Part 1 of 5
NOTES
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES
HSTL: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
DDEL: Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library
JFKL: John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library
LBJL: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
NSAN: National Security Agency Newsletter
NSA: Unless otherwise noted, all NSA items came from the National Security Agency.
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
FRDS: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S. Series
ARRB: Assassinations Records Review Board
TICOM: Army Security Agency, Top Secret/Cream report, "European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II as Revealed by 'TICOM' Investigations and by Other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured Material, Principally German" (May 1, 1946). Nine volumes.
Lemnitzer's Private Summary: Long-hidden, handwritten fifty-two-page private account of the Bay of Pigs affair by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (undated). Kept in Lemnitzer's private papers at his family home in Pennsylvania.
CHAPTER 1: Memory
Page
1 The Munitions Building was located at the corner of Nineteenth Street and Constitution Avenue in Washington. Friedman walk to the vault: Frank B. Rowlett, The Story if Magic Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998), p. 34.
2 "Welcome, gentlemen": ibid" p. 35,
2 Rowlett's clothes: ibid., p. 34.
2 Sinkov and Kullback background: James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 30.
2 more than 10, 000 messages: ibid., p. 16.
3 the Chamber's demise: ibid., pp. 16-17.
5 given its cautious approval: Rowlett, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
3 State Department ... never to know: ibid.
3 vault twenty-five feet square: ibid" p. 34.
4 "The NSA Christmas party was a big secret": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, Oral history of Robert L. Prestel (December 21, 1993), p. 14.
4 "For a long time we didn't tell anybody": Laura Sullivan, "Secret Spy Agency Puts On Human Face, " Baltimore Sun (March 21, 2000).
5 "They picked him up": ibid.
5 NSA leased the entire building: ibid.
5 "I do this with some trepidation": Address by Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to the Baltimore/Washington Corridor Chamber (June 29, 1990).
CHAPTER 2: Sweat
Page
7 "the United States will be": Office of Strategic Services, secret memorandum, William O. Donovan to President Truman, with attached report, "Problems and Objectives of United States Policy" (May 5, 1945), pp. 1, 2 (HSTL, Rose Conway File, OSS Memoranda for the President, Box 15). "
8 TICOM: Army Security Agency, Top Secret/Cream report, "European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II as Revealed 'by 'TICOM' Investigations and by Other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured Material, Principally German, " (May 1, 1946). Nine volumes. (Hereafter referred to as TICOM.)
8 Colonel George A. Bicher: TICOM, vol. 1, p. 2.
8 Marshall message to Eisenhower: War Department message, Marshall to Eisenhower (August 7, 1944), contained in TICOM, vol. 8, p. 55.
9 "the plan contemplated": ibid., p. 3.
9 "a. To learn the extent ... war against Japan": ibid.
10 "was no longer feasible": TICOM, vol. 8, p. 52.
10 "take over and exploit": TICOM, vol. 1, p. 3.
10 suburban location was chosen: Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 9.
10 "was brilliantly conceived": TICOM, vol. 2, p. 1.
10 "Allied Comint agencies had been exploiting": NSA, Robert J. Hanyok, "Defining the Limits of Hell: Allied Communications Intelligence and the Holocaust During the Second World War, 1939-1945" (1999). This paper was presented at the Cryptologic History Symposium at NSA on October 27, 1999.
11 "One day we got this frantic call": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, oral history of Paul E. Neff (January 26, 1983).
12 "Apparently they had": ibid., p. 45.
12 At thirty-eight; Background information about Whitaker is drawn from an interview with Dr. Paul K. Whitaker (January 1999); diary of Paul K. Whitaker, copy in author's collection.
13 Selmer S. Norland: Information about his background is drawn from Thomas Parrish, The Ultra Americans: The Us. Role in Breaking the Nazi Codes (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein & Day, 1986), p. 102.
13 Arthur Levenson: Background information comes from ibid., pp. 86-87.
13 British policy had forbidden: Signal Security Service, secret report by William F. Friedman, "Report on E Operations of the GC & CS at Bletchley Park" (August 12, 1943), p. 9.
14 "I eventually got my commission": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), pp. 2-3.
