"Science," the Greek word for knowledge, when appended to the word "political," creates what seems like an oxymoron. For who could claim to know politics? More complicated than any game, most people who play it become addicts and die without understanding what they were addicted to. The rest of us suffer under their malpractice as our "leaders." A truer case of the blind leading the blind could not be found. Plumb the depths of confusion here.


Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:37 am

Chapter 19: Son of Sasha

In mid-April 1987, James Angleton had only a month to live when he granted an interview to David Binder of the New York Times. The former counterintelligence chief had been diagnosed as having lung cancer five months earlier, but he smoked filter cigarettes throughout the interview. [1]

Although Angleton had told the newspaper he would not discuss intelligence matters, he could not stay away from the subject of moles. It was clear that with time running out, Angleton consoled himself with the belief that he had at least identified one mole.

Although he did not reveal the man's name, it was equally clear that he was talking about Igor Orlov, who Angleton was convinced was Golitsin's "Sasha." There was a case, Angleton told Binder, where the Soviets had infiltrated a man into the CIA.

The article, paraphrasing Angleton's words, said, "In an elaborate ruse in WWII, he was parachuted behind German lines. ... The Germans picked him up and made him into a double agent. But his true loyalty had remained with the Russians. After the war, he was employed by the C.I.A., working under cover in Soviet emigre organizations based in Berlin and was eventually taken on" -- and here the article quoted Angleton directly -- "'as a full-fledged intelligence officer.'" [2]

Referring to Golitsin without naming him, Angleton said that a high-level KGB man had defected and alerted American counterintelligence, which became convinced that the CIA operative in question was a Soviet agent. Again paraphrasing Angleton, the interview continued: "Ultimately, through a number of clumsy bureaucratic actions, the suspect was able to avoid prosecution and, as far as Mr. Angleton knew, lived quietly in the Washington area. 'The man was a genius,' Mr. Angleton recalled with genuine professional respect."

The reference to "clumsy bureaucratic actions" may have been Angleton's way of saying that the FBI had been unable to build a case against, or arrest, Igor Orlov. Angleton's conviction of Orlov's guilt was undoubtedly reinforced by information provided to American intelligence in 1985 by the controversial defector Vitaly Yurchenko.

Yurchenko, a high-ranking KGB man in charge of operations in the United States and Canada, defected in August 1985. Before he redefected in November he provided a great deal of information to the CIA and the FBI, some of which proved accurate. Yurchenko identified Orlov as a Soviet agent. Moreover, in a statement that threw both agencies into a tailspin, he announced that Orlov had recruited one or more of his sons as a Soviet spy.

On Saturday, January 9, 1988, a whole new generation of FBI agents, none of whom remembered the investigation twenty-three years earlier, descended on the Gallery Orlov in Alexandria. Simultaneously, other FBI agents in Chicago and Boston fanned out and called on Orlov's two sons, George and Robert, in their suburban homes.

George Orlov, the younger of the two Orlov sons, remembered the agents coming to his home in Hinsdale, Illinois, that afternoon. A physicist and a nuclear engineer who once held a "Q" clearance, Orlov was working as a private consultant on nuclear power plants when the FBI came calling.

"They knocked on the door -- the bell doesn't work -- in the early afternoon," he said. "There were two agents, Vincente M. Rosado, he is Cuban, an ex-state trooper out West, and Steven Vass. They flash their ID, and announce, 'FBI. We'd like to talk to you.'"

"I've been expecting you," Orlov replied. [3]

"I invited them in and they said, 'We'd like to ask a few questions, but we'd rather not do it here. We have a place we'd like to take you.' We hop into their little blue Celica, drive to the Hyatt Regency in Oak Brook, and go to this nice suite. They had rented several suites.

"At the hotel they say they think I'm a Soviet agent. I said, 'Why am I working as a management consultant instead of in the technical field, missiles, something the Russians would be interested in?'" Both George and his brother, Robert, a computer expert, had graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but in 1988 neither was engaged in defense work.

The FBI continued to question George Orlov. "They offer me lunch, I ordered up a Cobb salad. They say, 'There's something we have to show you.' So they showed me a transcript and said it was Yurchenko. They said it was a transcript of Yurchenko saying that my father had recruited my brother and myself.

"It was about five pages long. It said there's a Russian agent working for us, his name is Igor Orlov, he has a frame shop, he has two sons, both of whom went to schools in the Northeast, the sons are technically oriented, he recruited them, they're working for us. He gave vague descriptions of what Robert did and I did. He said that I travel a lot. [4]

"Then they played the tape. He (Yurchenko] spoke in broken English, very halting English, that's why they gave me the transcript, so I could hear it and follow along at same time. I don't know if it was Yurchenko, but they said it was.

"I don't know if my jaw dropped, but mentally my jaw dropped. I looked at them in disbelief. I said this guy is confused, this is a mistake. I'll do anything I can to clear it up."

The FBI agents then asked George why Yurchenko had made these statements. There were "maybe a couple of reasons," George told the FBI men. "To keep the FBI busy investigating a family that wasn't agents. Maybe to divert from real spies. I'd read a little bit about Angleton in the sixties, and I knew how a couple of words could tie us up in knots.

"They had questions. 'Why did I go to Canada in 1978?' 'To plan an experiment on a research reactor.' 'Why did I go running at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton?' I was visiting my in-laws -- they live in Princeton -- in the mid-eighties. Apparently they followed me and found red and blue nylon strings tied to a fence post along the trail."

The FBI suspected that the nylon strings were signals that George Orlov had left for a Soviet agent. "They asked, 'You didn't put them there?' 'No.' 'You didn't know there was a Soviet scholar named so-and-so in one of the compounds?' 'No.' They said when I went for a run near Hinsdale, I crossed a bridge over a little creek, and they found some white chalk marks on the bridge. They had it chemically analyzed and figured it was surveyor's chalk, and since I was working on a construction site at the time at a nuclear power plant, they figured it was me. Of course, our surveyors use paint."

That was about the point in the interview when the FBI accused George of having received "the sign of life" from a KGB agent. It had happened when George came East and visited his mother. "I went running in Washington, and afterward I went up to the third floor of the gallery. They saw I came to the window wearing the same red jogging suit. They said they had traced some Russian spy out of the embassy who was walking up and down across the street and making the 'sign of life.' I said, 'What does that mean?' They explained that a sign of life was letting me know, 'We're around, we're still here.' They showed me the Russian's picture -- had I ever seen him before? No. They thought my driving habits were suspicious. They thought that I kept losing them, a technique used by people who are professionally trained to lose tails. At the time I had a 911 Porsche Carrera and I was driving it fast. I was not aware that I was being followed.

"They asked me if my father was a spy. I said I didn't know. They showed me a lot of pictures of people they believed had come into the gallery -- did I know these people? I said no."

More than two decades after the FBI had first searched the gallery, "they were still trying to uncover people who had visited the gallery. They asked, 'Who were his friends, who were his acquaintances?' Basically, they said they are still looking today for people who might have been associated with my father or who my father might have converted, turned. They firmly believed I was a Russian agent. My father had converted me."

The FBI also questioned George Orlov about a trip he had made to San Diego, the headquarters of Science Applications, Inc., where he had worked seven years earlier. "They do management of defense contracts. They were prime contractors for SDI, the Star Wars program, in the early 1980s."

The FBI had little choice, of course, but to take Yurchenko's information seriously. An important defector, the KGB official in charge of North America, had said that Igor Orlov, the man at the very heart of the CIA mole hunt two decades earlier, was a Soviet agent and had recruited one or more of his sons. Once Yurchenko had made that statement, the FBI was obliged to follow up by interviewing Orlov's sons.

Nor was the FBI's concern about George Orlov's previous work surprising, since after graduating from MIT in 1977 he worked for a time for a defense contractor who was developing instruments to measure the accuracy of ballistic missiles. [5]

After playing the Yurchenko tape and questioning George Orlov, the FBI agents asked if he would be willing to take a lie-detector test. Orlov agreed. "We went into another room, where they bring out two experts from Washington. They hooked me up and started asking questions. Did I speak Russian? I said, 'Da, nyet, maybe do svidaniya.' I don't speak Russian at all. They asked eight questions over and over again in various order. 'Is your name George Orlov? Are you working for the Soviet government? Did you ever give secrets to the Russians?' 'No.' One question I took issue with: 'Did your father recruit you?' They asked me that over and over again. I said, 'No.' It took an hour and a half. They told me I passed on seven of the eight questions. They got an anomalous response on 'did my father recruit me.' I told them the question was insulting to me. My father wouldn't do that, if he loved me, he obviously wouldn't do that. He had always told me, 'Don't get involved with the government, with the CIA. The American CIA are a bunch of no-good, unprofessional people.' He said they are a bunch of kids right out of prep school, 'cowboys without honor.' When he found I had applied to the Defense Intelligence Agency after college, he said, 'You don't want to work for them, or any of the intelligence services.'

"Recruiting me -- you can't be a loving father if you recruit your own children and put them in harm's way. It pissed me off. [FBI agent] Rosado had told me his father escaped Castro's Cuba. I said to him, 'How would you like it if I told you your father was a Commie and said your father recruited you to work for Castro.' He said, 'I'd be pretty pissed off.' They said they would take the results back to Washington and they would be in contact.

"We went to dinner that night. They were playing good guy, bad guy. Rosado was the good guy, he seemed honestly friendly. After all the things they thought I was doing, I think they realized I wasn't a big bad Soviet agent. At first, they were ready to lock me up and throw away the key."

His father, George Orlov said, "voted for Nixon. He was a conservative as far as conversation around the dinner table went. He worked twelve to sixteen hours a day. He believed people should work for what they get, no handouts. How Republican can you get? My wife is a Harvard-educated liberal and I'm a conservative. I'm to the right of Attila the Hun."

Igor Orlov, George said, had never spoken to him of the Soviet Union. "He never talked about his life there, or about the war. To this day I don't know who my grandparents were on my father's side. I haven't seen it, but my mother told me I have a false birth certificate, doctored by the CIA. That I was born under a false name.

"I'm not going to tell you my father is or isn't a spy, but I don't know. In 1963 I was six years old and had no reason to believe he was a spy. I had no reason to believe he was a spy anytime after that. He seldom left the shop, he never met with anyone. I know he had very few friends -- he was almost a recluse. I didn't see him recruiting people, I didn't see him trying to cultivate people."

Robert Orlov, who lived with his wife in Sudbury, Massachusetts, declined to comment on the FBI interview, but Richard Laurent, a close friend who grew up in Alexandria with him, said he had visited Robert around the time of the FBI inquiry. He described Robert as "pretty mad" because the investigation was taking up a lot of time and energy.

He remembered that Robert Orlov had been suspicious of a nearby vacant house, apparently believing he was being watched from it. Laurent said Robert turned up the stereo so they could talk. "He thought they might have a directional mike."

Robert Orlov told him some of the questions the FBI had asked, Laurent said. "'Isn't it true you're a photographer?' 'Yes.' 'Isn't it true you're a pilot?' 'Yes.' 'Then what's to stop you from taking pictures over Portsmouth Naval Base in New Hampshire?'

"They kept asking him the same questions over and over again. At one point, he told them, 'It's no wonder the Walkers and the Pollards did so well, because you wasted this time going after me instead of the real spies.'"

For Eleonore Orlov, the FBI visit in 1988 was, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, deja vu all over again. By now, she was an experienced hand at FBI investigations. "They came on Saturday, January 9, 1988, about five P.M.," she said. "There were two FBI agents, they gave me their cards, Stephanie P. Gleason and Charles K. Sciarini. The woman was twenty-five and the man was maybe twenty-nine. There were very young, friendly. They showed up and said what Yurchenko said, and I couldn't believe it. They had no warrant. They asked to search the house." The agents, she recalled, said they were looking for "a lot of money, and some equipment. A shortwave radio transmitter. I said the only radio we had was a Grundig and it was burned in the fire. We had a fire in January of 1987.

"They tried to dig up the backyard. They asked, 'Did your husband ever dig in the backyard? What did he dig for?' I said by a tree, for burying our cat. 'Where?' I said, 'Look, it's just a dead cat.' It was already eleven o'clock at night. They searched for five hours, opened all the drawers, found his wallet, credit cards, and took everything with them. They took a binder with my husband's English lessons. A grammar book. They left at midnight."

Her son George had called from Chicago the next morning to report his FBI visit. "Georgie said, 'Tell them everything you know about Papa. You know what they can do with me. They can put me in prison and throw away the key for twelve years and no one would ever hear from me.'

"When the FBI came to see Robert," Mrs. Orlov continued, "he said, 'Do you guys have a warrant? No? Make an appointment.' 'We can come in now,' they said, 'it's a matter of national security.' They stopped him outside his house. 'Let's call my congressman,' he said. No answer. He had just come back from sledding with his daughter."

On Sunday morning, Eleonore Orlov called her old friend Fred Tansey, the former FBI agent. "I called Mr. Tansey and said, 'I don't think these people are for real -- can you find out if they are real FBI agents?' He was here in five minutes. He said, 'Come in my car.' We drove for two hours in his car. He said, 'The best thing is to call the two agents and talk more. You have to convince them the children are not agents. Forget your husband, whatever he did he paid ten thousand times.' He called the FBI on his car phone. It was Sunday and he asked for Gleason and Sciarini. Both were in church, but they were beeped and called him back, and he said, 'I'm a friend of Eleonore Orlov and I'm sitting here in the parking lot of the courthouse in Alexandria in a black car. Please meet me there. And show me your ID.'

"In half an hour, Sciarini came in a big station wagon with the baby seat still there. He got out and said, 'I'm Sciarini and I'm working for the FBI.' Tansey said, 'If you ever go in their house, she will sue you. You ruined their business. You did this twenty-five years ago. If you would like to talk to Mrs. Orlov, go to a hotel or anyplace, but not her house.'

"They made a reservation for the Holiday Inn. I went to the hotel. Gleason and Sciarini met us there and they started asking me about Berlin, who I met, and they started showing me pictures. They showed me a lot of pictures of people, did you meet this guy or that guy. They showed me pictures of both Kozlov and Mrs. Kozlov. After all those years I didn't recognize them. I had worked with her in the censorship office, but that was thirty years ago. They wanted to know a lot about Kozlov. I only knew my husband hated him, that's all I could say.

"They came back on Tuesday to the basement and went through the children's things. They came back in blue jeans -- I warned them the basement was full of soot and oil, from the fire. They went through games, toys. They packed everything in big cartons. I'm a citizen since '76. Sasha became a citizen in 1971, approximately. They said, 'We don't need a search warrant. This is a matter of national security.'

"It was eerie. It was like a bad dream. They asked if my husband did carpentry during the restoring of the house. He could have put in some secret compartments. I asked, 'Could he? For what?' 'For the money he got from the Russians.' They said they were looking for a place where Sasha could hide hundreds of thousands of dollars. I said, 'Let's search for it. May I help you? For whom did he hide it? He would have told me, he knew he was dying.'

"They came to the gallery twice a week for three months. The FBI found no money, no secret compartments, no clues. Finally, I agreed to a polygraph. They got me -- they said, 'If you do a lie-detector test for us we will leave your boys alone for twenty years.' 'And if I don't?' They just smiled. But I got the message.

"Thirty years ago, when I took the polygraph in Germany, before I started the letter-translating business they gave me one. It was the first time I worked for the CIA. The CIA asked sex questions which bothered me. So I made one condition, no sex questions."

The polygraph took place in the Morrison House, an Alexandria hotel. "There was a polygraph operator from New York and Gleason and Sciarini. The polygraph took place in the bedroom, five hours, from six to eleven p.m. Gleason and Sciarini were in the living room. They asked twenty-seven questions. 'Was your husband a spy for Soviets? Did he have connections with KGB?' And so on. 'Why did Robert take flying lessons?' I said, 'He liked it.'"

And then, as suddenly as it had begun, it was over. The FBI faded away, and the Orlov sons resumed their normal lives. Eleonore went back to running the gallery. It kept her busy, but sometimes at dusk, when the last customer had gone, and there were only the cats to keep her company, she had time to wonder whether she would ever know the truth about the man she had met on streetcar No. 8 in Schwabing a lifetime ago.


James Angleton never lived to see the second unsuccessful investigation of Sasha, his nemesis. On the morning of May 11, 1987, he died of lung cancer at Sibley Memorial Hospital in Washington at the age of sixty-nine.

He was mourned by his friends, if not by his enemies. But even those who admired him the most, and there were many, seemed to realize that his obsession with moles and his fascination with Anatoly Golitsin had become a fatal flaw.

Rolfe Kingsley, who had taken over the Soviet division at the height of the mole hunt, had valued his close relationship with Angleton and admired him personally as a Renaissance man. But even Kingsley saw Angleton's limits. "Jim was one of the most brilliant officers I've ever worked with until Golitsin appeared," he said. "I won't say any more."

Mrs. Angleton shared Kingsley's view. She told a former CIA station chief, who had known her husband well, that in part she blamed Richard Helms: "The worst thing that happened to Jim was Golitsin. Why didn't Dick take him away from him?"

They held the memorial service on Friday, May 15, at the Rock Spring Congregational Church in Arlington. There were hymns and scripture readings, and the poet Reed Whittemore, Angleton's old friend and Yale roommate, gave a reading from T. S. Eliot. The closing hymn was "My Country, 'Tis of Thee."

Daniel Schorr, who had interviewed Angleton for four hours thirteen years earlier and had had some contact with the former counterintelligence chief since then, decided to attend the service. He was struck by the fact that no one had spoken about Angleton's life and work.

