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CHAPTER THREE: The Federal Reserve Act"Our financial system is a false one and a huge burden on the people . . . This Act establishes the most gigantic trust on earth."
--Congressman Charles Augustus Lindbergh, Sr.
The speeches of Senator LaFollette and Congressman Lindbergh became rallying points of opposition to the Aldrich Plan in 1912. They also aroused popular feeling against the Money Trust. Congressman Lindbergh said, on December 15, 1911, "The government prosecutes other trusts, but supports the money trust. I have been waiting patiently for several years for an opportunity to expose the false money standard, and to show that the greatest of all favoritism is that extended by the government to the money trust."
Senator LaFollette publicly charged that a money trust of fifty men controlled the United States. George F. Baker, partner of J.P. Morgan, on being queried by reporters as to the truth of the charge, replied that it was absolutely in error. He said that he knew from personal knowledge that not more than eight men ran this country.
The Nation Magazine replied editorially to Senator LaFollette that "If there is a Money Trust, it will not be practical to establish that it exercises its influence either for good or for bad."
Senator LaFollette remarks in his memoirs that his speech against the Money Trust later cost him the Presidency of the United States, just as Woodrow Wilson’s early support of the Aldrich Plan had brought him into consideration for that office.
Congress finally made a gesture to appease popular feeling by appointing a committee to investigate the control of money and credit in the United States. This was the Pujo Committee , a subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee, which conducted the famous "Money Trust" hearings in 1912, under the leadership of Congressman Arsene Pujo of Louisiana, who was regarded as a spokesman for the oil interests. These hearings were deliberately dragged on for five months, and resulted in six-thousand pages of printed testimony in four volumes. Month after month, the bankers made the train trip from New York to Washington, testified before the Committee and returned to New York. The hearings were extremely dull, and no startling information turned up at these sessions. The bankers solemnly admitted that they were indeed bankers, insisted that they always operated in the public interest, and claimed that they were animated only by the highest ideals of public service, like the Congressmen before whom they were testifying.
The paradoxical nature of the Pujo Money Trust Hearings may better be understood if we examine the man who single-handedly carried on these hearings, Samuel Untermyer. He was one of the principal contributors to Woodrow Wilson’s Presidential campaign fund, and was one of the wealthiest corporation lawyers in New York. He states in his autobiography in "Who’s Who" of 1926 that he once received a $775,000 fee for a single legal transaction, the successful merger of the Utah Copper Company and the Boston Consolidated and Nevada Company, a firm with a market value of one hundred million dollars. He refused to ask either Senator LaFollette or Congressman Lindbergh to testify in the investigation which they alone had forced Congress to hold. As Special Counsel for the Pujo Committee, Untermyer ran the hearings as a one-man operation. The Congressional members, including its chairman, Congressman Arsene Pujo, seemed to have been struck dumb from the commencement of the hearings to their conclusion. One of these silent servants of the public was Congressman James Byrnes, of South Carolina, representing Bernard Baruch’s home district, who later achieved fame as "Baruch’s man", and was placed by Baruch in charge of the Office of War Mobilization during the Second World War.
Although he was a specialist in such matters, Untermyer did not ask any of the bankers about the system of interlocking directorates through which they controlled industry. He did not go into international gold movements, which were known as a factor in money panics, or the international relationships between American bankers and European bankers. The international banking houses of Eugene Meyer, Lazard Freres, J. & W. Seligman, Ladenburg Thalmann, Speyer Brothers, M. M. Warburg, and the Rothschild Brothers did not arouse Samuel Untermyer’s curiosity, although it was well known in the New York financial world that all of these family banking houses either had branches or controlled subsidiary houses in Wall Street. When Jacob Schiff appeared before the Pujo Committee, Mr. Untermyer’s adroit questioning allowed Mr. Schiff to talk for many minutes without revealing any information about the operations of the banking house of Kuhn Loeb Company, of which he was senior partner, and which Senator Robert L. Owen had identified as the representative of the European Rothschilds in the United States.
The aging J.P. Morgan, who had only a few more months to live, appeared before the Committee to justify his decades of international financial deals. He stated for Mr. Untermyer’s edification that "Money is a commodity." This was a favorite ploy of the money creators, as they wished to make the public believe that the creation of money was a natural occurrence akin to the growing of a field of corn, although it was actually a bounty conferred upon the bankers by governments over which they had gained control.
