Chapter 1, Part 3
Biological Warfare Defense
The following section, describing the types, dissemination, and defensive measures against biological agents, is quoted verbatim from a United States Marine Corps Institute document, Nuclear and Chemical Operations, MCI 7711B, used in the Command and Staff College's nonresident program. It is clear from this document that the Department of Defense recognizes both the threat and U.S. vulnerability to biological weapons. This document also outlines the Department's understanding of what actions should be taken in the event that a biological weapon has been or is suspected to have been employed.
"Biological agents cannot be detected by the human senses. A person could become a casualty before he is aware he has been exposed to a biological agent. An aerosol or mist of biological agent is borne in the air. These agents can silently and effectively attack man, animals, plants, and in some cases, material. Agents can be tailored for a specific type of target. [60]
Methods of using antipersonnel agents undoubtedly vary so that no uniform pattern of employment or operation is evident. It is likely that agents will be used in combinations so that the disease symptoms will confuse diagnosis and interfere with proper treatment. It is also probable that biological agents would be used in heavy concentrations to insure a high percentage of infection in the target area. The use of such concentrations could result in the breakdown of individual immunity because the large number of micro-organisms entering the body could overwhelm the natural body defenses. [61]
Types of Biological Agents
Different antipersonnel agents require varying periods of time before they take effect, and the periods of time for which they will incapacitate a person also vary. Most of these diseases having antipersonnel employment potential are found among a group of diseases that are naturally transmitted between animals and man. Mankind is highly vulnerable to them since he has little contact with animals in today's urban society. The micro-organisms of possible use in warfare are found in four naturally occurring groups -- the fungi, bacteria, rickettsiae, and viruses. [62]
a. Fungi. Fungi occur in many forms and are found almost everywhere. They range in size from a single cell, such as yeast, to multicellular forms, such as mushrooms and puffballs. Their greatest employment potential is against plants, although some forms cause disease in man. A fungus causes the disease coccidioidomycosis in man. Other common infections caused by Fungi include ringworm and "athletes foot." [63]
b. Bacteria. Bacteria comprises a large and varied group of organisms. They occur in varying shapes, such as rods, spheres, and spirals, but they are all one-celled plants. Some bacteria can assume a resistant structure called a spore, which enables them to resist adverse environmental conditions. Others may produce poisonous substances called toxins. Examples of human disease caused by bacteria are anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, staphylococcus, and streptococcus. [64]
c. Rickettsiae. Rickettsiae organisms have the physical appearance of bacteria and the growth characteristics of viruses. Members of this group must have living tissue for growth and reproduction, whereas most fungi and bacteria can be grown on artificial material. Another characteristic of rickettsiae is that most diseases caused by this group are transmitted by the bite of an insect, such as the mosquito, mite, or tick. Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Q fever, and typhus are diseases of mankind caused by rickettsiae. [65]
d. Virus. The smallest living things known to mankind are viruses. Viruses are so small that an electron microscope is required to see them. Viruses cannot be grown in the absence of living tissue. Diseases which are caused by viruses cannot normally be treated with antibiotics. Viruses cause yellow fever, rabies, and poliomyelitis. [66]
Dissemination of Biological Agents
a. Aerosol. Biological agents may be disseminated on, or over, the target by many means, such as aircraft, missiles, and explosive munitions. These devices produce a biological aerosol, and, if antipersonnel biological agents are ever used, they will probably be disseminated in the form of biological mists or aerosols. This method of dissemination would be extremely effective because the micro-organisms would be drawn into the lungs as a person breathes, and there they would be rapidly absorbed into the blood stream. The hours from dusk until dawn appear to be the best time for dissemination of biological agents. The weather conditions are most favorable for these agents at night, since sunlight will destroy many of them. In field trials, using harmless biological aerosols, area coverages of thousands of square miles have been accomplished. The aerosol particles were carried for long distances by air currents. [67](emphasis added)
b. Living Hosts. Personnel may be infected by disease carrying vectors, such as insects, rats, or other animals. Mosquitos may spread malaria, yellow fever, or encephalitis; rats spread plague (any mammal may carry rabies). Militarily, specific vectors may be selected, infected as required, and then released in the target area to seek out their human victims and pass on the disease. Since infection is transmitted through a bite in the skin, protective masks offer no protection. A vector borne agent may remain in the target area for as long as there are live hosts; thus, a major disadvantage results. The vector borne agent can become a permanent hazard in the area as the host infects others of his species. [68]
c. Food and Water Contamination. Biological agents could also be delivered to target personnel by placing the agent in food and water supplies (sabotage). This type of attack would probably be directed against small targets, such as industrial complexes, headquarters, or specific individuals. The methods of delivering the attack are many and varied. [69]
Defensive Measures
The United States carries out research aimed at improved means of detection of biological agents and treatment and immunization of personnel. Both of these are essential to biological defense. [70]
a. Before an Attack: The inability of the individual to detect a biological attack is perhaps the greatest problem. Contributing factors are the delay experienced before the onset of symptoms and the time required to identify specific agents. Without an adequate means of detection, complete defensive measures may not be taken since an attack must first be detected before you can defend against it. Diseases caused by biological agents do not appear until a few days to weeks after contact with the agent. Personnel are protected against biological agents in aerosol form by the protective mask. Ordinary clothing protects the skin from contamination by biological agents. Other means of protection include immunizations; quarantining contaminated areas; cleanliness of the body, clothing, and living quarters; stringent rodent and pest control; proper care of cuts and wounds; and education of troops to eat and drink only from approved sources. [71]
b. After an Attack: After a biological agent attack has occurred, it will be necessary to identify the agent used in the attack so that proper medical treatment may be given to exposed personnel. To perform this identification, it is necessary to collect samples or objects from the contaminated area and send them to a laboratory or suitable facility for processing. Samples may be taken from the air, from contaminated surfaces, or from contaminated water. After the sample is taken, laboratory time will be required to identify the suspected biological agent. The length of time for identification is being significantly shortened through the use of new medical and laboratory techniques. Proper defensive actions taken during a biological attack depend upon the rapid detection of the attack. Biological defense is continuous. You must always be prepared for the employment of these weapons. [72] (emphasis added)
Iraq's Experience in the Use of Chemical Warfare Agents
The fears and the precautions taken prior to the Gulf War were not the product of excessive hysteria. Five United Nations reports have confirmed the use of chemical warfare agents in the Iran-Iraq War. [73] Use of chemical weapons against both the Kurds and Shiite Moslems within Iraq is well documented. Press reports also document Iraqi readiness to use these weapons against Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War.
In April 1993, two U.S. based human rights organizations confirmed that they had found residues of chemical weapons used by the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein against Kurdish village in northern Iraq in 1988. These groups, Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, said they had used advanced analytical techniques to discover the presence of mustard gas and the nerve gas Sarin. Those chemical weapons reportedly were dropped by aircraft on August 25, 1988 and killed four people in the Kurdish village of Birjinni. [74] Testimony from survivors of the Birjinni bombing, who said victims of the raids died writhing and coughing blood, led to accusations that Iraq had gassed its own citizens as part of a campaign against rebellious Kurds that killed tens of thousands. [75] This was the first time that scientists had been able to prove the use of chemical weapons, and especially a nerve gas, through the analysis of environmental residue acquired years after such an attack occurred. [76]
Soil samples were gathered from the 1988 bombing sites and then delivered to a British laboratory. Chemists at Porton Down found traces of mustard gas and Sarin. Dr. Graham Pearson, director of the British Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, verified these results and confirmed the samples were taken from bomb craters near the northern Iraqi village of Birjinni in June 1992. The byproducts of the breakdown of these poisons are so specific that they provide a "unique fingerprint" in chemical analysis that points directly to a poison gas attack. [77]
An earlier attack had been reported on March 17, 1988 on the village of Halabja. Amnesty International reported that chemical weapons were used in an attack by Iraq, in which "some 5,000 Kurds were killed within an hour." [78] A U.N. team sent to investigate the attack found evidence of chemical weapons, although they did not rule on who carried out the attack on the town, which had been occupied by Iran since mid-March. [79]
On September 26, 1993, Shiite rebels living in the southern Iraqi marshlands reported an early morning shelling attack by Iraqi forces. The eyewitnesses, who spoke with a New York Times reporter, mentioned that the shells landed with a thud "and not the usual explosion" sending up white clouds. The artillery attack was followed by a ground assault by Iraqi troops who were equipped with gas masks. [80]
A Shiite rebel claimed that upon entering one of the Iraqi armored personnel carriers they found battle orders calling for a chemical attack. Rebel leaders provided a copy of the captured orders. Written in Arabic on the twenty-sixth of September, the orders, numbered 1-15, instructed the Iraqi soldiers to use chemical weapons to "retake the village" and that "each soldier must be instructed on how to respond during the chemical attack." [81]
After the attack, some villagers returned for their belongings, but there was nothing left. They discovered that trees and plants had withered and yellowed. Furthermore, "the cats, the dogs, the birds and even the water snakes had died. But for some reason the victims had been removed by the troops. We saw no bodies." [82]
In November 1993, a nine member U.N. inspection team arrived to take samples from the area of the alleged chemical attack. The results of the inspection were inconclusive.