14 Swordfish: NSA, "The Docent Book" (January 1996). Among the variations of the "Fish" were machines nicknamed by American codebreakers "Tunny" and "Sturgeon." The Tunny (better known in English as the tuna) was the Schlusselzusatz 40 (SZ40). It was manufactured by the German firm Lorenz and was used by the German army for upper-echelon communications. The Sturgeon, actually a Siemens T-52, was developed at the request of the German navy, with the first units manufactured in 1932. The German air force began using it in 1942. Unlike the Enigma, the Sturgeon did not use wired rotors. The rotors have a series of cogs that open and dose on electrical contacts.
Unless otherwise noted, all details of the hunt for the Fish machine are from Paul K. Whitaker's personal diary (unpaginated), a copy of which is in the author's possession.
14 "The impressions were": Whitaker diary.
14 "The roads were lined": ibid.
15 "How are things down there?": ibid.
16 "They were working": ibid.
17 Dustbin: TICOM, Top Secret/Ultra report, "Narrative and Report of the Proceedings of TICOM Team 6, 11 April-6 July 1945" (September 5, 1945).
17 Among those clandestinely brought: ibid.
17 "It is almost certain": TICOM, vol. 3, p. 8.
17 "We found that the Germans": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), pp. 2-3.
18 "European cryptanalysts were unable": TICOM, vol. 1, p. 6. Other systems solved by Germany included between 10 and 30 percent of intercepted U.S. Army M-209 messages. Except where keys were captured, it was usually read too late to be of tactical value. Almost 100 percent of messages sent by the U.S. Army in Slidex, Codex, bomber code, assault code, aircraft movement code, map coordinate codes, and cipher device M-94 where employed, were read regularly (TICOM, vol. 1, p. 5).
18 SIGABA: NSA, "The Docent Book" (January 1996). The Army SIGABA was designated M134C and the Navy SIGABA was the CSP 888.
18 It was finally taken out of service: ibid.
18 "practically 100% readable": TICOM, vol. 1, Appendix: "Results of European Axis Cryptanalysis as Learned from TICOM Sources" (88 pages, unpaginated).
19 "cryptanalytic attack had been": ibid. See also Army Security Agency, Top Secret/ Ultra report, "The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), p. 31.
19 more than 1 million decrypted messages: NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On Watch" (September 1986), p. 1lo
19 "Overnight, the targets that occupied": ibid., p. 13.
19 Gone were the army intercept stations: Prior to the war, intercept stations were located at Fort Hancock, New Jersey; the Presidio, San Francisco, California; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Corozal, Panama Canal Zone; Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii; Fort McKinley, Philippine Islands; and Fort Hunt, Virginia. During the war additional intercept stations were added at Indian Creek Station, Miami Beach, Florida; Asmara, Eritrea; Amchitka, Aleutian Islands; Fairbanks, Alaska; New Delhi, India; Bellmore, New York; Tarzana, California; and Guam (Army Security Agency, Top Secret/Ultra report, "The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), pp. 11-12).
19 Vint Hill Farms Station: In 1999 the station was taken over by the Federal Aviation Administration as the new home of a consolidated radar operations center for the Washington-Baltimore area's four major airports-Dulles, Reagan National, Baltimore-Washington, and Andrews Air Force Base. The system is known as TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control).
20 At war's end: By V-J Day 7, 848 people were working at Arlington Hall (Army Security Agency, "The Achievements of the Signal Security Agency in World War II" (February 20, 1946), p. 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 457, Box 107, SRH-349.)
20 "They intercepted printers at Vint Hill": NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Colonel Russell H. Horton (March 24, 1982), p. 64.
20 "For a few months in early 1942": NSA/CIA, Cecil James Phillips, "What Made Venona Possible?" in "Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957" (1996), p. xv.
21 Phillips estimated that between 1942 and 1948: David Martin, "The Code War, " Washington Post Magazine (May 10, 1998), p. 16.
21 Long black limousines: The description of the UN's founding conference draws on Linda Melvern, The Ultimate Crime: Who Betrayed the UN and Why? (London: Allison & Busby, 1995), p. 23.
22 the French delegation: Details on breaking French codes and ciphers come from TICOM, vol. 1, Appendix: "Results of European Axis Cryptanalysis as Learned from TICOM Sources."
22 "Our inclusion among the sponsoring": War Department, Top Secret/Ultra report, "Magic" Diplomatic Summary (May 2, 1945), p. 8.