J.P. Morgan also told the Pujo Committee that, in making a loan, he seriously considered only one factor, a man’s character; even the man’s ability to repay the loan, or his collateral, were of little importance. This astonishing observation startled even the blasé members of the Committee.
The farce of the Pujo Committee ended without a single well-known opponent of the money creators being allowed to appear or testify. As far as Samuel Untermyer was concerned, Senator LaFollette and Congressman Charles Augustus Lindbergh had never existed. Nevertheless, these Congressmen had managed to convince the people of the United States that the New York bankers did have a monopoly on the nation’s money and credit. At the close of the hearings, the bankers and their subsidized newspapers claimed that the only way to break this monopoly was to enact the banking and currency legislation now being proposed to Congress, a bill which would be passed a year later as the Federal Reserve Act. The press seriously demanded that the New York banking monopoly be broken by turning over the administration of the new banking system to the most knowledgeable banker of them all, Paul Warburg.
The Presidential campaign of 1912 records one of the more interesting political upsets in American history. The incumbent, William Howard Taft, was a popular president, and the Republicans, in a period of general prosperity, were firmly in control of the government through a Republican majority in both houses. The Democratic challenger, Woodrow Wilson, Governor of New Jersey, had no national recognition, and was a stiff, austere man who excited little public support. Both parties included a monetary reform bill in their platforms: The Republicans were committed to the Aldrich Plan, which had been denounced as a Wall Street plan, and the Democrats had the Federal Reserve Act. Neither party bothered to inform the public that the bills were almost identical except for the names. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the money creators decided to dump Taft and go with Wilson. How do we know this? Taft seemed certain of reelection, and Wilson would return to obscurity. Suddenly, Theodore Roosevelt "threw his hat into the ring." He announced that he was running as a third party candidate, the "Bull Moose". His candidacy would have been ludicrous had it not been for the fact that he was exceptionally well-financed. Moreover, he was given unlimited press coverage, more than Taft and Wilson combined. As a Republican ex-president, it was obvious that Roosevelt would cut deeply into Taft’s vote. This proved the case, and Wilson won the election. To this day, no one can say what Theodore Roosevelt’s program was, or why he would sabotage his own party. Since the bankers were financing all three candidates, they would win regardless of the outcome. Later Congressional testimony showed that in the firm of Kuhn Loeb Company, Felix Warburg was supporting Taft, Paul Warburg and Jacob Schiff were supporting Wilson, and Otto Kahn was supporting Roosevelt. The result was that a Democratic Congress and a Democratic President were elected in 1912 to get the central bank legislation passed. It seems probable that the identification of the Aldrich Plan as a Wall Street operation predicted that it would have a difficult passage through Congress, as the Democrats would solidly oppose it, whereas a successful Democratic candidate, supported by a Democratic Congress, would be able to pass the central bank plan. Taft was thrown overboard because the bankers doubted he could deliver on the Aldrich Plan, and Roosevelt was the instrument of his demise.
To further confuse the American people and blind them to the real purpose of the proposed Federal Reserve Act, the architects of the Aldrich Plan, powerful Nelson Aldrich, although no longer a senator, and Frank Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, set up a hue and cry against the bill. They gave interviews whenever they could find an audience denouncing the proposed Federal Reserve Act as inimical to banking and to good government. The bugaboo of inflation was raised because of the Act’s provisions for printing Federal Reserve notes. The Nation, on October 23, 1913, pointed out, "Mr. Aldrich himself raised a hue and cry over the issue of government "fiat money", that is, money issued without gold or bullion back of it, although a bill to do precisely that had been passed in 1908 with his own name as author, and he knew besides, that the ‘government’ had nothing to do with it, that the Federal Reserve Board would have full charge of the issuing of such moneys."
Frank Vanderlip’s claims were so bizarre that Senator Robert L. Owen, chairman of the newly formed Senate Banking and Currency Committee, which had been formed on March 18, 1913, accused him of openly carrying on a campaign of misrepresentation about the bill. The interests of the public, so Carter Glass claimed in a speech on September 10, 1913 to Congress, would be protected by an advisory council of bankers. "There can be nothing sinister about its transactions. Meeting with it at least four times a year will be a bankers’ advisory council representing every regional reserve district in the system. How could we have exercised greater caution in safeguarding the public interests?"
