Oupnek'hat, by Anquetil Duperron

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Part 2 of 2

K'HAND SEVENTH (7).

O mokelan of the senses once again with ([x]) Pradjapat they said, that: O worthy of veneration! Again, you can teach us something.

Pradjapat said: well; After he (then) explained, he shows that, the first letter, which is [x] alef maftouh (opened by a), is an adj; that is, it was not produced: and it is abominable; that is, it is great: and it is good; that is, without death: and it is an adj. that is, he does not have old age: he loves; that is, it is without cessation: it is abhi; that is, he is without fear: he is asouk; that is, it is without sadness: it is love; that is, he has no knowledge: and he is atsch; that is, he is without hunger; that is, he is without thirst: he is satisfied; that is, it has no second.

With this kind of alef maftouh [x] djiw atma as he asked:

And the second letter, which is vau mazzmoum (ou): and it is great: and it is the making of the product: and it is entering into everything: [and] it is the lifting (taking away): and it is the deep view (appearing great): and the making is great: and preventing (obstructing) the way of error (protecting from deviation): and bringing down is great: and giving motion is great: and it is not different (changed): [and occupying (possessor) is].

With this kind of va mazzmoum [x] pram atma as he asked:

To alef maftouh, that with the place (vice) [x] djiw atma exists when [x] vau mazzmoum makes one: [x] sing'hi, that which is bringing down the lion, let it be.

The third letter, that mim saken (m resting) is great; and there is much light: and there is a form of light: and all that is pointing is: and there is moukt; that is, he is always absolutely freed (blessed, saved): and the light is great: and the knowledge is great: and the Lord is great: [and [x] the spear (existence) is great]: and the joy is great: and the powerful is great .

And [x] alef and [x] vau, that one rendered, voice ou deed, when this kind of mim saken, which is pram atma, makes one; the whole time should be brought down.

Anyone who knows this way, having been freed from the bond of the gross body, and from the subtle body, which is the place of the senses and [x] pran, having been freed from non-knowledge, which is the state of [x] sak'hepat, and the cause of the production of the subtle and gross body he is, having become liberated, [x] hasti (existence), and knowledge, and joy have been rendered pure, he himself becomes light with himself.

They asked Pradjapat again about the Mokelan senses, what are you kisti (who are you)? he said: yes, that is, I.

In this way, from anyone who asks, who are you? first, I: as he said, he says something else. Therefore, since all; I: they say, [x] aham is the name of every (being) made (as it was made), in the word aham alef maftouh, which is the first letter [x] pranou, and the explanation (praise) of it has been mentioned, that the form [x] atma it is, it comes, and the name of everything becomes.

Consequently, all [x] were atma.

Then this very alef maftouh enters into everything; with respect to this (idea), that nothing is, that there is no atma in it; whatever exists is atma; that the form [x] is alef maftouh.

Consequently, it is necessary to seek from [x] alef maftouh [x] atma.

Whatever is seen is all Brahm: and since Brahm is the figure [x] of existence, and knowledge, and joy, the world is also [Brahm and] the figure [x] of the spear, and knowledge, and joy; ) that whatever is seen, [x] hasti itself (its existence) is apparent, and since seeing [x] hasti is understood, knowledge also enters into the medium (auxiliary) of that (thing).

Oi Fereschtehha they asked Pradjapat, that, [x] you have, what is it?

He said: the intellect, that this and that is not in it, and [x] to understand that, anoubhou say, that the explanation is given by [x] vadj; that [x] is yours.

They asked that; [x] vadj dan, what is it?

Pradjapat, as he covered his eye, became silent (remained in that state), and gave no answer: that is, [x] vadj dan1 [Samskretic, vaschanam, word, speech; danam, fear.] [x] It is a state that does not enter (into the language) with the tongue (which cannot be spoken).

Afterwards they asked him what knowledge is; and what is joy?

Pradjapat said that; this is also anoubhou; that is, it is vadj dan.

Again they asked, that; in these [x] vadj dan what is it?

Pradjapat, as before, covering his eye, with (in) silence, gave the answer, that knowledge and joy are all vadj dan.

After that he said: That which is sensible, [x] haste, and knowledge, [and] is joy; and that which is not sensible, that [also] [x] thou hast, and knowledge, and is joy: and the joy of that being is great joy. That great joy which is Brahm, and its name is also Brahm; with regard to that (idea), that the last (end) of the name [x] Brahm [x] is saken mim, and the last [x] pranou [Oum], is also [x] mim saken; [x] the last mim [x] pranou [Oum], [x] the last mim [x] is Brahm: it is necessary that with this mim [x] Brahm will pronounce great.

After that (then) Pradjapat said: at the time when (when) they ask something from someone, what is this in this way? if that thing is known to him for certain, he says in answer, Oum; that is, it is true and just: and the meaning [x] Oum becomes true and right.

Accordingly, from [x] alef maftouh [x] djiw atma as he sought, and from [x] vau mazzmoum as he knew the true and just, with [x] mim saken, which is Brahm, become one.

And whoever knows in this way, having become liberated from the body, and the senses, and [sx] prana, and not by knowledge, and [x] hasti, and knowledge, and the pure joy of the result, he himself becomes light with himself.

This whole world, whatever exists, is all Brahm: with respect to that (idea), which brings down Brahm is all; [and] it is beneficial; he is the master of power; and he is a great nurturer; he is light; and his face is on every side; [and] that narsing'hah bringing down is everything; [and] he who causes fear is everything; he gives joy to everyone; it is death that makes it vanish; he is worthy of reverence; he saying: "I" is in everything: (so) whatever exists, all that (world) is; he is beneficent; he is the master of power; and he is a great nourisher; and that is light; and his face is on every side; he is the lion, which brings everything down; making fear is all he is; and he is giving joy to all; and it is he who makes death vanish; and he is worthy of reverence; and saying: I: in all things, he is.

And, for this very reason, from [x] alef maftouh [x] Pram Brahm verified as he shows, when mim saken, that [x] is makar, and having preserved the heart and all the senses, and is the witness of all this (reality), let him seek him.

At the time when this atma is not tending to this world (toward this world), the whole world enters into it: at the time when, having become awakened with everything (toward everything) it becomes tending, all the world above it comes (goes out); and up to the time which he wills to be kept, after the predetermined time he caused all this to arise, and prevented all from all actions (caused all actions to cease), and rubbed all together (allured), and caused to burn, and all to eat , he gives himself to them (he mingles with them).

He (atma) is very beneficent: and he is the lord of much power: and he who nourishes is very great: on all sides his face is much: there is much light: and he who brings down the narsing'hah is very great: and he who does much is to be feared : and he is the giver of much joy to all; I: saying much in all things, that is.

Having become (existing) with these qualities, he is always in his greatness.

From this respect, it is necessary that this djiw atma be one with [x] mim saken as he did, with the meaning of [x] alef maftouh, which is Pra Brahm, to make one; and with the wow mazzmoum he will put all his doubts aside (remove them).

Whoever knows in this way, having become liberated from the body, and the senses, and [x] prana, and not knowledge, and [x] hasti, and knowledge, and the pure joy of the result, he himself becomes light with himself.

In accordance with this, in another mantra (book) Beid, it is also mentioned that, the horn(a) with the side (side) of the halved horn (mim) so that he drew (a man), with this horn to make one; and this horn, which with another horn (Vau) makes one; and let that horn(a) become one with this [horn] (wow).

The seventh K'hand is absolute.

***

K'HAND EIGHTH.

Now, [x] nim matrai the fourth [xx] pranou, when this atma, which is mentioned, must at the same time be the thread under the thread he knew (to know).

And here is the atma narsing'hah; that is, the lion, which carries everything down: and here the whole world is in the midst of it: and it is the soul of the whole world: and whatever exists, it is all: and the thread under the theme is all of it: and it has no second.

And this atma is unique: and it is not being changed: this whole world, which is seen, [x] does not have this (existence), and (what) is shown (what) is without being (exists).

In the middle of the world, the atma like a rope entered [(into) a precarious corolla] remains.

And this atma is full of [x] hasti (existence); and he is full of knowledge; and he is full of joy; and in every place it is in one way (of one nature, equal); and does not enter into any occupation (does nothing); and he has no second.

In the same way, Oum is also an underlying thread.

At the time that (they) ask for something from someone, what does it exist in this way? if it exists (in this way), he says in reply, Oum: and if he asks, what, is it not in this way? if it is not, he also says Oum in answer to it. Since the principle of speech is Oum, and whatever exists, speech exists (is), and nothing is extraneous from speech; therefore, whatever exists is Ohm.

And this Oum itself is the form of knowledge: and the whole world is also the form of knowledge: from this respect (therefore) all the world becomes one with the great lord of the world.

At the time when the world becomes one with the great lord of the world; at that time it is without ceasing and without fear: why? that [Brahm] is without fear.

Whoever understands this way, he also becomes Brahm without fear.

This [secret] must be covered with excess (quite a bit).

And this atma is himself making the gift: why? that he gives himself to the seeker.

All these living things do not have life by themselves: all things are alive with (from) him.

And this power also did not say to him [that he became a piece (thread) and entered into everything: and this also did not say power], that giving himself is when he seeks himself: with respect to that (propterea), that he with something [x] it does not mix (intermingle itself), which, having become a thread, enters into something. Since he [x] is not changed (to be), and he has no second, with whom (to whom) he gives himself?

And Oum also in this way making a gift is himself when he seeks himself; with regard to that (idea) that every person does something that is approved; Oum says: since the principle of speech is Oum, with speech everything is approved; therefore Oum is the form of knowledge.

And the whole world is also a form of knowledge.

And this world, which has neither knowledge nor soul, that atmai, which is the form of knowledge, enters into these (this world) and gives knowledge: from this respect all the world becomes one with the great atmai.

At the time when (when) the whole world becomes one with the great Atma, at that time it is done without ceasing and without fear: why? that Brahm is without fear.

Whoever understands this way, he also becomes Brahm without fear.

This secret should be covered with excess (very much).

And in this very way, this atma is the form of knowledge and of one mode (par); and he is full of knowledge; and he was a light before all the world. Since his knowledge is ancient; from this very respect he is full of knowledge, and is immune from [x] being a thread, and from [x] making himself a gift; from this very respect, that, at this level, whatever exists is atma, and apart from [x] atma there is no other existing thing. Consequently, it is not a tar (thread) that becomes woven into something [x]: and it is not, apart from it [something else (something)] existing, that makes itself a gift with it (it): and it is a being; and it is a form of science; and it is of one kind (par, equal).

[In this very way, Oum is also the form of knowledge, and is unique (simple, equal)].

At the time when someone makes an approved word, because he has acquired knowledge of it, [x] Oum, as he said, makes it approved (proves assent): speech is also Oum, for the reason that speech makes all things approved: and Oum is the form of knowledge it is; and [x] it is approved to do any thing even from knowledge.

From this point of view the whole world becomes one with the great lord of the world.

At the time when (when) the whole world becomes one with the great Lord of the world, at that time it is without cessation and without fear: why? that Brahm is without fear.

And whoever knows and understands this way, he becomes Brahm without fear.

This secret should be covered with excess (very much).

In this way, this atma has no other; and from this respect (propterea), that according to him (what) is not.

Oum also has nothing else; from this respect, which has no second. And this Oum is the form of knowledge.

From this respect the whole world becomes one with the great lord of the world.

And at this level, the atma does not have any bond, and it does not have the cause of the bond.

If someone in the unity (uniqueness) [x] of the atma, one particle apart from that atma, makes an estimate (has the value of a single particle, thinks that it is), that person becomes a hundred pieces and a thousand pieces: [with] whatever world (to whatever world) he goes to, he does not obtain deliverance from the hand of death, after death.

For him ([x] atma) according to (what) it is impossible: and he himself is light; and joy is great: and atmai is pure; and it is without cessation; and it is without fear: why? that Brahm is without fear.

And whoever understands this way, he also becomes Brahm without fear.

This secret should be covered with excess (mostly).

K'hand becomes the eighth absolute.

***

K'hand Ninth.

Oi Fereschtehha with Pradjapat they said; which: O worthy veneration! this Oum, which is the form [x] of the atma, do this with us (us) taught.

Pradjapat, being approved as he had done, said: the atma, having become separated from everything, sees everything; and from any occupation (operation) and the pure and evils of man's world [x] he has no accident and request (subject to no man's occupation, he has no desire for any).

And this Atma itself, bringing down all the non-sciences, is the form of science; it has no apparent existence; and knowing is everything; He is at every time, in every place, in everything; duality is impossible in him: and there is only one truth.

And this one atma is the truth (being); everything else is vain (false): it is not according to him (anything).

The reason [x] is that the mai'a is appearing separately (and showing itself separately).

And this atma himself is great: and this atma himself is everything.

Those who are learned and learned know that the whole world, which enters with the intuition (to the intuition), is audya; that is, vain (false).

And he himself is this djiw atma, pram atma: and apart from this, that which exists is vain.

And for the sake of [x] doing to understand this, another thing is not (necessary) into action: he himself becomes the understanding by himself (through himself); from this respect (propterea) that whatever is long and broad and has a body (solid, deep) enters with the intuition and the heart (to the intuition and the heart): since this atma is immune from all these, it with any [x] power did not understand (they cannot understand): and from [x] knowing and not knowing is also immune (neither is known, nor is unknown); and with pure vadj dan be acquired.

And here is a greater figure of darkness and lack of knowledge. not to know this very thing ([x]), it is Maya.

Maya appearing to make an inanimate bot (idol), and error through carelessness, and complexity; just as here [x] nothing; and [x] absurdity, and non-existence, appearing (makes it appear); He is also nothing and absurd (something); and it was never (none) pure (absolute).

And they do not know the form of that [x] atmai itself.

He [Maya] himself shows (shows) these things with the shaft (existence) of light (non-existence); [x] they show the existent, the non-existent, and the [x] the non-existent, the existent: and he himself here maya, [x] the elect, (voluntary) without choice (involuntary) shows, and [x] without choice, the elect. Here Maya is like a fruit tree; which, to be seen in [x], is very small, but it has the power (power) [x] of making many trees with branch, leaf, and fruit in appearance; let him be in every tree; In this very way, this Maya, with that (although) he is not separated from anything [x], separates all the bodies separately, as he shows, he makes one worship (deity or man), and the other, a servant (worshipper).

Again the Maya became two horns (branches), one horn which was made audya, in (with) the being, which is the form of knowledge, as he mingled, he makes the servant (servant) say: and himself with the being, which is the form of knowledge, as he mingled , worship (worshipped, to whom service is rendered)

And here maya1 [Maya, eternal love, the active will of the supreme Being, coming forth through three qualities, eidjad, creation; abka, preservation; afna, destruction, in three divisions [x] atma in radjouguen in satguen, in temouguen, correlatives, the light of the first, the only being mixed, [x] Brahma, [x] Beschn, and [x] Mehisch (Roudr), refers to its very shape , he shows: hence, the soul itself puts on these three figures, and comes under them to be seen. Therefore [x] Fertschtehha, beginning with the first, is nothing else, but a continuous action, the same in itself, in different species, of a single being, producing an endless series of things, in perpetual succession, as if those things really existed, when it is a mere spectacle given to the eyes , being an absolute being always equal and uniquely existing (Supra, No. 130, p. 251, note 1).], which has a genus (different genus) of figures, is much firmly constricted (compacted); and the horns (branches) raise up (rise) a great deal from his head. Still, he is the son and the father: and he himself, on account of three (3) qualities, that is, [x] eidjad, [x] abka, and [x] afna, appears to be separate.

And in every horn also, when he entered with the foot of the three (3) qualities, he showed them separately separately.

Tov Brahma, and [x] Beschn, and [x] Mehisch, with the permission (through the permission) of the Light-Being, which is the form of knowledge, shows itself with its shape: from this respect, the shape [x] of the atma (second) three ( 3) the division, with the view (to the view) enters; in the division [x] radjouguen, with the figure [x] Brahma; and in the division [x] satguen, with the figure [x] Beschn; and in the division [x] temouguen, with the figure [x] Mehisch, appears.

Giving respect (relation) of all actions to himself (who does them), he is aabed (servant, serving); and making to do, maaboud (worship, to whom worship, service is offered).

And the difference between the souls and the Haranguerbehah is this, that the souls separate themselves separately as they knew, [x], I: say: and the Haranguerbehah himself as he knew the collection of souls, [x], I: says.

And Haranguerbehah has [three (3)] figures; that is, [x] eidjad, [x] abha, and [x] afna.

Whatever the Creator wills to be produced by his will (true determination) with his hand, by (through) Haranguerbehah it itself becomes apparent from the will (intention).

That (being) making the product is in everything; and he is the master; and he has the power [x] to understand every thing: and he has the power (faculty) [x] to do every action: every thing is in every thing: and in all souls every thing is.

Since all atma exists, djiw atma is that atma itself: therefore, whatever is in atma, in any of the four states, that is, [x] nasout, and [x] malkout, and [x] djabrout, and [x] lahout, and in djiw is atma.

Since the existence of that which (even) is all in all, yet indeed the atma is greater (greater) than all: just as the surrounding sea (ocean) with its universality is in every wave (every wave); but the waves, the cause of their apparent existence, are small; [and] the sea is great (greater) than anything else.

He himself here atma the elements, and senses, etc. the shape of the whole world, and [x] mokelan and [x] Fereschtehha and five (5) treasures, which is in all bodies, appearing (appearance) as he made it, and himself in the middle of everything (thing ) entered, when the existence of that which (though) is the form of knowledge, the cause [x] of Maya, having become ignorant, does the occupations (operations of the world).

From this very respect (property) the atma has no second; and on (in) [x] the shaft is pure (existing absolutely, alone); and always is; and it is pure; and knowledge is pure (not mixed); and it is true; [and] it is free from everything without appropriation; and he is immune from everything; and encompassing (comprising all) is; and there is no limit to his joy; and is superior to all.

Other things, which are face to face (face to face), with the indication of the finger, which, when he is on their side (toward them), (a man) makes him understand: and him, with the indication of the finger, (that) with his side He does it himself (towards himself), makes him understand.

He is of one kind (par, equal) in this manner, which, with all the senses, and understanding, and reasoning (man) can know (know); on account of the fact that whatever exists [x] belongs to this rod; and [x] his shafts are far earlier than all; and whatever is far before everything is also that.

Brahm,1 [Ms. born Brahm o anoubhou, Brahm and anoubhou.] anoubhou, which is [x] vadj dan, besides him (another being from him) he did not find.

That atma, which is the form [x] vadj given, is itself light with itself, and is the witness of all (beings), and is not changed in it, and has no second; in the midst of it [x] there is no hearing, which is fog and not knowledge: he sees that, all this that is seen, [x] is pure to thee, and there is nothing else.

From this very respect it is true; and it is ancient; and the product was not made; let him be in himself; and he is full of the joy of knowledge; and it is firm (stable); and Djibril, and Mikail, and Asrafil, and other things, all in2 [Ms. born az ou, from it.] they are firm (permanent) by it.

From this very respect, that atma is pure; and there is no cessation of its shape; and its form is light; and this is the figure of rest; and that is atma; and there is nothing that does not have atma in it.

Atma, before everything was firm (stable); and these were not (were not) anything.

Let the soul always be in its greatness; and to him the volition of any thing is not; he is the witness of all (beings); and he is unique; and he with himself [is light].

Oi Fereschtehha asked Pradjapat that, what relation do they have to the dry land (dry earth, barren soil, stones, etc.) which is without soul (life) with [x] atma?

Pradjapat said: the answer, what I will say, there is no doubt about it; that, this very reason (respect) is that the visible thing (proceeded) from the atma: and whatever is made by it [appearing] is its form. of the earth, of stones, of rocks, of all things which are not endowed with life, to the supreme Being; they came out of him.].

He is all-seeing; and he is every witness, and he is not changed; and he is firm; and he is immune from lack of knowledge and error through carelessness; whatever is in the apparent (exterior) and interior, that is; and from this very respect it is apparent; and he is superior to non-science.

After that (then) Pradjapat with [x] Ferdschtehha said that, [say that you saw that (being) or did you not see it? they said, we saw, he said]: what do you see? They said: that which flows (proceeds) making occupation (operations), and with that which (although) is small, is great, and is the witness (caution) of all senses: true, it does not have all greatnesses; we see that; that is, [x] djiw atma: and that which is immune from joy and sorrow, so that it has no second; and the Atma is great, and all-knowing; and it is without end; and it is not separated from any thing; and he has no second (other) and it is always a scientific figure; and even so is light, that its light is not hidden from [x] mays; and we did not see that (being); that is, [x] pram atma.

Pradjapat said, that whatever you see, you are also that: and that (being), which has no second, they said (you said), that we do not see; It is not according to him himself that, you see; you are that too.

Oi Fereschtehha they said, that, O worthy veneration! make you understand again.

Pradjapat said: [x] atma, which, if you want (desire), you are. And if you see things other than [x] atma, you are not atma dan ([x] atma knower).

Atma is without a like (equal), and has no other: since for this very reason (therefore) you are Atma; You are light with yourselves.

Whatever may be seen, you have (existence) and pure (sincere) knowledge: with this very respect (about that) you also [x] have and are pure knowledge.

Oi Fereschtehha said that if we, together with ourselves, were the light, we would be without a similar one.

Pradjapat said: if you, with yourselves, are not light, how do you say that, [x] djiw atma we see?

They said that we do not know what we are, and with whom we see.

Pradjapat said: as much as you yourselves knew, which we do not know, this is knowledge itself; and knowledge is light: therefore you, together with yourselves, are light.

And the form [x] of the shaft (of existence), and the form of knowledge, which you are, is from that, that [x] the shaft and knowledge were before everything, therefore, whatever is visible has been made, since from the shaft and knowledge the visible has been made , the form [x] of the spear is also the form of knowledge.

And that Being, which is the form [x] of the spear and of knowledge, does not enter into occupation (operations of men), and is light, and has no second.

Pradjapat with ([x]) Fereschtehha said: What I said, do you understand me to say with pure (simple) [x] (faith)? or do you understand it from your own verification (because you yourselves have certainly verified it)?

Oi Fereschtehha said: we knew in this way, that it (being) from [x] is superior to both knowing and not knowing.

Pradjapat said: this very understanding of yours (this understanding of yours) is Brahm, according to (what) it does not have: and since it is without end, according to what place is it contained?

And it always is; and it is pure and the form of knowledge; and without appropriation and freed (not bound); and it is true; and it is subtle; and it is full (fills everything), and has no second; and spears, and knowledge, and joy is pure; and this very thing is atma: and therefore (of course) and with it no one can make profit (interest) and commerce (contract).

You did not see another (Ens), and you made a firm retention of the senses, when you see [x] Oum [x] atma, which, atma is true (Ens): in this word do not bring any doubt, that, atma Brahm, and Brahm, Atma is, and Oum is Atma.

Oi Kianian and scholars see it this way.

This atma does not enter into voice, and touch, and color, and taste, and smell, and speech; and with the hand the power did not seize (seize) him; and with any reason (in any way) the power did not make him cross (transcend, escape); and the acquisition of pleasure from it with the freedom (in the power) of no one is: the heart, and understanding, and reflection, and egoism, with it (to him) did not reach: and pran, and apan, and aodan (advan), and saman, and bian, which is the five winds, does not reach with him (they do not reach): and he is immune from sense and perceptible external (apparent) and internal: and he is without indication, and without similar (equal), and without quality , and it is without movement: and it does not enter into meaning: and the quality of eidjad, and abka, and afna, is not in its being: and maya is not contained in it: and with [x] Oupnek'hathai pure, that, its great secrets that is, the power finds him (they can find him).

And in the perfect (absolutely) there is light: whoever becomes light at one time with his light, always remains light, and of (for) all lights that (Being-) was the first Light.

That light, you, when (in) [x] hens also, which has the name adjpa; that is, in [x] the breath strikes (breathes), all animate things, flowing without freedom (naturally) (they have a course, they live); the meaning of that (thing) is that I am that; that I am; (that light in this) you see.

Pradjapat again asked [x] Fereschtehhai that: do you see or do you not see?

Oi Fereschtehha they said that we have seen; a [x] to know and not to know (it) is above.

Pradjapat said: that; you, what you said, that we see; from [x] to know and not to know (that is) above: in what place is that pure knowledge?

Oi Fereschtehha said that; with what reason are you asking?

Again he asked Pradjapat, what has he acquired from him?

Oi Fereschtehha said that; nothing has been acquired from him (does not come from him).

Pradjapat said: you are showing a wonder: you have found it well.

Oi Fereschtehha said that we are not to be surprised; you are to be admired.

Pradjapat said: you, [x] Oum as you say, make it approved, because we are to be surprised; and [x] You are thirsty to have spoken Oum (you have truly pronounced Oum).

Again Pradjapat said, what, now did you know?

Oi Fereschtehha they said: we knew: but we did not know like you.

Pradjapat said: again [x] dedicate yourself to Om, because the atma is firm (stable), this is it.

Oi Fereschtehha they said: O worthy veneration! now that which, we see, we fear to do [x] expounded, [o] worthy of veneration! humble submission to you! be beneficent upon us.

Pradjapat knew: since these questions have made a lot, they make a consideration (they are worried, they consult themselves, they consider this).

Pradjapat said: do not be afraid: if you want something else, you can ask.

Oi Fereschtehha they said: first you asked us that; Where is that pure knowledge? [we also ask of you; you say: what, in what place is that pure knowledge?]

Pradjapat said: this very thing is atma; that is, whatever exists is atma; and knowledge is pure. Therefore, if knowledge is pure, in what place is it, in what way did the power say (can they say)?

O Fereschtehha, they all said that, in humble submission to you, that we are that atma himself to be admired.

Pradjapat [x] Fereschtehha made them learned in this way.