22 "Pressure of work": Signal Security Agency, Top Secret report, Rowlett to Commanding Officer, SSA, "Semimonthly Branch Activity Report, 1-15 June 1945."
23 "Russia's prejudice": War Department, Top Secret/Ultra report, "Magic" Diplomatic Summary (April 30, 1945), pp. 7- 12.
23 Spanish decrypts: ibid.
23 Czechoslovakian message: ibid.
23 "a situation that compared": NSA, David A. Hatch with Robert Louis Benson,
"The Korean War: The Sigint Background" (June 2000), p. 4.
23 "a remarkably complete picture": ibid.
23 "perhaps the most significant": ibid., p. 5.
23 Black Friday: ibid., p. 4.
24 a gregarious Russian linguist: Details concerning William Weisband are drawn from NSA/CIA, "Venona; Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957" (1996), p. xxviii.
24 "three-headed monster"; NSA, Top Secret/Codeword, Oral History of Herbert J. Conley (March 5, 1984), pp. 58, 59.
24 "He couldn't control": ibid.
24 Korea barely registered: Unless otherwise noted, details on Sigint in Korea are from NSA, David A. Hatch with Robert Louis Benson, "The Korean War: The Sigint Background" (June 2000), p. 4.
25 "AFSA had no Korean linguists": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Handle via Talent and Keyhole Comint Control Systems Jointly, Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold war (1995), p. 36.
25 Buried in stacks of intercepted Soviet traffic: ibid., pp. 39-40.
25 Joseph Darrigo, a U.S. Army captain: ibid., p. 40.
25 "AFSA (along with everyone else) was looking": ibid., p. 54.
25 arriving ten to twelve hours after intercept: NSA, Jill Frahm, "So Power Can Be Brought into Play: Sigint and the Pusan Perimeter" (2000), p. 6; see also NSA, Patrick D. Weadon, "Sigint and Comsec Help Save the Day at Pusan, " pp. 1-2.
26 Father Harold Henry had spent a number of years: NSA, "Korea, " pp. 42-43.
26 "When we got into the ... Perimeter": Donald Knox, The Korean War: An Oral History (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p. 77.
26 provided him with such vital information as the exact locations: NSA, "So Power Can Be Brought into Play: Sigint and the Pusan Perimeter, " p. 10.
26 "ground-return intercept": NSA, "The Korean 'War: The Sigint Background, " p. 12.
27 "One of our problems in Korea": NSA, Top Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Paul Odonovich (August 5, 1983), p. 33.
27 low-level voice intercept (LLVI): NSA, "Korea, " pp. 47-48.
27 A team set up in Nanjing ... "poor hearability": NSA, 10p Secret/Umbra, "Comint and the PRC Intervention in the Korean War, " Cryptologic Quarterly (Summer 1996), p. 4.
27 the British had been secretly listening: ibid., p. 6.
28 "clear and convincing evidence": NSA, "Korea, " p. 44.
28 Sigint reports noted that some 70;000 Chinese troops; NSA, "Comint and the PRC Intervention in the Korean War, " p. 11.
28 "Very little"; ibid., p. 15.
28 twenty troop trains were heading: ibid., p. 14.
28 "We are already at war here": NSA, "Korea, " p. 44.
28 intercepts during the first three weeks: NSA, "Comint and the PRC Intervention in the Korean War, " p. 18.
29 AFSA reports demonstrated clearly: ibid., p. 17.
29 "No one who received Comint product": ibid., p. 1.
29 "During the Second World War, MacArthur had disregarded''; ibid., p. 21.
29 NSA later attributed this caution: NSA, "Korea, " p. 55.
30 "The ... last three major": ibid., p. 36.
30 "It has become apparent": NSA, "The Korean War: The Sigint Background"
(June 2000), p. 15.
30 A year later NSA director Ralph Canine: NSA, "So Power Can Be Brought into Play: Sigint and the Pusan Perimeter, " p. 15.
30 "gravely concerned": CIA, Top Secret/Codeword memorandum, "Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities" (December 10, 1951) (HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence, Box 250).
30 Truman ordered the investigation: National Security Council, Top Secret/Codeword memorandum, "Proposed Survey of Intelligence Activities" (December 13, 1951) (HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence, Box 250).
