekcija o vsemirno-istoriceskom znacenii iudejstva' [On the Universal Historical Meaning of Judaism], given in February 1882 within the framework of the Zenskie kursy [Women courses] at St. Petersburg University. [51] Here we already find Solov'ev's three central views fully expressed: namely i) the historical role of Jewry past, present, and future; ii) the qualities that make them the elected people; and iii) the duty of Christians to relate to them in a Christian way.

One year later, in 1883, in the lecture 'Tret'ja ree' v pamjat' Dostoevskogo' [Third speech in memory of Oostoevskij], Solov'ev turned Oostoevskij's Judeo-phobic stance upside down and reformulated the latter's view on Christian reconciliation from his own perspective, that is, by implicitly transforming the Jews' 'materialism' into a positive value (point ii), and by explicitly advocating a reconciliation with 'our historical enemies', the Catholics and the Jews (point iii). [52]

The publication that established Solov'ev's reputation as a defender of the Jews' cause was his essay eloquently entitled 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' [Jewry and the Christian question], first published in 1884 in the journal Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie [The Orthodox Review]. [53] This essay consisted of an elaborate version of his first lecture. His point of departure was to posit the Jewish question as a Christian question given the fact that Christians still did not relate to Jews as Christians [po-khristianski] (point iii). Instead of judging them, Christians should try and understand them. For this purpose, Solov'ev demonstrated that the Jews' main qualities (point ii), namely religiosity, individuality, and religious materialism, explained why the Jewry was predestined to give birth to Jesus Christ. [54] Christians and Jews shared the final goal, that of an 'universal theocracy.' [55] However, the excessive status given exclusively to individuality and materialism prompted the Jews to reject Jesus Christ, who precisely demanded that they give up their 'national egoism and worldly strivings.' [56] The only way to show the Jews that they were wrong was to realise the Christian idea, which would prompt their conversion (point iii). Finally, he elaborated on his ideal of free theocracy in Russia, with at its head a king, a priest, and a prophet. For this purpose, the Jews' Old Testament idea of theocracy, with its emphasis on the prophetic element, was an intrinsic component (point i) if combined with the Byzantine (king) and Catholic (priest) experiences of theocracy. These were represented within the Russian empire by the Russian Orthodox tsardom and the Polish Catholic ecclesiastic authority respectively. More concretely, but still from the perspective of Solov'ev theocratic idea, thanks to their qualities, the Jews could contribute to Russian society also by developing an urban middle-class, hereby forming the true cement of society.

In 1885, in 'Novozavetnyj Izrail' [New Testament Israel], published in the journal Rus', Solov'ev called for tolerance for the Judeo-Christian sect 'Bethleem', which he perceived as the 'embryonic phenomenon' of a religious rapprochement of Jews towards Christianity. [57] This sect was founded in 1882 in Kisinev by a Jew converted to Christianity, losif Rabinovic, and was forbidden in 1885. Reminding his fellow believers that the Christian credo had also needed time and an entire process of development, Solov'ev called for them to welcome these new believers as brothers, rather then condemning them for their rejection of some aspects of dogma (point iii). [58]

One year later, in 1886, Solov'ev presented his interpretation of a much debated issue, the evaluation of the Talmud from a Christian perspective, in his lengthy essay 'Talmud i novejsaja polemiceskaja literatura o nem v Avstrii i Germanii' [The Talmud and the Recent Polemical Literature on it in Austria and Gennany] in Russkaja Mysl'. [59] This article contains an apology of Judaism, of the Jewry as a nation [narod], and of the Talmud. Solov'ev worked towards a rapprochement between Judaism and Christianity from an essentially scholarly historical-theological and ethical point of view. Acquainting the 'ignorant Christian reader' with the true content of the Talmud, he demonstrated the inconsistency of the widespread criticism of the Talmud as professing hate with respect to Christianity and as exalting the Jews' fanaticism and particularism. [60] The argument is built on four main points. Firstly, he addresses the historical development of Jewish thought leading to the writing of the Talmud. Secondly, the content of the Talmud, especially its moral teaching; this, according to Solov'ev, was fundamentally similar to the Christian teaching, and where it contained elements hostile to the Christians (such as loans with interest), Solov'ev countered this by denouncing the discriminating attitude of the pseudo-Christian states with respect to the Jews. Thirdly, a demonstration of the inconsistency of cliches concerning the hostility of Jews and the Talmud. Fourthly, an exhortation of Christians to demonstrate the possibility of realising Christianity de facto as the only way to convince the Jews. [61]

Solov'ev had begun to learn Hebrew around 1883. By 1887 he had read the Torah, the historical books, the prophets and the psalms, and added some Jewish phrases to his weekly prayers. [62] This knowledge of Hebrew allowed him to obtain a profound knowledge of the Jewish Scripture, which he integrated into his comprehensive works, the most significant example of which was Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii [The History and Future of Theocracy, 1885-1887]. [63] The Jews were the first to develop theocracy as balanced rule shared between a king, a priest, and a prophet, and to introduce the notion of universal theocracy. [64] Solov'ev used 'the model of the Jews to buttress many of his central arguments' on theocracy, humanity and Divine humanity.' [65] In his unpublished 'Grekhi Rossii' [Russia's Sins] he denounced the situation of the Jews as one of 'Russia's sins.' [66]

In 1888, in front of a French audience during his lecture L'idee russe, he displayed a more critical attitude with respect to the history of the Jews. Judaism had found its achievement only in Christianity, irrespective of what the Jews themselves might think. Besides, their destiny, with a glorious beginning and a petty end, reminded him of that of the Russian nation as viewed by his nationalist fellow countrymen. [67] In the same year, in La Russie et l'Eglise universelle, he praised the historical merits of the Jewish people in their preparation of the messianic idea. They had developed the idea of a triune theocracy with harmonious relationship between king, priest, and prophet. They had also contributed to realising this idea, and had developed the function of prophets, not in opposition with the two other powers, but as representatives of national progress. [68]

Solov'ev's special concern for Jews and the Jewish condition turned into practical commitment from 1887-8 onwards, when he tried to help Fajvel' Gec obtain permission to publish a journal for the Jews. [69] In the following years, he intensified his commitment. Two texts mark this apogee of Solov'ev's commitment to the improvement of the condition of Jews in Russia. First, in 1890, he and English journalist and Daily Telegraph correspondent in Russia Emil J. Dillon (1854-1934) organised a petition as an official reaction against anti- Semitism in the Russian press. Solov'ev wrote the manifesto entitled 'Protest protiv antisemiticeskogo dvizenija v pecati' [Protest against the anti-Semitic movement in the press], and succeeded in collecting more than fifty signatures among Russian writers. [70] This was picked up by the authorities, which immediately forbade it in Russia. It was published in English in the London paper, The Times, anonymously. [71] Solov'ev appealed to the Russian educated society for principles of justice and humanity with respect to the Jews, for the sake of the future of Russia. The Jews deserved respect and full civil rights as a cultural and religious group, and were not responsible for having been compelled (by persecutions) to exclusively monetary activities.

Secondly, he wrote a letter to Fajvel' Gec, which was used in the introduction to the latter's apologetic book on the Jewry Slovo podsudimomu! [[Give] the Floor to the Accused!, 1891]. [72] The book was immediately confiscated by the censors and burnt. In this remarkable piece, apart from his usual moral and religious stance, Solov'ev used other weapons to fight anti-Semitism in the press. First, he quoted extensively from Mikhail Katkov because of his status as acknowledged authority among the conservatives, and from Boris Cicerin for his sobriety and his experience in rural areas both populated and not populated by Jews. He also suggested a confrontation with the usual cliches about Jews with factual evidence drawn from statistics about the Pale of Settlement. Secondly, he showed the inconsistency of articles published in the conservative journals and newspapers.

The question now arises as to whether he chose, for the coming time, to focus on the controversial issue of Judaism instead of struggling for a proper place for Jewry in Russian society. Whatever may have been the case, publications in the 1890s testify to his status as an expert on Judaism. In 'Evrei, ikh veroucenie i nravoucenie' (1891), published in Severnyj Vestnik, Solov'ev again displayed his knowledge of Judaism and the Talmud in criticising the complete inconsistency of a report published posthumously by S.Ja. Diminskij, who was most likely a high official. [73] Solov'ev took this work, which in his eyes totally lacked knowledge of Jewish texts including the Talmud, as an example of the level of ignorance with respect to Judaism in those circles that had decided to publish the report, apparently taking it for an authoritative work. In addition, Solov'ev wrote the entry 'Kabbala' for the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia. [74] A similar text was published as an introduction to an article written by David Gincburg 'Kabbala, misticeskaja filosofija evreev' [The Kabbalah, the Mystical Philosophy of the Jews]. [75]

In his last publication as an expert of Judaism, 'Kogda zili evrejskie proroki?' [When did the Jewish prophets live?] [1896] Solov'ev offered a sharp criticism of a work by French author Ernest Havet entitled La modernite des prophetes. [76] He first pinned down the author's lack of knowledge of Hebrew and lack of scholarly research, and his inconsistent interpretation of the prophecies of the Hebrew Scripture. Then, presenting his own thesis regarding the Old Testament prophets, he stressed the spiritual strength of the Jews, which made it possible for them to survive all catastrophes and persecutions, and which he ascribed to their 'prophetic consciousness.' [77] He concluded that the prophets who first developed this consciousness lived not after the end of the kingdom of Israel, as Havet contended, but before.

In 1899, he returned to the founder of the sect 'Bethleem', I.D. Rabinovic, spoke his necrology and wrote some memoirs on this figure, in whose commitment he saw the 'anticipation of the future Judeo- Christian unity.' [78] In 1900, his 'Kratkaja povest' ob Antikhriste' [Short Story about the Antichrist] reserved a privileged role for the Jews as an enlightened community. Although they had followed the Antichrist, they were the first to rise up against him when they saw he was not circumcised. [79] At the end of the story, he made them realize his wish and unite with the Christians. A well-known episode concluded his interest and commitment to the Jewish case: on his deathbed, he asked to be kept awake so that he could pray for the Jews, and recited psalms in Hebrew. [80]

b) Solov'ev's treatment of the Jewish question against the background of the pogroms and the policies regarding Jews

Solov'ev perceived the Jewry in Russia as a significant component of Russian society. This position was in complete opposite to the attempts by the government to isolate the Jewish population. He started expressing himself on the Jewish question, orally at least and in private correspondence, during the first wave of pogroms in 1882, and published during the period of intensification of repressive measures against the Jews (1880s). It is not known whether he visited places within the Pale of Settlement himself, but it is reasonable to conclude that he drew his information on the pogroms and government policies both from newspapers and from his Jewish acquaintances. [81] He reacted to the pogroms explicitly on two occasions, though not in published form. Firstly, in his 1882 lecture he broached the Jewish question, which was a testimony of his esteem and recognition of the cultural significance of the Jewish people. The reviewer mentioned that Solov'ev, when asked about his opinion about the pogroms and the Jewish question, pointed to full rights and the intelligentsia's humane relationship with respect to Jewry. [82] Secondly, in 1886, when he was in Zagreb Solov'ev read -- the source remains unknown -- about the pogroms that were occurring in Russia, which distressed him deeply. [83] Complaining that there was no news about the pogroms in the foreign press, he asked Gec to keep him informed. [84]

As to his reaction to the policies issued in the 1880s-1890s, this has to be read between the lines, but it does depart from the idea that the Jews form an integral part of Russian society. The Ministry of Education, under Deljanov, issued a circular in July 1887 to restrict the access of Jews to higher education with a numerus clausus. Deeply preoccupied by these developments, Solov'ev asked Gec what he could do, and proposed, within the limits of his means, to publish in Moskovskie Vedomosti, and to publish a work, -- which most probably became La Russie et l’Eglise universelle -- on Russia's political obligations, including giving full rights to the Jews. [85] This shows that he saw his work as his specific weapon against the anti-Jewish policies. More importantly, his 1890 manifesto, despite the title 'Against the anti-Semitic movement in the press', arguably also targeted the government. The precipitation and determination with which the government reacted to it are sufficiently eloquent. Quite possibly, Solov'ev hereby criticised the tendency, encouraged by Pobedonoscev, to publish documents that were critical of the Jews, such as Diminskij's report, which probably served this purpose. [86] More obviously, Solov'ev wrote the manifesto at a time when new discriminative laws with respect to the Jewish population in Russia were in preparation, notably the zemskoe polozenie. In his correspondence, he alluded to 'rumours of new rules for the Jews in Russia. [87] Solov'ev condemned the exclusively repressive measures against Jewry as a collectivity, and their 'special civil situation', and argued that the same obligations to which the Jewish subjects were submitted had to be accompanied by the same rights. He characterised that period as a 'fall of humane ideas, and weakness of the juridical principle.' In other words, together with the people who signed the manifesto, he called on the government to grant the Jews full rights. The gathering of signatures and the publication of the manifesto by Solov'ev, which targeted 'some illusory persecution of Jews in Russia', was immediately stopped by a decree issued by the Minister of the Interior, Ivan Durnovo, who, when hearing about Solov'ev's plan, personally took care to forbid the publication of any 'collective announcement concerning Jews' in the Russian press. [88]

This, however, was a unique intervention. On the whole, rather than condemning current events, whether pogroms or repressive measures, or offering practical solutions to the Jewish question, Solov'ev examined the underlying misunderstandings about Jews that in his eyes were the basis of the distorted attitude of the Russian people and government towards Jews. His considerations on the socio-economic position of Jews can be interpreted as a reaction to the Provisional Rules, which precisely strove to limit their economic activity. More importantly perhaps, considering Russian society as a whole, Solov'ev greatly regretted the absence of an urban industrial class. To remedy this situation, he designated the Jews as capable of forming this social class in the future ideal society. [89] Similarly, the Jews could playa role by intensifying their contact with the peasants. These two views, which defined Jews as the possible cement of Russian society, did not take into account the existing animosity between Muscovite merchants and Jews, peasants living in the regions of the Pale of Settlement, and the Jews established there, respectively. [90] However, these considerations, upon which he unfortunately did not elaborate, strike the present-day reader as a brilliant attempt to find for the Jews a concrete place and role in Russian society.

His most factual arguments can be found in 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', in which he discusses the cliches related to the social and economic condition and activities of Jews, which portrayed them as exploiters, materialists, and criminals. He suggested a comparative analysis of the regions inhabited and not inhabited by a Jewish population. The Pale of Settlement, by concentrating the Jews on given territories, indeed made such a measure possible. However, the publications issued by the central statistics committee at the Ministry of the Interior did not contain such a comparative analysis. [91] Against the common supposition that Jews exploited the Russian peasants, were responsible for the misery in the countryside, and exalted the animosity of the Russian peasant, So\ov'ev presented counter examples, which showed not only that the latter were often better off in the Pale of Settlement than in other areas, but also that violence on the part of the impoverished peasant community did indeed occur, but in places where there were no Jews. [92] Besides, against the accusation of high criminality among Jews, Solov'ev answered that criminality occurred far more frequently in Christian communities. [93] With these facts Solov'ev strove to demonstrate the inconsistency of persistent cliches regarding the Jews.

Did he try to influence the governmental policies by using his contacts with official circles? Although there is no trace of such an initiative on his part, we know that he was acquainted with influential Jews who were members of the Commission Palen, such as Nikolaj Bakst. [94] However, it is unclear whether they met as early as 1883-1888, while the Commission Palen was working on new rules concerning the Jews. Anyway, rather than concentrating on legal aspects, his chief approach to the Jewish question was the focus on the manner in which Jews were portrayed or thought of, the main expression of which he found in the press.

c) Solov'ev's treatment of the Jewish question against the background of the debates

In this section, I discuss Solov'ev's reaction to the various positions in public opinion indicated above. While it is difficult to evaluate his influence on the discussions, a number of reviews of his texts by people from different camps contribute to situating him within the debates of public opinion.

i) The conservatives

His main target was the conservative press, which overwhelmingly stigmatised the Jews. He countered this camp in three different ways. Firstly, he argued in most of his publications that Judeophobia was a 'case of the Christians accusing the Jews of their own sins.' [95] Against those who interpreted the Jewish question merely as a justified religious antagonism between Christianity and Judaism, and ascribed it to the religiosity of the Jews, he answered that it was rather the Christians who were guilty of not following the moral principles of their religion in their relationship to the Jews. [96] In this sense, he would have subscribed to the statement made by the specialist of Jewry in imperial Russia John Klier that 'modern Russian Judeophobia infected the values of Orthodox Christianity'. [97]

Secondly, he considered the content of the main cliches applied to Jews to be positive attributes, not negative characteristics. [98] Against the reproach that the Jews lived in isolation, refused to mingle with the Russian population, in short, that they claimed exclusivity and individuality, Solov'ev showed that individuality was a positive factor and had allowed the development of a conception of the relationship between God and man in personal terms, as an individual relationship. Further, to those authors who ascribed the Jewish question to the materialism and cupidity of Jews, Solov'ev countered by demonstrating the positive value of an attachment to material goods for the construction of society. His argument also implicitly applied to the views of Dostoevskij, which were clearly dominated by such cliches. [99]

Thirdly, against the claim of an unbridgeable gap between Christianity (Bible) and Judaism (Talmud), he offered a positive valuation of the Talmud. By doing so, Solov'ev touched a sensitive spot, since there was a long tradition among Russian Orthodoxy to stigmatise the Talmud as an anti-Christian text. In Solov'ev's eyes, this interpretation was based on misunderstanding and ignorance of the fundamental principles of the Talmud. Against the 'devices of tendentious accusers of the Talmud', for instance Aksakov and Istomin, Solov'ev undertook its apology. He first argued that Christianity has its historical roots in the best elements of the three parties present within Judaism, namely the Sadducees, the Pharisees, and the Esseans. Second, the moral teaching of the Talmud, based on faith and altruism, was similar to the New Testament. [100] Thirdly, against the usual criticism that the Talmud had neglected supreme ideals and was instead immersed in the study and application of rules, Solov'ev showed that Christianity was as much to blame in this respect for having fallen into the other extreme, namely by distinguishing between religious truth and real life. The Talmud's position was even stronger than that of Christianity since it had reinforced the inner unity of the community throughout the centuries. [101] Fourthly, Solov'ev demonstrated the inconsistency of German and Austrian anti-Semite scholars such as Rohling, who were popular in Russian conservative circles and tried to prove that Jewish codices contained anti-Christian slogans. On the basis of an analysis, he concluded that there were no evil laws in the Talmud. It also contained progressive ideas regarding social justice and liberalism, so that the main reproach made to Jewry as an enemy of contemporary civilisation was also inconsistent. It was absurd to expect from the Jews that they behave better than Christians. They also represented the strong and weak sides of the human kind. To summarise, the Talmud contained no rules professing hate with respect to Christians, as some German and Russian scholars claimed.

Solov'ev was fiercely criticised by Istomin for his defence of the Talmud. [102] Against what he saw as Solov'ev's ambition to merge Judaism and Christianity in his theocratic ideal, he opposed Talmudic theocracy, with its exclusive privilege to the Jewish nationality and submission of other peoples, to Christian theocracy, professing universality, freedom, and brotherhood. [103] He defended Rohling against Solov'ev's criticism. [104] On the whole, contrary to Solov'ev's hopes, the Talmud could not possibly evolve, since it had not changed since the time of Kiev metropolite Illarion, whose instructions regarding Jews were still relevant.

Fourthly, Solov'ev offered a critical discussion of the data provided by the conservative press in Slovo podsudimomu! He showed how conservative organs such as Novoe Vremja, Grazdanin and Nedelja contradicted each other on the information they presented. Besides, articles on Jews were not based on facts, but generalised on the basis of single examples or incidents and used a cheap psychological explanation of the Jewish character. [105]

In spite of these differences, however, there were at least three points of convergence between him and the conservatives, namely the wish that Jews would convert, the critique that the Jews had rejected Jesus Christ, and the use of cliches to characterise Jewry. Firstly, he agreed with Istomin for instance, that in the long run it was desirable that the Jews adopt the Christian faith. Only the means he suggested differed radically from those that the conservatives had in mind. Secondly, he conceded that during the life of Jesus Christ, Jews had failed to subordinate the principle of nationality and materiality to the religious principle, and had not accepted individual sacrifice, or the path of the cross, towards salvation. Thirdly, he criticised the Jews' social and economic place in Russian society on the basis of cliches. For instance, he initially did not reject the fact that Jews were exploiting Russian peasants, or that they were materialistic. He also initially claimed that since Europe was governed by money, the Jews were quite logically masters in Europe. [106] As a matter of fact, he often recuperated the cliches regarding Jews, turning them into a quality in favour of his argument. By this device, he still made use of the same representations as the authors he was criticising, and was therefore perhaps closer to their position that he himself thought. In any case, he was not an unconditional Judaeophile. [107]

The moderately conservative journal Russkoe Obozrenie did not mention Solov'ev. But it is perhaps not a coincidence that a publication was printed at the exact time that Solov'ev's manifesto was forbidden, reminding readers of a protest in 1858 signed by the liberal thinkers of the Reform Era, including Solov'ev's father Sergej Solov'ev, to defend the freedom of opinion of two Jewish authors. [108] Even less of a coincidence, Russkoe Obozrenie also mentioned a recent article in the Londonian The Times on the oppression of Jews in Russia, in which we could see an allusion to Solov'ev's protest and its publication in The Times. As for Solov'ev's reaction to the journal's publications, Solov'ev begged his friend the editor Certelev: 'I only ask you not to touch the people of God.' [109]

The reaction to Solov'ev's views by an anonymous author in Cerkovno-obscestvennyj vestnik [Church Social Messenger] is significant in understanding the reception of Solov'ev's views on Judaism and the Jewry in church-related circles, which were on the whole conservative- minded. [110] Characteristically, and to his disadvantage, his views were compared to those of philosopher Eduard yon Hartmann. [111] Solov'ev's solution to the Jewish question as presented in 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', that is, free theocracy, which implied that one part of the Jews would convert to Christianity, was completely unrealistic. The author further rightly argued that the union of Orthodoxy and Catholicism left aside many Protestants, Muslims and pagans living on Russian soil. [112] It also left unanswered the question of what would occur if the Jews refused to unite with Christians, and neglected practical, economic and political issues. The author clearly favoured von Hartmann's solution to the Jewish question, based on an analysis of the economic and political tasks of contemporary Jewry, and argued that a limitation of their rights was necessary, and that the Pale of Settlement was large enough for them. [113] History had shown that the Jews, despite the fact that they received the right to education, were not grateful, as their adherence to revolutionary groups showed. [114]

ii) The radicals and the liberals

With the liberals and the radicals, Solov'ev shared the unanimous defence of full rights for the Jews. His concurrence with the radicals stopped there however. He denounced the anti-Semitism of some prominent populists in passing. [115] Perhaps his denouncing the cliches of the Jews' materialism was also aimed at the anti-capitalistic anti-Semitism of some radicals. By arguing that the Jews represented the progressive element of Russian society, he also sought to counter the widespread view among radicals that Jewish society was a remnant of an outdated structure.

His contact with liberals for his manifesto as well as for the publication of Gec's book (Cicerin and Korolenko) has been established. Interestingly, against the liberal background, Solov'ev's treatment of the Jewish question was not original in three respects. Firstly, we find in many works of the liberals a historical argumentation aimed at legitimising the value of the Jews as a people in its own right. This argumentation starts from the Bible, and accounts for the role of Jews in the history of nations. Secondly, the Jewish question is approached, though not primarily as a Christian question as in Solov'ev, but as a Russian question. Thirdly, it seems to have been a common tendency to take the widespread stigmatisation of the Jews as a starting point, and then to attempt to prove their inconsistency, neutralise them.

How did the liberals welcome Solov'ev's views? The fact that some liberals supported his 1890 protest and signed his manifesto was a sign of support of his commitment to improve the life conditions of the Jews. [116]

Solov'ev's approach diverges from the liberals', however, by virtue of his religious perspective. The liberals eliminated the religious component of Jewry and the 'spiritual significance' of Judaism 'by portraying it as a legalistic, particularistic or merely political religion.' [117] In this respect, Solov'ev's reflection on the Jewish question and positive appreciation of the Judaic religion as a central feature of Jewry may have been a voluntary reaction to the liberals' unreligious approach. Lack of interest in Solov'ev's model of free theocracy as a solution to the Jewish question in Russia was understandable on the part of people primarily concerned with the political, legal and economic aspects of the issue. An example of this attitude is a review of 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' published in the liberal-populist journal Russkaja Mysl'. [118] According to this review, Solov'ev occupied a peculiar place in Russian literature by virtue of his 'intelligence, talent and knowledge', despite his lack of scientific method. [119] Regarding the Jewish question, he deplorably developed the strange idea of theocracy, a 'completely useless case', which led him to produce a 'religious-philosophical phantasmagoria.' [120] Russkaja Mysl' did agree one year later to publish Solov'ev's essay on the Talmud, and its editor Gol'cev signed Solov'ev's petition. These factors show that the journal was nevertheless disposed to support Solov'ev's defence of the Jewry.

iii) The progressive religious thinkers

Solov'ev shared with Nikanor and Tolstoj an approach and concern for ethical principles grounded on religious faith. lie referred explicitly to Nikanor as having inspired him to write his major essay 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros.' The bishop had brilliantly succeeded in demonstrating 'the unity of Judaism and Christianity [...] on the real basis of a spiritual and natural kinship and positive religious interests.' [121] Solov'ev was glad to find support for his views in Nikanor's thought and wished to complement it. As a matter of fact, the bishop's claim of a continuity between the two confessions found a remarkable echo in Solov'ev's works. Both thinkers were also characterised by a comparative approach, and did not hesitate to use it to voice criticism regarding their own society: Solov'ev followed Nikanor when claiming that in Jesus Christ's time, the Pharisees, despite the negative connotation of the word, were far more virtuous than the Russians in his days. [122] Solov'ev also shared with Nikanor the view that the integrating power of Christianity would sooner or later make the Jews turn to Christianity. However, Solov'ev went further and emphasised specific features of Judaism, which indicated that Jews would have a major role to play in future free theocracy. In this respect, his emphasis on prophecy and consistent integration into his worldview is perhaps his most original contribution to the debates on the Jewish question.

With Tolstoj, Solov'ev shared practical commitment. He convinced Tolstoj to take part in his manifesto, which undoubtedly was Solov'ev's most militant reaction to anti-Semitism in the press and in measures taken by the government. Correspondence between the two authors allows us to gain an insight in Solov'ev's initiative. When he asked the writer if he would write the text of the manifesto, Tolstoj answered that ifSolov'ev did that, he would certainly express Tolstoj's own 'thought and feelings, because the basis of our disgust [otvrascenie] from the measures of oppression of the Jewish nationality is one and the same: the awareness of a brotherly bond with all the peoples, and all the more with the Jews among whom Jesus Christ was born.' [123] Tolstoj actually delegated this task to Solov'ev because 'there are many topics which preoccupy me [Tolstoj, MC] more than this one, and therefore I could not write anything on this topic which would touch [tronulo] people.' [124] Solov'ev therefore wrote the manifesto, and Tolstoj added his signature. The fact that both saw Judaism as the predecessor of Christianity, had learnt Hebrew, and admired the Jews' application of moral principles in daily life, might also have prompted them to exchange lively discussions, of which, however, there is no trace. On the whole, Tolstoj's aversion, voiced in the 1880s, for many aspects of Judaism and contemporary Jewry probably did not make him a sympathetic partner of discussion for Solov'ev. By contrast, Solov'ev was far more deeply and permanently concerned with the destiny of the Jews in Russia.