And according to this mantra (book) it is Beid that, pranou also has four states; and the atma also has four states.

And from the first letter [x] pranou, that the thread ([x]) is all to weave, let (man) know the first state [x] of atma, that he also is all to weave the thread ([x]).

And from the second letter [x] pranou, which is to make a gift oneself, let him know the state according to [x] atma, which also is to make a gift oneself.

And from the third letter [x] pranou, which is knowledge and has no second, let him know the third state [x] atma, which is also knowledge and has no second.

And from this third state [x] pranou, [x] atma as he obtained, from [nim] matrai the fourth [x] pranou, which has no other, the fourth state [x] atma, which, he also has no other, [and ] is near (a neighbor) and a witness, as he knew that he would reach (him) with him.

The absolute becomes the ninth K'hand (9), [with [x] Brahm nemeskar].

And with the absolution (to the end) he reached [Oupnek'hat] Narsing'hah atmai, which has an excess (infinity) of time, and is the limit of the degrees of unification, and of mystical (contemplative) science, and the requested (questions, object) [x] kian and knowledge, and the last (end) (of the book) is Athrban Beid.

And (the book) Athrban Beid [also] the last (extremity) of which is three (3) Beids1 [You have the key of the Indian sanctuary before your hands, learned reader, but a little rough with rust. Enter, if you dare, if you can, with a pure and simple heart, agglutinated with the glow of the Supreme Being, as if transfused into it; external senses asleep, internal ones alert; with a body as if dead: and immersed at the same time in the depth of knowledge and the sea of ​​ignorance, outside of God there is nothing to see you, to be nothing, according to the ancient custom of the Indians, if it is true, acknowledge it with veneration.].

This interpretation [x] Oupnekhathai of any of the four (books) of Beid, which is designated with great secrecy (by great secrecy), and complete knowledge of the light of lights, [here] the fakir without sadness, [Sultan] Mohammed Dara schakoh himself [Dara Shikoh [Shukoh] [Shucoh]], with the meaning of the right , with sincerity, during the period of six (6) months, [on the last day, the second [x] Schonbeh, the twenty-sixth] [month] [x] of Ramazan, in the year one thousand and sixty [and seven] (one thousand and sixty-seven ) [x] hedjri (Christi 1667), in the city of Dehli, in the mansion (lodge) nak'he noudeh, with absolution (to the end) he makes to arrive.

Of the wonderful successful events, this is [what was determined according to the man of this book of God of old], that, at the time (when) (the book) Beidha became hidden, the true (God) was supreme in this very nak'he boudeh1 [Samskretic, nikhananam bouddihi , character, habit of character: or, in Persian, a place where dear children are kept.], he made (it) apparent.

In that same way, the true (God) holy and supreme, in this (in the same way), in the head (on the face) of the earth (make him) visible (make known to the world).

May the supreme God grant grace to those who seek him: [that, from this treasure of knowledge they may become partakers, and freed from imaginary existence, when they have arrived at true existence (to true existence), they may become freed and absolute (salvation, blessed) eternally; Amen. Lord of the worlds!]

On the twenty (20th) day of the month of Rabi Essan in the year 1181 [x] hedjri (Christ 1767), the birth (installation) in the (seventh) year [x] Schah Aalem, on the day of Schonbeh, on the day of nature peace (fausta), in [x ] Ssoubeh Aoudeh, with the manuscript (manual writing) [x] Atma Ram, complete rest, these fifty Oupnek'hat with absolution (reached).

Oom, oom, Oom, Oom, Oom. Sealing. (Finish.)

***

Absolute is this Apograph of the Latin version [x] fifty OUPNEK'HATHA, verbatim, from the Persian idiom, interspersed with Samskretic words, made on October 9, 1795, 18 Brumaire, anni 4 Republ. Gall. Paris

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Part 1 of 15 (EMENDATIONES ET ANNOTATIONES IN [x] OUPNEK’HAT)
[Latin Version]

ΠAPAI'NEƩIƩ

In ista prolixiore compositione Indica, duo obscuritatis et erroris fontes: primus, ipsum libri argumentum, seu res spiritales et materiales, insueto modo, et Orientali genio ac stylo tractatoe: secundus, interpretis Latini imperitia vel oscitatio. Prior, lectorem eruditum, intelligentem, altis meditationibus assuetum, haud terrebit: posterior, quo me immunem haud dixerim, indulgentem, benevolum invocat; proesertim in sat longa loci impressionis ab auctoris habitatione distantia. Si quid sensui repugnans, aut nimia tectum caligine, sese offerat, statim ad Annotationes, etc. recurrendum: illic remedium, Coeterum nunquam accuratum et diligentem typographum eo errasse ut folium rursus proelo dare necessum foret, affirmare non dubito.

***

EMENDATIONES ET ANNOTATIONES IN [x] OUPNEK’HAT

TOMUM II.

Peractum est iter longum et arduum. Si quid in via erratum, ingenue id fateri, male visa aut dicta corrigere, obscura, ut potis est, elucidare, jubet viro probo innatus veritatis amor. Coeterum, in tanta quoe Galliam, Europam, orbem fere totum agitat tempestate; mentibus terrore et errore perculsis; opinionibus, nisi in rejicienda tum relligione, tum ratione, dissentientibus; spreta veterum doctrina; urgente novorum dogmatum, soli placet innixorum, farragine; cunctis ferme, brutorum more, corporis affectibus serviliter addictis: senem infirmum, imbellem, cum fortuna, cum quoestuosis etiam proximorum suasionibus luctantem, et a typographo, ut jam dictum est, procul remotum, multo pluries a recto non deviasse forsitan mirabitur justus rerum oestimator.

OUPNEKHAT 7.[x], NARAIN.
N.° LXXXVII.

PAG. 1, lin. 5: Narain, id est, ens ...
Samskretice, naraha, martiaha, homo, vel femina.

Primo Enti, quale Indi ex operationibus agnoscunt, optime convenit haec significatio, ad Lingam, pluries explicatum (supra, T. I, Annotat. p. 513; Baldoeus, ibid. p. 647), etiam relata.

In creatione, supra, T. I, N.° XXII, p. 100-105; N.° XXIV, p. 122-126, ignis primus apparet: hic pran, aer et ventus.

Sic et in Mahabarat (12 Porb. 2 part. fol. 449 r.): Modus creationis mundi e commixtione memorata super hac ratione est. Primum intellectus in existentiam venit: et ex intellectu egoitas: et ex ea oether (aer): et ex eo ventus: et ex eo ignis: et ex eo aqua: et ex eo terra: et mundus ex his octo rebus creatus (factus), et in his octo rebus sit. (Ttariek paedaesch aalem az ekhtelatt madzkoureh bar in nohedjast awel aakel bevodjoud miaiad ve az aakel ahenkar ve az ou akas ve az ou bad ve az ou atesch ve az ou ab ve az ou zemin ve aalem az in hascht tchiz makhlouk schodeh o dar in hascht tschiz mibaschad).

Verum ignis, sol et ventus, dignitate aequales sunt (supra, T. I, N.° XXII, p. 102); ipsoe hoe tres divisiones [x] pran sunt: quod aerem revera ut elementorum fontem indigitat. Graecorum philosophorum sententiae de primo rerum materiali principio, aere, igne aut aqua, diligentius et comparate perpensae, eodem forte redirent.

Pag. 1, lin. penultim. pag. 2, lin. 1-16: [Brahma .... qualitas productions]: Andr ... qualitas regis ... etipse ille Narain Brahma est, .... Andr est .... Aschnikamar est .... rek’heschiran ... est ....

Diversa, in systemate Indico, 2. 1, etiam 3.1 ordinis agentia, esse meras qualitates, clare dicitur; et [x] Narain illa ipsa esse, sicut est homines a Deo dilecti; Narain, cujus proprietates Ens supremum referunt: quod semper existentiarum apparentium catenam ad primum, unum annulum revocat, e pluribus unum facit.

Verum peculiariter Narain de Beschn, nutriente, conservante, dicitur (pag. 3, lin. 6, 7, 13, 14).

Pag. 2, lin. 5; Vas, lege: Vas.

Pag. 3, lin. 16-28; pag. 4: quicunque hoc Oupnek'kat tempore mane legit .... et ei facile non sit quod legat (Beid) ....

Sic paulatim, quemadmodum in aliis relligionibus, ad quandam peculiarem praxim (legere hoc vel illud talis opens caput, pater et ave, rosarium, S. Virginis officium recitare, hoc vel illo tempore), vera pietatis praecepta, ductorum minus prudentum consilio reducuntur. Negligitur institutio; difficultatis obtentu deseruntur libri sacri1 [Malum tamen Europam totam non invasit, si Diaria fides adbibenda, in quo legitur: "La societe formee dans cette ville (Londres) en 1785, pour l’encouragement et l’assistance des ecoles du dimanche (Sunday schools), reparties dans les divers comtes d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, a fait distribuer depuis son etablissement 151,962 alphabets ou livres a epeler, 35,802 Nouveaux Testament, et 6336 Bibles, a 1774 ecoles, contenant 172,148 ecoliers. Outre les secours fournis par cette societe a 53 ecoles deja etablies, elle a, dans ces six derniers mois, concouru a en fonder 44 en Angleterre, et un grand nomhre d’autres dans le Nord et le Sud du pays de Galles." Moniteur, 17 thermid. an 9, p. 1307; Londres, le 27 juill. (1801), 8 thermid. Novum istud S. Scripturoe, etiam in tenera aetate, lectionis propagandae, et sic veri et uberrimi moralis fontis reserendi studium, Anglorum sanam mentem ac solidum, quidquid sit de politico eorum erga alias gentes agendi modo judicium, ingemum probat, et futuram nationi moratam, et animo ac vita, ut ratio et bonum publicum postulant, constitutam, parat generationem.]; peccatorum, impetrandae veniae facilitate, gravitas, enormitas evanescit; vilescit strictae sanctitatis meritum: mollior, quasi rosacea via, per quam, dulciter cadendo et surgendo, velut ludendo, ad tremendum supremi judicis tribunal, incaute, futurorum ignari, inermes traducuntur.

Pag. 3, lin. 22: [x] quinque peccatum ... (pandj [sine punctis sed cum numer. nota 5 super posita] ghounah ke ghounah kabireh ast).

Samskretice, panscha, quinque.

Peccatum erit quintum gradu, seu maximum. Si bikh legeretur, ad vocem samskreticam bhichanam, verbis minari, terrere; bhichakaha, homo qui horrido vultu terret, referri posset.

***

OUPNEKHAT 8[x], TADIW.

N.° LXXXVIII.

Pag. 5, lin. 2, Tadiw.

Samskretice, tadeva, solummodo, solus.  

Lin. 5, 6: mortificatio .... finem habet; et [x] Brahm finis non est.

Magni momenti, in relligione observatio. Praeterit exterior poenitentia; Deus aeternus permanet: proinde illi soli adhaerere, eum solum et semper ubique intueri, attendere, de eo meditari, unica verae felicitatis culmen attingendi via.

Lin. 20; Momentum .... et oculi nictatio etc.

Vide supra, T. I, Annotat. p. 598; Animadvertenda, p. 702, 703, diversas temporis divisiones.

Pag. 6, lin. 14 etc. propter quemnam Fereschtah korban ... faciam? et N.° XC, p. 14-17; humilis submissio ....

Forma precum, quae litaniarum nomen habent1 [Vide Mabillonii Veterum Analector. T. 2 (1676), p. 669 -689. — Ducange; Glossar. ad scriptor. med. et infim. latinitat. T. 4 (1733), p. 234, 235; sub voce Litaniae. [x] Oupnek’hat finale comma, propter quamnam etc.; et supra, N.° CXXII-CXXVI, p. 171-196; humilis submissio, [x] ora, orate; intercedite pro me, pro nobis; parce nobis, libera nos, te rogamus, audi nos, litaniarum respondent.], antiquitus in Oriente recepta, unde ad Occidentem forte transiit.

Pag. 6, lin. 27-28; pag. 7, lin. 5, 6; cum cognoscente se ... largitum vim est ... non cognoscenti, viam suam non facit.

Beschenasandeh khod bakhschideh kowatast .... naschenasandeh rah khod nakonad.

A Deo, Dei scientia: cui eam non largitur, ad eum ire nequit.

Pag. 7, lin. 18, 19; Andr ... Bran ... aquam vitae comedunt...

Andr (supra, p. 2), est qualitas regis: Bran, erit, pari ratione, qualitas aquae. Quod hic Indus postulat, allegorice sumptum, est. vita in Deo, sub aquoe vitoe emblemate.

Pag. 7, lin. ultim. p. 8, lin. 1, 4, 10: cum illo quod prius ab omni est, in ventre matris etiam id est ... hic homo cum figura trium nour (lucum).

Ens, omnium causa, in ventre matris, generationis incunabulo, absconditum residet; et cum foras prodit, homo universalis, mundum repraesentans, cum trium qualitatum figura (supra, N.° LXXXVII, p. 1, 2) apparet.

Pag. 8, lin. 28; pag. 9, lin. 1, 2: Omnis mundus primum in aqua absconditus fuit; et aqua in atman: aqua, quae ex voluntate aeterna cum mundo gravida fuit: et fructum (fetum) cepit ignis (hameh aalem awel dar ab nehan boudeh o ab dar atman ab ke az aradeh azli beaalem hamleh schod ve hamel guereft atesch).

Hic agnosci potest Genesis1 [Ve Haarets haiietah tohou va bobou ve khoschek aal penei tehom ve rouakh Elohim merakhefet aal penei hammaim. Genes. I, 2.], terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebroe erant super faciem abyssi; et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas.

Voluntas aeterna erit maia (T. I, N.° LXVII, p. 316): aqua mundo, terra gravida (N.° XXII, p. 101); ignis fetum capiens (p. 102); scilicet, Haranguerbehah (collectio elementorum simplicium), in tria, ignem, solem et ventum, divisus; spiritus Dei (Beischwanr atma, calor naturalis cunctis vitam impertiens (T I, N.° XIV, p. 44-48), super aquas latus.

Pag. 10, lin. 1, 2: in his tribus qualitatibus ...

Tres qualitates seu figurae, sunt Antrdjami (ille qui in mediocordis est, et secreta cordis novit, T. I, N.° II, p. 12. Samskretice, antarena, inter; antar gamanam, intrare, introducere), maia et Brahma. Inde liquet diversis istis significationibus, explicationibus, unum idem ens, attributis, quae veluti agentia operantur, praeditum enunciari.

***

N.° LXXXIX.

Pag. 11, lin. 2; in eum (atma) projiciat.

Omnia in atma, quasi victimam sacrificii in ignem, ubi consumuntur, projicere, entia est variorum ordinum in primo, unico ente existentia; scilicet hoc solum vere, substantialiter existens, agnoscere, confiteri.

Lin. 24. Sarb mid.

Samskretice, midhounam, vel yougmam, congregatio, simul, una.

***

OUPNEK'HAT 9.[x], ATHRB SAR.

N.° XC.

Pag. 12, lin. 2; Athrb sar.

Supra, T. I, N.° III, p. 13: athrb, simpliciter; hic cum voce sar. Samskretice, suraha, succus, sapor, condimentum, perfectio.

Not. 1, lin. 2, adde:

Versionem Anglicam, clariss. D. Boughton Rouse adscriptam (supra, T. I, Monit. p. VI, VII, not. 1, Institut. of Timur etc. ad calcem, p. XLVIII), quaeque ad pag. usque 14 lin. 9, in luce sua absconditus fuit, textus progreditur, hic juvat apponere.

"The foregoing prayer is extracted from the Judger Bed: to which it may he curious to subjoin a description of Ruder, to whom it is adressed, as contained in another sacred Book, intitled the Atherban Bede.

"The Angels having assembled themselves in heaven before Ruder, made obeisance and asked him: O Ruder, what art thou? RUDER replied: Were there any other, I would describe myself by similitude. I always was, I always am, and always shall be. There is no other, so that I can say to you, I am like him. In this me is the inward essence, and the exterior substance of all things. I am the primitive cause of all. All things that exist in the east, or west, or north, or south, above or below, it is I. I am all. I am older than all. I am king of kings; my attribut are transcendent. I am truth. I am the spirit of creation; I am the Creator. I am the knowledge of the four Bedes1 [The sacred writings of the Hindoos in the shanscrit language.]. I am almighty. I am purity. I am the first, and the middle, and the end. I am the light. And for this purpose do I exist, that whosoever knows me, may know all the Angels, and all books, and all their ordinances. And whosoever knows the learnings of the Bedes, from thence he will learn the duties of life, he will understand truth, and his actions will be virtuous. And to those who practise virtue, will I give fullness and tranquillity.

"Ruder having pronounced these words to the Angels, was absorbed in his own brightness."

Pag. 12, lin. 10; Roudr dixit: si secundus meus (mei) sit...

Roudr, Brahm ipse, primum Ens hic adstruitur, quoniam ad ens unicum, ut supra (T. I, Annotat. p. 642) dictum est, omnia destruens, reducit.

Pag. 13, lin. 3, homo et non homo et femina, ego sum. Vide supra, T. I, N.° LXIX, p. 321.

Ibid. lin. 6, ignis naturalis ego sum.

Igne isto naturali duo ignes indicantur; 1.[x] Beischvanr atma, calor universalis naturae vitam inserens, eamque fovens (supra, N.° LXXXVIII, p. 8, T. I; N.° XIV, p. 44-48); 2.[x], calor naturalis (T. I, N.° LIV, p. 274), qui alimentum in stomacho concoquit.

Ibid. lin. 23; pag. 14, lin 6: Quicunque me scivit ....

Ordo rectitudinis, in Indica doctrina: semper, cum opere puro, Dei, veritatis, librorum Beid cognitio conjuncta.

Pag. 14, lin. 17, 18, 24; pag. 15, lin. 4, 5: Ille Roudri .. . et Brahma .. et Beschn .. et Maha diw .. et Parbati forma ejus ...

Roudr, Brahma creans, Beschn servans, Maha diw magnus diw, ut jam observatum, ejusque uxor, Parbati, ejus forma appellatur: quod omne ipsius qualitates nuncupatur, ejus entis forma. Ista nominum, attributorum communione, confirmantur quae supra, 458, 461 et T. I, annotat. p. 410, 411, observata.

Pag. 15, lin. 10, nabaik ....

In Mahabar. (13 Porb. fol. 659 v.) oi Deioutai [x] Maha diw comites (hamrahan) commemorantur, aguen (ignes) died; nempe Nandisour, et Maha kal, et Garmni barkeh, et Behdhoudj, et Kisr, et Nabaik, et Soum, et Roudr daken.

Samskretice, nabhavati, non est; non.

***

N.° XCI.

Pag. 17, lin. 19; auxilium efficax, (gratiam dans ad) opera bona ....

Vide supra, T. I, N.° XL, p. 214, et Annotat. p. 528.

Ibid. lin. penultim. faciens et non faciens.

Vide supra, T. I, N.° LXVII, p. 316, 317, et Annotat. p. 589, 590.

Pag. 18, lin. 2, aqua vitae .....

N.° LXXXVIII, p. 7, Brahm aquam vitae dat et ipse bibit: hic ipsa illa aqua est. Sic omne singulatim, separatum, distinctum existens perhibitum, in unum Ens supremum resolvitur.

Lin. 17, in margin, p. 338; lege: p. 343.  
In textu, et pag. 19, lin. 9, 10; Et nim matrai quartum ....

Sonus iste est finis pronunciationis [x] oum nasaliter prolongati; quod quasi litterae medietatem efficit. [x] pranou, nominis Dei; elogium.

Lin. 25: beneficum e benefico potestas ... obtinere ......

Res ejusdem perfectionis, invicem, una per alteram, intelligi, apprehendi queunt, sicut per vocabulum significatio.

Pag. 19, lin. 2; bucca edulii vestri ....

Quod ens unicum in se attrahit, annihilat, illud comedere dicitur. Clavis allegorica.

Lin. 11: (ens) universale et ligatum (particulare) vos estis.

Ens unicum, per nim matrai quartum, principium omnis rei, universale, seipsum est; per tria matrai, sub quorum figura mokelan in ejus corde resident, particulare.

***

N.° XCII.

Pag. 20, lin. 2 — pag. 22, lin. 18: Id, pranou ex illo dicunt ....

Diffusa [x] pranou, seu Oum expositio, ex eo quod in homine, qui illud pronunciat, operatur, petita: quae omnia Enti supremo propria; unde Ens supremum dici potest.

Lin. 5; opera, [x] Brahmen; lege: opera [x] Brahmen.

Vide supra, N.° XC, p. 14.

Opera sunt quae in [x] Brahmen praecipiuntur, quaeque illud legendo exequuntur.

Pag. 20, lin. 9, 11; sarb biabi ... cum omni circumdans est...

Samskretice: sarb, omnis; bi abhi, plenissime, omnino: abijna, fruitio.

Lin. 17; anant .... sine fine ....

Samskretice: antah, finis; anantah, infinitus.

Lin. 21-25; tar .... (ad ripam) faciens pervenire ... transire.

Samskretice, taranam, praetergredi, transire (v. g. aquam).

Lin. penultima: soutschhem .... subtile ....

Samskretice: souchman, aut paramanouhou, atomus, res tenuis.

Pag. 21, lin. 4; schokl .... purum ....

Samskretice, schoukla dravyam, albus.

Lin. 5, qualitate radj .... id est, volitio ....

Vide supra., T. I, N.° LXIV, p. 308, actiones malas qualitati radj attributas.

Lin. 9; badat (tadat), fulgur coruscans ....

Samskretice: tadayatam, strepitus, mugitus; vel d d d (infra, N.° XCIV, p. 32; supra, T. I, N.° XLVI, p. 267), nubis tonantis, fulgurantis, sonus, vox.

Lin. 24; isan .... dominum omnis rei ....

Samskretice: Ischa, dominus eminenter; Ischora, dominus dominorum. Sic Baldoeus, Ixora, Iswaren. Supra, T. I, Annotat. p. 644, 645.

Pag. 22, lin. 8.; bhagwan .... dignum veneratione ....

Samskretice, bhaga karanam; donum a patre et matre puellae nuptiarum die factum. In Mahabar. (19 porb. 2 part. fol. 564 v.) Bhagvan est Ens supremum, Tschakdis.

Lin. 12; Metsir (lege: Mehtsir) .... regem regum ....

In Mahabar. 12 porb. 2 part, fol. 664 r. Mehiser, omnium dominus, nomen [x] Maha diw. Mehelser. Id. fol. 509 v. Samskretice, meh, magnum; schiraha, caput.

Pag. 23, lin. 6-18. Quisquis seipsum dominum ... Roudr fit.

Qui sensibus absolute imperat, suae potentiae conscius, Roudr, Deus ipse efficitur, evenit.

Pag. 24, lin. 2; via outrain, quod septentrionale lumen sit.

Samskretice: outtara, septentrio; outtara pourva, N.-E.

Lin. penultima; p. 25, lin. 1: Cum illo quod iram et volitionem, et patientiam productas id (ens) fecit, oportet quod iram et volitionem, quod semen omnis est, ut reliquit, patientiam et tolerantiam, cum intellectu recto in corde suo (homo) custoditam habeat: illo tempore, cum Muha dm, qui lumen luminum est; unum fit.

(Ba ankeh ghazzab o khaesch o tahammel paeda kardeh oust baiad keh ghazzabra o khaeschra ke tokhm hameh ast goudzaschteh asabor o tahammelra beaakel daroust dar del khod negahdarad an zaman be maha diw keh rouschni rauschnihast ieki mischavad.)

Plura in hoc textu animadversione digna.

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Part 1 of 15

ΠAPAI'NEƩIƩ
[English version by Google Translate (of AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)]

In this lengthy Indian composition, there are two sources of obscurity and error: the first, the theme of the book itself, or spiritual and material matters, treated in an unusual manner, and with the genius and style of the Oriental: the second, the incompetence or yawning of the Latin translator. The former, an educated and intelligent reader, accustomed to deep meditations, will not frighten the latter; especially in the sufficiently long distance of the place of influence from the residence of the author. If anything contrary to sense, or too obscure, should present itself, immediately to the Annotations, etc. to be resorted to: there is a remedy, I have no doubt in asserting that the accurate and careful printer never erred so much as to make it necessary to give the leaf afresh.

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AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT

VOLUME II

The long and arduous journey has been completed. If you have done something wrong on the way, frankly admit it, correct what has been seen or said badly, and clarify the dark as you can, the innate love of truth commands a good man. Moreover, in such a way that Gaul, Europe, and almost the whole world are agitated by a storm; with minds shaken by terror and error; opinions, except in rejecting both religion and reason, those who disagree; scorning the teaching of the ancients; with the urgency of new dogmas, the sole pleasure of those who depended on it, mush; almost all, in the manner of brutes, slavishly addicted to the affections of the body: the old man, infirm, feeble, struggling with fortune, even with the flattering persuasions of his neighbors, and far removed from the printer, as has already been said, perhaps a just estimator of things will be surprised that he has not deviated from the right many times.

OUPNEKHAT 7.[x], NARAIN.
No. 87

PAGE 1, lin. 5: Narain, that is, being...
Samskretice, naraha, martiaha, man or woman.

To the first Being, such as the Indians recognize from their operations, this meaning best fits the Linga, explained several times (above, T. I, Annotat. p. 513; Baldoeus, ibid. p. 647), also related.

In creation, above, T. I, No. 22, p. 100-105; No. 24, p. 122-126, fire appears first: here prana, air and wind.