Glass claimed that the proposed Federal Advisory Council would force the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to act in the best interest of the people.
Senator Root raised the problem of inflation, claiming that under the Federal Reserve Act, note circulation would always expand indefinitely, causing great inflation. However, the later history of the Federal Reserve System showed that it not only caused inflation, but that the issue of notes could also be restricted, causing deflation, as occurred from 1929 to 1939.
One of the critics of the proposed "decentralized" system was a lawyer from Cleveland, Ohio, Alfred Crozier: Crozier was called to testify for the Senate Committee because he had written a provocative book in 1912, U.S. Money vs. Corporation Currency.* He attacked the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 as a Wall Street instrument, and he pointed out that when our government had to issue money based on privately owned securities, we were no longer a free nation.
Crozier testified before the Senate Committee that, "It should prohibit the granting or calling in of loans for the purpose of influencing quotation prices of securities and the contracting of loans or increasing interest rates in concert by the banks to influence public opinion or the action of any legislative body. Within recent months, William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States was reported in the open press as charging specifically that there was a conspiracy among certain of the large banking interests to put a contraction upon the currency and to raise interest rates for the sake of making the public force Congress into passing currency legislation desired by those interests. The so-called administration currency bill grants just what Wall Street and the big banks for twenty-five years have been striving for, that is, PRIVATE INSTEAD OF PUBLIC CONTROL OF CURRENCY. It does this as completely as the Aldrich Bill. Both measures rob the government and the people of all effective control over the public’s money, and vest in the banks exclusively the dangerous power to make money among the people scarce or plenty. The Aldrich Bill puts this power in one central bank.
The Administration Bill puts it in twelve regional central banks, all owned exclusively by the identical private interests that would have owned and operated the Aldrich Bank. President Garfield shortly before his assassination declared that whoever controls the supply of currency would control the business and activities of the people. Thomas Jefferson warned us a hundred years ago that a private central bank issuing the public currency was a greater menace to the liberties of the people than a standing army."
It is interesting to note how many assassinations of Presidents of the United States follow their concern with the issuing of public currency; Lincoln with his Greenback, non-interest-bearing notes, and Garfield, making a pronouncement on currency problems just before he was assassinated.
We now begin to understand why such a lengthy campaign of planned deception was necessary, from the secret conference at Jekyll Island to the identical "reform" plans proposed by the Democratic and Republican parties under different names. The bankers could not wrest control of the issuance of money from the citizens of the United States, to whom it had been designated through its Congress by the Constitution, until the Congress granted them their monopoly for a central bank. Therefore, much of the influence exerted to get the Federal Reserve Act passed was done behind the scenes, principally by two shadowy, non-elected persons: The German immigrant, Paul Warburg, and Colonel Edward Mandell House of Texas.
Paul Warburg made an appearance before the House Banking and Currency Committee in 1913, in which he briefly stated his background: "I am a member of the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb Company. I came over to this country in 1902, having been born and educated in the banking business in Hamburg, Germany, and studied banking in London and Paris, and have gone all around the world. In the Panic of 1907, the first suggestion I made was ‘Let us get a national clearing house.’ The Aldrich Plan contains some things which are simply fundamental rules of banking. Your aim in this plan (the Owen-Glass bill) must be the same--centralizing of reserves, mobilizing commercial credit, and getting an elastic note issue."
Warburg’s phrase, "mobilization of credit" was an important one, because the First World War was due to begin shortly, and the first task of the Federal Reserve System would be to finance the World War. The European nations were already bankrupt, because they had maintained large standing armies for almost fifty years, a situation created by their own central banks, and therefore they could not finance a war. A central bank always imposes a tremendous burden on the nation for "rearmament" and "defense", in order to create inextinguishable debt, simultaneously creating a military dictatorship and enslaving the people to pay the "interest" on the debt which the bankers have artificially created.