Walking up the aisle afterward, Schorr remarked, to no one in particular, "Gee, there was no eulogy."

Someone in front of Schorr turned around and snapped: "It's classified."



1. David Binder, "A Counterspymaster's View: Assessing Intelligence Breaches," New York Times, Apri1 10, 1987, p. A18.

2. Orlov was never a CIA officer. He was always a contract employee of the agency.

3. Orlov said he had been expecting the FBI because "they left a trail." The FBI ran a credit check, he said, and he discovered that when he applied for a mortgage; and "one day my mail came along with a xerox copy of two pieces of mail addressed to me. So it was obvious somebody was copying my mail. Then two days later the actual pieces of mail came in. The third clue was my brother had noticed he was being followed. He ran a check on the license plates and found they were FBI vehicles. This was just a few weeks before."

4. Igor Orlov had died six years earlier, and Yurchenko should have known this. Had he really spoken of Orlov as a current agent? "He said they have an agent in the U.S. with an art gallery," George Orlov replied, "but I don't remember whether he used the past or present tense. There was no doubt he was talking about us. I remember he did not say my father was no longer alive, he made no reference to that. He definitely did not say he is no longer working for us, or he has died. His grammar was not the best in the world, so it could be that explains it."

5. "We were looking for ways to measure the ablation of nose cones as they reentry," he said. "The burning off of the nose cone material. You want to know the shape of the nose cone because it will tell you the course of the reentry vehicle. You will know your CEP [Circular Error Probable, a measure of ballistic-missile accuracy]. The better you know the shape, the more accurate the reentry vehicle."
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:37 am

Chapter 20: Triumph

Peter Karlow never gave up hope.

Although forced out of the CIA at the age of forty-two, his intelligence career destroyed by the mole hunt, he continued to try to clear his name. It was a slow and frustrating process, and he received no encouragement from Langley.

In the 1970s, Karlow had several conversations with James Angleton after the counterintelligence chief had been fired. Karlow believed that James Angleton held the key; if he could somehow get Angleton to open up, some of the mists might clear away. Twice he had been able to speak with Angleton when they were both still in the agency. It was in Angleton's office that the counterintelligence chief had warned Karlow not to discuss his case with anyone. In a later encounter in the hall, Karlow tried again.

"I said, 'I've been asking more and more questions about this and there is nothing that ties what this defector said to me.' Angleton reacted strongly and said, 'Don't talk to anybody about this -- it's too secret.' I said, 'I'm keeping my own bigot list of who I have talked to, and you're welcome to see it.' He said okay. But he never asked for it."

Soon after Angleton was dismissed in 1974, Karlow encountered him at a Georgetown cocktail party. The two men chatted about the past. "At the party, he said I was the prime suspect." Karlow saw Angleton again at a reception at the embassy of South Africa. Karlow suggested lunch, and somewhat to his surprise, Angleton agreed.

They met at L 'Escargot, a small, out-of the-way French restaurant on upper Connecticut Avenue that was one of Angleton's favorites. "He said to me again, 'You were the prime suspect.' I said, 'How is it possible for a Soviet defector to knock out a staff officer of the CIA? Why don't we do something like that to the KGB? With a simple rumor.' I assumed Golitsin was running down and came up with me. Something to keep interest alive in him."

To Karlow, Angleton appeared to have a guilty conscience, but he admitted nothing. "Angleton never expressed any regret. He took the position it wasn't his doing. He said he never recommended my being fired. It was not something he had control over. He explained it was better from a CI viewpoint not to fire a suspect, but to keep him in place. He said the problem was I had become a security case."

This was pure double-talk, since the counterintelligence chief and the Office of Security worked hand in glove. OS had seized upon trivial security violations to make a case against Karlow because Angleton suspected he was a Soviet agent. If the CIA could not prove Karlow a spy, they would push him out the door on lesser grounds. He would be hung for a sheep. [l]

Karlow's meetings with Angleton were extraordinary, mole hunter and quarry, both fired by the CIA, sparring over the pate maison. But this was no Stockholm syndrome at work; Karlow had known Angleton for years, and had tried to help him develop ways of detecting Soviet bugging devices. One night in the late 1950s, Angleton had come to Karlow's house for dinner to discuss espionage equipment. Karlow's wife, Libby, gave up at midnight and retired, but Karlow and Angleton kept at it until four in the morning, when the counterintelligence chief finally went home.

By questioning Angleton, Karlow was trying to gather evidence to help his case; perhaps somehow he could still clear his name. At a second lunch at a restaurant in Alexandria, Virginia, "we went further into the same thing. We were talking like two ships that cross in the night. I was interested in getting a handle on this thing for my purposes and Jim was providing me with nothing that I felt I could use." Angleton confirmed the business about letter K. He told me it was logical that I was the person -- I was in Germany, my name began with K, I'd been in East Berlin, I had access to just about everything."

But there was one key fact that Angleton neglected to disclose. Karlow did not know that he had also come under suspicion of leaking to the Soviets the CIA's efforts to copy the bug found in the seal in the American embassy in Moscow. Nor did he know that Angleton had been informed by Peter Wright, of MI5, that the source of that leak was George Blake. The information from MI5 would have exonerated Karlow of this allegation, but Angleton never disclosed it, at the lunch or any other time. [2]

Karlow pressed the former CI chief. How could it all have happened? How could so many officers have fallen under false suspicion? "He said, 'There was literally panic when Golitsin said there was a mole. We were under so much pressure after Burgess and Maclean.'" [3]

At the time of these encounters with Angleton, Karlow was back in Washington as international affairs director for Monsanto. At first, after he was fired by the CIA, it had not been easy for Karlow, who had a wife and two children to support. Often it is difficult for officers in the Clandestine Services to make the transition to the private sector. Since their work has been secret, there is the delicate problem of what to put down on their resume.

"After scratching around for a year, I got a job with Monsanto," Karlow said. "The job paid better than the government, there were stock options, promotion after six months." Karlow worked for Monsanto in St. Louis for several years, and in 1970 the company sent him to Washington. As an executive of a Fortune 500 company, Karlow prospered.

But the improvement in his bank account hardly erased the painful memory of his departure from the CIA. His wife, Libby, had died in 1976, not knowing how the story would end.

Karlow retired from Monsanto but stayed on in Washington as an international business consultant. Determined to clear his name, he began talking to lawyers, including an old friend from the OSS, Edwin J. "Ned" Putzell, Jr. "I had to get at the root of what happened," Karlow said. "Who had it in for me, what had really gone on."

In September 1980, Karlow applied for his entire CIA file under both the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. When the Mole Relief Act passed in October, Karlow got wind of it. Two months later, on December 18, Putzell wrote to Admiral Turner formally filing a claim under the new law. And Karlow and his attorney met with CIA officials to press his case.

But, as it happened, the one-year window that opened in October 1980 for claimants under the Mole Relief Act spanned two administrations. In January 1981, with the inauguration of President Reagan, a new team took over the CIA. Karlow's case ended up on the desk of William J. Casey.

The new CIA director asked his general counsel, Stanley Sporkin, to check into the matter. Secretly, a special three- man panel was convened, including Sporkin, to review the case. In a memorandum to Casey, Sporkin concluded that the facts placed Karlow's case "on a different footing" from those of Kovich and Garbler, who had been granted compensation. [4]

The Sporkin memo went on to review what supposedly had occurred. In December 1961, the memo said, a KGB defector -- Golisin -- had reported that the Soviets had penetrated the CIA. "The defector was not able to provide a positive identification of this 'mole,' but the descriptive data provided by the defector fit Mr. Karlow to such an extent that he came under serious suspicion and an extensive investigation of Mr. Karlow followed. The investigation did not result in the conclusion that Mr. Karlow was the mole ..."

Then came the bombshell in the secret memo. Since Karlow had not been proved to be the mole, Sporkin wrote, it might appear he was entitled to compensation. "However, information developed during the course of the investigation of Mr. Karlow led to the decision that he must be dismissed on security grounds quite apart from the fact that he had been accused ... of being the mole." [5] The panel, Sporkin added, had concluded that Karlow's claim should be denied.

The agency had trotted out the same old shopworn goods -- Karlow had been unclear about his father's birthplace, he had been vague about where he had traveled on certain dates, he had left his safe open, and so on.

But official records often fail to give a complete picture. For Sporkin and the other CIA officers reviewing the files almost two decades later, it may have been difficult to grasp the truth -- that once Karlow was tarred as a mole suspect, the agency had been determined to get rid of him come what may. If it could not prove he was a traitor, then other grounds would do. A senior CIA officer who knew what had happened in 1963 declared, "They used the security material to frame Karlow with this chickenshit stuff."

Karlow as yet knew nothing of the Sporkin memo. In October 1981, after the one-year window had slammed shut, Casey wrote to Karlow explaining why his claim had been turned down. Karlow remarried that year -- his new wife, Carolyn, was a respected college administrator -- and he engaged Stanley Gaines, who had successfully represented Richard Kovich, to carry on the fight.

Gaines tried to convince the Senate Intelligence Committee that justice had miscarried in Karlow's case, but he was too late; the agency had persuaded the committee's staff that there were sound, albeit murky and elusive, reasons for rejecting his client's claim.

Karlow, normally a temperate man, now let his frustration boil over. "There is a deliberate concealment or frame-up here," he told Gaines. The agency, Karlow added, was "making me a scapegoat for something." [6]

In October 1986, Karlow got his first break. By now, he and Carolyn had moved to northern California, where he continued to work as an international business consultant. Back in Washington to attend an OSS symposium, Karlow gave a speech to his wartime colleagues. So did Casey, who had served in the OSS in London.

Afterward, the two men had a chance to chat. "Casey came up to me and we talked," Karlow remembered, "and he said, 'What the hell is going on with your case?'"

Volatile, quick-tempered, and mercurial, Casey was nevertheless an approachable man, and for all of his flaws, he did not have a closed mind. Within days of his conversation with Karlow, Casey personally ordered the case reopened. He telephoned Karlow in California and asked him to work with the agency's new general counsel, David Doherty, to prepare new recommendations to compensate Karlow. At the same time, the floodgates opened; more than 150 documents dealing with his case were suddenly declassified and released to Karlow.

But there was one crucial fact that the CIA had never disclosed to Karlow, and it dared not reveal it now. In 1963, Peter Karlow had been cleared by the FBI.

The former FBI agent in charge of the investigation confirmed this. "The agents who questioned Karlow," said Courtland J. Jones, "felt he was not the person described by Golitsin. Both FBI men who questioned him were top- notch." Maurice "Gook" Taylor and Aubrey "Pete" Brent had been tough and unrelenting in their five-day interrogation. But they came away convinced of Karlow's innocence. Jones was sure of it because he remembered Taylor's reaction. "I recalled Gook saying how good he felt that he had cleared a man who had been painted guilty." Jones added: "Our inquiry cleared Karlow." [7]

According to Jones, a report would normally have been sent by the Washington Field Office of the FBI, which conducted the interview, to headquarters, and from there to the CIA. And was that done in the Karlow case? "Of course," Jones replied. No such document was ever released to Karlow by either agency.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, Karlow did finally obtain Sporkin's memo, which shocked him when he was finally able to read it. It was the first he had learned of the CIA's spurious claim that he had been forced out for any reason other than the mole charges. The 1963 memo written by Lawrence R. Houston, the CIA's lawyer, when Karlow was pushed out, said just the opposite -- that although Karlow had not been shown to be the mole, his usefulness was over because of that accusation. To Karlow's dismay, the CIA initially could not even find Houston's memo. It was lost in a sea of paper.

At the request of the general counsel, Karlow wrote a detailed rebuttal of the Sporkin memo and the old charges. As the CIA lawyers went over the case once more, they quickly perceived that the minor "security" matters that had been developed during the course of the mole investigation were not, in fact, the real reason that Karlow had been asked to resign. The agency had made a mistake, it now realized, in rejecting Karlow's claim under the Mole Relief Act.

But there was a problem: the one-year law had expired five years earlier. The CIA had no legal authority to compensate Karlow.

Moreover, Karlow's case was soon swept aside by the tidal wave of Iran-Contra. In the very month that Casey had ordered the Karlow case reopened, the arms-for-hostages scandal was coming down around his ears. By November, the incredible facts had emerged: Ronald Reagan, staunch opponent of Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini, had secretly provided arms to that country in the hope of gaining the release of American hostages, and millions in profits from the arms sales had been illegally diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua. White House aide Oliver North, the Marine lieutenant colonel at the center of the scandal, became a household name. For the Reagan administration, Casey, and the CIA, it was a disaster.

Casey was in his office on December 15 preparing for another appearance on Iran-Contra before the Senate Intelligence Committee when he suffered a seizure. He was operated on for a malignant brain tumor and never returned to work. He died on May 6, 1987, five days before the death of James Angleton.

Robert M. Gates, the deputy director of the CIA, had become acting CIA director when Casey underwent surgery, and on February 2, Reagan nominated him to be director. But Gates, who had also played a role in the arms-for- hostages scandal -- and had helped to keep Congress in the dark about it -- faced a bruising confirmation fight in the Senate. In March, Gates withdrew and Reagan nominated FBI director William H. Webster as the new CIA chief. [8]

For Karlow, the chain of events touched off soon after his promising encounter with Casey at the OSS meeting in October must have had a why-do-these-things-happen-to-me? impact. The timing of Iran-Contra was a cruel joke. "They were going to make a settlement with me," Karlow said. "After Casey died, Gates didn't want to pick it up. Webster stalled."

But after Webster, a former federal judge, had settled into the CIA, he took another look. "Webster brought a group of aides from the FBI," Karlow said. "They went over my case and Webster agreed I'd been screwed."

The agency's lawyers worked out an amount of damages that they felt Karlow was owed for having his career unjustly destroyed twenty-five years earlier. And they solved the problem of how to pay the money. They would quietly ask Congress to pass the Mole Relief Act all over again, just for Peter Karlow.

On September 15, 1988, the House and Senate passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 1989. Buried in its provisions was Section 501 (a), which contained language identical to that of the 1980 Mole Relief Act. Two weeks later, President Reagan signed the bill. [9] The Mole Relief Act of 1988 was now law.

The press failed to notice the obscure provision or to uncover for whom the law had been passed. Since the CIA did not provide any public notice of the new law, or attempt to contact ex-employees who might have been affected, no other victim of the mole hunt came forward.

William Webster approved the settlement. Early in 1989, Peter Karlow flew to Washington. At CIA headquarters, in the general counsel's office, he was handed a check for close to $500,000.

Karlow declined to discuss numbers; all he would say was: "It was under a million." Karlow drove back to downtown Washington to try to find a bank where he could deposit the check. Ironically, perhaps, he found himself on K Street, the city's main business thoroughfare.

"It was a funny feeling to stand on K Street at three P.M. with a check that size in your hand and what do you do with it?" Karlow found a bank. "Fortunately," he said, "it was open until four P.M." The bank was happy to take the money.

The payment was nice, but, Karlow said, "There is no way to compensate for being called a traitor, and kept in that position for twenty years." He wanted something "to hang on the wall," some visible symbol of his vindication. Webster agreed. Karlow was invited to come back to Langley in the spring.

The CIA wanted to give him a medal.



1. A former CIA officer familiar with the case speculated that Karlow had been dismissed on "security" grounds because the agency had feared embarrassment if it became known publicly that Karlow had been wiretapped without cause. "They had a tap on Karlow," he said, "and it was alleged he and his mother talked about classified matters. But this was stuff they didn't want to bring into a court of law. The legal department stonewalled and didn't want any of this aired. They never had anything against Peter except these minor indiscretions, the telephone chatter."

2. After Blake confessed, Sir Dick White, the head of MI6, came to Washington with a damage report on the Blake case that omitted the fact that Blake had told the Soviets about the work on the bug by the CIA and the British. But later Peter Wright tipped off Angleton that Blake had confessed to this. The CIA believed that the KGB requirements circular that Golitsin brought with him when he defected, and which revealed Soviet knowledge of the CIA research, was based on the information Blake gave to the KGB. A former CIA man who knew the story said, "Jim had knowledge it was Blake, not Karlow. He acquired this information from Peter Wright after Karlow had been fired and sat on the information and never revealed it. The horrific thing was, Jim knew that Karlow had been wrongly treated and suppressed that information and didn't do anything about it."

3. Interestingly, Angleton, in explaining the pressure, never mentioned Philby, who was far more important than Burgess or Maclean. It may have been too painful, since Philby had been Angleton's regular luncheon partner in Washington but was never detected as a Soviet agent by the CIA counterintelligence chief.

4. "Serge Peter Karlow -- Request for Relief Under Section 405 of Public Law 96-450 ('Mole Relief Act')," memorandum, Stanley Sporkin, CIA general counsel, to Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, August 21, 1981.

5. Ibid.

6. Letter, Peter Karlow to Stanley H. Gaines, September 23, 1982.

7. Not only was Karlow cleared by the FBI, he passed the polygraph test that the bureau had administered during his five days of interrogation. Alexander W. Neale, Jr., the case agent who handled the Karlow inquiry, said, "The results of the polygraph did not reveal any facts that would indicate the man's guilt." So the lie-detector test showed that Karlow was innocent? "You can take it a step farther," Neale replied, "and say he was innocent."

8. President Bush nominated Gates on May 14, 1991, to succeed Webster. The Senate, after lengthy hearings and renewed controversy over Gates, confirmed him on November 5.