So also in the Mahabarat (12 Porb. 2 part. fol. 449 r.): The mode of creation of the world from the mixture is mentioned on this account. First the intellect came into existence: and from the intellect egoism: and from it the ether (air): and from it the wind: and from it the fire: and from it the water: and from it the earth: and the world was created (made) from these eight things. and let it be in these eight things. (Ttariek paedaesch aalem az ekhtelatt madzkoureh bar in nohedjast awel aakel bevodjoud miaiad ve az aakel ahenkar ve az ou akas ve az ou bad ve az ou atesch ve az ou ab ve az ou zemin ve aalem az in hascht tchiz makhlouk schodeh o dar in hascht tschiz mibaschad).

True, fire, sun, and wind are equal in dignity (above, T. I, No. 22, p. 102); These are the three divisions [x] of prana: which really needs air as a source of elements. The opinions of the Greek philosophers about the first material principle of things, air, fire, or water, more carefully and comparatively weighed, would return to the same chance.

Pag. 1, lin. little by little page 2, lin. 1-16: [Brahma .... the quality of productions]: Andr ... the quality of the king ... even he is Narain Brahma, .... Andr is .... Aschnikamar is .... rek'heschiran .. . it is ....

It is clearly stated that, in the Indian system, agents of the 2.1, even 3.1 order, are mere qualities; and [x] that Narain is herself, as are men loved by God; Narain, whose properties refer to the supreme Being: which always recalls the chain of apparent existences to the first, one ring, makes one out of many.

Verum is said to be peculiarly Narain de Beschn, nourishing, preserving (page 3, lines 6, 7, 13, 14).

Pag. 2, lin. 5; Vessel, read: Vessel.

Pag. 3, lin. 16-28; page 4: whoever reads this Oupnek'kat at the time of the morning ... and it is not easy for him to read (Beid) ...

So little by little, as in other religions, the true precepts of piety are reduced to a certain particular practice (reading this or that such opens the head, the father and the bird, the rosary, the office of St. Virgin, at this or that time), by the advice of less prudent leaders. The training is neglected; in the face of difficulty, the sacred books are abandoned1 ),distributed in the various counties of England and Wales, has distributed since its establishment 151,962 alphabets or spelling books, 35,802 New Testaments, and 6336 Bibles, to 1774 schools, containing 172,148 pupils. Besides the help furnished by this society to 53 schools already established, it has, in the last six months, helped to found 44 in England, and a large number of others in North and South Wales." Monitor , 17 Thermid. or 9, p. 1307; London, July 27 (1801), 8 Thermid.This new study of St. Scripture, even at a tender age, the reading of propaganda, and thus the study of unlocking the truth and most abundant moral source, proves the sound and solid mind of the English, whatever may be their political judgment in the way of acting towards other nations, proves a sigh, and the future of the nation delayed. and in mind and life, as reason and the public good demand, he prepares an established generation.] sins, with the ease of obtaining forgiveness, the gravity, the abnormality disappears; the merit of strict sanctity is despised: softer, like a rosy road, by which, sweetly falling and rising, as if playing, to the terrible tribunal of the supreme judgment, carelessly, ignorant of the future, the defenseless are conveyed.

Pag. 3, lin. 22: [x] five sins ... (pandj [without dots but with numer. note 5 placed above] ghounah ke ghounah kabireh ast).

Samskretice, panscha, five.

It will be a sin of the fifth degree, or the greatest. If bikh were to be read, to the Samskretic word bhichan, to threaten with words, to terrify; bhichakaha, a man who frightens with his hideous face, might be referred to.

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OUPNEKHAT 8[x], TADIW.

No. 88

Pag. 5, lin. 2, Tadiw.

Samskretice, tadeva, solummodo, alone.

Lin. 5, 6: mortification ... has an end; and [x] Brahm is not the end.

An important observation in religion. The outward penitence passes away; God remains eternal: therefore, to cling to him alone, to look at him alone and always everywhere, to pay attention to him, to meditate on him, is the only way to reach the summit of true happiness.

Lin. 20; The moment .... and the twinkling of the eye, etc.

See above, T. I, Notes. p. 598; Note, p. 702, 703, different divisions of time.

Pag. 6, lin. 14 etc. for which Fereschtah korban ... will I do? and No. 90, p. 14-17; low submission...

The form of precum which has the name of litanies1 [See Mabillon's Ancient Analector. T. 2 (1676), p. 669 -689. - Lead; glossary to the writer medicine and finally latinity T. 4 (1733), p. 234, 235; under the voice of the Litany. [x] Oupnek'hat final comma, because of which etc.; and above, No. 222-266, p. 171-196; humble submission, [x] pray, pray; intercede for me, for us; spare us, deliver us, we beseech thee, hear us, they answer the litanies.], anciently received in the East, whence it may have passed to the West.

Pag. 6, lin. 27-28; page 7, lin. 5, 6; with the one who knows himself ... there is power given ... to the one who does not know, he does not make his own way.

Beschenasandeh khod bakhschideh kowatast .... naschenasandeh rah khod nakonad.

From God, God's knowledge: to whom it is not given, cannot go to him.

Pag. 7, lin. 18, 19; Andr ... Bran ... they eat the water of life ...

Andr (above, p. 2) is the quality of a king: Bran will be, by the same token, the quality of water. What the Indian demands here, taken allegorically, is life in God, under the emblem of the watery vine.

Pag. 7, lin. last p. 8, lin. 1, 4, 10: with that which is before everything, that is also in the mother's womb... this man with the figure of three nour (heaven).

Being, the cause of all, resides hidden in the mother's womb, the cradle of generation; and when he comes forth, the universal man, representing the world, appears with the figure of the three qualities (above, No. 87, p. 1, 2).

Pag. 8, lin. 28; page 9, lin. 1, 2: All the world was first hidden in water; and water in the atman: water, which was pregnant with the world from the eternal will: and the fire caught the fruit (fetus) (Hama is a scholar, the first house of a father, we want him, a father, a house, I trust your father, Ezz, I want him to stay in my palm.).

Here can be recognized Genesis 1 [Ve Haarets haiietah tohou va bobou ve khoschek aal penei tehom ve rouakh Elohim merakhefet aal penei hammaim. Genes. 1, 2], but the earth was empty and void, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss; and the spirit of God moved upon the waters.

May's eternal will be (T. I, No. 67, p. 316): water for the world, earth pregnant (No. XXII, p. 101); fire catching the fetus (p. 102); namely, Haranguerbehah (a collection of simple elements), divided into three, fire, sun, and wind; the spirit of God (Beischwanr atma, natural heat imparting life to all (T 1, No. 14, p. 44-48), over the waters side.

Pag. 10, lin. 1, 2: in these three qualities...

The three qualities or figures are Antrdjami (he who is in the middle of the heart and knows the secrets of the heart, T. I, No. 2, p. 12. Samskretic, antarena, between; antar gamanam, to enter, to introduce), maya and Brahma. From this it is clear that by these different meanings and explanations, one and the same being is enunciated, endowed with attributes which operate as agents.

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No. 89

Pag. 11, lin. 2; let him throw it (atma) into him.

To cast all things into the soul, as a sacrificial victim into the fire, where they are consumed, is the existence of various orders in the first, single being; that is to say, to acknowledge and to confess that this alone is truly, substantially existing.

Lin. 24. Sarb mid.

Samskretice, midhounam, or yougma, assembly, together, one.

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OUPNEK'HAT 9.[x], ATHRB SAR.

No. 90

Pag. 12, lin. 2; Athrb sar.

Above, T. I, No. 3, p. 13: athrb, simply; here with the voice of Sar. Samskretice, suraha, juice, flavor, sauce, perfection.

Not. 1, lin. 2, add:

English version, Clariss. ascribed to D. Boughton Rouse (above, T. I, Monit. p. 6, 7, note. 1, Institut. of Timur etc. at the foot, p. 48), and which at pag. until 14 lin. 9, it was hidden in its light, the text continues, it helps to add it here.

"The foregoing prayer is extracted from the Judger Bede: to which it may he curious to subjoin a description of Ruder, to whom it is addressed, as contained in another sacred Book, entitled the Atherban Bede.

"The Angels having assembled themselves in heaven before Ruder, made obeisance and asked him: O Ruder, what art thou? RUDER replied: Were there any other, I would describe myself by similitude. I always was, I always am, and always shall be. There is no other, so that I can say to you, I am like him. In this me is the inward essence, and the exterior substance of all things. I am the primitive cause of all. All things that exist in the east, or west, or north, or south, above or below, it is I. I am all. I am older than all. I am king of kings; my attributes are transcendent. I am truth. I am the spirit of creation ; I am the Creator. I am the knowledge of the four Bedes1 [The sacred writings of the Hindoos in the Shanscrit language.]. I am almighty. I am purity. I am the first, and the middle, and the end. I am the light. And for this purpose do I exist, that whoever knows me, may know all the Angels, and all books, and all their ordinances. And whoever knows the teachings of the Bedes, from thence he will learn the duties of life , he will understand truth, and his actions will be virtuous. And to those who practice virtue, I will give fullness and tranquility.

"Ruder having pronounced these words to the Angels, was absorbed in his own brightness."

Pag. 12, lin. 10; Roudr said: if my second (mine) is...

Roudr, Brahm himself, is the first Being here to be constructed, since, as was said above (T. I, Annotat. p. 642), destroying all, he reduces to a single being.

Pag. 13, lin. 3. I am man and not man and woman. See above, T. I, No. 69, p. 321

Ibid. lin. 6, I am a natural fire.

Two fires are indicated by this natural fire; 1. [x] Beischvanr atma, the universal heat of nature infusing life and fostering it (above, No. 88, p. 8, T. I; No. 14, p. 44-48); 2.[x], natural heat (T. I, No. LIV, p. 274), which digests food in the stomach.

Ibid. lin. 23; page 14, line 6: Whoever knew me...

The order of rectitude, in Indian doctrine: always, with pure work, the knowledge of God, of truth, of the Beid books.

Pag. 14, lin. 17, 18, 24; page 15, lin. 4, 5: That Roudri .. . and Brahma .. and Beschn .. and Maha diw .. and his Parbati form ...

Roudr, creating Brahma, preserving Beschn, Maha diw great diw, as already observed, and his wife, Parbati, are called his form: that all his qualities are called the form of his being. These are confirmed by the communion of names and attributes, which he notes above, 458, 461 and T. I. p. 410, 411, observed.

Pag. 15, lin. 10, nabaik ....

In Mahabar. (13 Porb. fol. 659 v.) oi Deioutai [x] Maha diw counts (hamrahan) are mentioned, aguen (fires) died; namely Nandisour, and Maha kal, and Garmni barkeh, and Behdhoudj, and Kisr, and Nabaik, and Soum, and Roudr daken.

In Samskretic, nabhavati, it is not; no

No. 101

Pag. 17, lin. 19; effective help, (giving thanks to) good works ...

See above, T. I, No. 40, p. 214, and notes p. 528

Ibid. lin. little by little doing and not doing.

See above, T. I, No. 67, p. 316, 317, and notes. p. 589, 590

Pag. 18, lin. 2, the water of life .....

No. 88, p. 7, Brahm gives the water of life and he himself drinks: here is that water itself. Thus every individual, separate, and distinct existence, held together, is resolved into one supreme Being.

Lin. 17, in the margin, p. 338; read: p. 343
In the text, and p. 19, lin. 9, 10; And then the fourth matri ...

This sound is the end of the pronunciation [x] oum prolonged nasally; which makes, as it were, half of the letter. [x] pranou, of the name of God; praise

Lin. 25: benefic from benefic power ... to obtain ...

Things of the same perfection, one by one, are to be understood and apprehended, just as the signification is by a word.

Pag. 19, lin. 2; mouth of your food ....

That which a single being attracts to itself, it annihilates, is said to eat it. Allegorical key.

Lin. 11: (being) universal and bound (particular) you are.

The only being, through him the fourth matrai, the principle of all things, the universal, is itself; by three matrai, under whose figure Mokelan resides in his heart, particular.

No. 92

Pag. 20, lin. 2 - pag. 22, lin. 18: That, pranou from that they say ...

Diffuse [x] pranou, or exposition of Oum, from that which works in the man who pronounces it, claimed: all of which are proper to the Supreme Being; whence the Being may be said to be supreme.

Lin. 5; works, [x] Brahmen; read: works [x] Brahmen.

See above, No. 90, p. 14.

There are works which are prescribed in [x] Brahman, and which are performed by reading it.

Pag. 20, lin. 9, 11; sarb biabi... with everything surrounding...

Samskretice: sarb, all; bi abhi, fully, completely: abijna, enjoyment.

Lin. 17; anant .... without end ...

Samskretic: antah, the end; anantah, infinite.

Lin. 21-25; tar .... (to the bank) making to reach ... to pass

Samskretice, taranam, to pass by, pass over (v. g. water).

Lin. penultimate: soutschhem .... subtly ...

Samskretice: souchman, or paramanouhou, an atom, a thin thing.

Pag. 21, lin. 4; schokl .... pure ...

Samskretice, schoukla dravyam, white.

Lin. 5, the quality of radj ... that is, volition ...

See above, T. I, No. 64, p. 308, bad actions attributed to the quality of radj.

Lin. 9; badat (tadat), flashing lightning ...

Samskretice: tadayatam, a noise, a roar; or d d d (below, No. 94, p. 32; above, T. I, No. 46, p. 267), a sound, a voice, of a cloud thundering, of lightning.

Lin. 24; isan ... the master of all things ...

Samskretice: Ischa, lord eminently; Ischora, lord of lords. Thus Baldoeus, Ixora, Iswaren. Above, T. I, notes. p. 644, 645

Pag. 22, lin. 8.; bhagwan .... worthy of reverence ...

In Sanskrit, bhaga karanam; a gift made by the father and mother of the girl on her wedding day. In Mahabar. (19 porb. 2 part. fol. 564 v.) Bhagvan is the supreme Being, Tschakdis.

Lin. 12; Metsir (read: Mehtsir) .... king of kings ...

In Mahabar. 12 porb. 2 part, fol. 664 r. Mehiser, lord of all, name [x] Maha diw. Mehelser. Id. fol. 509 v. Samskretic, meh, great; schiraha, head

Pag. 23, lin. 6-18 Whoever becomes the master of himself ... Roudr.

He who commands the senses absolutely, aware of his power, becomes Roudr, God himself.

Pag. 24, lin. 2; the way outrain, which is the northern light.

Samskretic: outtara, north; outtara pourva, N.-E.

Lin. penultimate; p. 25, lin. 1: With that which (being) produced anger and volition and patience, it is necessary that anger and volition, which is the seed of everything, as he left, patience and forbearance, with a right understanding in his heart (man): at that time , with Muha dm, who is the light of lights; becomes one

(Ba ankeh ghazzab o khaesch o tahammel paeda kardeh oust baiad keh ghazzabra o khaeschra ke tokhm hameh ast goudzaschteh asabor o tahammelra beaakel daroust dar del khod negahdarad an zaman be maha diw keh rouschni rauschnihast ieki mischavad.)

More in this text is worth noting.

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Part 2 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[Latin Version]

§. I.

Patientia, tolerantia speciatim injungitur, ut cum Maha diw unum fiant. Quidquid ergo de crudeli et destructiva istius agentis qualitate dicitur, allegorico modo, de omnium in Ente supremo immersione, annihilatione, intelligendum. Vide supra, T. I, annotat. p. 642.

Patientia, et praecipue tolerantia erga malos, vexantes, affligentes, erga bonos, molestiam creantes, exercetur. Homines sunt, id est, fratres, cum idem, quamvis remotum, incunabulum, primae mulieris vulvam habeant: et injuriae inter fratres, proximos, quaecunque sit, oblivionem vel tolerantiam naturae, non secus ac rationis, relligionis, vox imperat.

Privatos videlicet, singulos tantum obstringit hoc humanitatis praeceptum! congregatis nimirum, in populos, nationes coadunatis, cuilibet animi affectui, motui, impetui, licet obsequi! proh dolor! quod lubet audacter arripiunt, audacius vi et servili, mercenario diplomaticorum calamo propugnant, vexatorum, spoliatorum defensionem aegre, vix ferentes.

Sic loquitur, in Parlamenti Britannici inferiore curia, vir praestans, magnis animi dotibus praeditus, at cum paterno in Galliam odio, tum augendorum suae patriae potentiae, commercii, opum studio nimium indulgens (illustr. Pitt), si diariis fides adhibenda.

"1 [Journ. des defens, de la patr. 13 germ. an. 9, p. 4 . Royaum. Britanniq. Londr. 25 mars 1801 (4 germin.) Chambr. des commun. Seance du 25 mars.] Ce qui fut fait dans un temps ou la France, l'Espagne et la Hollande nous disputoient la superiorite maritime, ne doit pas s’appliquer aux circonstances presentes. Notre marine aujourd'hui est egale aux forces combinees des puissances du Nord et de la France, de l'Espagne et de la Hollande. Il faut profiter de notre heureuse situation, pour etablir notre droit (maris dominium affectandi, naves quaslibet inspiciendi) d'une maniere incontestable; ou bien il faut que nous y renoncions pour toujours."

Jus ergo, sonus inanis, rerum statui subservit. Quod utile, quamvis iniquum, ubi occasio est, ratum facere gentis magnae est officium.

Europaeorum auribus incommoda sane Indorum erit sublimis, justa et benigna moralis doctrina!

Jam arduam de origine boni et mali quaestionem, in tomo primo (Annotat. p. 568-588) ex antiquorum philosophorum mente tractatam, e novorum resumere operae pretium est. Pravae et rectae affectiones, in systemate Indico, a Deo productae: et nihilominus eas in corde custodire quasi a seipso ortas homo tenetur. Ista ergo. sibi invicem adversantia non habet Indus philosophus. Quid ea de re recentes sentiant, videamus.

Sed prius de veritatis fonte, certitudinis fundamento, recti regula, innata humanae rationis norma, quaedam praeferre liceat.

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Part 2 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[English Version by Google Translate]

§ I.

Patience and tolerance are specifically enjoined to become one with Maha Diw. Whatever is said about the cruel and destructive quality of this agent, in an allegorical way, must be understood of the immersion, the annihilation, of all in the Supreme Being. See above, T. I, comments. p. 642.

Patience, and especially tolerance towards the bad, harassing and afflicting, towards the good, creating trouble, is exercised. They are men, that is to say, brothers, when they have the same, though remote, cradle, the womb of the first woman: and insults between brothers, neighbors, whatever it may be, the oblivion or tolerance of nature, no less than the voice of reason, of religion, commands.

This precept of humanity only binds the private, the individual! gathered together, of course, into peoples, nations, to obey every emotion, movement, and impulse of the mind! alas! what they like they seize boldly, they defend more boldly by force and servitude, with the mercenary pen of diplomats, they hardly bear the defense of the harassed and the despoiled.

Thus he speaks, in the lower court of the British Parliament, a distinguished man, endowed with great gifts of mind, but with his father's hatred of Gaul, and indulging too much in the pursuit of increasing his country's power, commerce, and wealth (illustrated by Pitt), if the diaries are to be believed.

“1 [Journ. des defens, de la patr. 13 germ. an. 9, p. 4 . Royaum. Britanniq. Londr. was made at a time when France, Spain, and Holland disputed with us the maritime superiority, must not apply to the present circumstances. Our navy today is equal to the combined forces of the powers of the North and of France, of the "Spain and Holland. We must take advantage of our happy situation to establish our right (affecting the dominion of the sea, inspecting any ships) in an incontestable manner; or we must renounce it forever."

Right, therefore, an empty sound, serves the state of things. It is the duty of a great nation to make good, however unjust, where there is an opportunity.

Inconvenient to the ears of Europeans, of course, the sublime, just and kind moral teaching of the Indians!

Already the arduous question of the origin of good and evil, treated in the first volume (Annotat. p. 568-588) from the mind of the ancient philosophers, is worth the effort from the resume of the new ones. Right and wrong affections, in the Indian system, are produced by God: and nevertheless man is bound to keep them in his heart as if they had arisen from himself. So that's it. The Indian philosopher does not oppose each other. Let's see what the freshers think about it.

But first of all it may be permitted to prefer certain things about the source of truth, the foundation of certainty, the rule of right, the innate norm of human reason.

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Part 3 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[Latin Version]

§. II.

Verum, rectum, justum, inter homines, in se consideratum, a tali relligione, a positivo Dei praecepto, ab arbitraria, ut loquuntur, dispositione independens est; non autem a primo vero, recto, justo, quod in se existit, et est Ens supremum, ipse Deus, cujus quasi signaculum, mentibus humanis impressum, sese per rationem animi, veluti per organum exerit.

Si, quod impossible, prima illa vivens et intellectualis regula non existeret, ratio humana, nullo fundamento nixa, nihil aliud esset quam unius hominis vel plurium, plurimorum idem videndi et sentiendi modus; cujus rectitudini, altera pariter res intuendi ratione repugnantibus affectibus, convenientiae, pacis, tranquillitatis, tandem proprii commodi causa, auctoritate, etiam vi, absque eo quod veritatis, justitiae aut rectitudinis defectum quisquam ostendere queat, quilibet posset contradicere. Ratio humana, sub hoc respectu, merus sensuum, affectionum foetus, a quasi ratione in aliis animantibus deprehensa etsi forte perfectior, genere non differret: inde nimirum materialistarum opinionis lues, dum animi motus ex objectis externis orti, iis compositi, aliam, nempe spiritualem, naturam excludere censentur.

Errat ergo doctissimus Grotius, cum de juris fonte, de eo quod stricto hominum coetui (societatibus), vel laxiori (gentibus), convenit,1 [Grotius; de jure belli et pacis (1631), prolegomen.] et hoec quidem quoe jam diximus, inquit, locum, aliquem haberent, etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana.

Falsum omnino assertum. Officium, debitum, ut recte observat Barbeyrac2 [Barbeyrac; Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, tr. en franc. (1729); T. I, Disc. prelimin. p. 13, §. XI, not.], proinde jus supponit supremum hominum dominum, qui alius a Creatore, a Deo ipso esse non potest.

Errat et subtilis Baylius, qui, ad tuendam fantasticae suae Atheorum societatis, reipublicae possibilitatem3 [Bayle; Continuat. des diverses pensees sur la comete, T. 2 (1705), §. CXVIII-CXXI, p. 568-582.], locum Grotii supra datum refert4 [Ibid. §. CLII, p. 768.], et contra Grotio repugnantes, summi viri sententiae calculum album adjiciendo, sic concludit:5 [Ibid, p. 769.]

"Ne leur en deplaise, je m'en tiens a la doctrine de Grotius. Il me semble que l'homme est tout autant oblige de se conformer aux idees de la droite raison dans les actes de sa volonte, que de suivre les regles de la logique dans les actes de son entendement. Or il est incontestable que, dans la supposition meme des athees, on passeroit pour ridicule si l'on se vouloit mettre au dessus du raisonnement."

Celebri et acutissimo philosopbo ne displiceat; hic caecutit acer Pyrrhonianus, quamvis de scholasticorum quorumdam, etiam divi Thomae auctoritate glorians. Petitionis principio laborat ejus argumentatio. Nulla logica, nulla ratiocinationis regula, si primum, originale verum, rectum, quod quidem, ut dixi, Deus ipse est, non existit. Homini contra usum receptum ratiocinanti alter dicere poterit, et aequo jure: meo judicio erras; nullo autem modo falsum realiter, in se, monstrare, probare, cum archetypum originale et vivens, activa norma (Ens supremum), ad quam ex utraque parte provocari queat, debeatur, non sit supposita.

Nunc [x] Oupnek’hat doctrinae uberiorem fas sit proponere expositionem.

Nulla in textu contradictio. Solummodo Entis supremi attributa cum moralis doctrinae fundamentis concordare clare agnoscitur; quidquid susurret mens humana propriae imbecillitati relicta.

T. I, Annotat, p. 566-588, quam debiles, quam mancae sint et jejunae veterum philosophorum sententiae de origine mali et Entis supremi cum hominis libertate convenientia, satis fuse ostensum: recentiorum, saltem celebriorum, hac de quaestione opinionibus eodem modo recensitis, nihil clarius inde elucescet. Quisque adversarii sententiam oppugnat, et sensum suum promit, affirmat, pari jure ab adversario refutandum.

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Part 3 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
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§ II.

True, right, just, among men, considered in itself, is independent of such religion, of the positive commandment of God, of arbitrary, as they say, disposition; but not from the first truth, the right, the just, which exists in itself and is the supreme being, God himself, whose seal, as it were, imprinted on the minds of men, has manifested itself through the reason of the soul, as it were through an organ.

If, which is impossible, that first living and intellectual rule did not exist, human reason, resting on no foundation, would be nothing else than the way of seeing and feeling the same thing for one person or for many, many people. to whose rectitude, the other, equally, by looking at things with conflicting affections, agreement, peace, tranquillity, finally for the sake of his own advantage, by authority, even by force, without the fact that anyone can show a lack of truth, justice, or rectitude, anyone could contradict. Human reason, in this respect, the mere fetus of senses and affections, would not differ in kind from the kind of reason found in other living beings, though perhaps more perfect. they are considered to exclude nature.

The most learned Grotius errs, therefore, when he speaks of the source of law, of that which applies to a narrow group of men (societies), or to a looser one (nations),1 [Grotius; on the law of war and peace (1631), prologue.] And this, he says, which we have already said, would have some place, even if we were to grant, which cannot be granted without the greatest crime, that there is no God, or that human affairs are not cared for by him.

A completely false claim. Duty, debt, as he correctly observes Barbeyrac2 [Barbeyrac; The Law of War and Peace, tr. in France (1729); T.I, Disc. preliminary p. 13, §. 11 rating], therefore, right supposes the supreme lord of men, who cannot be other than the Creator, God himself.

