THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE: WHAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENSE D

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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. If we direct our attention back to the P-4, the P-4 memo that General McChrystal sent out, you said he had become aware, "of suspected reports that POTUS, the President of the United States, and the Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillman's heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in speeches currently being prepared, not knowing the specifics surrounding his death.'' So obviously the objective of that P-4 was to get those specifics, the fact that there was a fratricidal investigation going on, to the appropriate people to the White House.

General Abizaid, you were the primary addressee on the memo, and I think it was not uncommon for the President to direct conversations with the combatant commander such as yourself. Did you take any steps to alert the White House that Corporal Tillman's death was suspected as friendly fire?

General Abizaid. No, sir. I talked directly to the chairman.

Mr. Tierney. Having that direct relationship with the President and knowing that it was specifically put in the P-4, that in fact there was a concern that the President might make a statement about the conditions surrounding that event, why didn't you take it up yourself to make sure that the White House was informed?

General Abizaid. I did not take it upon myself to inform the White House directly nor did I ever when I was in command. When something would come up in our normal meetings with the President, I would have a free flowing conversation, but I usually commented through the chairman or directly with the Secretary.

Mr. Tierney. And that's the case even when there is some immediacy in the memo indicating that the President might be in the position to make an embarrassing statement unless he was warned otherwise?

General Abizaid. First of all, I received the message late, which is clearly a problem within my own headquarters. When I received the message late, I talked to the chairman. I also saw the two other addressees, General Brown and the Army, and after having talked to the chairman, it became clear to me that the chairman knew about it and I presumed that the information flowed in Washington through Army channels as I might have expected. Those assumptions were obviously incorrect.

Mr. Tierney. General Brown, what about you? Did you notify the White House about the possibility that Corporal Tillman was killed by his own unit after you saw that memo?

General Brown. No, sir. I didn't.

Mr. Tierney. And why didn't you do that knowing that there was some immediacy to the memo?

General Brown. Well, sir, first of all on the P-4, I was an info addressee, which is not the primary addressee.

Mr. Tierney. If I could interrupt, I understand. But General Abizaid said the reason that he didn't do it was because you were on the memo. So he must have expected that you would do something. That was ill placed?

General Brown. No, I don't think anybody would expect me to call the President of the United States based on the comment made on an info message where I was an info addressee.

Mr. Tierney. General Myers, at that time you were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You were the principal military adviser to the President and the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense. Did you advise the President or anyone at the White House that there was a fratricide investigation?

General Myers. Bear in mind again I had not seen the P-4. All I knew was that there was potential for fratricide, there was an investigation ongoing. I do not recall and am fully certain I didn't talk to anyone at the White House about that.

Mr. Tierney. Did anybody at your staff talk to anybody at the White House?

General Myers. I can't tell you that. There are some things, by the way, that circulate in public affairs channels that could be like that. But I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Tierney. Who on your staff would have been in that loop, the public affairs loop?

General Myers. My public affairs officer was then Captain Frank Thorpe, and I do remember talking to him about the potential of fratricide and saying we have to be cautious here; if we make any comments, we have to bear that in mind.

Mr. Tierney. And who would that person's contact at the White House be?

General Myers. I don't know. Routinely he would never talk to the White House. They would talk to the services' public affairs officers. He would also talk to the Office of Secretary of Defense's public affairs folks. But I can't imagine him ever talking to the White House, unless it was on a conference call where he was included.

Mr. Tierney. Secretary Rumsfeld, let me ask you the same question to close things out. Did you advise the President or anyone at the White House that there was evidence that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire at any time?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall. Clearly it would be logical that I would have or someone in my office would have after the information became readily available and the family was notified and it became a subject of interest. Then one would want to know -- make sure that the White House was aware of it and there were daily calls back and forth between the National Security Council and the office.

Mr. Tierney. General Myers indicated at one point there was fairly common knowledge around this. Who in your office or the Secretary's office would have had the kind of contact with the National Security Council staff or the White House on a subject like that?

Mr. Rumsfeld. There are multiple contacts each day and they would happen throughout military assistants, they would happen through the civilian assistants, they would happen through the public affairs. General Myers and I would meet with the President at least once a week.

Mr. Tierney. Setting aside --

Mr. Rumsfeld. Just a second, please, and let me just complete the thought. And in addition, we were in National Security Council meetings and principal committees meetings on a regular basis during the week. Probably five times a week.

Mr. Tierney. You are telling me that neither you or General Myers have any recollection of either of you gentlemen telling anybody, so who on your staff -- who would you suggest on your staff that we could talk to that might have had conversations with the White House on that?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I just don't know other than my response to you as to the kind of contacts that took place on a regular basis.