In the Senate debate on the Federal Reserve Act, Senator Stone said on December 12, 1913,
"The great banks for years have sought to have and control agents in the Treasury to serve their purposes. Let me quote from this World article, ‘Just as soon as Mr. McAdoo came to Washington, a woman whom the National City Bank had installed in the Treasury Department to get advance information on the condition of banks, and other matters of interest to the big WallStreet group, was removed. Immediately the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary, John Skelton
Williams, were criticized severely by the agents of the Wall Street group.’" "I myself have known more than one occasion when bankers refused credit to men who opposed their political views and purposes. When Senator Aldrich and others were going around the country exploiting this scheme, the big banks of New York and Chicago were engaged in raising a munificent fund to bolster up the Aldrich propaganda. I have been told by bankers of my own state that contributions to this exploitation fund had been demanded of them and that they had contributed because they were afraid of being blacklisted or boycotted. There are bankers of this country who are enemies of the public welfare. In the past, a few great banks have followed policies and projects that have paralyzed the industrial energies of the country to perpetuate their tremendous power over the financial and business industries of America."
Carter Glass states in his autobiography that he was summoned by Woodrow Wilson to the White House, and that Wilson told him he intended to make the reserve notes obligations of the United States. Glass says, "I was for an instant speechless. I remonstrated. There is not any government obligation here, Mr. President. Wilson said he had had to compromise on this point in order to save the bill."
The term "compromise" on this point came directly from Paul Warburg. Col. Elisha Ely Garrison, in Roosevelt,* Wilson and the Federal Reserve Law wrote,
"In 1911, Lawrence Abbot, Mr. Roosevelt’s private officer at ‘The Outlook’ handed me a copy of the so-called Aldrich Plan for currency reform. I said, I could not believe that Mr. Warburg was the author. This plan is nothing more than the Aldrich-Vreeland legislation which provided for currency issue against securities. Warburg knows that as well as I do. I am going to see him at once and ask him about it. All right, the truth. Yes, I wrote it, he said. Why? I asked. It was a compromise, answered Warburg." [13]
Garrison says that Warburg wrote him on February 8, 1912.
"I have no doubt that at the end of a thorough discussion, either you will see it my way or I will see it yours--but I hope you will see it mine."
This was another famous Warburg saying when he secretly lobbied Congressmen to support his interest, the veiled threat that they should "see it his way". Those who did not found large sums contributed to their opponents at the next elections, and usually went down in defeat.
Col. Garrison, an agent of Brown Brothers bankers, later Brown Brothers Harriman, had entree everywhere in the financial community. He writes of Col. House, "Col. House agreed entirely with the early writing of Mr. Warburg." Page 337, he quotes Col. House:
"I am also suggesting that the Central Board be increased from four members to five and their terms lengthened from eight to ten years. This would give stability and would take away the power of a President to change the personnel of the board during a single term of office."
House’s phrase, "take away the power of a President" is significant, because later Presidents found themselves helpless to change the direction of the government because they did not have the power to change the composition of the Federal Reserve Board to attain a majority on it during that President’s term of office. Garrison also wrote in this book,
"Paul Warburg is the man who got the Federal Reserve Act together after the Aldrich Plan aroused such nationwide resentment and opposition. The mastermind of both plans was Baron Alfred Rothschild of London."
Colonel Edward Mandell House* was referred to by Rabbi Stephen Wise in his autobiography, Challenging Years as "the unofficial Secretary of State". House noted that he and Wilson knew that in passing the Federal Reserve Act, they had created an instrument more powerful than the Supreme Court. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors actually comprised a Supreme Court of Finance, and there was no appeal from any of their rulings.