9. Public Law 100-453, signed by the President on September 29, 1988.
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:38 am

Chapter 21: The Legacy

As he looked back on the era of the mole hunt, Richard Helms had no regrets. It was warm in his office in downtown Washington, but he preferred to keep on the jacket of his exquisitely tailored suit as he talked.

Angleton may have been the point man, but it was Helms who had presided over the period of the mole hunt, first as the deputy director for plans from 1962 and then as the Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973. Little of importance could have occurred during that period without his personal approval. Helms knew.

In retrospect, what did he think of the handling of the mole investigation? It had to be done, Helms said. "One of the real nightmares the DCI lives with is that someone is going to walk into his office and say, 'We found a penetration.' Any director worthy of his stripes is bound to pay attention to allegations and to try to run them down. We had to check these things out. I felt it then, and now.

"When I was director, I refused to sign off on getting rid of anybody until it was clearly demonstrated that they were indeed a penetration." But, he conceded, some officers had been "put on a siding while the allegations were being checked out.

"What are you going to do with these people in the meantime? You can't hang them from the ceiling. When these cases came forward it was Angleton who raised the possibilities, but investigations had to be conducted by OS, not by Angleton."

How many CIA officers had been investigated? "I don't know the numbers," Richard Helms said.

And no one was found?

"Not that I'm aware of."


Any large organization rests on trust, or it could not function. Among its members, there is a presumption of loyalty to the organization, to their common goals, and to each other. As Robert T. Crowley, the veteran Clandestine Services officer, put it graphically, "In operations you have to ask, 'Would I want this guy on my air hose at two hundred feet?'"

The CIA, too, rests on trust, but assumes betrayal. That is its continuing dilemma.

The era of the mole hunt brought into sharp relief the potential threat posed to any organization that has built into its basic structure a powerful unit in charge of suspecting everyone. A Department of Paranoia, as it were.

James Angleton, who directed the agency's counterintelligence for two decades, devoted the last thirteen years of his career to finding "the mole" or moles in the agency. Angleton was the CIA's Captain Ahab, endlessly pursuing the great white whale. He never even got close enough to throw a harpoon.

It is tempting but too easy to say that Angleton was paranoid. By the dictionary definition, a paranoid is "characterized by oversuspiciousness, grandiose delusions, or delusions of persecution." [1]

Yet it is hard, and perhaps unfair, to make the case that Angleton was paranoid. His suspicions had a rational basis. There were moles and traitors in other intelligence agencies, notably M16. Even in the CIA, moles and traitors would surface (although none of the CIA cases took place, or at least were discovered, until after Angleton left the agency). Some cases may remain unpublicized, because the CIA preferred it that way, but the known list is long enough:

Edwin Gibbons Moore II, a former CIA officer who had hundreds of classified documents in his home, and offered them to the Soviets for $200,000. Convicted and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in 1977.

William P. Kampiles, a former CIA watch officer, who received $3,000 from the Soviets for a copy of the manual for the KH-11 spy satellite. Convicted and sentenced in 1978 to forty years.

David Barnett, a former CIA case officer in Indonesia, who sold agency secrets to the Soviets for $92,600. Pleaded guilty to espionage in 1980 and sentenced to eighteen years.

Karl F. Koecher, a CIA contract employee who worked as a translator from 1973 to 1975 while an agent of Czech intelligence. Arrested in 1984, pleaded guilty to espionage, and traded in an East-West exchange of prisoners in 1986.

Sharon M. Scranage, a CIA clerk in Ghana, who passed agency secrets to her lover, an agent of the Ghanaian intelligence service. Arrested in 1985, pleaded guilty to revealing classified information, and sentenced to five years.

Larry Wu Tai Chin, a former CIA broadcasting analyst who passed secrets to Chinese intelligence for thirty-three years, for which he received about $140,000. Arrested in 1985, convicted the following year, and committed suicide in February 1986 while in jail and awaiting sentence.

Edward Lee Howard, a CIA case officer about to be sent to Moscow when he failed a polygraph test and was fired. Howard then sold the secrets of the CIA's operations in Moscow to the KGB and put the money he received in a secret Swiss bank account containing upwards of $150,000; he buried an additional $10,000 in the New Mexico desert. Escaped from the FBI in 1985 and was granted asylum in the Soviet Union.

The list is sufficient evidence that moles and traitors exist, and logically must be pursued and, if at all possible, detected. "Today," Sam Papich insisted, "we have moles in every agency, including the FBI. We'd be stupid if we don't think so."

But like so much in a democratic system, rooting out spies requires a delicate balance between security and liberty. The CIA is not exempt from due process. It is part of the American government. The agency is free to practice its full range of black arts against other nations, subject to certain minimal presidential and congressional restrictions, but logically it cannot -- at least when dealing with its own officers -- operate outside the democratic norms of the system it professes to defend. It cannot, without great cost, trample on the values it was created to protect.

If Angleton was brilliant, as his admirers claim, he was also warped, as his detractors maintain, a tortured and twisted man who saw conspiracy and deception as the natural order of things. His mind, and his universe, was a hopeless bramble of false trails and switchbacks, an intricate maze to nowhere. He was, in the end, truly lost in a "wilderness of mirrors."

A former case officer, a white-bearded, wise old owl who left the agency years ago to settle in the foothills of the Colorado Rockies, perhaps put it best:

"The wilderness? More people found their way into it than out of it. There is something inhuman about the CI mind, and the manipulation of human beings. It's always tempting for a counterintelligence officer to take a case and double it back. That leads you into the wilderness."

The old case officer added: "Much of the trouble we get into is due to stupidity rather than to evil design, sabotage, or treason. Normally it's stupidity.

"If you have good control over CI, and it works, that's fine. If it doesn't, it ought to be stopped. I'm not even saying that it should be stopped if it damages careers. Those are casualties of war."

He gazed out the window, toward the nearby mountains. A breeze was rippling the trees. "There must be control over Angletons," he said. "We can't afford to run the risk of getting the whole outfit screwed up. Angleton went over the line."

A former chief of the Soviet division, although he had admired Angleton personally, agreed. Guarding against penetration was "absolutely basic," he said, but it was a question of the methods used. "It's a matter of dealing with facts, not theories. If you're going to move, you have to have hard evidence."

But the basic conflict between trust and betrayal that gave rise to the mole hunt inside the CIA was larger than anyone individual. The problem was, and is, endemic.

Angleton, after all, exercised great power under five directors -- Walter Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, John McCone, William Raborn, and Richard Helms. Angleton could not have amassed and wielded that power unless the CIA as an institution wanted him to do so. Angleton operated in a supportive environment, not in a vacuum.

The mole hunt in the CIA destroyed the careers of loyal officers, shattered lives and families, and paralyzed the agency, bringing to a halt its operations against the Soviet Union at a time -- during the height of the Cold War -- when those operations were the CIA's raison d'etre.

Leonard V. McCoy, the reports officer in the Soviet division who later became deputy chief of the reorganized CI Staff, said as much in an article circulated privately among former CIA employees. He wrote: "The negative effect of the Golitsyn era on our Soviet operational management was in fact devastating -- the inevitable culmination of a long-standing belief that CIA could not have a bona fide Soviet operation. Potential cases were turned down, ongoing operations were judged to be deception operations (including Penkovskiy), and defectors who gave information supporting Nosenko ... were judged to have been dispatched by the KGB." [2]

Another veteran CIA officer, F. Mark Wyatt, in a review of a BBC film about the Nosenko case, put it even more succinctly: "Because of this case and its many ramifications, careers had been ruined, operations against the Soviet Union paralyzed, and relations with several friendly intelligence services crippled." [3]

The mole hunt spread to several other Western allies, touching off a particularly destructive and inconclusive search for traitors at the top levels of British intelligence. It claimed innocent victims in other countries, such as Norway's Ingeborg Lygren. And it created a climate of fear in the CIA.

It was not an unfamiliar atmosphere. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's hunt for Communists in the American government flourished in the early 1950s. What happened inside the CIA in the 1960s paralleled the McCarthyism that had taken poisonous root in America a decade earlier. That in itself was ironic, since the CIA had been one of the Wisconsin senator's targets in his destructive witch-hunt. It was almost as though the CIA, insulated by its walls of secrecy, was caught in a time warp, experiencing its own witch-hunt several years after that in the larger society. [4]

Like a speeding locomotive with no brakes, the mole hunt had gathered a momentum of its own until, inevitably, it went completely off the rails.

The "war of the defectors," the conflict over Golitsin and Nosenko, a central event of the mole hunt, split the agency into two camps, creating scars that had yet to heal decades later.

The harm done was so great that the agency even agreed to an act of Congress to compensate the victims of the mole hunt, although it did not take the initiative in seeking to redress the wrongs it had committed. But the payments to Karlow, Garbler, and Kovich, substantial though they were, did not make up for the harm done to them, and to dozens of other loyal officers, some of whom to this day do not even realize that they were victims.

Like a snake eating its tail, the mole hunters eventually devoured each other. The mole hunt turned on itself, and led to the spectacle of the chief of the Soviet division, the chief of counterintelligence, even the director of the CIA being accused. David Murphy, James Angleton, and William Colby -- all were touched by the corrosive finger of suspicion. The Soviet division's operations virtually ground to a halt.

In the greatest irony of all, as a direct consequence of the mole hunt, counterintelligence within the CIA was also diminished, its size, influence, and effectiveness greatly reduced. When William Colby took over as CIA director in 1973, he was rightly convinced that Angleton had become a destructive force within the CIA. The belief of the Counterintelligence Staff that all Soviet defectors or volunteers were plants and that the agency itself was deeply penetrated had frozen the CIA's operations against the Soviet Union around the world. Determined to change this and to maneuver Angleton out of the agency, Colby dismantled his empire. The pieces were never put back together. [5] "CI," said Sam Papich, "has never been reconstructed."

With his excess of zeal, Angleton had succeeded in destroying all that he had worked for. The world of counterintelligence is rather like a cave, so deep, so dark, that no one can fully see into all of its crevices. But the basic task of CIA counterintelligence is to prevent penetrations within the agency and to help detect foreign spies.

While the work of counterintelligence -- precisely because it is carried on in secret -- is difficult to measure, one reasonable yardstick is the number of espionage cases that surface in a given period. And the proliferation of spy cases in the mid-1980s, from Edward Lee Howard in the CIA, to Ronald Pelton in the NSA, to John A. Walker, Jr., and his confederates in the Navy, to Richard W. Miller in the FBI, and to the Army's Clyde Lee Conrad, all suggest that something had gone very wrong with U.S. counterintelligence.

Indeed, more than one official study reached the same conclusion. In 1988, a subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee investigated the nation's counterintelligence agencies. The panel directed its heaviest criticism at the way the CIA had handled the case of Edward Lee Howard, the agency's first defector to the Soviet Union. In its report, the House committee called the case "one of the most serious losses in the history of U.S. intelligence." [6] It published excerpts from secret testimony by Gardner R. "Gus" Hathaway, then the CIA's counterintelligence chief, who admitted for the first time that "what Howard did to us was devastating," and that Howard had revealed to the Russians "some of the most important operations we have ever run in the Soviet Union." Hathaway also conceded that in the Howard case "the agency did not do its job properly." [7] Reviewing the counterintelligence problems facing the United States, the House committee concluded that "something is fundamentally wrong." [8]

That same year, a Senate-House conference report found "basic flaws" in the nation's security apparatus. It called the intelligence community "poorly organized, staffed, trained and equipped to deal with continuing counterintelligence challenges." [9]

So many espionage cases broke in 1985 that it became known as "the Year of the Spy. " In the wake of these cases, and the defection and redefection of the KGB's Vitaly Yurchenko, CIA director William Webster quietly reorganized the agency's Counterintelligence Staff, replacing it with a new Counterintelligence Center and upgrading its director to the level of associate deputy director for operations for counterintelligence. Whether the changes would prove to be more than a bureaucratic shuffle remained to be seen.

Scotty Miler, Angleton's former deputy, lamented what he saw as the demise of counterintelligence in the wake of Angleton's dismissal and his own departure. But Miler, who spent years in the SIG looking for moles, and never found any -- except, perhaps, Igor Orlov -- was aware that counterintelligence was an inexact science. He liked to quote a remark by the CIA's former deputy director for plans: "Desmond FitzGerald once said CI is nothing but a couple of guys in the back room examining the entrails of chickens."

In the end, Angleton had self-destructed. He had mesmerized a succession of CIA directors, but the Wizard of Oz analogy was apt. With the agency tied up in knots, he could no longer maintain the mystique.

As John Denley Walker, the former station chief who had clashed with Angleton in Israel, put it: "Angleton became like the spider king and he never knew what was in the web. Colby was pretty nearly right."

David H. Blee, one of Angleton's successors as chief of counterintelligence, grasped the problem very well. Blee headed the CI Staff for seven years. "In counterintelligence," he said, "we're all paranoid. If we weren't, we couldn't do our jobs."

Another former CIA counterintelligence chief did not want to be identified, but he was astonishingly frank about the hazards. "You go berserk in this job," he said. "You lose your orientation completely. You become demented. You're looking for spies everywhere." It might be a good idea, he added, if the CIA's counterintelligence chief were limited to a term of one year.

Angleton's deep-seated belief that Soviet walk-ins or defectors after Anatoly Golitsin were all plants died hard, even after Angleton himself had gone. Some former CIA officers insist that the agency had recovered rapidly from this mind-set.

But in 1976, two years after Angleton's departure, Adolf G. Tolkachev, a Soviet defense researcher working on Stealth technology for aircraft, began leaving notes in the cars of U.S. diplomats near the American embassy in Moscow. Tolkachev, fearing KGB surveillance, did not dare to approach the embassy itself. The CIA's Moscow station relayed these approaches to Langley.

Three times, it can be revealed, Tolkachev was turned away by the CIA, which feared he might be a plant. Finally, the agency decided to take a chance and began accepting material from the Soviet defense researcher. For almost a decade, Tolkachev proved to be the CIA's most valuable asset inside the Soviet Union, his existence a closely guarded secret. Because of the agency's initial suspicion, it had come close to losing his rich haul of Soviet secrets. Tolkachev was finally caught, betrayed, almost certainly, by Edward Lee Howard. [10]

In the end, it all came back to betrayal. The need for trust, the reality of betrayal, transcend the dilemma faced by the CIA and the mole hunters of the 1960s. They are at the core of every human relationship.

On one level, James Angleton's obsessive quest for the mole was a search for the evil within. The parallel to the human condition is obvious. In a sense, Angleton and his band of mole hunters were exorcists. Ultimately, they had about as much success as others who have attempted to ply that difficult trade.

John Denley Walker, who saw it all from the inside but managed to keep a sense of balance, summed up: "The mole hunt," he said, "probably did more to protect the Soviet agent, if there was one, than to unmask him. While everyone was being investigated and accused, the real mole was sitting back laughing."



1. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, Second College Edition (Cleveland: William Collins Publishers, 1980), p. 1030.

2. Leonard V. McCoy, "Yuriy Nosenko, CIA," CIRA Newsletter, Vol. XII, No.3 (Fall 1987), published by Central Intelligence Retirees' Association, p. 20.

3. Mark Wyatt, "Yuri Nosenko, KGB," CIRA Newsletter, Vol. XI, No.4 (Winter 1986/1987), p. 11.

4. It is perhaps of passing historical interest to note that Senator McCarthy was condemned by the Senate, 67-22, on December 2, 1954, eighteen days before James J. Angleton became chief of counterintelligence.

5. There was one exception, however. The power of the Counterintelligence Staff to approve clandestine operations -- such as the recruitment of an agent -- in advance was restored by Angleton's immediate successor, George T. Kalaris. Operational approval was one of the functions that had been removed by Colby.

6. "U.S. Counterintelligence and Security Concerns: A Status Report," Report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1988), p. 15.

7. Ibid., pp. v, 15.

8. lbid., p. 19.

9. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 20, 1988, p. 2345.

10. On June 14,1985, Tolkachev was arrested in Moscow during a meeting with his CIA case officer, Paul M. Stombaugh, Jr ., who was expelled for espionage. On October 22, 1986, TASS, the Soviet news agency, announced that Tolkachev had been tried, convicted, and executed. When I interviewed Edward Lee Howard in Budapest in June 1987, he admitted that Tolkachev "could very well have been one of the assets I would have handled." Asked if he had betrayed Tolkachev, Howard said: "I don't believe I did that." David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 261-62.
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:38 am


On May 26,1989, Peter Karlow, accompanied by his wife, Carolyn, drove to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, for the ceremony.

It took place in a briefing room on the seventh floor, near the office of William H. Webster, the Director of Central Intelligence. Webster looked on as Richard F. Stolz, Jr., the DDO, presented the agency's Intelligence Commendation Medal to Karlow.

Stolz, the chief of all clandestine operations for the CIA, was an ordinary-looking man with heavy horn-rimmed glasses. In his dark blue suit and red tie, he might have been an insurance executive presenting an employee with a gold watch at a retirement party. [1]

In addition to the small bronze medal, Karlow also received a large blue leatherette binder with the gold seal of the CIA on the front. Inside was a two-page citation that went with the medal. "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA," it began, above the CIA seal with eagle and shield, "To all who shall see these presents, greeting: This is to certify that the Director of Central Intelligence has awarded the Intelligence Commendation Medal to Serge Peter Karlow for especially commendable service." The text said the medal was awarded to Karlow "in recognition of his more than twenty-two years of devoted service to the Central Intelligence Agency. He distinguished himself in a series of increasingly responsible assignments both at Headquarters and overseas. Mr. Karlow demonstrated inspired leadership, operational wisdom, and good judgment throughout his career, reflecting credit upon himself, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal service."