The subtle Baylius is also mistaken, who, in order to protect his fantastic society of atheists, the possibility of a republic3 [Bayle; It continues. various thoughts on the comet, T. 2 (1705), § 118-121, p. 568-582.], refers to the place of Grotius given above4 [Ibid. § CLIII, p. 768.], and contradicting Grotius, adding the white calculus of the supreme man's opinion, concludes thus:5 [Ibid, p. 769.]

"No offense to them, I stick to the doctrine of Grotius. It seems to me that man is as much obliged to conform to the ideas of right reason in the acts of his will, as to follow the rules of logic in the acts of one's understanding. Now it is indisputable that, even on the assumption of atheists, one would pass for ridiculous if one wanted to put oneself above reasoning."

Let him not displease the famous and most acute philosopher; here he is blinded by the zeal of Pyrrhonius, although he is proud of the authority of certain scholastics, even of the divine Thomas. His argument works at the beginning of the petition. There is no logic, no rule of reasoning, if the first, original truth, right, which indeed, as I said, is God himself, does not exist. To a man reasoning against received usage, another may say, and with equal right: you are wrong in my judgment; but in no way can the falsity really, in itself, be shown or proved, since the original and living archetype, the active norm (the Supreme Being), to which it can be provoked from both sides, is not supposed to be supposed.

Now [x] Oupnek'hat doctrine it is right to propose a more fruitful exposition.

There is no contradiction in the text. Only the attributes of the Supreme Being are clearly recognized to agree with the foundations of moral doctrine; whatever the human mind whispers, left to its own weakness.

T. I, Annotate, p. 566-588, how weak and how weak are the views of the ancient philosophers concerning the origin of evil and the compatibility of the Supreme Being with man's freedom, has been sufficiently shown: from the opinions of the more recent, at least the more famous, reviewed in the same way on this question, nothing can be more clearly revealed from it. Each one attacks the opinion of his adversary, and promises his opinion, affirms, to be refuted with equal right by his adversary.

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Part 4 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[Latin Version]

§. III.

Novorum philosophorum, scilicet dialectica, et metaphysicoe speculationibus proestantium, de origine mali, ejus poena, et Dei scientioe, potentioe, cum hominis libero arbitrio consensu opiniones breviter expositoe et discussoe.

I. Summum philosophum audiamus, cuique suum tribuentem, [Leibnite.] nullum lumen, quod e variis opinionibus, cogitationibus emergere possit, repellentem.

1 [Leibnitz; Eclaircissement sur l'union du corps et de l'ame. Recueil de Desmaizeaux (1759), T. 9, p. 417, 419.] "La consideration de ce systeme (harmonia proestabilita), inquit Leibnitz, fait voir aussi que, lorsqu'on entre dans le fond des choses, on remarque plus de raison qu’on ne croyoit dans la plupart des sectes des philosophes. Le peu de realite substantielle des choses sensibles des Sceptiques; la reduction de tout aux harmonies ou nombres, idees ou perceptions des Pythagoristes et Platoniciens; l'un et meme un tout de Parmenide et de Plotin, sans aucun Spinosisme; la connexion Stoicienne compatible avec la spontaneite des autres; la philosophie vitale des Cabalistes et Hermetiques, qui mettent du sentiment par tout; les formes et entelechies d'Aristote et des Scolastiques; et cependant l'explication mechanique de tous les phenomenes particuliers selon Democrite et les modernes, etc. se trouvent reunies comme dans un centre de perspective, d’ou l'objet (embrouille en regardant de tout autre endroit) fait voir sa regularite et la convenance de ses parties. On a manque par un esprit de secte, en se bornant par la rejection des autres. Les philosophes formalistes blament les materiels ou corpusculaires, et vice versa. On donne mal des limites a la division et subtilite, aussi bien qu’a la richesse et beaute de la nature, lorsqu'on met des atomes et du vuide, lorsqu'on se figure certains premiers elemens (tels meme que les Cartisiens), au lieu des veritables unites, et lorsqu’on ne reconnoit pas l'infini en tout, et l'exacte expression du plus grand dans le plus petit, jointe a la tendance de chacun a se developper dans un ordre parfait; ce qui est le plus admirable et le plus bel effet du souverain principe, dont la sagesse ne laisseroit rien a desirer de meilleur a ceux qui en pourroient entendre l'economie."

Optima sane critices praecepta, quaeque, magni Leibnitzii venia, ejus monadibus, atomis formalibus1 [Leibnitz; Essais de Theodicee sur la bonte de Dieu, la liberte de l'homme et l'origine du mal (1734), T, 2, p. 330. Remarq. sur le liv. de l'orig. du mal.], entelechiis, unitatibus realibus; [x] ego, extensionis, temporis, motus definitionibus; harmonioe proestabilitoe,1 ["Que l'union de l'ame avec le corps, et meme l'operation d’une substance sur l'autre, ne consiste que dans ce parfait accord mutuel, etabli expres par l'ordre de la premiere creation, en vertu duquel chaque substance, suivant ses propres lois, se rencontre dans ce que demandent les autres; et les operations de l'une suivent et accompagnent ainsi l'operation ou le changement de l'autre." Lettr. de M. Leibnitz a M. Arnauld, du 23 mars 1690, dans les Mem. de litterat. de Sallengre (du P. Desmolets), T. VIII (1729), I.re part. p. 214, 215.] rationi sufficienti optimismo, cujus ope2 [] libertatem hominis cum Dei essentia conciliare nititur vir in philosophando quantus! dicerem, in theologando, quantillus1 [Theodic. T. 2, p. 161, 162, 272, 273. — Oeuvr. posthum. de Bossuet. Projet de r'union entre les catholiq. et les protest. 2.e part. lettr. de Leibnitz et de l'Eveq, de Meaux, p. 333-544.]! necessitati morali hypotheticoe in Deo ut in homine, a necessitate absoluta, metaphysica distinctae, id est, toti ejus philosophico systemati aeque conveniunt.

2. "Les raisons de cette liaison, par laquelle l'un est place dans des circonstances plus favorables que l'autre, sont cachees dans la profondeur de la sagesse de Dieu: elles dependent de l'harmonie universelle. Le meilleur plan de l'univers, que Dieu ne pouvoit pas manquer de choisir, le portoit ainsi. Leibn. Theodic. T. 2, 3.e part. p. 273.

"Neque ob rerum certitudinem preces laboresque fiunt inutiles ad obtinenda futura quae desideramus. Nam in hujus seriei rerum, tanquam possibilis, repraesentatione apud Deum, antequam decerni intelligeretur, utique et preces in ea (si eligeretur) futurae et aliae effectuum in ea comprehendendorum causae inerant, et ad electionem seriei, adeoque ad eventus in ea comprehensos, ut par erat, valuere. Et quoe, nunc movent Deum ad agendum aut permittendum, jam tum eum moverunt ad decernendum quid acturus esset aut permissurus. Theodic. T. 2, p. 354; Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus etc."

Si Arnoldo communicatus a Leibnitzio, qui praestantis hujus doctoris judicium tanti faciebat *, de causa mali et justitia Dei latine scriptus Dialogus, cujusque lectione haud alienari aut offendi (s'effaroucher) non visus est (Thiodic. T. 2, 2.e part. p. 107) eximius phiiosophus, est ipsa causa Dei asserta etc., alia forma deinceps donata; profecto istam occasionalem in principio decretorum Dei causam, quae yelut pedissequam sapientiam et potentiam divinam constituit, vir summe theologus sanctione sua non magis firmaverit, quam quae de numero malorum, animae origine, rationalitate, corruptione, peccati originalis traductione et effectu (lib. cit. p. 356, 357-363, 364), et infidelium, quibus sola externa praedicatio negata est, salute (p. 368); de malo in optima et a Deo praeferenda rerum serie quasi necessario seu conveniente (p. 371, 374); contra gratiam per se effectricem, in omnia victricem (p.371), minus caute, sobrii Leibnitzius hariolatur.

[*Arnaldi et Leibnitzii commercium epistolare, veram summorum istorum virorum ideam praebere potest. Quaedam ex eo excerpta hic proferam, quibus Gallo philosopho in rebus metaphysicis Germanus primas dare videtur.

"Comme je defere beaucoup a votre jugement," inquit Leibnitzius (Epistol. ad Arnald. Hanov. 14 Jul. 1686. Arnald. Op. T. 5, p. 190-193, 188, 194),"j’ai ete rejoui de voir que vous aviez modere votre censure, apres avoir vu mon explication sur cette proposition que je crois importante, et qui vous avoit paru etrange, que la notion individuelle de chaque personne enferme une fois pour toutes ce qui lui arrivera jamais. Vous en aviez tire d’abord cette consequence, que de cette seule supporsition que Dieu ait resolu de creer Adam, tout le reste des evenemens humains arrives a Adam et a sa posterite, s’en seroient suivis par une necessite fatale, sans que Dieu eut plus eu la liberte d’en disposer, non plus qu’il (ne) peut ne pas creer une nature capable de penser apres avoir pris la resolution de me creer.

A quoi j’avois repondu, que, les desseins de Dieu touchant tout cet univers etant lies entr’eux, conformement a sa souveraine sagesse, il n’a pris aucune resolution a l'egard d’Adam, sans en prendre a l'egard de tout ce qui a quelque liaison avec lui. Ce n’est donc pas a cause de la resolution prise a l'egard d’Adam, mais a cause de la resolution prise en meme temps a l'egard de tout le reste (a quoi celle qui est prise a l'egard d’Adam enveloppe un parfait rapport), que Dieu s’est determine sur tous les evenemens humains. En quoi il me sembloit qu’il n’y avoit point de necessite fatale, ni rien de contraire a la liberte de Dieu, non plus que dans cette liberte hypothetique, generalement approuvee, qu’il y a al'egard de Dieu meme, d'executer ce qu’il a resolu.

"Vous demeurez d’accord, Monsieur, dans votre replique * [Cette replique s'est egaree; il ne nous, a pas ete possible de la trouver, malgre toutes nos recherches. Not. de l'edit.], de cette raison des resolutions divines (p. 191), que j’avois mise en avant, et vous avez meme la sincerite d’avouer que vous aviez pris ma proposition tout autrement, parce qu'on n'a pas accoutume (ce sont vos paroles) de considerer la notion specifique d'une sphere, par rapport a ce qu'elle est representee dans l'entendement divin, mais par rapport a ce qu'elle est en elle-meme; et que vous aviez eru qu'il en etoit encore ainsi a l'egard de la notion individuelle de chaque personne.

Pour moi, j’avois cru que les notions pleines et comprehensives sont representees dans l'entendement divin comme elles sont en elles-memes. Mais maintenant que vous savez que c’est la ma pensee, cela suffit pour vous y conformer, et pour examiner si elle leve la difficulte. Il semble donc que vous reconnoissiez que mon sentiment explique de cette maniere, savoir les notions pleines telles qu’elles sont dans l'entendement divin, n’est pas seulement innocent, mais meme qu’il est certain; car voici vos paroles: je demeure d'accord que la connoissance que Dieu a eue d'Adam, lorsqu'il a resolu de le creer, a enferme celle de tout ce qui lui est arrive et doit arriver a sa posterite, et ainsi, prenant en ce sens la notion individuelle d'Adam, ce que vous en dites est tris-certain. Nous allons voir tantot en quoi consiste la difficulte que vous y trouvez encore. Cependant je dirai un mot de la raison de la difference qu’il y a en ceci, entre les notions des especes et celles des substances individuelles, plutot par rapport a la volonte divine, que par rapport au simple entendement. C’est que les notions specifiques les plus abstraites ne comprennent que des verites necessaires ou eternelles, qui ne dependent point des decrets divins (quoi qu’en disent les Carthesiens, dont il semble que vous-meme ne vous etes pas soucie en ce point); mais les notions des substances individuelles, qui sont completes et capables de distinguer leur sujet, et qui enveloppent par consequent les verites contingentes ou de fait, et les circonstances individuelles du temps, du lieu et autres, doivent aussi envelopper dans leur notion, prise comme possible, les decrets libres de Dieu, pris aussi comme possibles, parce que ces decrets libres sont les principales sources des existences ou faits; au lieu que les essences sont dans l'entendement divin, avant la consideration de la volonte.

"Cela nous servira pour mieux entendre tout le reste, et pour satisfaire aux difficultes qui semblent encore rester dans mon explication; car c’est ainsi que vous continuez, Monsieur: mais il me semble qu'apres cela il reste a demander, et c'est ce qui fait ma difficulte, si la liaison entre ces objets (j’entends Adam et les evenemens humains) est telle d'elle-meme, independamment de tous les decrets libres de Dieu, ou si elle en est independante (dependante): c'est-a-dire, si ce n’est qu'ensuite des decrets libres par lesquels Dieu a ordonne tout ce qui arriveroit a Adam et a sa posterite, que Dieu a connu tout ce qui leur arriveroit; ou s'il y a, independamment de ces decrets, entre Adam d'une part, et ce qui est arrive et arrivera a lui et a sa posterite, de l'autre, une connexion intrinseque et necessaire. Il vous paroit que je choisirai le dernier parti, parce que j’ai dit que Dieu a trouve parmi les possibles un Adam accompagne de toutes les circoncstances individuelles, et qui entre autres predicats a aussi celui d'avoir avec le temps une telle posterite; or, vous supposez que j’accorderai que les possibles sont possibles avant tous les decrets libres de Dieu. Supposant donc cette explication de mon sentiment, suivant le dernier parti, vous jugez qu’elle a des difficultes insurmontables; car il y a, comme vous dites avec grande raison, une infinite d’evenemens humains, arrives par des ordres tres-particuliers de Dieu, comme (p. 192), entr'autres, la religion judaique et chretienne, et surtout l'incarnation du Verbe divin; et je ne sais comment on pourroit dire que tout cela (qui est arrive par des decrets tres-libres de Dieu) etoit enferme dans la notion individuelle de l'Adam possible: ce qui est considere comme possible devant avoir tout ce que l'on concoit qu’il a sous cette notion, independamment des decrets divins.

J’ai voulu rapporter exactement votre difficulte, Monsieur, et voici comme j’espere d’y satisfaire entierement, a votre gre meme. [M. Leibnitz emploie ici quatre grandes pages a satisfaire a cette difficulte, par des raisonnemens metaphysiques dans lesquels on se perd; apres quoi il continue ainsi (parenthes. minus philosophi editoris)];

"Quant a la realite des substances purement possibles, c’est-a-dire, que Dieu ne creera jamais, vous dites, Monsieur, d’etre fort porte a croire que ce sont des chimeres; a quoi je ne m’oppose pas, si vous l'entendez, comme je crois, qu’elles n’ont point d’autre realite que celle qu’elles ont dans l'entendement divin et dans la puissance active de Dieu. Cependant vous voyez par la, qu’on est oblige de recourir a la science et puissance divine pour les bien expliquer. Je trouve aussi fort solide ce que vous dites ensuite, qu'on ne concoit jamais aucune substance purement possible que sous l'idee de quelqu'une [ou par les idees comprises dans quelqu’une] de celles que Dieu a creces. Vous dites aussi: nous nous imaginons qu'avant de creer le monde, Dieu a envisage une infinite de choses possibles, dont il a choisi les lines et rebute les autres; plusieurs Adams [premiers hommes] possibles, chacun avec une grande suite de personnes avec qui il a une liaison intrinsique: et nous supposons que la liaison de toutes ees autres choses avec un de ces Adams [premiers hommes] possibles, est toute semblabe a celle qu'a eue l'Adam cree avec toute sa posterite; ce qui nous fait penser que c'est celui-la de tous les Adams possibles que Dieu a choisi, et qu’il n'a point voulu de tous les autres. En quoi vous semblez reconnoitre, Monsieur, que ces pensees, que j’avoue pour miennes [pourvu qu’on entende la pluralitie des Adams et leur possibilite, selon l'explication que j’ai donnee, et qu’on prenne tout cela selon notre maniere de concevoir quelqu’ordre dans les pensees ou operations que nous attribuons a Dieu], entrent assez naturellement dans l'esprit, quand on pense un peu a cette matiere, et meme ne sauroient etre evitees, et peut-etre ne vous ont deplu que parce que vous avez suppose qu’on ne pouvoit pas les concilier avec les decrets libres de Dieu. Tout ce qui est actuel peut etre concu comme possible, et si l'Adam actuel aura avec le temps une belle posterite, on ne sauroit nier ce meme predicat a cet Adam concu comme possible, d’autant plus que vous accordez que Dieu envisage en lui tous ces predicats, lorsqu’il determine de le creer. Ils lui appartiennent donc; et je ne vois pas que ce que vous dites de la realite des possibles y soit contraire. Pour appeler quelque chose possible, ce m’est assez qu’on en puisse former une notion, quand elle ne seroit que dans l'entendement divin, qui est, pour ainsi dire, le pays des realites possibles. Ainsi en parlant des possibles, je me contente qu’on en puisse former des propositions veritables, comme l'on peut juger, par exemple, qu'un carre parfait n’implique point de contradiction, quand il n’y auroit point de carre parfait au monde. Et si on vouloit rejeter absolument ces purs possibles, on detruiroit la contingence et la liberte; car, s’il n’y avoit rien de possible que ce que Dieu a cree effectivement, ce que Dieu a cree seroit neessaire, et Dieu, voulant creer quelque chose, ne pourroit creer que cela seul, sans avoir la liberte du choix.

"Tout cela me fait espeer [apres les explications que j’ai donnees, et dont j’ai toujours apporte des raisons, afin de vous faire juger que ce ne sont pas (p. 193) des faux-fuyans controuves pour eluder vos objections] qu’au bout du compte vos pensees ne se trouvent pas si eloignees des miennes qu’elles ont paru d'abord l'etre. Vous approuvez la liaison des resolutions de Dieu; vous reconnoissez ma proposition principale pour certaine, dans le sens que je lui avois donne dans ma reponse: vous aviez doute seulement si je faisois la liaison independante des decrets libres de Dieu, et cela vous avoit fait de la peine, avec grande raison; mais j’ai fait voir qu’elle depend de ces decrets, selon moi, et qu’elle n’est pas necessaire, quoi-qu’elle soit intrinseque. Vous avez insiste sur l'inconvenient qu’il y avoit de dire que si je ne fais pas le voyage que je dois faire, je ne serai pas moi, et j’ai explique comment on le peut dire ou non. Enfin j’ai donne une raison decisive, qui, a mon avis, tient lieu de demonstration: c’est que toujours, dans toute proposition affirmative, veritable, necessaire ou contingente, universelle ou singuliere, la notion du predicat est comprise, en quelque facon, dans celle du sujet; proedicatum inest subjecto; ou bien je ne sais ce que c’est que la verite.

[M. Leibnitz emploie trois grandes pages a rendre ses pensees intelligibles et aen, faire voir, dit-il, la solidite et l'importance (eas editor non debebat omittere: in materia subtili, difficili, nihil nimii, superflui)].

P. 196, au meme. Hanovre, 28 novembre 1686.

Pour ce qui est des deux difficultes que vous trouvez dans ma lettre; l'une, touchant l'hypothese de la concomitance, ou l'accord des substances entr’elles; l'autre, touchant la nature des formes des substances corporelles, j’avoue qu’elles sont considerables, et si j’y pouvois satisfaire entierement, je croirois pouvoir dechiffrer les plus grands secrets de la nature universelle.

P. 198, au meme, Nuremberg. janv. 1688.

Le mouvement en lui-meme, separe de la force, est relatif, et ne sauroit determiner le sujet dans lequel il se trouve. Mais la force est quelque chose de reel et d’absolu; et c’est pour cela que la nature garde la quantite de la force, et non pas la quantite du mouvement. Cependant il s’ensuit qu’il y a dans la nature quelqu’autre chose que l'etendue et le mouvement, a moins que de refuser aux choses toute la forme ou puissance; ce qui est, de substances qu’elles sont, les changer en modes, et tomber, sans y penser, dans les sentimens dangereux de Spinosa, qui veut que toutes les choses ne soient que des modes de Dieu.........."

Totam Leibnitzii Theodiceam, eximium alioquin opus, sed quod, sublatis repetitionibus, quae materiei tenebras creant, ad dimidium facile reduci posset, citare operae pretium foret, si celeberr. philosophi minus recte, etiam contra ipsius sensum dicta refellere quis vellet. Idem ubique infirmum quoad mali originem responsum, dictatorie datum, optimi, ex parte Dei, rerum status, perfectissimi mundi electio.

Humanae mentis naturam ni cognoscerem, et eadem effata in observationibus ad Hobbesii de Libertate, et King, de Origine mali, libros, etiam in causa Dei asserta etc. (p. 352, 353, 358-362-375), reperirem, fidem facile darem ei quod in Bibliotheca Germanica (T. 14 [1727], p. 178, art. Tubingen) legitur; scilicet:  
"On trouve a la fin (des institutions au droit ecclesiastique par M. le Chancel. Pfaff), quelques lettres de M. de Leibnitz a M. Pfaff, dans lesquelles il declare qu’il ne regarde que comme un jeu d’esprit le systeme qu’il a etabli dans la Theodicee, par rapport a l'origine du mal."

Celeberr. Le Clerc (Bibliotheq. anc. et modern. T. XV (1721), p. 179, 180) prius in ea sententia fuerat. Ipsa Cancell. Pfaff verba (Act. erudit. [Leips.] mens. mart. 1728, p. 125 et seq.) hic dare juvat:

"Rogaverat abs me vir illustris (Leibnitzius), inquit Pfaff (Desmaiz. libr. cit. T. I, avertissement), quid de Theodicoea sentirem, methodoque illa qua Baelium refutasset: scripsi, existimare me, quod animi saltem causa illud philosophiae confinxerit systema, et quemadmodum Clericus Boelium refutaturus, Origenistam simulaverit, ita et ipse novam hanc philosophandi viam inierit ad refutandum Boelium, quae quidem, licet pulverem saltern oculis eorum, qui et altum alias haud videant, injiciat, tamen eo ingeniosior sit, quod probe perspecta, et sententiam Boelii crassiorem sub specie refutationis, potius modo subtiliore, mysterio tamen non illico detegendo firmet, et diversis quoque dissidentium relligionum systematis opinionibusque, alias vix defendendis, incrustandis, favorique adeo et theologorum omnium fere partium, maxime nostratium aucupando, sit applicabilis; praeoptare vero me, ut Boelii tam periculosa sententia serio, solide et graviter refutetur.

"Quid, quaeso, ad me respondit Leibnitzius, quem credideram mihi ob ingenuam responsionem indignaturum? Ita autem ille in litteris Hanovera, a. 1716, d. 21 maji, ad me datis [do verd verba viri formalia, licet brevissima, reliqua enim epistolae, quae hoc negotium non tangunt, addere non convenit]: Ita prorsus est, vir summe reverende, uti scribis de Theodicoea mea. Rem acu tetigisti. Et miror, neminem hactenus fuisse, qui sensum hunc meum senserit. Neque enim philosophorum est, rem serio semper agere, qui in fingendis hypothesibus, uti bene mones, ingenii sui vires experiuntur. Tu, qui theologus, in refutandis erroribus theologum ages."

Verum hoec ipsa Leibnitzium seria mente haud scripsisse putant celeb. Bulfinger, Wolf (Act. erudit. decemb. 1728, p. 550, 551). Idem sentit M. de Neufville, auctor Leibnitzii vitae (Theodic. T. I, p. 117, 118, 122-125); et profecto haud aliter opinari non permittit locus iste observationum in Holbesii librum (Theodic. T. II, p. 289).

"Il vaut donc mieux, inquit summus philosophus, incomparablement, expliquer la volonte de Dieu comme nous l'avons fait dans cet ouvrage (la Theodicee). Ainsi nous dirons que Dieu, en vertu de sa souveraine bonte, a prealablement une inclination serieuse a produire, ou a voir, et a faire produire, tout bien et toute action louable; et a empecher, ou a voir, et a faire manquer, tout mai et toute action mauvaise; mais qu’il est determine par cette meme bonte, jointe a une sagesse infinie, et par le concours meme de toutes les inclinations prealables et particulieres envers chaque bien et envers l'empechement de chaque mal, a produire le meilleur dessein possible des choses; ce qui fait sa volonte finale et directoire; et que, ce dessein du meilleur etant d'une telle nature que le bien y doit etre rehausse comme la lumiere par les ombrages de quelque mal incomparablement moindre que ce bien, Dieu ne pouvoit point exclure ce mal, ni introduire certains biens exclus dans ce plan, sans faire du tort a sa supreme perfection, et que c’est pour cela qu’on doit dire qu’il a permis le peche d’autrui, parce qu’autrement il auroit fait lui - meme une action pire que tout le peche des creatures." (Id. Theodic. T. 2, 2.e part. p. 23, 24; T. 1.re part. p. 91; T. 2, 3.e part. p. 314).

Ista sane serio dicta, nec ingenii lusum redolent. Similiter ea quae minus sapienter (T. 2, p. 234) effutit Leibnitzius.

"Nous avons deja montre, inquit, que cette source (celle du mal) se trouve dans les formes ou idees des possibles; car elle doit etre eternelle, et la matiere ne l'est pas. Or, Dieu ayant fait toute realite positive qui n’est pas eternelle, il auroit fait la source du mal, si elle ne consistoit pas dans la possibilite des choses ou des formes, seule chose que Dieu n'a point faite, puisqu'il n'est point auteur de son propre entendement."

Observandum tamen celeberrimum auctorem non adeo principiis stare, quin aliquando, ut jam dixi, ab eis deflectat. Sic (2.e part. p. 15, 16):

"Il manque souvent, inquit, aux creatures le moyen de se donner la volonte qu’on devroit avoir; meme il leur manque souvent la volonte de se servir des moyens qui donnent indirectement une bonne volonte, dont j’ai deja parle plus d’une fois. Il faut avouer ce defaut, et il faut meme reconnoitre que Dieu en auroit peut-etre pu exempter les creatures, puisque rien n’empeche, ce semble, qu’il n’y en ait dont la nature soit d'avoir toujours une bonne volonte. Mais je repons qu’il n’est pas necessaire, et qu'il n'a point ete faisable, que toutes les creatures raisonnables eussent une si grande perfection qui les approchat tant de la divinite."