To summarise, Solov'ev struggled against reductionist and pejorative views of Jews and Judaism that were central in the conservative press. His political claim was most akin to that of the liberals, whereas his approach was similar to that of the progressive religious thinkers. His historical approach, his appeal for full rights for Jews, and his denouncing the inconsistency of cliches about Jews were not original. Solov'ev's contribution lies elsewhere. It consists, firstly, in defining the Jewish question not as a problem of the Jews, but of the Christians. Secondly, in being one of the very few to take risks to initiate a pamphlet to defend his views. Thirdly, in bringing to the fore the aspects of prophecy, prophet, and a positive valuation of theocracy as an answer to the situation of modern times in Russia. As for the various reactions to his treatment of the Jewish question, they show that his theocratic plans were judged to be unrealistic by both a conservative and a progressive author. His denouncement of anti-Semitism found support in liberals and was forbidden by the (conservative) authorities. Finally, his apology of the Talmud was published in the liberal-populist press, whereas it was fiercely rejected by a conservative journal.

He therefore found support if not affinity with the liberals, and was the target of a many- fold critique from the conservatives. In the following subsection I attempt to situate his interventions with respect to the group in question, namely the Jews in Russia.

iv) The Russian-Jewish press

Three major aspects have to be examined finally, namely Solov'ev's contact with the Russian Jewish community, the reception of his treatment of the Jewish question in the Russian-Jewish press, and finally a confrontation of his views with their major debates.

In sharp contrast with the religious minorities dealt with in the case-studies, namely the Poles and the Old Believers, Solov'ev had firm contacts with the group concerned. Here, his friendship with Gec from 1879 onwards stands out. Gec was his Hebrew teacher, and they maintained regular correspondence. [125] In addition, Solov'ev actively met with other Russian assimilated Jews such as the St. Petersburg banker and maecenas Goracij Gincburg, with whom he was friends, his son David Gincburg, who possessed one of the largest collection of Jewish manuscripts, Nikolaj Bakst and Ljubov' Gurevic. [126] He also was an honorary member of the 'Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment among the Jews', which Gincburg directed, and which published his essay 'Kogda zili evrejskie proroki?' [127] According to Gec, Solov'ev also read Jewish journals and literature. [128] However, his interest seems to have focused on the Hebrew Scripture, the Talmud, and the Kabbalah. We have no data concerning Solov'ev's potential knowledge of 19th century Jewish thought. [129] When he referred to Jewish thinkers, it was not specifically for their belonging to Judaism, but rather for their contribution to philosophy (Spinoza, Maimon). [130] Surprisingly, he did not write a single line on the famous medieval theologian Maimonides (1135-1204). These factors show that his interest for Judaism was limited to the Ancient and early Christian period. Solov'ev's distance can be noted also with respect to contemporary Jewish debates, in whose discussions on the Talmud, for instance, he did not get involved. Besides, his commitment had limits: he refused to take part in a future committee for the organization of the Jewish emigration. [131]

Solov'ev's interventions for the improvement of the Jewish condition generated a vivid reaction in the Russian-Jewish press. [132] At the time of his death, he was mourned as an important figure, and was the object of a commemorative speech by the rabbi of Kiev and by N.1. Bakst and M.I. Kuliser. [133] Moreover, the president of the 'Society for the Promotion of Enlightenment among the Jews' proposed that a portrait of Solov'ev be hung up in Society's library and that a scholarship for students be created in his memory. [134] In the early 20th century, Russian Jewish editors republished his texts on the Jewish question and Judaism. [135] A whole body of literature appeared on his contributions to these issues. [136] Also M.G. Morgulis, a famous Russian Jewish publicist of his time, mentioned Solov'ev as one of the few eminent minds that had reflected thoroughly on the Jewish question. [137]

Against the background of the debates in the Russian-Jewish press, two major aspects must be emphasised. Solov'ev's repeated statements about the Jews as people chosen by God, and that, more rarely expressed, but nonetheless highly original, about their possible role as the unifying element of Russian society, testified to his wish that Jews be a central component of Russian society, and were most likely to meet with the agreement of the Jewish moderate camps. However, the fact that he spoke neither about emigration, which he refused to support as a solution, nor about Zionism, which obviously did not enter into his vision of the future, did not make him an all-round discussion partner for Russian Jews. Besides, no elements have been found that point to discussions on the Talmud with Russian Jewish circles. He did not publish in their organs, as did for instance Stasov (Evrejskaja Biblioteka). Finally, the absence of any treatment or even reference from his part to the trial which shook the international (Jewish) community, namely the Dreyfus affair, reinforces the impression that Solov'ev was in fact exclusively preoccupied with the destiny of the Jews in Russia. [138] In connection with Zionism, a pal1icularly delicate question, at least for the Jews if not for Solov'ev, was that of the link between nation and territory. He knew about Zionism, but was not in contact with these people. [139] Did Jews have a right to their own national territory? Solov'ev kept saying that Jews were a nation in their own right, and even the nation par excellence. On the other hand, he eluded the question as to whether a nation could live without a territory. Arguably, for Solov'ev, the Jews had a historical mission for which they did not need a territory, and it was a sign of God that they had ended up in Russia. These factors strongly suggest that Solov'ev essentially addressed the Christian community, not the Jewish one. [140]
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

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Part 2 of 2

d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history

Solov'ev held that the Jews formed the 'axis of world history.' [141] This statement is symptomatic of his treatment of the Jewish question, in which he sought to value the dynamics between the long-term historical scheme (from 1000 BC until the end of the 19th century) and recent developments in his own country regarding the Jews. He developed this view in all three registers that I distinguish. This is perhaps the case in which the three registers come closest together, up to the point of actually merging.

The theological character of history, which is determined by a qualitative difference and a line of dependence between the transcendent God and man, in this case the Jews, is central in so far as it organises the whole framework within which Solov'ev reflected on the Jews. The Old Testament provides historical information on this people: [142] in Ancient times, the Jews were elected as the people of God, and brought forth Jesus Christ. In the present time, God had placed them within the Russian empire. In Solov'ev's eyes, these two factors were decisive in allowing the conception of a further role for the Jews in the future. As a matter of fact, the Jews did remain the people chosen by God. Why? First, God's choice, as such, had to be respected. Further, the Jews continued living according to their religious principles and their life was entirely organised by the observance of the moral rules and rites of their religion. This permeation of religion in daily life had Solov'ev's profound sympathy. In contrast with the official Russian attitude, the Jews were in fact doing better than the Christians. The fact that their life had always been and still was dominated by religion had also strengthened the unity of the Jewish nation. Life organised by religious principles and unity: in these two characteristics of the Jews Solov'ev recognised his own ideal. It would be an illusion to expect the Jews to convert to Christianity now, given the latter's present, lamentable, state, as well as the persecutions that Jews had endured and still were enduring from pseudo-Christian states, Russia in particular. This explains Solov'ev's growing concern about the implications of the Russian anti-Christian attitude towards the Jews. Finally, Solov'ev found in Judaic thought fundamental theological categories: theocracy, prophecy, and messianism. As we shall see, he sought to reinvest these categories with new content, to mould them into his own, not only theological, but also philosophical and sophiological worldview.

Solov'ev's fascination for the Jewry was thus echoed in his philosophical conception of history. The Jews had existed since the beginning of history and were not only the oldest nation in the world, but also the truly historical nation and the inventors of the notion of nationhood as an integrating force. [143] Herewith Solov'ev interpreted their sense of nation and Jewish particularity as a morally positive attitude. He emphasised the positive aspects of the Jewry in his time as a community perfectly adapted to modern society, and even more, as its fleuron: he indeed viewed the Jewish intelligentsia as the best part of the educated class. [144] Moreover, not only was the Jewry a modern nation, but it was also precisely with respect to the Jewish question that one could question whether the Russian state was able to behave in an enlightened and progressive manner. In this sense, the Jewish question was a test case for Russia as a modern historical nation.

The combination of the theological and the philosophical registers applied to the Jews provokes a tension in Solov'ev's discourse. For instance, if, according to the category of historical nation [philosophy of history], Jewry had already played its role by paving the ground for the coming of Jesus Christ, how could it still qualify for a mission in the future, by virtue of being God's elected people [theology of history]? [145] This tension is not solved.

Sophiology of history is also present in Solov'ev's exhortations to Russian society to integrate the Jews within it. Especially his original claim that the Jews were able to playa unifying role as urban middleclass testifies to his concern with the cohesion of Russian society. We also find sophiological elements in Solov'ev's texts on Judaism, notably in his valuation of the Kabbalah. He admired this corpus of Jewish mysticism for its ability to conceive of the world not in dualistic terms, but primarily as a process. Also, the Kabbalistic view that God possessed a feminine Other, Shekhinah, fascinated him, the recipient of Sophia's message. However, it is striking to note that Solov'ev never mentioned his knowledge of Kabbalah when dealing with the Jewish question and matters related to Judaism. Although this might be ascribed to the influence of Gec, who was resolutely opposed to mystical Judaism, a more convincing explanation is that he saw in the Kabbalah not a specifically Jewish view, but a universal heritage. [146] This suggests that his whole approach to Judaism bears an instrumental character. I tend to think that Solov'ev was searching in Judaism for solutions to the problems of conceiving a Christian historical mission in connection with the expectation of Redemption (messianism), establishing a Christian society on earth (theocracy), and last but not least, conceiving of a role for himself in society that took into account his privileged contact with God and Sophia (prophecy).

In Judaism Solov'ev found messianism, theocracy and prophecy, which he remoulded according to his own agenda, and which he reformulated as Russian universal messianism, free theocracy and social prophecy. It is, however, beyond the purpose of this study to confront Solov'ev's considerations with the complex and manifold tradition of Jewish thought on messianism, theocracy, and prophecy. [147] In addition, the issue of the Judaic sources Solov'ev read, and how he interpreted them belongs to specialists of Judaism. It seems that he blended Judaic messianic thought with the 19th century philosophical- historical conception of the historic mission of a nation, and applied this to the Russian empire, on whose soil Christian society had to be realised. [148] The sophiological stamp can be seen in the fact that, in the background of the philosopher's commitment, there is the permanent question of the parallel between the Jewish and Russian messianic destinies. [149] Could Russia play the role of the modern nation chosen to realise universal Christianity?

A way to integrate its predecessor, Jewry, was to give it a role in the future regime of free theocracy. Without ever referring to the 1st century Jewish writer Flavius Josephus, who coined the term theocracy, he directly borrowed the latter's interpretation of the term, which had become widespread since the 16th century, as the specificity of the Jewish community in contrast with other political regimes. [150] Of theocracy he made free theocracy, to which the Jews would contribute in practical terms by implementing materiality according to religious principles or holy corporeality, which I have identified as a typically sophiological motive. [151]

Finally, the category of prophecy received a Solov'evian touch in two respects. Firstly by rooting it in the complex situation of late 19th century Russia when public opinion was developing. without yet having the right to playa role in the decision-making of the government. Was his understanding of prophecy his own solution to this problem? He sought to ground the prophet's role on a simultaneously practical, immanent (PH) and ideal, transcendent (TH) basis by virtue of his connection with Sophia (SH). How Solov'ev reflected on the status of prophet and his interaction with society is shown by the fact that, in his eyes, the ideal principles were given by the Judaic prophets in three ways: they 'anticipated [predvarili] the kingdom of truth', they 'denounced and judged the real state of their people as contrary to this ideal and predicted [predskazyvali] national catastrophes as a necessary consequence of this contradiction'; and 'through their very presence and their activity they indicated in advance [predukazyvali] the solution of this contradiction in a near future, precisely through the acknowledgement by the people of this higher consciousness and their submission to it.' [152] Even though, in contrast with the Jewish model of prophecy, he in no sense received full acknowledgement from the group he was supposed to guide, namely Russian educated society, Solov'ev fulfilled these three functions (anticipating, judging and indicating in advance) with zeal during his whole career as a publicist. Also characteristic was his determination not only to stand up for the Jews as the prophetic people, but also to act in a prophetic way himself with respect to the future reconciliation between Jews and Christians.

3. Conclusion

As this case study has shown, Solov'ev's commitment was unique in four respects. Firstly, he provoked his fellow believers with the claim that the roots of the Jewish question lay in the Christian rather than in the Jewish way of life and values. Secondly, his manifesto courageously targeted the anti-Semitic press and the government's repressive policy, Thirdly, he became an expert on Biblical and Talmudic Judaism, which he integrated into his treatment of the Jewish question, and as a specialist discussed recent foreign publications on Judaism. Fourthly, he integrated the Judaic concepts of messianism, theocracy and prophecy and reformulated them within his own worldview. That his underlying preoccupation was to unravel the roots of Christianity and to profess its duty in the immediate future is now obvious. In this respect, his three-fold conception of history served as a basis for the claim that the Jews were 'the axis of world history.'

To what extent did Solov'ev's theocratic design answer the Jewish question as it was posed in Russia the 1880s? At that time, it was a set of political, social, economic, religious an cultural issues, involving acute polemical points such as the Pale of Settlement, juridical rights, access to education, cliches regarding the Jewish mentality, etc. On the one hand, Solov'ev tried to answer what seemed to him the principal question behind all the above: tolerance, freedom, equality as Christian moral duties, as well as, even though in passing, the question of an economical and social role for the Jews in Russia. On the other hand, he used the Judaic heritage and the historical fact of the Jewry living in Russia to promote his own agenda of Russian universal messianism and free theocracy, and to ground his own position as a prophet on a solid conceptual basis.

However, Solov'ev did not stick to this theocratic ideal throughout his life. His view of the Russian mission narrowed from universal free theocracy to merely civil rights. With the decline of his faith in the feasibility of theocracy, he began to demand from the Russian government simply that it treat its religious minorities with the respect they deserved. His scholarly approach shows that, rather than examining the Biblical, Talmudic, and Kabbalistic sources for a historical analysis of the concepts of theocracy, messianism, and prophecy, Solov'ev 'bent', as it were, his discoveries in these corpuses of texts into his own view. In this respect, one could doubt whether, despite all his respect for and affinity with the Jewish community, he took their concerns for their own sake. In the end, his treatment of the Jewish question was instrumental and he integrated some aspects of it into his own agenda.

The following case study shows how in connecting the Polish question with his project of free theocracy, he included not only Jewry, but also another stateless entity, Poland, in the category of historical nations.

_______________

Notes:

1. 'I ne darom Providenie vodvorilo v nasem otecestve samuju bol'suju i samuju krepkuju cast' evrejstva' ('Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', in: Fajvel' Gec, Slovo podsudimomu' (Sankt-Peterburg: Novosti, 1891), p. xxvii).

2. The expression 'Jewish question' had become widespread, notably with the polemic of Karl Marx with Bauer [Judenfrage] in the 1840s. In the Russian context, it gained acuteness and significance due to the vast size of the Jewish population within the empire, making them the most important Jewish community in the world.

3. A.I. Solzenicyn, Dvesti let vmeste (1795-1995), 2 vols. (Moskva: Russkij put', 2001- 2002). On the relevance of the issue for Russian public opinion nowadays, see also for instance, Sergej Lezov, "'Evrejskij vopros" v russkoj intellektual'noj zizni (1985-1995)', Znamja, 1996, 9, pp. 182-187. Worth mentioning is the reprint of Semen Dubnov et al. (eds.), Evrejskaja Enciklopedija: svod znanij o evrejstve i ego kul 'ture v proslom i v naslojascem, 16 vols., Reprintnoe vosproizvedenie izdanija obscestva dlja naucnykh Evrejskikh izdanij i Izdatel'stva Brokgauz-Efron (Moskva: Terra, 1991).

4. Z.A. Krakhmal'nikova (ed.), Russkaja ideja i evrei: Rokovyj spor: Khristianstvo, antisemitizm, nacionalizm: Shornik statej (Moskva: Nauka, 1994), pp. 16-61.

5. Fajvel' Gec, 'Nekotorye vospominanij ob otnosenii V.S. Solov'eva k evrejam', Voskhod, 1900, 63, pp. 30-35; 79, pp. 18-25. 'Ob otnosenii Vl. S. Solov'eva k evrejskomu voprosu', Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 1901, 56, pp. 159-198.

6. Ludolf Muller, 'Vladimir Solovjev und das Judentum', in: Muller 1951, pp. 125-131; Bernard Dupuy, 'Les Juifs, l'histoire et la fin des temps scion Vladimir Soloviev' (1st publ. 1992), in: de Guibert 1994, pp. 108-141. esp. pp. 120-141; A. Patrasnikov, 'Vladimir Solov'ev o evrejakh', Golos zarubez'ja 3 (Munchen, 1976), pp. 26-35; Jean Halperin, 'Vladimir Solovev a l'ccoute d'Israel: la question chretienne', in: de Guibert 1994, pp. 95- 07: Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, 'Vladimir Solov'ev on Spiritual Nationhood, Russia and the Jews', in Russian Review 56 (1997), 2, pp. 157-177; Evert van der Zweerde, 'Vladimir Solovyov and the Russian-Christian .Jewish question', Journal of Eastern Christian Studies (forthcoming in 2004).

7. Walter G. Moss, 'Vladimir Soloviev and the Jews in Russia', Russian Review 29 (1970), 2, pp. 181-191; V.P. Babincev, Evrejskij vopros' v social'no-filosofskoj mysli rossijskoj imperii (XIX-nacala XX v.) (PhD thesis Belgorod, 1999); Judith Deutsch Kornblatt and Gary Rosenshield, 'Vladimir Solovyov: Confronting Dostoevsky on the Jewish and Christian Questions', Journal of the American Academy of Religion 68 (2000), 1. pp. 69- 98; Hamutal Bar-Yosef: 'The Jewish Reception of Vladimir Solov'ev', in: van den Bercken et al. 2000, pp. 363-392.

8. Kornblatt 1997, p. 158.

9. Important analyses of the governmental attitude to the Jews and of popular anti- Semitism in late imperial Russia have been made over the past decades. I base this survey on three central contributions, which are: Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, Antisemitismus und reaktionare Utopie: Russischer Konservatismus im Kampf gegen den Wandel von Staat und Gesellschaft, 1890-1917 (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1978); Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986): John Doyle Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

10. Rogger 1986, p. 18; Lowe 1978. pp. 14-15. On the role of the university as a place of contact between Russians and Jews. see Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2002), pp. 201-256.

11. Donald W. Treadgold, 'Russian Orthodoxy and Society', in: Robert L. Nichols and Teofanis George Stavrou (eds.), Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978). pp. 21-43: p. 35).

12. After these pogroms, which formed the most severe and extended wave of violence. other pogroms happened recurrently up to the pogrom in Kisinev in 1903. Whether the pogroms were planned and by whom remains unclear. Recent research has questioned the thesis that the pogroms had been planned (see for instance I. Michel Aronson, Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1990). Edward H. Judge, Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom (New York: New York University Press, 1992).

13. From 1881-1882 onwards, between 50,000 and 60,000 Jews left the country each year. In 1891, after the expulsion of Jewish craftsmen from Moscow, 110,000 emigrated, and in 1892, 137,000 (Michel Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire (Paris: Flammarion, 1999). p. 847). Emigration can also be understood without the context of the threat of the pogroms. Over 50,0000 Jews had emigrated to the United States in the 1870s (Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 50). As for conversions to Christianity, they remained a marginal phenomenon, ranging namely from 500 to 1000 a year (Rogger 1986, p. 35).

14. Jurij Gessen, Istorija evrejskogo naroda v Rossii, 2 vols. (Leningrad: 1927), p. 227. The Provisional Rules aimed at 'limiting the access for Jews to the villages in order to weaken their economic influence on the life of the peasants' and forbade Jews from then on from settling in villages, acquiring real estate outside cities and towns and from exploiting land ('Vremennye pravila 3 maja 1882 goda', Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 5, col. 815-822: col. 815).

15. Ibid., col. 820-822; Gessen 1927, p. 228. The full name of the commission, which was named after its president, count K. Palen, was 'Supreme Commission far the Revision of Laws Concerning the Jews' [Vyssaja kommisija dlja peresmotrara zakonov o evrejakh]. On the Jewish members of the commission (Goracij Gincburg. Nikolaj Bakst), see Gessen 1927, p. 227: Viktor Kel'ner, 'Evrejskij vopros i russkaja intelligencija v konce XIX-nac. XX v.', unpublished paper given at the 6th World congress for Central and East European Studies. Tampere. August 2000; on Bakst, see Solzenicyn 2001, p. 208.

16. The numerus clausus was 1% within the Pale of Settlement, 5% in other provinces. and 3% in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Riasanovsky 1993, p. 397).

17. A special commission chaired by senator and assistant minister V.K. Pleve tried to implement new measures to limit the juridical position of Jews (Rogger 1986, pp. 69-70). On the expulsions, see 'Aleksandr III'. Evrejskaja Enciklopedija I. col. 825-839: col. 838: Gessen 1927, p. 232.

18. Rogger 1986, pp. 66-68.

19. This was the case in France, Germany England, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States (John Kent, 'Religion and Science', in: Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz and Patrick Sherry (eds.), Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol. 3 (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1-35: p. 12; Rogger 1986, p. 3).

20. Rogger 1986, pp. 26-28.

21. The sources of information for this section are newspaper and journal materials, collections of publications (mainly: Russkie ljudy o evrejakh (Sankt-Peterburg: tip.-lit. A.M. Vol'f, 1891)), entries from Evrejskaja Enciklopedija, and secondary literature (Frankel 1981, Lowe 1978, Solzenicyn 2001).

22. The distinction between Judeophobia and anti-Semitism may seem irrelevant for the present-day reader. However, one should be cautious in the use of these terms. First. since 1945 we cannot speak of 'anti-Semitism' without that the term be loaded by the terrifying reference to the Holocaust -- a reference which was absent at the end of the 19th century. Second. in the Russian context. there was a distinction between 'domestic Judeophobia' and 'foreign anti-Semitism'. The latter, which developed theoretical constructs about the Talmud. the identification of Jewry as a conspiring or even satanic force. was imported mainly by such conservatives as Ivan Aksakov, Fedor Dostoevskij. Konstantin Pobedonoscev, Vladimir Mescerskij (1839-1914) and Nikolaj Golicyn (1836-1893) from German debates and politics towards the end of the 1870s, and amalgamated with the former (Klier 1995, pp. 407-416; Klier 1999, p. 30).

23. Lowe 1978, p. 27.

24. Rogger 1986, p. 37; Babincev 1999, pp. 62-65.

25. John Klier, 'Traditional Russian Religious Antisemitism: A Useful Concept or a Barrier to Understanding?', The Jewish Quarterly 29 (1999), pp. 29-34: p. 30.

26. In Germany, renewed scholarly interest in Judaism occurred as a consequence of the civil emancipation with authors such as Franz Delitsch and his polemic with overtly anti- semitic writers such as Rohling and Justus. (R.E. Clemens, 'The Study of the Old Testament', in: Smart et al. 1985, pp. 109-142: p. 133). Rohling and the essays of Eduard von Hartmann, which were very hostile toward the Jews, were translated into Russian, the latter by Novoe Vremja (Russkaja Mysl', 1885, 4, p. 13; Stojanov, 'Obrazovannye evrei v svoikh otnosenijakh k khristianstvu', Vera i razum, 1886, 1. pp. 35-72: p. 67). In Germany, the theoretical works on races of Henrich von Treitschke and Eugen During in the 1870s were also influential on the representation of Jews (Klier 1995, p. 411). In France, a rather political anti-Jewish discourse dominated, with Ernest Renan who was the first to connect race theory with anti-Judaism (Histoire du peuple d'Israel (1858), 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' (1882)), followed by Edouard Drumont (La France juive (1886). and of course the well-known Dreyfus trial (1894-1906).

27. On Aleksej Suvorin (1834-1912), see Solzenicyn 2001, p. 31; the entry 'Antisemitizm v Rossii', Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 1, col. 740; E. Dinerstejn, 'A.S. Suvorin i "evrejskij vopros"', Vestnik Evrejskogo Universiteta v Moskve, 1992, 1, pp. 57-74. Quotation from Aksakov in: Moss 1968, p. 130.

28. Ibid., p. 184 [Konstantin Istomin, 1848-1914].

29. Ibid., p. 184. Istomin devoted a whole publication to a condemnation of the apology of the Talmud by the Russian Jew Priluker (T. Stojanov, 'Obrazovannye evrei v svoikh otnosenijakh k khristianstvu', Vera i razum 1885, 21, pp. 625-645; 22, pp. 694-723; 1886, 1, pp. 35-72). His fierce criticism of the Talmud was exposed in 'Sovremennaja apologija Talmuda i talmudistov', Vera i razum 1888, 14, pp. 79-110: 15, pp. 158-188. In this publication, the second part aimed specifically at Solov'ev. Aksakov had expressed himself against a rapprochement between Christians and Jews as early as the 1860s, arguing that the essence of Judaism, which was presented in the Talmud, was a fundamental negation of Christianity (Lukashevich 1965, pp. 97-101).

30. About these views in the journal of Dmitrij Certelev (1852-1911) Russkoe Obozrenie, 1890, [46] November, p. 403: Ibid., 1890, 3. p. 859. The account about the journal of Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887) is based on the extracts selected in the collection Russkie ljudy o evrejakh (pp. 232-234, 237, 246), which unfortunately does not give the names of the authors.

31. See for instance Russkie ljudi o evrejakh, p. 292. Matvej Stasjulevic (1826-1911) was later the editor of Vestnik Evropy, where writers such as Nikolaj Leskov and Vladimir Korolenko published literary short stories to portray the living conditions of the Jews and awaken the readers' sense of justice. Mikhail Saltykov-Scedrin's (1826-1889) article 'ljul'skoe vejanie' (Otecestvennye zapiski, 1882, 8, signed M.S.) provoked the disapprobation of conservative circles (for a lengthy extract of his article 'ljul'skoe vejanie', see Russkie ljudy o evrejakh, pp. 168- 174); 'Scedrin. N. (Saltykov, Mikhail Evgrafovic), Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 16, col. 141-143. However, it was only at the end of the 1870s that the liberals moved from Judaeophobia to sympathy toward Jews, as John Doyle Klier has convincingly shown (Klier 1995, pp. 370-383).

32. Nikolaj Gradovskij (1829-1907) wrote notably Torgovljo i drugie prava evreev v Rossii v istoriceskom khode :zakonodatel 'nykh mer (1886) and Otnosenija k evrejam v drevnej i sovremennoj Rusi: Motivy istoriko-naciunal 'nye: s tocki zrenija russko-pravoslavnoj (1891). He also was one of the very few Russians, next to V. Stasov and D. Mordovcev) who published, though anonymously, in the Russian-Jewish journal Voskhod (in 1889, signing 'Russkij' ('Gradovskij, Nikolaj Dmitrievic', Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 6, col. 754- 755; Solzenicyn 2001, p. 198). Andrej Subbotin (1852-1906) offered vivid descriptions of the life of Jews in the Pale as well as statistics, published in Ekonomiceskij Zurnal in 1887 ('Subbotin, Andrej Pavlovic', Evrejskaja enciklopedija 14, col. 599-600).