General Myers. I would agree. I wouldn't know who to say.

Mr. Tierney. You don't know who made those contacts on a regular basis?

General Myers. There were multiple people depending on the subject. But on this subject, I wouldn't know of anybody.

Chairman Waxman. Mr. Tierney, your time has expired. Mr. Platts.

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Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing as we continue to address this very important matter. And I know that all of us here, both our witnesses, those in the audience and committee and staff, continue to have the Tillman family and all the families of our courageous men and women who have given their lives in defense of our country in our prayers. And I know certainly with the four of our witnesses, given your distinguished careers and patriotic service to our Nation, that you all share in the regret that we all feel in how the Tillman family learned of the true manner in which their loved one gave his life. And I certainly appreciate your volunteering to be here today so that we can get to the bottom of this.

I want to followup, I know my colleague Mr. Issa of California asked the question about uniformity and, General Brown, you stated that you would take that recommendation back. I want to add my support for the services coming together as one who has followed up with 17 families in my district, either whose loved ones gave their lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, off the coast of Djibouti, and knowing how those families want as much information as possible and have followed up with me, and we worked with the various military branches.

Sometimes it is difficult as a Member in working with families because of the variances in the branches, in how we get noticed and when we get noticed and how we can then help the families. I want to echo Mr. Issa's suggestion that this be pursued. And in addition, General Brown, you doing it within the ranks of Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers and General Abizaid, given your historic and great service and your knowledge of the importance of these issues, would encourage you to even on the civilian side to join in in helping to push that issue forward for uniformity within the branches.

Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to followup a question that Ranking Member Davis asked. A memo of March 2006 where you, in communicating to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, of the unacceptable nature of how things played out and that they need to address it. As we are here today -- because I think the reminder that we're Oversight and Government Reform and to me what I hope we get out of today is how to make sure this never happens again -- is with, Secretary Rumsfeld, you or other witnesses, your knowledge of what changes have been made to ensure this does not repeat itself.

Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I very briefly, I am sure there have been a great many changes made that I am not aware of. But in the aftermath of the early investigations, I am told that the Army instituted a number of changes and adjustments in how they handled things and that those have been reported to the committee and the Congress.

Mr. Platts. General Brown, could you comment on that?

General Brown. Well, I think the big -- I think Secretary of the Army Geren said yesterday the changes are important, but you have to execute the changes and execute the process the way it is designed if you are going to change the process.

And the fact that the Army regulation we talked about earlier, 600-8 I think it is, that requires the family to be notified and I think in that regulation it also says to keep them constantly updated and no later than 30 days, I think that regulation is the answer to a lot of these problems, having been through fratricide problems before in my career; that proper execution of that process will help us not to have these kind of problems in the future.

While I'm on it, I would also totally agree with you. I think the way that is written today sounds to me, and I am not familiar at all with the Marines' policy or Air Force policy or any of those, but it sounds to me like the right policy or the right regulation for all the services.

So I think you can -- they have made changes, I think, but you have to execute the changes the way they are designed if you want to solve, fix this very difficult process.

Mr. Platts. General Abizaid.

General Abizaid. Congressman, if I may, we found out a lot of things in the course of this conflict about systems that we have in place that really don't make sense for the modern world. In the world of e-mail and in the world of telecommunication, phones with the soldiers in the field, cameras, etc., that it is almost impossible to stop the flow of information from the field.

I can remember when my daughter was informed about her husband's being wounded it came not from the Department of the Army initially, but from an e-mail that came from somebody in the field. Not only was it incorrect in the way that was initially conveyed to her but it had some other bad information in there.

Nevertheless, what we have to do is figure out how to deal with these communications means that are ubiquitous in the field and figure out how we are going to deal with them when these bad things happen which will continue to happen.

Mr. Platts. Thank you, General Abizaid. My time has expired. My sincere thanks for each of you being here and my thanks for your service to the Nation.

Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Platts. Ms. Watson.

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Ms. Watson. I want to address my questions to Secretary Rumsfeld. On July 26, 2007, you wrote a letter to the committee which I'd like to make part of the record. And in that letter you made the following statement: The Tillmans were owed the truth, unvarnished and delivered in a forthright manner, and the Department owed it to the memory of a man who sacrificed his life, gave up a very lucrative career, to serve his country.

And I certainly could not agree more. And in fact I believe it is the standard that everyone in the Department should be held to -- everyone, including yourself. But my question is whether or not you met this standard. We sent you a list of six questions and you did not address those questions. And within your letter you said I don't recall and I've not been here the full time, but quite frequently you have said I don't recall.

Now I have a document here that the IG sent, and there is a copy of it probably up on the marquees for all of you to see. And it is a memo, six pages, with over two dozen specific investigative questions, many with subparts, about your involvement in handling the case. Do you remember the Inspector General's questions? Do you remember this document that was sent to you?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I do.