Quis non aures tinnire arbitretur, cum eundem philosophum audit dicentem: (p. 21)

"Dieu, dit-on, pouvoit donner le bonheur a tous; il le pouvoit donner promptement et facilement, et sans se faire aucune incommodite; car il peut tout. Mais le doit-il? puisqu’il ne le fait point, c’est une marque qu'il le devoit faire tout autrement."

Hoc est nodum secare, non solvere. Factum dicis, profecto recte, sapienter factum. Sed, qui recte? rationem quaero, non intelligens. Facto respondes! siccine philosophus?

Pari ratione (ibid.):

"Dieu n’en manque pas (de capacite ou de bonne volonte); Il pourroit faire le bien que nous souhaiterions, il le veut meme, en le prenant detache: mais il ne doit point le faire preferablement a d'autres biens plus grands qui s‘y opposent."

Quam abjectus de Ente supremo et sentiendi et loquendi modus!

"Au reste on n’a aucun sujet de se plaindre de ce qu’on ne parvient ordinairement au salut que par bien des souffrances, et en portant la croix de J. C.; les maux servent a rendre les elus imitateurs de leur maitre, et a augmenter leur bonheur."

Pia et solida paraenesis (et 2.e part. p. 148), in disputatione philosophica haud expectanda, sed quae mysterium supponens, velum Dei operationi impositum nedum auferat, nequidem sublevat, et auctoris systema funditus diruit.

Idem dicendum de eo quod ait auctor (T. 1, 1.e part. p. 149):

"et afin que nous n’ayions point sujet de nous glorifier, il faut que nous ignorions les raisons du choix de Dieu: aussi sontelles trop variees pour tomber sous notre connoissance; et il se peut que Dieu montre quelquefois la puissance de sa grace, en surmontant la plus opiniatre resistance, afin que personne n’ait sujet de se desesperer, comme personne n’en doit avoir de se flatter. Et il semble que S. Paul a eu cette pensee, se proposan a cet egard en exemple: Dieu, dit-il, m’a fait misericorde, pour donner un grand exemple de sa patience."

Quae si auctor in memoriam revocasset, Laurentii Valloei Dialogum de libero arbitrio, contra Boetium, supplere non tentasset (T. 2, p. 256-261); multo minus Baylii, acuto, solerti, erudito ingenio, nec non indomita ratiocinandi vi praediti, longa et praestantia loca, cum debili, manca et jejuna refutatione retulisset. Unum hic proferam.

"Par le sentiment clair et net que nous avons de notre existence, inquit Baylius (Reponses aux questions d’un provincial, T. 3 (1706), p. 761-765, — Leibnitz, Theodic. T. 2, 3.e part. p. 172-175), nous ne discernons pas si nous existons par nous-memes, ou si nous tenons d'un autre ce que nous sommes; nous ne discernons cela que par la voie des reflexions, c’est-a-dire, qu'en meditant sur l'impuissance ou nous sommes de nous conserver autant que nous voudrions, et de nous delivrer de la dependance des etres qui nous environnent, etc. Il est meme sur que les Payens [il faut dire la meme chose des Sociniens, puisqu'ils nient la creation] ne sont jamais venus a la connoissance de ce dogme veritable, que nous avons ete faits de rien, et que nous sommes tires du neant a chaque moment de notre vie. Ils ont donc era faussement que tout ce qu’il y a de substances dans l'univers existent par elles-memes, et qu’elles ne peuvent jamais etre aneanties, et qu'ainsi elles ne dependent d’aucune autre chose qu’a l'egard de leurs modifications, sujettes a etre detruites par l'action d’une cause externe. Cette erreur ne vient-elle pas de ce que nous ne sentons point l'action creatrice qui nous conserve, et que nous sentons seulement que nous existons, que nous le sentons, dis-je, d'une maniere qui nous tiendroit eternellement dans l'ignorance de la cause de notre etre, si d’autres lumieres ne nous secouroient.

"Disons aussi que le sentiment clair et net que nous avons des actes de notre volonte, ne nous peut pas faire discerner si nous nous les donnons nous-memes, ou si nous les recevons de la meme cause qui nous donne l'existence. Il faut recourir a la reflexion, ou a la meditation, afin de faire ce discernement. Or je mets en fait que par des meditations purement philosophiques on ne peut jamais parvenir a une certitude bien fondee que nous sommes la cause efficiente de nos volitions; car toute personne qui examinera bien les choses, connoitra evidemment que, si nous n'etions qu’un sujet passif a l'egard de la volonte, nous aurions les memes sentimens d’experience que nous avons lorsque nous croyons etre fibres. Supposez, par plaisir, que Dieu ait regle de telle sorte les lois de l'union de l'ame et du corps, que toutes les modalites de l'ame, sans en excepter aucune, soient liees necessairement entre elles avec l'interposition des modalites du cerveau, vous comprendrez qu'il ne nous arrivera que ce que nous eprouvons. Il y aura dans notre ame la meme suite de pensees, depuis la perception des objets des sens, qui est sa premiere demarche, jusqu’aux volitions les plus fixes, qui sont sa derniere demarche. Il y aura dans cette suite le sentiment des idees, celui des affirmations, celui des irresolutions, celui des velleites, et celui des volitions. Car, soit que l'acte de vouloir nous soit imprime par une cause exterieure, soit que nous le produisions nous-memes, il sera egalement vrai que nous voulons, et que nous sentons que nous voulons; et, comme cette cause exterieure peut meler autant de plaisir qu’elle veut dans la volition qu’elle nous imprime, nous pourrons sentir quelquefois que les actes de notre volonte nous plaisent infiniment, et qu’ils nous menent selon la pente de nos plus fortes inclinations. Nous ne sentirons point de contrainte: vous savez la maxime, voluntas non potest cogi. Ne comprenez- vous pas clairement qu’une girouette, a qui l'on imprimeroit toujours tout a la fois [en sorte pourtant que la priorite de nature, ou, si l'on veut meme, une priorite d’instant reel conviendroit au desir de se mouvoir] le mouvement vers un certain point de l'horizon, et l'envie de se tourner de ce cote-la, seroit persuadee qu’elle se mouvroit d’elle-meme pour executer les desirs qu’elle formeroit? Je suppose qu’elle ne sauroit point qu’il y eut des vents, ni qu’une cause exterieure fit changer tout a la fois et sa situation et ses desirs. Nous voila naturellement dans cet etat: nous ne savons point si une cause invisible nous fait passer successivement d’une pensee a une autre. Il est donc naturel que les hommes se persuadent qu’ils se determinent eux-memes: mais il reste a examiner s’ils se trompent en cela comme en une infinite d’autres choses qu’ils affirment par une espece d’instinct, et sans avoir employe les meditations metaphysiques.

"Puis donc qu'il y a deux hypotheses sur ce qui se passe dans l'homme, l'une qu’il n'est qu’un sujet passif, l'autre qu'il a des vertus actives, on ne peut raisonnablement preferer la seconde a la premiere, pendant qu’on ne peut alleguer que des preuves de sentiment; car nous sentirions avec une egale force que nous voulons ceci ou cela, soit que toutes nos volitions fussent imprimees a notre ame par une cause exterieure et invisible, soit que nous les formassions nous-memes.

Ad haec observat summus Leibnitzius (lib. cit. p. 174, 175):

"Il y a ici des raisonnemens fort beaux, qui ont de la force contre [Leibnitz.] les systemes ordinaires; mais ils cessent par rapport au systeme de l'harmonie preetablie, qui nous meme plus loin que nous ne pouvions aller auparavant."

Sic plerumque fatur cujuslibet systematis auctor. Difficultatibus cedunt hucusque prolatae opiniones. Illis ejus sola respondet, eas solvit; et omnia de industria denegandi, impugnandi (p. 212) reus arguitur, etiam mentis imbecillitate donatur (id. p. 178, 190), qui fulgenti veritati renuit acquiescere. Magnum, Hercule! crimen, insignis temeritas, aedificium tanto labore structum, cujus omnes partes, apte connexae, harmonice sibi correspondent (p. 212), labefactare, uno ictu evertere, diruere!

"M. Bayle met on fait, addit philosophus, que par des meditations purement philosophiques on ne peut jamais parvenir a une certitude fondee, que nous sommes la cause efficiente de nos volitions: mais c’est un point que je ne lui acoorde pas; car l'etablissement de ce systeme montre indubitablement que, dans le cours de la nature, chaque substance est la cause unique de ses actions."

Ostendit, id est, supponit, at nullo modo probat, demonstrat:

"et qu’elle est exempte de toute influence physique de toute autre substance,

Hic agitur de operatione corporis, objectorum externorum, in animam (p. 316).

"excepte le concours ordinaire de Dieu."

In Deo, philosophice, non est ordinarii et extraordinarii distinctio. Omnia, ut voluit, ab aeterno sicut in praesenti ordinata; eodem, ei simili, modo peraguntur. Mens humana constantem istam, statam, uniformem operationum seriem comprehendere non valens, quo minus saepe percellitur, extraordinarium nuncupat; cum in supremo Agente omne sit unum et idem.

"Et c’est ce systeme, inquit Leibnitzius, qui fait voir que notre spontaneite est vraie, et non pas seulement apparente, comme M. Wittichius l'avoit cru. M. Bayle soutient aussi par les memes raisons (Rep. aux quest, etc. ch. 170; p. 1132 -1135), que s’il y avoit un fatum astrologicum, il ne detruiroit point la liberte; et je le lui accorderois, si elle ne consistoit que dans une spontaneite apparente."

Spontaneitas, est spontaneitas vera, cum [x] sponte nisi facto apparente cognosci non possit.

At vero dilecti systematis nimium plenus summus alioqui philosophus se eadem ac adversarios protrudere non advertit.

Verbi gratis non videt acerrimo vir ingenio, suam harmonium a causis occasionalibus realiter non differre. Ens aeternum nihil successive operatur; ens omnipotens, per se agens, nulla externa causa determinatur: oum ergo Deus animi motus occasione motum in corpore producere dicitur, et vice versa, loquendi modus est; una, aeterna, semper praesenti actione, et quod in corpore et quod in anima apparet, concomitanter et separatim, nulla praevia aut ad tempus occasionali ratione inductus, de se, quoniam ita vult, efficit. In supremo, summe perfecto ente, simul seorsim, proedefinite occasionaliter, eodem modo diverso agere, corporis et animae machinas, sit verbo venia! sibi invicem respondentes, ab initio ordinare, vel successim, uti res se habere videtur, unum est et idem. Errat similiter Leibnitzius, nec sane quod ad moralem approbatorem habuisset Arnaldum, ad quem scribit 14 jan. 1688 (Arnald. Op. T. 5, p, 199):

"Si je trouve un jour assez de loisir, je veux achever mes meditations sur la caracteristique generale, ou maniere du calcul universel, qui doit servir dans les autres sciences comme dans les mathematiques. J’en ai deja de beaux essais. J’ai les definitions, axiomes, theoremes, et problemes fort remarquables de la coincidence de la determination [ou de unico] de la similitude, de la relation en general, de la puissance ou cause de la substance; et partout je procede par lettres, d’une maniere precise et rigoureuse, comme dans l'algebre ou dans les nombres.

"Si on poursuivoit cette methode, il y auroit moyen de finir bien des controverses et disputes, en se disant, comptons."

Rarum profecto mathematici delirii specimen. Sic dicendo, numeremus, omnia in Gallia susque deque, pedes ad caput, caput ad pedes lata.1 [Exemplum sit nova Era, in se incerta, imperfecta, intricata, vetus Galliae cum reliqua Europe conjunctionis, etiam relligionis vinculum revellens, et arduas in chronologia, historia, ut in vita communi creans difficultates. Hac de re legi potest opusculum cui titulus: Considerations critiques sur la nouvelle Ere, sous la forme d'un discours suppose tenu a la tribune du Conseil des Cinq cens; suivies de l'extrait d'un memoire de l'astronome Delambre sur les moyens de trouver les annees sextiles du nouveau calendrier, par J. B. Vienot-Vaublanc. Par. an 9 (1801), p. 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 32, 43, 45.]

"On en pourroit encore donner des essais en morale.

Hoc tentarunt Leibnitzii simiae, materialistae philosophi. Hominis affectus, nunquam plane cognitos, rationis lumen, affectionum motu semper turbidum, rerum, temporum, locorum, morum perpetuam varietatem: haec omnia, quemadmodum materiae partes, numerorum unitates, data supponere; et inde litterarum ope, ut in algebra, supputare rationem, quae dementia!

"Et j’en ai deja dans la jurisprudence. Aussi ne sais-je point d’auteurs dont le style approche davantage de celui des geometres, que celui des jurisconsultes anciens, dont les fragmens sont dans les digestes. Dans les matures conjecturales on pourra au moins determiner ce qui doit etre juge le plus probable et le plus sur, ex datis (similiter, characterum algebricorum ope)."

Si ludere licet in re gravi, Rabelaisii judicem Bridoye hic adducam, lites tesserarum jactu dirimentem.1 [Les OEuvres de M. Fr. Rabelais, doct. en medecine (1588), liv. 3, ch. 39-41, p. 173-184.]

Longius esset profundam et arduam Leibnitzii cum Clarckio de extensione, tempore et motu disputationem referre. Haec tria, prior philosophus meras rei ad rem rationes2 [Leibnitz; Epistol. ed. Kortholt, T. 2 (1735); epistol. 14, ad Jacob. Thomasium, p. 137, 138-142.] (nihil in se) esse contendit, laboriose probat, et, dum aliquid, quod ingenio perspicaci arridere potest, se proferre, quaestioni lumen affundere arbitratur, revera, caligine tantummodo caliginem pellit.

[Clarke.] II. Ea est de Leibnitzii systemate, viri, cui nullus par in rebus metaphysicis, summi Clarkii, sententia; qui quidem extensionem, tempus et motum, substantias non dicit, sed tamen realiter, absolute, ut proprietates, quantitates, existere.3 [Vide super illa quaestione etc. quinque Leibnitzii scripta, et quinque Clarkii responsiones, recueil de Desmaiz, T. 1, p. 3a, 40, 41, 59, 68, 69, 72, 73, 76, 77, 80, 8i, 98, 99, 103, 136, 172, not. p. 181, 220, 225.]

Philosophi omnes, ut jam observavi, qui de primis rerum principiis agunt, adversariorum suorum hypotheses haud multo nisu evertunt; contrariam autem suam ipsorum sententiam non pari successu statuunt. Cartesius, Newtonus; impulsio, attractio; plenum vacuum impugnantur: brevi impugnator ipse, alio praelio victus, e solo quod occupabat depellitur.

Unde Clarkius, tempus quidem, motum, spatium non esse meras rationes, sed quid reale, a substantiis quas spectant diversum, istius autem quid naturam sibi incognitam dicens, rei convenientiori modo responderet.

Sic etiam, in litteris ad doctum virum Cantabrigensem, suam de libertate opinionem, scilicet1 [See. de Desmaiz. T. I, p. 240.] physicam varia agendi potestatem, esse in Deo et in homine essentiam libertatis, exponit, explicat philosophus anglus; nihil vero, quo difficultas, nempe, qua ratione a creatura imperfecta, quae perfectionem nec a Deo recepit, nec sibi ipsa dare potuit, de eo quod imperfecte fecit ratio reposci queat, solvi posset, suppeditat.

Semper, his in terns, tenebris involuta remanebunt, quidquid ad eas removendas acerrima ingenia moliantur, rerum principia; quibus Entis supremi attributa et entis secundarii liberum arbitrium, scilicet, operum causa, merces, delictorum poena, malorum physicorum sensus, includuntur.

III. Campum subit novus athleta, eodem apparatu et pari [Collins.] exitu, vir acri sane et acuto ingenio, Collins, qui,2 [Recherches philosophiques sur la liberte; recueil de Desmaiz. T. 1, p. 268, 277, 341, 346, 347.] dum necessitatis causam orat, equidem hominem non esse agens liberum omnimode ad agendum, vel non agendum, ad diversa, etiam opposita, eo sensu quem clar. Clarkius tuetur, strenue et quasi insuperabiliter evincit: cum autem eundem esse agens necessarium statuit, et difficultates ex actionum merito et societatis politia ortas solvere autumat, necessitatem moralem a physica distinguens, voluntarium sufficere statuens, adversarii telis inerme corpus objicit.

Nec lucidus entis liberi essentiam exponit laudatus Clarkius, in suis ad Collinsii disquisitiones philosophicas de hominis libertate observationibus, ubi1 [Remarques sur un livre intitule: Recherches philosophiques sur la liberte de l'homme, lib. cit. p. 375.] dictatorie magis quam philosophice pronunciat, agens, quod motus inchoandi potestatem habet, non posse proprie esse necessarium; non rationibus, argumentis, abstractis notionibus, voluptate vel dolore, passivis perceptionibus, uti ait2 [Lib. cit. p. 381, 383.], vere ad actum determinari; bilancem, quae intelligens supposita, qua parte pondus eam trahit, sentit, et istum motum approbat3 [Id. p. 387.], non esse verum agens, quoniam entis liberi vera definitio est: ens potestate agendi, aeque ac alterius actionem recipiendi, proeditum; necessitatem moralem, vere et philosophice loquendo, nullatenus esse necessitatem4 [Ibid.]; quod verum videtur admittere, quod falsum rejicere, non esse actiones5 [Id. p. 396.], quamvis voluntas, modo ultimam intellectus perceptionem aut approbationem, modo primum facultatis sese moventis actum significet; Deum ei, qui liber non meretur, poenam nisi injuste infligere non posse6 [Id. p. 423.]; Dei judicium infallibile, seu ejus praescientiam, de veritatibus contingentibus, earum naturam non mutare, eas non reddere necessarias7 [Id. p. 419.]: quod fatendum; etenim non ideo res necessarioe, quia Deus eas praevidit, praescivit8 [Clarcke; Traites de l'existence de Dieu etc., T. I, chap. II, p. 188-194. — Remarq. etc. lib. cit. p. 419, 490.]; sed, ut ab aeterno certae, ab aeterno decretae, decretas praenoscit, necessarioe seu ineluctabiles erunt dicendae: tandem, praescientia in Deo qua ratione nihil rerum contingentiae detrahat, dum se fusius explicasse ait in auis Discours sur l'existence et les attributs de Dieu; ubi tamen9 [Traites de l'existence de Dieu, etc., T. I, p. 189.], j'avoue, inquit, quil n’est pas possible d’expliquer comment Dieu peut prevoir les choses futures, a moins de supposer une chaine de causes necessaires: et mirum quam levibus argumentis Dei praescientiam, mali originem explicare, et istarum veritatum certitudinem cum libertate hominis conciliare contendat1 [Id. p. 191-197.]. Ea omnia pari jure asseri vel negari possunt, nisi aliunde probentur, quod magnus philosophus non facit, cum res istae in quaestione versentur; et, si supposita tantum traduntur, verba dare sit, obscurum per obscurius explicare.

At vero in disceptationibus, praesertim metaphysicis, locum habet illud poetae:

Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.

Juxta altissimas praestantis ingenii cogitationes jacent infimi conceptus, vix rudi, saltem communi menti tribuendi. Profecto sapientem Clarkium2 [Id. p. 189, 190.], quemadmodum homo aut angelus acuta mentis vi pollens, ex alterius hominis caractere et circumstantiis quid acturus sit, facilius, certius, quam quilibet alius, praenoscere potest; sic a Deo summe scio, perfecto, tanto magis actus, res contingentes praevidendas, quasi ex abundanti dicere, Dei attributa audaci manu ponderare3 ["Car suppose que ces deux choses (la proscience et la liberte) fussent reellement incompatibles, et que l'une des deux dut etre aneantie, qui ne voit que l'introduction d’un destin absolu et uuiversel, le tombeau et l'extinction entiere de la religion et de la morale, feroit une breche a la gloire de Dieu bien plus considirable que ne feroit la negation de sa proscience, qui dans cette supposition seroit impossible et contradictoire? en ce cas un homme qui nieroit la proscience de Dieu ne lui raviroit pourtant pas sa touts-science, de meme qu’en niant qu'il ait le pouvoir de faire des choses contradictoires, on ne lui ote pas pour cela sa toute-puissance. Traites de l'exist, etc., T. 1, p. 190, 191.], portentosum videbitur.

Nova congruismi species, inverecunda de supremo omnium dominatore sententia, quae primam causam, Creatorem ad humilem creaturae modum dejicit, quamque in opere philosophico, theologico, invenire, monstrum apparebit.

Libere, at non aspere summorum philosophorum opiniones reprehendo. Nemo, in nullo genere, omnibus numeris absolutus. Non ergo, ut recte observat Cicero1 [Cicero, de nat. Deorum, lib. l, ed. interpret. d'Oliv. T. 1, p. 168.], tam auctoritates in disputando quam rationis momenta quoerenda sunt.

[King.] Operi Guillelmi King, episcopi Derensis, quod inscribitur de origine mali (Londini 1702), aliquandiu immorabor. Etsi auctorem laudibus extollat Leibnitzius, nihil in quatuor primis capitibus, quae de malo physico tractant, cui philosophice responderi nequeat. Convenientia, inconvenientia, ad rationis humanae normam, affert Derensis episcopus, quae, ubi de summo, omnipotenti, sapientissimo opifice agitur, in argumentum adduci non possunt. Idem optismo favet2 [King; de Origine mali (1704), cap. 4, sect. 9, p. 108-117.], quod ad rerum statum a Deo electum: forsitan inde Leibnitzii praeconium; et quidquid hujus philosophi systemati, aeque Britanni episcopi opinioni opponitur3 [Operis de origine mali vide in Jacq. Bernard (Nouvell. de la Republ. des lettr. 1703, 5 mai, art. 5, p. 554-578, juin. art. 1, p. 603-635) compendium summa cura elaboratum: examen vere criticum, acri et profunda mente factum, praecipuorum istius compendii capitum, quae malum physicum, dolorem, malum morale, culpam, peccatum, ejus permissionem, poenas ei addictas, falsam libertatis a Britanno praesule datam definitionem spectant, in Baylii rep. aux quest. d'un provinc. T. 2 (1706), ch. 74-92, p. 76-341; tum istud examen annunciatum cum auctoris, eo quod epitome tantum, non ipsum librum legisset, reprehensione (Bernard, lib. cit. 1705, novembr. p. 591-593). Idem repetit doctus diariarius (1706, janv. p. 56-74), quaedam quoque, examinis loco, redarguens. Sed mirum! quam debili et forte inepta contra adeo valentem adversarium manu! Ultimum denique Baylii responsum (lib. cit. T. 5, ch. 20-26, p. 260- 352), ubi eadem, novo colore, acutus et vehemens philosophus proponit et versat argumenta, quibus Guillelmi King opiniones, et a diariario Bernard earum quasi apologia, rationis humanae in hac materia imbecillitate invincibiliter astructa, funditus evertuntur. Vide et Journ. de Leipsic. 1704, juin, p. 274; Leibnitz, Theodic. T. 2, p. 293-344.].

Duo tamen in Guillelmi King opere attentione digna observabimus: nempe assertionem a Leibnitzio acriter impugnatam1 [Theodic. remarq. sur le livre de l'orig. du mal, p. 324, 325.], scilicet,2 [King; Lib. cit. cap. 5, sect. 1, subsect. 4, p. 154, 155. N.° Il (1.°).] nihil illi (Deo) in creatis ante electionem aut bonum aut malum est; appetitum nullum habet, qui rerum extra se fruitione satietur. Absolute ergb indifferens est ad omnia EXTERNA, nec juvari aut loedi ab aliquo potest. Quid igitur voluntatem ejus ad agendum determinet? nihil certe extra se; ipse ergo se determinat, et sibi quasi appetitum eligendo facit. Facta enim electione, non minore studio et diligentia, quod elegit, efficaciter procurare conabitur, quam si appetitu naturali et necessario ad conandum incitaretur; et quoe ad electa obtinenda faciant, pro bonis habebit, quoe verb obsint, pro malis.

3 [Id. p. 155, 156, N.° III, 2°.] Voluntas divina CAUSA bonitatis in creatis est, et, ut fere omnes agnoscunt, ab ea pendent. Res enim creatoe totum quod sunt a voluntate divina habent. Nec aliud passunt esse, quam quod voluit.... in se nec bonoe nec maloe concipi poterant, cum nihil ante actum voluntatis divinoe fuissent.... Bonitas ergo rerum a congruentia voluntati divinoe determinanda est, non vero illa a congruenti aut bonitate rerum.

4 [Id. p. 156, N.° IV, 3°.] Audiendi igitur non sunt, qui Deum res eligere volunt quia bonoe sunt: quasi bonum et majus bonum, quod in rebus percipit, voluntatem ejus determinaret....

5 [Id. p. 166, N.° XVII.] Non igitur ex bonitate rerum determinatur electio divina, sed ex electione bonitas et convenientia in rebus oriuntur, et id illis optimum, quod electioni divinoe congruit, qua eas id esse voluit, quod sunt. Ex his satis ut opinor patet, Deum ejusmodi agens esse, cui res ea ratione sola placent, quia eliguntur.

Inde duae eliciuntur propositiones. 1.a Rerum bonitas metaphysics, physica, moralis, quaecunque sit, a Deo est.

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Part 4 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[English Version by Google Translate]

§ III.

The opinions of the new philosophers, that is, dialectical and metaphysical speculations, about the origin of evil, its punishment, and the knowledge and power of God, with the consent of man's free will, briefly set forth and discussed.