It is also suspected that Iraq may have used biological agents (mycotoxins) during the 1984 attack on Majnoon Island, during the Iran-Iraq War, and in 1988 against the Kurds (cholera and typhus). However, no medical verification of Iraqi use of biological warfare agents yet exists. [83]
The above documented instances of chemical weapons use (and suspected use) against Iranians, Kurds, and Shiites undermine Department of Defense assertions that Iraq may not have used these weapons against Coalition forces because they "feared contamination of their own men." [81] Marine Brigadier General Richard Neil said that prisoner debriefings of Persian Gulf War EPWs had "yielded the impression that the Iraqis were not comfortable operating in a chemical environment...and...Iraqi soldiers had poor chemical protection equipment of their own." [82] Lt. General Thomas Kelly stated in a press briefing that "the Iraqi Army was very uncomfortable, we are finding out from the POWs, about the use of chemical weapons because they are not familiar with it." [83] However, as the preceding paragraphs make clear, the Iraqi Army had operational experience with the use of these weapons, unlike their American counterparts.
Gulf War Syndrome: The Case for Chemical/Biological Agent Exposure
As the preceding sections of this report make clear, the Government of Iraq possessed a large and sophisticated chemical and biological weapons production complex. Iraq's army, organized and equipped along Soviet lines, also appeared to employ Soviet chemical warfare doctrine, which advocated the use of mixed agent warfare. Iraq used these weapons against its own people in the 1980's, and possibly again in 1993. It should not be surprising that Baghdad would also use every weapon in its arsenal against the much more serious threat to its own survival posed by the massed Coalition forces. Additionally, the release of chemical and biological agents as a result of Coalition bombing should have been expected by the Allied forces, based upon their own doctrine regarding the dispersal of chemical agents.
Several theories have been put forward to explain the cause(s) of Gulf War Syndrome. Most of them lack credibility because they do not explain transmission of similar symptoms across a broad and dissimilar population whose only commonality was the service of a family member in the Persian Gulf theater of operations or contact with materiel returned from that venue. Meanwhile, the passage of over three years since the appearance of the first symptoms, and the inability of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs to find a cause, suggests that the illnesses may be caused by something that these institutions have not examined. Further, the absence of credible and verifiable published scientific research on the syndrome by the these agencies, providing specifics of the types of laboratory research that have been conducted, case histories, and methodologies used, leaves each interested scientist in the dark as to what diagnostic processes have been attempted and which have failed.
There is a growing body of evidence, outlined in detail below, which supports the claims of Gulf War veterans that exposure to chemical and/or biological warfare agents may be the cause of the complex of illnesses they currently suffer. There appear to be four primary sources of exposure: 1) As a result of direct attack, via missile, rocket, artillery, or aircraft munitions; 2) As a result of intermittent low-level exposure to fallout from Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical and biological warfare plants and munitions bunkers; 3) As a result of administration of a nerve agent pre-treatment drug that acts in a manner similar to actual nerve agent; and, 4) as a result of continuing contact with the Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). In addition, there appear to be two secondary sources of exposure: 1) Exposure to occupational/environmental hazards in Southwest Asia and to contaminated material returned from the theater of operations, and 2) transmission among family members. Exposure to endemic diseases and illnesses and diseases must also be thoroughly researched.
Hundreds of Gulf War veterans have been interviewed by the Committee staff. The events cited below are included because the veterans reporting them could remember approximately when they occurred, or because there were multiple independent confirming sources. A map showing the location of these events appears at the end of this section.
_______________
Notes:
60. Nuclear and Chemical Operations, MCI 7711B, Marine Corps Institute, Command and Staff College's nonresident program (Marine Barracks, Washington, DC, 1983), p. 8, section 1501.
61. lbid.
62. Ibid. p. 9, section 1502.
63. Ibid, p 9, section 1502a.
64. Ibid, p. 9, Section 1502b.
65. Ibid, p 9, Section 1502c.
66. Ibid, p 9, Section 1502d.
67. Ibid, p 9. Section 1503a.
68. Ibid, p 9, Section 1503b.
69. Ibid, p 9. Section 1503c.
70. Ibid, p. 10, Section 1504.
71. Ibid, p 10, Section 1504a.
72. Ibid, p 10, Section 1504b.
73. Steven R Bowman, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief: Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Issues for Congress. 1B90084 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and Defense Division. Updated August 17, 1993) 2.
74. "Washington Dateline: Group Offers Evidence Iraq Used Poison Gas Against Own People," Associated Press (April 29, 1993), PM Cycle; Deborah Zabarenko, "Scientists: Lab Shows Iraq Used Poison Gas on Kurds," Reuters (April 29. 1993), EC Cycle.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. "British Lab Shows Iraq Used Poison Gas on Kurds," Associated Press. Press Newsfile (April 29, 1993).
78. Patricia Dibsie, "Kurds Demonstrate in Memory of 5,000 Killed by Iraqi Weapons," San Diego Union Tribune, (March 18, 1994).
79. "Iraq Says it Has Launched a New Offensive Against Iran," Reuters, (May 28, 1988), P.M. Cycle
80. Chris Hedges, "In a Remote Southern Marsh, Iraq is Strangling the Shiites," New York Times (November 16, 1993), A1.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Thomas Hargrove, "Doctors Say Gulf War Vets Gasses: Biological Weapons Believed Responsible for Mysterious Ailments of Returned US Troops," San Francisco Examiner (November 17, 1993), A7; H. Kadivar and S.C. Adams, "Treatment of Chemical and Biological Warfare Injuries; Insights Derived From the 1984 Attack on Majnoon Island," Military Medicine, (April 1991), 171-7. A. Heyndrickx, "Chemical Warfare Injuries," The Lancet. Vol. 337 (February 16. 1991).
81. Tony Walker, "The Gulf Ceasefire; Formal Ceasefire Talks to Begin Soon -- Victors Will Meet Vanquished Amid Claims of Truce Violations, Financial Times, (March 2, 1991).
82. Ann Deuroy and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush to Move Fast on Mideast Peace, Ceasefire Talks Delayed by Technical Details'." Washington Post, (March 2, 1991), A1.
83. Federal News Service, Department of Defense Regular Briefing (March 4, 1991).
United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
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Chapter 2: Group I Exposures: Reported Direct Exposure Events
A number of direct exposure events are described below as reported by members of the U.S. Armed Forces who served in the Gulf War. Not every detail can be verified by multiple sources to date, but additional data from unofficial and unrelated sources continue to bolster initial accounts of events best explained as missile and rocket attacks or aerial explosions. Units located in areas where these events occurred are reporting high rates of illnesses. The areas in which these events occurred were key logistic and staging areas, as well as those areas which were breached during the liberations of Kuwait. Many veterans of these units have reported seeing large numbers of dead or dying animals in the area after the attacks; one veteran noted that "all the insects were dead too."
Department of Defense conclusions that no chemical or biological attacks occurred seem to be based on the assumption that there was no significant evidence of immediate chemical and biological casualties. However, since one of the primary goals of a biological attack is to debilitate your adversary's forces, while retaining a high degree of deniability, and since many of those interviewed describe both immediate physical reactions and long term debilitating effect, the issue of what these individuals may have been exposed to becomes highly critical.