31 put it together again: For the Brownell Report, see Committee Appointed to Survey Communications Intelligence Activities of the Government, Top Secret/ Comint Channels Only, "Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense" (June 13, 1952) (National Archives, Record Group 457, Special Research History 123).
31 "step backward": ibid.
31 meeting with the president: White House, President's Appointment Schedule for Friday, October 24, 1952 (HSTL, Files of Mathew 1. Connelly). Secretary of State Dean Acheson was giving a speech on Korea at the UN General Assembly at the time of the meeting (HSTL, Secretary of State Dean Acheson Appointment Book, Box 46).
31 leaving a voting booth: White House, President's Appointment Schedule for Tuesday, November 4, 1952 (HSTL, Files of Mathew 1. Connelly).
31 "The 'smart money'": NSA, Tom Johnson, "The Plan to Save NSA, " in "In Memoriam: Dr. Louis W Tordella" (undated), p. 6. In fact, only four days before NSA opened its doors, the FBI's 1. Edgar Hoover sent a snippy letter to the National Security Council complaining about the new agency: "I am concerned about the authority granted to the Director of the National Security Agency" (FBI, Personal and Confidential letter, Hoover to James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC [October 31, 1952]) (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 194).
CHAPTER 3: Nerves
Page
33 "With all the electrical gear": Bruce Bailey, "From the Craw's Nest, " Air & Space (September 1994), p. 33.
34 "an ugly, overweight": ibid.
35 Nicknamed Project Homerun: Details of the project are drawn from R. Cargill Hall, "The Truth About Overflights, " MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 9, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 36-39.
37 "The stringent security measures imposed": CIA, Secret Noforn report, "The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954--1974" (1992), p. 2.
38 "The weather was gorgeous": Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War (Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1996), p. 84.
38 "The guns won't work": ibid., p. 85.
39 "the first major test": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History" (1988) (Special Series, Crisis Collection, vol. 2), p. 1. 39 his long experience with pack mules: "Ralph J. Canine, " The Phoenician (Fall 1992), p. 12.
39 "People were scared of him": NSA, Secret Comint Channels Only, "Oral History of Colonel Frank L. Herrelko" (November 8, 1982), pp. 31, 42.
40 agreed to by Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, defense minister Shimon Peres, and armed forces chief of staff Moshe Dayan: Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1998), pp. 342-44.
40 intercepts from Spain and Syria: White House, Top Secret/Eyes Only memorandum for the record (August 6, 1956), p. 3.
40 "communications between Paris and Tel Aviv": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History" (1988) (Special Series Crisis Collection, vol. 2), p. 19.
41 To make matters worse: NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/Noforn report, "American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization 1945-1989" (1995), p. 236.
41 "1956 was a bad time": ibid.
41 "about as crude and brutal": Department of State, memorandum of telephone call to the president (October 30, 1956) (DDEL, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Calls, Box 11).
41 "It was the gravest": Department of State, memorandum of telephone call from Allen Dulles (October 30, 1956) (DDEL, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Box 5).
41 "It would be a complete mistake": White House Top Secret memorandum, Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of the National Security Council (November 1, 1956), pp. 6-13. (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8).
41 Harold Stassen objected: ibid.
41 "One thing at least was clear"; ibid.
41 "As for crisis response": NSA, Top Secret Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/ Noforn report, "American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization· 1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.
42 consultants from McKinsey and Company: ibid.
42 "modified geographical concept": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Talent/Key hole/Noforn report, "American Cryptology During the Cold War, 19405-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization 1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.
42 Internal organization: See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 90-91.
42 "Canine ... stands out": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard Campaigne (June 29, 1983), p. 125.
43 Details of Powers's wait on the airstrip come from Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 76.
43 "He would sometimes cut out": Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Oral History (November 9, 1976), p. 11 (DDEL).
44 "the System-V unit worked well": CIA, Top Secret/Codeword mission folder 4019 (December 22, 1956) (contained in CIA/U2P, p. 126).
44 "We usually flew from Turkey": Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, pp. 46-47.
44 "The equipment we carried on such occasions": ibid.
45 Powers locked his canopy: His preparations for the U-2 flight are described in Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, p. 78.
45 "Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky reporting": Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 443, 444.
45 "Shoot down the plane": ibid.
45 "We were sick and tired": ibid.
45 A missile launch was considered: CIA, Colonel Alexander Orlov, "A 'Hot' Front in the Cold War, " Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999), web pages.