Ms. Watson. OK. And I won't read all of them. But here is one particular one. When you were told friendly fire --

Mr. Rumsfeld. What number is that?

Ms. Watson. Let's see, I am just going to read it to you. They are listed here, and there is a number. Let's see if I can find the one I am reading. Let me read it to you.

When you were told friendly fire was suspected, did you know the family was told that enemy fire caused Corporal Tillman's death?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I'm sorry, could you repeat that? Your voice dropped and I missed a word or two.

Ms. Watson. Sorry, I'm a little ways from the mic. When you were told friendly fire was suspected, did you know the family was told that enemy fire caused Corporal Tillman's death and the family was not to be informed the death was under investigation? Do you recall that?

Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I did not know that the family -- I did not know what you just said.

Ms. Watson. OK. You did not know that the family -- I just want to get it for the record. You did not know that the family was told that enemy fire caused Corporal Tillman's death and the family was not to be informed that death was under investigation? You did not know that?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no recollection that anyone ever said to me that the family should not be told the truth or that it was possibly friendly fire or friendly fire. I have no recollection of anyone suggesting that.

Ms. Watson. You were unaware the family was told that it was enemy fire that caused Corporal Tillman's death?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I think everyone was told that.

Ms. Watson. No, did you?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I was aware from the press and I knew nothing other than in those early days, April 22nd, when he was killed. I did not have knowledge other than what was in the press that he was killed by enemy fire.

The information that it first was a possibility of fratricide came later and in no instance was I told that people had the belief that it might have been fratricide and that no one should tell the family that. I had no knowledge of that, which I believe was your question.

Ms. Watson. OK. I'm just giving you an example of what was asked of you and my question is whether you remember these questions.

Mr. Rumsfeld. I've got them in front of me.

Ms. Watson. Do you remember them?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I remember -- I do not remember them from the time they apparently were originally provided. But I do -- have seen them, I've read them and I believe I have answered all of those that I am able to answer.

Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mrs. Watson, your time is up.

Ms. Watson. Maybe he can answer -- I just wanted to mention this so maybe he can respond while he is answering some other questions.

Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment on a couple of things that have gone prior to this? One is there were a couple of charts shown up there. I couldn't read any of it and I don't want to have anyone to believe that I could read those two charts that were put up.

Second, the Congressman asked the chairman if he was in the chain of command and of course he answered he was not. I would not want that to leave anyone with the question that he did not have the same standard of care with respect to his public or private utterances with respect to the risk of command influence. Because in his position as chairman, clearly he had to exercise the same degree of care that I did with respect to that issue.

[The information referred to follows:]

Office of Donald Rumsfeld

July 26, 2007

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6143

The Honorable Tom Davis
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6143

Dear Chairman Waxman and Congressman Davis:

I write in response to your letter of July 13, 2007, inviting me to testify before your Committee at a hearing scheduled for August 1, 2007. Although I will be out of the city on that date, I do welcome the opportunity to respond to your request for information concerning the death of U.S. Army Corporal Patrick Tillman.

First, I wish to again extend my deepest sympathies to the Tillman family, as I did in my letter to the family dated May 3, 2004. Theirs is the grief shared by the thousands of others whose sons and daughters, husbands and wives, fathers and mothers have given their lives in our nation's service. And it is the grief shared by all who have had the solemn duty and privilege of working alongside those in uniform. Words cannot fill the void that those losses have created in the lives of their families and loved ones. The valor of Corporal Tillman's decision to step forward and volunteer for service to our nation was an example for all. It remains so today.

The handling of the circumstances surrounding Corporal Tillman's death could only have added to the pain of losing a loved one. And certainly I personally, and all connected with the Department of Defense, extend our deep regrets.

I have always believed that the American people -- and particularly the military families who sacrifice so much -- deserve the truth. In March 2002, as the then-Secretary of Defense, I wrote a memo for Department of Defense employees entitled "Principles for the Department of Defense." The very first principle was:

"Do nothing that could raise questions about the credibility of DoD. DoD officials must tell the truth and must be believed to be telling the truth or our important work is undermined."

Mr. Chairman and Congressman Davis, in your invitation, you asked that I discuss how I learned of the circumstances surrounding Corporal Tillman's death, when I learned of it and with whom I discussed it. I will, to the best of my ability, respond to your request.

In December of 2006, I sent a letter to the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Mr. Thomas Gimble, describing my best recollection of those events, which had occurred approximately 32 months before. A copy of my letter is attached. I would like to quote part of it.