Event 1:
January 17, 1991, early morning hours Cement City
Mr. Willie HIcks, then with the 644th Ordinance Company, was serving as the non-commissioned officer in charge of arms and ammunitions shipments. Staff Sergeant Hicks has testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services' Subcommittee for Force Structure and Personnel that, at about 2:30a.m. on January 17, 1991, he heard a loud explosion, which was followed by a sounding of alarms. As Hicks was running to the bunker, his face began to burn. One member of the unit "just dropped." About ten minutes later, according to Hicks, the unit's first sergeant came by and told members of the unit to go to the highest level of alert. The unit remained at that level for 24 hours.
Two or three days later, Hicks began feeling ill and noticed blood in his urine. Several other members of the unit began experiencing "problems" with their rectums. Hicks testified that when members of the unit began to question what had happened, they were ordered by their commanding officer not to discuss it. Of the unit's 100 soldiers, 85 now suffer from medical problems, and one, Staff Sergeant Bayle, who Hicks described as having been in good physical shape, has inexplicably died. HIcks described another member of the unit, Staff Sergeant Heal, as being seriously incapacitated.
Hicks, a former teacher and Vietnam veteran, carries a notebook with him everywhere. He claims to have a severe problem with memory loss. He quit his job because he kept passing out and getting lost on the way to work. Other symptoms being suffered by Mr. Hicks include headaches, blood in his urine, insomnia, joint and muscle pain, deteriorating vision, loss of mobility in his left arm, night sweats, and diarrhea (sometimes bloody). His illness has been classified by the Veterans Administration as post traumatic stress disorder.
Event 2:
January 19, 1991, early morning hours. Camp 13, 6-7 miles west of Port of Jubayl, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Although some individuals reported this event as taking place on January 20, documentary evidence indicates that it took place on the 19th.)
Witness 01: Petty Officer Sterling Symms, then assigned to the Naval Reserve Construction Battalion 24, in an area south of the Kuwait border, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that between 2:00a.m. and 3:00a.m. on January 20, 1991, there was a "real bad explosion" overhead. The alarms went off and everybody started running towards their bunkers. Petty Officer Symms said there was a sharp odor of ammonia in the air. His eyes burned and his skin stung. HIs unit donned full chemical gear for nearly two hours until the "all clear" was given. [1]
Later, according to Symms, members of the unit were advised that what they heard was a sonic boom. Petty Officer Symms said that he did not believe that it was a sonic boom because there was also a "fireball" associated with the explosion. Members of the unit were ordered not to discuss the incident. Petty Officer Symms says he has since experienced fatigue, sore joints, running nose, a chronic severe rash, and open sores which have been diagnosed as an "itching problem." He has also been treated for streptococcus infections. In his testimony, Symms stated that 4 or 5 other members of his unit and two of their wives have been treated for similar infections. [2]
Witness 02: Mike Moore, assigned to the same unit as Symms, also reported that on January 20, 1991, at about 3a.m., he was awakened by a double explosion. As the sound of the explosion faded the alarms went off. The unit intercom announced "Go to MOPP level 4." Everyone in the tent put on their gas gear and went to the bunker. They stayed at MOPP level 4 until about 7a.m.. Later that day or the next, everyone's chemical suits and masks were collected and replaced. According to Mr. Moore, he was told the explosion was a sonic boom, to quit worrying about it, and to get back to work. Mr. Moore said that he later heard that what he heard was an incoming SCUD, but he also heard rumors that a Iraqi MIG was shot down in the area that night.
Mr. Moore said that he did not feel a spray or smell ammonia. He had no stinging or numb lips. Since returning home from the Gulf, he has suffered a severe thyroid problem, a heart attack, memory loss, tired and aching joints, rashes on his feet, nervousness, and muscle cramps, although he reported no bleeding. According to Mr. Moore, he has had about ten blood tests and two sets of x-rays performed at the Tuskeegee, Alabama, Veterans Affairs Medical Center. In past calls to the Tuskeegee, Alabama, VAMC, however, he had been told that there is no information in his record.
In February 1992, Mr. Moore's daughter began developing a thyroid problem and has been suffering from nervousness, headaches, and fatigue. Over the last year, his wife has begun to develop these symptoms as well. There is no history of thyroid problems in family.
Witness 03: Mr. William Larry Kay was an electrician assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. He was also assigned to Camp 13. On January 20, 1991, Mr. Kay heard two "booms", shaking the whole building. Sirens began going off. The camp intercom announced "confirmed mustard gas -- go to MOPP level 4." Mr. Kay was at the Recreation Center when the blasts occurred. He had fallen asleep. He went outside and put his gas mask on. It immediately filled with fumes. He recalls that it smelled like ammonia. Mr. Kay has been a member of a Hazmat (Hazardous Materials) team of the fire department in Columbus, Georgia; he said the strong smell of ammonia is unusual in an open area. There was an ammonia plant nearby, but he had never smelled such a strong odor of ammonia in the area. He reported to his assigned bunker. Each member of the unit had a duty during these attacks -- Mr. Kay was assigned to a decontamination team. There were other people assigned to test for chemical contamination. A radio call came in for these people to check for gas. Then, almost immediately, the intercom announced "all clear."
Mr. Kay said that after the incident, in response to questions from the unit as to what had occurrred, the unit Commanding Officer said "Have you ever heard of a sonic boom?" When members of the unit continued to question the unit commanders about what had occurred, they were ordered not to discuss the incident.
Witness 04: Mr. Terry Avery of Salem, Alabama worked on utilities for Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, and was also assigned to Camp 13. During the night of January 20, 1991, Mr. Avery said that he heard a double explosion. The alert siren went off. He put on his gas mask and went to the bunker. While in the bunker, his unit received the command to go to MOPP level 4 over the camp loudspeaker. He put on his chemical suit. Mr. Avery said he was almost completely dressed when they announced "all clear." He left the bunker and returned to his tent.
Mr. Avery was later told by his Master Chief that the noise he heard was just a sonic boom. A veteran of Vietnam who had heard sonic booms before, Mr. Avery felt that it was not a sonic boom, but he never got a good answer about the explosion. He reported that the rumor going around the camp was that an enemy plane had been shot down over the desert.
Late in the summer of 1991, Mr. Avery began feeling tired and having headaches. He saw a private doctor, who said he was probably working too hard in the sun. He says he does not think he is as ill as the rest of the men in his unit (NMCB24). He feels that he has leveled out, but he still has good days and bad days. He currently suffers from fatigue, headaches, weight gain, itching, muscle and joint pains, and memory loss (inability to concentrate).
His wife is also ill. Mr. Avery feels that she is more ill than he is. She has an enlarged spleen, an enlarged liver and abnormal liver functions, joint pains, night sweats, fatigue, stomach problems, itching, and rashes, but has not complained of memory loss. Two of his children are also complaining of headaches, joint pain, and abdominal pains. His 13 year old daughter was diagnosed as having mononucleosis. She also has sinus infections, and throat pains from the sinus drainage. His 11 year old son has had rashes, headaches, joint pain, itching, sinus and throat infections, and fevers.
Witness 05: The following are excerpts from one of two letters written by a U.S. serviceman present at Camp 13 during the January 19, 1991 incident. This individual has been interviewed by U.S. Senate professional staff. These original letters confirm the actual events of that morning. This individual has requested confidentiality. The original letters have been retained as evidence.
"8:00 pm
19 Jan 91
In the interview with Senate staff, the individual said that during patrols around Camp 13 in the days just after the incident he wrote about, he observed many animals that were either sick or dead. He also confirmed that after the attack, their chemical protective gear was replaced.
Witness 06: Mr. Mike Tidd was assigned to perform security duties with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. He currently suffers from joint aches and pains, sinus infections, diarrhea, urinary urgency and frequency, rashes, small mosquito bite-like sores, heartburn, dizziness, occasional low temperatures, occasional night sweats, and chronic fatigue. Mr. Tidd kept a log while in Saudi Arabia.
According to his log, on January 19, a little past 0330hrs., Mr. Tidd was sitting on Tower 6 when all of a sudden, there was a double boom off to the northwest of the camp, accompanied by a bright flash of light. Within minutes, the general quarters alarm sounded. Mr. Tidd's unit first donned their gas masks and ponchos, and then minutes later, the call came to go to MOPP level 4. At about 0600hrs, the "all clear" was sounded.