I. Let us listen to the supreme philosopher, giving to each his own, [Leibnitz] rejecting any light that can emerge from various opinions and thoughts.

1 [Leibnitz; Clarification on the union of body and soul. Collection of Desmaizeaux (1759), T. 9, p. 417, 419.] "The consideration of this system (harmony established), said Leibnitz, also shows that, when we get to the bottom of things, we notice more reason than we believed in most sects of the The Skeptics' lack of substantial reality in sensible things, the reduction of everything to harmonies or numbers, ideas or perceptions of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, the one and even a whole of Parmenides and Plotinus, without any Spinosism, the Stoic connection compatible with the spontaneity of others; the vital philosophy of the Cabalists and Hermetics, who put sentiment into everything; the forms and entelechia of Aristotle and the Scholastics; and yet the mechanical explanation of all particular phenomena according to Democritus and the moderns, etc. are found united as in a center of perspective, whence the object (confusing looking from any other place) shows its regularity and the suitability of its parts. by the rejection of others Formalist philosophers blame the material or corpuscular, and vice versa. It is difficult to give limits to division and subtlety, as well as to the richness and beauty of nature, when we put atoms and void, when we imagine certain first elements (such as the Cartisians), instead of true unities, and when we do not recognize the infinite in everything, and the exact expression of the greatest in the smallest, joined to the tendency of each to develop in a perfect order; which is the most admirable and the most beautiful effect of the sovereign prince, whose wisdom would leave nothing better to be desired to those who could understand its economy.

Of course, the best critical precepts, and all of them, thanks to the great Leibnitz, his monads, formal atoms1 [Leibnitz; Essays by Theodicee on the goodness of God, the freedom of man and the origin of evil (1734), T, 2, p. 330. Note. on the book. of the origin. difficulty.], to the entelechy, to the real units; [x] I, with the definitions of extension, time, and movement; harmoniously established, creation, by virtue of which each substance, following its own laws, meets in what the others require; and the operations of the one sivan and thus accompany the operation or change of the other." Letters from M. Leibnitz to M. Arnauld, du March 23, 1690, giving the Mem. of literature by Sallengre (from P . Desmolets), T. VIII (1729), I.re part, pp. 214, 215.] with reason sufficient for optimism, with the help of which [] how much a man in philosophizing tries to reconcile the freedom of man with the essence of God! I would say, in theologizing, quantillus1 [Theodic. T. 2, p. 161, 162, 272, 273. - Oeuvr. afterwards of Bossuet. Project of union between Catholics. and they protested. 2. part. letter de Leibnitz and de l'Eveq, de Meaux, p. 333-544]! to the hypothetical moral necessity in God as in man, distinct from the absolute, metaphysical necessity, that is, they agree equally with his entire philosophical system.

2. "The reasons for this binding, by which one is placed in circumstances more favorable than the other, are hidden in the depths of the wisdom of God: they depend on universal harmony. The best plan of the "The universe, which God could not fail to choose, bore it thus. Leibn. Theodic. T. 2, 3.e part. p. 273.

"Nor because of the certainty of things, prayers and labors become useless to obtain the future that we desire. For in the representation of this series of things, as possible, before God, before the decision was understood, of course the prayers also contained in it (if it were chosen) the future and other causes of the effects included in it , and to give value to the choice of the series, and so to the events included in it, as it was equal. And by which, now they move God to act or permit, they have already moved him to decide what he was going to do or permit. Theodic. T. 2, p. 354; God's cause asserted by his justice, etc."

If communicated to Arnold by Leibnitz, who made the judgment of this distinguished teacher worth it *, a dialogue written in Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God, he was not seen to be alienated or offended (s'effaroucher) by the reading of each of them (Thiodic. T. 2, 2.e part (p. 107) the supreme philosopher, is the very cause of God asserted, etc., given another form afterwards; certainly this occasional cause at the beginning of the decrees of God, which establishes the divine wisdom and power, the supreme theologian has not confirmed with his sanction any more than that concerning the number of evils, the origin of the soul, rationality, corruption, the transmission and effect of original sin (lib. cit. pp. 356, 357-363, 364), and the salvation of unbelievers, to whom only external preaching is denied (p. 368); of evil in the best and preferred by God series of things as if necessary or convenient (p. 371, 374); against grace, which is productive in itself, victorious in all things (p. 371), less cautiously, the sober Leibnitzius jokes.

[*The correspondence between Arnald and Leibnitz can give a true idea of ​​the greatness of these men. I will here quote some extracts from it, in which the German seems to give the first place to the Gallic philosopher in matters of metaphysics.

"How much I defer to your judgment," worried Leibnitzius (Epistol. ad Arnald. Hanov. 14 Jul. 1686. Arnald. Op. T. 5, pp. 190-193, 188, 194), "I was glad to see that you had moderated your censorship, after having seen my explanation of this proposition which I believe to be important, and which had seemed strange to you, that the individual notion of each person encloses once and for all what will ever happen to him. first draw this conclusion, that from this sole support the freedom to dispose of it, any more than he (cannot) not create a nature capable of thinking after having taken the resolution to create me.

To which I replied, that, the designs of God affecting this whole universe being linked together, in conformity with his sovereign wisdom, he took no resolution with regard to Adam, without taking any with regard to everything that has some connection with him. It is therefore not because of the resolution taken with regard to Adam, but because of the resolution taken at the same time with regard to all the rest (what that which is taken with regard to Adam envelops a perfect relationship), that God has determined himself on all human events. In which it seemed to me that there was no fatal necessity, nor anything contrary to the freedom of God, any more than in this hypothetical freedom, generally approved, that there is with regard to God himself, to carry out what he has resolved.

"You remain in agreement, Sir, in your reply * [This reply has gone astray; it has not been possible for us to find it, despite all our searches. Not. of the edit.], for this reason divine resolutions (p. 191), which I had put forward, and you even have the sincerity to admit that you took my proposal quite differently, because we were not accustomed (these are your words) to consider the specific notion of a sphere, in relation to what it is represented in the divine understanding, but in relation to what it is in itself; and that you had felt that it was still thus with regard to the individual notion of each person.

As for me, I had believed that full and comprehensive notions are represented in the divine understanding as they are in themselves. But now that you know that it is my thought, that is enough for you to conform to it, and to examine whether it removes the difficulty. It therefore seems that you recognize that my feeling explains in this way, to know the full notions such as they are in the divine understanding, is not only innocent, but even that it is certain; for here are your words: I remain in agreement that the knowledge that God had of Adam, when he resolved to create him, included that of all that happened to him and must happen to his posterity, and so, taking in this sense the individual notion of Adam, what you say about it is very certain. We are going to see later in what consists the difficulty that you still find there. However, I will say a word about the reason for the difference that there is in this, between the notions of species and those of individual substances, rather in relation to the divine will than in relation to simple understanding. It is that the most abstract specific notions include only necessary or eternal truths, which do not depend on divine decrees (whatever the Carthesians say, about which it seems that you yourself were not concerned at this point); but notions of individual substances, which are complete and capable of distinguishing their subject, and which therefore include contingent or factual truths, and individual circumstances of time, place, and the like, must also include in their notion, taken as possible, the free decrees of God, taken also as possible, because these free decrees are the principal sources of existences or facts; whereas the essences are in the divine understanding, before the consideration of the will.

"It will serve us to better understand all the rest, and to satisfy the difficulties which still seem to remain in my explanation; for this is how you continue, Sir: but it seems to me that after that there remains to be asked, and that This is what causes my difficulty, if the connection between these objects (I mean Adam and human events) is such of itself, independently of all the free decrees of God, or if it is independent of them (dependent) that is to say, if it was not until after the free decrees by which God ordered everything that would happen to Adam and his posterity, that God knew everything that would happen to them; or if he There is, independently of these decrees, between Adam on the one hand, and what happened and will happen to him and his posterity, on the other, an intrinsic and necessary connection. It seems to you that I will choose the latter party, because I said that God found among the possible ones an Adam accompanied by all the individual circumstances, and who among other predicates also has that of having in time such a posterity; now, you suppose that I will grant that the possible are possible before all the free decrees of God. Supposing then this explanation of my feeling, according to the last party, you judge that it has insurmountable difficulties; for there is, as you say with great reason, an infinity of human events, which have happened by very particular orders from God, such as (p. 192), among others, the Judaic and Christian religion, and above all the incarnation of the divine Word; and I do not know how one could say that all this (which happened by very free decrees of God) was enclosed in the individual notion of the possible Adam: what is considered as possible must have everything that one conceives that he has under this notion, regardless of divine decrees.

I wanted to report exactly your difficulty, Sir, and here is how I hope to satisfy it entirely, at your pleasure. [Mr. Leibnitz employs here four long pages to satisfy this difficulty, by metaphysical reasonings in which one gets lost; after which it continues thus (parenthes. minus philosophi editoris)];

"As for the reality of substances that are purely possible, that is to say, that God will never create, you say, Sir, that you are strongly led to believe that they are chimeras; to which I do not oppose , if you understand it, as I believe, that they have no other reality than that which they have in the divine understanding and in the active power of God. is obliged to have recourse to science and divine power to explain them well. I also find what you say then very solid, that one never conceives of any purely possible substance except under the idea of ​​someone [or by the included in some] of those that God created. You also say: we imagine that before creating the world, God considered an infinity of possible things, the lines of which he chose and the others rejected; several Adams possible [first men], each with a large retinue of persons with whom he has an intrinsic connection: and we suppose that the connection of all other things with one of these possible Adams [first men], is quite similar to that which had the created Adam with all his posterity; which makes us think that it is this one of all the possible Adams that God has chosen, and that he did not want all the others. How do you seem to recognize, Sir, that these thoughts, that I confess for mine [provided that one understands the plurality of Adams and their possibility, according to the explanation that I have given, and that one takes all this according to our way of conceiving some order in the thoughts or operations that we attribute to God], enter quite naturally into the mind, when one thinks a little about this matter, and cannot even be avoided, and perhaps only displeased you because you supposed that one could not reconcile them with the free decrees of God. Everything that is actual can be conceived as possible, and if the actual Adam will have a beautiful posterity over time, we cannot deny this same predicate to this Adam conceived as possible, especially since you grant that God envisages in him all these predicates, when he determines to create it. They therefore belong to him; and I don't see that what you say about the reality of possibilities is contrary to it. To call something possible, it is enough for me to be able to form a notion of it, even if it were only in the divine understanding, which is, so to speak, the country of possible realities. So in speaking of possibilities, I am satisfied that we can form true propositions from them, just as we can judge, for example, that a perfect square does not imply a contradiction, when there would be no square. perfect in the world. And if we wanted to absolutely reject these pure possibilities, we would destroy contingency and freedom; for, if there were nothing possible other than what God has actually created, what God has created would be necessary, and God, wishing to create something, could only create that, without having the freedom of choice.

"All this makes me hope [after the explanations I have given, and for which I have always provided reasons, in order to make you judge that these are not (p. 193) contrived evasions to elude your objections ] that in the end your thoughts are not so far removed from mine as they first appeared to be. You approve of the connection of God's resolutions; you recognize my main proposition as certain, in the sense I had given him in my answer: you only doubted whether I was making the independent connection of the free decrees of God, and that pained you, with great reason; but I showed that it depends on these decrees, in my opinion, and that it is not necessary, although it is intrinsic. You have insisted on the inconvenience of saying that if I do not make the journey will not be me, and I explained how one can say it or not. Finally I gave a decisive reason, which, in my opinion, takes the place of demonstration: it is that always, in any affirmative proposition, true , necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is included, in some way, in that of the subject; what is said is in the subject; or else I don't know what the truth is.

[Mr. Leibnitz uses three large pages to make his thoughts intelligible and meaningful, to show, he says, the solidity and the importance (the editor should not have omitted them: in fine, difficult matter, nothing excessive, superfluous)].

P. 196, at the same. Hanover, November 28, 1686.

As for the two difficulties you find in my letter; one, touching the hypothesis of concomitance, or the harmony of substances among themselves; the other, touching the nature of the forms of corporeal substances, I admit that they are considerable, and if I could satisfy them entirely, I would believe I could decipher the greatest secrets of universal nature.

P. 198, at the same, Nuremberg. Jan. 1688.

The movement in itself, separated from the force, is relative, and cannot determine the subject in which it is located. But force is something real and absolute; and that is why nature keeps the quantity of force, and not the quantity of motion. Yet it follows that there is something else in nature besides extension and motion, unless things deny all form or power; what is, from substances that they are, to change them into modes, and to fall, without thinking about it, into the dangerous sentiments of Spinosa, who wants all things to be only modes of God.... ..."

The whole of Leibnitz's Theodicy, otherwise an excellent work, but which, by removing the repetitions which create the darkness of the material, could easily be reduced to half, would be worth quoting, if it were famous. Who would want to refute the philosophers less rightly, even against his sense? The same weak answer everywhere as to the origin of evil, dictatorially given, the choice of the best, on the part of God, of the state of things, of the most perfect world.

I did not know the nature of the human mind, and the same things were asserted in the observations of Hobbes on Liberty, and King, on the Origin of Evil, books, even in the cause of God, etc. (p. 352, 353, 358-362-375), I would find, I would easily give credence to what is read in the German Library (T. 14 [1727], p. 178, art. Tubingen); of course:

"We find at the end (From Institutions to Ecclesiastical Law by M. le Chancel. Pfaff), some letters from M. de Leibnitz to M. Pfaff, in the sequences he declares that he only regards the system which he established in the Theodicy, in relation to the origin of evil."

Celebr. Le Clerc (Bibliotheq. anc. et modern. T. XV (1721), p. 179, 180) had previously been of that opinion. The chancellor herself It helps to give the words of Pfaff (Act. erudit. [Leips.] mens. March. 1728, p. 125 et seq.):

"An illustrious man (Leibnitzius) had asked me, says Pfaff (Desmaiz. libr. cit. T. I, avertissement), what I thought of Theodicoea, and of the method by which Baelius had refuted it: I wrote that I thought that, at least for the sake of the soul, the system of philosophy confined it, and just as the Cleric, about to refute Boelius, pretended to be an Origenist, so he himself began this new way of philosophizing in order to refute Boelius, which indeed, though it throws dust at least into the eyes of those who cannot see the depth otherwise, is nevertheless all the more ingenious because it is well understood, and the opinion of Boelius is strengthened under the guise of a refutation, rather in a more subtle way, but not immediately uncovering the mystery; so that such a dangerous opinion of Boelius may be seriously, solidly, and seriously refuted.

"What, I pray thee, did Leibnitzius reply to me, whom I had believed would be indignant at me for a frank answer? And so he, in the letters of Hanover, a. 1716, d. 21 maji, given to me, which do not touch this business, it is not appropriate to add]: It is exactly so, most reverend man, as you write about my Theodicy. those who test the strength of their genius in forming hypotheses, as you well advise. You, who are a theologian, act like a theologian in refuting errors."

But the celebs think that Leibnitz himself did not write this with a serious mind. Bulfinger, Wolf (Act. erudit. Decemb. 1728, p. 550, 551). M. de Neufville, the author of Leibniz's life, feels the same way (Theodic. T. I, p. 117, 118, 122-125); and surely this place of observations in Holbesius's book does not allow us to think otherwise (Theodic. T. II, p. 289).

“It is therefore better,” says the supreme philosopher, “incomparably, to explain the will of God as we have done in this work (the Theodicy). serious inclination to produce, or to see, and to cause to produce, all good and all praiseworthy action; and to prevent, or to see, and to cause to be missed, all may and all bad action; but that it is determined by this same goodness, joined to an infinite wisdom, and by the very concurrence of all the prior and particular inclinations towards each good and towards the prevention of each evil, to produce the best possible design of things, which constitutes its final and directing will; and that, this design of the best being of such a nature that the good must be heightened there like the light by the shadows of some evil incomparably less than this good, God could not exclude this evil, nor introduce certain excluded goods into this good. plan, without doing harm to his supreme perfection, and that is why we must say that he allowed the sin of others, because otherwise he himself would have done an action worse than all the others. fishing for creatures" (Id. Theodic. T. 2, 2.e part. p. 23, 24; T. 1.re leaves. p. 91; T. 2, 3.e part. p. 314).

Of course, these are said seriously, and do not smell like a game of genius. Similarly, Leibnitzius blurted out those things less wisely (T. 2, p. 234).

"We have already shown, he says, that this source (that of evil) is found in the forms or ideas of possibilities; for it must be eternal, and matter is not. Now, God having made all positive reality which is not eternal, he would have made the source of evil, if it did not consist in the possibility of things or forms, the only thing that God has not made, since he is not the author of his own understanding"

It must be observed, however, that the most famous author does not so much stand by his principles, that sometimes, as I have already said, he deviates from them. Thus (2nd part. p. 15, 16):

“Creatures often lack, he says, the means of giving themselves the will that one ought to have; even they often lack the will to make use of the means which indirectly give a good will, of which I have already spoken above. We must admit this defect, and we must even recognize that God might perhaps have been able to exempt creatures from it, since nothing prevents, it seems, that there are some whose nature is to always have a good will. But I answer that it is not necessary, and that it has not been feasible, that all reasonable creatures should have such a great perfection which brought them so near to divinity."

Who does not think that his ears are ringing when he hears the same philosopher saying: (p. 21)

"God, it is said, could give happiness to all; he could give it quickly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience; for he can do anything. But must he? since he does not do it, it is is a mark that he should do it all otherwise."

This is to cut the knot, not to untie it. You say it was done, surely rightly done, wisely done. But who is right? I seek reasoning, not understanding. You answer the fact! is he a philosopher?

Equally (ibid.):

God does not lack it (in ability or good will); those who oppose it."

What a despicable way of thinking and speaking about the Supreme Being!

"Besides, we have no reason to complain that salvation is usually only achieved by many sufferings, and by carrying the cross of J.C.; the evils serve to make the elect imitators of their master, and to increase their happiness."

A pious and solid paraenesis (and the 2nd part. p. 148), not to be expected in a philosophical discussion, but which, supposing a mystery, does not remove the veil imposed on the operation of God, let alone lift it, and the author's system is completely torn apart.

The same must be said about what the author says (T. 1, 1.e part. p. 149):

"And so that we have no reason to boast, we must ignore the reasons for God's choice: therefore they are too varied to fall under our knowledge; and it is possible that God sometimes shows the power of his grace, by overcoming the most obstinate resistance, so that no one should have cause to despair, as no one should have to flatter himself, he said, had mercy on me, to give a great example of his patience."

If the author had remembered this, he would not have attempted to supplement Laurentius Valloei's Dialogue on Free Will, contrary to Boethius (T. 2, p. 256-261); much less Baylius, who was endowed with a sharp, skilful, learned intellect, and also endowed with indomitable power of reasoning, had reported long and excellent passages with a weak, weak, and fasting refutation. I will mention one thing here.

"By the clear and distinct feeling that we have of our existence, Baylius worried (Responses to the questions of a provincial, T. 3 (1706), p. 761-765, — Leibnitz, Theodic. T. 2, 3.e p. 172-175), we do not discern if we exist by ourselves, or if we hold from another what we are; we discern this only by way of reflections, that is to say say, that by meditating on the impotence in which we are to preserve ourselves as much as we would like, and to deliver ourselves from the dependence of the beings which surround us, etc. It is even certain that the Pagans [it must be said the same thing of the Socinians, since they deny creation] never came to the knowledge of this true dogma, that we were made of nothing, and that we are drawn from nothing at every moment of our life. that all substances in the universe exist by themselves, and that they can never be annihilated, and that thus they depend on nothing other than their modifications, subject to being destroyed by the action of an external cause. Doesn't this error come from the fact that we don't feel the creative action that preserves us, and that we only feel that we exist, that we feel it, I say, in a way that would keep us eternally in the ignorance of the cause of our being, if other lights did not help us.

"Let us also say that the clear and distinct feeling that we have of the acts of our will, cannot enable us to discern whether we give them to ourselves, or whether we receive them from the same cause which gives us existence. must have recourse to reflection, or to meditation, in order to make this discernment. Now I put in fact that by purely philosophical meditations one can never arrive at a well-founded certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions; for all no one who examines things well will obviously know that, if we were only a passive subject with regard to the will, we would have the same feelings of experience that we have when we believe ourselves to be fiber. , that God has regulated in such a way the laws of the union of the soul and the body, that all the modalities of the soul, without excluding any of them, are necessarily linked together with the interposition of the modalities of the brain, you will understand that only what we feel will happen to us. There will be in our soul the same series of thoughts, from the perception of the objects of the senses, which is its first step, to the most fixed volitions, which are his last step. There will be in this sequence the feeling of ideas, that of affirmations, that of irresolutions, that of inclinations, and that of volitions. For whether the act of willing is imprinted on us by an external cause, or whether we produce it ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feel that we will; and, as this external cause can mix as much pleasure as it wants in the volition it imparts to us, we can sometimes feel that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and that they lead us according to the slope of our most strong inclinations. We will feel no constraint: you know the maxim, the will cannot be forced. Do you not clearly understand that a weather vane, on which one would always imprint everything at the same time, nevertheless ensures that the priority of nature, or, if you will even, a priority of a real instant, would suit desire? to move] the movement towards a certain point of the horizon, and the desire to turn to that side, would be persuaded that it would move of itself to execute the desires that it would form? I suppose she would not know that there were winds, nor that an external cause changed both her situation and her desires. Here we are naturally in this state: we do not know if an invisible cause makes us pass successively from one thought to another. It is therefore natural for men to persuade themselves that they determine themselves: but it remains to be examined whether they are mistaken in this as in an infinity of other things which they affirm by a kind of instinct, and without having used metaphysical meditations.

"Since therefore there are two hypotheses on what happens in man, one that he is only a passive subject, the other that he has active virtues, one cannot reasonably prefer the second to the first, while only proofs of feeling can be adduced; for we would feel with equal force that we want this or that, whether all our volitions were impressed on our soul by an external and invisible cause, or that we train them ourselves.

To these things the supreme Leibnitzius observes (lib. cit. p. 174, 175):

"There are very fine arguments here, which have force against [Leibnitz.] ordinary systems; but they cease in relation to the system of pre-established harmony, which takes us even further than we could go before."

Thus the author of any system is generally admitted. The opinions presented thus far give way to difficulties. His alone answers to them, he resolves them; and he is accused of denying and resisting everything with energy (p. 212), and is also gifted with weakness of mind (ibid., p. 178, 190), who refuses to acquiesce in the shining truth. Great, Hercules! a crime, a remarkable rashness, to undermine, to overturn, to demolish, at a single stroke, an edifice built with so much labor, all the parts of which, suitably connected, correspond harmoniously to each other (p. 212)!

"M. Bayle puts it, adds the philosopher, that by purely philosophical meditations one can never arrive at a founded certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions: but this is a point that I do not agree with him; for the establishment of this system shows beyond doubt that, in the course of nature, each substance is the sole cause of its actions."

He shows, that is, he assumes, but in no way proves, he demonstrates:

"and that he is exempt from any physical influence of any other substance,

Here we are dealing with the operation of the body, of external objects, on the soul (p. 316).

"except the ordinary concurrence of God."

In God, philosophically, there is no distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary. All things, as he willed, were ordered from eternity as in the present; they are carried out in the same, similar manner. The human mind, not being able to comprehend this constant, static, uniform series of operations, by which it is less frequently struck, calls it extraordinary; since in the supreme Agent everything is one and the same.

"And it is this system, worried Leibnitzius, which shows that our spontaneity is real, and not only apparent, as M. Wittichius had believed. M. Bayle also maintains for the same reasons (Rep. aux quest, etc. ch. 170; p. 1132 -1135), that if there were a astrological fate, it would not destroy freedom; and I would grant it to him, if it consisted only in an apparent spontaneity."

Spontaneity is true spontaneity, since [x] cannot be known spontaneously unless it is made apparent.

But in truth the beloved system is too full, otherwise the philosopher does not take care to assert himself as well as his adversaries.

A man of the most active intellect does not see that his harmony does not really differ from occasional causes. An eternal being does nothing successively; an omnipotent being, acting by himself, is determined by no external cause: therefore God is said to produce motion in the body on the occasion of the emotion of the soul, and vice versa, it is a way of speaking; by one, eternal, ever-present action, and that which appears in the body and that which appears in the soul, concomitantly and separately, without any prior or temporary reason being induced, He makes of Himself, because He so wills. In the supreme, supremely perfect being, at the same time separately, predefinitely occasionally, acting in the same way differently, the machines of body and soul, let it be pardoned by the word! answering to each other, ordering from the beginning, or successively, as things seem to have, are one and the same. Leibnitzius errs in the same way, and certainly not because he had Arnald as a moral approver, to whom he writes on Jan. 14. 1688 (Arnald. Op. T. 5, p, 199):

"If one day I find enough leisure, I want to complete my meditations on the general characteristic, or manner of universal calculation, which must be used in the other sciences as in mathematics. I have already some fine essays. I have the definitions, axioms, theorems, and very remarkable problems of the coincidence of the determination [or of unico] of the similarity, of the relation in general, of the power or cause of the substance; and everywhere I proceed by letters, to a precise and rigorous way, as in algebra or in numbers.

"If we continued this method, there would be a way to end many controversies and disputes, by saying, let's count."

A truly rare specimen of mathematical madness. Saying so, let us count everything in Gaul and the rest of it, foot to head, head to foot wide. 1 chronology, history, as in common life creating problems. On this matter one can read a work entitled:

Critical Considerations on the New Era, in the Form of a Speech Supposedly Held at the Tribune of the Council of Five Hundreds; followed by an extract from a memoir by the astronomer Delambre on the means of finding the sextile years of the new calendar, by J. B. Vienot-Vaublanc. By. year 9 (1801), p. 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 32, 43, 45.]