33. In the 1880s, Nikanor [Aleksandr Brovkovic, 1826-1890] was bishop of Kherson and Odessa, a region where outbursts of anti-Semitism and pogroms took place. See Besedy i poucenija Nikanora, episkopa Khersonskogo i Odesskogo, 2nd ed. (Odessa: n.p., 1887), vol. 4; Russkie ljudy o evrejakh, pp. 55-68. The attitude of Lev Tolstoj towards the Jews was positive only in the I890s. About Tolstoj's ambiguous and conflicting relationship to Judaism and the Jewish people, see Harold K. Schefski, 'Toistoi and the Jews', Russian Review 41 (1982), 1, pp. 1-10). For an exclusively positive account or his position, see entry 'Tolstoj, Lev Nikolaevic', Valentin Speranskij, Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 14, col. 903- 905. Gec published excerpts from Tolstoj's correspondence with him (Gec 1891, pp. vii-xiv).

34. This comment on the Russian Orthodox Church is offered in Klier 1995, p. 455.

35. Nikanor confronted Russians with the question 'whether our Christian world has not fallen lower than the Judaic world of the time of Jesus Christ' (Russkie ljudy o evrejakh, p. 57). Tolstoj perceived the Jews' application of the moral teaching in daily life as superior to the attitude of the Christians in his days ('Otkryvki iz pisem grara L.N. Tolstogo k avtoru', in Gec 1891, p. vii)

36. Nikanor: Russkie ljudy o evrejakh, pp. 57-60; 'Poucenie', Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie, maj-ijun' 1884. pp. 3-17: p. 5. Solov'ev referred to this publication [see section 2c], Tolstoj: in Gec 1891, pp. viii-xii.

37. X

38. X

39. X

40. X

41. X

42. X

43. Solov'ev was befriended with both of them. The brightest example to promote Jewish culture in Russian was the ten-volume Evrejskaja Biblioteka. Defenders of moderate assimilation such as M. Morgulis, Nikolaj Bakst, or Leontij Bramson -- with whom Solov'ev was acquainted -- also regularly published in Russian journals, such as Vestnik Evropy, Russkaja Mysl', Moskovskie Vedomosti (Solzenicyn 2001, p. 313).

44. For an account of the Jews' participation in revolutionary movements from the 1860s to the beginning of the 20th century, see Frankel 1981, pp. 5-328.

45. Ibid., pp. 171-257.

46. Pokrovskij quoted in Solzenicyn 2001, p. 237.

47. For an account of these tendencies, except the revolutionary one, within the Russian Jewish community, see: I. Socis, 'Period krizisa: Obscestvennye tecenija v literature 80-kh godov', Evrejskaja Starina, 1916, 1, pp. 46-60.

48. 'Periodiceskaja pecat'', Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 12, esp. col. 436-8. For an analysis of the emergence of Zionism in Russia, see: Ilse (Judith) Yago-Jung, Die nationale Frage in der judischen Arbeiterbewegung i Russland, Polen und Palastina bis 1929 (PhD thesis Frankfurt am Main: Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat, 1976), pp. 222-251.

49. His views on the Kabbalah have been analysed in Part One. chap. IV 'Solov'ev's Sophiology or History.'

50. I share this valuation with Kornblatt 1997, and would like to add that his interest did not appear before 1881, for instance, the Jews play no significant role in his historical survey in Filosofskie nacala cel'nogo znanija (1877).

51. Solov'ev indicated the title, or at least the subject, in the next publication (S. 1989 1, p. 209, n. 2). I base myself on the review published in Russkij Evrej for the content of the lecture (See the small report in Russkij Evrej 1882, 8, p. 301, and a full account in Ibid., 1882, 9, p. 344-346).

52. 'Tret’ja rec' v pamjat' Dostoevskogo', Rus '. 1883, 6. Edition used: S. 1988 2, pp. 307-318: pp. 316-318.

53. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie 1884, 8-9. The same year the essay was published as a separate brochure. Edition used: S. 1989 1, pp. 206-256.

54. About the Jews' individuality, he repeated views expressed in earlier works, such as Ctenija o Bogocelovecestve, on the Jews' contribution to universal history through their idea of individuality in the relationship between God and man.

55. Solov'ev's understanding of theocracy is broached in Part One, chap. II 'Solov'ev's Theology or History'.

56. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 227.

57. Novozavetnyj Izrail", Rus', 1885, 24-25. Edition used: S. 1989 2. pp. 189-202: p. 202. It remains unclear how exactly Solov'ev published this piece in the journal or Ivan Aksakov (who was known for his hostility to the Jews), except by pointing to their kinship of views on other issues. One can assume that they avoided an explicit discussion or their views on the Jewish question.

58. He quoted from a private conversation with Rabinovic, from his latest sermon, translated from Hebrew, and from his credo, which included a declaration of belief in Jesus Christ the Messiah and in the apostolic church.

59. 'Talmud i novejsaja polemiceskaja literatura o nem v Avstrii i Germanii', Russkaja Mysl', 1886, 8. Edition used: SS. 6, pp. 2-32. Solov'ev initially intended to publish it in Vestnik Evropy, but its editor Stasjulevic refused because the article would not pass religious censorship (Pis'ma 2, p. 138). Gec undertook to translate it into German and publish it abroad (Ibid., p. 141). Whether he published it is unknown. Hearing about the success of his article (through an editor or through the public, this remains unclear), Solov'ev only recommended his friend to be cautious with every publication of his own hand, given the persecution he was enduring by the censorship committees (Ibid., p. 142).

60. Numerous Hebrew terms, explained in footnotes, as well as the long quotations and paraphrases or passages of the Talmud, confirmed his knowledge, and put him in the role of translator of the Jewish tradition for Christians.

61. A tactic which is quite unusual for Solov'ev, was to put this exhortation first into a Jew's mouth, and secondly to conclude with his own words.

62. Pis'ma 2, pp. 135, 144.

63. About this work Solov'ev wrote that it was 'almost completely filled by Jewry [napaolnen evrejstvom]' (Pis 'ma 2, p. 148).

64. With David the King ordering Zadok the Priest and Nathan the Prophet together to consecrate Solomon. passage to a universal theocracy. Nevertheless the Jews kept their national character (Istorija i buduscnost' teokratii, pp. 547-549).

65. Kornblatt 1997, p. 169. These arguments were: humanity connected to spiritual and material worlds; humanity is good, fall is in deed, not in essence. Judaism as the origin of Bogocelovecestvo, and the reconciling power of the prophet (Ibid.). At about the same time. Solov'ev planned to publish an essay on Moses' law entitled 'O zakonodatel'stve Moiseevom', which for unknown reasons was censored (letter to Aleksandr Kireev, Pis 'ma 2, p. 130).

66. On Solov'ev's repeated question what he could do in favour of the Jews, Gec asked Solov'ev to publish a piece on the .Jewish question for the newspaper Novosti, to which Solov'ev agreed. This article. 'Grekhi Rossii' was cancelled by censorship and not published (see case study on the Polish question for a further analysis of this piece). On 'Grekhi Rossii', see also case study IV 'The Polish Question'.

67. L 'idee russe, p. 87.

68. La Russie et l'Eglise universelle, p. 279.

69. Pis'ma 2, pp. 148, 156, 157; Gec 1901, pp. 160-2. Solov'ev wrote two letters of recommendation to the censors Feoktistov and Majkov (Pis'ma 2, p. 148).

70. 'Protest protiv antisemiticeskogo dvizenija v pecati': edition used: S. 1989 2. pp. 281-282.

71. Only the support or Russian writers and Lev Tolstoj was mentioned (Ibid., comment p. 873).

72. Edition used: Gec 1891, pp. xv-xxvii (also included in S. 1989 2. pp. 296-304). Solov'cv's commitment to this book showed from several acts. He wrote to Korolenko and Tolstoj to give their letters for Gec's work Slovo podsudimomu! (Pis 'ma 2, p. 157). He contacted the censor Feoktistov, suggested the title of the book -- whether on his own initiative, or on the basis of an existing working title given by Gec, remains unclear -- which, except for the word 'unpublished' before 'letters' was used in the published text; and Solov'ev himself brought texts to the editor Notovic (Pis 'ma 2, pp. 173-175). O. Notovic was a converted Jew (Klier 1995, p. 455), which might explain his willingness to take the risk of such a publication.

73. Published in Severnyj Vestnik, 1891, 8. Edition used: SS. 6, pp. 374-380.

74. The content of this text has been discussed in the chapter 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History.'

75. Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 1896, 33. Edition used: SS. 12, pp. 332-4.

76. Published in Sbornik v pol'zu evrejskikh skol, Izdanie Obscestva dlja rasprostranenija prosvescenija mezdu evrejami v Rossii (Sankt-Peterburg: tip-lit. A.E. Landau, 1896), pp. 255-277. Edition used: SS. 7. pp. 180-202.

77. Ibid., p. 198.

78. ‘I.D. Rabinovic', SS. 9, pp. 422-423: p. 422. His unfinished memoirs of Rabinovic were probably written parallel to the necrology. 'losif Davidovic Rabinovic, > 5 maja 1889g. [sic]', first published in S. 1989 2, pp. 651-655. Contrary to the date given in the title. Rabinovic died in 1899.

79. Although this point makes a Judeophobic interpretation of Solov'ev's 'Kratkaja povest" impossible, it did not hinder the religious writer Sergej Nilus (1862- 1929) to be deeply inspired by 'Kratkaja povest". Through his publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Nilus reinterpreted Solov'ev's apocalyptic scenario in the form of a Judeo-masonic conspiracy. For a refreshing confrontation of Solov'ev's and Nilus' views, see Michael Hagemeister, 'Vladimir Solov'ev and Sergej Nilus: Apocalypticism and Judeophobia', in: van den Bercken et al. 2000, pp. 287-296.

80. S.N. T'rubeckoj, 'Smert' VI. Solov'eva' (1st publ. 1900), in: D.K. Burlaka (ed.), Vl. S. Solov'ev: pro et contra, vol. 1 (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd. Khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta. 2000), pp. 207-215: p. 210.

81. From the end of the 1880s onwards, also his contacts with the liberal lawyers Spasovic and Koni. who daily frequented Jewish colleagues at the bar, may have provided him with information about the condition of the Jews (on Spasovic's and Koni's involvment with the problem of the overrepresentation of Jews at the bar, see Nathans 2002, pp. 348-358.

82. Russkij Evrej, op. cit., p. 346.

83. Pis 'ma 2, p. 139.

84. Ibid., p. 140.

85. Ibid., pp. 146-147.

86. In the 1880s and 1890s, similar to his attitude with respect to the Old Believers, Pobedonoscev supported publications criticising the Jews (Byrnes 1968, pp. 208- 209; Rogger 1986, p. 68). Arguably, Solov'ev reacted to such publications by his 'Evrei, ikh veroucenie i nravoucenie', published 1891, thus one year after the manifesto.

87. See S. 1989 2. p. 682, quote from letter of Solov'ev and Dillon to Tolstoj (1890).

88. Ibid., pp. 683-684.

89. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', pp. 253.

90. Neither do they take into account the fact that there was an urban industrial middle-
class developing at that time, notably thanks to the activity of Old Believers.

91. 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', Gec 1891, p. xix.

92. Ibid., p. xxiv, referring notably to the book of G. Sazonov on Pskov gubernija (Krest 'janskaja zemel'naja sobstvennost' v Porkhovskom uezde (Sankt-Peterburg: n.p., 1890) (S. 1989 2. p. 687), and p. xxv, referring to a letter of Cicerin to Solov’ev.

93. 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', Gec 1891, p. xix.

94. Did he in 1883-1888 personally know other Jewish members of the Commission
such as rabbi Avraam Drabkin, who pronounced a speech after his death, and
Goracij Gincburg, whose son David Gincburg he met in the 1890s? These questions
remain unanswered al this stage of Solov'ev research.

95. Kornblatt's happy formulation applies to several publications of Solov'ev (Kornblatt
1997, p. 168).

96. It is also in this sense that we can understand Solov'ev's own motivation to intervene: 'as a moral duty to purify my conscience', as a Christian, one could add for the sake of clarity ('Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', Gec 1891, p. xxii).

97. Klier 1999, p. 34.

98. In ‘Lekcija …’, ‘Tret'ja rec' v pamjat Dostoevskogo', 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros'.

99. See Kornblatt 2000 for a sound analysis of Solov'ev's taking distance from Dostoevskij on this point.

100. The ethical discord between Christianity and Judaism only concerned specific religious-metaphysical matters, such as the God-human significance and redemptory sacrifice of Jesus Christ.

101. 'Evrei, ikh veroucenie ... ', p. 378.

102. In Stojanov 1888.

103. Stojanov 1888, p. 94. Solov'ev was opposed to this view and argued that 'the best minds of Israel understood the Kingdom of God in spiritual and universal terms' (Valliere 2000 a, p. 197).

104. Stojanov 1888, p. 106.

105. 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', Gec 1891, p. xxiv.

106. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 213.

107. Gec. referred to in Bar-Yosef 2000, p. 371.

108. The journal cautiously did not take any position, but reproduced a publication of the newspaper Novosti that reprinted the protest (Russkoe Obozrenie, 1890, [46] November, pp. 405-413).

109. Pis 'ma 2, p. 259.

110. Anonymous, 'Evrejstvo pred sudom filosofii', Cerkovno-Obscestvennyj vestnik, 1885, 92, pp. 2-3; 93, pp. 1-3; 99, pp. 1-3; 100, p. 1-3; 101, pp. 1-3. No information has been found either on the editor and the orientation of this journal, or on its possible affiliation to the Holy Synod (source consulted: Robert H. Davis, '19th century Russian Religious- theological Journals: Structure and Access', St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 33 (1989), 3, pp. 235-259. The journal is mentioned, without further details.

111. This curious association of Solov'ev with von Hartmann, who wrote essays notorious for their hostility toward the Jews, might very well have been caused by Solov'ev's own enthusiastic statements as a youth, not on the German's views on the Jews, but on his philosophy (see Kochetkova 2001, pp. 71-88).

112. 'Evrejstvo pred sudom filosofii', 93, p. 2.

113. Ibid., 101, p. 1.

114. Ibid., p. 3.

115. 'Kto prozrel?’, p. 430, perhaps aiming at I. I. Juzov [Kablic] (commentary p. 698).

116. When Korolenko received the manifesto, 22 people had already signed it, including 11 professors, and public figures like Lev Tolstoj, Viktor Gol'cev, and Pavel Miljukov ('Deklaracija V.S. Solov'eva'. in: Polnoe sobranie socinenij V.G. Korolenko, vol. 9 (Petrograd: Izdanie T-va A.F. Marks, 1914), pp. 257-260: p. 258). As early as 1887, Solov'ev was conscious of the fact that if some action was taken and someone intervened against anti-Semitism, others would follow and that would counterbalance those 'furors' (Pis'ma 2, p. 151). Interestingly, however, Solov'ev was selective in his choice and categorically refused to ask authors working for the opposite camp: when collecting signatures, he refused to approach 'the historian of Novoe Vremja' Vasilij Kljucevskij (Pis'ma 2, p. 159).

117. Valliere 2000a. p. 203.

118. Review on Solov'ev's 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros': Anonymous. - 'Bibliograficeskij otdel: Religija i filosofija', Russkaja Mysl’, 1885, 4, pp. 11-13.

119. Ibid., p. 12.

120. Ibid., pp. 12. 13.

121. ‘Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros’, p. 209.

122. ‘Talmud ...', p. 5 ff.

123. Quoted in Gec 1891, p. iii. Reprinted in Solov'ev, Pis'ma 2, p. 159, n. 1.

124. 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k avtoru', p. vii.

125. In this correspondence we read mostly about Solov'ev's progression in learning Hebrew, reading original texts and integrating them into his prayers, in sum, to incorporate these texts into his own experience.

126. On Solov'ev's contacts with Gurevic, see case study V 'The Famine of 1891-1892'. On Goracij Gincburg, see entry in Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 6, col. 525-531. On David Gineburg see Ibid., col. 521-532 and Burmistrov 1998, p. 89, n. 231.

127. Gec 1901, p. 197.

128. Ibid., p. 169.

129. The prominent authors Samuel Hirsch (1815-1889) and Salomon Formstecher (1808- 1889) wrote respectively Die Religion der Juden (1842) and Die Religion des Geistes (1841, notably on World Soul). Solov'ev only mentioned Joseph Salvador (1796-1873), a 'Franco-Jewish historian of religion who envisioned a universal. progressivist religion combining features of Judaism, Christianity and other faiths' (Valliere 2000a, p. 195, n. 52).

130. About the latter, Solov'ev wrote an entry in the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopaedia (Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), who lived precisely one century before Solov'ev. He mentioned that 'the autobiography of Maimon is for the cultural history of the Russian- Polish Jews interesting', and is partially translated into Russian, and published at the Evrejskaja Biblioteka (1871-1872). Solov'ev had possibly read it, at any rate he was informed about this publication.

131. Solov'ev argued to Gec that he saw the only fair solution in full civil rights, whereas emigration was a necessity as a temporary and palliative alleviation (Pis'ma 2. pp. 175- 77). This episode shows that Solov'ev was most concerned with contributing to improving the condition of Jews in Russia.

132. A. Flekser. 'Istoriceskaja rol' evrejstva' [on Solov'ev's lecture on Jewish Question in February 1882], Rassvet, 1882, 9; Anonymous [Tverdyj znak]. 'Lekcija prof. V. S. Solov'eva', Russkij Evrej, 1882, 9, pp. 344-346. [announced in Ibidem, 8, p. 301]; Anonymous. [on Solov'ev's lecture]. 'Peterburgskaja Letopis'', Nedel'naja Khronika Voskhoda, 1882, 9, pp. 212-213 [announced in Ibidem, 8. p. 1841. For an analysis of the significance of the Russian Jewish reception of Solov'ev, see Bar-Yosef 2000, who has found the abovementioned material.

133. P.A. Jampol'skij, Slovo, proiznesennoe Kievskim Ravvinom D-rom P. A. Jampol'- skim v molitvennom dome L. I. Brodskaga v Subbotu 14 Oktjabrja 1900 g. posle zaupokojnogo bogosluzenija po pokojnom russkom myslitele-Filosofe Vladimire Sergeevice Solov 'eve (Kiev: Izd. S. lofe i G. ZlatopoJ'skogo. 1900). 134. Gec 1901, p. 197.

135. Several of the following republications were the initiative of Jews: 'Ob antisemiticeskom dvizenii v pecali: neizdannaja stat'ja Vl. S. Solov'eva', Buduscnost' 35 (1901), pp. 684-685: 'Talmud i novejsaja polemiceskaja literatura o nem v Avstrii i v Germanii', Pomosc' evrejam, postradavsim ot neurozaja: Lit.- khudozestvennyj sbornik (Sankt-Peterburg: tip. I. Gol'dberga, 1901): Talmud (Varsava: Pravda, 1906), 2nd ed. 1907; Evrejskij vopros - Khristianskij vopros (Sobranie statej) (Varsava: Izd. Pravda, 1906) [includes excerpts from 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' as well as the texts 'Grekhi Rossii'. 'Pis'mo V.S. Solov'eva k F. Gecu'. 'Ob antisemiticeskom dvizenii v pecati']: Pis 'ma k F. B. Gecu (Sankt- Peterburg: tip. T-va Obscestvennaja pol'za, 1909): the lollowing text was inserted in a collection containing anti-Jewish articles by Ivan Aksakov, Dostoevskij, Rozanov, Belyj and others, with an anonymous preface written by Pavel Florenskij: 'Pocemu iudejstvo bylo prednaznaceno dlja rozdenija iz nego Bogoceloveka Messij, ili Khrista?', Izrail' v proslom. nastojas'cem i buduscem: Sbornik (Sergiev Posad: Religiozno- filosofskaja Biblioteka, 1915); 'O nacionalizme (Neizdannoe pis'mo), Scit: Literaturnyj Sbornik, L. Andreev, M. Gor'kij and F. Sologub (eds.) (Moskva: T-vo tip. A.I. Mamontova. 1915), p. 152: 'V zemlju obetovannuju (Posv. A. P. Solomonu)', U rek Vavilonskikh: Nacional'no-evrejskaja lirika v mirovoj poezii, L.B. Jaffe (ed.) (Moskva: Izd. Safrut, 1917); Talmud: Ocerk (Moskva: VCIK, 1918): Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros (Berlin: Mysl'. 1921); Talmud i novejsaja polemiceskaja literatura o nem v Avstrii i v Germanii (Berlin: n.p., 1925).

136. N.I. Bakst, 'Pamjati Vladimira S. Solov'eva", Knizki Voskhoda 1900, 11. pp. 335-337; Gec 1900; Gec 1901; Semen Gruzenberg, 'Solov'ev, Vladimir Sergeevic', Evrejskaja Enciklopedija 14. col. 445-447.

137. M.G. Morgulis, Voprosy evrejskoj zizni: Sobranie statej M. G. Morgulisa (Sankt- Peterburg: tip. Landau, 1889), p. 11.

138. Solov'ev did express his deep shock regarding the Dreyfus trial in a letter to Tavernier (E. 1978, p. 340).

139. Source: interview with Nikolaj Kotrelev (14th September 1999).

140. For a critical analysis of Solov'ev's treatment of the issue, see van der Zweerde 2004.

141. 'Talmud ...', p. 18.

142. It was precisely this historical sense that Solov'ev missed in Renan's Histoire d'Israel (Pis 'ma 2, p. 153). This was probably not his only criticism with respect to the French anti-Semite writer.

143. Istorija i buduscnost teokratii. pp. 414-415.

144. Pis 'ma 2. p. 134.

145. See for instance L 'idee russe for his view of Jewry' s glorious beginning and petty end, because they missed their chance to realise a universal mission, in his eyes (pp. 86-87).

146. These two hypotheses are offered in Burmistrov 1998 (pp. 76-77).

147. On the complexity of the Judaic tradition with respect to these terms, see the classic work which presents the many-fold historical development of the messianic idea: Gershom Scholem, 'Zum Verstandnis der messianischen Idee im Judentum', in: Ibid., Judaica I (1st publ. 1963; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp. 7-74; James C. VanderKam, 'Messianism and Apocalypticism'. in: John J. Collins (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Apocalypticism, vol. 1: The origins of Apocalypticism in Judaism and Christianity (New York: Continuum, 1999), pp. 193-228: Moshe Idel, 'Jewish Apocalypticism: 670-1670", in: Ibid., vol. 2: Apocalypticism in Western History and Culture, pp. 204-237.

148. In Trubeckoj's view, Solov'ev's messianism was too much influenced by Jewish model as it contained too a sharp national component (Trubeckoj 1995 2, p. 493ff). Trubeckoj emphasized the inconsistency between Solov'ev's positive statements on the Jewish past, and his 'superficial' plan for the future role of the Jews. In my eyes, this is an excessive criticism in two respects. Firstly, Solov'ev also criticized the Jews for their past rejection or Jesus Christ. Secondly, their future role in Russia, as reconciling class between the nobility and the people, was anything but superficial. In this respect I share Moss's view (Moss 1968, p. 138).

149. This question has been raised by Kornblatt (1997).

150. For a sharp analysis of the concept or theocracy in its history and treatment in Solov'ev's work, see Marin Terpstra, "'God's Case on Earth": Notes on Theocracy and the Political Theology of Vladimir Solov'ev', in: van den Bercken et al. 2000, pp. 411-429.

151. See 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros'. p. 213.

152. 'Kogda zili evrejskie proroki', p. 199. On his distorting the Hebrew concept of prophecy, see Davidson 2000, pp. 668-669.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

Postby admin » Thu May 10, 2018 8:07 am

Part 1 of 2

IV. The Polish Question [1]

Are our [sic! MC] Poles not the natural mediators of unification, by being subjects or the Russian tsar and spiritual children or the Roman pope, being by blood Slavs and close to Russians, and by spirit and culture neighbours or the Roman-German West? [2]


1. Introduction

Solov'ev ascribed a unique role to Poland as mediator between Eastern and Western Christianity. The fact that Poland belonged to the Russian empire, or at least part of it, allowed him to understand this role as a part of Russia's regenerating mission in the world.

In Solov'ev-scholarship, his views on the Polish question have not yet been analysed against the Russian historical background, but are mostly interpreted within the philosophical context of Polish and Russian messianism. [3]

a) Thesis

In this chapter I aim to make a case for the following points. Firstly, Soloy'ey's treatment of the Polish question was instrumental to his own agenda in so far as it was thoroughly based on his ideal of reconciling Eastern and Western Christianity. Solov'ev was interested in the Polish question to the extent that he saw in it elements for this ideal, which initially took the form of church reunification as a first step towards free theocracy, and later of spiritual unity between Russian Orthodox and Polish Catholics. This ideal, however utopian it may seem, was nevertheless reflected in the ongoing relationship between the Vatican and Russia.

Secondly, Solov'ev combined borrowings from ongoing debates with a unique interpretation. On the one hand, his intervention was characteristic of the debates held in his time, yet without exclusively belonging to one camp. His framework was the Slavophile worldview of a religious antagonism between East and West, into which he moulded the principles of cultural and religious freedom defended by the liberals. On the other hand, he was probably the only thinker who interpreted the Polish question in terms of church reunification, and certainly the only thinker to see in it a step towards free theocracy. This is where his profound originality lies, as well as his loneliness in Russian public opinion on this issue. The three registers of history that I have identified as forming his views of history allow to understand why his fellow countrymen hardly reacted to his views on the Polish question.

Thirdly, and most interestingly if we put that in contrast with the other cases, all three key figures of free theocracy are dealt with concurrently in the Polish question namely: the tsar through the government's attitude to the Poles, the prophet as the announcer of church reunion, and the pope as spiritual head of the Poles and Western Europe. Arguably, this three-fold prism made his views obscure for all camps in Russian public opinion.

Fourthly, his conception of history plays a decisive role both for the promotion of his ideal and for legitimising and reinforcing his position in Russian public opinion. In The three registers of history defined in Part One have an explanatory value in this respect. Interestingly, while theology of history dominates in the texts and provides a partly Slavophile framework, philosophy of history provides the necessary support of his liberal position. Also, some aspects of his sophiology of history come to the fore due to inspiration by the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, and possibly also from Polish philosopher August Cieszkowski.