45 ''An uncomfortable situation": ibid.
46 "Shame!": ibid.
46 "If I could become a missile": ibid.
46 "I was sure": Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, p. 80.
46 "In view of the improving": CIA, Top Secret/Talent report, "Annex to the report of DCI Ad hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program, " August 25, 1959 (DDEL, Office of Staff Secretary, Intelligence, Box 15).
47 "Evidence indicates": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the 442nd Meeting of the National Security Council, April 28, 1960" (April 28, 1960), p. 8. (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council series, Box 12).
47 "Destroy target": Orlov, ''A 'Hot' Front, " web pages.
47 "My God, I've had it now!": Powers with Gentry, Operation Overflight, p. 82.
47 "Instinctively I grasped the throttle": ibid.
48 "I reached for the destruct switches": ibid., p. 83. Powers was killed on August 1, 1977, at the age of forty-seven, in the crash of a helicopter he was flying for a Los Angeles television station. He was buried with honors in Arlington National Cemetery. A decade later the U.S. Air Force awarded him posthumously the Distinguished Flying Cross.
48 "The plane was still spinning": ibid., p. 84.
48 "It was a pleasant": ibid.
49 "He's turning left!": Jack Anderson, "US. Heard Russians Chasing U-2, " Washington Post, May 12, 1960.
50 "the hideout"; White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Notes for Use in Talking to the Secretary of State about the U-2 and the NSC" (June 14, 1960) (DDEL, White House Office, Box 18).
51 "Following cover plan" Top Secret memorandum (No addressee; May 2, 1960) (DDEL, White House, Office of Staff Secretary, Box 15).
52 the president huddled: This and other details of the events following the U-2 , shootdown are from White House, Top Secret/Limited Distribution, "Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 Incident" (June 14, 1960) (DDEL, White House Office, Box 18).
52 "we had an understanding": Colonel William D. Johnson and Lieutenant Colonel James C. Ferguson, Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral History (January 9, 1976), p. 45 (U.S. Army Center for Military History).
52 Walter Bonney was forced: Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 51-52; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 83.
53 "Almost instantly": Richard Strout, "T.R.B., " New Republic, May 16, 1960.
53 "While the President": Department of State, telephone calls, May 9, 1960 (DDEL, Papers of Christian A. Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10).
53 "I would like to resign": Ann Whitman diary, May 9, 1960 (DDEL).
53 Dulles, Eisenhower said: The account in this paragraph is from Department of State, telephone calls, May 9, 1960 (DDEL, Papers of Christian A. Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10).
54 "Our reconnaissance was discovered": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 9, 1960" (May 13, 1960), p. 2 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council series, Box 12).
54 "extensive aerial surveillance": Department of State, Press Announcement, May 9, 1960 (DDEL).
54 "Call off": The quotations in this paragraph come from Department of State, memorandum of telephone conversation with General Goodpaster, June 1, 1960 (DDEL, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls, Box to).
54 "It was as though": Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 451.
55 "We couldn't possibly"; ibid., p. 452.
56 "It appeared": White House, Top Secret memorandum, Gordon Gray meeting with the president, May 24, 1960 (DDEL, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 4).
56 "The President": This and the preceding description of a typical NSC meeting draw on Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 302.
56 The description of the NSC meeting draws on photos from DDEL.
56 "to play up the U-2 incident": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 24, 1960, " p. 3 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council Series, Box 12).
57 "It was clear": ibid" p. 5.
57 "Administration officials": ibid., p. 5.
57 "Some investigators": ibid., p. 17.
57 "No information": ibid" p. 8.
57 "What's more ... that's under oath": Thomas Gates Oral History, Columbia University Oral History Project.
57 "The investigation, once started": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 24, 1960, " p. 8 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council Series, Box 12).
58 "Accordingly ... the investigation": ibid., p. 8.
58 "Mr. Dulles": ibid.
58 "The speech": ibid., p. 9.
58 "Congress could be told": ibid., p. 5.
58 "The impression": ibid.
59 "We handed Khrushchev": David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 172.
60 "trace the chain": Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday; Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 313.
60 "What the CIA": ibid.
60 "heartily approved of the inquiry": White House, memorandum of Congressional breakfast meeting, May 26, 1960 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower diaries).
60 "just gobbledy-gook": Beschloss, Mayday, p. 314.