While Mr. Tidd heard the bang and saw the flash, which he described as being fairly close, he does not recall seeing a cloud. He said that he did not experience any symptoms, but attributes that to having been in a covered guard tower about 20 feet off the ground with a 3' visibility area.
Event 3:
January 19, 1991, early morning hours (possibly January 20). King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station (NMCB24-Air Det), 3 miles south of Port of Jubayl, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Mr. Larry Perry, of North Carolina, was a naval construction worker stationed near the port city of Al-Jubayl, at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station. He says the explosion on January 20, 1991 sent his entire unit running for the bomb shelter. When they emerged in their gas masks, they were enveloped by a mist.
Witness 02: Mr. Fred Willoughby of Columbus, Georgia was with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 - Air Det. He currently suffers from headaches, diarrhea, aching joints, blood shot eyes, bloat, intestional problems, and chronic fatigue. He has had a polyp removed from his colon, and suffered from rectal bleeding in 1992.
Mr. Willoughby has reported that on January 20, 1991, at about 3-4a.m., he was "hanging out" outside his tent when he heard a long, loud explosion. Shortly thereafter, a siren sounded and he went inside the tent to get his gas mask. By the time he came out, people were yelling 'MOPP 4, MOPP 4, not a drill'. Immediately, his mouth, lips, and face became numb all over, a sensation he likened to novocaine at the dentist's office. He was in the bunker for about an hour or an hour and a half. When he came out of the bunker, he and the others in the unit were told by the officers and chiefs that what they had heard was just a sonic boom. The next day, the unit was told not to talk about it. But the unit's MOPP gear was collected and replaced the next morning. Mr. Willoughby also heard that an enemy aircraft was shot down in the Gulf, not far from the base.
His wife has begun exhibiting similar symptoms, including fatigue, diarrhea, and aching joints.
Witness 03: Roy Morrow of Phenix City, Alabama was a builder with NMCB24 and was assigned to the Air Detachment at King Abdul Aziz Stadium. On January 20, 1991, he heard two explosions between 3:00-3:30a.m. He was awakened and went to the bunker. The unit went to MOPP level 2 for 25-30 minutes. The "all clear" was then given. When he exited the bunker, Mr. Morrow noticed the Marines running and screaming "MOPP level 4." The siren sounded again. He began to feel a burning sensation on his arms, legs, the back of his neck, and on his ears and face. His lips felt numb. His unit went to full MOPP level 4. Right before he went to the bunker the second time, Mr. Morrow saw a flash at the commercial port of Al-Jubayl. He had a radio in the bunker, and heard a call for the decontaminaton teams to respond.
BU2 Edwards was the head of the decontamination team in Mr. Morrow's unit. According to Mr. Morrow, BU2 Edwards said the next day that mustard gas and lewisite had been detected. When they began to discuss it, according to Mr. Morrow, the unit was told that the two explosions were a sonic boom, and they were ordered not to talk about it any more. The next day, all of their chemical gear was collected and replaced with new equipment.
The numbness experienced by Mr. Morrow remained for at least a week. Within two to three days after the incident, unit members began to suffer from rashes, diarrhea, and fatigue. The aching joints began a couple of weeks later. Mr. Morrow's symptoms have been getting progressively worse until the present time. He currently suffers from swollen lymph nodes, fatigue, diarrhea, night sweats, low grade temperature, weight loss, aching joints, muscle cramps, rashes (transient) blister, welts (2-3 times a month), a permanent hand rash, and short-term memory loss.
Witness 04: Mr. Harold Jerome Edwards, the chemical NCO in charge of the Nuclear/Biological/Chemical team for the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Air Detachment at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station was interviewed by U.S. Senate staff on January 13, 1994. During that interview Mr. Edwards said that he conducted three M-256 tests for chemical agents on the evening of this event. According to Edwards, two of the three tests he conducted were positive for chemical blister agent. He said that the negative test was conducted in an area in between a number of rows of tents. He also said that he reported this information to his unit commander. In addition, Mr. Edwards said that a member of the unit, Tom Muse, blistered in the area under his watch during this event. The "all clear" was given from a higher command. Mr. Edwards was called out to serve on a chemical decontamination team that day. He said that the Mark 12 decontamination unit assigned to the team was inoperative and that he was assigned to take out a 500 gallon water truck and stand by to decontaminate incoming personnel. According to Mr. Edwards, no one was decontaminated by his team. He said that this was the only time he was called out on this type of mission throughout the entire war.
Other Information Regarding the Detection of Chemical Agents at Jubayl.
Ken Allison, then a Lance Corporal with the 174th Marine Wing Support Squadron, Group 37, was delivering supplies to Jubayl Airfield. During an interview with Senate staff, he reported that sometime during his deployment there, possibly in January 1991, he saw a sign posted on a guard shack at the airfield's southern gate. The sign warned: that the area had tested positive for chemicals; make sure your MOPP gear was ready; and that when the alarms go off it is for real. Although he did not recall the exact wording on the sign, he remembered the content clearly.
In addition, a number of British military personnel suffering from Gulf War Syndrome who were stationed near the Port of Jubayl have come forward and have described similar events.
Event 4:
Late February 1991 "Log Base Charlie", 7 miles from the Iraqi border near Rafha
Witness 01: Ms. Valerie Sweatman from Columbia, South Carolina, was serving as a telecommunications specialist with the U.S. Army, assigned to the 2nd MASH Hospital. Ms. Sweatman recalls that prior to moving to "Log Base Orange" in Iraq during the ground war, her unit packed up their equipment at "Log Base Charlie." "Log Base Charlie" was located about 7 miles from the Iraqi border, near Rafha. One night in late February 1991, she was awakened by a sergeant and was told there was a chemical alert and to go to MOPP level 4. She put on her MOPP suit and mask and began going outside while she was still putting on her gloves. Her unit stayed at MOPP level 4 for 1- 2 hours. That night, she heard that at least one soldier had come into the hospital showing symptoms of nerve agent exposure. She was told that there was a SCUD alert that night. She did not, however, hear any explosion. The morning after this incident, Ms. Sweatman's hands were itching from the wrists on down. She had developed little blisters which went away about a week later. She was treated with ointments and benadryl for a "skin condition."
Ms. Sweatman had heard the chemical alarms go off on other occasions prior to the incident reported above. She was the night telecommunications NCO for her unit, and heard alarms sounding during the first nights of the air war, when her unit was assigned to King Khalid Military City (KKMC). On one occasion during this period, she heard a blast and felt a mist in the same area. After this incident she experienced nausea, diarrhea, and bloody stools. Her unit began taking the nerve agent pre- treatment pills (NAPP), after these earlier alarms. Although the alarms sounded, the NBC NCO claimed that they were sounding because the alarm equipment had bad batteries and not because of chemicals.
Ms. Sweatman currently suffers from headaches, exhaustion, fatigue, memory loss, nausea, muscle and joint pains, rectal and vaginal bleeding, and rashes. She has been diagnosed as having arthritis, headaches, and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Event 5:
Early February 1991 In the Desert Between Hafir Al Batin and King Khalid Military City, Northern Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Ms. Michelle Hanlon of Killeen, Texas was assigned to the 1st Calvary Division as a communications specialist. On February 14, 1991, during lunch, she heard an explosion overhead. She thought at the time that it was a SCUD being intercepted by a Patriot missile and thought nothing more of it.
On another occasion, when her unit was assigned to a field base near Hafir Al Batin, she recalled that one night, the night air breeze made her eyes begin to water. She immediately put on her gas mask and thought nothing more of the incident. She also reported that on a number of days, she could actually smell sulfur from the Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical plants during the air war.
She is currently suffering from intestinal problems, hemorrhoids, occasional fatigue, a rash on her finger (like little water blisters under the skin), cervical infections which coincide with intestinal problems, and some memory loss. She feels that she is becoming progressively more ill. Her rash has been diagnosed as exzema and has been treated with antibiotics. She is 23 years old. Her child, now 16 months old, has been getting fevers, yeast infections, rectal and penile disclorations.