“We could still give essays in morality.

This is what Leibnitz's monkeys, the materialistic philosophers, are trying to do. The affections of man, never fully known, the light of reason, always clouded by the movement of affections, the perpetual variety of things, times, places, and manners: all these things, just as the parts of matter, the units of numbers, are given; and thence, with the aid of letters, as in algebra, to calculate the reason, what madness!

"And I already have some in the jurisprudence. Also I know of no authors whose style approaches more that of the geometers, than that of the ancient jurisconsults, whose fragments are in the digests. In the conjectural matures one can at least determine what should be judged most probable and most certain, ex datis (similiter, characterum algebricorum ope)."

If it is permissible to play in a serious matter, I will bring Rabelais's judge Bridoye here, to settle disputes by throwing tickets.1 [Les OEuvres de M. Fr. Rabelais, Dr. en medecine (1588), liv. 3, ch. 39-41, p. 173-184.]

It would be too long to recount Leibnitz's deep and arduous discussion with Clark about extension, time, and motion. These three, the former philosopher, the mere ratios of matter to matter2 [Leibnitz; Epistle ed. Kortholt, T. 2 (1735); mail 14, to Jacob. Thomas, p. 137, 138-142.] (nothing in itself) it strives to be, it laboriously proves it, and while something that can be laughed at by a perspicacious mind, puts itself forward, and thinks that it sheds light on the question, in truth, the darkness only drives away the darkness.

[Clarke.] II. It is about the system of Leibniz, the opinion of a man who has no equal in metaphysical matters, the great Clarke; who indeed does not say that extension, time, and motion are substances, but that they exist really, absolutely, as properties, quantities.3 [See on that question, etc. five writings of Leibnitz, and five responses of Clark, recueil de Desmaiz, T. 1, p. 3a, 40, 41, 59, 68, 69, 72, 73, 76, 77, 80, 8i, 98, 99, 103, 136, 172, not. p. 181, 220, 225.]

All philosophers, as I have already observed, who deal with the first principles of things, overthrow the hypotheses of their adversaries with little effort; but they establish their own opposite opinion with not equal success. Descartes, Newton; impulse, attraction; they are attacked in a complete vacuum: soon the assailant himself, defeated in another battle, is driven from the ground he was occupying.

Hence Clarkius, saying that time, motion, and space are not mere factors, but something real, distinct from the substances which they regard, and the nature of the latter being unknown to him, would have answered the matter in a more appropriate manner.

So also, in a letter to a learned man from Cambridge, his opinion on liberty, viz.1 [See. of Desmaiz. T. I, p. 240.] The English philosopher expounds and explains that the various physical powers of action are the essence of freedom in God and in man. But there is nothing by which the difficulty, namely, by what reason an imperfect creature, who neither received perfection from God, nor could give it to herself, could be solved by reason of what she made imperfectly.

The principles of things will always remain enveloped in these terns, in darkness, whatever the most active minds may attempt to remove them; in which are included the attributes of the supreme being and the free will of the secondary being, viz., the cause of works, the reward, the punishment of offences, the sense of physical evils.

III. A new athlete enters the field, with the same equipment and with the same [Collins.] exit, a man of keen health and sharp wit, Collins, who,2 [Philosophical research on freedom; collection of Desmaiz T. 1, p. 268, 277, 341, 346, 347.] while he pleads the cause of necessity, since man is not an agent free in every way to act, or not to act, to different things, even opposites, in that sense which is clear. Clark defends, energetically and as if insurmountably defeats: but when he determines that the same agent is necessary, and sets out to solve the difficulties arising from the actions of merit and the politeness of society, distinguishing moral necessity from physical, determining that volition is sufficient, he throws the weapon of the adversary's defenseless body.

Nor does the lauded Clarkius explain the essence of a free being in a clear light, in his observations on the freedom of man in his Philosophical Disquisitions ad Collins, where [Remarks on a book entitled: Philosophical research on the freedom of man, lib. city ​​p. 375.] he pronounces dictatorially more than philosophically, that an agent, which has the power to initiate motion, cannot properly be necessary; not by reasons, arguments, abstract ideas, pleasure or pain, passive perceptions, as he says [Lib. city p. 381, 383.], really to be determined by the act; the balance, which understands the suppositories, on which side the weight pulls it, feels it, and approves of this movement3 [Id. p. 387.], not to be a true agent, since the true definition of a free being is: a being with the power to act, as well as to receive the action of another, proceeds; moral necessity, truly and philosophically speaking, by no means to be a necessity4 [Ibid.]; that which seems to admit the truth, and that to reject the falsity, are not actions5 [Id. p. 396], although the will signifies only the last perception or approval of the intellect, only the first act of the faculty moving itself; God cannot inflict punishment on him who does not deserve freedom except unjustly6 [Id. p. 423.]; God's infallible judgment, or his foreknowledge, of contingent truths, not to change their nature, not to render them necessary7 [Id. p. 419.]: what must be admitted; for that is not why things are necessary, because God foresaw them, he foresaw8 [Clarke; Treatises on the existence of God etc., T. I, chap. II, p. 188-194. - Remark. etc. book city p. 419, 490]; but as he foretells decrees certain from eternity, decreed from eternity, they will be said to be necessary or inescapable: finally, foreknowledge in God by what reason does nothing detract from the contingency of things, while he says that he has explained himself more fully in his discourses on the existence and attributes of God; where, however9 [Treatises on the existence of God, etc., T. I, p. 189.], I admit, he says, that it is not possible to explain how God can foresee future things, unless we suppose a chain of necessary causes: and how wonderful to explain the foreknowledge of God with light arguments, the origin of evil, and He strives to reconcile the certainty of these truths with the freedom of man [Id. p. 191-197.]. All these things can be asserted or denied with equal right, unless they are proved from another source, which the great philosopher does not do when these things are in question; and if only suppositions are conveyed, let the words be given, and the obscure be explained by the more obscure.

But it is true that in discussions, especially metaphysical ones, the poet has a place:

And sometimes the good Homer sleeps.

Next to the most profound thoughts of an eminent genius lie the lowest conceptions, scarcely crude, at least to be attributed to the common mind. Indeed, the wise Clark [Id. p. 189, 190.], just as a man or an angel powerful with acute mental power, can foretell from the character and circumstances of another man what he is going to do, more easily and more certainly than anyone else; so I know from God supremely, perfect, all the more acts, contingent things to be foreseen, as if to say out of abundance, to weigh the attributes of God with a bold hand of the two had to be annihilated, who only sees the introduction of an absolute and universal destiny, the tomb and the entire extinction of religion and morals, would make a dent in the glory of God far more considerable than would the denial of his proscience, which in this supposition would be impossible and contradictory? contradictory things, we do not deprive him of his omnipotence for that. Treatises on existence, etc., T. 1, pp. 190, 191.], it will be seen as portentous.

A new species of congruism, a shameless view of the supreme ruler of all, which lowers the first cause, the Creator, to the low level of a creature, and which, to find in philosophical and theological work, will appear as a monster.

Freely, but not harshly, check the opinions of the greatest philosophers. No one, in any class, is perfect in all numbers. Not therefore, as Cicero rightly observes [Cicero, about nat. Deorum, lib. 1, ed. interpreter d'Oliv T. 1, p. 168], both the authorities in discussion and the points of reason are to be sought.

[King.] I will dwell for a while on the work of William King, bishop of Derens, which is written on the origin of evil (London, 1702). Although Leibnitz praises the author, nothing in the first four chapters, which deal with physical evil, cannot be answered philosophically. The bishop of Derens brings forth the conveniences and inconveniences of the norm of human reason, which, when dealing with the supreme, omnipotent, and wisest worker, cannot be brought into argument. [King; On the Origin of Evil (1704), chap. 4, sect. 9, p. 108-117.], which was chosen by God for the state of things: perhaps thence Leibnitz's proclamation; and whatever is the system of this philosopher, it is equally opposed to the opinion of the British bishop. Bernard (New. of the Republ. letters 1703, May 5, s. 5, p. 554-578, June. art. 1, p. 603-635) a compendium elaborated with the utmost care: a truly critical, sharp and profound examination made in mind, of the principal chapters of that compendium, which concern physical evil, pain, moral evil, guilt, sin, its permission, the punishments attached to it, the false definition of liberty given by the British prince, in Bayli's rep. or quest of a province T. 2 (1706), ch. 74-92, p. 76-341; then this examination was announced with the criticism of the author, that he had only read the epitome, and not the book itself (Bernard, lib. cit. 1705, November, p. 591-593). The learned diarist repeats the same thing (1706, Jan. p. 56-74), retracing certain things also, instead of an examination. But what a surprise! how weak and perhaps foolish against so strong an adversary at hand! Finally, the last response of Baylius (lib. cit. T. 5, ch. 20-26, p. 260-352), where the same, in a new color, the sharp and vehement philosopher proposes and turns the arguments, with which William King's opinions, and by the diarist Bernard their, as it were, an apology, built up invincibly by the weakness of human reason in this matter, are utterly overthrown. See and Journ. from Leipsic 1704, June, p. 274; Leibnitz, Theodic. T. 2, p. 293-344.].

However, we will observe two things in William King's work worthy of attention: namely, the assertion fiercely contested by Leibniz1 [Theodic. note on the book of orig. two evils, p. 324, 325.], of course,2 [King; Lib. city chap. 5, sect. 1, subsection 4, p. 154, 155. No. 11 (1.°).] For him (God) there is nothing in the creatures before election, either good or bad; he has no appetite, who is satisfied by the enjoyment of things outside himself. He is absolutely indifferent to all external things, and cannot be helped or harmed by anyone. What, then, determines his will to act? certainly nothing outside itself; therefore he himself determines himself, and makes a choice for himself, as it were, by his appetite. For having made a choice, he will try to procure effectively what he has chosen with no less diligence and diligence than if he were prompted to try by natural appetite and necessity; and what they do to obtain the elect, he will regard as good, what word they oppose, as bad.

3 [Id. p. 155, 156, No. 3, 2.] The divine will is the CAUSE of goodness in creatures, and, as almost everyone acknowledges, they depend on it. For created things have all that they are from the divine will. And they suffered nothing else to be than what He willed... They could conceive neither good nor evil in themselves, since they had been nothing before the act of the divine will.... The goodness of things is therefore to be determined by their congruence with the divine will, but not by the congruity or goodness of things .

4 [Id. p. 156, No. 4, 3.] Therefore those who want to choose God for things because they are good are not to be heard: as if the good and greater good which he perceives in things should determine his will...

5 [Id. p. 166, No. 17.] Therefore divine choice is not determined by the goodness of things, but goodness and conformity in things arise from choice, and that which is best for them is in accordance with the divine choice by which he willed them to be what they are. From these I think it is sufficiently clear, that God is such an agent, to whom things please that reason alone, because they are chosen.

From this two propositions are elicited. 1.a The goodness of metaphysical, physical, and moral things, whatever they may be, is from God.

[admin]

Part 5 of 15 (AMENDMENTS AND ANNOTATIONS IN [x] OUPNEK'HAT)
[Latin Version]

2.a Quidquid Deus agit, non a se, independenter, ante voluntatem, determinationem primi entis, bonum est: proinde Deus operatur quoniam ita vult; et inde solum, quod facit bonum est; non quia aliquid, quod in se bonum est, eligit.

Duae istae propositiones primo aspectu rerum bonitatis essentiae1 [Bayle; Rep. aux quest. etc. T. 2, ch. 89, p. 202-207.] in se adversari videri possunt: attente consideratae, fundamentum, quidquid contra deblaterent Creatorem creaturae assimilantes philosophi, cui vera et sola rerum bonitas innititur, subministrant. Ens supremum, et veritas, bonitas essentialis, sunt unum et idem: Deus a suis attributis non distinguitur; et nihil nec temporis nec natures prioritate ante eum supponi potest. Voluntas Dei et essentia rerum invicem permutantur. Vult ergo quod essentialiter bonum, et illud essentialiter, quoniam vult; bonum est. Nulla re externa, ratione extra se, ad actum ferri potest; cum totus in se per se, perfectus, absolutus, integer, nullo deficiens, sit et dici debeat. Homo, ens partiale, propositam normam, ideam, regulam veri et aequi sibi oblatam, consulit, sequitur, in agendo ab externo dirigitur2 [Guill, King aliter sentit: lib. cit. subsect. 5, p. 167, 168, etc.]. Idea illa particularis essentialis ideae portio est, quam Deus, seipsum intuens, intuetur.

Res ergo verae et bonae reipsa sunt, quia Deus eas scit, vult reras, bonas; non autem Deus eas scit aut vult veras, bonas, quoniam in se, cum in se nihil sint, et prius ab actione Dei sunt verae et bonae.

Fatendum simul, re altius penetrata, de pura verborum quoestione hic proprie agi: cum utrinque absoluta Dei, et a quolibet extra independens operatio Entis supremi agnoscatur. E naturali ad mentem humanam et ejus agendi modum ratione, respectu, incaute considerate, oritur differentia. Deum omni supereminentem, nulli conferendum libenter, aperte confitemur; quod tamen, quin operationes ejus tacite ex ingenio nostro metiamur, ex natura nostra fingamus, non impedit.

Haec consideratio auctoris opinionibus applicanda, quibus hominem principii hujus electionis sibi placentis participem esse, id est, convenientiam et bonitatem in rebus volendo efficere1 [Lib. cit. subsect. 5, p. 167-184.]; felicitatem in electionibus esse ostenditur2 [Id. sect. 2, p. 185-190.]: quomodo concilientur electiones pravoe cum potentia et bonitate divina 3 [Id. sect. 5, p. 198.]: cur Deus agentia libera creaverit.... sine agentibus liberis totus mundus machina mera fuisset.... nihil in se potens.... opificium Dei totum, ne unam actionem ex se elicere potuisset, sed totum in se stupidum et brutum.... quantum mundus sic constructus deficeret a proesenti, non opus est (inquit) dicere, nec quam ineptus et Deo auctore indignus..... majora sunt mala naturalia quam naturalia.... satius est quosdam aliquando peccare, et molestiam ex conscientia peccati pati, quam omnes in omnibus temper timere, fluctuare, et sollicitos esse, imo plerumque ab omni actione cessare4 [King; lib. cit. cap. 5, sect. 5, subsect. 3, p. 202, 203, 207, 216.]: cur Deus non interponat omnipotentiam suam, et cum opus sit, voluntatem ab electione prava coerceat (nempe plura et graviora mala rerum universitati obventura ex ejusmodi interpositione quam ex liberi arbitrii abusu); difficultatem vero, quomodo contingentia rerum cum proescientia divina consentiat, aggredi auctor hujus loci esse non ducit; libellum enim integrum, inquit, exigeret1 [King; lib. cit. sect. 5, subsect. 1, 2, p. 198-217; subsect. 3, p. 217- 238.]: cur Deus alibi hominem non transferat, ubi nihil occurreret, quo ad male agendum sollicitaretur2 [Id. subsect. 5, p. 239, 240.]: Deum e malis minimum semper eligere3 [Id. subsect. 7, p. 256, 257.]; permissum est hominibus libero arbitrio male uti: estque necessarium; ut Deus id, aut majus incommodum toleraret; et quidquid de poenis infligendis dicitur4 [Id. appendix de legibus divinis, sect. 1-3, p. 261-281.].

Nihil in cogitationibus, expositionibus, responsis Derensis episcopi, nisi humano modo, agendi creaturae rationabilis mori consentaneum, ex accidentibus, ex convenientibus desumptum. Res, quaestio de mali origine, Dei attributorum cum libero hominis arbitrio conciliatione, et justa mercedis aut poenae retributione; non in se, independenterak consequentibus, tractatur, elucidatur.

Quo autem auctoris ratiocinandi modus cognoscatur, haec lubet apponere.

"Ut quod, inquit,5 [Lib. cit. cap. 5, sect. 5, subsect. 7, N.° X, p. 257, 258.] sentio dicam, ausim audacter sed cum reverentia effari, Deum nec infinite potentem, nec BONUM fuisse, si nihil, quod malum dicimus, potuisset. Sunt enim quoedam possibilia, quoe inter se minime consistunt, imo impugnant, et se mutuo destruunt, id est, mala sunt sibi invicem; si Deus nihil horum efficere posset, quomodo infinite potens foret, cum omnia possibilia non potuerit? (Eo modo quo turrim simul quadratam et rotundam efficere non potest.) Nec minus injuriosum, noluisse; sic enim potentia frustra fuisset, nec aliquid unquam effecisset; cum nullum sit bonum simplex, et malis omnibus liberatum, proeter Deum.

Rectd omnino. Sed quare poena infligitur, si aliter fieri nequit. Si igitur bonitas divina negasset rebus creatis esse SUUM (homimini liberum arbitrium etiam cum abusu) propter mala adhoerentia, invidisse revera, censeretur, eb quod nulli nisi sibi esse indulsisset.

Quam abjecta et irreverenda de Deo loquendi ratio!

Et dum noluerit aliquid mali, rejecisset omne bonum.

Videat, qui potest, consequentiam, saltern necessariam.

Evanescit ergo herculeum hoc argumentum, quo freti Epicurei numen sustulere, et Manichoei malum posuerunt.

Silentio numen adorari, quam paradoxis argumentis ejus operationum, solitis et novis difficultatibus obnoxiarum, defensionem praebere, doctum et prudenti studio ardentem episcopum magis decebat.

Huic de mali origine disceptationi, viri omni exceptione majoris, Arnaldi, sententia, celebriorum aliquot aliorum [Arnauld.] philosophorum intermiscens, addens opiniones, finem imponam.

Summi istius theologi aeque ac philosophi nomine in memoriam revocatur Portus Regius, labanti in Gallia relligioni datum a divina providentia fulcimentum.

Illic, spretis mundi illecebris, opibus, honoribus, etiam [Port Royal.] ingenii, dotum fama, duro et continuo, in victu, vestitu, cubitu, somno, silentio, sub directore pietate et humani cordis cognitione insigni, D. Singlin, poenitentiae habitu, assidua librorum divinorum, Patrum Ecclesiae, conciliorum lectione, ac rerum spiritualium meditatione, pauperum cura, etiam adolescentum institutione, primorum Ecclesiae temporum vitam, libero animi motu, nullis votis astricti, corrupto, stupenti, frendenti saeculo offerebant, seorsim, congregatim, pro officii genere, degentes, e quibuscunque, etiam eminentissimis, nobilissimis conditionibus, statibus orti Solitarii.

Illic, cum perpetuae Entis supremi adorationi, tum puellarum educationi et pauperum levamento deditae, angelico et perenni vocum concentu Deum celebrantes, humili, puro, poenitenti corde et corpore, ardentibus votis, precibus, coelestes in terram gratias, sonti mundo miserationem, veniam accientes Deo sacratae VIRGINES.

Illic praestantes coelesti doctrina et pietate, nec minus mundi scientiarum periti viri (Arnauld, Nicole, Lemaitre de Sacy, Lancelot, Tillemont, le Tourneux, Pascal), duce primum celebri Abbate S. Cyran, in eo toti ut grassantes contra morum doctrinam, famosae nimis Societatis et ejus asseclarum ope errores profligarent, pretiosaque gratioe per se efficacis, proedestinationis gratuitoe, gratuiti Dei auxilii ad opus bonum necessarii, amoris Dei dominantis ad obtinendam peccatorum veniam requisiti, denique supremi et absoluti Creatoris in creaturam dominii, dogmata, novorum Pelagianorum audacia impugnata, novi Augustini, operibus, gallice aut latine accurate, eleganter scriptis, strenue et solide assererent1 [Hanc genuinorum Europae Saniasian descriptionem libenter legent docti Saniasan, Brahmanes Indi, qui Deo unice, domitis sensibus, adhaerentem, supremi Entis consortio frui posse, quemcunque vestitum gerat, autumant.].

Inter quos, ut in S. Benedicti docta, erudita, pia familia; Mabillonius et Montefalconius, primas tenent Arnaldus et Nicolius, duoe olivoe et duo candelabra in conspectu Domini terroe stantes2 [[x]. Apocalyps, XI, 4.]; et prae omnibus magnus Arnaldus, per tres et quinquaginta annos indefesso labore et invicto animo, potentem, doctam, ingenii dotibus, non autem solum necessario veritatis amore praeditam debellans sodalitatem1 [Leibnitz; Theodic. T. l, Pref. p. XL.], uti et sectas contra Ecclesian rebellatrices, ac ingeniorum alioqui sublimium, sed e recto tramite deflexorum perniciosas opiniones.

Hujus generis erat Mallebranchii, summi philosophi at minime theologi, nullo modo eruditi, novum systema de natura et gratia: cujus basis est, 1.° actio Dei generalis; 2,° optimismus in se, 3.° et praesertim quoad media2 [Oeuvr. de M. Arnauld, T. 39 (1781); Reflex. philosophiq. et theologiq. sur le nouv. systeme de la nat. et de la grace; liv. l, ch. 1, p. 179, 181, 182.].

Contra quod operis perfectionem majorem mediorum, viarum, majori simplicitati, omnium judicio praeferendam Arnaldus censet3 [Ibid. p. 182.]: praeterea, 1.° falsum esse Deum, in ordine naturoe, non agere nisi ut causam universalem; 2.° in creatione mundi, Deum, non viis simplicioribus, sed infinita potentia per voluntates particulares, nullis causis occasionalibus voluntates ejus generales 4 eterminantibus, operatum; 3.® in conservation mundi corporei f voluntatibus particularibus, sicut et generalibus, actum edere; 4.° in ordine naturoe, Deum, in rebus quae voluntatibus liberis determinantur, voluntatibus particularibus uti4 [Id. p. 185.]: quod cum scriptura, tum ratione humana asseri affirmat.

Ut autem cognoscatur quid de rationis auxilio in hac materia censeat profundus aeque ac sapiens philosophus, ejus verba proferamus.

"Si nous n'avions, inquit ARNALDUS5 [Ibid. ch. 11, p. 264.], d’autre lumiere pour juger de la conduite de Dieu dans le monde que la foiblesse de notre raison, chacun auroit plus de droit de sa la figurer telle qu'il voudroit, selon ses imaginations et ses pensees. Mais Dieu se connoit infiniment mieux que nous ne pouvons le connoitre, et il a daigne parler aux hommes, tant par les anciennes traditions, que par les ecritures divines. C’est donc de lui que nous devons apprendre quelle est la maniere dont il gouverne ce qu’il a cree"....

Et inferius:

"1 [Reflex. philosophiq. et theologiq. etc. liv. 1, ch. 15, p. 303, 304.] Rien n’est plus digne de Dieu, et ne remplit davantage l'idee que nous avons de l'Etre infiniment sage, qui n’a pas seulement cree l'univers, mais en est aussi le souverain administrateur, que la maniere dont il fait servir a l'execution de ses desseins tout ce qui se fait dans le monde, meme par les agens libres: mais aussi rien n'est plus difficile a concevoir, et c’est la difficulte d’accorder cette partie de la providence avec la liberte des creatures intelligentes, qui la fait rejeter par les impies, en meme temps que toutes les personnes raisonnables reconnoissent qu’on la doit croire et l'adorer, quoiqu'on ne la puisse comprendre.

"M. Descartes, addit Arnaldus, nous en a donne un bel exemple. Sachant, d’une part, dit-il2 [En ipsum insignis philosophi textum, quem summatim Arnaldus refert: "Mais a cause que ce que nous avons depuis connu de Dieu nous assure que sa puissance est si grande que nous ferions un crime de penser que nous eussions jamais ete capables de faire aucune chose qu'il ne l'eut auparavant ordonnee, nous pourrions auisement nous embarrasser en des difficultes tres-grandes si nous entreprenions d’accorder la liberte de notre volonte avec ses ordonnances, et si nous tachions de comprendre, c’est-a-dire, d’embrasser, et comme limiter avec notre entendement, toute l'etendue de notre libre arbitre et l'ordre de la providence eternelle. Au lieu que nous n’aurons point du tout de peine a nous en delivrer si nous remarquons que notre pensee est finie, et que la toute-puissance de Dieu,  par laquelle il a non-seulement connu de toute eternite ce qui est ou ce qui peut etre, mais il l'a aussi voulu, est infinie. Ce qui fait que nous avons bien assez d’intelligence pour connoitre clairement et distinctement que cette puissance est en Dieu, mais que nous n’en avons pas assez pour comprendre tellement son etendue, que nous puissions savoir comment elle laisse les actions des hommes entierement libres et indeterminees: et que d’autre cote nous sommes aussi tellement assures de la liberte et de l'indifference qui est en nous, qu’il n’y a rien que nous connoissions plus clairement, de facon que la toute-puissance de Dieu ne nous doit point empecher de la croire; car nous aurions tort de douter de ce que nous apercevons interieurement et que nous savons par experience etre en nous, parce que nous ne comprenons pas bien autre chose que nous savons etre incomprehensible de sa nature. Les principes de la philosophie, ecrits en latin par Rene Descartes, et traduits en francois par un de ses amis (1647). part. 1, N.°s 40, 41, p. 27, 28."], que nous sommes libres, par le sentiment interieur que nous avons de notre liberte; et ne pouvant douter, de l'autre, quand on connoit Dieu, qu’il ne se fait rien dans le monde qu’il n’ait ordonne, nous nous embarrasserions en des difficultes iusurmontables, si nous entreprenions d’accorder la liberte de notre volonte avec ses ordonnances; parce qu'il faudroit pour cela, que nous pussions comprendre, c'est-a-dire, embrasser et comme limiter avec notre entendement, l'etendue de notre liberte et celle de l'ordre de la providence eternelle, qui, etant infinie, ne sauroit etre comprise par une intelligence finie."