In order to drive home these points, I first provide a brief survey of the situation of the Poles in the Russian empire (1b) and of the debates on the Polish question (1e) in the time when Solov'ev intervened on the issue (1880-1900). In the second part, the presentation of the texts in which Solov'ev dealt with the Polish question is followed by a confrontation of these texts with the historical context of the situation of the Poles (2b), and with the debates (2c). Finally, his intervention in the Polish question is unravelled in terms of the three registers of theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history (2d).

b) The historical context: policies [4]

The Polish kingdom disappeared from the European map as a result of partitions of the country between Russia, which was given the lion share, Prussia and Austria at the turn of the 19th century. After a first Polish uprising in 1831 a second followed in 1863, which was mercilessly repressed. From the end of the 1860s onwards up to the end of the century, the government decided to solve this specific aspect of the question of nationalities, the Polish question, by a policy of russification. This involved a permanent action upon the Polish people aimed at eliminating their specificities in order to gradually assimilate them into the Russian population. [5]

For this purpose, reforms were implemented in three fields, namely agriculture, administration, and culture. The agrarian reform succeeded in creating a free Polish peasant class and in weakening the Polish gentry (szlachta); indirectly, it transformed the urban demography by driving the middle gentry into the cities, where they formed a middle class, by creating a working class, and more generally by creating opportunities for quick economic development. [6] The administrative reform aimed at concentrating full power over the Polish provinces in Russian hands. But it was the goal of cultural fusion of the Poles within the Russian empire that entailed the harshest measures. Education was russified by prohibiting the use of Polish as teaching language. The Catholic Church, considered a main factor in the uprising, came under constant vigilance, most monasteries were closed, and ecclesiastical goods were confiscated. The clergy were remunerated by the government and the bishops appointed by the Ecclesiastical College of St. Petersburg. [7] Strikingly, the objective of cultural fusion of the Poles was not accompanied with Orthodox missionary campaigns to convert them. As a matter of fact, the number of conversions of Catholics to Orthodoxy remained very low. [8]

Between 1880 and 1900, opposition to Russian occupation, though weakening with the time, came mostly from the Polish clergy. This factor increased the traditional antipathy of Russian Orthodox with respect to Catholicism, and contributed to reinforce the religious aspect of the Polish question. Pobedonoscev did not hesitate to link the Catholicism of the Poles as the cause of their national aspirations and their hatred of Russia, and to denounce a Polish conspiracy against Russia through the Vatican. [9] In this sense, the Polish question played a role in the diplomatic relationship between Russia and the Vatican. These had been broken off in the 1860s after the repression by Russia of the Polish uprising. Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903, pope from 1878 to 1903) worked at resuming the bond by promising Russia that he would use his spiritual authority to soften the tension between the Polish population and the Russian occupyers. In 1889, urged the resistant core of Polish Catholics, namely the Polish bishops, to cooperate with the Russian authorities. [10] In contrast, many Poles worked at building a Polish society and developing Polish culture without seeking open confrontation with Russian rule, namely by clandestinely teaching Polish, promoting cultural activities and improving the economic infrastructure. [11] From 1885 to 1904, 'the whole period was to pass without an appeal to violence, without a concerted blow struck for national independence.' [12]

c) Debates in Russian public opinion [13]

In the aftermath of the Polish uprising of 1863, a consensus reigned in the Russian press that regarded the Russian occupation of Polish territories as fully justified. [14] A differentiation of views appeared in the 1870s, with the progressive camps who advocated religious and cultural freedom for the Poles on the one hand, and the conservatives, who defended an assimilation of the Polish population within the empire through the policy of russification, on the other. In the 1880s, when Solov'ev started writing on the Polish question, the issue practically disappeared from the debates, eclipsed by other problems connected with the new era of reaction under Alexander III. [15] In the 1890s, a number of authors expressed themselves on the Polish question, while the claim to Polish national autonomy was heard increasingly. Four main positions can be distinguished for the period in question (1880-1900): the conservative nationalists, Slavophiles, liberals, and (mostly Polish) radicals.

The conservative nationalists (Konstantin Pobedonoscev, Mikhail Katkov, Vladimir Gringmut) fiercely defended the policy of russification as a necessary means for boosting the interests of the Russian state. [16] The highly prolific writer Gringmut stressed the necessity of reinforcing state unity, which implied that the Poles should work towards a 'complete fusion of the former Polish kingdom with the great, powerful Russian empire.' [17] The Poles had the right to speak Polish and go to Catholic churches as long as this practice remained in the private sphere, but in no way should deprive the Russian language of its 'state significance' [gosudarstvennoe znacenie], or diminish the sanctity or dignity of the Orthodox church. [18]

The Slavophiles (Ivan Aksakov, Nikolaj Danilevskij, Vladimir Lamanskij, I. Filevic) on the whole approved of repressive measures against the Poles but, in contrast with the conservative nationalists, rejected a military dictatorship in the Polish provinces. [19] Basing them selves on Samarin's identification of Poland with Western civilisation and Latinity, as opposed to Russia and Slavdom, they stigmatised the Polish gentry and clergy as the armed propaganda of Catholicism, and in the name of the unity of Slavic peoples favoured the assimilation of the Poles as the only solution to the Polish question. [20]

The liberals (Nikolaj Kareev, Vladimir Spasovic) went yet another step further than the Slavophiles. [21] Their defence of the greatest possible autonomy for Poles within the Russian empire logically prompted them to vehemently condemn the policy of russification. Drawing from his experience of living in Warsaw, Kareev was highly critical of the aggressive, paternalistic attitude of the Russian press with respect to the Poles, and stressed positive developments in Poland, such as a free peasantry developing a Polish nationality, economic progress, and a notable social bloom. Spasovic not only advocated equal civil treatment of Russians and Poles, but also worked at bringing together the two nations as a publicist and literary critic.

As regards the radicals, they began to openly defend the idea of Polish national autonomy by the end of the 1890s onwards. Until then they did not reflect along the line of national self-determination, but mainly thought in terms of cooperation between Russians and Poles. The country's national independence was nevertheless generally accepted among socialists. [22] In 1883, the labour party was founded in the Polish provinces, and it was active in the publication of journals, organisation of strikes, and collaboration with the analogous Russian underground organisation, Narodnaja Volja. [23] The movement also found support in the Polish League founded in 1886 and based in Switzerland. The Manifest of the Polish League was published in 1897. Mostly of Polish nationality, such as Stanislav Tarnowski, its members advocated political independence. [24] The poor living conditions among the working class created a favourable soil for an enthusiastic reception of Marx in Poland, and for the development of Polish Marxism. [25] Its unbending internationalism made it a subsidiary of Russian Social Democracy. [26]

The Polish question had thus become a central problem for Russian authorities, who implemented radical transformations in the Polish provinces between 1863 and 1900. The period in which Solov'ev lived was precisely the harshest period of Russian rule over Poland, both in terms of the scale of measures that touched all areas of existence and of the thoroughness with which these measures were applied. The debates on the Polish question focused on the question whether the policy of russification was the best solution to the Polish question, and whether it was legitimate and desirable for the Russian nation as well as for the Poles. A whole scale of views was given from a full defence of the repressive policies to a claim of Polish national autonomy. In the following section I will show Solov'ev's instrumental approach to the issue and situate it within the context of the debates in order to show his originality, his support of common views, as well as the role of his conception of history in his peculiar position.

2. Solov'ev's intervention

a) Solov 'ev's texts


Solov'ev became acquainted with Poland as early as 1875 on his trip to London, when he stayed in Warsaw for a couple of days. Even though he did not begin to write on the Polish question until the early 1880s, his Polish sympathies may date back to that journey. [27] Solov'ev wrote a contre-courant on the Polish question: his writings extend from 1883 until 1898, in a period when the wave of interest in the Polish question that had dominated in the 1870s had practically disappeared, and was only beginning to come back with the claims for Polish independence. He devoted several articles to expound his views, mostly in connection with other questions.

In the first article, 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros' [Poland and the Eastern Question], published in 1883 in Aksakov's journal Rus' as an introduction to his work Velikij spor i khristianskaja politika [The Great Schism and Christian Politics], the philosopher set the historical and conceptual framework of his reflection upon Christian politics. [28] The Polish question was significant for Solov'ev in two respects: first, it was the most urgent of the three national tasks, next to the Jewish question and the Eastern question. Secondly, and more specifically, Poland was a pivot in his theocratic idea. In his opinion, Russia had a crucial role to play in the resolution of the great schism that was tearing mankind apart, namely the schism between East and West. By reconciling with Poland in the form of a religious solidarity between Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia, Russia would pave the way for reconciliation between East and West, understood by Solov'ev as Orthodox Russia and (mostly) Roman Catholic Western Europe. Poland, being ethnically close to Russians and religiously affiliated to Catholicism, would work as the reconciling factor. In this way, Poland would contribute to the reunification of the churches, a necessary condition for the establishment of theocracy.

In the following year, 1884, a few pages were devoted to the Polish question as a national task for Russia in the essay 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' [Judaism and the Christian Question]. [29] Polish society was dominated by the landed gentry, the szlachta, which was the main hindrance for building a state. Nevertheless, Poland had a role to play in the theocratic mission, in virtue of its belonging to Catholicism, i.e. to the spiritual authority of the pope. Solov'ev linked the Polish question with the Jewish question by pointing to the fact that, at this moment, the people of Israel could also playa reconciling role between Poland and Russia.

A couple of years later, his tone changed and became openly critical of Russia's foreign and internal policies. Given the strict control of the press by censorship, this critique was not published in Russia at the time of its writing. In 1887, in the unpublished 'Grekhi Rossii' [Russia's Sins], he denounced the policy of Poland's russification and the absence of religious freedom for Catholics. [30] In 1888, he had the opportunity to voice his criticism publicly, though abroad, in Paris, in his lecture L 'idee russe. [31] The year 1888 was the ninth centenary of the Baptism of Russia, a topic which Solov'ev connected with the 'raison d'etre of Russia in universal history' in order to castigate the un-Christian attitude of the Russian government with respect to the religious minorities. [32]

This lecture provoked a reaction from the Polish thinker Stanislaw Tarnowski, to whom Solov'ev responded in his 'Lettre a la redaction du Przeglad Polski' in 1889. [33] This text offers one of the very few reflexive considerations on his work, and, more importantly for our analysis, on his own contribution to history. Next to Russia's historical mission and the idea of Christian prophetism, the philosopher broached the Polish question and argued against the restoration of Poland's political autonomy. At the same time he envisaged the possibility of a plebiscite in order to ask the Polish population to which nation it preferred to belong. He also valued the destiny of Poland positively, which, by giving up being a particular national state, would precede all other European countries, and in this way anticipate the ideal supranational Christian community.

His next publication in Russia on the Polish question, in 1893, was the second part of the essay 'Iz voprosov kul'tury' [From Questions of Culture] entitled 'Istoriceskij sfinks' [The Historical Sphinx], and consisted of a defence of religious tolerance, written in reaction to two publications by the neo-Slavophile Konstantin Bestuzev-Rjumin and the Orthodox conservative I.S. Durnovo. [34] Religious tolerance should be part of Orthodoxy, and, implicitly, of the Russian idea, and as such should be applied notably to Catholic Poles.

In that same year, Solov'ev was already working on his comprehensive work of ethics, Opravdanie dobra [The Justification of the Good]. In his account of each historical nation and its universal character, he defined the essence of the Polish nation as follows: Polish universalism manifests itself in its broad idealism, characterised by openness to foreign influences. [35]

The motive of religious tolerance was picked up again in his 'Mir' Vostoka i Zapada' [The World of East and West], a eulogy for empress Catherine II on the occasion of the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of her death in 1896. [36] He stressed the assessment of the contribution of Peter the Great to Russian history, and the significance of the reign of Catherine in continuing the task of bringing East and West closer together. Here we also find Solov'ev's interpretation of the situation of Poland in the 18th century, and his justification of its annexation by Catherine.

One year later, in 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov" [The Polish National Church], Solov'ev rejected the creation, advocated by some Polish Catholic priests, of a national Polish church. This church would be separated from the Roman Catholic Church and would allow, notably, the marriage of priests. [37] From the perspective of the historical bonds between Poland, Russia and Rome, Solov'ev argued, this would be a negative development, especially now that the diplomatic relationships between Russia and the Vatican were restored. In this connection, he envisaged a future reconciliation between Poland and Russia in spiritual terms, through the shared veneration of an ancient Byzantine Icon of the Virgin on Polish territory, our Lady of Czestochowa. [38]

This spiritual, rather than religious or institutional, dimension of the Polish question, is also present in his last text on the topic, 'Mickevie', Solov'ev's commemorative speech on the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz, on December 27th, 1898. [39] Solov'ev emphasised that Mickiewicz had correctly perceived his nation in terms of self-sacrifice and bowed before the suffering of his fatherland.

In Solov'ev's eyes, Poland was not only a symptom of the conflict between East and West, but also played a role in its solution, Although the motives of reconciling East and West and of the reunification of the churches do not always appear equally prominently, they lie at the basis of his rel1ections on the Polish question. These take various thematic directions: towards a messianic discourse, with such topics as the national mission, the national idea; towards a spiritualization of the topic, with reference to the icon and the characterisation of Poland as Nation-Prophet; and towards a moral discourse, as the terms of sins, punishment, obligations, and principle of religious tolerance indicate. A shift of emphasis appears in the course of his interventions. The earlier texts bring to the foreground Solov'ev's ideas about the role of Poles in his future theocratic project, while social, political and cultural considerations on Poland -- mainly concerning the policy of russification and the rejection of political autonomy -- are only mentioned in passing. Later, as his theocratic hopes weakened, the philosopher committed himself more deeply to a struggle in the social, political and cultural field, by advocating freedom of confession and of cultural development in the Polish province. The question, dealt with in the next section, is to what extent these reflections are based on historical events.

b) Confrontation with the historical development of Poland

Solov'ev was fascinated by Poland, belonging as it did ethnically to Slavdom, and religiously to Catholicism. And although one could name other cases of ethnic Slavs belonging to Catholicism, for instance Croats, Solov'ev did not deal with those cases. [40] An explanation is that the philosopher defined the Polish question as one of the vital questions that the Russian nation had to solve. This definition shapes his perspective as a whole on the Polish question and on Polish history.

In his various publications, Solov'ev recurrently broached four main moments of Polish history: the defeat of Poland under Catherine II, the partitions, the 1863 uprising, and the present time (1880-1900). These points are never elaborate arguments or analyses, but rather statements or conclusions, on the basis of which it is possible to reconstruct the chronology of the Polish question according to Solov'ev and to discuss his views.

The chronology of the Polish question properly speaking thus starts for Solov'ev with the fall of Poland at the end of the 18th century, He first characterised the Polish regime as a whole as the embodiment, through the gentry, of 'the extreme of Western individualism., [41] Solov'ev repeatedly emphasised Poland's political and social weakness, which he ascribed to the exclusive power of the szlachta by virtue of the institution of Poland's constitutional system, the liberum veto, [42] In the liberum veto, the effective power lay in the hands of the gentry and did not leave any room for reform or decisive action by the monarch. [43] The same point is made by modern historians who stress the weakness of royal power due to its submission to the rule of the liberum veto in the 18th century, yet without reducing the cause of the fall of Poland to this factor, as did Solov'ev. [44] Besides, his general valuation of the degradation of Poland was correct, although he tended to reduce Polish political history to its unfortunate development in the 18th century, neglecting its flourishing, especially the 16th century. [45] In addition, his interpretation of the fall of Poland reduces Polish society to the szlachta, and Polish politics to the liberum veto. without taking into account the attempts to reform the latter. [46]

With respect to the definitive defeat of Poland, Solov'ev significantly did not refer to any Polish historical figure, but only to Catherine II. The occasion on which Solov'ev expressed himself, namely the eulogy of the great empress, naturally also played a role in this choice. Her deeds in foreign politics were widely considered to be her greatest achievements, and in this respect Solov'ev simply joined the common choir of praise in the historiography of both his time and ours. [47] Her greatness as a Christian ruler was shown by her intervention in Poland in the I760s, as an example of commitment to tolerance and justice. Without mentioning dates or Polish or Russian historical figures, he referred to the pinnacle of Catherine's policy of influence in Poland, when she sent her troops into the kingdom, an episode that sharpened Poland's inner crisis, and accelerated its loss of political autonomy. Solov'ev justified the intervention by Catherine, in terms of 'reparation of injustice, defence of the persecuted dissidents, not in the name of exclusively confessional sympathies, but in the name of the broad, truly imperial principle of fair religious tolerance for all. ' [48] By 'dissidents', Solov'ev meant the Protestants and Orthodox in Poland, who indeed had suffered persecutions, especially in the Counter- Reformation period. At the end of the 18th century, however, Protestants and Orthodox in Poland possessed full civil rights and freedom of confession. Catherine II and Frederick II demanded that they also be given political rights, in the same way as Catholics, which reinforced dissent within the szlachta. [49]

Viewing Catherine's politics in Poland exclusively as a defence of religious tolerance seems to have been a commonly accepted view among many thinkers known for their commitment to this cause. [50] In the same vein, Solov'ev did not interpret Catherine's actions in Poland as a strategic move, understandable from the perspective of her territorial ambitions on Polish soil. [51] He acknowledged the category of 'historical right' in the territorial question, yet without according it to the Poles. [52] Polish ambitions to rebuild Poland according to its earlier borders were mere 'hallucinations' and the fruit of a 'pathological' attitude. [53] Russia was called to intervene in favour of justice: 'The right to Poland was given to Catherine's imperial politics by the offences done to the dissidents.' [54] From there, it was a small step to regarding the territorial annexation as a fair, justified, and deserved 'restitution', a step which Solov'ev indeed took. [55]

The same conclusions can be drawn from Solov'ev's examination of the partitions of Poland (1773, 1793, 1795, 1815), the second episode of Polish history that retained his attention. In 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', Solov'ev unfolds the map of the strategic situation of Poland at the congress of Vienna (1815), which decided Poland's fourth partition between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Solov'ev justified Russia's good intentions by arguing, firstly, that Russia did not act out of its own interest. His argument that 'Russian' Galicia was left to Austria is debatable: this 'leaving' of Galicia was not so much an altruistic gesture as one of the conditions of the partitions themselves, namely that part of the whole would be left for Austria; from the first partition onwards, it was indeed clear to Russia and Prussia that Austria was also involved.56 Solov'ev also considered the Russian annexation of the main Polish territories a gesture by tsar Alexander I to educate Poland and to preserve it from 'germanisation' by Prussia. This gives rise to three remarks. First, Solov'ev does justice to Alexander's efforts to guarantee the Poles the freedom of national development; Alexander did indeed grant them a constitution, a system of local self- government, liberty of the press, and the right to have a separate army. Second, his position is typical for a 19th century view on politics and of colonisation, formulated in paternalistic terms of education and protection. Thirdly, Solov'ev, quite significantly, does not value the annexation of the other parts of Poland by Austria and Prussia in the same manner. On the contrary, he condemns the German appetite. This stance shows that Solov'ev does not content himself with approving annexation as good in itself, but judges the intention behind it according to moral criteria.

Concerning the Polish uprising of 1863, the philosopher focused on the social composition of Poland at that time. He realistically stated that Polish society was exclusively dominated by the gentry, the szlachta, at the expense of the rest of the population, notably the peasants. On this basis, he interpreted Russia's repression of the uprising and the accompanying reforms -- redistribution of the land to the liberated peasants, and the correspondingly weakening of the gentry -- as the emancipation of the peasants and the liberation of Poland from the 'fatal antagonism' between the two classes. His statement that Russia 'guaranteed the future of the real, not only noble, and not only peasant, but Polish Poland' came down to the view that 'real Poland' was more Polish under Russian rule than as an independent state, which testifies to Solov'ev's belief in Russia's essentially protective mission with respect to the country. [57] The assumption, however, that this 'liberation' was definitive is contradicted by frequent statements by Solov'ev himself on the division in Polish society up to his own time, and for this reason, the impossibility of Poland building a state.

The time in which he was writing (the 1880s-1890s), is the fourth aspect examined by Solov'ev with respect to the Polish question. The unacceptability of the policy of russification forms a core issue in the years 1887 ('Grekhi Rossii'), 1888 (L'idee russe), and 1893 ('Istoriceskij sfinks'). Clearly, they are not directly linked by any special events or particularly crude news from the Polish province. As we know, the policy of russification had started by the 1860s, and the repression of Catholicism reached its peak in the 1870s, So what was the motive behind Solov'ev's fierce criticism of the Russian policy? Arguably, the underlying motive was the principle of religious freedom. Solov'ev did not elaborate on the measures taken to repress Polish culture, but his position against the assimilation of Poland into Russian culture is obvious. He repeatedly denounced the persecution of Catholic Poles, but again without elaborating on this point. The only concrete example can be found in one of his last articles, 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov". There he saluted, carefully but clearly, the fact that the Polish Catholic clergy had returned to the authority of the Roman pope, thereby implicitly criticising both the attempts by Poles to create a Polish national church, and the subordination of the Polish Catholic clergy to the Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg after 1863. [58] He also welcomed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and the Vatican, which had restored the ancient Roman authority, legitimised by tradition. In this respect, his ideal of church reunion, or at least of a rapprochement between the Eastern and the Western churches was not merely the fruit of his own utopian dream, but found a concrete basis, relevance and legitimacy in the ongoing developments.

Solov'ev's noble defence of Poland's right to free cultural development and religious confession was a response to concrete persecution in Polish territories. However, this concern for the implementation of freedom and respect eclipsed other, social and economic realities in the Polish territories. His views of the components of Polish society were simplistic and outdated: 'without any aptitudes to a strong state power, with the exclusively passive character of the peasant class and with the absence of an urban class, Poland as a whole is represented by the szlachta alone.' [59] This quotation shows that Solov'ev strikingly stuck to an image of Poland as it existed in the 18th century, and until the 1860s at the most. [60] By the 1880s, Polish society had become more complex than the conflict between gentry and peasants, with the appearance of an urban intelligentsia and of a working class.

Solov'ev also held that Poland's annexation by Russia was economically valuable. [61] On the one hand, the Polish area under Russian rule did experience tremendous economic growth that went beyond the development of Prussian and Austrian Poland. On the other hand, this development was hardly due to Russian tsardom, since Russia did not offer any assistance to the Polish economy by building infrastructure such as railways, sewage or waterworks. [62] As a consequence, it is impossible to speak of the Russian occupation in terms of active support and contribution to welfare in the Polish province, as Solov'ev did. [63] This again reveals his total disinterest as to Russia's strategic manoeuvres in Poland. Russia strove to divide in order to strengthen its power, by first helping the gentry during the uprising, then, once the uprising was crushed, by helping the peasants by way of agrarian reform. Russia did work at reducing social differences, as Solov'ev claimed, but at the same time strove to keep these two social groups separate, secluded, as is shown by the administrative measures in the villages imposed after the repression of the uprising. [64]

c) Confrontation of Solov 'ev's views with debates

i) The conservative nationalists


Solov'ev's position with respect to the conservative nationalists was univocally and constantly critical. Solov'ev reacted to the statements made by historian Bestuzev-Rjumin and publicist I.S. Durnovo by explicitly rejecting their defence of the policy of russification and religious persecution of the Catholic Poles. He argued that Orthodoxy should include religious tolerance, and that as such this tolerance should be applied to Catholic Poles and to other religious minorities living on Russian soil, notably the Jews. [65] Opposing the twist given to the concept of a national mission towards intolerance and aggressive nationalism, he repeatedly emphasised the necessity of understanding Russia's mission not as a privilege, but as a moral obligation, a serving [sluzenie]. [66] Besides, when the utterly conservative journal Novoe Vremja supported the creation of a Polish national church separated from Rome, the philosopher explicitly reacted by showing that this idea was inconsistent, inspired by anti-Catholic motives, and formed an obstacle to the relationships between Russians and Poles. [67]

Significantly, the only reactions to Solov'ev's interventions came from the conservative nationalist camp. In the 1890s, two minor authors, the abovementioned I.S. Durnovo and Dmitrij Ilovajskij, put pen to paper to react in Moskovskie Vedomosti against Solov'ev's writings on the Polish question. Both were engaged in an ongoing polemic with Solov'ev. [68] Ilovajskij criticized Solov'ev for propagating ideas against the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state, especially with respect to the occupation of the Polish territories. [69] Solov'ev's statements on the obligation to respect your neighbours' religion and law only amounted, he claimed, to negating and humiliating the Orthodox Church in relation to Catholicism. Durnovo's response was far more elaborate. [70] Against Solov'ev's critique of intolerance, Durnovo protested that the policy of russification had in no way violated the respect for Polish narodnost'. He claimed that Solov'ev displayed logical inconsistency in founding a government's policy on respect for the free development of another narodnost'. Moreover, the principle of respect was subjective, negative, and led to non-participation in public affairs. For these reasons, it could not serve as a basis to act for the Russian government, in particular in the Polish territories. Significantly, these two reactions to Solov'ev's writings concern his fundamental critique of Russian government policy, which obviously was serious enough to generate the need to react. [71]

However, the strong hostility between Solov'ev and the conservative nationalists should not conceal the fact that there were points of convergence in their worldviews. For instance, with Gringmut Solov'ev shared the faith in the Russian institutions of tsardom and the Orthodox Church. But while this faith prompted Gringmut and the conservative nationalists to prohibit all criticism of these institutions, it motivated Solov'ev to exhort them to act according to the Christian principles they embodied. [72]

ii) The Slavophiles

Solov'ev's perception of Poland was closest to the Slavophile perspective. In fact, he shared with them a basic identification of Poland with Western civilisation, and more specifically, with Catholicism. In a similar stance, Solov'ev characterized Poland as bearing within itself the extreme feature of Western civilisation, that is, individualism, as a result of which it was doomed to fall. [73] He regarded the 18th century Polish regime as a whole as the embodiment of 'the extreme of Western individualism.' [74] This individualism was typical of the gentry, the szlachta, which, by abusing its privileged position, had concentrated Polish society and politics within itself: 'all the force of Poland was in the szlachta, and Poland died. It did not die because of possessing a strong gentry, for this was a privilege, but because its gentry, instead of being a social class, organized to serve the state and to rule over the people, transformed into a class which ruled without limits, and included the state in itself.' [75]

Solov'ev, however, went further than the Slavophiles's identification of Poland with Catholicism in two respects, namely by valuing Catholicism positively, and by ascribing to Poland a role in solving the universal schism. While the Slavophiles saw the conflict in its universal scope as unsolvable, and sometimes regarded the Poles as irredeemably divided and as traitors of the Slav world, Solov'ev used the Polish situation as a means to overcome the schism: the Polish reason of being was even to serve Catholicism. [76] In his eyes, Catholicism, with its seat in Rome, represented the unity and authority received from tradition that Orthodoxy lacked. Poland, being religiously affiliated with Catholicism, would work as the reconciling factor, and contribute to the reunification of the churches. [77] Poland bore within itself this universal conflict between East and West. Characteristic of his treatment of ideals and their implementation, however, he limited his message to this general exhortation, without proposing concrete measures for a rapprochement between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. However, in that period marked by strong anti- Catholic feelings in Russia, his call undoubtedly had a disturbing effect.