Witness 02: Mr. Richard Voss was with the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade assigned to the 1st Infantry Division. Mr. Voss recalled witnessing what appeared to be a missile attack while stuck in slow-moving traffic heading west toward Hafir Al Batin on Tapline Road in early February 1991. Mr. Voss reports that sometime between noon and 4:00 p.m., he watched the missile, coming in from the north-northeast, impact to the east of Hafir Al Batin, about one mile away from his vehicle. He saw a large dark brown cloud rise up. Within two or three minutes, MPs came by giving the gas alert signal. He recalled that the wind was blowing from the north or northeast at the time of the incident. He continued to drive in traffic in MOPP gear for about 1-1/2 - 2 hours past Hafir Al Batin toward an assembly area. He got the "all clear" when he got near Log Base Echo.
Currently, Mr. Voss suffers from headaches, occasional fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss/inability to concentrate, urinary urgency, dizziness, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, rashes, recurring walking pneumonia, chest pains, numbness, and severe joint pains in both wrists and hands. His wife suffers from recurring yeast infections, menstrual irregularities, rashes, fatigue, muscle pain, and severe joint pain in her wrists.
_______________
Notes:
1. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Force Structure and Personnel (June 30, 1993).
2. Ibid.
A number of direct exposure events are described below as reported by members of the U.S. Armed Forces who served in the Gulf War. Not every detail can be verified by multiple sources to date, but additional data from unofficial and unrelated sources continue to bolster initial accounts of events best explained as missile and rocket attacks or aerial explosions. Units located in areas where these events occurred are reporting high rates of illnesses. The areas in which these events occurred were key logistic and staging areas, as well as those areas which were breached during the liberations of Kuwait. Many veterans of these units have reported seeing large numbers of dead or dying animals in the area after the attacks; one veteran noted that "all the insects were dead too."
Department of Defense conclusions that no chemical or biological attacks occurred seem to be based on the assumption that there was no significant evidence of immediate chemical and biological casualties. However, since one of the primary goals of a biological attack is to debilitate your adversary's forces, while retaining a high degree of deniability, and since many of those interviewed describe both immediate physical reactions and long term debilitating effect, the issue of what these individuals may have been exposed to becomes highly critical.
Event 1:
January 17, 1991, early morning hours Cement City
Mr. Willie HIcks, then with the 644th Ordinance Company, was serving as the non-commissioned officer in charge of arms and ammunitions shipments. Staff Sergeant Hicks has testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services' Subcommittee for Force Structure and Personnel that, at about 2:30a.m. on January 17, 1991, he heard a loud explosion, which was followed by a sounding of alarms. As Hicks was running to the bunker, his face began to burn. One member of the unit "just dropped." About ten minutes later, according to Hicks, the unit's first sergeant came by and told members of the unit to go to the highest level of alert. The unit remained at that level for 24 hours.
Two or three days later, Hicks began feeling ill and noticed blood in his urine. Several other members of the unit began experiencing "problems" with their rectums. Hicks testified that when members of the unit began to question what had happened, they were ordered by their commanding officer not to discuss it. Of the unit's 100 soldiers, 85 now suffer from medical problems, and one, Staff Sergeant Bayle, who Hicks described as having been in good physical shape, has inexplicably died. HIcks described another member of the unit, Staff Sergeant Heal, as being seriously incapacitated.
Hicks, a former teacher and Vietnam veteran, carries a notebook with him everywhere. He claims to have a severe problem with memory loss. He quit his job because he kept passing out and getting lost on the way to work. Other symptoms being suffered by Mr. Hicks include headaches, blood in his urine, insomnia, joint and muscle pain, deteriorating vision, loss of mobility in his left arm, night sweats, and diarrhea (sometimes bloody). His illness has been classified by the Veterans Administration as post traumatic stress disorder.
Event 2:
January 19, 1991, early morning hours. Camp 13, 6-7 miles west of Port of Jubayl, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Although some individuals reported this event as taking place on January 20, documentary evidence indicates that it took place on the 19th.)
Witness 01: Petty Officer Sterling Symms, then assigned to the Naval Reserve Construction Battalion 24, in an area south of the Kuwait border, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that between 2:00a.m. and 3:00a.m. on January 20, 1991, there was a "real bad explosion" overhead. The alarms went off and everybody started running towards their bunkers. Petty Officer Symms said there was a sharp odor of ammonia in the air. His eyes burned and his skin stung. HIs unit donned full chemical gear for nearly two hours until the "all clear" was given. [1]
Later, according to Symms, members of the unit were advised that what they heard was a sonic boom. Petty Officer Symms said that he did not believe that it was a sonic boom because there was also a "fireball" associated with the explosion. Members of the unit were ordered not to discuss the incident. Petty Officer Symms says he has since experienced fatigue, sore joints, running nose, a chronic severe rash, and open sores which have been diagnosed as an "itching problem." He has also been treated for streptococcus infections. In his testimony, Symms stated that 4 or 5 other members of his unit and two of their wives have been treated for similar infections. [2]
Witness 02: Mike Moore, assigned to the same unit as Symms, also reported that on January 20, 1991, at about 3a.m., he was awakened by a double explosion. As the sound of the explosion faded the alarms went off. The unit intercom announced "Go to MOPP level 4." Everyone in the tent put on their gas gear and went to the bunker. They stayed at MOPP level 4 until about 7a.m.. Later that day or the next, everyone's chemical suits and masks were collected and replaced. According to Mr. Moore, he was told the explosion was a sonic boom, to quit worrying about it, and to get back to work. Mr. Moore said that he later heard that what he heard was an incoming SCUD, but he also heard rumors that a Iraqi MIG was shot down in the area that night.
Mr. Moore said that he did not feel a spray or smell ammonia. He had no stinging or numb lips. Since returning home from the Gulf, he has suffered a severe thyroid problem, a heart attack, memory loss, tired and aching joints, rashes on his feet, nervousness, and muscle cramps, although he reported no bleeding. According to Mr. Moore, he has had about ten blood tests and two sets of x-rays performed at the Tuskeegee, Alabama, Veterans Affairs Medical Center. In past calls to the Tuskeegee, Alabama, VAMC, however, he had been told that there is no information in his record.
In February 1992, Mr. Moore's daughter began developing a thyroid problem and has been suffering from nervousness, headaches, and fatigue. Over the last year, his wife has begun to develop these symptoms as well. There is no history of thyroid problems in family.
Witness 03: Mr. William Larry Kay was an electrician assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. He was also assigned to Camp 13. On January 20, 1991, Mr. Kay heard two "booms", shaking the whole building. Sirens began going off. The camp intercom announced "confirmed mustard gas -- go to MOPP level 4." Mr. Kay was at the Recreation Center when the blasts occurred. He had fallen asleep. He went outside and put his gas mask on. It immediately filled with fumes. He recalls that it smelled like ammonia. Mr. Kay has been a member of a Hazmat (Hazardous Materials) team of the fire department in Columbus, Georgia; he said the strong smell of ammonia is unusual in an open area. There was an ammonia plant nearby, but he had never smelled such a strong odor of ammonia in the area. He reported to his assigned bunker. Each member of the unit had a duty during these attacks -- Mr. Kay was assigned to a decontamination team. There were other people assigned to test for chemical contamination. A radio call came in for these people to check for gas. Then, almost immediately, the intercom announced "all clear."
Mr. Kay said that after the incident, in response to questions from the unit as to what had occurrred, the unit Commanding Officer said "Have you ever heard of a sonic boom?" When members of the unit continued to question the unit commanders about what had occurred, they were ordered not to discuss the incident.
Witness 04: Mr. Terry Avery of Salem, Alabama worked on utilities for Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, and was also assigned to Camp 13. During the night of January 20, 1991, Mr. Avery said that he heard a double explosion. The alert siren went off. He put on his gas mask and went to the bunker. While in the bunker, his unit received the command to go to MOPP level 4 over the camp loudspeaker. He put on his chemical suit. Mr. Avery said he was almost completely dressed when they announced "all clear." He left the bunker and returned to his tent.
Mr. Avery was later told by his Master Chief that the noise he heard was just a sonic boom. A veteran of Vietnam who had heard sonic booms before, Mr. Avery felt that it was not a sonic boom, but he never got a good answer about the explosion. He reported that the rumor going around the camp was that an enemy plane had been shot down over the desert.