61 Dillon's boss went much further: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Events Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d sess., May 27, 31, June 1, 2, 1960, p. 103.
61 "They were all sworn": Beschloss, Mayday, p. 314.
61 "You now stand'?: Thomas Powers, The Man W1w Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 304-305.
62 "very disturbed": Department of State, memorandum of telephone conversation, June 1, 1960 (DDEL, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 10).
62 "At the present time": White House, Clark Clifford memorandum for the record, January 24, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #22).
63 "In the long run": Department of Defense, Robert S. McNamara memorandum to President Kennedy, January 24, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #22).
63 The only answer: Lemnitzer's private summary; p. 6.
CHAPTER 4: Fists
Page
64 By daybreak: Details of the preparation for the Inauguration are drawn from Department of Defense, General Order No.1, Inaugural Parade (January 20, 1961), pp. 1-84; JCS, Memorandum for General Lemnitzer, "Summary of Inaugural Activities, 20 January 1961" (January 17, 1961) (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
65 Quarters 1: What was then Quarters 1 is today Quarters 6.
65 "The presence of a benign and popular General of the Army": Donald Janson and Bernard Eismann, The Far Right (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 6.
66 Warren should be hanged: ibid., p. 138.
66 One of those was Major General Edwin A. Walker ... The Overseas Weekly, charged that Walker: "President Kennedy and the Ultra Right Extremists, " web site http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4035/disunity.htm.
67 "It seems in this Administration": Drew Pearson, "Another Admiral's Speech Censored, " San Francisco Chronicle, February 21, 1961.
67 "Studious, handsome, thoughtful-looking": Bill Henry, "Doughboy Will Have His Day, " Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1960.
67 "The most important military job": "Who Envies Gen. Lemnitzer?" Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1960.
67 "He thoroughly enjoyed himself": personal letter, Lemnitzer to Lois and Henry Simpson, January 14, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
67 "bordered on reverence": L. James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), p. 239.
68 he ordered his Joint Chiefs Chairman: ibid., p. 242.
68 find a way to secretly torpedo: ibid., p. 252.
68 "I have been involved in some very rugged": personal letter, Lemnitzer to Ernest Lemnitzer, March 3, 1960 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University)
69 "The Certain Trumpet": Binder, Lemnitzer, p. 236.
69 "Here was a president with no military experience": General Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History (March 3, 1982) (LBJL).
69 "Nearly all of these people were ardent": Admiral Arleigh A. Burke Oral History (November 1972-January 1973) (US. Naval Institute, Annapolis).
70 "I would offer the suggestion"; Letter, Lemnitzer to Victor Henderson Ashe II, August 22, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
70 Lemnitzer and the Chiefs knew; JCS, Top Secret report, "Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of Action in Cuba, " January 16, 1961 (FRUS Vol. X, #19).
71 passed the Secret Service booth: Frank M. Matthews, "Private Citizen Ike at His Farm, " Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 21, 1961.
72 "This is the first known"; NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept, February" '1, lY61.
72 "What is required is a basic expansion of plans": White House, Top Secret memorandum of conference with the president, January 25, 1961 (JFKL, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. I, drafted on January 27 by Goodpaster) (FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, #26).
72 "I'm not going to risk": Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 114.
73 "We can confidently assert"; CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, " October 1961, p. 60.
73 "the Agency was driving forward": ibid., p. 50.
73 elaborate instructions: Drew Pearson, "Merry-Ga.-Round, " San Francisco Chronicle, February 21, 1961.
73 eight-page biography: Lemnitzer biography, prepared as part of his testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, March 23, 1961.
73 "Planners are a funny lot": Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University.
74 "In view of the rapid buildup": Lemnitzer's private summary, p. 8.
74 "Evaluation of the current plan": ibid., pp. 10-11.
74 twenty-minute discussion: ibid., p. 36.
75 insisted that the choice of Zapata for a landing site: ibid., pp. 22-23.
76 "The [NSA] effort was very small": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982).
77 "possibly arrived at a Cuban port": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept, April 10, 1961.
77 U-2s were crisscrossing: CIA, Secret/Noforn report, "The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974" (1992), p. 198.
77 NSA voice-intercept operators: CIA, Top Secret report, "An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans), " January 18, 1962, Section V, "The Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan, " p. 3.