In Solov'ev's eyes, the way of dealing with the Polish territories was a test case for Russia's Christian or non-Christian attitude. For him, the applicability to concrete reality of the principles discussed was at stake, and not the purely theoretical examination of these principles, upon which all Slavophiles agreed, without putting them into practice. Solov'ev criticized the discrepancy between theoretical views (Samarin's claim of the freedom of cultural development and religious confession) and their non-application to concrete situations, which led to religious fanaticism. [78] The same criticism was aimed at Dostoevskij, whose chauvinism Solov'ev condemned explicitly. [79]

Walicki has argued that it was precisely Solov'ev's position with respect to the Polish question, especially his liberalism and his heterodox messianism, combined with his growing fascination with Roman Catholicism, that played a key role in his distancing himself from the Slavophiles. [80] This thesis seems true for one part only. Solov'ev did indeed start writing in Rus', the journal of the Slavophile Ivan Aksakov who saluted his publication on the Polish question. [81] However, concerning his later publications after he had left Rus', in spite of his criticism of the Slavophile's purely theoretical preoccupations, and in spite of his properly un-Slavophile valuation of Catholicism, he still shared with the Slavophiles the understanding of Poland and the Polish question from a religious perspective, in terms of an antagonism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, or between East and West. [82] The case of Poland shows that Solov'ev traded the Slavophile worldview, which was centred on Orthodoxy, traditional Russia and theoretical ideals, and which was on the whole oriented towards the past, for an ecumenical messianism that demanded concrete realisation of principles and was by definition future-oriented.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

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Part 2 of 2

iii) The liberals

Solov'ev's distancing from the Slavophiles in the mid-1880s went hand-in-hand with a rapprochement with the liberals. He started to publish regularly in the latters' mouthpiece, Vestnik Evropy, and by the end of the 1880s collaborated closely with the editorial board and attended the weekly meetings with the editor-in-chief Matvej Stasjulevic, so that the conservative press regarded him as a liberal. [83]

Solov'ev condemned the 'forced russification in the borderlands', the 'injustice [... ] of the abominable system of russification [... ] which attacks national existence, the very soul of the Polish people.' [84] Here Solov'ev was referring to Poland's cultural achievements, by virtue of which it should be considered a nation. Without elaborating on the measures taken to repress Polish culture, he clearly stated his position against the assimilation of Poland into Russian culture. Equally short and incisive was his condemnation of the persecution of Catholic Poles. However, he did not question Russian occupation, as it had put an end to the tyrannical domination of the gentry and favoured Poland's free development. In this connection, he agreed with the liberals on the positive valuation of the agrarian reform in Poland, He interpreted the reform of land redistribution to the liberated peasants as the emancipation of peasants and the liberation of Poland from the 'fatal antagonism' between the two classes, Solov'ev also shared, especially with Kareev, the idea that Russian occupation protected Poland from germanisation, which was considered a real danger. [85] Of particular interest is the true friendship that developed between Solov'ev and an insider in the Polish question, and close collaborator of Vestnik Evropy, Vladimir Spasovic. [86] With Spasovic, and against the Polish advocates of independence, he argued that no political autonomy was possible because the internal antagonism between the gentry and the common people had remained intact until his time and posed a major obstacle for building a state. [87] Poles still lacked 'the very first necessary conditions for political restoration.' [88] More diplomatically, he suggested that the Polish population be asked by means of a plebiscite to which state it should belong. [89] In any case, instead of being concerned with the goal that Solov'ev envisaged for them, i.e., the reconciliation between East and West, the Poles remained rather focused on their own national interest. [90]

His criticism of the Polish attitude shows that his approach to Poland was quite different from the liberal Kareev. Analysis of historical events, of the implementation of policies, and of agrarian reforms, and in general concern for the concrete situation, typical for Kareev's approach, were alien to Solov'ev. It was precisely the reduction of Polish society to gentry and peasantry and the use of cliches that were condemned by Kareev in his critique of the pejorative treatment of the Polish question in the Russian press. [91] Another point of difference of approach concerns Poland's political future. Solov'ev explicitly confessed his absence of concern for the form of political regime, and did not consider it a primary necessity for Poland to again have a state. Instead of being concerned with the evolution of the political status of the Polish nation, he focused on the Christian attitude that Russia should have with respect to Poland, and systematically approached the Polish question from a religious or moral perspective. [92] This different focus may explain the absence of any reaction from the liberals to Solov'ev's views on Poland. It also determined another fundamental difference with the liberals. While Catholic faith was only one of the factors that according to Kareev made up Polish identity, for instance, Solov'ev focused on it to such an extent that he even valued Poland exclusively for belonging to Catholicism and identified the Polish national idea with Catholicism.

iv) The radicals

Against the Polish defenders of political autonomy, Solov'ev repeatedly argued that the restoration of a Polish state was impossible. [93] The internal antagonism between the gentry and the peasantry had remained until his time, and formed a major obstacle for building a state. Solov'ev nevertheless conceded that the Poles had learnt to give up their arbitrariness, and had adopted organised and disciplined action. [94] It is unclear what Solov'ev was referring to here: Polish docility towards Russian authorities, or their clandestine social organisations in favour of the spreading of the Polish language and culture. He may have heard about the latter through his friend Spasovic. However, Solov'ev never broached the topic of these organisations, perhaps for fear of revealing information that should be kept secret from the Russian authorities, or simply because he did not know about them. It is at least clear that Solov'ev objected to Polish ambitions of political independence. To the reproach by Tarnowski of talking like the Polish messianists, he answered that, contrary to them, he considered his own country not as an elected nation and object of cult, but only as one with a historical obligation at that very moment. [95] The protective tone of the Russian thinker could only meet with disapproval on the part of the Polish defenders of national independence.

Solov'ev's approach to the Polish question contributed to redefining his position in the Russian intellectual world of his time. He did not belong fully to anyone camp, but clearly borrowed views from the Slavophiles and the liberals. From the Slavophiles he preserved the framework of world history with its division between East and West, and its overly religious perspective. In the liberals he found support for the implementation of his principles in the concrete situation of the Polish cultural and religious minority. As for the reception of his views, three remarks should be made. His critique of the state's policy of russification and the religious persecution of the Catholic Poles, led to his being considered immoral, decadent and anti-patriotic by the nationalist-conservative party. Besides, the complete absence of a reaction on the liberals' part to his treatment of the Polish question indicates that Solov'ev, though undoubtedly esteemed for his defence of liberal principles, was actually too religious to be considered a valuable partner in the discussion about the economic, social and political aspects of the Polish question. His emphasis on church reunification could therefore only provoke the protest of the conservatively-minded Russians, as well as the disinterest of the liberals and radicals. Finally, his support of the Russian occupation of Poland, and his disinterest in the political future of the country were too conservative in the eyes of the Polish supporters of political independence. The originality of his approach explains his isolated position in the debates. It led him to interpret events in moral and religious terms, thereby turning them into symbols, and thus translating them into a higher, spiritual dimension. By the same token, he did not turn his back on society and his time, but sought to transfigure the relationships between Russia and Poland, to lift them onto a higher, moral level of solidarity and justice. This translation of the issue into a speculative discourse is true to his threefold conception of history, which serves to explain his approach to the Polish question.

d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history

It is no coincidence that Solov'ev dealt with the three pillars of free theocracy, namely pope, Russian emperor, and prophet, within one single text, and even on one page. [96] This shows the central significance that he viewed in the Polish question for the realisation of his ideal. In this respect, the three registers of history that I have identified in Solov'ev's texts provide an explanation to his position.

The theological register of history clearly dominates in Solov'ev's texts on the Polish question. He viewed the East-West conflict in terms of a conflict between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and, accordingly, defined Poland primarily as a Catholic nation. Poland was to play a role in this conflict by eliminating it through the reunification of the churches. Perhaps as an alternative to the liberal view, he held that the rapprochement with the West should take place not only in political, military and intellectual terms, as Peter and Catherine had done, but also, and even primarily, in religious terms. Russia's attitude with respect to Poland also appears in the theological perspective on history. Russia stands before a crossway: either it contributes to God's work on earth through a reconciliation with Poland involving religious freedom for the Poles, or it leaves God's path. [97] Russia had already been punished by God for its sins, the policy of russification. This was shown by the outcome of the Crimean wars, for instance the decisive battle against Turkish, French and British troops in Sebastopol in 1855, as well as by the withdrawal of some territories promised to Russia at the Congress of Berlin after its victory in the Balkan war in 1878. [98]

Solov'ev found support in the philosophical register of history to make the following two points, which were in his opinion fundamental. His emphasis on Poland's right to develop itself culturally is based on the application to Poland of the central category of philosophy of history, the notion of 'historical nation. ' This allowed him to gain firm ground against the understanding of Poland as merely a temporary subculture due for assimilation with Russia, as the conservative nationalists claimed. At the same time, against those arguing for Polish independence, he indicated why Poland was unable to have a state at that stage by referring to an explanation that also belonged to this register, namely the social composition and the historical domination of one social group (the gentry) over the others.

As for sophiology of history, this only comes to the fore in Solov'ev's self-definition, decipherable between the lines, as the prophet who establishes the diagnosis of Russia and points to the right path for Russia's attitude with respect to Poland. [99] His status as prophet appears precisely in the fact that he translated values in the concrete situation of his time. Interestingly, for this self-perception, he borrowed elements from the eminent Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz. Mickiewicz, who had emphasised the role of the individual and who, by virtue of his spiritual achievements, acts as the 'revealer' of the higher truth to humanity. [100] This is precisely what Solov'ev did in his treatment of the Polish question, by translating Christian values into the concept of the national missions of Russia (love, brotherhood) and Poland (sacrifice). Besides, Mickiewicz had made the connection between the Polish question and the Jewish question, and had defined Poland as a theocratic nation. Precisely this connection helped Solov'ev to define his own attitude with respect to the issue of nationalities, and in particular with respect to the Polish question. [101] Finally, on a more personal level, another similarity should be mentioned. Solov'ev argued that the notion of sacrifice was fundamental in understanding Mickiewicz's life itself. The Polish poet had renounced and hereby overcome the exclusive love of a woman, as well as the exclusive love of his fatherland Poland, in order to reach love of humanity. [102] In this statement, we cannot fail to discern a projection of Solov'ev's own sophianic relationship with women, Russia, and ultimately World Soul. Significant in this respect is that he sketched the possibility of reconciliation between Orthodox Russians and Catholic Poles in the form of common veneration of an icon. It was precisely in front of this icon that Mickiewicz had had a mystical experience. [103]

With respect to the Polish question specifically, it becomes clear that Solov'ev could not agree with a conception of the Polish or Russian nation in terms of superiority over other nations. This is why he rejected Polish messianism in favour of a universalistic conception of Poland's tasks. [104]

The critique of Polish messianism for excluding other Slavic nations and hatred of Russia was central to the thought of another Polish thinker, August Cieszkowski (1814-1894). [105] Although there is no evidence that Solov'ev ever read this philosopher, who sought to combine philosophy and religious thought, and more importantly for our matter subject, Hegelianism and messianism, there are striking parallels between both thinkers. [106] Both developed a 'Christiano-centric' theology of history and a philosophy of history in which humanity, nations and great men are the major actors. In addition, both focused on the necessity of action, which is the core concept by which Cieszkowski distinguished his system from Hegel's philosophy of history and called it 'historiosophy.' [107] This term could very well apply to Solov'ev's sophiology of history, which was his own attempt at a synthesis of philosophy of history and theology of history, and by which he sought to contribute to the transfiguration of creation by deeds. This emphasis on action as well as on a future-oriented and universalist vision of the Slav countries, is characteristic of Solov'ev's interventions on the Polish question.

3. Conclusion

As I have demonstrated, Solov'ev's perception of Poland and interpretation of its role in history was instrumental to his own agenda. His motivation to intervene on the Polish question was rooted in his ideal of a reconciliation between Eastern and Western Christianity. Firstly, as the leading Orthodox country, Russia could and should pave the way by reconciling with Catholic Poland in the form of religious solidarity. Poland's role was to serve Catholicism for the purpose of church reunification. In this respect, Solov'ev's interpretation was highly original in Russian public opinion. Secondly, to establish a Christian society on earth also implied that the Russian nation should act according to the Christian principles of love and justice. The attitude of the Russian government towards the Polish land was quite the opposite. This led Solov'ev to fiercely denounce the policy of forced russification and to advocate religious tolerance. Nevertheless, he did not stop believing in the possibility of a spiritual reconciliation between Poland and Russia, and from this perspective suggested a common veneration of the icon of our Lady of Czestochowa. He also identified Poland as a nation-prophet, an example of a true, self- sacrificing nation, as Adam Mickiewicz had conceived before him.

From this perspective, Solov'ev reduced the Polish nation to its Catholicism, and departed from an outdated conception of Polish society, which did not take into account the social differentiation of recent decades. I have also demonstrated how, for his original interpretation of the Polish question from the perspective of church reunion and reconciliation between East and West, he leant upon a Slavophile worldview in which he accommodated liberal principles. But he went further -- and his contemporaries could hardly follow him this far -- by viewing the Polish question through the prism of his ideal of free theocracy. The desired interaction of tsar, prophet and pope was already present in germ-form in the fact that Poles were submitted to the Russian tsar, that the prophet Solov'ev advocated reconciliation, and that the Catholic Poles had returned under the authority of the pope. In this sense, the rapprochement between the Vatican and Russia nurtured Solov'ev's ideal of church reunification, which from this perspective may appear a little less utopian. However, his contemporaries either condemned his interpretation as an anti-Orthodox position, or ignored it. The fact that he found support for his interpretation in his three-fold conception of history, as I have shown, probably contributed further to his being a unique case in Russian public opinion. It was in his sophiology of history, with respect to which he was inspired by Mickiewicz and perhaps also by Cieszkowski, that he found a legitimisation of his own role as a prophet and translator of Christian principles in the practical situation of Poland within the Russian empire.

_______________

Notes:

1. This is the extended and revised version of two earlier publications: 'Two narratives on history in Vladimir Solov'ev: the Polish question', in: Borisova and Kozyrev 2001, pp. 475-486; 'Poland as the pivot for church reunion and as a test case for Russia: Vladimir Solov'ev's views on the Polish question', in: David Ransel and Bozena Shallcross (eds.), Russian Identity/Polish Encounters (Indiana University press, forthcoming).

2. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252.

3. Stremooukhoff 1974; Andrzej Walicki, Russia, Poland, and Universal Regeneration: Studies on Russian and Polish Thought of the Romantic Epoch (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), chap. 3: 'Adam Mickiewicz's Paris Lectures and Russian Slavophilism, pp. 107-157. For a first orientation on Polish messianism, see entry 'Polish messianism', in: Andrzei de Lazari (ed.), Idei v Rossii/ldeas in Russia/ Idee w Rosji, vol. 4 (Lodz: Ed. Ibidem, 2001). pp. 431-437. A recent article by Lilianna Kiejzik ('The Polish Case in Vladimir Solov'ev's Vision of the Future', in Studies in East European Thought 55 (2003), 2, pp. 141-155) focuses on the specific polemic of Solov'ev with the Polish thinker Tarnowski.

4. This overview is based on works on Polish history from various periods and origins: Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski. The History of Poland (Westport, Connecticut, & I.ondon: Greenwood Press. 2000): Aleksander Gieysztor. Stefan Kieniewicz. Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir and Henryk Wereszycki, Histoire de Pologne (Warszawa: Editions scientiliques de Pologne. 1971), chapters 17-19, pp. 545-636; W.F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski (eds.). The Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to Pilsudski (1697-1935) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941). Chapters XVI-XVII, pp. 365-408; Heller 1999, pp. 792-795; A.L. Pogodin, Glavnye tecenija pol'skoj politiceskoj mysli (1863-/907 gg.) (Sankt-Peterburg: knigoizdatel'skoe Tovariscestvo Prosvescenie, 1907): Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Riasanovsky 1993.

5. Pogodin 1907, p. 13 ff.

6. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 385: Biskupski 2000, p. 30

7. Pogodin 1907, p. 47.

8. Smolitsch 1991. p. 373.

9. Pobedonoscev, quoted in Smolitsch 1991, p. 363.

10. Heller 1999, p. 845.

11. Giesztor et al. 1971, p. 612, Prizel 1998, pp. 47-56.

12. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 387.

13. Surveys of literature on the Polish question and authorial publications allow Solov'ev to be resituated within the debate in the Russian press or his time. The following works in Russian have been found on the Polish question after 1881: M. Gakkebus, Ob avtonomii Pol'si (Voskresajuscij Lazar'), 2nd ed. (n.p.: T-vo I.D. Sytina, 1906), Pogodin 1907, and the bibliographical work of N.A. Rubakin, Sredi knig: Opyt obzora russkikh kniznykh bogatstv v svjai s istoriej naucnofilosofskikh i literaturno-obscestvennykh idej, vol. 3 (Moskva: Nauka, 1915). References to authorial publications arc given below. Solov'ev is not mentioned in the surveys devoted to the Polish question. except in Rubakin.

14. The Poles' ingratitude regarding Russia, their refusal to admit their defeat and the well-deserved loss of their independence, their treachery and their calling the Western compassion and support for their cause, met the unanimous disapprobation of the Russian public opinion (Heller 1999, pp. 792-794). A notable exception was Aleksander Gercen, who supported the insurrectionists from London (Walicki 1991. 65-69).

15. For a comprehensive account of the Polish question before 1881, see Aleksandr Pypin, 'Pol'skij vopros v russkoj literature', Vestnik Evropy, 1880, 2. pp. 703- 736; 4, pp. 686-709; 5, pp. 239-271: 10, pp. 681-711: 11, pp. 281-307. In contemporary scholarship, see: Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus und Offentlichkeit im Zarenreich 1855-1875 (Koln, Weimar & Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 2000), chap. 3, pp. 185-273.

16. On Pobedonoscev, see Byrnes 1968, pp. 192-195; On Katkov (1818-1887), see Renner 2000, pp. 185-273 (on the period up to 1875). On Vladimir Gringmut (1851-1907), see Sobranie statej VA. Gringmuta 1896-1907 (Moskva: Universitetskaja tipografija, 1908). Gringmut was Katkov's successor in the editorial board of Moskovskie vedomosti. For a depreciative picture of his activities, see S.U., 'Mozaika', Istoriceskij vestnik 130 (1912), 12, pp. 1013-1066: pp. 1023-1024.

17. Gringmut 1908, p. 77.

18. Gringmut 1908, p. 22. His argument, based on faith in the greatness of the Russian nation [narod], religion (Orthodoxy), and state, echoed the official credo expressed by Sergej Uvarov under Nicholas I of 'Nationality, Orthodoxy, Autocracy'.

19. I. Aksakov, Sobranie socinenij 3, pp. 569-683; On Danilevskij, see Walicki 1991, p. 492; on Lamanskij (1833-1914), see Pypin 1880, pp. 283-307; I. Filevic (years unknown), 'Pol'sa i pol'skij vopros, Russkoe Obozrenie, 1894, 3. pp. 85-105; 4. pp. 559-581; 8. pp. 668-692: 10, pp. 636-658: 11, pp. 31-45.

20. Jurij Samarin (1819-1876) remained an authoritative figure even after his death. Pypin analysed Samarin's 'Sovremennyj ob'em pol'skogo voprosa' (first published in Den', 1863, 38) (Pypin 1880,4. p. 686 ff.).

21. Gakkebus 1906, p. 48 ff. The historian Nikolaj Kareev (1850-1931) had an insight into Polish culture and society drawn from his experience in teaching history at Warsaw university from 1879 to 1884, and on this basis published a series of articles in Russkaja mysl'. Republished in: Nikolaj Kareev, Polonica: Sbornik statej po pol'skim delam (1881- 1905) (Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. M. M. Stasjulevica, 1905); see esp. 'Necto o russko-pol'skikh otnosenijakh', pp. 1-19. and 'Pol'skie pis'ma', pp. 20-135. Vladimir Spasovic [Wlodzimierz Spasowicz, 1829-1892] was of Polish descent but received a fully Russian education. Trained as a lawyer and based in St. Petersburg, he was close to the liberals. Admiring Russian civilisation, Spasovic was at the same time deeply influenced by Polish cultural values. He showed in deeds that it is possible to be a Polish patriot and a son of Russia at the same time. He participated in the foundation, in 1882, of the weekly journal Kraj, published in St. Petersburg and supported by the trade and industrial bourgeoisie, and by Polish landowners of the Western provinces who thought that the ideas that he propagated were in harmony with their economic and social interests (Obscestvennoe dviznie no Pol'skikh zemljakh: Osnovnye idejnye tecenija i politiceskie partii v 1864-1914 gg. (Moskva: Nauka, 1988), p. 42). For an account of Spasovic's personality and views, see: W. Feldman, Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilugen (1795-1914) (1st publ. 1917; Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1964), pp. 281-283.

22. Jyrki livonen, Independence or Incorporation? The Idea of Poland's National Self- determination and Independence within the Russian and Soviet Socialism from the 1870s to the 1920s (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. 98-99.

23. Narodnaja Volja itself had up to 15% of Polish members. These were mainly workers who actively participated in agitation in St. Petersburg factories (livonen 1990, pp. 94 and 97).

24. For literature, see Pogodin 1907; livonen 1990.

25. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 394. About the reception of Marxism in Russia, see Leszek Kolakowski, The Main Currents of Marxism, its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vol. 2, chap. 9 on Ludwik Krzywicki, pp. 193-207.

26. Rogger 1983, p. 189.

27. Stremooukhoff 1974, p. 175.

28. 'Vstuplenie: Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', Rus', 1883. L pp, 20-30, Edition used: S. 1989 1, pp. 59-75. The significance of this article is attested by the fact that Solov'ev used it in a reworked version opening his collection of essays Nacional'nyj vopros under the title 'Nravstvennost' i politika, Istoriceskie objazannosti Rossii' [1884] (S. 1989 1. pp. 264-279).

29. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', op. cit.

30. 'Grekhi Rossii', op. cit.

31. L 'idee russe, op. cit.

32. Ibid., p. 83, pp. 96-97.

33. 'Lettre a la redaction du Przeglad Polski' Przeglad Polski, 1889, 92, pp. 179-187: the version used here is the Russian translation. 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski' (S. 1989 2, pp. 267-272). For a detailed examination of this polemic and a first publication of Solov'ev's letter in the French original, see Kiejzik 2003 (pp. 149-154); on Tarnowski, see Feldman 1964, passim.

34. 'Istoriceskij stinks', Vestnik Evropy, 1893, 7, pp. 780-789. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 481-491.

35. Opravdanie dobra, p. 375.

36. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 1896, date unknown. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 602-605.

37. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov", Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 1897, 41. Edition used: SS. 9, pp. 61-70.

38. On the religious significance of this icon in Poland, see Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 82.

39. 'Mivkevic', Mir Iskusstva, 1899, 5. pp. 27-30. Edition used: S. 1991, pp. 371- 379.

40. Solov'ev did have contact with the Croat bishop Strossmayer with whom he shared an ecumenical commitment. On Solov'ev's contact with Strossmayer and other Catholics abroad, see Stremooukhoff 1974, pp. 188-211; David 1960, pp. 300-326.

41. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada,' p. 603.

42. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 250; See also: 'all the force or Poland was in the szlachta, and Poland died. It did not die because or possessing a strong gentry, for this was a privilege. but because its gentry, instead or being a social class, organised to serve the state and to rule over the people. transformed into a class which ruled without limits, and included the state in itself. This led to 'legitimised anarchy. It is well-known that the Polish szlachta represents the only example in history of a ruling class, or which each member possessed separately complete state power' (both quotations from 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', pp. 250-251). See also 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603, and 'Mickevic, pp. 376-377.

43. Biskupski 2000, pp. 16-17.

44. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 100, Riasanovsky 1993, p. 290.

45. Biskupski 2000, pp. 16-17.

46. This retrospective interpretation of the fall of Poland can be round among some Western historians (Biskupski 2000, p. 13).

47. In Solov'ev's time. for instance Vasilij Kljucevskij, see Heller 1999, p. 575. In contemporary historians: see Riasanovsky 1993, pp. 301-302.

48. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603.

49. Heller 1999, p. 579.

50. This interpretation was also given for instance by Voltaire, who praised Catherine's intervention as being the first 'army of peace in the history of mankind' (quoted in Heller 1999, p. 579), and, on Russian soil, by Solov'ev's father himself, the historian Sergej Solov'ev, who characterised Catherine's policy of annexation as a 'victory of tolerance over fanaticism'. Ironically enough, Solov'ev qualified the fact that Catherine admired the French philosopher, who was the French champion of religious tolerance, as an intellectual weakness, common to that milieu and epoch' ("Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 605). Solov'ev may not have known Voltaire's piece on Catherine's intervention, yet it remains striking to see that it was precisely on that point that he shared the opinion of the French thinker, who he perhaps despised for his anti-clericalism. About the position of Sergej Solov'ev. see J.L. Black, 'Interpretations of Poland in Nineteenth Century Russian Nationalist-Conservative Historiography', in: The Polish Review 27 (1972), 4. pp. 20-41 [Offprint, p. 19].

51. As did, for example. Vasilij Kljucevskij, Kurs russkoj istorii. Cast' V, in: Socinenija v devjati tomakh, vol. 5 (Moskva: Mysl;, 1989), p. 48.

52. Pis'mo' v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski', p. 271.

53. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 73.

54. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', pp. 603-604.

55. Ibid., p. 603.

56. Biskupski 2000, p. 18.

57. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 70.

58. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja ccrkov'', p. 66.

59. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252.

60. See also: 'The upper class was and is everything. Poland and the szlachta are one and the same thing' ('Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 250). As far as the peasants were concerned, it seems that for a long time they indeed remained passive and tried to avoid any conflicts with the Russian occupant (see Prizel 1998, pp. 49-50).

61. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 70.

62. Reddaway et al. 1941, p. 390.

63. See 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros'. p. 70. This discrepancy between historically attested information and Solov'ev's interpretation again has to do with his exclusive focus on the intentions of the Russian state. He tends to characterize these intentions as good as long as they emanate from those Russian rulers whom he identifies as truly Christian rulers, i.e. primarily Peter the Great and Catherine II, but also Alexander I and Alexander II.

64. Gieysztor et al. 1971, p. 574.

65. 'Istoriceskij sfinks', pp. 482-483.

66. See for example 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 62.

67. 'Pol'skaja nacional'naja cerkov', p. 67.

68. Among the conservative nationalists, Gringmut did not react to Solov'ev's views on the Polish question, but was his merciless opponent in the polemic provoked by Solov'ev's 1891 lecture 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview'. Like Gringmut, Dmitrij Ilovajskij had voiced strong disapprobation of Solov'ev's abovementioned lecture in 1891. Both Ilovajskij and Durnovo wrote in response to Solov'ev's 'Iz voprosov kul'tury'. Durnovo was highly hostile with respect to Solov'ev since Solov'ev had quoted him as an example of the intolerance exhorted under the banner of defence of Orthodoxy.

69. Dmitrij Ilovajskij, 'Antinacional'nye i Izekhristianskie teorii', Moskovskie vedomosti, 1893, 157, p. 2. Dmitrij Ilovajskij (1832-1920) was a historian and publicist. No further contacts between Solov'ev and him are known of.

70. I.S. Durnovo, 'G. Solov'ev v roli Pol'skogo patriota; Vos'moe "Pis'mo" iz Peterburga',
Moskovskie vedomosti, 1893, 169, p. 2. Durnovo defended the adoption of
drastic measures concerning the repartition of land in the Polish territories, which
implied the prohibition for Poles to buy, administrate or cultivate land in the Polish
territories. See I.S. Durnovo, 'Kolonizacija Rossii inostrancami; Tret'e
"Pis'mo" iz Peterburga', Moskovskie vedomosti, 1893, 121, p. 2. No information
could be found on I.S. Durnovo, which leads to the conclusion that he was neither
a professional publicist, nor a well-known figure in the public, political and intellectual
arena. I. S. Durnovo, about whom no information could be found, should
not be confused either with Petr Nikolaevic Durnovo (1845-1915), head of the police department, or with I.N. Durnovo (1834-1903), Minister of the Interior from 1889 to 1895.

71. Arguably. it is for the same reason that L 'idee russe was condemned by the oberprokuror of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonoscev. Pobedonoscev published a critique of the lecture in Moskovskie vedomosti (1888, 271), and attracted the attention of Alexander III with respect to Solov'ev, whose lecture testified to the "craziness" of its author (K.P. Pobedonoscev i ego karrespondenty: Pis 'ma i zapiski, vol. 1, part 2 (Moskva & Pctrograd: Gosudarstvennoe Izd., 1923), p. 828.

72. The most radical example is Solov'ev's criticism of Alexander III for not having forgiven the murderers of his father, tsar Alexander II [see case study 1].

73. In 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros' and 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', as well as 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada'. These views were first expressed by Jurij Samarin, whose work, on the whole, Solov'ev valued highly.

74. 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603.

75. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros' pp. 250-251. See also 'Mir Vostoka i Zapada', p. 603, and 'Miekevic', pp. 376-377.

76. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros, p. 253.

77. 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', pp. 71-2.

78. 'Istoriceskij sfinks', p. 484.