"I am told that I received word of this development sometime after May 20, 2004, but my recollection reflects the fact that it occurred well over 2 years ago. As a result, I do not recall when I first learned about the possibility that Corporal Tillman's death might have resulted from fratricide.'' I went on to say, "I am confident that I did not discuss this matter with anyone outside of the Department of Defense.''

What I wrote in December of 2006 remains my best recollection today of when I was informed, and whom I talked with, before May 20, 2004. I understand that the May 20, 2004, date was shortly before the Tillman family was informed of the circumstances on May 26, 2004.

Your letter also asked about my knowledge of a "Personal For" or "P-4" message dated April 29, 2004. That message was not addressed to me. I do not recall seeing it. I am told that Acting Inspector General Gimble testified to this Committee in April of this year that "the addressees on the P-4 were the three generals, and you know, I can't explain why they chose not to move that up."

That is what I recall regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Corporal Tillman.

I understand that the Acting Inspector General's report concluded that there were some "critical errors" and raised questions about the judgment of some of those responsible for the handling of matters surrounding Corporal Tillman's death. The Tillmans were owed the truth -- unvarnished and delivered in a forthright and timely manner. And the Department owed it to the memory of a man who sacrificed his life serving his country.

Thank you for allowing me to submit this information.

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld

Enclosure

***

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC. 15, 2006

Mr. Thomas Gimble
Acting Inspector General
for Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Gimble:

I understand that you have requested my recollection of the manner in which I learned of the details involving the tragic death of Corporal Patrick Tillman.

I am told that I received word of this development sometime after May 20, 2004, but my recollection reflects the fact that it occurred well over two years ago. As a result, I do not recall when I first learned about the possibility that Corporal Tillman's death might have resulted from fratricide. I am confident that I did not discuss this matter with anyone outside of the Department of Defense.

I trust that this information will be of assistance as you conclude your review. I hope your review brings some additional element of closure for friends and family of this courageous young man. I appreciate the effort that you and your team have devoted to this matter.

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld

Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much. Mr. McHugh.

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Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I appreciate deeply your service. Just to kind of fill in the blank a little bit for some who may not be aware of the military parlance. Let me start with General Abizaid. General Abizaid, what is a P-4? What exactly does that designate?

General Abizaid. A "personal for'' communication is usually a direct command communication from one commander to another or to a series of commanders designed to pass information that is considered very, very important.

Mr. McHugh. And this P-4 --

General Myers. If I can, Mr. McHugh, it is also my understanding of the P-4 as well is that it is supposed to be pretty closely held. It is personal for the addressees to and the info columns.

Mr. McHugh. An e-mail for eyes only?

General Myers. Pretty much. It's not supposed to get wide distribution.

Mr. McHugh. This particular e-mail, this particular P-4 was addressed to whom now? General Abizaid, General Brown?

General Abizaid. It was addressed to me and it was addressed personal for U.S. Commander CENTCOM, commander U.S. SOCOM, commander USASOC.

Mr. McHugh. Secretary Rumsfeld, would it be the normal course of business in the Pentagon for the Secretary of Defense to review or have synopses of or be informed of on a routine basis P-4s at combatant command level?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I don't recall in 6 years ever seeing one until this hearing -- prior to this hearing. It may be that I have, but I just don't recall them. And there is certainly no one who reaches in and grabs communications that are addressed to other people and then gives me a synopsis of them. It just doesn't happen that way.

Mr. McHugh. So it would not? I heard Secretary Rumsfeld -- and if others have responded, I apologize, this vote schedule has been an inconvenience to our guests, certainly, but to Members as well. I heard Secretary Rumsfeld say that at no time does he recall having a conversation early in the process about the fratricide involved with -- in the Tillman case, but I didn't hear the same question directed to General Myers.

General, did you ever have a discussion with the White House, with the President prior to the final determination as to this case?

General Myers. I cannot recall any time that I had a conversation with the White House with anybody.

Mr. McHugh. Speechwriters included?

General Myers. Speechwriters included, about this case one way or the other.

Mr. McHugh. General Abizaid, you were a frequent visitor to the Hill, we were always bringing you back here time and time again. I suspect while you were under command performance at Capitol Hill you perhaps stopped by and had a chat at the White House. Do you recall addressing this case with the President or any of his key operatives?

General Abizaid. I didn't expect once I retired I would continue this, but so it is. I was in Washington from the 18th to the 20th and I talked with the Secretary during that period, and I believe during that period I discussed with him the fratricide investigation.

Mr. McHugh. The Secretary of Defense?

General Abizaid. Right. I don't recall mentioning it to the President except perhaps after the period where I signed off on the report that said it was absolutely friendly fire. Once we confirmed the friendly fire, which was on the 28th.

Mr. McHugh. Have you had a chance to review General Wallace's report?