In 1911, prior to Wilson’s taking office as President, House had returned to his home in Texas and completed a book called Philip Dru, Administrator. Ostensibly a novel, it was actually a detailed plan for the future government of the United States, "which would establish Socialism as dreamed by Karl Marx", according to House. This "novel" predicted the enactment of the graduated income tax, excess profits tax, unemployment insurance, social security, and a flexible currency system. In short, it was the blueprint which was later followed by the Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt administrations. It was published "anonymously" by B. W. Huebsch of New York, and widely circulated among government officials, who were left in no doubt as to its authorship. George Sylvester Viereck**, who knew House for years, later wrote an account of the Wilson-House relationship, The Strangest Friendship in History.14 In 1955, Westbrook Pegler, the Hearst columnist from 1932 to 1956, heard of the Philip Dru book and called Viereck to ask if he had a copy. Viereck sent Pegler his copy of the book, and Pegler wrote a column about it, stating:
"One of the institutions outlined in Philip Dru is the Federal Reserve System. The Schiffs, the Warburgs, the Kahns, the Rockefellers and Morgans put their faith in House. The Schiff, Warburg, Rockefeller and Morgan interests were personally represented in the mysterious conference at Jekyll Island. Frankfurter landed on the Harvard law faculty, thanks to a financial contribution to Harvard by Felix Warburg and Paul Warburg, and so we got Alger and Donald Hiss, Lee Pressman, Harry Dexter White and many other protégés of Little Weenie."*
House’s openly Socialistic views were forthrightly expressed in Philip Dru, Administrator; on pages 57-58, House wrote:
"In a direct and forceful manner, he pointed out that our civilization was fundamentally wrong, inasmuch, among other things, as it restricted efficiency; that if society were properly organized, there would be none who were not sufficiently clothed and fed. The result, that the laws, habits and ethical training in vogue were alike responsible for the inequalities in opportunity and the consequent wide difference between the few and the many; that the results of such conditions was to render inefficient a large part of the population, the percentage differing in each country in the ratio that education and enlightenment and unselfish laws bore to ignorance, bigotry and selfish laws." [15]
In his book, House (Dru) envisions himself becoming a dictator and forcing on the people his radical views, page 148: "They recognized the fact that Dru dominated the situation and that a master mind had at last risen in the Republic." He now assumes the title of General. "General Dru announced his purpose of assuming the powers of a dictator . . . they were assured that he was free from any personal ambition . . . he proclaimed himself ‘Administrator of the Republic.’"*
This pensive dreamer who imagined himself a dictator actually managed to place himself in the position of the confidential advisor to the President of the United States, and then to have many of his desires enacted into law! On page 227, he lists some of the laws he wishes to enact as dictator. Among them are an old age pension law, laborers insurance compensation, cooperative markets, a federal reserve banking system, cooperative loans, national employment bureaus, and other "social legislation", some of which was enacted during Wilson’s administration, and others during the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration. The latter was actually a continuation of the Wilson Administration, with many of the same personnel, and with House guiding the administration from behind the scenes.
Like most of the behind-the-scenes operators in this book, Col. Edward Mandell House had the obligatory "London connection". Originally a Dutch family, "Huis", his ancestors had lived in England for three hundred years, after which his father settled in Texas, where he made a fortune in blockade-running during the Civil War, shipping cotton and other contraband to his British connections, including the Rothschilds, and bringing back supplies for the beleaguered Texans. The senior House, not trusting the volatile Texas situation, prudently deposited all his profits from his blockade-running in gold with Baring banking house in London*. At the close of the Civil War, he was one of the wealthiest men in Texas. He named his son "Mandell" after one of his merchant associates. According to Arthur Howden Smith, when House’s father died in 1880, his estate was distributed among his sons as follows: Thomas William got the banking business; John, the sugar plantation; and Edward M. the cotton plantations, which brought him an income of $20,000 a year.16
At the age of twelve, the young Edward Mandell House had brain fever, and was later further crippled by sunstroke. He was a semi-invalid, and his ailments gave him an odd Oriental appearance. He never entered any profession, but used his father’s money to become the kingmaker of Texas politics, successively electing five governors from 1893 to 1911. In 1911 he began to support Wilson for president, and threw the crucial Texas delegation to him which ensured his nomination. House met Wilson for the first time at the Hotel Gotham, May 31, 1912.
In The Strangest Friendship In History, Woodrow Wilson and Col. House, by George Sylvester Viereck, Viereck writes:
"What," I asked House, "cemented your friendship?" "The identity of our temperaments and our public policies," answered House. "What was your purpose and his?" "To translate into legislation certain liberal and progressive ideas." [17]
House told Viereck that when he went to Wilson at the White House, he handed him $35,000. This was exceeded only by the $50,000 which Bernard Baruch had given Wilson.
The successful enactment of House’s programs did not escape the notice of other Wilson associates. In Vol. 1, page 157 of The Intimate Papers of Col. House, House notes, "Cabinet members like Mr. Lane and Mr. Bryan commented upon the influence of Dru with the President. ‘All that the book has said should be,’ wrote Lane, ‘comes about. The President comes to ‘Philip Dru’ in the end.’"18
House recorded some of his efforts on behalf of the Federal Reserve Act in The Intimate Papers of Col. House,
"December 19, 1912. I talked with Paul Warburg over the phone concerning currency reform. I told of my trip to Washington and what I had done there to get it in working order. I told him that the Senate and the Congressmen seemed anxious to do what he desired, and that President-elect Wilson thought straight concerning the issue." [19]
Thus we have Warburg’s agent in Washington, Col. House, assuring him that the Senate and Congressmen will do what he desires, and that the President-elect "thought straight concerning the issue." In this context, representative government seems to have ceased to exist. House continues in his "Papers":
"March 13, 1913. Warburg and I had an intimate discussion concerning currency reform.