79. Ibid., p. 485.

80. See Andrzej Walicki. Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (1st publ. 1967: Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). pp. 171-174.

81. See 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', comment p. 653.

82. Globally, he criticized the Slavophiles' uncritical and unhistorical treatment of the Russian past. For a critical appraisal of Solov'ev on these issues, see Schrooyen 2000, pp. 13-27.

83. See Anatolij Koni, 'Vestnik Evropy', in: Sobranie socinenij, vol. 7 (Moskva: Juridiceskaja literatura, 1969), pp. 220-259. Also worth noticing in this respect is his assimilating Solov'ev to the liberals. This was also the opinion of I.S. Durnovo in the conservative newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti (Durnovo 1893b).

84. 'Grekhi Rossii', p. 211: L 'idee russe, p. 96.

85. Kareev 1905, pp, 16-17, Solov'ev: 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', p. 69.

86. See Walicki 1992. p. 172. About Spasovic's role in Vestnik Evropy, see Koni 1969, pp. 237-243. His death in 1892 was 'an enormous loss' to Solov'ev, as he confessed (Pis 'ma 1. p. 109).

87. About Spasovic, see Feldman 1964, pp. 281-283. Solov'ev emphasized this point in 'Pol'sa i vostocnyj vopros', 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', 'Grekhi Rossii', and 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'.

88. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252.

89. It is unclear whether Solov'ev really believed in this option or not. He only mentioned it once, and admitted that the purely political aspect of the question did not interest him very much, and that he did not believe in the future of independent states ('Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski', p. 271). Interestingly, Aleksej Khomjakov had also made this claim, going as far as calling for a plebiscite among the Poles. Solov'ev's punctual call for a plebiscite in 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglqd Polski' was perhaps an unacknowledged echo of Khomjakov's position (Ibid.).

90. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252.

91. 'For hostile and mistrustful speeches there is always ready material at hand; a couple of common places about the historical character of the Polish szlachta and the Polish ksendzy [Catholic priests, MC]' (Kareev 1905, p. 2). Even though Solov'ev did not intend to write hostile pieces on Poles, his approach is quite similar to those Polonophobes in the Russian press.

92. Significantly, the same formulation of a liberal stance in religious terms on the Polish question can be found in the view of his father (Black 1972, offprint p. 19).

93. See especially his polemics with Tarnowski in 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'.

94. 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros', p. 252.

95. 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnaia Przeglad Polski', p. 269.

96. Ibid., p. 268.

97. Ibid., pp. 268-269.

98. 'Grekhi Rossii', p. 209.

99. See for instance 'Pis'mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski'.

100. Andrzej Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 258-259.

101. Walicki considers that Mickiewicz directly influenced Solov'ev on this point (Walicki 2000, p. 481).

102. ‘Mickevic', pp. 376-377.

103. Ibid., p. 376 (excerpts quoted from Mickiewicz's poem Pan Tadeusz (1834)).

104. In the entry 'Messianizm' he rejected the ideas of the father of Polish messianism Hoene-Wronski (SS 12. p. 600).

105. On this point, see Andre Liebich, Between Ideology and Utopia: The Politics and Philosophy of August Cieszkowski (Dordrecht et al.: Reidel, 1979), p. 252.

106. The affinity between Cieszkowski and Solov'ev has been pointed out by Berdjaev (quoted in Walicki 1982, p. 296) and Kiejzik 2003, pp. 47-48. On Cieszkowski's conception of history, see also Walicki 1982, pp. 295-307.

107. See Cieszkowski's Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (Berlin: n.p., 1838). Since then, the meaning of this term has evolved to refer to any speculative conception of history containing a religious perspective, for instance in Berdjaev, Zenkovsky, and in post- communist Russian discourse on history, especially on the 'Russian idea' and the 'specificity' of Russia (Jutta Scherrer, Kulturologie: Russland auf der Suche nach einer zivilisatorischen Identitat (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003), p. 96.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

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Part 1 of 2

V. The Famine of 1891-1892

The current famine manifests simultaneously the extreme inconsistency of our semi-civilised society as well as that of our uncivilized people. [1]


1. Introduction

In 1891-1892, a famine struck Russia that cost the lives of 400,000 people. The struggle against this disaster mobilised the energy of the entire country, and provoked an intense reaction among Russian public opinion. Not only did Solov'ev propose his explanation, but also took concrete initiatives to remedy the famine. Within the corpus of So- 10v'ev's work as a whole, his commitment stands out clearly. First, never before or after did he show himself so anxious to commit himself to current affairs in a concrete way. Second, partly because of this commitment, and partly because of other publications, he was more than ever considered a subversive figure, a troublemaker, by the organs of censorship. Third, and in connection with the former point, the solutions that he brought to the fore contained a political message that went beyond the immediate relief of the hunger-stricken.

Recent scholarship on the famine of 1891-1892 includes a number of valuable studies on the reaction to it by the Russian government and public opinion. [2] Solov'ev's articles on the famine have often caught the eye of scholars specialised in the philosopher as the most obvious testimony of his social concern, yet without being examined further. [3] Only Gregory Gaut has indicated the significance of Solov'ev's interventions and provided a very clear survey of Solov'ev's main points. Interpreting them as showing a truly liberal stance, he has, however. neither addressed what Solov'ev meant by his call to the educated layer of society to organise itself. nor the political implications of this call for the understanding of his own position. [4]

a) Thesis

This attempt at recontextualising Solov'ev's views regarding the famine historically aims at underscoring three points. Firstly. ascribing the famine to the absence of a bond between educated society and the peasantry. he tried to remedy this situation by combining his usual moralising tone with a highly exceptional factual approach through borrowing data from agronomy and economy, and practical initiatives. Secondly, against the background of the ongoing debates. his publications stand out, not so much because of the topic they broached or their liberal stance, as the sharpness and broadness of his considerations. His affinity and at the same time profound divergence with Lev Tolstoj can be highlighted most clearly in this case. Third. the peculiar sense that he had of his own historical mission as prophet and leader with respect to educated society especially, showed not only through his writings, but also through particular clandestine activities, which reveal that he still nursed the hope of a free theocracy. As a result, his factual approach rather than speculative schemes and real interest in the issue, combined with practical commitment, is the only case in Solov'ev's life and work about which we can speak of social activism. In this sense, this case brings his conception of history closest to his social commitment.

In order to understand Solov'ev's views within the context of their formulation, and to assess their acuity and actual relevance, the following points are addressed in this chapter. First, in (1b) I briefly examine the causes of the famine, and the practical response to it on the part of the government and Russian society on the basis of historical works. This section is completed in (1c) by a survey of the debates that went on in the Russian press during these two years, including a differentiation of opinions into major tendencies on the basis of sources and secondary literature. After in (2a) presenting his publications and other undertakings related to the famine, in (2b) I address Solov'ev's perception of the causes of the famine, as well as of the government and society's reaction. In (2c) I seek to unravel the specificity of his discourse on the occasion of the famine, respectively the extent to which his discourse stood out within the ongoing debates of the time, his views are confronted with these debates. Finally, in (2d), the distinction of the three registers of history is used to explain the role of history in his discourse.

b) The famine of 1891-1892 and the measures taken to remedy it

For decades Russia had been suffering from a permanent harvest problem that varied in degree, and hunger was part of reality in the countryside. In 1891, however, the country was struck by a disaster of as yet unknown proportions: some 15 provinces in European Russia, mainly in the Volga and black soil provinces, faced a 30% to 50% crop failure as a result of insufficient harvest in both the winter and the summer. [5] These regions were considered Russia's granary, and in 1891 comprised an area one-third larger than Germany, and almost double the size of France. [6] As a direct consequence of the crop failure, millions of peasants and their families had to endure a famine that lasted well into the summer of 1892, and which cost some 400,000 lives. [7]

It is possible to distinguish three main causes of the famine. While a succession of unfavourable weather conditions (a long cold winter and summer drought) was the most immediate cause, the chief factor was the long-term impoverishment of the peasantry as a result of the Emancipation Act of 1861 that put an end to serfdom. Since emancipation. the peasants had been forced to till gradually shrinking allotments from which they had to squeeze out their living. They also had to repay the government tor the land they received, often at a cost far above the actual value, which hindered them from investing in new tools, livestock, and fertilisers. In addition, the Emancipation Act had declared the commune [obscina], and not the individual cultivator. the real owner of the land, which hampered technical improvements and made the peasant dependent on the commune. A third cause of the famine and peasant misery were the economic policies of the late 1880s, which placed even greater pressure on the village. [8] The Minister of Finance, Ivan Vysnegradskij, aiming to strengthen the national economy, ordered an increase in the sale of Russian grain abroad at the costs of the peasants' own consumption, and imposed a new tax. [9] In order to break out of this crisis, the peasants, financially burdened. tried to expand their fields at the expense of fallow. pasture. and forest land, which rapidly exhausted the soil; the felling of forests in particular had dramatic consequences, since it robbed the land of natural wind breaks, and created conditions favourable for drought. [10]

The government learned about the poor agricultural conditions as early as spring 1891,and during the summer offered help only by granting loans to the zemstva. [11] Facing a growing crisis, the Committee of Ministers convened in October 1891, but failed to present an elaborate programme. From that point onwards, the relief management was carried out in a fragmented way, in the provinces, which operated for their own interests. Within each province, relief was left to three main institutions, the district zemstva, the land captains, and the charity committees, which sometimes handled both public and private relief. [12] The initiative of the central government became confined to those areas where special agencies or individuals were empowered to act, i.e. railway transport, public works, and private charity. [13] At the same time, the tsar and his advisors decided to set up special agencies to take over and administrate parts of the relief program. The most important of these agencies was the Special Committee on Famine Relief [Osobyj Komitet dlja pomosci golodajuscim], created in December 1891 to stimulate and coordinate charity work in the hunger-stricken provinces. [14] It achieved practical relief for thousands of peasant households, by such efforts as financing grain purchase, managing the distribution of grain arriving from abroad, organising village soup kitchens, and the distribution of horses to the peasants. [15]

The official end of the famine was declared on July 1st 1892. The state had succeeded in averting the real threat of mass starvation and had prevented total economic collapse in the stricken regions. [16] Yet shortcomings at many levels, institutional, political, and infrastructural, had hampered the government in responding to the crisis quickly and efficiently. The core problem was insufficient coordination between the ministries due to the absence of a cabinet capable of formulating a policy and monitoring its execution. [17] Other defects in the state machinery were also obvious. These included gathering information the command chain from the centre to the countryside, the defiant attitude of both governors and zemstva, the lack of confidence in cooperation with local authorities, the absence of coordination of private efforts, and an inadequate transport network. Tragically. there had been sufficient supplies of grain within the borders of the Empire to feed the people, but these food reserves were located at considerable distance from the starving black soil areas. [18] The government also did not remedy the absence of an institution at the most local level of the volost' and the village, which could have ensured proper distribution of food to the peasants' families.

In addition to government aid, other official, semi-official and private aid was also organised. The church organised help mainly on the level of the diocese, and from institutions such as St. Petersburg Kazan' Cathedral. The Holy Synod and the Red Cross also initiated charity projects that were realised by local bodies. But the response of the Russian public was incredibly weak. [19] In addition, the government initially even tried to hinder and prevent the establishment of private aid. [20] Private philanthropic interest emerged among circles of educated Muscovites and the well-to-do in September 1891. But it was only in December, parallel to the creation of the Special Committee that was to coordinate charity works, that instructions were given not to hamper private famine relief. Besides donations, which came from all social strata, and to which wealthy Old Believers made a substantial contribution [see case study II], numerous private organisations, such as merchants and landowner organisations, set up help for the peasants at the local level, mainly in the form of soup kitchens. [21] But despite these efforts. charity relief was not effective at the start of the winter: it was slow, lacked coordination, and remained small in comparison to the extensive relief work carried out under the government's aegis.

c) Debates in the Russian press on the famine [22]

The famine received extensive coverage in newspapers, journals, and books as early as May 1891, and dominated the news to the point that it literally drove discussions on international politics from the pages of the daily newspapers. [23] How severe was the famine? [24] What were its causes? Which measures should the government take to remedy it? These were the most urgent issues during the winter of 1891-1892.

Three main camps can be distinguished in the polemics published in the Russian press, namely the conservative, liberal, and radical camps. Between the two latter camps, there was also the position of Lev Tolstoj, which can be called Christian anarchist and which caused the greatest stir both in the Russian press and abroad. In this survey I discuss these four positions with respect to the main issues mentioned above. All four perspectives were consistent with their general positions, and saw in the famine a confirmation of the views they already held of the regime.

The conservatives (Moskovskie Vedomosti, Nikolaj Aksakov, Sergej Sarapov, Dmitrij Samarin) did not unanimously recognise the severity of the famine and considered it an administrative issue. [25] In doing so, they ascribed the famine to the bad state of the grain reserves, which were placed under the administration of the zemstva. During the famine, an entire campaign was held to discredit this institution. [26] They also pointed to a more far-reaching cause, by holding the Emancipation Act of Alexander II responsible for the degradation of the peasants' condition. [27] On the whole, the high and middle bureaucracy approved of the government's response to the disaster, and suggested it could be reinforced by a special governmental organ, or even by passing all grain stocks into the hands of the government. [28] In an anti-bureaucratic stance, other conservatives voiced criticism of the Ministry of Internal affairs, and pointed to the competence of the landed gentry and its representative, the land captains, to educate the peasantry. [29]

The liberals (L. Sionimskij in Vestnik Evropy, Russkoe Obozrenie) devoted a considerable number of articles to arguing against the conservatives' underestimation of the scope of the famine. [30] In their eyes, the famine was caused by the gradual decline of crop husbandry and the exhaustion of soil, and was symptomatic of the technical backwardness of the agricultural system. The liberals denounced the dependence of the peasant on the commune since the agrarian reforms of Alexander II, the present inability of the commune to reform agriculture, and more globally, the gradual impoverishment of the peasants over the preceding decades. [31] Vestnik Evropy was highly critical of the government's slow, quantitatively insufficient and inefficient reaction. and related it to the inflexibility of centralised power as well as to the district and province administration. [32] The solution lay in the development of free civil life through the extension of self-government, for instance by the creation of small administrative units that represented all classes [vsesoslovnye volosti] as well as in the activity of the zemstvo. [33] The liberal camp was thus ready to cooperate with the government, and only hoped that this cooperation would be realised by an admission by the government of a wider space for public initiative. [34]

An intellectual figure who, properly speaking, was not a liberal, but shared with them some principles, enjoyed their respect and published in their journals, was Lev Tolstoj. [35] He not only organised more than 200 soup kitchens in the year of the famine, the most famous example of private relief, but also made a well-known contribution to the debates concerning the famine. [36] On the basis of his experience on the countryside, he described the peasants' psychology and their real needs, which were fundamentally misunderstood. [37] The degradation of the condition of the peasant lay in a fundamentally unjust relationship between the higher, urban, educated layer of society, and the peasantry. The latter had been living with too many taxes, too little land, and had been kept in too much isolation and wild conditions to be able to feed the whole country. He stated that the educated layer of society should not maintain the people under the threat of hunger and famine, but should show love and brotherhood, and serve the people in practical terms, or else they would rise. Addressing the government with the burning question of whether there was enough bread to feed Russia, Tolstoj also advocated the collection of data on the real needs of the population. [38]

The fiercest critique, however, came from the radicals who denounced the tsarist system, and interpreted the famine as a symptom of the failure of autocratic rule. [39] For the populists (V. Voroncov, N. Daniel'son, S. Juzakov, N.A. Karysev in Russkoe Bogatstvo), the development of a capitalist economy and the government's fiscal policies had impoverished the peasantry, of which the famine was direct proof. They concluded that the capitalist system could not possibly work in Russia. [40] From this perspective, logically, the government's response to the famine was judged fully inadequate and believed to point to the system's failure. With respect to the future of the Russian peasantry, they stressed the importance of the commune as the foundation of the future order under the guidance of the zemstvo. [41] This was precisely the point where, within the radical camp, socialists and populists parted ways during the 1880s: the socialists (P. Struve) considered the commune, and the peasantry as a whole, a remnant of an obsolete historical order. [42]

The famine of 1891-1892 marked a turning point in Russian life, shaking educated people awake and prompting them to commit themselves not only to the future of peasantry, but also to that of the country as a whole. [43] Even though the government had succeeded in averting the disaster, its way of handling it could neither avoid the ruin of the nation's agriculture, nor conceal the many shortcomings of the administration. After the famine, criticism with respect to the state increased and positions hardened from both sides, culminating in the revolution of 1905.

2. Solov'ev's interventions

a) Solov'ev's contribution to famine relief: publications and actions


The scope of the famine in the Russian countryside, as well as the omnipresence of the debates regarding the issue did not leave Solov'ev indifferent. The philosopher wrote on both issues and engaged in concrete action to relieve the famine.

In 1891 and 1892, he published five articles related to the famine: 'Narodnaja beda i ohscestvennaja pomose" [The National Misfortune and Public Aid], 'Nas grekh i nasa objazannost" [Our Sin and Our Obligation], 'Kto prozrel?' [Who Was Enlightened?], 'Vrag s Vostoka' [Enemy from the East], and 'Mnimye i destvitel'nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija' [Imaginary and Real Measures for Raising National Welfare].

'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose" was published in October 1891 in Vestnik Evropy. [44] In this article, written as a 'general programme', Solov'ev strove to make educated society aware of the necessity of organising common action to remedy the famine. [45] This article already contains all fundamental elements of Solov'ev's position with respect to the issue. First, he wanted to establish the fact that there was a famine. and to this end, gave concrete data on living conditions in the stricken provinces (i). Secondly, he raised the issue of the critical state of agriculture and pointed to the danger of exhaustion of the land (ii). Thirdly, he widened the debate by associating the famine with culture, the goal of which he identified as the common good (iii). Educated society had failed to place culture in service of the peasants and thus contribute to their welfare. The cause of this failure lay in the absence of any organisation of the forces of educated society (iv).

At the same time, 'Nas grekh i nasa objazannost" was published in the journal Severnyj Vestnik. [46] In this very short article, he addressed the members of educated society in a more critical tone, sharpening point iii mentioned above. He exhorted them to acknowledge their sin and to show repentance through concrete action, namely by helping the peasants combat the famine. Russian educated society was guilty of the disastrous situation: in thirty years it had done nothing to improve agriculture. It was impossible for the peasantry to improve its condition by itself: and it needed aid from educated society as an organised whole.

As a result of the unfavourable position in which Solov'ev found himself with respect to censorship, though not directly for his publications on the famine, he was then silent for the next six months. [47] Many months later, he published 'Kto prozrel?' in Vestnik Evropy, a response to an anonymous critic in Russkaja Mysl'. [48]' This publication, which is only indirectly related to the issue of the famine, served two aims. Firstly, Solov'ev wanted to defend himself against the attack of acting as a prophet and of invoking solutions to the famine that had been known for a long time: secondly, he made his critical position towards populism clear by discussing the attitude of educated society, especially of the populist wing, with respect to the peasantry (related to point iii).

One month passed and, in July 1892, Solov'ev provided his readers with scientific material that showed the dramatic character of the situation in agriculture. Indeed, a significant part of his 'Vrag s Vostoka', published in the journal Severnyj Vestnik, consists of quotations from two acknowledged scientific sources, namely works by agricultural economist A.S. Ermolov and geologist Vasilij Dokucaev on the topic. [49] Solov'ev identified increasing drought as the primary danger threatening the Russian countryside (backing point ii). He quoted largely from the two scholars' works to make clear the fact that misery and drought were not accidental phenomena, but the consequence of a natural process that had been accelerated by the destructive relationship of the population to nature and ill-conceived undertakings, such as the drainage of swamps. To fight it, a 'fundamental and systematic transformation of agriculture' was needed, a complex task which required all the forces of state and educated society (point iii linked with point iv). [50] Concerning the support offered by educated society, he only briefly discussed the attempts made by private individuals and organisations to help the peasants, but stressed at the same time the limits of such interventions as compared to public action (point iii). In this respect, Solov'ev seemed to consider the efforts made in science, notably by Ermolov and Dokucaev, to be more promising, and more likely to represent the basis of organised action.

Drought remained a central topic in his last publication on the famine, 'Mnimye i dejstvitel 'nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija', written in September, but published only in November 1892 in Vestnik Evropy. [51] Here, Solov'ev actualised point ii once more. He summarized news reports confirming that the drought was even more significant than a year before, lasted longer than the famine itself, and was so dramatic that there was even a danger or desertification. He stated that a solution to this issue could not come from a rational agricultural system, which would be the equivalent of prescribing expensive medicine to a poor person, instead or working at improving the material welfare or the population. Help emanating from the government was also subject to Solov'ev's criticism: the philosopher pointed to the vicious circle in which it was engaged by having to levy means from the peasants through taxes in order to help them. Having shown the inconsistency of purely economic solutions, such as a new division of land or a new repartition of the population by means or deportation, Solov'ev pointed to the only solution in his eyes, namely that educated society educate the peasants in order to remedy their misery (point iii).

From his correspondence, we learn that he intended to 'continue the elucidation of the question how one can and must really help the people.' [52] He planned a contribution to the October issue of Severnyj Vestnik, of which there is, however, no trace. Another project was realised though, namely the publication or an essay in a collection for the benefit of the hunger-stricken. Solov' ev wrote' Licnaja nravstvennost' i obscee delo' [Personal Morality and the Common Cause], a first draft of a chapter of Opravdanie dobra. [53] Not incidentally, he pointed to the criminal behaviour of landowners with respect to the peasantry in the Russian countryside. [54] His conclusion that the power of morality was objectivated only in the state, and only there became a common task for all, was undoubtedly relevant in the famine year.

As an epilogue to Solov'ev's views on the famine, peasant misery and the related problem of desertification, it is important to consider a later publication of his, 'Iz Moskovskoj gubernii' [From the Moscow province], published in Vestnik Evropy in 1897. [55] This text expresses the author's distressed impressions during a stay in the Moscow province. Five years after the famine, he noted that despite the warnings of Ermolov and Dokucaev, drought had not disappeared -- it was a 'Turkestan summer.' [56] The population in the countryside had even declined, and still lived in misery. 'Is Russia really condemned to a moral drought as well as to a physical one?", Solov'ev asked anxiously. [57] For the first time Solov'ev broached the problem of morality of the peasantry, which he previously had overseen or considered to be the result of its lack of culture. Here he gave up his moralising tone, teaching the educated public how to form the peasant, and instead expressed despair about the condition of the peasantry and of the Russian soil.

Thus there are five articles written between 1891-1892 in which Solov'ev quite consistently identified the famine as being the result of a wrong relationship of, mainly, educated society to the peasants. The phenomenon of the famine (i) and the desertification of land (ii) were the result of the inability of primarily educated society to make culture available to the peasants (iii). The only solution to the disaster was that educated society set up public, organised action (iv).

Solov'ev did not, however, limit himself to publications, but was also actively engaged in a number of organisational tasks. Not everything is known about this side of Solov'ev's biography, but that which is available completes the picture of his reaction to the famine in an interesting manner. From his correspondence, we learn that in September 1891 he tried with others to organise public lectures for the victims' benefit. [58] He also tried to set up an aid committee on the model of the Panslav committee created during the Crimean war. The unheard of scope of the support achieved at that time had impressed all contemporaries. Solov'ev's correspondence attests to the fact that he sought to create large- scale commitment and mobilisation against the famine. [59] It is most likely that he was hindered by the authorities. Which at that time regarded any private initiative as an intrusion into their task or providing relief, and as a possible means or countering their action. Indeed, in the end, the lectures were never organised. [60] Relating to this episode. Solov'ev on the one hand pointed to the obstacles above in writing that 'no public help will be allowed.' [61] On the other hand, he complained about the impossibility of organising society in the direction of a 'future social/public [obscestvennyj] organism.' The task of mobilising his fellow citizens, and or reaching an agreement on a common goal, was 'obviously far more difficult than the call to the Varangians or the baptism of Russia', he concluded bitterly. [62]

He also tried to organise future society in other, less official ways. Contrary to what Gaut affirms, various documents confirm that Solov'ev still nursed the hope of a social movement and or mobilising the theocratic leadership he had dreamt or for years. [63] However, he proposed an adapted, modernised form of the theocratic scheme. This time, it was not the pope and the tsar who would back the prophet (in the function of which he confirmed to see himself), but a religious leader and a general. [64] Solov'ev talked about his plans with Evgenij Trubeckoj, and in more detail with book editor Longin Panteleev, who was engaged in famine relief. [65] These plans consisted of finding a general, whom soldiers would follow, and a member of the higher clergy [arkhierej] whom the people would follow, in order to guarantee the success of a revolution. [66] He wrote to Radlov that he had found such an arkhierej. [67] For the function of general he selected Mikhail Dragomirov, general governor of the provinces of Kiev, Podol'sk and Volhynia, and even planned to travel to Kiev to submit his ideas to him. [68] Panteleev warned Solov'ev that Dragomirov would either call the gendarmes or laugh at him. Fortunately, the philosopher did not go to Kiev, and, by 1892, his revolutionary hopes had vanished, arguably as a consequence of his disillusion about Russian educated society. At the time of the famine, therefore, Solov'ev still maintained his idea of a theocracy, about which he wrote only in his correspondence, and not in the press because of the revolutionary tenor of the project.

These are the only known facts about Solov'ev's attempts to organise famine relief, which remained at the level of organising lectures and possibly a committee, and, more importantly, of provoking a social movement of greater scope. There is little information about his further activities during that winter. What is known is that he certainly contributed financially to relief to the best or his ability by asking the editor of Severnyj Vestnik to put aside his honorarium for the hungry. [69]

b) Solov'ev's perception of the famine and of the famine relief by government and society

In the present section, I analyse Solov'ev's perception of the famine and relief against the background of the general knowledge available in scholarship as presented in section 1b. I examine Solov'ev's analysis of the causes of the disaster, and then focus on his interpretation of the reaction of government and the public.

The first question that arises is what the source of his information was. In sharp contrast to other issues on which he intervened, Solov'ev, in his treatment of the issue of the famine of 1891-1892, wanted to present himself as a well-informed, and fact-oriented expert. Far more than in other cases, he referred explicitly to his sources, which came from four areas. First of all, he drew data on the living conditions of the peasants during the famine as well as statistics mostly from the periodical press, namely the newspapers Moskovskie Vedomosti and Grazdanin, and the journals Russkie Vedomosti and Vestnik Finansov. He also used official figures issued by the government. [70] Additionally, the abovementioned scientific works by Dokucaev and Ermolov were central to his argument: the authoritative status or Ermolov was confirmed a couple or years later with his nomination as Minister of Agriculture. [71] Although evidence of contact with people directly involved in famine relief has not been found, apart from his stormy relationship with Tolstoj, it is certain that Solov'ev also heard about it through informal communication and conversations. [72] Finally, his own observations of drought in regions neighbouring the famine-stricken area confirmed his diagnosis of the deplorable state of the Russian land. [73]

The famine occurred as an immediate result of drought, as Ermolov stated in Solov'ev's time, and Robbins confirms in ours. From his first article onwards, Solov'ev warned that drought had not only provoked that particular famine, but was in the long run a threat to the Russian land, which could soon turn into desert. In 'Vrag s Vostoka', published after the immediate effects of the famine had been contained in the summer of 1892, he offered lengthy quotes from Ermolov and Dokucaev's scientific works to explain the drought factor. These sources, which are still authoritative today, allowed Solov'ev to be well informed about the issue. [74] He assumed their observations of the black soil region and concluded that the increasing dehydration of the land was due to two main human interventions. The first was deforestation, as a result or which there were no obstacles to Eastern winds. Indeed forests, which not only form barriers to the wind, but also retain water, are the best regulator of atmospheric waters. [75] Second, he mentioned the drainage of swamps and the destruction of other natural water reservoirs. Additionally, the exploitation of the land as it was practiced, including unmanaged ploughing, could only lead to further soil exhaustion. With these comments, Solov'ev showed a thorough knowledge of the agrarian situation from what we would today call an ecological standpoint, as well as of its role in provoking, or at least not precluding the famine.