The citation was signed by William Webster.

Karlow remembered Stolz: "He was a junior officer when I was in Germany." And although Stolz was never photographed in public, a CIA photographer was on hand this day to record the presentation. Later, Stolz inscribed a copy of the color print: "For Peter Karlow, in small recognition for an outstanding professional career of a great gentleman, Dick Stolz, May 26, 1989." Karlow hung it on the wall.

Except for Stolz, there was a new cast of characters at the CIA. None of the officials who had driven Karlow from the agency twenty-six years before attended the ceremony. They were all long gone.

But one of Angleton's successors as chief of counterintelligence, Gardner R. "Gus" Hathaway, came to the presentation. "I guess he wanted to get a look at me," Karlow said. "I had a brief chat with Gus. I had mixed feelings about having him there." [2]

There was a party afterward, at the International Club of Washington, on K Street, and many of Karlow's old friends and retired colleagues came. Trapper Drum was there, from the Technical Services Division, Reid Denis from Berlin base, Peter Heimann from Bonn. And Richard Helms.

"Everyone there was relieved," Karlow said. Many of his former colleagues had refused to believe he was anything but a loyal American, but until the director of the CIA ordered that Karlow be given a medal, the doubts had lingered.

Smiling, one of the CIA men raised a glass and said to Karlow: "You've won, you beat 'em."

But Karlow didn't really feel that way. He was not bitter, or angry, but he had waited twenty-six years for this day. When he left the CIA in 1963, he was forty-two. When he returned in 1989, he was a sixty-eight-year-old man. Certainly, he had done well in the private sector, and there was the compensation from the agency.

But the mole hunt had robbed him of a lifetime. It had destroyed his career. It had accused him of treason. It had taken him away from doing the work he loved, for his country. He had already given his left leg, but it wasn't enough. Peter Karlow also had to give his reputation, and his best years.


There is an emptiness to the New Mexico landscape. The rolling high desert north of Albuquerque has a special beauty, but it is the beauty of desolation, the barren hills relieved only by the occasional juniper or prickly pear cactus.

Scotty Miler, living there, far from Langley, had plenty of time to look back. He lit a cigarette and inhaled deeply. "I wish there was some way the government could lay all this to rest, because it's unfair," he said. "If you go into intelligence you have to expect you will be investigated, that there may be allegations about you."

It had not been so easy for the mole hunters, either, he said. "Even while I was investigating these people I was obliged to deal with them on a day-to-day basis." That had created "a certain uneasiness."

And what was his view, in retrospect, about the lives and careers that were damaged, that had been in his hands?

"Regrettable. You're concerned -- have you been fair? It's regrettable that it has to happen. But you have to have a system if there is sufficient cause for suspicion ... You're trying to protect something larger than an individual. If there is one thing that you learn, it's that there are no certainties about who's going to be a spy."

Miler stubbed out his cigarette and looked up. "As far as we know, none of these people we investigated turned out to be spies."

Did that mean there was no mole?

"No, I didn't say that," Miler replied. "It means we didn't find one."

Scotty Miler's rear porch faced west, toward Arizona. To the north, the Sangre de Cristo mountains darkened the distant horizon. With his wife, Miler had come to New Mexico from Washington in 1976, "to get away from the long arm of the investigating committees."

The Milers had set out hummingbird feeders on the porch, filled with sugar water. They loved to watch the aerial acrobatics of the tiny creatures, swooping and buzzing around the porch. But Miler's wife had died in 1988, and he was alone in the house with his memories, and the hummingbirds.

There were fewer hummingbirds now, but they still came to feed. "On a good day," he said, "you can see twenty- five."



1. Stolz himself retired in December 1990. He was replaced, on January 1, 1991, by Thomas A. Twetten, former head of the CIA's Near East division and one of the officials involved in the events that led to the Iran-Contra scandal.

2. Hathaway retired in March 1990 after five years as chief of counterintelligence. He was replaced by his deputy, Hugh E. "Ted" Price, fifty-two, a short, sandy-haired man who favored tweeds and fiddled constantly with a pipe. Price, a Far East hand who spoke Mandarin Chinese, switched over to the job of assistant deputy director for operations early in 1991. His successor as CIA chief of counterintelligence was James Olson, a six-foot, slender, blond Iowan who several years earlier had served in the Moscow station.
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Author's Note

Almost ten years ago I had lunch in Washington, at an appropriately inconspicuous restaurant, with a former officer of the CIA's Clandestine Services whom I had come to know and like. I respected this man for many reasons, not the least of which was that he had never told me anything that proved to be untrue.

But that day I thought his record of verity might be strained to the limit. In the course of our lunch he told me that a Soviet defector had said there was a penetration in the CIA whose name began with the letter K, and that this had cast a shadow on many officers, including one who was forced out.

A CIA man dismissed because his name began with the letter K? My friend nodded. Clearly he was serious. And just as clearly, I knew it was a story I had to write. In a low voice, he confided the man's name: Peter Karlow.

Other projects intervened, but I was determined to return one day to the subject of the mole hunt that had taken place inside the CIA and to find the man whom I had begun to think of as Mr. K. It was almost five years later that I found him. He had been working for most of that time in Washington, ironically in an office on K Street. He had moved to California but agreed to meet with me on his next trip back East.

A few weeks later, on a sunny spring day, I was sitting opposite Peter Karlow at an outdoor restaurant in the capital. The story I had heard about him was true, he said. He might be willing to tell it to me. But Karlow, it became clear, was a modest man, and he did not want a book written only about him. He pointed out that what had happened was part of a much larger pattern.

And I knew he was right. I had by now read David C. Martin's ground-breaking book Wilderness of Mirrors, and from that and other sources, I was well aware that the mole hunt that had paralyzed the CIA was intertwined with the "war of the defectors" -- the clash over Anatoly Golitsin and Yuri Nosenko -- and with dozens of secret operations that the United States and the Soviet Union had mounted against each other during the height of the Cold War.

I had stepped into a maze, and friends in the intelligence world warned me that I might become lost in the wilderness. In truth, the paths and byways seemed to lead in a hundred directions. The story was complex, but not, as it turned out, beyond reach.

Around the same time that I had met Peter Karlow, I had also begun conversations with Paul Garbler. At first, I was puzzled. He, too, had been a major suspect, but his name did not begin with a K.

I was interviewing Garbler in his study in Tucson when a moment of revelation came. I knew that Igor Orlov, whose wife still ran the picture-framing gallery in Alexandria, was a key to the mystery, but where did he fit? When Garbler revealed that the agent he had run in Berlin was Orlov, I realized with mounting excitement that I was getting close. Then he walked over to the bookcase, reached up, and took down the book that Orlov had inscribed and presented to him in Berlin as a farewell gift thirty-three years earlier. It was signed "Franz Koischwitz."

Orlov's operational name had begun with the letter K! That was the nexus, the missing link that explained how the mole hunt had spread far beyond Karlow. The pieces began to fall into place.

To research this book, I conducted 650 interviews with more than two hundred persons. Although my interest in the mole hunt extended over a decade, most of my effort was concentrated in the last two years. While much of the research was based on the interviews, there are additional references to books, congressional hearings, and other documentation, including CIA and FBI files, and these sources are cited in the footnotes included in the text.

A book about secret operations and agencies presents special problems of attribution. Wherever possible, sources are identified by name and quoted directly. But the book also contains some information attributed to former intelligence officers who, given the nature of their work and having been anonymous all their lives, preferred to remain so. I have respected their wishes.

Every writer wrestles with this problem. On balance, it seemed more important to me to use the material from former CIA and FBI officers, and to let them speak in their own voices, than to sacrifice the information because they declined to be identified. Many of these former officers believed the facts should come out, but did not want to open themselves to criticism by their colleagues for breaking the code of silence. All of these men and women have my thanks and deep appreciation. They know who they are.

Many former and some present intelligence officers and officials, as well as other sources, were willing to be interviewed on the record. While the list is too long to permit me to mention everyone, I am especially grateful to a number of former CIA officers, including S. Peter Karlow, Paul Garbler, George Kisevalter, Newton S. Miler, Robert T. Crowley, Tennent H. Bagley, William E. Colby, Richard M. Helms, John Denley Walker, George Goldberg, Donald F. B. Jameson, Frank F. Friberg, Clare Edward Petty, Joseph C. Evans, William R. Johnson, F. Mark Wyatt, Thomas W. Braden, Stephen Roll, Peter M. F. Sichel, Eugen F. Burgstaller, George L. Cary, David H. Blee, James H. Critchfield, Rolfe Kingsley, Anthony A. Lapham, Bela Herczeg, and Stanley H. Gaines; and to Joseph R. DeTrani, director, and E. Peter Earnest, deputy director, of the CIA's Office of Public Affairs.

Among many former FBI officials, I am particularly indebted to James E. Nolan, Jr., Donald E. Moore, Sam J. Papich, Eugene C. Peterson, Courtland J. Jones, Phillip A. Parker, James H. Geer, Edward J. O'Malley, and Alexander W. Neale, Jr. In France, I am also grateful to Count Alexandre de Marenches, the former head of the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-espionnage, and Marcel Chalet, the former chief of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, for their assistance.

Others deserve my thanks. John V. Abidian generously explained his role in inspecting Oleg Penkovsky's dead drop in Moscow. Eleonore Orlov was unsparing of her time, and always patient with my endless questions, as was her son, George Orlov. William G. Miller helped me to reconstruct the legislative history of the Mole Relief Act. Vera Connolly kindly shared her memories of her brother, Edgar Snow, and I could not have reconstructed the remarkable story of the Yankovskys without the help of Anastasia Sokolovskaya. I am grateful as well to Joseph A. Mehan, Earl D. Eisenhower, Spencer Davis, Irene Thompson, Philip L. Chabot, Jr., G. Robert, Blakey, George S. Pinter, Nicholas R. Doman, Victor Gundarev, and Dr. John W. Walsh.

Many writers and colleagues in the press were generous as well, especially Seymour M. Hersh; Andrew J. Glass, chief of the Washington bureau of the Cox newspapers; Per E. Hegge, the Washington correspondent for Oslo's Aftenposten; Daniel Schorr, senior news analyst of National Public Radio; David C. Martin, of CBS News; Thomas J. Moore; Francis Lara; Bill Wallace, of the San Francisco Chronicle; Elizabeth Bancroft, editor of the Surveillant; Michael Evans, defense correspondent of the Times of London; Robert J. Donovan; Tom Lambert; Don Cook; Marianne Szegedy-Maszak; Arnaud de Borchgrave, of the Washington Times; William R. Corson; Aslak Bonde, of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation; John Costello; Henry Hurt; Aaron Latham; Robert H. Phelps; Jukka Rislakki, of the Helsingin Sanomat; Dean Beeby, news editor of the Halifax bureau of the Canadian Press; Michael Littlejohns, former chief of the United Nations bureau of Reuters; John Scali, of ABC News; Kathy Foley, deputy director of the Washington Post news research center; David Binder, of the New York Times Washington bureau, and Barclay Walsh, the bureau's research supervisor; and Camille Sweeney, former researcher for the New York Times Magazine.

A special word of appreciation must go to Carol Monaco, who conducted the research for this book with great patience and with resourcefulness that enabled her to overcome many of the obstacles we encountered along the way. I am grateful as well to William A. Wise, who provided additional research assistance, and to whom this book is dedicated. My thanks also go to Kate Sawyer, who cheerfully helped me to keep my newspaper files current.

None of the former and present CIA and FBI officials or other individuals thanked here are in any way responsible for the conclusions reached in this book, which are, of course, entirely my own.

Those who must live with writers are indeed noble, and my family is no exception. Without their love and support, I would hesitate to try to navigate the deep and murky waters I encountered in bringing forth Molehunt. I am, as always, indebted the most to Joan, Christopher, and Jonathan.

David Wise
Washington, D.C.
June 19, 1991
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:39 am


Abel, Rudolf, 23, 23n, 24n, 232
Abidian, John V., 61, 71, 72n, 118, 119n,
Adams, Ian, 114n
AEFOXTROT, see Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich
AEGUSTO,See Loginov, Yuri
AELADLE, see Golitsin, Anatoly Mikhailovich
AEWlRELESS, see Belitsky, Boris
agent-in-place, 4, 19, 46, 79, 171
"Alex," see Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich, CIA
code name for
Allason, Rupert (Nigel West), 103/1
Alsop, Joseph, 77
and FBI, 77n
and Nosenko's claims about, 76
and White House interest in, 77n
Alsop, Stewart, 178
Anderson, Jack, 243n
Andrew, Christopher, 103n, 250
ANDREY, 70, 141, 142
Angleton, Cicely d'Autremont, 41, 282
Angleton, James Hugh, 40
Angleton, James Jesus, ("Hugh Ashmead,"
"the Gray Ghost," "the Black Knight,"
"the Orchid Man," "the Fisherman,"
" Jesus," "Slim Jim," "Skinny Jim,"
"Scarecrow"), 22n, 29, 29n, 30, 30n, 31,
33, 35n, 36, 37, 39, 39/1, 42, 43, 50, 96,
97,105,110, JJ2, ]58, J60, J62, ]64,
205, 219,233, 243, 247, 270, 276, 285n,
292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 299
appears before Senator Church's Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, 247 ,
background of, 40
and Pete Bagley, 79, 80, 235
and belief that Soviet defectors were
plants, 21 J
CIA pseudonym of, 32
and William Colby, 238, 239, 240
Colby feels CIA was paralyzed by, 241
death of, 28J, 289
and decision to betray Yuri Loginov to
South African intelligence, 2J8
and Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, 110,
JIJ, 111n
dismissal of, 244, 244n, 245, 245n, 246,
and Allen Dulles, 39, 39n, 240, 295
and Edward J. Epstein, 260, 260n, 261n
and FBI investigation of Igor Orlov,
J93-194, 197, 274
and FEDORA, 148
and fishing skills of, 32, 33, J65, 260
and "the Flat Earth Conference," 178
and Paul Garbler, 50,62, 63, 64, 263
and gemstones, 33,34
and Anatoly Golitsin, 8, 26, 42, 66, 79,
80,96, 97, 100, 105, III, 131,157,
157/1, 165, 166, 178, 193, 235, 255,282
and Richard Helms, 21, 39,240, 295
and Bela Herczeg, 44, 45
Seymour Hersh on Colby's firing of,
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
142, 143, 143n, 144, 154
investigated by Ed Petty as suspected
mole, 235, 236, 236n, 237, 237n, 259
and Peter Karlow, 15, 95, 283, 284, 285
and Richard Kovich, 270
and Ingeborg Lygren, 164, 165, 166
and John McCone, 240, 295
and Leonard McCoy, 254, 254/1, 255
and mole hunt in Britain, 101, 102
and mole hunt in Canada, 113
and mole hunt in France, 107
nicknames of, 32, 32n, 40
and Yuri Nosenko, 9, 80, 131, 137, 139,
142, 143, 143n, 144
on not finding the mole, 193, 248, 249
and Operation DINOSAUR, 177
and orchids, 33, 34, 34/1
and Igor Orlov, 193, 273, 274, 281
power in CIA diminishes, 234-244
psychological makeup of, 258, 293, 295
and purge of Soviet division in search for
mole, 230
reported bugging and wiretapping by, 30,
30/1, 31,31/1, 32
and rumors in Washington that William
Colby was a mole, 261
and James Schlesinger, 240
and Nicholas Shadrin case, 196-197/1
and SIG investigalion of David Murphy,
225, 226, 227,228, 228n, 229
and Edward Ellis Smith, 48
and Walter Bedell Smith, 295
succeeded as chief of counterintelligence
by George Kalaris, 252
sues Stansfield T\lrner, 260
supported by CIA d\lring mole hunt,
and supposed nickname, "Mother," 32n
and suspicions of Harold Wilson as
Soviet agent, 99, 100, 115
and suspicions KGB poisoned Hugh
Gaitskell. 98
and trade of Yuri Loginov to the Soviets,
230, 231
and whether paranoid, 293
Arafat, Yasir, 246
Arkhipov, Vladimir, 109
ARNlKA, 117/1
ArnoJd, Charles, 160
Artamonov, Nikolai Federovich (Nicholas
Shadrin), 196-197, 197n,
alias of, 195
and Paul Garbler,J95n
and Cynthia Hausmann, 196
and Igor Kochnov (KITTY HAWK), 195
and Leonard McCoY, 255
and Bruce Solie, 196
and Vitaly Yurchenko, on fate of,
Artamonov, Ewa Gora, 195, 195n