77 "Arms urgent": This and the other quotations in this paragraph come from CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, " October 1961, p. 109.
77 "It wasn't much that was done": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish (October 12, 1982), p. 29.
78 "We are out of ammo": CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation" (October 1961) pp. 32-33.
78 "In water. Out of ammo": ibid.
78 scores of their comrades: A total of 114 brigade members were killed and 1, 189 were wounded.
78 "Am destroying all equipment"; convoy heading for the beach reversed course: CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation" (October 1961), pp. 32-33.
79 "those employees on it": CIA, Secret, Richard Bissell memorandum for the record, November 5, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #272).
79 "The traditional civilian control of the military": Janson and Eismann, The Far Right, p. 184. On April 10, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald, who seven months later would assassinate President Kennedy, attempted to assassinate Walker as he sat at his desk in his Dallas home. Using the same rifle with which he killed Kennedy, Oswald shot at Walker through a window but missed by inches. Walker died in relative obscurity in Dallas on October 31, 1993.
79 "extreme right-wing, witch-hunting": ibid., p. 194.
80 Foreign Relations Committee ... warned: David Burnham, United Press International wire report, July 20, 1961.
80 "thesis of the nature of the Communist threat": ibid.
80 "an example of the ultimate danger": ibid.
80 "Concern had grown that a belligerent": Janson and Eismann, The Far Right, p. 197.
81 "I had considered sending this information": Letter, Personal/Confidential/Eyes Only, Lemnitzer to Norstad, February 28, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
81 "You and Charlie are probably wondering what": ibid.
81 "civilian hierarchy was crippled": Walter S. Poole, JCS, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History (February 12, 1976) (US. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.).
82 "The Bay of Pigs fiasco broke the dike": Janson and Eismann, The Far Right, pp. 6-7.
83 "could think of manufacturing something": White House, Top Secret, memorandum of meeting with the president, on January 3, 1961 (January 9, 1961).
83 Lansdale was ordered: Department of State, Top Secret/Sensitive memorandum, "The Cuba Project, " March 2, 1962 (FRDS, Vol. X, #309).
83 "World opinion": Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn report, "Report by the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the Caribbean Survey Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Cuba Project, " March 9, 1962 (ARRB).
84 "the objective is": Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special Handling memorandum, Craig to Lansdale, February 2, 1962 (ARRB).
84 "a series of well coordinated": ibid.
84 "We could blow up a US. ship": JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Northwoods, Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A, "Pretexts to Justify US. Military Intervention in Cuba" (March 12, 1962), p. 8 (ARRB).
84 "We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign": ibid., pp. 8-9.
85 "Exploding a few plastic bombs": ibid., pp. 9-10.
85 "create an incident which will": The plan is in ibid., pp. 9-11.
86 "It is recommended": JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn memorandum, Lemnitzer to McNamara, March 13, 1962 (ARRB).
86 At 2:30 on the afternoon of ... March 13: Lemnitzer's official diary for March 13, 1962 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).
87 Kennedy told Lemnitzer: Department of State, Secret memorandum, written by U. Alexis Johnson and dated March 16; attached to "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose" (March 14, 1962) (FRUS, Vol. X, #314). Ironically, President Gerald Ford in 1975 appointed Lemnitzer to a blue-ribbon panel to investigate domestic activities of the CIA.
87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved"; JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn memorandum, Lemnitzer to McNamara, April 10, 1962, pp. 1-2 (ARRB).
87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States": ibid.
87 "[T]he Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend": ibid.
87 "I am the senior military officer"; Binder, Lemnitzer, p. 279,
88 Lemnitzer ordered Gray to destroy all his notes: ibid., p. 273.
89 "A contrived 'Cuban' attack on an GAS": Office of the Secretary of Defense, Top Secret/Sensitive policy paper, "War Between Cuba and Another LA State" (1963), p, 1 (ARRB).
89 "Any of the contrived situations described above": ibid., p. 3.
89 "The only area remaining for consideration": ibid.
89 "a possible scenario": Department of Defense, Top Secret/Sensitive memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze to Bundy, May to, 1963 (JFKL, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #337).
90 "If the US. did institute": ibid.
90 About a month later: Department of State, Top Secret/Eyes Only, Acting Secretary of State George Ball to the president, June 25, 1963 (JFKL, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #352).