Late in the summer of 1991, Mr. Avery began feeling tired and having headaches. He saw a private doctor, who said he was probably working too hard in the sun. He says he does not think he is as ill as the rest of the men in his unit (NMCB24). He feels that he has leveled out, but he still has good days and bad days. He currently suffers from fatigue, headaches, weight gain, itching, muscle and joint pains, and memory loss (inability to concentrate).
His wife is also ill. Mr. Avery feels that she is more ill than he is. She has an enlarged spleen, an enlarged liver and abnormal liver functions, joint pains, night sweats, fatigue, stomach problems, itching, and rashes, but has not complained of memory loss. Two of his children are also complaining of headaches, joint pain, and abdominal pains. His 13 year old daughter was diagnosed as having mononucleosis. She also has sinus infections, and throat pains from the sinus drainage. His 11 year old son has had rashes, headaches, joint pain, itching, sinus and throat infections, and fevers.
Witness 05: The following are excerpts from one of two letters written by a U.S. serviceman present at Camp 13 during the January 19, 1991 incident. This individual has been interviewed by U.S. Senate professional staff. These original letters confirm the actual events of that morning. This individual has requested confidentiality. The original letters have been retained as evidence.
"8:00 pm
19 Jan 91
Dear Mom,
I just talked to you on the phone. I really didn't want to call you and tell you about the SCUD missile/gas attack so you wouldn't worry, but I really needed to hear a familiar voice...I'm trying like hell to keep my mind off the fact that it's night time again, and we could get hit again.
Mom, I can deal with getting shot at, because I can fight back and even if I got hit, I can be put back together, a missile, on the other hand, doesn't work like that, but I can even accept that. But gas scares the hell out of me. I know how to put on the protective suits and gear, but it's the thought. Once the missile hit (without warning!) we were so busy getting dressed in our chemical suits we never had time for it to sink in and be scared. I was proud of all of us because no one froze up - we all responded like we'd been trained to, but after we got suited up, we had to sit there and force ourselves to breathe slow and try and cool down - the suits are very hot. It's hard to slow your breathing when your heart's beating a million times a minute...[a] fire team [went] out and...patrolled the camp and checked all of the towers. The rest of the camp were in their bunkers except security and the chemical detection teams. I know they detected a cloud of dusty mustard gas because I was there with them, but today everyone denies it. I was there when they radioed the other camps north of us and warned them of the cloud...I talked to the look-outs that saw the air burst and cloud and had to stay with them for a few minutes to try and calm them down even though I was just as scared (probably more!). Jubail is South East of us, and that's where the Scud hit that was confirmed, but the air burst my guys saw was only 200+ yards west of us. I don't know what that was, but that's where most of the gas came from I think. But the wind was almost blowing due North. I probably won't sleep much tonight, but at least I'll be able to respond faster..."
In the interview with Senate staff, the individual said that during patrols around Camp 13 in the days just after the incident he wrote about, he observed many animals that were either sick or dead. He also confirmed that after the attack, their chemical protective gear was replaced.
Witness 06: Mr. Mike Tidd was assigned to perform security duties with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. He currently suffers from joint aches and pains, sinus infections, diarrhea, urinary urgency and frequency, rashes, small mosquito bite-like sores, heartburn, dizziness, occasional low temperatures, occasional night sweats, and chronic fatigue. Mr. Tidd kept a log while in Saudi Arabia.
According to his log, on January 19, a little past 0330hrs., Mr. Tidd was sitting on Tower 6 when all of a sudden, there was a double boom off to the northwest of the camp, accompanied by a bright flash of light. Within minutes, the general quarters alarm sounded. Mr. Tidd's unit first donned their gas masks and ponchos, and then minutes later, the call came to go to MOPP level 4. At about 0600hrs, the "all clear" was sounded.
While Mr. Tidd heard the bang and saw the flash, which he described as being fairly close, he does not recall seeing a cloud. He said that he did not experience any symptoms, but attributes that to having been in a covered guard tower about 20 feet off the ground with a 3' visibility area.
Event 3:
January 19, 1991, early morning hours (possibly January 20). King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station (NMCB24-Air Det), 3 miles south of Port of Jubayl, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Mr. Larry Perry, of North Carolina, was a naval construction worker stationed near the port city of Al-Jubayl, at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station. He says the explosion on January 20, 1991 sent his entire unit running for the bomb shelter. When they emerged in their gas masks, they were enveloped by a mist.
Witness 02: Mr. Fred Willoughby of Columbus, Georgia was with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 - Air Det. He currently suffers from headaches, diarrhea, aching joints, blood shot eyes, bloat, intestional problems, and chronic fatigue. He has had a polyp removed from his colon, and suffered from rectal bleeding in 1992.
Mr. Willoughby has reported that on January 20, 1991, at about 3-4a.m., he was "hanging out" outside his tent when he heard a long, loud explosion. Shortly thereafter, a siren sounded and he went inside the tent to get his gas mask. By the time he came out, people were yelling 'MOPP 4, MOPP 4, not a drill'. Immediately, his mouth, lips, and face became numb all over, a sensation he likened to novocaine at the dentist's office. He was in the bunker for about an hour or an hour and a half. When he came out of the bunker, he and the others in the unit were told by the officers and chiefs that what they had heard was just a sonic boom. The next day, the unit was told not to talk about it. But the unit's MOPP gear was collected and replaced the next morning. Mr. Willoughby also heard that an enemy aircraft was shot down in the Gulf, not far from the base.
His wife has begun exhibiting similar symptoms, including fatigue, diarrhea, and aching joints.
Witness 03: Roy Morrow of Phenix City, Alabama was a builder with NMCB24 and was assigned to the Air Detachment at King Abdul Aziz Stadium. On January 20, 1991, he heard two explosions between 3:00-3:30a.m. He was awakened and went to the bunker. The unit went to MOPP level 2 for 25-30 minutes. The "all clear" was then given. When he exited the bunker, Mr. Morrow noticed the Marines running and screaming "MOPP level 4." The siren sounded again. He began to feel a burning sensation on his arms, legs, the back of his neck, and on his ears and face. His lips felt numb. His unit went to full MOPP level 4. Right before he went to the bunker the second time, Mr. Morrow saw a flash at the commercial port of Al-Jubayl. He had a radio in the bunker, and heard a call for the decontaminaton teams to respond.
BU2 Edwards was the head of the decontamination team in Mr. Morrow's unit. According to Mr. Morrow, BU2 Edwards said the next day that mustard gas and lewisite had been detected. When they began to discuss it, according to Mr. Morrow, the unit was told that the two explosions were a sonic boom, and they were ordered not to talk about it any more. The next day, all of their chemical gear was collected and replaced with new equipment.
The numbness experienced by Mr. Morrow remained for at least a week. Within two to three days after the incident, unit members began to suffer from rashes, diarrhea, and fatigue. The aching joints began a couple of weeks later. Mr. Morrow's symptoms have been getting progressively worse until the present time. He currently suffers from swollen lymph nodes, fatigue, diarrhea, night sweats, low grade temperature, weight loss, aching joints, muscle cramps, rashes (transient) blister, welts (2-3 times a month), a permanent hand rash, and short-term memory loss.
Witness 04: Mr. Harold Jerome Edwards, the chemical NCO in charge of the Nuclear/Biological/Chemical team for the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Air Detachment at King Abdul Aziz Naval Air Station was interviewed by U.S. Senate staff on January 13, 1994. During that interview Mr. Edwards said that he conducted three M-256 tests for chemical agents on the evening of this event. According to Edwards, two of the three tests he conducted were positive for chemical blister agent. He said that the negative test was conducted in an area in between a number of rows of tents. He also said that he reported this information to his unit commander. In addition, Mr. Edwards said that a member of the unit, Tom Muse, blistered in the area under his watch during this event. The "all clear" was given from a higher command. Mr. Edwards was called out to serve on a chemical decontamination team that day. He said that the Mark 12 decontamination unit assigned to the team was inoperative and that he was assigned to take out a 500 gallon water truck and stand by to decontaminate incoming personnel. According to Mr. Edwards, no one was decontaminated by his team. He said that this was the only time he was called out on this type of mission throughout the entire war.
Other Information Regarding the Detection of Chemical Agents at Jubayl.