Bacon, Sir Francis, 15811
Bagley, Tennent Harrington "Pete"
(GIRAFFE), 26, 47,214,218
and James Angleton, 79
background of, 67, 68
becomes targct of Angleton's mole
hunters, 234
and Peter Deriabin, 68
and Goleniewski letters, 68
and Golitsin's warnings abO\lt mole in
CIA, 70, 96
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
143, 143/1, 147, 148,154,155
and Y\lri Loginov, 215, 217,231, 232
and Leonard McCoY, 254, 255
and Moscow dead drop for Oleg
Penkovsky, 71n, 72n, 120/1
and Yuri Nosenko, 65, 71n, 72, 73,78,
80n, 130,131, 131/1, 134, 136,137,139,
140, 141, 142, 142/1, 155n, 235
and Igor Orlov, 190
on Edward Ellis Smith, 75
transferred from Soviet division to
Brussels, 234
Bannerman, Robert L, 127,129
Barnett, David, 294
Barnett, Robert B., 266, 267/1
Barron, John, 109/1, 212/1
Bay of Pigs, 5,6, 17
Bayh, Birch, 267,268
Beeby, Dean, 56
Belitsky, Boris (AEWlRELESS), 70, 71,79, 119/1
background of, 69
CIA doubts about, 69/1
as double agent under KGB control, 119/1
and George Goldberg, 175
and Yuri Nosenko, 68, 69
and Harry Young, 69
Bennett, Leslie James
suspected as mole in Canada, 112, 113,
Bernstein, Carl, 242
Binder, David, 273, 273n
Birdsall, Paul, 62
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 6
meaning of in CIA, 168
Blake, George, 25, 2511, 43n, 246, 256, 27111,
272n, 285, 285n
Blake, John F., 262, 26211
Blee, David H., 237,23711, 245, 299
"Blue U," see Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), "Blue U"
Blunt, Anthony, 100, 10011, lOin, 103, 103n
Bond, James, 10
Booth by, John M., 18711
Borisoglebsky, Viktor V., 169, 170
and Mikhail Federov, 169, 170,170/1
and trial of Oleg Penkovsky, 170n
and Francis Gary powers, 170n
Borten, Per, 16411
Borwick, Lillian, 18711
Borwick, Richard, 18711
Bossard, Frank C., 154
BOURBON, see polyakov, Dimitri Fedorovich
Boy1e, Andrew, 103/1
Braadland, Eric, 163
Braden, Tom, 30, 30n, 31, 31n, 36
Brandes, Harry, 256
Branigan, Bill, 196
Brent, Aubrey S. ("Pete"), 89, 288
mole hunt in, 26, 96-105, 114-115
British intelligence, 256
andSATY1'" 14
see also MI5, M16; Britain, mole hunt in
Broe, William V ., 208
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, 73n, 105n
Bryhn, Asbj6m, 164, 16411
Btfsplk, Joe, 220, 220n
bugging and wiretapping, 13, 13n
and James Angleton, 30,3011, 31,31/1, 32
CIA and FB1 bugs in cars de1ivered to
Soviet embassy in Mexico, 92
Great Seal bugging device, 15,91
Bulik, Joseph J., 44, 45, 57
and Oleg Penkovsky's dead drop, 120, 121
Bulloch, John, 104, 105
Burgess, Guy, 43, 100, 285, 285n
Burgstaller, Eugen F., 228, 228n
Burke, James, 237
Bush, George, 155, 155/1, 265n, 266, 266/1,

Cabell, Charles P., 8, 168, 170
Cairncross, John, 103, 103/1
Camp, William E. III, 253, 258/1
Campbell, Graflon B. "Soupy," 205
and mole hunt in, 112-114
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS), 112n, 256
CAPITALIST, see Harriman, Averell, and
Soviet cryptonym for
Carlson, Rodney W., 120/1
Carter, Jimmy, 266, 268
Carter, Marshall S., 128
Casey, William J., 156n, 258, 268, 268n, 286,
286n, 287, 288, 289, 290
Castro, Fidel, 6
and CIA use in eavesdropping, 8n
Cattley, William, 34n
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 3, 10, 12,
17, 19n, 20, 22, 25, 32, 35, 36, 38, 42,
43,44, 49, 51,52,62,66,75,78, 80, 84,
85, 89, 90, 91,93,94/1, 109, 115, 11711,
124, 124/1, 125, 127, 128, 130, 138, 142,
148, 157, 158, 159, 159n, 161, 163, 164,
165, 169,170, 173, 176, 185n, 190-191,
201,205, 207, 213,215,218,219,220,
222, 223, 224n, 225,226, 227, 227n,
232, 233, 234,235,236, 239/1, 247, 248,
253,256, 261n, 263, 265,266, 267, 272,
272/1, 273, 274, 278, 283, 284, 285/1,
289, 290, 294, 295, 298, 302
apologizes to Paul Garbler, 262
assistant depuly director for operations,
49, 76, 302n
awards Peter Karlow a medal, 291,301,
and Bay of Pigs, 5
and "Blue U," 41n
and bugging devices, 14, 82
Central and Western Euro~an divisions
merged into European dIvision, 202
and the "Cherepanov papers," 123
compared to MI6, 74n
and counterintelligence 8, 15, 16, 37, 159
Counterintelligence Center of, 298
Counterintelligence Staff (CI Staff) of, 38,
39, 39/1, 41, 42,43, 48,69, 74n, 85, 95,
96,113, 140,158,158/1, 161,162, 164,
167, 169n, 170, 174,190, 196, 196-197n,
207, 210, 211, 215, 218, 220,224, 229,
237, 237n, 238,239, 240, 241,245,247,
253, 254, 255,258, 258n, 259,261, 295,
296, 297, 297n, 298
defection of Anatoly Golitsin, 4, 7, 9, 66
deputy director for operations, 6n, 17, 30,
39n, 88,89, 125, 127, 139, 168, 208,
218/1, 262, 289, 302/1
deputy director for plans; see deputy
director for operations
and Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli (LAMIA),
and digraphs in code names, 19, 166
Directorate of Operations, 6, 6/1, 13, 36,
38,39, 39n, 50, 89, 161,202, 218, 218/1,
230, 237n, 238, 239, 240, 245, 256, 285
and Direclor of Central Intelligence
(DCI), 39/1, 206, 240, 268, 268n, 292,
Domestic Operations Division, 175
and domestic surveillance program
(Operation Chaos), 244, 245
Eastern European (EE) division (formerly
Foreign Division M) 11, Iln, 87,229,
Economic Action Division, 13,87,88
European Division of, 202, 229
Far East division, 253
and FEDORA, 149-153
and Mikhail Fedorov, 166, 168, 168n
and Michal Goleniewski, 24, 24n, 234
Anatoly Golitsin first came to attention
and Golitsin's warnings about moles in, 9,
70, 81, 104, 205-206/1
imprisonment of Yuri Nosenko, 142, 143,
143n, 144, 144n, 146, 146n, 147, 14711,
148, 154, 154n, 155, 156, 156n, 210,
217, 258n
and Ivy League "Old Boys," 39
and KGB knowledge of Oleg Penkovsky's
dead drop, 118, 119, 119n, 120,120/1
and leak of Golitsin's presence in Britain,
and "legal travel program," 272
and Yuri Loginov, 171,172,216-217,
217/1,231, 231n
and Ingeborg Lygren, 162, 163,253
mail-opening program (HTLINGUAL), 238,
239, 239n
and mole hunt in Britain, 101, 102, 105,
114, 115
and mole hunt in Canada, 112-114
and mole hunt in France, 105-112
and mole hunt in Norway, 163-166, 253,
and mole hunt in U.S., number of
suspects screened in, 157, 161, 257,
mole hunt paralyzes, 210, 211,212,297
Near East division, 236, 301n
never told Peter Karlow he had been
cleared by FBI, 288
and 1953 covert operation in Iran, 1711
and Nixon's White House plumbers, 242
and Yuri Nosenko, 65-80, 130-156
Office of General Counsel, 266, 269
Office of Security (OS), 6, 16, 32, 69, 78,
83,84n, 85,89, 127, 145, 154, 190, 196,
204,2I0' 224,228,230, 258, 265, 272n,
284, 286, 292
Office of Training, 87
and Eleonore Orlov, 182, 185, 186, 187,
and Igor Orlov, 189-193
and Oleg Penkovsky, 53n, 55, 55n, 56,57,
and pyotr Popov, 20,46, 46n, 66, 162,
163, 169n, 224
Research and Analysis, component of CI
Staff, 255
Central Intelligence Agency ( cont'd!
refuses to confirm names of officers
compensated under the Mole Relief
Act, 269, 269n, 270
and resistance to the idea of the Mole
Relief Act, 267
and SAPPHIRE, 107
and Shadrin case, 197
Soviet division, 8, 11, 20, 2211, 24, 25, 26,
38,46, 46n, 47, 64, 6911, 96,104,130,
143, 153, 155, 162, 163, 176, 200, 201,
202, 203, 210,211, 211n, 213, 215,217,
219, 220, 225, 229,230,234,238,270
Soviet Russia division, see Central
Intelligence Division (CIA), Soviet
SR-9, 46, 4611, 120-121
Technical Requirements Board, 13,15,83,87
and Technical Services Division, 18, 62,
82, 87, 88, 302
and \JNACUTE, 167
and the "war of the defectors," 80, 260,
Western European division of, 50, 202
Chabot, Philip Jr., 260-261n
Chalet, Marcel, 109, 109n, 15911
and SIG investigation of David Murphy,
228, 22811
Chavchavadze, David, 173
Cherepanov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich, 121,
123, 135, 136,139,140
and spy dust, 169n
"the Cherepanov papers," 121, 123,135,
and Yuri Nosenko, 139,140
and spy dust, 16911
CHICKADEE, 116,117,121,123
Chin, Larry Wu Tai, 294
Chisho1m, Janet Ann, 59, 117, 120n, 132,
Chisholm, Roderick "Ruari," 59, 12011
ChistoV, Alexei, see Federov, Mikhail,
supposed real name
Church, Frank, 3711, 247, 248,26511
Churchill, Winston S., 30
CI, see Counterintelligence; Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Counterintelligence Staff (CI Staff of
Clandestine Services, see Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Directorate of
Cohen, Lona ("Helen Kroger"), 24
Cohen, Morris ("Peter Kroger"), 24
Colby, William E., 225, 247, 26111, 297, 297n
appointed CIA executive director, 237
appointed DDO Under James Schlesinger,
appointed Director of Central Intelligence,
and CIA domestic surveillance program,
on CI Staff's investigation of David
Murphy, 226, 22611, 227, 227n
decides to dismiss James Angleton, 241,
dismissed by President Ford, 265, 265n
dismisses James Angleton, 244---24511
and Seymour Hersh 242-246
and investigation of James Angleton as
possible mole, 237, 23711, 238
on mole hunt paralyzing CIA Soviet
operations, 211
and Project Jennifer, 243n
reduces power of CI Staff, 239, 240,
replaces James Angleton with George
Kalaris as chief of counterintelligence
252, 253 ,
and retirement of Richard Kovich, 264,
26411 ,
and rumors he is a mole, 261
Condon, Richard, 36n
Conrad, Clyde Lee, 298
Cook, Don, 7711
Copeland, Miles 32n
costello, John, 10311
Counterintelligence, 5
definition of, 37,3711
Counterintelligence Staff, see Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Counterintelligence Staff of; Special
InvestigatiOns GrouP (SIG)
Cram, Cleveland, C., 114,255
background of, 256
and History of the Colll1terintelligence
Staff 1954-1974, 256, 257, 2577!, 258
Critchfleld, James H., 236, 236n, 237
Crowley, Robert T., 32, 38, 293

D notice, 104, 10411, 105, 10511
Davies, Richard, 11811
Davis, Dwight F" 31n
Davis, Pauline, 31n
Davison, Alexis H.
expelled from Soviet Union, 120n
and Oleg Penkovsky, 60, 117
dead drops, 11, 168,16811
DDO, see Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Directorate of operations
DDP, see Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Directorate of operations
Deep Throat, 260
definition of, 175n
Defense Intelligence Agency, 196
de Gaulle, Charles, 106, 107, 111, 112
Dejean, Maurice, 212n
de Jurquet d' Anfreville de la Salle, Charles,
de Lannurien, Georges, 108
de Mowbray, Stephen, 22n, 97
Denis, Reid, 302
deputy director for operations, see Central
Intelligence Agency {CIA), deputy
director for operations
deputy director for plans, see Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), deputy
director for operations
Deriabin, Peter, 4,47!, 21, 22n, 68
de Marenches, Count Alexandre
and SIG investigation of David Murphy,
226,227, 22711, 241
de Rougemont, Jean-Louis, 106
de Silva, Peer, 46n, 270
de Vosjoli, philippe Thyraud (LAMIA), 110,
Dillon, Paul L., 154
DINOSAUR, see Harriman. Averell, and code
Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure
(DOSE), 106, 106n; see also Service de
Documentation Exterieure et de
Contre-espionnage (SDECE); "la
Directorate of Operations, see Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Directorate
of Operations
Directorate of Plans, see CentraJ Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Directorate of
DirectIon de la Surveillance du Territoire
(DST), 106, 107, 109
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), see
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
DO, see Centra! Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Directorate of Operations
Doherty, David P., 288
"Dolnytsin, Anatoli," see Golitsin, Anato!y
Mikhailovich, D notice name of
Dolnytsin, Anatoly A., j05n
Doman, Nicholas R., 44, 45
Donovan, General William J. "Wild Bill", 17
Doustin, Daniel, 107
DRAT, 102
Driver, Wally, 181-182
Drum, Trapper, 302
Dulles, Allen W., 5, 6, 30,40
and James Angleton, 39, 39n, 240, 295
and Bay of Pigs, 5
and Mikhail Federov, 168
and Golitsin on whether moles in CIA,
and Ed Snow, 224
and Nata Sokolovskaya, 224
Dulles, Eleanor Lansing, 39/1
Duncan, Susana, 261

EASY CHAIR, 14, 15,83, 91
Edwards, Sheffield, 15n, 83, 84, 84n, 124,
125, 125/1, 127, 272n
Eisenhower, Dwight D
and Bay of Pigs, 6
Eliot, T. S., 35, 282
E1Isberg, Danie1, 152
Epstein, Edward J., 152, 153n,
and James Angleton, 260, 260n, 261n
Evang, Wilhelm, 163, 164n, 165
Evans, Jean M.
background of, 159
and Ed Petty, 236
Evans, Joseph C.
background of, 214-215
decides Yuri Loginov is a plant, 218,
on Yuri Loginov, 216, 2I6-217n, 232

Fain, Tom, 123
Faithful, Sidney, 271, 271n
Family Jewels, the
definition of, 242
and Seymour Hersh, 242
Farm, the (Camp Peary), 202, 203, 255
and imprisonment of Nosenko at by CIA,
145, 146, 147, 154n, 210
FBI, 23, 3911, 50, 83, 84, 89, 91,99, 109,
!58, 165, 194, 207, 219, 265,290, 298
and Joseph Alsop, 7711
and CI Staff, 239
compared to MI5, 74n
and Direction de la Surveillance du
Territoire (DST), 106, 107, 159n, 228
and FEDORA, 149, 149n, 153
and HONETOL, 161n
investigates Soviet division for moles, 210
and Robert Lee Johnson, 135, 135n
and Peter Karlow investigation, 81, 82,
82/1, 83/1, 85, 86/1, 88,91, 93, 124, 125,
126, 128, 205-206n, 288
and KJTTY HAWK, 140
and v. M. Kovshuk, 28
and mole hunt in Britain, 101, 102
and Yuri Nosenko, 138
and Eleonore Or]ov, ]82, 191, 199
and George Orlov, 275, 275n, 276
and Igor Orlov, 191-195, 197, 274,277,
and Robert Orlov, 280
and Sasha case, 192
Washington Field Office of, 193, 289
FEDORA, see Kulak, Aleksei Isidorovich
Federov, Mikhail (UNACUTE), 162, 166, 167,
168n, 264
and Charles P. Cabell, 168, 170
and CIA, 166, 168, 168n
disappears, 169
and Allen Dulles, 168
and George Kisevalter, 167, 168, 169
and Richard Kovich, 162, 166, 167, 168,
169, J70, 214
Scotty Miler on, 167
and Oleg Penkovsky, 169
reported execution of, 169, 170
and Sputnik III, 167
supposed real name, 166
Fedoseev, Sergei M., 138
"feed material," 151
Felfe, Heinz, 25, 159
"FE Mafia" 253
Fieldhouse: Jack J.
and Cleveland Cram, 258
and jnvestigatjon of Igor Orlov case,
191-195, 197
and study of Loginov case, 258
and study of Nosenko case, 155n, 156n
FitzGerald, Desmond, 202, 203, 218n
on counterintelligence, 299
"Flat Earth Conference," 178
FLUENCY committee, 101
Foccart, Jacques, 107
Forbath, Peter, 226n
Ford, GeraJd R., 245, 247, 265, 265n
and Golitsin's warnings about moles in,
mole hunt in, 26, 105-112, 296
Friberg, Frank F., 3, 4,
and defection of Anatoly Golitsin 4, 5, 7, 8
and Golitsin on moles in CIA, 205-206,
and Yuri Loginov, 170, 171
Frolov, Nikolai A., 171
Fulton, Robert "Steamboat," 7