March 27, 1913. Mr. J.P. Morgan, Jr. and Mr. Denny of his firm came promptly at five.
McAdoo came about ten minutes afterward. Morgan had a currency plan already printed. I suggested he have it typewritten, so it would not seem too prearranged, and send it to Wilson and myself today.
July 23, 1913. I tried to show Mayor Quincy (of Boston) the folly of the Eastern bankers taking
an antagonistic attitude towards the Currency Bill. I explained to Major Henry Higginson* with what care the bill had been framed. Just before he arrived, I had finished a review by Professor Sprague of Harvard of Paul Warburg’s criticism of the Glass-Owen Bill, and will transmit it to Washington tomorrow. Every banker known to Warburg, who knows the subject practically, has been called up about the making of the bill.
October 13, 1913. Paul Warburg was my first caller today. He came to discuss the currency measure. There are many features of the Owen-Glass Bill that he does not approve. I promised to put him in touch with McAdoo and Senator Owen so that he might discuss it with them.
November 17, 1913. Paul Warburg telephoned about his trip to Washington. Later, he and Mr. Jacob Schiff came over for a few minutes.
Warburg did most of the talking. He had a new suggestion in regard to grouping the regular reserve banks so as to get the units welded together and in easier touch with the Federal Reserve Board."
George Sylvester Viereck in The Strangest Friendship in History, Woodrow Wilson and Col. House wrote: "The Schiffs, the Warburgs, the Kahns, the Rockefellers, the Morgans put their faith in House. When the Federal Reserve legislation at last assumed definite shape, House was the intermediary between the White House and the financiers."20
On page 45, Viereck notes, "Col. House looks upon the reform of the monetary system as the crowning internal achievement of the Wilson Administration." [21]
The Glass Bill (the House version of the final Federal Reserve Act) had passed the House on September 18, 1913 by 287 to 85. On December 19, 1913, the Senate passed their version by a vote of 54-34. More than forty important differences in the House and Senate versions remained to be settled, and the opponents of the bill in both houses of Congress were led to believe that many weeks would yet elapse before the Conference bill would be ready for consideration. The Congressmen prepared to leave Washington for the annual Christmas recess, assured that the Conference bill would not be brought up until the following year. Now the money creators prepared and executed the most brilliant stroke of their plan. In a single day, they ironed out all forty of the disputed passages in the bill and quickly brought it to a vote. On Monday, December 22, 1913, the bill was passed by the House 282-60 and the Senate 43-23.
On December 21, 1913, The New York Times commented editorially on the act, "New York will be on a firmer basis of financial growth, and we shall soon see her the money centre of the world."
The New York Times reported on the front page, Monday, December 22, 1913 in headlines: MONEY BILL MAY BE LAW TODAY--CONFEREES HAD ADJUSTED NEARLY ALL DIFFERENCES AT 1:30 THIS MORNING--NO DEPOSIT GUARANTEES--SENATE YIELDS ON THIS POINT BUT PUTS THROUGH MANY OTHER CHANGES "With almost unprecedented speed, the conference to adjust the House and Senate differences on the Currency Bill practically completed its labours early this morning. On Saturday the Conferees did little more than dispose of the preliminaries, leaving forty essential differences to be thrashed out Sunday. . . . No other legislation of importance will be taken up in either House of Congress this week. Members of both houses are already preparing to leave Washington."
"Unprecedented speed", says The New York Times. One sees the fine hand of Paul Warburg in this final strategy. Some of the bill’s most vocal critics had already left Washington. It was a long-standing political courtesy that important legislation would not be acted upon during the week before Christmas, but this tradition was rudely shattered in order to perpetrate the Federal Reserve Act on the American people.
The Times buried a brief quote from Congressman Lindbergh that "the bill would establish the most gigantic trust on earth," and quoted Representative Guernsey of Maine, a Republican on the House Banking and Currency Committee, that "This is an inflation bill, the only question being the extent of the inflation."