Ken Allison, then a Lance Corporal with the 174th Marine Wing Support Squadron, Group 37, was delivering supplies to Jubayl Airfield. During an interview with Senate staff, he reported that sometime during his deployment there, possibly in January 1991, he saw a sign posted on a guard shack at the airfield's southern gate. The sign warned: that the area had tested positive for chemicals; make sure your MOPP gear was ready; and that when the alarms go off it is for real. Although he did not recall the exact wording on the sign, he remembered the content clearly.
In addition, a number of British military personnel suffering from Gulf War Syndrome who were stationed near the Port of Jubayl have come forward and have described similar events.
Event 4:
Late February 1991 "Log Base Charlie", 7 miles from the Iraqi border near Rafha
Witness 01: Ms. Valerie Sweatman from Columbia, South Carolina, was serving as a telecommunications specialist with the U.S. Army, assigned to the 2nd MASH Hospital. Ms. Sweatman recalls that prior to moving to "Log Base Orange" in Iraq during the ground war, her unit packed up their equipment at "Log Base Charlie." "Log Base Charlie" was located about 7 miles from the Iraqi border, near Rafha. One night in late February 1991, she was awakened by a sergeant and was told there was a chemical alert and to go to MOPP level 4. She put on her MOPP suit and mask and began going outside while she was still putting on her gloves. Her unit stayed at MOPP level 4 for 1- 2 hours. That night, she heard that at least one soldier had come into the hospital showing symptoms of nerve agent exposure. She was told that there was a SCUD alert that night. She did not, however, hear any explosion. The morning after this incident, Ms. Sweatman's hands were itching from the wrists on down. She had developed little blisters which went away about a week later. She was treated with ointments and benadryl for a "skin condition."
Ms. Sweatman had heard the chemical alarms go off on other occasions prior to the incident reported above. She was the night telecommunications NCO for her unit, and heard alarms sounding during the first nights of the air war, when her unit was assigned to King Khalid Military City (KKMC). On one occasion during this period, she heard a blast and felt a mist in the same area. After this incident she experienced nausea, diarrhea, and bloody stools. Her unit began taking the nerve agent pre- treatment pills (NAPP), after these earlier alarms. Although the alarms sounded, the NBC NCO claimed that they were sounding because the alarm equipment had bad batteries and not because of chemicals.
Ms. Sweatman currently suffers from headaches, exhaustion, fatigue, memory loss, nausea, muscle and joint pains, rectal and vaginal bleeding, and rashes. She has been diagnosed as having arthritis, headaches, and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Event 5:
Early February 1991 In the Desert Between Hafir Al Batin and King Khalid Military City, Northern Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Ms. Michelle Hanlon of Killeen, Texas was assigned to the 1st Calvary Division as a communications specialist. On February 14, 1991, during lunch, she heard an explosion overhead. She thought at the time that it was a SCUD being intercepted by a Patriot missile and thought nothing more of it.
On another occasion, when her unit was assigned to a field base near Hafir Al Batin, she recalled that one night, the night air breeze made her eyes begin to water. She immediately put on her gas mask and thought nothing more of the incident. She also reported that on a number of days, she could actually smell sulfur from the Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical plants during the air war.
She is currently suffering from intestinal problems, hemorrhoids, occasional fatigue, a rash on her finger (like little water blisters under the skin), cervical infections which coincide with intestinal problems, and some memory loss. She feels that she is becoming progressively more ill. Her rash has been diagnosed as exzema and has been treated with antibiotics. She is 23 years old. Her child, now 16 months old, has been getting fevers, yeast infections, rectal and penile disclorations.
Witness 02: Mr. Richard Voss was with the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade assigned to the 1st Infantry Division. Mr. Voss recalled witnessing what appeared to be a missile attack while stuck in slow-moving traffic heading west toward Hafir Al Batin on Tapline Road in early February 1991. Mr. Voss reports that sometime between noon and 4:00 p.m., he watched the missile, coming in from the north-northeast, impact to the east of Hafir Al Batin, about one mile away from his vehicle. He saw a large dark brown cloud rise up. Within two or three minutes, MPs came by giving the gas alert signal. He recalled that the wind was blowing from the north or northeast at the time of the incident. He continued to drive in traffic in MOPP gear for about 1-1/2 - 2 hours past Hafir Al Batin toward an assembly area. He got the "all clear" when he got near Log Base Echo.
Currently, Mr. Voss suffers from headaches, occasional fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss/inability to concentrate, urinary urgency, dizziness, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, rashes, recurring walking pneumonia, chest pains, numbness, and severe joint pains in both wrists and hands. His wife suffers from recurring yeast infections, menstrual irregularities, rashes, fatigue, muscle pain, and severe joint pain in her wrists.
_______________
Notes:
1. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Force Structure and Personnel (June 30, 1993).
2. Ibid.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
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CHAPTER 2, Part 2.
Witness 03: Ms. Patricia Williams of Nolanville, Texas was assigned to the 1st Calvary Division, near Hafir Al Batin, as a civilian mechanic. One late afternoon in mid- February, she recalled an explosion somewhere in the desert. She described it as a very powerful explosion that she both heard and felt. To her knowledge, no chemical alarms had been set up. Coincidentially, her unit was told that they were going to have a chemical practice; they were told to put on their chemical gear. They were kept at MOPP level 4 for about twenty minutes, but told that this was just a practice. They were also told that the sound they had just heard was a sonic boom. Five civilians were so frightened that they departed that night. She reports that of the forty people originally in her unit, only half are left. She said the rest were so scared that they went home. Ms. Williams said that she did not get sick in the Persian Gulf until this incident. After this incident, she experienced headaches, diarrhea, and photosensitivity.
Ms. Williams currently suffers from headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, lumps on her arms and neck, night sweats, insomnia, urinary argency, diarrhea, photosensitivity, gastrointestinal problems, deteriorating vision, shortness of breath, coughing, thyroid problems, abnormal hair loss, swollen lymph nodes, sinusitis, and chest pains. She is forty-four years old.
Witness 04: A confidential source told Senate staff that, on February 14, he was in traffic between KKMC and Hafir Al Batin, near KKMC. Although he did not see or hear this event himself, Military Police with whom he spoke while in traffic told him that a SCUD had been shot down near Hafir Al Batin. He was told that it was nothing to worry about. No one around him went to MOPP.
Event 6:
February 22, 1991, late afternoon or early evening Near King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Kindgom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Charlene Harmon Davis was a medical secretary with the 34th Aeromedical Patient Staging Station at KKMC. She reported that, on February 22, she was getting ready for work (her shift began at 7:00 p.m.) when three of what she believed to be SCUD missiles were intercepted over KKMC by Patriot missiles. Ms. Davis recalls that the chemical alarms went off. After these explosions, her face, eyes, and throat began to burn, her nose began to run, and she began to feel nauseous. There was a funny taste in her mouth. These immediate symptoms lasted for about twenty minutes, but she has gotten progressively more ill since that incident. When she sought medical attention after this event, the doctor told her that she might have had a contaminated gas mask, that the mask might have been contaminated by a previous user. Ms. Davis, however, said that she knew she was the first user of the mask because she broke the seal on it.
Ms. Davis currently suffers from migraine headaches, patellar syndrome, seborrheic dermatitis, hip pain, hair loss, insomnia, nightsweats, nightmares, numbness in toes, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, gastrointestinal problems, and dizziness. She also suffers recurring rashes which she says began after the first explosion, believed to be a SCUD missile attack, occurred near her location a few days after the beginning of the air war. Ms. Davis reports that these rashes continue to be a problem to this day. She has advised Senate staff that she is extremely concerned about her health as well as her prognosis. She is twenty-eight years old.
Witness 02: David Pena was a mechanic with the 63 Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), attached to the 3rd Armor Division. He was stationed at Camp Texas, near KKMC. He reports that on approximately February 22, 1991, he was leaving a meeting at about 5:30 p.m. when he heard an explosion, and saw a cloud. His unit went to MOPP level 4 for 1.5 - 2 hours. Mr. Pena recalls that he became nauseous and had blurry vision, lung disease, and skin problems.