Gaines, Stanley H., 266, 287, 288, 288n
Gaitskell, Hugh, 98,98/1, 114
Garbler, Florence Fjtzsimrnons, 50, 63, 200,
208, 209,263, 271, 271/1
GarbJer, Paul (Philip Gardner), 49, 51/1, 52,
62, 120n, 180, 205, 209, 213,219,266,
286, 297
and James Angleton, 50, 62, 63, 64
and Nikolai Artamonov, 195n
asks Stansfield Turner for compensation,
262, 262n
background of, 50
and George Blake, 207,271, 27211
and "Cherepanov papers," 122, 123, 135,
CIA alias of, 51
CIA apologizes to, 262
clashes with Pete Bagley, 201, 202
clashes with Dave Murphy, 202
compensated by CIA for damage to his
career, 268, 269,297
as deputy director of the Farm, 203
and Sidney Faithful, 271, 27111
fall from grace of, in Soviet division, 202
as first chief of station in Moscow, 50
and Thomas Karamessines, 203, 208
learns that FBI investigated him, 272
Jearns he is mole suspect, 204
and Leonard McCoy, 254n
and the Mole Relief Act, 266, 267, 268,
and Hugh Montgomery, 200-201 .
and no knowledge Penkovsky dead drop
contaminated, 12]
and Igor Orlov, 180, 181, 185/1, 270
andOlegPenkovsky,61, 117, 118,200
receives apology but no compensation
from Stansfield Turner, 263
rehabilitated within CIA and transferred
to Stockholm, 208
retirement of, 263. 26311
and skiing accident in Austria, 200-201
as Soviet division operations chief,
transferred to the Farm, 202
transferred to Trinidad, 203-204, 210
transferred to Western European division,
Gardner, Philip, see Garbler, Paul, CIA
alias of
Garthoff, Raymond, L., 116n
Gates, Robert M., 289, 290, 290n
Gee, Ethel Elizabeth, 24
Gehlen, Reinhard, 25, 66,67, 159n, 184
GIRAFFE, see Bagley, Tennent Harrington
Gleason, Stephanie P, 279, 280, 281
Glomar Explorer, 243, 243n
Gmirkin, Vasia C., 2211
background of, 175
CIA career of, 176
as CIA mole suspect, 175, 176
and Anatoly Golitsin, 176
and Nicholas Shadrin case, 196-197n
and studies of Shadrin and KITTY HAWK,
Goldberg, George, 69, 70, 71
background of, 174
and Boris Belitsky, 175
career of, 174, 175
as CIA mole suspect, 174
Scotty Miler on, 175
and Harry Young, 175
Goleniewski, Micha] ("Sniper"), 24, 24n
and arrest of George Blake, 25
and Pete Bagley, 234
and Heinz Felfe, 25
and Portland naval secrets case, 24
Goleniewski letters, 24, 68
Golitsin, Anatoly Mikhailovich (AELADLE,
KAGO, MARTEL, "Anatoly KJimov,"
"John Stone") 8, 15,20, 21, 22n, 23,
26, 26n, 38, 42, 52, 80,96, 97, 104, 107,
]09, 110, III, 111n,1]4,15711, 158n,
199,213,215,224,258, 259,274,284,
285n, 297,299
aliases of, 3, 4, 5, 19n
and James Angleton 8, 26, 157,282
background of, 22, 22n
British code name for, 19n
and bugs in American Embassy in
charges that Harold Wilson was a Soviet
agent, 92, 100
and CIA agents' Soviet military identity
documents, 190-191
CIA alias of, 19n
CIA code name for, 19
and claims about SAPP!llRE, 107
defection of, 5,6, 7,8, 16, 52n, 83,87,
and demand to deal directly with J. Edgar
and D notice name of, 105
first came to attention of CJA, 21
and Gunvor Haavik, 251-252
and Donald Jameson, 25
and Peter Karlow, 15, 18, 26, 288
and meeting with Robert Kennedy, 21n
and Richard Kovich, 162
and v. M. Kovshuk's visit to United
States, 28, 29
and letter to President Kennedy, 21
and Ingeborg Lygren, 163
and Scotty Miler, 28,96, 97, 157/1, 176,
and mole hunt in Soviet division, 210
motive for defection of, 5
and Yuri Nosenko, 73n, 260
on Igor Orlov as Sasha, 205
and Georges Paques, 108, 109, 112, 259
and Kim Philby, 104
in possession of CIA files, 255
as possible mole sent by Soviets to
manipulate James Angleton, 235, 236
and stay in Britain, 100-105
suspects KGB poisoned Hugh Gaitskell,
and William Vassall, 259
warns of mole in British intelligence, 100,
101, 103
warns of mole in Canadian intelligence
service, 112
warns of mole in the CJA, 9, 15, 26, 27 ,
28, 28n, 38,42, 66, 70,74,75, 79, 81,
96, 97-99, 140--142,157, 162, 163,
175-177, 190, 192,205-206, 20611, 210,
257-259,274, 285,286
warns of moles in France, 106
warns of moles in Norway, 163
warns of spy in British Admiralty, 74, 74n
and Watkins case, 75
Golitsin, lrina, 2211, 178
"Golitsin serials," 26
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 252n
Gordievsky,Oleg,103,10311, 250/1, 250--251/1
Gore, Virginia Erwin Page, 187n
Gorse, Georges, 107
Gottlieb, Sidney, 259n
GRALLSPICE, see Popov, pyotr
Grand Duke Alexel, 24
Great Seal bugging device, 14, 14n, 87, 206
Gribanov, Oleg Mikhailovich, 75
and Paul Garbler suspicious of being
drugged by, 201
and Lee Harvey Oswald, 132
and John Watkins, 76
Gromov, S. Z., 252
GRU, 20, 46, 50, 53n, 59, 97, 109, 153
auk, Yuri Ivanovich, 74, 136
Gundarev, Victor, 15611

Haarstad, Gunnar, 165, 166
Haavik, Gunvor Galtung, 250, 250n, 251
gives secret documents to KGB, 251
run by Gennady Titov, 252
Hadden, John L, 42
Hagerty, James C., 77/1
Halpern, Samuel, 143n
Hambleton, Hugh George, 109
Hanley, Michael ("Jumbo"), 100, 102
Harriman, Averell (DINOSAUR)
and Anatoly Golitsin, 177
and Great Seal bugging device, 14, 176,
and code name DINOSAUR, 177
and SIG investigation of, 176, 177
and Soviet cryptonym for, 177
supposedly recruited by KGB, 177
and Vasili V. Vakrushev, 177n
Harrison, James, 56
Hart, John L, 65/1, 155, 155n, 177
Harvey, William King ("the Pear"), 49n,
and Paul Garbler, 49
and David Murphy, 213
and Igor Orlov, 180
Hathaway, Gardner R "Gus," 298,302,30211
Hausmann, Cynthia J, 196
Hayes, Helen, 82n
Hegge, Per, 163, 164, 164n
Heimann, Peter, 302
Helms, Julia, 195
Helms, Richard M., 6, 2411, 49, 50, 82, 89
and James Angleton, 21, 39, 224, 240, 295
and CIA career of Peter Karlow, 11,13,
17, 18, 82, 84,87,89,94,95, 124, 125,
125n, 126, 12611, 127,128, 238, 302
defends mole hunt, 292, 293
and FEDORA, 152
and Paul Garbler, 203, 204, 263, 272
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
143, 14311, 144, 145, 146, 154, 15411,
155, 156,226, 227
and KJTTY HAWK case, 196n
launches hard target program, 211
and Loginov case, 231n
and Leonard McCoy, 254
and Yuri Nosenko, 137n, 139
and Nicholas Shadrin, 196n, 227
and SIG investigation of David Murphy,
219, 227, 227n, 228
and Soviet division, denies accounts of
mass transfers from in blanket search
for mole, 230
transfers Pete Bagley from Soviet division
to Brussels, 234
whether authorized Ed Petty to investigate
Angleton as mole, 236
Herczeg, Bela, 44, 45
Herre, Heinz, 113
Herrmann, Rudolph A., 109
Hersh, Seymour M., 40/1, 151, 151n, 15211
and Angleton's dismissal by Colby,
background of, 242
and the Family Jewels, 242, 243, 244
reports resignation of James Angleton,
Higgins, William, 10411
Hill, George Washington, 86
Hitchcock, Alfred, llln
Hobson, Valerie, 97
Ho Chi Minh, 53
Hollis, Roger (DRAT), 101, 102, 103, 103n,
104, 114, 115
Holt, Sir Vivian, 271, 271n
HONETOL, 161, 161n
and FBI, 161n
and J. Edgar Hoover, 161n
and Scotty Miler, 161n
honey trap, 47, 251
Hood, William J., 245
Hoover, J. Edgar, 24,43, 85, 193, 194
and FEDORA, 150
and HONETOL, 161
and Peter Karlow investigation, 15n, 81,
84,85, 85n, 125
Houghton, Henry Frederick, 24
Houneau, Leonard, 108n
House Intelligence Committee, 268
Houston, Lawrence R., 89, 95, 126, 128, 289
Howarti, Edward Lee, 294, 298, 300, 30011
HTLINGUAL, see Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), mail-opening program
Hunt, Howard, 246
Hunt, James Ram say, 235
Huntington, Merritt, 33, 34n

Iacobescu, Ion, 109, 110
illegal,55n, 100, 109, 162, 166, 168/1, 171,
214, 215,216, 217, 23111, 232,258
defined, 23
Ingraham, Samuel S., 18711
Inouye, Daniel K., 267
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal
1981 (Mole Relief Act), 268, 269, 269n,
286, 286n, 289, 297
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal
1989 (Mole Relief Act of 1988), 290
Ionchenko, Nikolai V ., 53, 5411
Iran-Contra scandal, the, 289, 290, 301n
IRONBARK, 116, I 17, 123
Ivanov, Eugene, 97

Jacob, Richard, C., 118, 118n, 120, 121
Jacquier, Paul, 107, 111
Jameson, Donald F. B., 25, 26, 26n, 71/1,
73n, 205n, 206n, 229
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 131, 225
Johnson, Robert Lee, 135
and Yuri Nosenko, 142
Johnson, Quentin C., 253
Johnson, William R., 219
Jones, Courtland J., 288, 289
background of, 191
and FBI ivestigation of Igor Orlov,
193-194n, 197
and Igor Kochnov (KITTY HAWK), 195
Jones, Edward Martin Fumival, 99
Jones, William C., III, 120n
Joxe, Louis, 107

K, the letter, 20/1, 162, 205, 206, 265
and Anatoly Golitsin's warning about, 27,
and Peter Karlow, 15, 85
and Richard Kovich, 162, 214
and Sasha, 9, 15, 27, 189, 199
and significance in mole hunt of, 9, 81
Kafka, Franz, 95
Kagan, Joe, 99
KAGO, see Golitsin, Anatoly Mikhailovich
Kalaris, George T ., 155, 252, 255, 256, 257 ,
background of, 252, 253, 254
and Cleveland Cram's History of the
Counterintelligence Staff 1954-1974,
cornrnissions other studies of CI Staff
operations, 253, 255, 258, 258n
and Bronson Tweedy's study of Anatoly
Golitsin, 259
Kampiles, William P., 294
Kapusta, Peter, 219
Karalekas, Anne, 116n
Karamessines, Thomas H. ("Tom K."), 50,
76, 89, 89n, 211,218, 230
sends Paul Garbler to the Farm, 202, 203
transfers Paul Garbler to Trinidad,
Karlow, Carolyn, 287,288, 301
Karlow, Elizabeth "Libby" Rausch, 82,87,
127, 284, 286
Karlow, Serge Peter, 11,15,15/1, 26, 82,
82n, 83n, 89, 92,93, 94,95, 219, 285n,
302, 303
and James Angleton, 15, 95, 283, 284, 285
awarded CIA's Intelligence
Cornrnendation Medal, 291, 301,302
background of, 85-87
career with Monsanto, 286
childhood of, II, 86
CIA never told him he was cleared by the
FBI, 288, 288n, 289
as CIA representative to State
Department crisis center, 18
clears his name with CIA, 283
compensated by CIA for destruction of
his agency career, 290,291, 297
dismissed by CIA, 128, 129, 283-289
and Economic Action Division, 13,87,
and Sheffield Edwards, 124, 125
and Great Seal bugging device, 14, 285
and hope to be chief of CIA 's Technical
Services Division, 18, 82
investigated by FBI, 81, 82, 82/1, 83/1, 85,
86n, 88,91,93, 124-126,128,205-206,
206/1, 288
and laboratory in HOchst, 12
and the letter K, 15, 85, 285
and Jean L'Herminier, 126, 127
and Leonard McCoy, 254/1
and Mole Relief Acts, 268n, 269, 286-290
name at birth (KJibansky), 15, 85
and plan to steal Mia from Russians, 13
as principal suspect in CIA mole hunt, 15,
66, 81, 82, 83, 84, 84n, 85,86, 86/1, 90,
91, 124, 125n, 126, 128, 129, 140, 162,
192, 205-206n
and psychological warfare unit of Eastern
European division, 13
and Sasha, suspected as, 81, 83, 94,
124-125, 192
and SATYR, 14n
and similarity to "Q," 10
and Technical Requirements Board, 13,
as war hero in OSS, 16, 17
and wiretaps of, 15, 284n
Karpovich, Serge, 134
Keeler, Christine, 97
Kennedy, Caroline, 187
Kennedy, Jacqueline, 150n, 187
Kennedy, John F., 17, 20, 26, 77
assassination of, 123, 131, 132, 137, 139
and Bay of Pigs, 6
and Cuban missile crisis, 1 16
and moles in France, 106
Kennedy, John F., Jr., 187/1
Kennedy, Robert F.
and Anatoly Golitsin, 21, 21n, 26n
Kergel, Albert P., 160
KGB, 14, 22, 23, 33, 42, 43, 47,79, 137n,
138, 148n, 149, 150n, 151, 161, 201,
220,233,234,241, 246, 252n, 255,
272/1, 284, 285n, 294, 296
American embassy section, 28, 73
and bug in Great Seal of the United
States, 14, 205-206n
and "Cherepanov papers," 121-123, 200
and defection of Anatoly Golitsin 4, 5, 6,
7, 52n
Department 13, 98
Department of Wet Affairs, 98
efforts to discourage defectors, 170
and FEDORA, 148
First Department, 73, 138
and Golitsin's claim of spy in NATO, 108
and Robert Lee Johnson, 135
and KITTY HAWK, 140
and knowledge of EASY CHAIR, 15
and "Iitra system," 77, 77n, 79
and Yuri Loginov, 171, 172,214,215,
216,217, 218, 230-232
and Ingeborg Lygren, 163
and mole hunt in Canada, 113, 114
and Yuri Nosenko, 131, 137, 139, 140,
and Igor Orlov, 190-191,197, 281
and Lee Harvey Oswald, 131, 132, 137,
137n, 138, 139,146, 147, 155n
and Oleg Penkovsky's dead drop, 71, 71n,
and possible mole in the CIA, 9, 151, 161,
234, 284, 296
and recruitment targets in CIA, 161, 162
and Ring of Five, 100
Second Chief Directorate, 28n, 70, 73,
73n, 75, 121, 122, 132, 138, 148,201,
211, 212n
Seventh Department, 73, 148
Seventh directorate, 132
and Edward Ellis Smith, 48, 75
and surveillance of Oleg Penkovsky,
suspected of poisoning Hugh Gaitskell, 98
and technical espionage equipment, 14
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 289
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 6, 54, 72, 167
and insulting remarks about John
Watkins, 75
and Oleg Penkovsky, 54n, 59
Kingsley, Rolfe, 176, 202, 218
on James Angleton, 282
disputes accounts of wholesale purge of
Soviet division in search of mole, 230
position on trade of Loginov to the
replaces David Murphy as chief of Soviet
division, 225, 229
Kisevalter, George a. ("Teddy Bear"), 20n,
21, 21n, 22n, 46, 58, 6711, 79, 169n
and James Angleton, 36,41,42
on James Angreton's role in trade of
Loginov to Soviets, 230
background of, 20, 66, 67, 67n
and Boris Belitsky, 69
and Aleksandr Cherepanov, 135, 136
and Mikhail Federov, 167, 168, 169
and Reinhard Gehlen, 67
and Golitsin's warnings about mole in
CIA, 70
and Bela Herczeg, 44
and KGB bugs in American embassy in
Moscow, 72
and KGB knowledge of Oleg Penkovsky's
dead drop, 71, 71n, 72n, 120
on KGB's litra system, 77, 77n
and Robert Kennedy tape, 21n
and Richard Kovich, 162, 163
on Yuri Loginov, 232
meeting with Anatoly Golitsin, 20
on David Murphy, 213
and Yuri Nosenko, 65, 66, 68, 73, 74, 75,
78, 130, 131, 137
and Oleg Penkovsky, 53, 53n, 54, 55, 55n,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60,6011, 66, 133, 135,
and pyotr Popov, 20, 46, 66, 224
on Edward Ellis Smith, 47
and Edgar Snow, 224
on John Watkins, 76
Kissinger, Henry A., 247,265
KITTY HAWK, see Kochnov, Igor Petrovich
Klements, see Golitsin, Anatoly
Mikhailovich, aliases of
Klibansky, Sergei, 86
Klimov, Anatoly, see Golitsin, Anatoly
Mikhailovich, aliases of
Knightley, Phillip, 43n
Kochnov, Igor Petrovich, (KITTY HAWK),
140, 195n, 196, 197, 197n
and CIA, 195
code name for, 195
and Richard Helms, 195
and Igor Orlov, 195,280
and James Nolan, Jr., 141, 196n
and Nicholas Shadrin, 196
Koecher, Karl F., 294
Kohler, Foy, 121
Koischwitz, Franz, see Orlov, Igor, CIA
operational name of
Komarov, Vladimir Mikhailovich, see
Kovshuk, Vladislav Mikhailovich
Kopatzky, Alexander, see Orlov, Igor,
aliases of
Kovich, Richard "Dushan," 162, 166,214,
219, 266n, 286,287, 297
and James Angleton, 270
background of, 162, 163
and CIA career of, 163, 164,264
compensated under Mole Relief Act, 267,
at the Farm, 163, 264
and Mikhail Federov, 162, 166, 167, 168,
169, 170
and George Kisevalter, 162, 163
and KTIP (Keep Them In Place) rule
about defectors, 163
and the letter K, 162, 214,265
and Yuri Loginov, 162, 171, 232
and Ingeborg Lygren, 162-164, 214
and Leonard McCoy, 254
name at birth, 162
nickname of, 162
and pyotr Popov, 162
realizes he can no longer work for CIA,
retirement of, 264, 264n
suspected of working for Soviets, 163-164,
166-167, 170-172, 264-265
works for CIA on contract, 264-265
Kovich, Sara Arthur, 172, 264
Kovacevich, Dushan, see Kovich, Richard,
name at birth
Kovshuk, Vladislav Mikhailovich (V1adimir
Mikhailovich Komarov), 28, 2811, 29,
70, 141, 142
Kozlov, Nicholas, 187, 188
Kroger, Peter, see Cohen, Morris
Kroger, Helen, see Cohen, Lona
Krotkov, Yuri, 211
compromises French ambassador to
Kryuchkov, Vladimir A., 25211
Kulak, Aleksei Isidorovich (FEDORA, SCOTCH,
"Fatso"), 150n, 151, 152, 152n, 153,
15311, 154
background of, 150
and CIA, 149, 151, 15111, 152, 153
CIA code name for, 149
death of, 153
Kulak (cont'd)
and Edward J. Epstein, 152-153, 153n,
260, 260n
and FBI, 149, 151,151/1, 152, 153
and FBI nickname for, 149
and Seymour Hersh, 151n, 152/1
and J. Edgar Hoover, 150,260
and KGB, 152
and Victor Lessiovski, 149/1
and James Nolan, Jr., 153,251
and Yuri Nosenko, 149
and UN Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation, 149
see also VUPOINT
Kulak, Alexei Sidorovich, see Kulak,
Aleksei Isidorovich