The long-term cause of the famine, the dramatic state of the peasantry, was central to Solov'ev's texts, which emphasised the specifically cultural aspect of this misery. He denounced the peasantry's lack of technical knowledge, which made it exhaust the soil. More fundamentally, the philosopher pointed to the insufficient culture and conditions of the commune. Although he continuously stressed this point in his four articles of 1891- 1892, he did not make it more concrete than a general call far the transformation of agriculture. and in general for the elevation of the cultural level of the peasant.

Solov'ev also dealt with the economic side of the peasant's misery, and in particular discussed the statement that the misery of the peasant originated in the insufficient parcel of land he had received to till at the time of the reforms. While he agreed with this, he added that the fundamental problem did not consist in the small parcel of land as such. because elsewhere, notably in the Netherlands, the productivity of the land was four times greater than in Russia. [76] In this way, by using numerous figures, he rejected the solution of a redistribution of land among peasants as invalid. [77]

He also voiced a critical remark concerning the economic policies of the 1880s, which Robbins has identified as the third factor that impoverished the peasants. He alluded to the tax system, which he called a vicious circle in this situation: the government had to help the hunger-stricken population but in order to do so, it first had to levy money through taxes from this very population. [78] He therefore provided a many-sided analysis of the causes of the famine and at least in part drew the same conclusions as 20th century scholarship. For another part, he remained silent on the specifically institutional. political, and social causes of the famine.

Equally discrete was his criticism of the measures taken by the government to organise famine relief. In the two first articles, he pointed in neutral terms to the merit of the government in having warned the public in time, and of having devoted significant resources to relief. He took it as normal that the government ascribe full priority to famine relief, and placed, in particular, military costs second. He wondered, however, whether these measures fulfilled all the needs of those stricken. In some places, the peasants had not received seeds in time to plant them. In other places, loans had been distributed inequitably. And most often, the peasants used the loans, received in money or in natura, for their immediate needs, i.e. to feed themselves. [79] Here Solov'ev suggested between the lines that the government's relief efforts were not efficient. Indeed, as we know, the government was very slow in initiating a relief programme, and above all failed to present a coordinated plan. Solov'ev remained silent about other specific measures, such as the Special Committee, the public works programme, the activity of the various institutions (zemstva, land captains, governors), and the transport programme. Although he suffered from it himself, he did not mention publicly the initial hindrance by the government with respect to charity work. Instead, he noted that the government had done everything it could, in contrast with the inability of the Russian educated society, to help the peasants. According to the philosopher, the issue was more fundamental and could not be solved by ad-hoc material support by the government. In the long run, all forces of the government as well as of educated society should be directed to the transformation of agriculture. His statements remained on this general level.

Several reasons may explain the mildness of his criticism of the government in his articles. The first relates to censorship, as at that time Solov'ev was very strictly controlled with respect to every text he published. [80] The second reason concerns the moment when he published on the famine, namely the autumn of 1891 and the summer of 1892. In the autumn of 1891, the special agencies and measures had not yet been set up; famine relief was only in its first phase, and consisted almost exclusively of loans. This explains why Solov'ev could not write about them then, but not why he failed to mention them in his articles in the summer of 1892.

The government was providing aid, as was the church: only the Russian public did not. Solov'ev briefly saluted the efforts made by the committees led by the St. Petersburg Kazan' Cathedral, consisting of high-ranked members of the clergy, and other committees led by the dioceses. [81] But, more important than the reaction by the government or the church, Solov'ev's target was the reaction, or rather the lack of reaction to the famine among the Russian public. His criticism on this point was justi1ied. and was shared both b) man) of his contemporaries and by later scholarship. More specifically, the main addressee of his publications was educated society, by which he meant something more than the total sum of private enterprises and relief organisations. He did not fail to mention the extraordinary efforts in philanthropy made by people such as Lev Tolstoj and botanist Sergej Racinskij, who set up village schools. However, he considered these attempts both quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient, given the fact that the official committees provided 99% of the resources for famine relief. [82] He deplored the absence of coordinated, organised action by educated society in order to help those stricken, and in the long run, to raise 'the intellectual and cultural level of the popular masses.' [83]

There is little evidence from which to discern what he meant by organised action, and only a few elements scattered in his articles point to an answer. Arguably, what Solov'ev was suggesting was an organisation endowed with a power and scope such as the state and the church. [84] He was indeed right in saying that there was no such organisation in Russia in his time, and, from this perspective, his claim had a political character. However, in order to make a political claim effective, and not merely the echo of a utopian plan, a reflection would have to follow about the organisation and institutionalisation of the forces in question. This discussion was not engaged in by Solov'ev. More fundamentally, his distinction between private charity and public action implies a distinction between private and public, the discussion of which is completely absent in his interventions. [85]

Besides, the reader is surprised to not even encounter a single comment on the very institution that most closely corresponded to Solov'ev's definition of an organisation that takes care of the peasants, namely the zemstvo. The absence of such reflections is all the more striking since the zemstvo received a specific and highly privileged place as the third pillar of Solov'ev's social system elaborated in Opravdanie dobra. [86] An explanation for this 'omission' is that Solov'ev was advocating organisation at the national level, which the zemstvo did not have. [87] Another hypothesis is that the treatment of the issue of the zemstvo, which the regime actively discredited at that time while having to work with it, was considered anti-governmental agitation, especially if it came from an author who already did not enjoy the favour of the censorship organs. More fundamentally, I want to make a case for the following: his understanding of 'zemstvo' went along a speculative rather than institutional line, and referred to the unity between educated society and people [see 'Solov'ev's Sophiology of History']. In this connection, plausibly, the philosopher was primarily addressing the urban educated class, and not the so-called zemstvo liberals, in his exhortation to unite with the peasant. [88] The response of the former to Solov'ev's call, however, was not great. After the publication of his two first articles, intended as calls to educated society, he did receive some positive response, if we are to believe his correspondence: 'my note has been remarked, and has thus reached its immediate goal.' [89] However, due to obstacles from the authorities, and probably also to the vagueness of his plans, no massive mobilisation took place under his aegis.

The absence of a discussion on the institutional limn that educated society should take docs not mean however, that Solov'ev did not hold opinions about the topic. In private conversations, if we can believe Trubeckoj, it was precisely in this period that he spoke about the necessity of having representative and constitutional institutions. [90] The only example provided repeatedly by Solov'ev to illustrate what he meant by true educated society were the Panslav committees set up in 1875-8 to help the Bulgarians, and which he unsuccessfully tried to recreate. [91] His foremost aim was the fundamental transformation of agriculture ['Vrag s Vostoka']. He saw a germ of this in the contribution of the scientific community to the agrarian question, meaning scholars such as Ermolov, who indeed worked at enlightening the educated public and the agrarian community with new facts. However, one month later, in the following article, Solov'ev took a step back by claiming that this was not the best time for such a transformation, and that the most urgent task was that the peasantry understand their 'inner truth', before they could be saved by agronomy and economy. [92]

Solov'ev proved himself to be well-informed about the main causes of the famine. Especially his emphasis on what we would today call the ecological aspects of the famine testifies to an astonishing knowledge of and interest in a long-term relationship with the soil. By contrast, the manner in which he expressed his concern for the fate of the peasants, and the solutions he offered to ameliorate their condition, reveal a far more abstract viewpoint on social relations and economic mechanisms. An interpretation of the reaction of the government to the disaster is virtually absent, whereas the main group that he held responsible for the calamity was the urban educated class. This nearly exclusive focus on the latter may be grounded by tactical motives: in order to be published, that is, to be able to transmit the main message of mobilisation to his addressees, it was essential to avoid censorship, and hence any direct criticism of the state. Characteristically, Solov'ev's call for education and support of the peasantry by educated society is based on a reduced perception of the society of his time, which does not take into account existing public institutions such as the zemstvo. Yet it does entail a political message, which if we take into account his attempts to organise a mobilisation of peasants and soldiers, did not exclude concrete, even revolutionary plans.

c) Solov'ev's views on the famine against the background of the debates in the Russian press

While his discourse was nurtured by the press of his time, the question arises as to what extent he related it to existing debates and positions. The analysis of his interventions leads to the following conclusions. He debated foremost with the populists and with Tolstoj, in passing also with the conservatives, while remaining silent on the socialist and the liberal positions. Below I explain why this was the case.

i) The liberals

Generally speaking, it can be said that his interventions testily to his adherence to the liberal camp. The first question that then arises is to what extent he showed himself a liberal in his interventions, and to what extent he could be considered -- by liberals, and by others -- as a mouthpiece of the liberal point of view with respect to the famine.

The censorship clearly identified him as a liberal troublemaker who agitated against the state, especially after his lecture 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview', given on October 19th 1891. This lecture, which had nothing to do with the issue of the famine, had triggered the fiercest possible reaction of Moskovskie Vedomosti, who anathemised Solov'ev for his attack on Russian Orthodoxy. At the same time, and in connection with this episode, Solov'ev's paper fell into the turmoil of the struggle against the non-governmental famine relief. [93] The issue of the journal in which the lecture was published, Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, also contained an article by its chief editor Nikolaj Grot, 'Etika i golod' [Ethics and the Famine], as well as Tolstoj's 'O golode·. This issue was considered a liberal defence of non-governmental famine relief, and, consequently, an open affront to government aid, and was confiscated. [94] Facing this harsh reaction. Solov'ev decided not to publish on the famine for the time being. [95] As a matter of fact, censorship as well as the conservatives around Moskovskie Vedomosti considered Solov'ev a prominent representative of liberal agitation. perhaps not directly because of his writings on the famine, but because of his general views of the non- Christian behaviour or Russian educated society. [96] Significantly, the literature that deals with the public response to the famine also presents Solov'ev as a central figure within the liberal camp. [97]

A close examination of his statements. however. must lead to a qualification of this characterisation. With the liberals, he decisively shared the opinion that a primitive economy had exhausted the soil. and that technical improvement was necessary to remedy this critical situation. In this context, he criticised the communal system for hampering progress in this field. He also shared their criticism of the flaws of Alexander II's reforms, which had led to the peasants' subjection to the commune. Equally typical for the liberal standpoint is his concern for the cultural backwardness of the peasantry. [98] Moreover, from his calls to mobilise and organise educated society, we can reasonably conclude that he joined the liberal criticism of an underdeveloped civil life. Fundamentally, he advocated a commitment of educated society not against the state, but conjointly with it and complementarily to it. Even if he did not broach this issue from an institutional perspective, he made an explicit political claim that was congenial to that of the liberals. [99] In the same way, their demand to change the system of tax imposition can be found in his discussion of the measures to be taken in order to alleviate the burden of charges upon the peasantry. [100]

He remained at a distance of other fundamentally liberal points however, such as the explicit exhortation that the government initiate reforms towards a constitution, or, more directly relevant for the decision-making in the countryside, to extend the access to representative government to all classes. As we have seen, even though in private conversations he expressed the same wish, Solov'ev abstained from such calls in public. His criticism of the communal system also did not go as far as to advocate, as the liberals did, the replacement of the commune by private ownership of land by peasants. [101] He declared that even if the peasantry took hold of all cultivable land, this would not improve the situation, because population increase and a continuous exhausting of the soil would erase any positive result. [102] The philosopher did not engage in the explicit defence of the zemstvo against the attacks of the conservatives either. These two examples convincingly show that he did not publicly adopt all liberal claims. Arguably, he was not primarily preoccupied with political, institutional and juridical issues. Contrary to his fellow publicists, he did not engage into a factual treatment of the famine the political, institutional, and administrative standpoints.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

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Part 2 of 2

ii) The conservatives

Solov'ev only voiced minor criticism in passing to the tenants of the conservative view. Against the conservatives' suggestion to displace peasants to other, less populated regions, he attempted to demonstrate that this would solve neither the problem of a primitive agriculture, nor that of desertification, but, on the contrary, would extend the damage. [103] On the whole, he showed the inconsistency of the position that viewed serfdom as a 'golden age', and qualified the supporters of a return to the pre-reform era of serfdom as defenders of a new economic slavery.

iii) The populists

The defence of the commune also was a major point of the populist position, to which Solov'ev addressed his fiercest critique. Since the beginning of his career as a publicist, he had denounced their use of violence and their belief in revolution for achieving their goals. [104] Even after some populists clearly distanced themselves from terrorist groupings such as Narodnaja Volja, he still had major objections against their principles, such as their rejection of capitalism, and their unconditional support of the commune, which became particularly relevant in the discussions during the famine year. He rejected the populists' idealistic view of the commune, which, in his eyes, came down to a defence of an economically bankrupt institution. [105] A fundamental issue was the relation between educated class and narod. As a matter of fact, Solov'ev shared their commitment. In this regard, it was therefore critical that he made explicit his ambition that the educated class should 'take care of the people', and thereby distinguished his understanding of the issue and his solution from theirs. He denounced their denial of culture and countered the statement by the leader of populism Voroncov that populism had reoriented itself with the remark that their concern about 'the true interests of the people' was nothing but an elementary task of educated society. In doing so, he ironically welcomed them back into the fold of educated society, which had long ago acknowledged these principles.

iv. Lev Tolstoj

Solov'ev did not spare Tolstoj his criticism either, though he adopted a far more discrete and milder tone than with respect to the populists and the conservatives. His statement that charity was an insufficient means of responding to the needs targeted Tolstoj's soup kitchens, as he specified in a footnote. He even affirmed that the government would not lose much if this help stopped, because it was minimal compared to governmental relief. However, Solov'ev defended Tolstoj by arguing against certain conservatives that the government would be wrong to forbid this type of aid. [106]

Solov'ev and Tolstoj diverged on other fundamental points. While Solov'ev argued that educated society had been neglecting the peasants, Tolstoj went further by claiming that educated society had made them its slave. [107] There was a difference of approach here between Solov'ev the scholar, and Tolstoj l'homme de terrain. Solov'ev argued rather in scholarly or global terms, whereas Tolstoj took a more practical stance, could present the viewpoint of the administration and the zemstvo, go into the psychology of the peasant, and suit the action to the word by, in a very concrete manner, helping hundreds of peasants. Perhaps, Tolstoj's experience is the ground for a third major difference with Solov'ev, namely an unconditional appreciation of the narod. 'O golode' clearly claimed 'Free them!', which stood in sharp contrast with Solov'ev's paternalistic call to educate the peasantry. Also his belief in the state as the institution capable of realising morality on a large scale clashed with Tolstoj's anti-statism. [108] As a matter of fact, at that time Solov'ev was furious with Tolstoj's defence of the peasantry's 'simple way of life', at a time when peasants were dying as a result of this force way of living. [109] His hostility went so far that he refused to go to see Tolstoj in December 1891. [110]

However, their approach of the issue of the famine bears striking resemblances. Perhaps their hostility was precisely due to more profound convergences. Like Solov'ev, Tolstoj was not a liberal pur-sang, but enjoyed their sympathy and respect, and published in Russkie Vedomosti. Also they both published an article in an issue Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, which was confiscated for its too subversive message, as we have seen, First, both shared the conviction that the crisis was deeper than the famine itself and the crop failure. Secondly, according to them, the case lay in the wrong relationship of educated society with the peasantry. Third, both used a moral discourse and appealed to love. Fourthly, both provided a large number of facts and concrete data; Solov'ev from scientific works, and Tolstoj from his own experience in the countryside and from his observation of the functioning of the local administration. Fifthly, both departed from an explicitly Christian position, however differently understood.

The parallel between the two figures remains striking, and beyond the divergences in their commitment against the death penalty and to the Jewish question, suggests that both were competing in the same field, though in different ways. As regards the famine, Tolstoj was in practice far more successful in mobilising people to join his initiatives of relief, and in inciting the government to gather data on the grain reserves.

Solov'ev was therefore most critical of the populists and of Tolstoj, while he actually concurred with them on the position of advisor of educated society, and through them, of the people. His political affinities brought him close to the liberals, with whose primarily political approach to the issue he, however, diverged. His fight took place in another area, namely the mobilisation of the urban educated class, first to help the peasants, and, in the long run, to exert power similar to that of the state and church. That his position implicitly rested upon his conception of history is the subject of the following subsection.

d) Theology of history, philosophy of history and sophiology of history

In stark contrast with other issues on which Solov'ev intervened, his treatment of the famine was not made primarily from a historical perspective. Historical elements arc integrated in his argumentation, but after the second intervention they decreasingly represent the spine of the discourse. The use of history in his discourse declines from a sketch of the historical mission of Russia in the two first articles to the complete replacement of the historical dimension by scientific and economic discussions about the present at the start of the 1890s. A hypothetical explanation for this deviation from his usual practice is that on this issue he wanted to act as a practical and engaged thinker -- hence his emphasis on agronomy -- and a commentator of current affairs, rather than as an abstractly philosophising figure. He himself denounced the tendency to intellectualise the issue, and called for action. Accordingly, references to history were made mainly for the sake of illustration.

However, history remains central in his discourse, namely in the view of the present as the result of a long process and as a historic moment, as the battlefield of good and evil forces in which there is an opportunity, and even an emergency, to choose the right path. Solov'ev's self-perception as the figure who might play a role in this choice for the good was particularly emphasised in his interventions. With the help of the three registers of history that I distinguish, we can analyse Solov'ev's discourse on the famine. First, theology of history [TH] is nearly absent. We encounter only one reference to the Bible -- albeit in an ironic mode -- and one call to repent for the detachment from Christianity. [111] Solov'ev hereby connected his interventions on the famine with earlier articles, and referred explicitly to his publications of the early 1880s, namely to the lectures after the tsaricide, and to 'Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros'. With the exception of these two statements, however, he made no mention or theological aspects or history. This nearly total absence of a register that is predominant elsewhere cannot be incidental. Apart from the general explanation given above, according to which Solov'ev strove to be as practical as possible, another main reason for leaving theology or history aside is that Solov'ev's main addressee was the urban educated class, which he encouraged to commitment. In order to reach a maximum number or readers, he published simultaneously in two journals, and in one or them formulated a call that was probably intentionally devoid of religious motives. Solov'ev wanted to reach the educated class as a whole. The same attitude can be round in the notorious lecture that he gave at the same time, namely 'On the Reasons of the Downfall of the Medieval Worldview', during which he explicitly pointed to the fact that non-Christians had happened to act according to Christian principles more than those who proclaimed themselves true Christians. His deliberate omission of theological elements of history in his interventions on the famine can be interpreted as a tactical move to rally a broader community than only Christians, without any 'qualitative loss.' Indeed, non-Christians could unintentionally contribute to a goal that Solov'ev saw as essentially Christian, i.e. selling up an ideal society in which the educated class would help the people develop.

The philosophical register of history is used to support the theme of educated society in relation to culture. In fact, elements of philosophy of history are conveyed to specifically trace the genealogy of educated society. In the articles written in October 1891, Solov'ev broadly sketched the history of educated society, composed of three milestones, i.e. its birth with Peter the Great, the decisive stage of the liberation of the peasants under Alexander II, and the present time. Peter the Great introduced culture, understood as an all-sided effort towards the common good and progress. [112] Since that historical moment, culture had represented a constitutive element of educated society. While it had mainly focused on science and on the institutional establishment of the latter, culture, however, was also meant to be placed in the service of the people. This happened in the epoch of the reforms of Alexander II, during which the educated class together with the government played an active role to ensure the liberation of the serfs, and to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry. This step was meant to pave the way for a next stage of development. Since that time, however, educated society as such had not again manifested itself (with the exception of the aid programme developed by the Panslav committees): its members had turned to terrorism (Narodnaja Volja) or were more eager to defend national intolerance (conservative nationalists). With these terms, he tried to awake that part of the elite with whom he shared convictions. The present famine represented a challenge to pick up the thread of 'social progress' initiated during the reforms. Solov'ev pointed to the discrepancy between a common faith in Russia's historical mission and the present crisis of social progress in Russia, evidence of which was the peasantry's backwardness, cruelly shown by the famine. By casting educated society in this register, Solov'ev wanted to emphasise the ability of it to change the course of affairs by practical acts.

The predominant register in these texts, however, is that of sophiology of history. His interest in agronomy can be explained from the sophiological perspective of a spiritualization of nature by man. Hence, his moral relationship to the soil. [113] When the famine was raging, he addressed the public with threatening words characteristic of the prophetic tone: "the earthly nature refuses to feed humanity [...] it is time to accept and realise our solidarity with mother earth, to save her from necrosis [omertvlenie] in order to save ourselves from death.' [114] His articles on the famine were a direct and literal expression of his call to save the earth.

Besides, in this context, the figure of the prophet in particular appears between the lines in all texts, with emphasis on his power to predict and to preach. Solov'ev addressed Russian educated society with an accusing tone. He called for repentance and reminded Russian educated society of his earlier warnings that oblivion of the true Christian principles of love and solidarity would lead to problems. In doing so, he made his position with respect to educated society explicit: taking the right to address them in a preaching tone, he at the same time excluded himself from those people who forgot the primary task of educated society. Significantly, he never addressed tsar, state, clergy or church, but concentrated exclusively on educated society, as if he carried a special responsibility regarding the latter. In this way, the implicit reference to Solov'ev's theocratic scheme becomes obvious [see table in synthesis part B]. In this scheme, the prophet is endowed with the leadership of educated society, which is, next to the state and church, one of the three pillars of theocratic rule. During the famine, Solov'ev deplored the absence of an organised educated society that was to be the pendant of the coexisting organised state and church. Even if he did not explicitly apply the term 'prophet' to himself, his arrogant tone irritated a populist critic. To him, Solov'ev had to respond against the charge of proclaiming himself the only prophet [see "Kto prozrel?'). Significantly, Solov'ev did not discuss the appellation of prophet as such, but only the qualifying 'only one.' [115]

The years 1891-1892 seemed to offer an opportunity to create this educated society. Solov'ev's correspondence, as well as the memoirs of his contemporaries. provide further evidence of his self-attribution of the role of leader of educated society and of his attempts to concretise its organisation. He indeed took it upon himself to organise this movement, wanting to act as the representative of educated society in cooperation with the state (general) and the church (arkhierej) [see section 2a]. Which institutional form this organisation should take was a question that could only be addressed later, once the minds were rallied under a single banner. The prophet could content himself with indicating priorities. Indeed, he saw himself as a figure authorised to decipher the meaning of the events from God's perspective: was the famine not a sign that 'the heavenly leadership has lost patience and wants to take us in hand'? [116]

3. Conclusion

The famine that Russia endured in 1891-1892 clearly illustrated the peasantry's miserable living conditions. Although the government and, to a limited extent, the Russian public succeeded in averting the famine, the structural shortcomings of the system were more apparent than ever, and were vividly discussed within the debates on the famine. Solov'ev's publications. numerous references to the current press, and his undertakings were a clear demonstration of his commitment. I have tried to show that he was more concretely involved than in other cases, and that he fully deserves the characterisation of social activist. For many thinkers at that time, the famine was the opportunity to hope for a change in the country's political system, and like the liberals, populists, and Tolstoj, Solov'ev felt that this change had to take place primarily in the attitude of the educated class with respect to the peasantry. In this sense, his call was not original. Yet the combination of various perspectives to define this attitude as a material, cultural, scientific, technical, and intellectual support allowed him to understand the issue in a broader sense than many of his contemporaries. with the possible exception of Tolstoj. Partially in order to make his message understood, partly out of genuine concern, he broached a number of issues that were discussed at that time, such as drought, the possibility of land redistribution, and the meaning of culture when applied in practice to the cause of the peasants. His sharp and precise comments on agronomy and economy stand in contrast to the general character of his main motive, namely the mobilisation of educated society. However, his correspondence reveals that Solov'ev actually had in mind a very specific type of mobilisation, which Trubeckoj did not hesitate to stamp as 'revolutionary.' His exhortation to develop a public sphere on equal level with the state, was highly critical of the current state of affairs. A government that considered even private charity a challenge to its power could not but see Solov'ev's project as a threat. Was his call anti- overnmental? Solov'ev was fundamentally a statist, but for a brief period of time nursed the dream of the establishment of an ideal society by means of an uprising. Later, he turned to action not against the government, but without it: even in July 1892, the date of the official end of the famine, he continued to seek means to convince educated society to help the peasants. Incontestably, however, the lack of a response from the educated class to his appeal, and to the famine relief in general, must have undermined his trust in the possibility of building an ideal society on Russian soil. That this period was a moment of historic choice becomes obvious if we observe the emphasis, placed between the lines in his sophiology of history, on his own mission with respect to the educated class, and, through it, the peasants.

_______________

Notes:

1. 'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose', S. 1989 2, p. 377.

2. Richard G. Jr. Robbins, Famine in Russia 1891-1892. The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York & London: Columbia Univ. Press. 1975); James Y. Simms The Impact of the Russian Famine of 1891-1892: A New Perspective (PhD thesis Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976); Nikolaj Sokolov, Golod 1891-1892 godov i obscestvennaja politiceskaja bor'ba (PhD thesis Moskva: Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 1987), in which Solov'ev is mentioned: Marina D. Kniga, Istorija goloda 1891- 1892 gg v Rossii (PhD thesis Voronez, 1997).

3. Evgenij Trubeckoj 1995 connected the famine with Solov'ev's first disillusion concerning the Russian state (Trubeckoj 1995 2, p. 10).

4. Gaut 1992, pp. 74-80.

5. Simms 1976, pp. 2-4, p. 10.

6. Ibid., p. 12: Robbins 1975, p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. 171.

8. Robbins 1975, pp. 3-10.

9. Although this policy only started to hear its fruit at the beginning of the 1890s and therefore cannot be held responsible for the famine and the misery of the peasantry, it cannot be denied that by 1891 many Russian peasants sorely felt the financial pressure.

10. Robbins 1975, p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 38-40.

12. Ibid. p. 149. The land captains [zemskie nacal'niki] had been introduced in 1889, as one of the most reactionary counter-reform measures. Contrary to what their title suggests, they had nothing to do with the zemstvo. They were recruited among the landed gentry, and appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to reinforce control over the peasants; they combined both administrative and juridical power (Riasanovsky 1993, p. 393).

13. See the chronology of events related to the famine in Sokolov 1987, pp. 219-227, esp. pp, 223-226.

14. Its composition reflected its symbolic importance: it was headed by the tsarevic, and included Durnovo, Pobedonoscev and the secretary of the section of law of the state chancellery and Head of the Red Cross, general Kaufman (Robbins 1975. pp. 95-98).

15. The Special Committee accumulated money mainly by organizing charitable lotteries. While the sums it dispensed were small when compared with the huge grants made available directly by central government, the significance of its work was considerable and was welcomed enthusiastically. The founding of the Committee also helped smooth the way for the growth of charitable activity independently of any governmental agency. Under its auspices, a number of persons considered political suspects, such as Vladimir Korolenko, were permitted to take an active part in relief work (Robbins 1975, p. 210). The Special Committee also contributed to setting up a public works programme to offer work to peasants in need of wages. This operation, however, proved a total failure.