General Abizaid. I have not seen General Wallace's report.

Mr. McHugh. General Brown, I see you shaking your head.

General Brown. No, sir.

Mr. McHugh. General Myers, have you?

General Myers. No, sir, I haven't.

Mr. McHugh. This is perhaps in that context not the fairest question I might ask, but I'm going to ask it anyway. Welcome to Congress. Based on what you heard about it, do you have any exceptions, objections, comments, anything that you find remarkable about it or just merit having it entered upon this record? Let's go from the right to the left, no political indication intended.

General Brown. Is the question -- I'm not sure I understand the question. I haven't seen --

Mr. McHugh. You haven't seen it, but you have heard about it. Based on what you have heard would you like to make any comments?

General Brown. No, I don't think I would like to make any comments.

Mr. McHugh. It is not the fairest question without having had it before you. General Abizaid.

General Abizaid. No, sir, I don't have any comments on it.

Mr. McHugh. General Myers.

General Myers. No, sir, I don't have any comments on it. Back to my previous statement on the White House. It would have been logical in our many meetings with the White House for the President or the Secretary or I to regret the Tillman death, because it was widely known. But it would have been a 5 or 10-second affair. And I don't recall that, but it would have been logical that we would have done something like that.

Mr. McHugh. But not about the questions was this a friendly fire or other kind of death?

General Myers. I don't recall that we ever talked about that.

Mr. McHugh. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. McHugh. Mr. Clay.

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Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Corporal Pat Tillman committed to serve his country, not to serving as a symbol for promoting President Bush's war. Corporal Tillman's mother, Mary, believes that this has been a complete donkey show and I certainly agree with her assessment.

The Tillman family gave the ultimate sacrifice for their country and they deserve to know the full truth behind Corporal Tillman's death.

Let me ask the entire panel, on April 30, 2004, the Army Special Operations Command announced that Corporal Tillman has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star. The award of a Silver Star was a major development. It was rushed through so it would be ready in time for the memorial service for Corporal Tillman on May 3, 2004, which was widely covered by the press.

According to Pentagon regulations, the Silver Star is to be awarded for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States. And before I turn to the specifics of the award, can anyone on the panel tell me who officially awarded the Silver Star to Corporal Tillman? Can anyone answer that? Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no idea who the individual was who actually awarded the Silver Star. I do know that the process does not include the Secretary of Defense at all. It is signed off on only by the Secretary of the Army and the recommendation comes up from the command to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Army signs the certificate. Who was physically present to present that to the extent it was presented posthumously, I don't know. But I wasn't involved in the Silver Star at all.

Mr. Clay. General Myers, would you know?

General Myers. My understanding was it came up from the Department of the Army channels and was approved by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary at the time. In my prep for this I was told that there was a board that usually meets on those high level awards to approve the award. The chairman's office was not involved in this award in any way. It was an Army matter.

Mr. Clay. General.

General Abizaid. Sir, the awards go through service channels, not through joint channels.

General Brown. Sir, I agree with everything they said, but I do not know who awarded the Silver Star at the memorial service.

Mr. Clay. The answer is President Bush. And let me put up a copy of the Silver Star citation. As you can see, it says the President of the United States of America has awarded the Silver Star to Corporal Patrick Tillman. So this is important. I know the President didn't actually review the supporting documentation for this award, but this award was given in the President's name. And that authority should be exercised only with the utmost care. But that didn't happen. Instead the Silver Star citation was false.

And here is what it says: Corporal Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire team to a covered position from which they could effectively employ their weapons at known enemy positions.

In his March 26, 2007, report, the Defense Department Inspector General concluded that the Silver Star citation and supporting documents had materially inaccurate statements and erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire. Everyone on this panel learned before the Tillman family and the American public that Corporal Tillman was likely killed by his own unit.

Can each of you please explain why you did not intervene to correct the record? I guess we will start with you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Rumsfeld. As I said, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not involved in the Silver Star award at all. I was not knowledgeable about it, did not sign off on it, did not know of the language at all.

Mr. Clay. Do you think he should have been awarded it?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I think from what I understand, the language of the award is to be reviewed or has been reviewed in view of the facts that are subsequently available.

Mr. Clay. Thank you. General Myers.

General Myers. My response is essentially like Secretary Rumsfeld's. The chairman's office, the Joint Staff is not involved in these awards. This is an Army responsibility. And like the Secretary, I understand that the wording is being looked at and I also understand -- and I can't tell you where I heard this -- it may have been in the prep -- that General McChrystal thought the actions were heroic whether or not they came from enemy fire or friendly fire. That was his determination.

Mr. Clay. Thank you. General.