Lach, Stanley C., 6
Lambert, Tom, 77n, 105
LAMIA, see de Vosjoli, Philippe Thyraud
Land, Edwin H., 12
Langelle, Russell, 169/1
Langley, Virginia (CIA headquarters), 5, 9,
35,38, 46, 65,78,79,105, 116, 120,
129-130, 132, 136, 147, 154, 157, 161,
170, 172,173, 193,201,211, 211n, 226,
227, 227/1, 255, 257n, 259n, 283, 291,
299, 301, 303
Lapham, Anthony A., 266, 267, 267/1
"la Piscine," 106, 106n
see also Direction Generale de la Securite
Exterieure (DOSE); Service de
Documentation Exterieure et de
Contre-espionnage (SDECE)
Latham, Aaron, 23n, 34/1
Laurent, Richard, 279
Leahy, William D., 68
le Carre, John, 158n, 268n
Leigh, David, 98n, 99, lOOn
Lessiovski, Victor, 150/1
erroneously identified as FEDORA, 149n
and Jacqueline Kennedy, 150n
L'Herminier, Jean, 126
Liddell, Guy, 103/1
Litrento, Anthony, 100
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 14n
Loginov, Yuri (AEGUSTO, Ronald William
Dean, Edmund Trinka), 214, 215, 216,
219, 255, 264
aliases of, 171, 217
background of, 172
Pete Bagley on, 217, 231
betrayed to South African intelligence by
CIA, 217,218, 218n, 230, 231n
and CIA, 171, 172,216,216-217, 217n,
231, 231n
CIA code name for, 171,214
Joseph Evans on, 216-218
and Anatoly Golitsin, 171
as an illegal, 172, 216
and Edward S. Juchniewicz, 172
and Peter Kapusta, 172
and the KGB, 171, 172,214-218,
and Richard Kovich, 162, 171
David Murphy's view of, 217
reported executed by Soviets, 232
supports Nosenko's bona fides, 217
as suspected KGB plant in CIA, 215-216
216-21711, 217, 217-218n ,
traded back to Soviet Union, 230-232
Lonsdale, Gordon (Conon Trofimovich
Molody), 24, 24n, 215
traded for Greville Wynne, 119
Loshak, Major, 53
LP (listening post), 16
Lumumba, Patrice, 259/1
"Lydia," 93, 126
Lygren, Ingeborg (SATINWOOD 37), 250-252
264, 296 ,
and James Angleton, 164, 166
apology to Norway over, by George
Kalaris of the CIA, 253
arrest of, 164
background of, 163
CIA code name for, 163
compensated by Norwegian government
for false arrest, 166
and Anatoly Golitsin, 163
and the KGB, 163
and Richard Kovich, 162-164, 214

MacLean, Donald, 43, 100, 285, 285/1
Macmillan, Harold, 97
Malenkov, Georgi, 246
Mangold, Tom, 40n, 146/1
MARK 2, 14
MARK 3, 14
MARTEL, see Golitsin, Anatoly Mikhailovich
Martin, Arthur, 22/1, 101
and Anatoly Golitsin, 96,97, 98, 100, 105
and FLUENCY committee, 101
Martin, David, C., 36n, 178n, 269n
Marx, Karl, 60
Mathias, Charles McC., 267
Maury, John M., Jr. "Jack," 8, 272
Mayerfield, Ernest, 268
McAnally, Ray, 100/1
McCarthy, Joseph R., 296n
McCloskey, Robert J., 214
McCone, John A., 6, 81, 84, 85n
and James Angleton, 240, 295
and Anatoly Golitsin, 114
McCoy, Leonard V., 73n, 254, 254n, 255,
296, 296n
Meir, Golda, 7
Mellbye Commission, 165, 165n
Mellbye, Jens Christian, 165/1
Menschemaub, 198
MI5 (British internal security service), 98,
100, 103n, 136, 285
duties of, 74n
and Anatoly Golitsin in Britain, 96-105,
and Roger Hollis, 102, 104, 115
investigates Harold Wilson, 99-100, loon
and Graham Mitchell, 101, 102
and Yuri Nosenko, 74
and OATSHEAF, 99
and SATYR, 14
and TOPHAT, 154n
MI6 (British secret intelligence service), 43,
97, 207, 285/1, 293
and Janet Ann Chisholrn, 132
duties of, 74n
and Oleg Gordievsky, 250/1
and Oleg Penkovsky, 55, 56, 57, 58
and Kim Philby, 104
MiG-15, 12
Mikoyan, Anastas I., 17711
Miler, Newton S. "Scotty," 22/1, 26, 27, 28,
background of, 27
and Colby's reduction of power of CI
Staff, 240
and Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, 112
and the Family Jewels, 245
and Mikhail Federov, 167
and FEDORA, 149
and George Goldberg, 175
and Anatoly Golitsin, 28, 96, 97, 15711,
176, 189
on Golitsin and William Vassall, 74/1
and A verell Harriman, 177
and Bela Herczeg, 45
and HONETOL, 161
laments state of CIA counterintelligence
after Angleton's dismissal, 299
on David Murphy, 213
and Yuri Nosenko, 140
on not finding the mole, 248-249
and Igor Orlov, 189, 190, 197
oversees mole hunt, 26-29, 102, 158, 159
retirement of, 245, 246
on SIG investigation of David Murphy,
and Edward Ellis Smith, 48
and Alexander Sogolow, 174
on transfers from Soviet division in search
of mole, 230
and Arseny Yankovsky, 221,223
Miller, Richard W., 298
Miller, William Green, 267,268
Mintkenbaugh, James Allen, 135, 135n
Mitchell, Graham (PETERS), 101-102
Mitterrand, Fran~ois, 106
Mobutu, Joseph, 259n
definition of, 158n
and John le Carre, 158n
mole hunt, 157-179,257, 257n, 258; see also
Angleton, James Jesus; Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); HONETOL;
individual countries by name; individual
suspects by name; Special Investigations
Group (SIG)
Mole Relief Act, the, 268, 269, 269/1, 286,
286n, 289, 297
and many CIA officers \lnaware they were
suspects, 271
passed again by Congress to compensate
Peter Karlow, 290
Molody, Conon Trofimovich, see Lonsdale,
Montgomery , Hugh, 11 7, 120/1, 200, 208
Moore, Don, 22, 23, 23n
on James Angleton, 34, 39n,
and Anatoly Golitsin, 24,99, 100, 178
Moore, Edwin Gibbons, II, 293
Moreno, Carmen, 40
Morgan, Robert, 248
Morganthau, Tom, 269n
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 1711
Mot Dag (Toward the Dawn), 164n
Murphy, David E., 130, 159n, 200,214,230,
attempt to recruit Georgy Pokrovsky, 213,
background of, 212, 213
and George Blake, 219, 220
CIA career of, 213
decision to betray Yuri Loginov to South
African intelligence, 218
and Paul Garbler, 201, 208
investigated by SIG as suspected mole,
and Yuri Loginov, 217
and Igor Orlov, ]84,220
replaced as head of Soviet division, 176
and role in Nosenko's imprisonment, 143,
and Andy Yankovsky, 222, 223, 225
Murphy, Marian Escovy, 212
"Murphy's Law," 212
Muskie, Edmund, 242

National Security Agency (NSA), 23, 160,
and FEDORA, 149
and Golitsin's clain1 of KGB spy in, 108,
Nea1e, Alexander W., Jr., 288n
Nelson, William E., 237,245
Nixon, Richard M., 151, 238, 278
Nolan, James E., Jr.
and FBI investigation of Igor Or1ov,
on FEDORA, 153
and KITTY HAWK, 140, 141, 196-197n
North, Oliver, 289
mole hunt in, 26, 163-166,250-253,296
Nosenko, Ivan Isiderovich, 72, 73
Nosenko, Ludmilla, 73
Nosenko, Oksana, 68
Nosenko, Yuri Ivanovich ("Alex,"
AEFOXTROT), 65n, 66, 68, 70, 76, 78, 80,
80n, 116, 139, 140,175, 213, 254, 255,
and Joseph Alsop, 76
and ANDREY, 70, 141
on assassination of John F. Kennedy, 131,
132, 132n, 136, 137n, 138, 138n, 139,
146, 147, 155n, 260
background of, 72
and Pete Bagley, 65, 71n, 72, 73,78, 80n,
130, 131, 131n, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140,
141, 142, 142n, 155n, 235
and Boris Belitsky, 69, 119/1
and Aleksandr Cherepanov, 136
and CIA, 65-80, 136, 139
CIA code name for, 78, 130
contacts CIA, 65, 65n, 79
and debriefing by CIA, 65-80, 131-148,
defection of, 137
dispute over rank held by, 73, 139, 140
and FEDORA, 148-149
and Goleniewski letters, 68
and Golitsin, 260
and Victor Gundarev on, 156n
and John Hart, 260
imprisonment by CIA, 142, 143, 143n,
144, 144n, 146, 146n, 147, 147n, 148,
154, 154n, 155, ]56, ]5611, 210, 217,
and KGB bugs in American embassy in
Moscow, 72
on KGB operations in Geneva, 76
and George Kisevalter, 73, 75
and Kovshuk mission, 70, 141
and "Iitra" system, 77
and Moscow dead drop for Oleg
Penkovsky, 71, 72n, 11911, 12011
and David Murphy, 225
and Lee Harvey Oswald, 13711, 138, 260
recruited into GRU. 73
and Sasha, 70, 140-142
shoots himself, 73, 73n
and Edward Ellis Smith, 75, 147, 148
on spy dust, 169
on "toothless ones," 135
and Vassal! case, 74, 74n
and Warren Commission, 145
and Watkins case, 75, 76, 76n

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 10, 17 ,
17n, 37, 39,41, 45, 87, 159,245, 288,
and James Angleton, 40
and Bela Herczeg, 44
and Peter Karlow, 16, 90,286
Oldfield, Maurice, 102
Olson, James, 302n
O'Neal, Birch D., 158, 160
"one-time pad," 59, 59n,
Operation Gold
and George Blake, 25n
Operation Chaos, see Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), domestic surveillance
Orlov, Igor "Sasha," ("the little man,"
Franz Koischwitz, Alexander
Kopatzky) 174, 180, 184, 18411, 186n,
187-199,205-206,210, 213, 219-220,
255,271, 273-278,299
aliases of, 180, 181, 183, 185, 190
and James Angleton, 273, 274, 281
background of, 183, 183n, 184, 18411
and Pete Bagley, 190
and CIA agents' Soviet military identity
documents, 190-191
and CIA career of, 184-189
death of, 198
and drinking, 185
and FBI code name for Orlov case, 192
and FBI investigation of, 191-195, 197,
274, 277, 281
and Paul Garbler, 51, 180, 181, 182, 213
and Courtland Jones, 191-192, 197
and KITTY HAWK, 196
and Nicholas Kozlov, 187, 188
and legend of Lohengrin, 198
marries Eleonore Stirner, 182
and mole "profile," 180, 186
and David Murphy, 184,220
parents' last name, 183
recruitment by CIA, 181
and Wolfgang Robinow, 181
and Sasha, suspected as, 180-187,
203-206, 273
and service in Germany, 180, 181, 182
SIG investigates case officers who worked
and Alexander Sogolow, 188
and Bruce Solie, 190-191
as spy for three countries, 183n
and visit to Soviet embassy, 192
and Vlasov army, 184
and work with prostitutes in Berlin, 181
185 ,
and Vitaly Yurchenko, 275, 275n
Orlov, Eleonore, 186, 188, 192, 194,280,
background of, 183
and CIA, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188
and death of Igor Orlov, 198
and FBI, 182, 193, 279
and Georgetown safe house, 187, 187n
and Hitler Youth, 183
andlgorOr]ov,182,18311, 184,
second FBI investigation of, 274-281
as stateless person, 18611
and Bert Turner, 191
and John Walsh, 187
Or1ov, George, 182, 187
FBI investigation of, 274-281
Orlov, Robert, 182, 186,
FBI investigation of, 274-281
OS, see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Office of Security
Osborn, Howard J., 20, 89, 130
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
154, 154n
and SIG investigation of David Murphy,
OSS, see Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 138n
and assassination of John F. Kennedy,
123, 131-132, 132n, 137-139, 155n, 260
and KGB, 131, 132, 137-139
and Yuri Nosenko, 136,137, 13711, 138,
146, 147, 155n, 260
and speculation over possible role as
Soviet agent, 139
Oswald, Marina, 132

Pancho Villa, 40
Papich, Sam J., 23, 33,34,83,84,219,239,
Paques, Georges, 108, 108n, 109, 112, 259
Parker, Cortlandt E., 187
Parker, Vivian L, 224,225
Patten, Susan Mary, 77n
Peake, Hayden, 143n
Pearson, Norman Holmes, 41
Pearson, Lester, 75
Peary, Camp (the Farm), see Farm, the
(Camp Peary)
Peck, Donald, 48
Pelton, Ronald, 298
"penetration," 9, 25-29, 37-39, 42-43, 45,
66, 70, 74, 79, 102, 105-106, 108, 112,
140, 142, 150, 157, 158, 158n, 160-162,
169n, 173,179, 205,206, 224, 229,
235-236, 236n, 237,240-241, 257,259,
262, 270
Penkovsky, Galina, 134
Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich, 20, 21, 54,
59, 60n, 71,254, 256, 296
and John Abidian, 61
and ARNIKA, 117n
arrest of, 71n
and attempts to approach Western
intelligence, 54-57
background of, 52, 53
and CHICKADEE, 116
and Janet Ann Chisholm, 59, 117, 133
and Roderick Chisholm, 59
and CIA, 53n, 55, 55n, 56, 57, 60
and Cuban missile crisis, 11 6n
and dead drop in Moscow, 71, 71n, 72,
72n, 118, 119, 119n, 120, 120n, 121
disappearance of, 117, 118
executed by KGB for spying, 123
and Mikhail Federov, 169, 170
and Paul Garbler, 50,52,61,200,207
and iRONBARK, 116
KGB detection of, 132~134
and George Kisevalter, 53, 53n, 54, 55,
55n, 56,57, 58, 59, 60, 60n, 66
Yuri Nosenko on, 132-34
and request for miniature nuclear bombs,
and warning of Soviet nuclear attack,
and Greville Wynne, 25, 25n, 27, 56, 57,
58, 59, 117
Penkovsky, Vera Gapanovich, 52, 53, 134
Penkovsky, Valentin Antonovich, 52n
Pepper, Benjamin Franklin, 153n,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives,
Subconunittee on Oversight and
Evaluation, 298n
Peterson, Eugene C
and counterintelligence, 150
and FEDORA, 150, 152
Petty, Clare Edward "Ed," 1 13
background of, 159, 160
and James Critchfield, 236, 236n, 237
and DINOSAUR investigation, 177
on Paul Garbler as suspected mole, 205
investigates James Angleton as mole
suspect, 235-237,23711, 259
investigates Pete Bagley, 234
and David Murphy, 225
Pershing, John J. "Black Jack," 40
Phelps, Robert H., 243
Philby, Harold Adrian Russell "Kim," 43,
97, 100, 102, 104, 112, 256, 285n
Philby, Rufa, 43/1
Pike, Otis G., 247
Pincher, Chapman, 103/1
Pokrovsky, Georgy P., 213, 214
Polaroid Corporation, 12
Polyakov, Dimitri Fedorovich (TOPHAT,
BOURBoN), 153, 154
CIA code name for, 153
and Paul DilJon, 154
FBI code name for, 153
and NlCKNACK, 154n
Soviets announce execution of, 154
and Peter Wright, 154n
Pope Paul VI, 150n
Popov, pyotr (GRALLSPICE), 20, 46, 46n, 224
and George Kisevalter, 66
aIJd Richard Kovich, 162, 163
aIJd George Payne Winters, Jr., 169n
Potocki, William F., 160
Pound, Ezra, 35, 40
Powers, Francis Gary, 23, 138n
Price, Hugh E. "Ted," 302n
Printsipalov, Aleksandr K., 251, 252
Profumo, John D., 97
Project Jennifer, 243
Purvis, Joseph D, 193-194
Putzell, Edwin J. "Ned," 286