16. Ibid., p. 168.

17. Ministers were responsible to the tsar only on individual basis, and the Committee of Ministers did not form a policy-making body. ‘This lack of unity meant that the Committee of Ministers was, to use the words of M.M. Speranskij, not an institution but a form of report’ (Ibid., pp. 66-67).

18. Ibid., p. 76.

19. This judgment was uttered both at the time and in 20th century scholarship (Simms 1976, p. 50). The mistrust with respect to the government and even the Red Cross, suspected of being corrupt, may explain the reluctance of private persons to donate large sums or money for the relief (Robbins 1975, p. (4).

20. It saw in private enterprises attempts to initiate sedition and protest against the state in the countryside, and to 'tear off from the government's hands the state affair of the struggle against the famine' (Sokolov 1987, p. 149).

21. Beside soup kitchens, childcare centres, school kitchens, feeding and replacing horses and cattle initiatives were set up. About donations, see Simms 1976, pp. 47-49.

22. The reconstruction of the debates in this section is based mainly on Simms 1976 and Sokolov 1987, and complemented with a study of sources when needed. The authors of the journal articles and rubrics are anonymous, unless specified.

23. Simms 1976, p. 14.

24. The question of the severity of the famine even took the form of a lively debate about the question whether there really was a famine in Russia at all; there was no doubt that crops had failed, but the issue was whether this crop failure had evolved into a famine. Until the winter, the government itself was reluctant to use the term famine [golod], but preferred the less emotionally-laden terms crop failure [neurozaj], bad harvest [nedorad], and misfortune [bedstvie] (Robbins 1975, p. 64).

25. N.P. Aksakov (1848-1909), S. F. Sarapov (1855-1911), 1). Samarin (1831-1901). With respect to the conservatives, the only available literature is Sokolov, who offers a rich insight into the ramifications of this camp. Unfortunately, he hardly ever mentions authors, and only refers to the journal or newspaper in which their articles were published.

26. Ibid., p. 146.

27. Ibid., p. 147.

28. Sokolov 1987, pp. 148-149. The Ministry of Agriculture, which was created a couple of years later, was the fruit of this proposition. In a circular, it was also proposed that all superfluous staff working in the commune should be removed (veterinarians, zemstvo teachers, province agronomes, and tax inspectors) (Ibid., p. 152).

29. Sokolov 1987, pp. 145-6, 154.

30. L. Slonimskij (1850-1918). See Simms 1976, pp. 79-85 on the vivid reports of the publicist Vladimir Korolenko published in Vestnik Evropy, on a detailed image of the terrible living conditions of the peasants.

31. See for instance the chronicle 'Vnutrenee Obozrenie' in Vestnik Evropy, 1892, 5, p. 372: Slonimskij (Simms, p. 109)

32. On the late reaction of the government and the hampering activity of land captains and governors, see for instance Vestnik Evropy, 1892. [6]. pp. 375ff. On the creation of new institutions, see Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12, p. 876, 869, Simms 1976, pp. 200-201.

33. See for instance Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 11, pp. 356-357. The bad communication between the zemstvo and the central administration was a commonly acknowledged problem (see the chronicle ‘Sovremennaja letopis’’ in Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, [6], p. 853).

34. See Slonimskij in Vestnik Evropy (quoted in Sokolov, 1987, p. 171); Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12. P. 874; Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, 2, p. 855.

35. Liberal journals not only published Tolstoj, but also defended him against the conservatives (Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 12, pp. 870-873; Russkoe Obozrenie, 1892, 2, p. 859).

36. ‘Strasnyj vopros’, first published in Russkoe Vedomosti [Russian News] on November 6, 1891. Edition used: L.N. Tolstoj, Polnoe sobranie socienij, vol. 29 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennyj Izd. Khudozestvennoj literatury, 1954), pp. 117-125. See also ‘O golode’, first forbidden by censorship when it was issued in October 1891 together notably with an article by Solov’ev, then modified and published in English in the Daily Telegraph on 14 January 1892, then in Russian, with modifications, in Moskovskie Vedomosti, 22 January, 1892. Edition used: Tolstoj 1954, pp. 86-116.

37. The issue was far more complicated and could not be solved by simply distributing food. For instance, there were often no external signs of this need. Besides, for people who had learnt that earning by working was positive, and remaining without work negative, free distribution raised a great deal of confusion and abuse. The administration had therefore fallen into the following vicious circle: the more free distribution there would be, the weaker the population would become, and the greater the need would be. Its needs consisted not only of food, but also, tools, stoves, clothes, shoes, healing, pilgrimage, and also taxes: these needs were not taken into account in the lists trying to assess the scope of the peasants' misery.

38. This question is the object of his article ‘Strasnyj vopros’. Tolstoj’s call had an immediate effect on the government decision-making: an instruction was given to count all the available grain within two weeks (Tolstoj 1954, commentary p. 396).

39. About the various reaction of the radical movement to the famine, see James Y. Simms. Jr., 'The Famine and the Radicals'. in: Edward H. Judge, James Y, Simms, Jr. (eds.), Modernization and Revolution: Dilemmas of Progress in Late Imperial Russia. Essays in Honor of Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Columbia University Pres, 1992, pp. 13-42).

40. See Vasilij Voroncov (1847-1918). N. Daniel’son (pen-name Nikolai-on, 1844-1918). S. Jusakov (1849-1910). N. A. Karysev (years unknown) in Russkoe bogatstvo [Russian Wealth] (Simms 1976, pp. 166-167, 171).

41. Gaut 1992, p. 76.

42. Petr Struve (1870-1944). Sokolov 1987, p. 162: Simms 1976, p. 166. From 1893 onwards, within the socialist movement, a split became more obvious between the revolutionary wing (G. Plekhanov, P. Lavrov), which called for the tsarist regime to be overthrown, as ell as legal Marxism (P. Struve), which focused on the necessity of fostering capitalism in Russia as a necessary phase (Simms 1976, pp. 143-147, 176: Simms 1992, pp. 15, 23, 28-34).

43. Riasonovsky 1993, p. 405; Simms 1976, p. 140.

44. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose’’. Edition used: S. 1989, 2, pp. 370-384.

45. ‘It contains a programme, or, better said, a leading thought of some undertakings that I have conceived and partially realised’ (correspondence with M.M. Stasjulevic, 11.9.1891, in: Pis’ma 1, p. 103).

46. ‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 384-386. About the relationship between Solov’ev and Severnyj Vestnik, see the article of its chief editor in the years when Solov’ev collaborated with it. I jubov’ Gurevic, ‘Istorija “Severnogo Vestnika”’, in: S.A. Vengerov (ed.). Russkaja literature XX veka 1890-1910 (Moskva: Izd. T-va ‘Mir’, 1914), pp. 235-264, esp. pp. 243-244. See also Solov’ev’s correspondence with Gurevic (Pis’ma 3, pp. 129-137).

47. For more details on the circumstances of this silence, see subsection 2c).

48. Full title: ‘Kto prozrel (Pis’mo v redakeiju [zurnala “Russkaja Mysl’”])’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 428-431.

49. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’ Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 432-44.

50. Ibid., p. 432.

51. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 450-458. No information has been found which could explain the delay of this publication.

52. Pis’ma 3, p. 137 (dated 20 August 1892).

53. In: D. Anuein (ed.). Pomose’ golodajuscim (Moskva: Izd. ‘Russkikh Vedomostej’, 1892), pp. 5560564. Information provided in S. 1989 2, p. 699), in which the article is republished (pp. 459-465). See Opravdanie dobra, p. 329ff.

54. See the discussion of these passages, see Part One, ch. III ‘Philosophy of History in Solov’ev’.

55. Full title: ‘Iz Moskovskoj gubernii (Pis’mo v. redakciju [Zurnala “Vestnik Evropy”])’. Edition used: S. 1989 2, pp. 623-625.

56. Ibid., p. 624.

57. Ibid., p. 625.

58. For instance, he invited Konstantin Arsen’ev to come and give a lecture (Pis’ma 2, p. 68).

59. ‘I am bustling around [khlopoca] to organize something against the famine […]. On September 8th, on my idea [po moej mysli] something was founded after the manner of the former [byvsego] Slavic committee, but it still is waiting for its permission and, probably, will not get it’ (Pis’ma 4, pp. 124).

60. Pis’ma 2, p. 80.

61. Pis’ma 3, p. 131.

62. Pis’ma 4, p. 54.

63. Gaut 1992, p. 79. According to Gaut, Solov’ev had abandoned this ideal by the end of the 1880s. Contrary to the acknowledged division of his work in three periods, a pre- theocratic, a theocratic, and a post-theocratic one (see for instance Trubeckoj 1995), the presence of the theocratic model in publications of 1891-1892 rather suggests continuity.

64. Another plan was to build a universal tsarian priesthood [vseobscee carskoe svjascenstvo], in which all could take part in priesthood and stardom; the participation of educated society would then be realised in the form of popular representation (Trubeckoj 1995 2. p. 13). In this scheme, the tripartition is maintained: the only difference is the explicit expectation that all take part in priesthood and stardom, whereas the third, initially 'prophetic' pillar is replaced by representation by some members of educated society or the people. Trubeckoj 1995 associated this scheme with Solov'ev's interest in representative power. In which way these three pillars have to share the power remains unclear.

65. Trubeckoj 1995 2. p. 13.

66. Quoted in Ibid., p. 12.

67. Pis’ma 1, p. 247.

68. Ibid., p. 103.

69. Pis’ma 3, p. 130.

70. For some of these data, he referred to his sources. For instance, he drew from the recently published ‘table of execution of the global state budget for the budget period of 1891’ (‘Mnimye I dejstvitel’nye mery …’, p. 452, n. 1) and from information gathered by the Ministry of State Domains (Ibid., p. 456). At other places, he did not mention his source on the cultivable land in European Russia (ex.: Ibid., pp. 454-456).

71. Robbins 1975, p. 179.

72. For instance, he briefly mentioned in a note the anecdote of the activities of the landowner and Slavophile Dmitrij Samarin, who sold his land to the peasants for nearly nothing and had to repurchase it (‘Narodnaja beda I obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 375).

73. He referred twice to his own impressions (probably when staying with family Kovalenskij, with whom he was related, in Dedovo (‘Vrag s Vostoka’, p. 439; ‘Iz Moskovskoj gubernii’, pp. 623-624).

74. Ermolov was an expert on economic problems in the countryside, and his book Neurozaj i narodnoe bedstvie, published in 1892, was the first major examination of the causes and impact of the famine, and still today ‘the best available analysis of the harvest of 1891’ (Robbins 1975, p. 191). Dokucaev published a collection of articles Nasi stepi prezde i teper’ in 1892, which Solov’ev quoted extensively. On his activities as a scholar in the years of the famine, see Kniga 1997, pp. 135-144.

75. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’, p. 443.

76. ‘Narodnaja bedaiI obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 374.

77. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 454-456.

78. Ibid., p. 45

79. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 371.

80. Even in summer 1892, his great problem was still to avoid censorship: ‘I intend to avoid a direct polemics and, probably, I will be able to do that, but which attitude should I take with respect to censorship [kak byt’s cenzuroj]? Even in the last article [‘Vrag s Vostoka’, MC], thanks to the exclusion of some necessary words, something came out which was mysterious and officious. Out of friendship for you, I am ready once more to submit myself to these unavoidable operations’ (letter to Ljubov’ Gurevic: Pis’ma 3, p. 137).

81. ‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”, p. 384.

82. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, pp. 379-380: 'Vrag s Vostoka", p. 436. He also specified that these 99% included the organization of lotteries by the state, which in no case could count as public aid (Ibid., n. 1).

83. 'Vrag s Vostoka', p. 435.

84. 'Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 381.

85. There are hardly any elements of a discussion apart from short comments in Opravdanie dobra.

86. See Opravdanie dobra, part III, chap. 10, section 18. However, Solov’ev did not expand on the zemstvo. Worth adding is the absence of consensus in Russia at that time on the function of the zemstvo, whether political (as a forum for liberals) or administrative (as a link in the chain of bureaucratic command) (see Thomas Fallows. ‘The Zemstvo and the Bureaucracy, 1890-1904’, in Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), The Zemstvo in Russia, An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 177-241; p. 178). One would probably expect support of the former position from Solov’ev.

87. The zemstvo was represented at both the district and the province level, and was not allowed to set up a national organization (Robbins 1975, p. 27).

88. The distinction between intelligentsia liberals and zemstvo liberals is provided by Solovov 1987, p. 158.

89. Pis’ma 3, p. 130.

90. Trubeckoj 1995 2, p. 13.

91. ‘Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomose”, pp. 382-382.

92. ‘Mnimye I dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, p. 458.

93. S. 1989 2, p. 689.

94. Solov' ev mentioned this setback in his correspondence (Pis’ma 3, p. 131). Vestnik Evropy mentioned the episode on the three alleged agitators (1891, 12, p. 372, note).

95. See his letter: ‘Therefore, in the interests of the affair (including the interest of “Severnyj Vestnik”) it is necessary for the time being, to hush up [promolcat’]’ (Pis’ma 3, p. 131).

96. An interesting, remark by the conservative Kireev reveals that situating Solov’ev, Tolstoj and Grot was more problematic that it seemed, and that not all conservatives agreed with the official anathema on these thinkers. In the days of the scandal around Voprosy filosofii I psikhologii, he wrote in a letter: 'Of course, the party of Rus[skie] Vedomosti, Vest[nik] Evropy etc. work towards a constitution […], but is it fair to count them among the enemies of the government (see yesterday' s N. of Mosk[ovskie] Vedom [osti]), enemies of the established order? It is fair only in theory: fortunately, people of such manners seldom are consequent' (quoted in Sokolov 1987, p. 164).

97. See Simms 1976, p. 109: Sokolov 1987, pp. 163-4. This also applies to works on Solov’ev: see especially Gaut 1992, pp. 74-80.

98. Gaut 1992, p. 79.

99. In other terms, he conveyed a political message without talking politics.

100. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 452-453.

101. In the beginning 1890s, this liberal principle influenced Witte, who became convinced of the necessity to reform land property by peasants. His attitude would change again towards the end of his life (Victor Lcontovitsch, Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland, Kulturwissenschaftliche Reibe, vol. 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957), p. 168.

102. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, p. 456. Also in ‘La question sociale en Europe'. written in August 1892 (published only in 1897), and Opravdanie dobra, his positive valuation of property, and property of soil as highest form, did not prompt him to claim the necessity that the peasant benefit of it and be set free from the commune.

103. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel"nye mery k pod"emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 456- 7. Massive displacement of peasant populations had been made legally possible by a law passed just before the famine, in 1889. This law was welcomed by public opinion. For a criticism of the applicability of this law and its effectiveness against peasant misery, see the comprehensive essay of a landowner in the province of Perm’, Dmitrij Druckoj-Sokol’ninskij, 'Nase sel'skoe khozjajstvo i ego buduscnost”, Vestnik Evropy, 1891, 10, pp. 698-734, esp. p. 700ff.

104. During the famine, in October 1891, he pinned down the populist attitude by reminding the reader of their tendency to occupy themselves with the wrong issues, such as ‘organising absurd crimes’, hereby alluding to the tsaricide of 1881 (‘Nas grekh i nasa objazannost”, p. 385) [see case study 1].

105. ‘Mnimye i dejstvitel’nye mery k pod”emu narodnogo blagosostojanija’, pp. 374-375.

106. ‘Vrag s Vostoka’, pp. 436-7, n. 2.

107. ‘O golode’, pp. 105-106.

108. This point has also been rightly pointed out by Gaut (Gaut 1992, pp. 75-76.

109. See Solov’ev’s criticism in ‘Idoly I dealy’ (S. 1989 1, p. 621) and his correspondence (Pis’ma 1, p. 71).

110. One may wonder if this invitation or meeting was related to Tolstoj setting up the komitet gramotnosti in favour of the hungry, in which case Solov’ev’s refusal shows a deeper animosity than purely intellectual debates in publications.

111. The reference to an episode in the Old Testament is based on a Talmudic interpretation (commentary, p. 694). This testifies to his profound interest for the religious heritage and fate of the Jews during the same period. An ironic analogy made between the conservatives and Joseph in an episode of the Old Testament during a famine: Joseph encouraged his people to sell everything, including their freedom. Solov’ev ironically concluded that the situation in Russia in his time was worse than in Egypt 2000 years earlier, because peasants were now not free to sell their land but forced to be dispossessed of their land by the communal system (‘Narodnaja beda I obscestvennaja pomose”, p. 383).
112. Solov'ev defined culture as ‘the totality of all historically elaborated means and tools for a solid preserving and all-sided improving of human life, that is to say, the life of all people'. To this he immediately added a definition in moral terms, of culture as the 'system of the necessary means for the full manifestation of love and a moral principle and for the full achievement of the common good as moral goal’ ("Narodnaja beda i obscestvennaja pomosce”, p. 376).

113. See ‘Ekonomiceskij vopros s nravstvennoj tocki zrenija’, Opravdanie dobra, pp. 406- 440.

114. ‘O pricinakh upadka srednevekovogo mirosozercanija’, p. 355.

115. His argument was that he could not be the only one if he belonged to a group, namely of those who had remained faithful to the Christian principles of educated society (‘Kto prozrel?’, pp. 428-9). He even added to its legitimacy when, in the same article, he referred to earlier publications, tracing, as it were, the genealogy of his mission as a prophet.

116. Pis’ma 4, p. 54.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

Postby admin » Thu May 10, 2018 8:13 am

Synthesis

The five case studies above have shown Solov'ev's commitment, either as contemporary intervention on specific episodes (tsaricide and famine), or as enduring concern for recurring issues in Russian society (Jewish question, Polish question, Old Believers). If one were to name one issue that received his greatest preoccupation, however, it would probably be the Jewish question, as is shown by the number of publications as well as the various forms of his commitment.

If the case studies are now cross-referenced, it is possible to discern answers to the following questions: i) To what extent was Solov'ev informed on the subject matter that he broached? ii) To what extent can his views be aligned with the ongoing debates? iii) Where can we situate him in these debates'? iv) Who was or were his addressee(s)? v) How were his interventions perceived by his contemporaries?

ad i) Solov'ev demonstrated general knowledge on the issues that he discussed. In two cases, however, he proved himself an expert on related matters, namely the Talmud (Jewish question), and agronomy (Famine). On the whole, however, he selected only very few facts as relevant for discussion, scarcely provided analysis, and formulated hasty conclusions. In two cases, he gave an utterly partial, simplistic image of the situation in his time, namely the Old Believers and the Catholic Poles, which suggests that he did not take into account all social. economic, and cultural key developments of these religious minorities. In fact, his method consisted of interpreting the issue by relating it to its higher essence, its meaning from the perspective of his ideals. which explains the frequent reduction of an issue to one or two aspects which he judged as its core, without taking other aspects or factors into account.

ad ii) A discrepancy appears when we examine to what extent he participated in the debates. On the one hand, he took part in them directly by offering his own opinion on the central issues raised by public opinion (roots of the revolutionary movement, unification tsar-people, religious and cultural freedom of the religious minorities, cliches regarding the Jews, the Talmud. Polish political independence, attitude of the educated society towards the peasant, and the latter's cultural backwardness). On the other hand, in sharp contrast with his colleagues, he hardly picked up the political, institutional, legal and administrative sides of the issues, about which he most probably was informed, but in which he obviously did not show any particular interest. This applies to the solutions proposed, including those he offered. He instead favoured an ethical and religious interpretation of the issues.

ad iii) Although he never fully belonged to a single camp. his views bore common features, in most cases with the liberals (religious and cultural freedom, cultural progress of the peasantry), and with the Slavophiles and progressive religious thinkers (general framework of thought). Interestingly, he also shared points with the people that he criticised most, such as the clerical and nationalist conservatives, the populists, and Lev Tolstoj.

The originality of his views consisted not so much in specific points of view, as in the combination of standpoints commonly voiced by opposed camps: abolition of the death penalty and reinforcing the monarchy, defence of religious freedom and hopes of conversion (Jews, Old Believers). The boldness of his tone and practical commitment also stands out (tsaricide, Jewish question, famine), Finally, the connection of all issues with his ideals of church reunion and/or free theocracy made his interpretation unique.

Arguably, it was his ideal of church reunion that lies at the basis of his two-fold attitude towards the Old Believers, the Jews and the Catholic Poles, namely a blend of respect for their religion as such, and a hope that sooner or later they would join universal church through conversion to official Orthodoxy in the first case, and to Christianity in the second. He committed himself to several issues. Whether directly or indirectly, from the perspective of free theocracy. If we hold to his own scheme of the institutions and leaders involved in free theocracy, his commitment can be demonstrated as a contribution to the realisation of free theocracy in Russia and his interventions distributed as follows: [1]

INSTITUTION / LEADER / ISSUES
church / pope / Old Believers, polish question
state / king / tsaricide, Old Believers, Jewish and Polish question
educated society united with people {zemstvo) / prophet / Old Believers, Jewish and Polish question tsaricide, famine


ad iv) His addressees were the three institutions which were central in his theocratic ideal, namely the Russian government (Polish and Jewish question, Old Believers) and on one occasion its ruler, the tsar (tsaricide), the Russian Orthodox Church (Old Believers). He addressed, however, unwaveringly Russian educated society (all cases). This included not only exhortations to act, but also criticism of a number of tendencies in Russian public opinion, primarily the conservative nationalists and the populists. Except in the case of the Old Believers, he generally did not address himself directly to the population group in question in the issues, namely the religious minorities and the peasants.

At this point, one may wonder why his address to the Russian Orthodox Church was not so prominent, given the central role of the church in his theoretic ideal. Four answers can be advanced. Firstly, he considered it his mission, as a prophet, to address and guide educated society. Secondly, educated society may be identified with the church in the sense of community, yet not in the institutional sense. Thirdly, he addressed them precisely because he regarded them as the progressive element of the nation, contrary to the church, which in his eyes was the conservative element, the preserver of tradition. Fourthly, and most importantly, since the creation of the Holy Synod the church did not exist as an independent, 'addressable' factor in Russia. Solov'ev would first have to make the tsar set the church free, before he could speak to its leader, namely the 'priest'.

Solov'ev exclusively addressed Russians with his exhortations. While the tsaricide, the famine and the Old Believers were indeed properly Russian issues, the Polish question also concerned Germany and Austria, and the Jewish question also related to France. He justified this exclusive focus on Russia by implying that he knew Russia's qualities and forces given by Providence. [2] More precisely, he addressed the Russians' conscience: at stake was the 'salvation of the national soul', which started with the 'acceptance of one's own duty.' [3] Since national conscience is 'the same for all', there is only one truth for it, and this truth was expressed by Solov'ev the prophet. In this respect, it was his perception of Russia as a new force capable of embodying eternal Sophia that prompted him to define all the critical issues analysed above in relation to the Russian national mission. In his eyes, Russia was a part of the organism 'humanity', and he strongly felt he was a member of that nation. Despite his universalist views and his supra-national approach present in his ideals of free theocracy and church reunion, he kept thinking from a national perspective.

ad v) Solov'ev received support from the editors in whose publications he published. This primarily included the Slavophile Aksakov, and later the liberal Stasjulevic and liberal- populist Gorcev. However, this does not mean that he received widespread approval. As a result of his boldness, his combining various motives of history, as the three registers allow to show, and the fact that he related the issues with his own projects, he was often perceived as a troublemaker by the authorities (tsaricide, Jewish question, famine), a false patriot talking rubbish by conservatives (tsaricide, Old Believers, Jewish question, Polish question), and a utopian by progressive camps (tsaricide, Old Believers, Jewish question, famine). He may well have 'obtained wider recognition through his current affairs writing', as Wozniuk sustains. [4] This probably applies to those two issues which he broached in such a way as to distanciate himself from the Slavophiles in the mid-1880s, namely church reunion and nationalism. But in so far as these five issues are concerned, which deal with all the cases of his concrete social commitment, he was mostly ignored by his contemporaries.

_______________

Notes:

1. From Filosofskie nacala cel’nogo znanija, p. 196, ‘Evrejstvo i khristianskij vopros, p. 231 [table in my introduction, p. 12].

2. ‘Pis’mo v redakciju zurnala Przeglad Polski’, p. 268.

3. ‘Pol’sa i vostocnyj vopros’, p. 68.

4. Wozniuk 2000, p. xxvii.
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Re: History, Sophia and the Russian Nation: A Reassessment o

Postby admin » Thu May 10, 2018 8:13 am

Theory and Case Studies Combined: Solov'ev the Translator

Solov'ev's treatment of the issues rested upon his conception of history, which he conveyed in all his interventions. The three registers that I distinguish have allowed to discern which functions his views on history fulfilled in his discourse. While his theology of history provided the framework for an ethical and religious interpretation of the issue, his philosophy of history allowed him to define persecuted religious minorities as nations with their own right to cultural development (Jewry and Poland) and to place social progress in the foreground (in favour of peasantry, contrary to the ideas of the Old Believers). His sophiology of history was central to all his interventions at a meta-discursive level, in as much as it legitimised his preaching prophet's tone with respect mostly to educated society, but also to the people, the government, the tsar, and the church.

The five case studies show to what extent Solov'ev departed from debated issues and a social, political, cultural and economic situation. His contribution stands out because of the fact that he related these issues to his ideals, which can best be understood in terms of a translation. Solov'ev perceived himself as the 'top down' translator of the eternal truth of Christian moral values [given in theology of history] in the most significant issues of contemporary Russian society. Conversely he made an 'upward' translation from ongoing events to theology of history by making a diagnosis in moral terms on the basis of concrete facts. This translation work was also common to the Slavophiles. Solov'ev combined this with a second translation into and from philosophy of history, which represented an intermediary level between concrete events and theology of history. Philosophy of history offered a level of interpretation that was already more speculative than pure actuality, but which only focused on immanent developments. On the basis of the valuation of nations, culture, and social progress that it provided, and that was used mostly by the liberals, Solov'ev further enlightened it from the moral and religious perspective of theology of history and sought to supersede the limitations of both schemes with his sophiology of history.

Solov'ev did not provide any argument to support the implicit statement that he was the one competent prophet to tell his own people what was good for them. Whether he derived his knowledge from a special mystical source of inspiration is never unveiled in his publicistika. On the one hand, his focus on the ideal that he wished to achieve made him intrumentalise the issues and to a certain extent turn his back on certain core aspects. From the five points indicated in the synthesis, I conclude a certain detachment from Solov'ev's part to the issues at stake. On the other hand, while at the same time demonstrating his unshakeable conviction that he knew the right path that Russia had to follow, as well as the outcome of history as a whole, his interventions showed his deep concern for the destiny of his own country, and his preoccupation with more unity between the social groups in Russia, in particular between educated society and the peasants (or city and countryside), and between the Orthodox (including the Old Believers), the Catholics (Poles) and the Jews. This persistent ambition to put society at the core of his interventions can be explained not only as part of his own task as a prophet, but also as a reaction to his father, who focused on the role of the state as the main driving force in history. Solov'ev complemented this view and fostered the participation of society as a fully-fledged actor in his country.

On a scale that combines a practical approach inspired by a sense of historical urgency to foster cohesion in society as a whole on the one hand, and speculative interpretation on the other, we observe that each case presents a different balance between the two poles. The closest to a practical approach is the famine, followed by the Jewish question, while regarding the tsaricide, the Old Believers, and most importantly the Polish question, speculation and abstraction dominate. But in all cases, the tension between a sense of present crisis and a highly speculative interpretation of events remains unsolved.
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