General Abizaid. Sir, in General McChrystal's personal forward he said the potential that he might have been killed by friendly fire in no way detracts from his witnessed heroism or the recommended personal decoration for valor in the face of the enemy. I believe that the Army has looked at the award on several different occasions. They have upheld it on every occasion. Whether or not the wording was correct or not in the initial stage, I do believe that the Corporal Tillman deserved the award that he received.

Mr. Clay. Thank you for your response. General, please?

General Brown. Sir, I believe that I agree with General Abizaid. I have talked to General McChrystal several times and the actions of Corporal Tillman, based on the discussion I had with General McChrystal, certainly would warrant a Silver Star. Awards goes through service channels, as everyone else here has mentioned here, and do not go through Special Operations Command, Tampa, FL. It is an administrative command, goes through the administrative chain, which is U.S. Army, not Special Operations Command.

Mr. Clay. Thank you for your response, and over and over and again what we have heard -- Mr. Chairman, may I conclude?

Chairman Waxman. If you will conclude.

Mr. Clay. We have heard the excuse that the military did not want to tell the Tillman family and the American public about the fratricide until the investigation was complete. As General McChrystal put it, they didn't want to put out a half baked story. But they did put out a half baked story. It was the Silver Star. They didn't wait for the results of the investigation. They rushed forward with false statements, and that is why the military now faces such skepticism about its motives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Clay. Mr. Bilbray.

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Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, Mr. Chairman, it is sad that the incidence of what historically has been called blue-on-blue is as old as warfare itself. And it doesn't make it any easier to address this issue.

You know, Mr. Chairman, this hearing really strikes home in a lot of ways. I was just sitting here thinking about the Tillman family and, let's face it, when you lose a child, you lose a son or a daughter, in the best of situations it is a tragedy and a family crisis. Add blue-on-blue and it just adds that much weight on your back.

And I must apologize, Mr. Chairman, I don't know how much of this hearing I'm going to sit through. I just realized that today is the 23rd anniversary of my first son dying and I just kind of relate to what would happen if Philip had been the young man who died in a blue-on-blue incident.

But let me just sort of back up and say, Mr. Secretary, we've always give the different branches of the armed services flexibility to create a lot of their own internal policies, but on this one and the notification and the procedures on not just blue- on-blue but also any armed service death, do you think we should be developing a uniform strategy that will be required to be carried out by the Marines the same as the Army or any other armed services or do you believe that we should still maintain the flexibility allowing the individual services to handle the situation in their manner?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I think the views of the general officers here and their indication that they think this is something that might best be handled in a uniform manner are persuasive to me. I do think that I am not in a position to say that all of the differing positions and policies that the services have necessarily ought to be exactly the same. I am a great believer in jointness and we have given enormous effort to that over the past 6 years.

But as one example, the tours of Army people tend to be a year and the tours of Marines tend to be 7 months, and that creates a perceived inequity on the part of some families and other people. And I have had meeting after meeting on it suggesting that they find a common length of time for a tour, and they believe very deeply that the differences fit the respective services properly. So I think one size doesn't fit all, necessarily.

Mr. Bilbray. Let me say as somebody who was raised in a military family, I support that concept that the services are different and they are designed to be different. The big decision we made after World War II was not to make them a uniform service, specifically to give that kind of diversity of service.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to close by saying that I think the frustration of any family that loses a child is that you always look around and say what went wrong? Who is lying to me? What information doesn't happen? And with a blue-on- blue situation it is just really aggravated and I hope that we have learned from this.

But as somebody who has now reflected after 23 years of loss of a child that if there is anything that we ought to understand is that it is not only a responsibility of us to inform properly, but it is the right of the family. Nothing else, no matter how much you may think you are trying to protect them, the worst thing you can do is not give the family the truth up front as soon as possible. And I think that is a right that every family has and that every armed service member has earned for their family, that the truth is something that is the minimum that the families are deserving of.

And I yield back to the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.

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Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. And because in recognition of the Tillman family being here today, we have talked about them a lot without fully trying to do what we can to correct what is left of the situation. I would like to go back to the Silver Star. My understanding, correct me if I am wrong, Corporal Tillman stood up to identify his unit, left a position where he could have survived, in order to stop the friendly fire. Is that correct? Anyone dispute that? OK.

So the bottom line is one of the most heroic acts anybody could do is what Corporal Tillman did that day. Is there anything in our regulations that would prevent him from receiving a Silver Star simply because he stood up to protect his people from friendly fire?

General Myers. No.

General Abizaid. No.

Mr. Issa. So as we sit here today, Corporal Tillman is every bit entitled to and will continue to be a person who earned a Silver Star, and maybe more. And the point of how he died is that, and not who fired the shots. Is that correct for the record?