"Q," 10
and Peter Karlow, 10, 18

Raborn, William F., 24n, 295
RCMP Security Service, 112
Reagan, RoIJa1d, 268, 286, 289, 290
Rhee, Syngman, 50
Rice-Davies, Mandy, 97
Richardson, John H. "Jocko," 42
Robinow, Wolfgang, 181
Rocca, Raymond G., 37, 165, 245
Rockefeller, Ne1soIJ R., 247, 265n
Rockefeller Commission, 24711
Roll, Stephen, 270
Roosevelt, Archibald B., 114
Roosevelt, Kermit "Kim," 17
Rosado, Vincent M., 274, 278
Rosenthal, Abe, 243
Rothschild, Victor, 103n
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
56, 112n, 114, 114n, 256
Rubenko, Niko1ai Petrovich, see Savchenko,
Nikolai Petrovich
Rusk, Dean, 17
"Ryzhiy" (the redhead), see Smith, Edward
Ellis, KGB code name for

Sasha, 28,38,79,83, i73, 179,193,220
and James Angleton, 15, 273
and CIA agents' Soviet military identity
documents, 190--191
and FB1, 81-83, 191-197, 199, 206-209
and Paul Garbler, 206-209, 271
and George Goldberg, 174-175, 175n
Golitsin's warnings to CIA about, 9, 15,
28, 38, 66, 70, 142, 205-206, 206n
Peter Karlow as Principal suspect, 81, 83,
94, 124-125
and Richard Kovich, 164
and Vladis1av Kovshuk, 141-142
and the letter K, 9, 15-16,27,66,81,85,
162, 173, 186, 189, 190, 199, 205-206,
214, 265, 285
and Scotty Mjler, 27, 189
and Yuri Nosenko, 70, 79, 140-141
and Igor Orlov, 18(}-.187, 197, 203-206, 273
possible subjects as, in FBI files, 192
service in Germany of, 9, 15, 20n, 27-28,
83, 140,162, 173-175, 189-191,214,
Slavic background of, 9, 15, 20n, 28, 28n,
83, 85, 162, 173, 180, 190,214,270
and Alexander Sogolow, 172-174
see also Orlov, Igor
SATINWOOD 37, see Lygren, Ingeborg, CIA
code name of
SATYR, 14, 14n
Savchenko, Nikolai Petrovich, 53, 5411
Sawatsky, John, 76
Sawyer, Harold S., 156
Schlesinger, James R., 238
and James Angleton, 240
forbids illegal activities by CIA, 242
suspends CIA mail opening operation,
Schorr, Daniel, 246, 247,282
Sciarini, Charles K, 279, 280, 281
SCOTCH, see Kulak, Aleksei Isidorovich
Scranage, Sharon M., 294
Schweiker, Richard, 248
Seaborn, Blair, 56n
"S-Deck," see Service de Documentation
Exterieure et de Contre-espionnage
Senate Intelligence Committee, 267, 287,
7922nd Technical Aids Detachment, 12, 84
Serov, Ivan Alexandrovich
and Oleg Penkovsky, 59
Service de Documentation Exterieure et de
Contre-espionnage (SDECE), 106, 107,
111, 112,22711, 234
and CI Staffs investigation of David
and Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, 110-112
and Georges Paques, 108/1
and SAPPHIRE, 107
Service Action, 106, 112
see also Direction Generale de la Securite
Exterieure (DGSE); "la Piscine";
Shackley, Theodore 0.,256
Shadrin, Nicholas, see Artamonov, Nikolai
Federovich, alias of
Shah of Iran, 17n, 5311
Shergold, Harold, 57, 60
Sichel, Peter, 11, 11n, 12
SIG, see Special Investigations Group (SIG)
"sign of life," 276
Silver, Daniel B., 267, 269n
Smith, Arnold, 56n
Smith, Edward Ellis, 79
first CIA man in Moscow, 45,46, 47, 47n,
KGB code name for, 47, 75
Nosenko on, 75, 147, 148
Smith, Walter Bedell "Beedle," 30, 295
and plan to steal MiG from Russians, 13
Snegeneff, Nikolai, 222
"Sniper," see Goleniewski, Michal
Snow, Edgar "Ed,"
backgro\lnd of, 222, 223
CI Staff investigation of, 224
Allen Dulles fires, 224
and Nata Sokolovskaya, 223, 224/1
and Andy Yankovsky, 223
and Olga Yankovsky, 223
Snow-Yankovsky mole hunt, 224
Sokolovskaya, Anastasia ("Nata"), 221, 222
CI Staff investigation of, 224
and Allen DulJes, 224
and Richard Helms, 224
and Edgar Snow, 223, 224n
Sokolovskaya, Rostislav ("Slava"), 221,222
Sogolow, Alexander "Sasha," 94, 94/1, 172
background of, 173
and CI Staff, 173
investigated by SIG, 173, 17311, 174
and Peter Karlow, 172
and Richard Kovich, 173
and Igor Orlov, 174, 188
Solomatin, Boris A.
and FEDORA, 153
Solie, Bruce
background of, 190
concludes Igor Orlov is Soviet agent,
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
and Yuri Nosenko, 69, 70
and Nicholas Shadrin, 196
Soviet Bloc division (SB), see Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Soviet
Soviet division, see Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Soviet division
Soviet/East European division (SE), see
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Soviet division
Soviet Russia division (SR), see Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Soviet
"sparrow" (KGB female agent), 14811
"special investigations," 27
Special Investigations Group (SIG), 27, 27n,
38, 113, 158, 158n, 160, 164, 173, 174,
175, 179, 234, 254,255,265,299
and code names of mole suspects, 176
investigates Averell Harriman, 176
investigates David Murphy, 219-229
investigates Soviet division for moles, 210,
Scotty Miler joins, 189
number of mole suspects screened by, 157 ,
161,257, 257n, 258
and purge of Soviet division in search for
suspects Orlov to be Sasha, 205
Special Investigation Unit, see Special
Investigations Group (SIG)
Sporkin, Stanley, 268n, 286, 286n, 287
"spy dust," 77n, 78/1, 169n
Stalin, Josef, 47, 4711, 72, 246
Stazhirovka (staging)
defined, 215
Sternberg, Rudy, 99
Sternfield, Lawrence M., 255
Stirner, Joseph, 183
Stirner, Rosa, 183, 189
Stoessel, Walter, 121, 122, 123, 12311, 136
Stokes, Michael, 57
Stolz, Richard F., Jr., 301, 301/1, 302
Stombaugh, Paul M., Jr., 300n
Stone, John, see Golitsin, Anatoly
Stone, Howard E. "Rocky," 201
"swallow" (KGB female agent), 47, 2]2n
Swift, Carlton B., Jr., 56
Szalasi, Ferenc, 44

Tansey, Fred A.
and FBI investigation of Igor Orlov, 194,
194n, 198, 280
Taylor, Maurice A. ("Gook"), 89, 288
Thatcher, Margaret, loon, 102, 102/1, 103n
Thompson, Llewellyn, E, 51
Timm, Eric, 50
Titov, Gennady F ("the Crocodile"), 252,
Tolkachev, Adolf G., 299, 300, 300n
Toon, Malcolm, 121
and "Cherepanov papers," 122, 123/1, 136
"the toothless ones," 135
TOPHAT, see Polyakov, Dimitri Fedoroyich
Treholt, Arne, 252n
Trinka, Edmund, see Loginov, Yuri, aliases of
Trinka, Edmund (real person), 217n
Truman, Harry S, 164
Tsikerdanos, Ernest J., 255
Tuominen, Erikki, 8
Tuominen, Poika, 8
Turner, Elbert T. "Bert," 191, 195
Turner, Stansfield, 142n, 266
apologizes to Paul Garb]er for spurious
security charge, 263, 263n
appointed as Director of CIA by Jimmy
Carter, 266
is asked by Paul Garbler for
compensation, 262, 262n
and Peter Karlow, 286
on Nosenko's imprisonment by CIA, 142,
146, 146n
sued by James Ang1eton, 260
Tweedy, Bronson, 258, 259n
and study of Golitsin, 259
and study of Petty report on Ang!eton, 259
Twetten, Thomas A., 301n

UB (Polish intelligence service), 234
UNACUTE, see Federov, Mikhail
UN Scientific Community on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation
and FEDORA, 149
United States, moJe hunt in, see mole hunt;
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
mole hunt in U.S.
Uris, Leon, 111, 11111
U-2 spy plane, 12
U Thant, 15011

Vakrushev, Vasili V., 177n
Valya, 47,75
van den Bergh, H. J., 218
Van Vliet, William, 55, 56
Varentsov, Nina, 53
Varentsov, Sergei S
and Oleg Penkovsky, 53, 54n
Vass, Stephen, 274
Vassall, William John, 74, 74n, 75, 79, 259
definition of, 160
and A verell Harriman, 177
and Birch O'Nea!, 160
"Vera," see Vassall, William John
Vlasov, Andrei, 184, 184n
von Lichnowsky, Karl max Furst, 69n

Walker, John A., Jr., 298
Walker, John Denley, 42, 160,233,299, 300
Waller, John H., 262,265
Walsh, John W., ]87, 187n
Ward, Stephen, 97
Warren, Earl
and Yuri Nosenko, 145
Warren Commission, 131, 132
and imprisonment of Nosenko by CIA,
Watkins, John, 75, 76, 76n
Webster, William H., 290, 290n, 29],301,302
reorganizes CI Staff, 298
Weinert, Ferida, 86
West German Federal Intelligence Agency
and Heinz Felfe, 159
and Heinz Herre, 25
West, Nigel, see Allason, Rupert
White, Dick Goldsmith, 102,21!, 285n
Whittemore, E. Reed, Jr., 40, 282
Wilson, Harold, 97, 98,99, 100, loon, 114
Winks, Robin W., 40n
Winsky, Stephen, 5
Winters, George Payne, Jr., 169n
Wise, David, 300n
Wolton, Thierry, !08, !08n
Woodward, Bob, 242
Wright, Peter, 99, 99n, 101, 285n
and Hugh GaitskeJl, 98n
and Anatoly Golitsin, 97, 98
and Roger Hollis, 102, 103n
and Peter Karlow, 285
and SATYR, 14
and TOPHAT, !54n
Wyatt, F. Mark, 296, 296/1
Wynne, Greville
arrest of by Soviets, 119
and Oleg Penkovsky, 25, 25n, 27,56,57,
58, 59
Yankovsky, Arseny ("Andy")
background of, 221,222
is fired from CIA, 224, 224n
and Scotty Miler, 221, 223
and David Murphy, 222, 223, 225
and Edgar Snow, 223
and Marianne, cousin of, 224

Yankovsky, George, 221
Yankovsky, Olga Sokolovskaya, 22!, 222
and David Murphy, 222
Yo-Yo, 51,59
Young, David R., 152, 152n
Young, Harry F., 69, 69n
Yurchenko, Vitaly
defection and redefection of, 298
and Igor Orlov, 274, 275, 276, 277
and the Shadrin case, 197

Zemenek, Ludek (Rudolph A Herrrnann),
Zenihov, V. V, 5
Zhukov, Georgi, 177n
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:39 am


DAVID WISE is America's leading writer on intelligence and espionage. He is coauthor of The Invisible Government, a number one best-seller that has been widely credited with bringing about a reappraisal of the role of the CIA in a democratic society. He is the author of The Spy Who Got Away, The American Police State, and The Politics of Lying, and coauthor with Thomas B. Ross of The Espionage Establishment, The Invisible Government, and The U-2 Affair. Mr. Wise has also written three espionage novels, The Samarkand Dimension, The Children's Game, and Spectrum. A native New Yorker and graduate of Columbia College, he is the former chief of the Washington bureau of the New York Herald Tribune and has contributed articles on government and politics to many national magazines. He is married and has two sons.
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:41 am

Part 1 of 5

Picture Gallery


THE DEFECTOR: A previously unpublished photograph of Anatoly Mikhailovich Golitsin, the KGB officer who defected in Helsinki in 1961, touching off the hunt for Soviet moles inside the CIA that lasted for almost two decades. This photo is the first to show Golitsin as a KGB officer before he defected to the CIA. In Helsinki, Golitsin posed as a Soviet diplomat and used the alias "Anatoly Klimov."


THE SUSPECTS: S. Peter Karlow, a war hero and ass veteran, was a respected CIA officer and an expert on espionage gadgetry for the agency when he mistakenly became the "principal suspect" in the mole hunt as a result of Golitsin's information. Karlow, investigated and polygraphed by the FBI, then fired from the CIA in 1963, fought for twenty-six years to clear his name.


Karlow receiving a bronze star for valor from General William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, the director of the wartime OSS, for a daring mission off the Italian coast in 1944. Karlow lost his left leg when his PT boat tripped a Nazi mine and exploded killing most of the crew.


Paul Garbler with his Doberman, Magic. The first CIA chief of station in Moscow, Garbler was also suspected as a Soviet spy and exiled to a Caribbean isle. The CIA never told him why. Garbler's innocence was belatedly acknowledged when Congress in 1980 passed the little-known "Mole Relief Act," and the CIA awarded him a substantial settlement.


A Navy dive bomber pilot in the Pacific during World War II, Garbler, below, right, face partially hidden, served as personal pilot to South Korea's President Syngman Rhee, center, before joining the CIA.


The CIA sent Garbler to Moscow in 1961 to monitor contacts with Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, the CIA's most celebrated spy in the Soviet Union. But Penkovsky's "dead drop" in Moscow had been discovered by the KGB.


Igor Orlov, the CIA agent whom the agency concluded was Golitsin's "Sasha," the elusive Soviet mole. Orlov operated for the CIA in Germany under Army cover.


Igor and Eleonore Orlov in Munich on their wedding day, July 14, 1948.
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:43 am

Part 2 of 5


Orlov on an idyllic outing near Munich in 1947. He was already an agent of the CIA.


Orlov in Berlin, 1953.


The CIA trained Orlov in espionage tradecraft. Pictured are pages from notes in his handwriting in Russian and English.


The CIA brought the Orlovs to America, where they opened an art gallery and picture-framing studio in Alexandria, Virginia. The FBI kept the gallery under surveillance for years, but never proved Orlov was a Soviet spy. After his death in 1982, his wife, Eleonore, continued to run the gallery.


"Sasha" Sogolow at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The Russian-born CIA officer became a mole suspect because, to his misfortune, his nickname was the same as the code name of the supposed Soviet mole.


George Goldberg became a suspect after Boris Belitsky, a top Radio Moscow correspondent whom he recruited for the CIA, turned out to be a double agent for the KGB. Innocent, but unaware that he had become a target of the mole hunters, Goldberg was puzzled that the CIA did not promote him.


Goldberg, captured by the Nazis during World War II, was liberated by Soviet troops and pressed into service as their interpreter when the Russians and Americans linked up at the Elbe River in 1945. Goldberg, center, is the man in the wool cap.


Vasia C. Gmirkin, a veteran CIA officer, was one of dozens of officers in the Soviet division who came under suspicion because they spoke Russian. Although he had an outstanding career, he failed to receive a promotion for seventeen years.
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Postby admin » Wed Nov 04, 2015 4:45 am

Part 3 of 5


Arseny "Andy" Yankovsky. The Special Investigations Group, the CIA's molehunting unit, suspected that Yankovsky had betrayed his own agents behind the lines during the Korean War. David Murphy, the chief of the CIA's Soviet division, fell victim to the mole hunters himself because he had helped to recruit Yankovsky into the CIA two decades earlier.


Yankovsky, right, with his older brother Valery, and a tiger they bagged in North Korea about 1942. The Yankovskys were White Russians who fled the Soviet Union and settled in an enclave in North Korea.


Edgar Snow, a CIA officer who married Yankovsky's stepdaughter, Nata, was fired by CIA director Allen W. Dulles, along with Yankovsky and another CIA case officer, Vivian L. Parker. Dulles considered Snow's dismissal a "tragedy," and helped him find a job after he was forced out of the CIA.


"Trouble is, it was the wrong woman." Ingeborg Lygren, an employee of the Norwegian intelligence service, was falsely accused as a Soviet spy because of erroneous information provided by Anatoly Golitsin and James Angleton. The real spy was caught twelve years later.


The CIA mole hunt spread to England as well. There, Sir Roger Hollis, the head of MI5, the British security service, was investigated by British mole hunters for years. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said "no evidence" was found to incriminate him.


THE HUNTERS: James J. Angleton, the reclusive chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, became obsessed with finding the Soviet mole who he was convinced had burrowed deep inside the CIA.


Poets and Spooks: Angleton helped to found a poetry journal at Yale and his friends included a number of poets. In this rare and previously unpublished photo, Angleton, standing, second from left, is shown during a lighter moment at a private party in Washington in the spring of 1966. Others (standing) are, from left, Ambrose Gordon, poet, professor, and contemporary of Angleton's at Yale; Howard Nemerov, poet and novelist; William R. Johnson, a CIA officer and member of Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff; and (seated), left, John Pauker, poet and official of the United States Information Agency; and Reed Whittemore, poet and Angleton's former roommate at Yale.


Newton S. " Scotty" Miler ran the mole hunt for Angleton and later became his chief of operations. This photo was taken at his home in New Mexico in 1989.
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