Huic, nec mirum, consonat paraphrasis, sic eam referens vocat Leibnitzius1 [Theodic. T. 2, 3.e part. p. 169.], Cartesii doctrinae, quam praebet celeb. Cartesianus Regis.

"La plupart des philosophes, inquit2 [Regis; systeme de philosoph. (1690) T. 1, metaphys. liv. 2, part. 2. ch. 22, p. 248. Haec verba la plupart.... impiete... in textu, locum citatum terminant.], sont tombes en erreur, en ce que les uns, ne pouvant comprendre le rapport qui est entre les actions libres et la providence de Dieu, ont nie que Dieu fut la cause efficiente premiere des actions du libre arbitre, ce qui est un sacrilege; et les autres, ne pouvant concevoir le rapport qui est entre l'efficacite de Dieu et les actions libres, ont nie que l'homme fut doue de liberte, ce qui est une impiete. Le milieu qu’on trouve entre ces deux extremites, est de dire que, quand nous ne pourrions pas comprendre tous les rapports qui sont entre la liberte et la providence de Dieu, nous ne laisserions pas d’etre obliges a reconnoitre que nous sommes libres et dependans de Dieu; parce que ces deux verites sont egalement connues, l'une par l'experience, et l'autre par la raison, et que la prudence ne veut pas qu’on abandonne des verites dont on est assure, parce qu'on ne peut pas concevoir tous les rapports qu’elles ont avec d'autres verites qu’on connoit.

"M. Bayle, addit Leibnitzius, y remarque fort bien a la marge, que ces expressions de M. Regis n'indiquent point que nous connoissions des rapports entre les actions de l'homme et la providence de Dieu, qui nous paroissent incompatibles avec la liberte. Il ajoute que ce sont des expressions menagees, qui affoiblissent l'etat de la question. Les auteurs supposent (dit-il) que la difficulte vient uniquement de ce qu'il nous manque des lumieres; au lieu qu'ils devroient dire qu'elle vient principalement des lumieres que nous avons, et que nous ne pouvons accorder1 [Vide totum Paulicianorum articuluin, in Baylii dictionnar. histor. critic. (1730), T. 3, praesertim, p. 634 et M.] [au sentiment de M. Bayle] avec nos mysteres.

Maximi ergo in eo concordant philosophi, licet in consequentibus dissentient, ut libertatem humanam cum summo Dei dominio, omnipotenti actione, rationis lumine conciliari non posse, aperte profiteantur.

Rursus ad Arnaldum. Magnus ille philosophus Deum extra [Arnauld.] se, quia simpliciter voluit, non ut inde ei honor veniret, sibi solum absolute sufficientem, operatum esse, invicte probat1 [Oper. T. 39, Reflex. philos. et theolog. etc. lib. 2, ch. 2, 3, p. 428-440.].

Idem opinionem Mallebranchii, summi philosophi, sed, ut jam observatum, nec theologi, nec eruditi, alias etiam sibi contradicentis2 [Id. ch. 8, p. 468-489], qui temere, in gratiae ad salutem necessariae distributione, Dei voluntatem generalem, Christi, quem, ut hominem non omnibus intentum esse, non omnia cognoscere posse supponit, voluntatibus particularibus determinari; praedestinationem ex iis simpliciter, non Dei ipsius voluntatibus particularibus ortam3 [Id ch. 14, p. 507-715.], indeque salutem vel damnationem exsurgere (mirum sane hoc in casu poenas locum habere posse!): istam opinionem, ut inverecundam, abjectam aeque ac rationi contrariam, utpote gratiarum partitionem fato potius quam consilio tribuentem, sugillat; istumque ordinem et ejus effectus, cum Apostolo et Patribus, ad peccatum originale refert: ubi sapientem videre est philosoplium solo supernaturali lumine, non autem rationis vi, difficultates quaestionem illam obsidentes, solvi posse, expresse declarantem.

"S. Augustin,"

inquit Arnaldus, contra Mallebranchium disserens4 [Id lib. 2, ch. 11, p. 493.],

"a ete bien eloigne d’avoir cru que les jugemens de Dieu ne sont impenetrables qu’en ce que nous n’en saurions connoitre le detail. Car que veut-on dire par ce detail? en a-t-il jamais ete question? non certainement. Ce Saint n’a jamais eu la pensee de restreindre a ce detail l'impenetrabilite des jugemens de Dieu; mais il declare expressement qu’ils sont impenetrables, parce qu'ils n'en sont pas moins justes pour nous etre inconnus: parce que c’est un profond abyme, qu'on ne peut sonder sans se mettre au hasard de tomber dans le precipice: parce qu'on ne peut sans temirite vouloir expliquer ce que Dieu a voulu tenir cache; et qu'il suffit que nous sachions que sa volonte ne sauroit etre que juste: parce que l'on ne doit pas demander raison d’une chose dont on ne sauroit trouver de raison: parce que, le sage connoissant que c’est un mystere profond et cache, l'ignorance de l'imprudent consiste en ce quil ne connoit pas seulement qu'il est profond, et que c’est ce qui a ete cause que plusieurs, ayant voulu rendre raison de cette profondeur incomprehensible, sont tombes en des imaginations vaines, et en des opinions pleines d’erreur et d’egarement"

[Bayle.] Quibus relatis recte omnino et sapienter subjungit Baylius1 [Rep. aux quest, etc. T. 3 (1706), p. 996, 997.]:

"Voila, dans le vrai, ou aboutissent, comme autant de lignes; tous les points de la dispute de M. Bayle sur l'origine du mal, ou sur ce qui a suivi la chute du premier homme. Tout ce que Dieu a permis ou decrete a cet egard, est conforme a toutes ses perfections infinies: mais, la raison en etant cachee dans les profondeurs impenetrables de l'Etre souverainement parfait, tous ne la sauroient decouvrir. Il nous doit suffire que le fait nous ait ete revele. La (ad paginam 682 revocat) raison, la philosophie nous montrent apres cela par leurs axiomes les plus evidens, que nous ne saurions tenir une conduite plus juste, que d’acquiescer, sans les comprendre, aux mysteres que Dieu nous a reveles. C’est ce que M. Bayle expose, declare et repete en cent occasions: et, si vous y prenez garde, vous verrez facilement qu’il y a plus de dispute de mots que de dispute reelle entre M. Jaquelot et lui; car la meilleure reponse que Jaquelot ait faite, a ete dire que nous sommes trop ignorans pour juger de la conduite de Dieu."

Pergit ARNALDUS.1 [Reflex. etc. lib. 2, ch. 22, p. 564, III Remarq.]

"Mais, inquit, ce que je trouve de plus dangereux dans cet article (P. Mallebranchii), est l'opposition qu'on y fait entre ceux qui se rendent a la raison et a l'ecriture, et ceux qui se soumettent a l'autorite d'un Pere, c’est-a- dire, S. Augustin (sur la predestination, la grace). Il n'y a [Arnauld.] ni justesse, ni verite dans cette opposition. Ceux qui se soumettent a l'autorite de S. Augustin, ensuite de l'approbation que lui a donnee l'Eglise, ne s’en soumettent pas moins a l'ecriture et a la raison eclairee par la foi; car, pour la raison corrompue, et abandonee aux tenebres que le peche a repandues dans nos ames a l'egard des choses de Dieu, ils font tresbien de la recuser pour juge dans ces matieres, qui ne sont pas de son ressort.".......

"2 [Id. VI Remarq. p. 567.] Quelle temerite c’est de vouloir reformer par la raison seule, dans une matekre aussi elevee au-dessus de la raison qu’est la conduite de Dieu dans l'ordre de la grace, ce que les plus grands hommes, les plus spirituels et les plus pieux, en ont pense depuis tant de siecles!"....

"3 [Id. ch. 26, p. 597.] Il seroit dangereux d'etablir cette fausse regle, qu'une conduite ou une maniere d’agir n’a pu etre celle de Dieu, parce que la raison humaine juge qu’une autre est plus digne de la sagesse de Dieu."

Infra1 [Reflex, etc. lib. 3, ch. 2, p. 666.], de reali humanitatis Christi potestate loquens,

"Est-ce qu’il faudra toujours, inquit, avertir les hommes, qui ne sont que tenebres et aveuglement a l'egard des choses divines, que ce n’est pas a leur ignoranee a mettre des bornes a la toute-puissance de Dieu? contentons-nous de raisonner sur ce qui ne passe pas la capacite de notre esprit."

Et tandem opus profunda, accurata, instanti ratiocinatione innixum, quo male conceptum et salebrosum Mallebranchii systema de natura et gratia, profligat, ad nihilum redigit, concludens,

"Voila, inquit eximius theologus2 [Id. lib. 2, ch. 20, p. 843, 844.], tout ce que j’avois a dire pour la 2.e partie de ce 3.e livre, dans laquelle je m'etois engage de faire voir que tout ce que l'auteur dit pour resoudre les difficultes qui se trouvent dans la distribution de la grace, qu'il s’est imagine etre insurmontables, a moins qu’on ne reconnoisse | que J. C. en est la cause occasionnelle, n’est que contradiction et erreur.

"N’a-t-il point (Mallebranchius) sujet de craindre, que ce ne soit une punition de la temeriti qu’il a eue de pretendre qu’il pourroit faire taire les libertins, en entreprenant de penetrer par sa foible raison les impenetrables jugemens de Dieu, dont S. Paul a voulu que nous adorassions la profondeur incomprehensible? C’est ce qui est arrive et qui arrivera toujours a ceux qui ont eu, ou qui auront a l'avenir, une semblable presomption; car ce que dit S. Augustin sera toujours vrai: 3 [S. Augusttni Op. serm. 7, de verbis Apostoli; edit. Benedictin. T. 5 (1683), serm, 165, col. 799, N.° 6.] multi de illo profundo quoerentes, reddere rationem, in fabulas vanitatis abierunt. Il y a bien des gens qui ont tache de rendre raison de la profondeur des jugemens de Dieu: pourquoi la grace est donnee a l'un et non pas a l'autre; pourquoi de deux enfans Dieu fait baptiser l'un et laisse mourir l'autre sans bapteme; pourquoi il donne la perseverance a tels et tels d’entre les justes, et ne la donne pas a d’autres; pourquoi il y a encore tant de peuples a qui l'evangile n’a pas ete preche? Mais tout ce qu’ils ont gagne par leurs recherches presomptueuses, a ete de s’egarer en de vaines et d'extravagantes fables.

"L’auteur du systeme en est un grand exemple, et jamais homme ne merita mieux qu’on lui adressat ce que le meme saint dit, en un autre endroit, aux chercheurs de raisons, qui s’imaginent pouvoir comprendre ce que S. Paul nous assure ne pouvoir etre compris.1 [Id. serm. 27 (1687); sermo 43, col. 211-214: de fidei necessitate agit hic sermo. At in eo non inveniuntur verba ab Arnaldo relata.] Quoeris tu rationem, ego expavesco altitudinem. Tu rationare, ego miror. Tu disputa, ego credam. Altitudinem video, ad profundum non pervenio. (Vous cherchez des raisons ou l'Apotre n’en a point trouve. Mais pour moi, je demeure effraye de ce qui l'a effraye lui-meme. Je vous laisse donc raisonner; mais pour moi je crois. Je vois un profond abyme; mais je n’arrive pas jusqu’a en voir le fond.) Ajouterai-je ce que ce Pere ajoute, qui est encore plus terrible: Si inscrutabilia scrutari venisti, et investigabilia investigare venisti, crede, nam periisti. (Si vous entreprenez de penetrer ce qui est impenetrable et de comprendre ce qui est incomprehensible, arretez-vous, et contentez-vous de croire; autrement vous etes perdu.)"

In alio opere, de mysteria cum notionibus naturalibus conciliandi conatu:

"Rien n’est plus dangereux, inquit ARNALDOS1 [Arnauld; Apologie pour les Catholiq. 2.e part. (1682), ch. 5, p. 56, 57.], que cette presomption, et c’est ce qui a fait les heretiques au regard de toutes les verites de la foi, qui sont au-dessus de la raison: et rien, au contraire, n’est plus sur, pour etre inebranlablement attache a la foi de l'Eglise, au regard des mysteres les plus difficiles a croire, que de s’en tenir uniquement a la revelation de Dieu, proposee par l'Eglise, sans se mettre en peine si cela se peut accorder avec la connoissance que nous avons des choses naturelles."

Sic ingenium sublime, firmum et vere analyticum, ardua et altissima mysteria scrutari, comprehendere, si in hominem id caderet, valens, rationis sibi relictae, quod ad divina, imbecillitatem, ea simpliciter utendi periculum clare profitetur.

Ipsum etiam subobscurum, ea est mentis humanae quaecunque sit infirmitas! ubi libertatis et meriti, cum gratiae semper et invincibiliter efficacis dono et influxu, actione connexum2 [Oeuvres d'Arnauld; T. 39, lettr. 7, au P. Malebr. p. 101-115.], et Dei immensitatis naturam, exponere, explicare3 [Id. lettr. 8, 9, p. 119- 150- 151.] nititur, difficultates non solvens, solummodo quid sentiendum, credendum sit statuens, opinionis adversae incoherentia, falsitate monstrata.

In hac temporum faece, ubi priscos philosophos, ut novis auctoritatem conciliet, doctrinae ad veram beatitatem ducentis praecones, ratio humana commendat: ubi Deum agnoscere magnum quid reputatur: ubi Christiana relligio non argumentis, quod difficile, sed insulsis dicteriis ab ignaris, idiotis detractoribus impugnatur; et ejus defensores, una manu Entis supremi templum, solo aequatum, restituere satagunt, altera, eloquentibus, ut dicunt, destructoribus, minus caute thus imprudens adolere non dubitant; magni Arnaldi, non minus eruditi et profundi philosophi, quam summi et accurati theologi, attento animo legendum opus eximium, quod- inscribitur: De lanicessiti de la foi en J. C. pour etre sauve, ou l'on examine si les payens et les philosophes qui ont, eu la connoissance d’un Dieu, et qui ont moralement bien vecu, ont pu etre sauves sans la foi en J. C. (1701.)

Dionis. Petavius, doctus, eruditus, licet aliquando minus certo [Petaw.] judicio, et ubi Generalis jussa calamum non constringebant, sat accuratus theologus, duas quaestiones; primam1 [Dion. Petavii, e S. J. theologicor. dogmat. T. 1 (1644), lib. 4, cap. 7, p. 271-277.]: Quomodo cum futurorum contingentium proescientia cohoereat libertas hominis; alteram, de mali a Deo summe bono permissione2 [Id. lib. 6, cap. 6, N.° V, XI, p. 424, 428.], baud acri mentis acie, sed ut plurimum veterum philosophorum ac SS. Patrum auctoritate tractaverat; de dono perseverantiae agens, ex quibus, inquit3 [Id. lib. 9, cap. 7, p. 602, N.° VI.] (verbis S. Augustini relatis), utriusque doni perseverantiae differentia illa conficitur, quod ejusmodi Adamo tributum est, quo voluntas ejus, sive possibilitas adjuvabatur, ut si vellet, perseverare posset; ut autem vellet, datum non est. Hoc est actus ipse constanter, invicteque volendi libero ejus arbitrio, quod valens et sanum erat, permissus est. At illud quod per Christi merita tribuitur donum, non solum dat posse si velint; sed etiam velle quod possunt: et est tale, ut eo dato non nisi perseverantes sint: id est ut certo, et, quod in scholis vulgo dicitur, infallibiliter perseverent: tametsi libere gratioe illi, donoque consentiant, non necessario, sed ita ut dissentire possint, si velint. Quod Tridentina sciscit synodus: quamvis ut non dissentire velint eodem illo perseverantioe dono perficitur.

Quod de secundo perseverantiae dono ex Augustino colligit Petavius, vevus est S. doctoris sensus, vera Ecclesiae fides et doctrina; sed rationi humanae impervia.

Similiter, qui attente legerit optimum de libertate tractatum D. Petitpied1 [Petittied; Traite de la liberte, dans lequel, apres avoir examine la nature de la liberte et les caracteres qui lui sont propres selon les differens etats des etres libres, on justifie Jansenius sur cette matiere, et-l'on concilie, selon les principes de cet auteur, la liberte de l'homme dans l'etat present avec la grace de J. C. necessaire pour toutes les actions de la piete chretienne (1753), part, l, art. XXVII, p. 69, 71; part. 3, art. 3-4, p. 302, 316.], eandem doctrinam docte ac solide stabilitam ibi, expositamque inveniet, nihil autem quod in se libertatem hominis cum actione, attributis Dei, quod ad meritum, poenam praecipue, in quo vera difficultas, concordare ostendat. Recte ergo praestans, pius et prudens theologus, discussa quaestione: quomodo ratione nihili, defectus (mali), cujus causa efficiens non est, voluntas rea sit;

"mais pourquoi, inquit2 [Id. p. 71.], cette grace de l'amour qui justifie, qui remplit ce neant de la volonte, en quoi j'ai fait voir, apres S. Augustin, que consiste le pouvoir de pecher; pourquoi, dis-je, cette grace n’est-elle pas donnee a tous? pourquoi est-elle donnee aux uns et non pas aux autres?, C’est-la le mystere de la predestination et de la grace. Nous ne pouvons en sonder les profondeurs. Mais soyons bien persuades qu’elle n’est due a personne, qu’elle est accordee par une misericorde toute gratuite a ceux a qui elle est accordee, et refusee par un jugement tres-secret et tres-juste"

Quod judicium secretissimum et justissimum poena sequitur, quamvis absque gratid voluntatis vacuum impleri noqueat.

"a ceux a qui elle est refusee. Nemo venit nisi tractus, dit S. Augustin1 [S. Augustin; Op. T. 3, part. 2 (1780), in Joann, evangel, cap. 6, fractal. 26, col. 494, 2.]. Quem trahat, et quem non trahat, quare illum trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle judicare, si non vis errare."

Pari ratione, acutus philosophus et studiosus ac diligens theologus Boursier, postquam argute2 [Boursier; De l'action de Dieu sur les creatures: traite dans lequel on prouve la promotion physique par le raisonnement, et ou l'on examine plusieurs questions qui ont rapport a la nature des esprits et a la grace, T. 2 (1713), 7 sect. l.re part. ch. 18, N.° III, p. 257, 258.], varias, et, ut ei videtur, solidas protulit rationes, cur homo malum, id est, nihilum, non ens faciens (proprie, non agens), poenas mereatur; cum nihil in se habeat, nisi quod Deus ipsi dat, et Deus ei quod actionem sine defectu redderet, non donet:

"apres tout, inquit3 [Id. N.° VII, p. 264, 265.], qu’on trouve tant qu’on voudra de la difficulte dans cette matiere; mais qu'on examine si cette difficulte ne vient point de ce que l'homme mesure la justice de Dieu sur une justice toute humaine, et qu’il s'imagine que Dieu est oblige de traiter avec la creature, comme une creature doit traiter avec une autre .... On peut, sapienter addit, alleguer pour solution l'incomprehensibilite de la matiere, et pour defense le peu d'etendue de notre esprit."

Quaestionem aggrediendo de hominis culpa, reatu (du tort et de l'injustice de l'homme), dixerat:4 [Id. ch. 18, N.° I, p. 255, 256, N.° 11.]

"cette difficulte, je l'avoue, me trouble et m’epouvante, et il me semble que je succomberois sous son poids, si je ne considerois, 1.° qu’elle attaque directement la doctrine celeste qui nous est revelee dans les saintes ecritures, et que S. Paul nous rapporte en ces termes: vous me direz peut-etre apres cela; pourquoi Dieu se plaintil de celui qui peche? car qui est-ce qui resiste a sa volonte?, Or cet Apotre, bien loin de la respecter, cette difficulte, et de s’y rendre, la rejette et la condamne avec toute la force et l'autorite que lui donne l'esprit de Dieu...... 2.° Que plus je passe et repasse sur les preuves de la promotion physique, plus je les trouve solides, fortes et demonstratives: or ne seroitce point manquer de fidelite envers la raison souveraine qui eclaire tous les esprits, et qui leur demandera compte un jour de l'usage qu'ils auront fait de ces lumieres, que de sacrifier des preuves evidentes a des difficultrs obscures?"

Difficultas obscura dici non potest, quae rationi humanae, in terminis ipsis, contradictionem praebet,

"et d'abandonner lachement une lumiere presente aux incertitudes et aux tenebres d’une raison foible et languissante?"

Optime. Sed eadem ratio, debilis, languens in argumentis et probationibus, ut pollens, vigens, vivida, demonstrativa aliunde adhibetur.

"Tenons donc ces deux verites, et que Dieu promeut l'homme qui peche, et que l'homme qui peche, a veritablement tort."

Duas illas veritates libenter agnosco, fide ductus; ratione, homini naturaliter insita, nullo modo: contraria infirmo ingenio offerunt.

"Comme il est dans les mathematiques des grandeurs incommensurables, c’est-a-dire, dont on ne peut assortir exactement l'’etendue, ni trouver la commune mesure; il est aussi des verites, surtout celles qui regardent des termes aussi differens que le sont Dieu et notre ame, qui sont incommensurables par rapport a nous, parce que Dieu nous a cache la mesure commune qui nous en decouvriroit la proportion et le rapport. Suivons la regle que nous nous sommes prescrite, de ne point pretendre, ni penetrer tout dans ces matieres profondes, ni rejeter tout ce que nous ne penetrons pas: au contraire, de trouver des difficultes impenetrables ou l'ecriture et les Peres en ont reconnu, c’est un des plus evidens caracteres de verite.1 [Boursier; de l'action de Dieu etc. N.° VII, p. 265.] Ces reflexions me rassurent, et je pourrois en demeurer la."

Doctissimi auctoris opus magis mihi arrideret, si reipsa vere ulterius progrederetur.

Cependant essayons de raisonner encore sur la difficulte proposee, dans le dessein, non pas d’en demeler tous les detours, mais au moins d’en rompre l'effort, et de me persuader que, si je ne puis sonder les profondeurs des voies dans lesquelles je marche, au moins je puis y marcher en surete, sans craindre les egaremens et les precipices."

De re ratiocinari, quae rationis captum longe superat, ad locum est excelsius, scala cum hoc loco haud proportionem habente, ascendere: temeritas casum adducit. Quod si non explorato difficultatis anfractu homo in via remanet, nec ejus conatum, vim, rumpit, nec, falso lumine praeeunte, tute, secure, nihil erroris, propecipitiorum reformidans, potest incedere.

"Le merite de la bonne action, inquit auctor2 [Id. N.° III, p. 257, 258.], est un etre, c’est un bien, c’est la bonte de l'action et sa perfection. On a donc raison de reconnoitre que nos merites viennent de Dieu, puisqu'il est la premiere source de tous les biens: au lieu que la faute d’une action, son defaut, son demerite, est formellement une privation, un neant. Il ne faut donc point le faire retomber sur Dieu, qui n’en est pas l'auteur."

Nee proinde in hominem, cum nihilum causam, agens habere nequeat: agere et non agere sunt pugnantia.

"En effet, on fait remonter vers Dieu le merite de la creature, parce que, si l'on demande la raison pourquoi la creature a un tel merite, on doit a la verite repondre que c'est qu'elle l'a opere librement. Mais si l'on demande une raison encore superieure, l'on doit repondre que c'est que Dieu lui a donne la grace de le faire, et l'a opere en elle.

"Au lieu que, si l'on demande pourquoi la creature a une telle action defectueuse,

Quod deficit in actione causam non habet, cum nulla sit nihili causa.

"l'on doit repondre que c'est qu'elle l'a operee ainsi: mais on ne peut ajouter que c'est parce que Dieu ne lui a pas donne ce qui auroit rempli ce defaut."

Nec hac ratione, quasi causa mobilis, agens, operata dici potest, sed quasi deficiens, si, absque Deo, defectum vacuum ex se implere absolute nequivit.

"Car comme le non etre n’a point de raison, et que l'on auroit tort de dire, telle creature n’existe pas, parce que Dieu ne lui a pas donne l'existence, mais qu’il faut reconnoitre qu’elle n’existe pas, parce qu’elle n'existe pas [ce qu’on a explique ailleurs];"

Causa quae agere potest, aut debet, et non agit, vera causa est non existentiae, sed causa deficiens, negativa.

"de meme le defaut et la depravation dans la nature n’a point de raison au-dela de la creature;

Rationem, causam positivam;

et l'on doit dire, cette volonte creee n’a pas voulu un acte qui eut telle perfection, parce qu’elle n'a pas voulu un acte qui eut telle perfection...."

Quod si, divino motu privata, voluntas aliter, ex se, velle non poterat, actionis defectus, vacuum, nihilum, istius motus privationi, ut causae negativae, recte attribui et potest, et debet.

"Mais, pour revenir, la punition qu’on merite en pechant, on la merite a cause de la malice du peche. Comme donc la malice du peche consiste dans la privation et dans le defaut, "

Privatio, nihilum, non existit: ergo malitia non est, multo minus poena digna.

"et que la volonte est cause premiere et souveraine en ce genre;"

Nulla, saepius dictum est, nihili causa. Ergo in hoc genere voluntas, facultas positiva, causa prima et suprema esse nequit.

"il s'ensuit que c'est sur la volonte seule que doit tomber cette punition,"

Sequitur voluntatem nihili, id est, non causam, nulla poena posse affici.

"et que ne pouvant rejeter sur d’autres que sur elle la raison du defaut qui se trouve en elle, elle doit aussi toute seule en porter la peine."

Defectus, qui in voluntate reperitur, ex ejus entis natura ortus, ei nec tribui, cum suae ipsius naturae causa non sit, cum istam naturam aliunde acceperit, proinde nec poenam mereri potest.

Ex paucis iis observationibus animadvertere est, quam manca sit, quam cassa, ubi de creaturae ad Creatorem ratione quaestio, rationis vis, hominis perspicientia, solertia.