General Myers. I believe that is correct. Absolutely correct.

General Abizaid. I agree.

Mr. Issa. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes.

Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Braley.

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Mr. Braley. Secretary Rumsfeld, does the name Michael Mullen mean anything to you?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Of course.

Mr. Braley. And can you tell us how you became aware of the name of Michael Mullen?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Oh, I can't. He was the, as I recall, the deputy to Admiral Vern Clark, if you are talking about the father. There is also a son named Mike Mullen who is, I believe, a lieutenant junior grade.

Mr. Braley. The Michael Mullen I am referring to was a young man who was killed in 1970 while serving with the 198th Light Armored Americal Division near Chu Lai. His mother, Peg Mullen, is a constituent of mine, who lives in Waterloo, IA, and was the subject of a book called Friendly Fire, that traced the history of fratricide, and specifically the problem of fratricide in Vietnam.

And as part of a congressional delegation who went to Vietnam early in the 1960's during the Americanization effort there and was part of a comprehensive investigation of some of the U.S. economic, military, and assistance programs, and came back to Congress as a young Member of Congress very critical of the way some of those programs were being operated, I just was wondering whether during this period of time you were aware of the problem of fratricide, specifically because of the visibility that this one particular incident presented?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Obviously, I was responding to the name Mike Mullen referring to the current Chief of Naval Operations and his son, as opposed to the individual you are referring to. Needless to say, I have been aware of fratricide as a problem for many, many decades.

Mr. Braley. In fact, General Stonewall Jackson was an early example of fratricide that a lot of people in the military are taught during military history courses. So this concept of fratricide and the impact it has on unit morale is something that has been known a long time. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes.

Mr. Braley. One of the concerns that Peg Mullen raised when she embarked on this crusade to educate the American public about the problem of fratricide in Vietnam, was a concern that the American people, and specifically American families, were not being given the whole truth about the circumstances of their loved one's death. And yet the example that we have been covering during these two hearings seems to suggest that very little has been learned in terms of how the military chain of command is dealing with fratricide.

What lessons would you like us to take away, as the body responsible for oversight, on what we can do better to make sure that future families, like the Tillman family, don't have to go through this?

Mr. Rumsfeld. You are addressing that to me?

Mr. Braley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rumsfeld. I think the comments that have been made, and some of the corrections that have been taken by the Army, and the indication that General Brown has discussed with respect to greater degree of uniformity in reporting requirements are probably all steps in the right direction. I think what you are dealing with here is you are always dealing with human beings, and human beings make mistakes, and human beings do things they shouldn't do. And it is tragic and it is unfortunate, but it is reality.

Mr. Braley. And isn't it one of the most important lessons we teach our children that when you make a mistake, you become accountable for that mistake and you vow not to repeat the mistake?

Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.

Mr. Braley. And do you feel that the Army's response to this tragedy has been a good example to the children of this country of accepting responsibility and accountability for how this evolved?

Mr. Rumsfeld. I expressed myself on a number of occasions in memorandums that were read earlier in the hearing that indicated my concern about the way the Army was handling the matter. I am not in a position to comment on the most recent effort that Secretary Geren and General Wallace have undertaken, because I just simply have not read what they have decided to do. But there is no question but that there were -- that this has been a terribly unfortunate matter, and the handling of it has contributed to the grief that fine family has experienced.

Mr. Braley. General Myers, my next question is for you. You made the comment during your testimony, we need to keep this in mind -- this reference to fratricide that we have been discussing and the P-4 memo. In case we go before the press, we need to calibrate this thing with that in mind. Do you recall that testimony?

General Myers. Absolutely.

Mr. Braley. What steps did you take, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, once you became aware that the dissemination of information about this event was inaccurate and potentially misleading?

General Myers. Well, I didn't become aware of that until much, much later. All I was referring to at that point was, as the Secretary discussed, and I think I discussed as well, is that we knew two things. We knew that Corporal Tillman had been killed, and then a few days later we knew that there was a possibility of fratricide.

So my comment was on, given that there is an investigation ongoing, we have just got to be careful how we speak about this because of the command influence. And that is what defense lawyers use to get people off, when there is undue command influence. You have to be very careful what you say.

Mr. Braley. In fact --

General Myers. That was the context of what --

Mr. Braley [continuing]. Those are similar to the precise concerns raised in this P-4, where the author said suspected reports that POTUS, the President of the United States, and the Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillman's heroism in speeches currently being prepared. And then it says, "I felt that it was essential that you receive this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country's leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death become public.'' And the circumstances he is referring to here are the circumstances involving fratricide. Correct?

General Myers. The possibility of fratricide, right.

Mr. Braley. So if you had access to the potential that fratricide was involved and you were aware that public statements were being made by the President and others about Corporal Tillman's heroism, can you explain to the committee what steps you took, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to raise concerns that this information might be misleading?

General Myers. Bear in mind I did not see the P-4, so I didn't have the benefit of General McChrystal's wisdom.

Mr. Braley. Let's eliminate the P-4.

Ms. Norton [presiding]. Let him answer the question, and then the gentleman's time has expired.

General Myers. Can I finish answering?

Ms. Norton. You can finish answering the question.

General Myers. What logically I would have done, and I do not recall this nor does the Secretary recall, that we would have had a discussion that there is potential for fratricide. And that would have been probably -- I didn't know the President was speaking about Corporal Tillman. I mean, that would not be something I would know.

Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Shays for 5 minutes.

Mr. Rumsfeld. Madam Chairman, may I just make a comment on that same point?

Ms. Norton. Yes, you may. Go ahead.

Mr. Rumsfeld. I indicated that I have been reading some of the materials, and there has been some confusion, I think, about the White House. I have never heard of this person who apparently sent an e-mail to the Pentagon. But the person who responded from the Pentagon was described in a hearing as a speechwriter. And she was actually a fact-checker, not a speechwriter.

And second, my understanding of the e-mails that went back and forth, which I was not aware of at the time but I have familiarized myself with since, is that the subject that they were discussing in the e-mails was not the nature of his death, but rather the nature of his enlistment, and that was the subject that was being asked, apparently, by the White House of a fact- checker in the Pentagon.

Thank you, Mrs. Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Shays for 5 minutes.

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Mr. Shays. Thank you. We all agree that Pat Tillman is a true American hero, however he died. He died in battle risking his life, and he volunteered for service. And it is also clear he was such a high-profile member of the Army and the Special Forces, it is understandable his death would have gotten special attention. And frankly, it would be surprising if it didn't.

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for being here today. I want to thank you for rearranging your schedule to be here. I think this is perhaps one of the first appearances you have had in Congress since you have retired as Secretary. And I want to thank you, Chairman Myers, and Generals Abizaid and Brown, for being here.

And I want to say I did not choose to ask questions at the beginning. I think it centers around, you know, two issues. Who knew what when, and who did they tell? And those answers have come by pretty quickly. So, you know, it is almost like let's get on with it. And we have General Kensinger, who clearly needs to be here. But you really answered the questions. And you are on record, and you are under oath, and so -- but what I wrestle with in this committee is we had one hearing where we were going to subpoena Condoleezza Rice on yellowcake to try to determine that -- we had a hearing this week on the embassy in Iraq, and the whole focus was on a temporary structure that wasn't built as well as it could have been electronically for $6,000, when we have learned that the embassy in fact is on schedule and is built under cost. And now we have this hearing.

And what I am wrestling with, and I just want to say this, Madam Chairman, is there are a lot of important issues. I mean I have had differences with the Secretary and others that it would have been interesting to have a dialog about that. Our men and women are risking their lives every day. I mean I wrestled with Abu Ghraib, one, that it should never have happened, but we spent a whole year exposing our dirty laundry while our men and women are risking their lives. I am hard-pressed to know how this is going to save one American life. I am hard-pressed to know how this is going to help us achieve the results that we need to achieve in Iraq or Afghanistan. And we have asked some of our best and brightest to come and spend their time talking about this.

And so as far as I am concerned, gentlemen, you have answered the question. And I am particularly grateful, Mr. Rumsfeld, that you called their bluff, because really what they wanted is for you to not show up, in my judgment. For you not to show up, and then they could keep criticizing you.

So is there anything that you all would like to put on the record that you think needs to be put on the record that isn't part of the record? And I would be happy to use my time that way.

Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would you yield?

Mr. Shays. Absolutely.

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Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask a question. General Abizaid, you said personal e-mails from the field are a common method of communication. I think we have all been there and seen that and talked to families. Do you or any of you know whether the Inspector General or the CID investigation looked at personal e-mails about the Tillman matter sent from the battlefield?

General Abizaid. Sir, I don't know. I believe that every record was open to them. They came to my headquarters. I think they went to all the headquarters.

Mr. Davis of Virginia. Personal e-mails wouldn't have been part of that necessarily, would they?

General Abizaid. I can't tell you whether they looked at that or not, sir.

Mr. Davis of Virginia. That could be a source of information from the committee dealing with what happened down on the ground, Mr. Shays, not what happened here. I think these members, they have come up here and they have spent the morning with us, but I am not sure they have a lot to share. But thank you very much.

General Abizaid. Although I would say, Congressman, that I think from Afghanistan it is a lot different than Iraq. Afghanistan is very, very isolated, and it is difficult for information to flow as freely from that theater as Iraq.