Event 7:
Approximately January 20, 1991, early morning (pre-dawn hours). Vicinity of King Fahd International Airport
Mr. Rocky Gallegos was a Lance Corporal with Bravo Battery, 2nd Light Anti- aircraft Missile Battalion. He observed what he believed to be a SCUD missile shot out of the sky almost directly overhead by a Patriot missile while on the midnight-5:00 a.m. guard duty shift on approximately January 20. He reported that the explosion "blossomed like a flower." According to Mr. Gallegos, it exploded again when it hit the ground. Mr. Gallegos said that after the explosion he experienced a "very strong raunchy taste, like very bitter burnt toast" in his mouth. He also began experiencing headaches, nausea, diarrhea, and sensitivity to bright lights almost immediately after the attack. He did not hear the chemical alarms go off immediately. Approximately 10 minutes later, however, the alert alarms sounded and they were ordered to put on their masks.
Mr. Gallegos remained at his post until approximately 4:00 a.m., when he along with a lieutenant, a staff sergeant, and three other enlisted personnel, went on a patrol to investigate the incident. They drove in the general direction of the explosion, but were not able to find evidence of impact.
Mr. Gallegos remained outside until daylight, when he noticed that his hands were tingling and looked as though they were sunburned. During the events of the early morning, his hands had been the only exposed area; his face was covered by a hood, scarf, and glasses, but he removed his gloves to smoke a cigarette.
Later that morning, about a half hour after they returned from the patrol, Mr. Gallegos was assigned to drive the NBC NCO to check all of the chemical detection units. At the fourth or fifth unit, the NBC NCO came back with soimething written on a piece of paper. He shoved the paper in his pocket and told Mr. Gallegos: "get me back to camp -- Now!" Mr. Gallegos described him as "very excited about something," but when questioned the NBC NCO told Mr. Gallegos that it was none of his business.
Two days later, they again went out to patrol the area where the explosion occurred. According to Mr. Gallegos, they saw at least half a dozen dead sheep and a couple of camels that appeared to be very sick.
Unit officials would not tell Mr. Gallegos what had happened. He said that they told him that if it was of concern to him they would tell him. According to Mr. Gallegos, the wind was blowing from the northeast (southwesterly wind) at the time of the explosions.
Mr. Gallegos continued to suffer headaches, nausea, diarrhea, and photosensitivity during his tour of duty in the Saudi Arabia. He became more seriously ill about two weeks before leaving Saudi Arabia. He also suffers from sinus infections (bleeding), narcolepsy, blackouts, dizziness, rashes, hair loss, joint pains in his knees, elbows, and hands, dental problems, muscle pains and spasms, fatigue, night sweats, insomnia, nightmares, and blurred vision. Since his return from the Persian Gulf, his wife Laurie has had bladder surgery, mitral valve prolapse, disrupted menstruation, headaches, yeast infections, and a swollen thyroid. Her physician recently refused to continue treating her, according to Mr. Gallegos, telling her that she was so sick that he did not believe he could help her.
Event 8:
Early in the "Air War" -- Approximately January 20, 1991 Dhahran, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Ms. Patrecia Browning of New London, North Carolina, then a Staff Serveant assigned to the 227th Transportation Company, was at Khobar Towers in Dhahran when a Patriot missile intercepted what she believed to be a SCUD missile directly overhead. Her unit went to MOPP level 4 for 3 1/2 - 4 hours. Ms. Browning said that her eyes began to burn, and she smelled a strong odor that reminded her of ammonia. Shortly afterwards she broke out in a rash and began experiencing headaches, nausea, vomiting, and sensitivity to bright lights.
Ms. Browning also reports that she received the anthrax vaccine and the pyridostigmine bromide anti-nerve agent pretreatment pills. She reported that when the latter caused her to have episodes of bloody vomiting, she was told to cut the pills in half. The vomiting did not stop, however, until she stopped taking the pill.
Ms. Browning, who is thirty-seven years old, currently suffers from memory loss, severe recurring headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, recurring rashes, night sweats, sleepiness, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blurry vision and photosensitivity, coughing and shortness of breath, two duodenal ulcers, chest pains, heart arrhythmia, and erractic blood pressure. She said that many of these symptoms originated while she was still in Saudi Arabia.
Witness 02: Mr. Randall Vallee, a Sergeant with the 1113th Transportation Company, was at the "Expo," just north of Dhahran on January 20. He said that he remembers this incident well because it was the first time he came under attack. He heard two or three explosions and felt the concussion. He was outside at the time, with approximately fifteen others, getting ready to move to Tent City. It was nighttime, although he did not remember the exact time. They ran for cover in school buses parked nearby, but then officers began yelling at everyone to get back into the Expo center and go to MOPP level 4 immediately. While running back to the building, he recalled that the air raid sirens were not going off, but there were other alarms going off in the distance. He stated that he "did not think the alarms he heard were chemical alarms because he had been told that the chemical alarms didn't work; that they were just set up because it was standard operating procedure to have them." The air raid sirens went off after he got into the building. Once in the building, he put his chemical gear on and sat down. He recalled becoming nauseous, weak, dizzy, sweating profusely, his head throbbing, and becoming very, very thirsty, as though he were dehydrated. He stated that his vision became blurry, but at the time he thought it was either because of his mask or his sweating. The blurry vision didn't last long; the headache and nausea lasted about twenty minutes, and he continued to feel weak and dizzy for about forty-five minutes. When he went outside, after the all clear was given, he immediately noticed a "very suffocating smell, as though there wasn't enough air to breath," kind of like ammonia, but very strong." He recalled others commenting on the smell, which dissipated soon.
Afterwards, he took the nerve agent pre-treatment pill and boarded his bus for Tent City. Mr. Vallee recalled several attacks and the smell of ammonia several times while at Tent City. He said that the missiles were shot out of the sky so close to them that the fragments would land between the tents. Although his unit's chemical suits were used frequently, they were never replaced. He noticed as the days progressed that his chest "started getting tight," and he was getting flu symptoms." The nausea, fatigue headaches and respiratory problems continued off and on. Finally he became "so dizzy that he couldn't walk." He was diagnosed with an ear infection, and sent home on January 28.
Mr. Vallee currently suffers very severe recurring headaches, fatigue, respiratory problems, joint pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, depression and irritability, night sweats, insomnia, blood in his urine, constipation, nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath and coughing, thyroid problems, flu symptoms, sinus problems and sensitivity to smells. He always feels cold, and takes medication for pain. His wife suffers from fatigue, yeast infections and menstrual irregularities. Mr. Vallee is twenty-seven years old, his wife is twenty-six.
Event 9:
During ground war; Task Force Ripper
In September 1993, a copy of an excerpt from "NBC Survivability from a User's Perspective," by Brigadier General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC, Director, Training and Education Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia was received by the Committee. It states: "The most significant piece of detection equipment was the FOX NBC reconnaissance system. It demonstrated great detection and analysis capability and quickly moved. Its only disadvantage is that it looks like the Warsaw Pact BTR-60. To protect it from friendly fire, multiple U.S. markings were placed on the vehicle. The FOX was used primarily in mine field breaching operations. After the mine field was cleared, the FOX was sent through as the lead vehicle. Within minutes, the FOX could confirm or deny the presence of chemical contamination in the area. If a CAM alarm sounded while a unit was moving, the FOX was sent to that location to confirm or deny the CAM's reading. False CAM alarms were attributed to the massive numbers of burning oil wells. In the three-day offensive operation in Kuwait, the CAM alarm sounded four times. In three cases, the FOX confirmed a false alarm. In the fourth case, the FOX indicated a lewisite agent. In the opinion of the chemical experts, according to General Fulford, the lewisite reading was attributed to the burning oil wells." (emphasis added)
Based on this report, research was done on the method with which the FOX vehicle detects chemicals. It uses some of the same techniques that field alarms might employ to detect chemical agents. In addition, however, it takes multiple air and ground samples and analyzes them using mass spectrometry.
Witness 01: On November 12, 1993, a Committee staff member interviewed CW03 Joseph Cottrel, the chemical detection supervisor assigned to this vehicle -- a U.S. Marine Corps NBC warrant officer. During the interview, Mr. Cottrel said that he detected chemical agents on three occasions during the Gulf War. According to a memorandum written by Mr. Cottrel, "The first detection occurred near N. 28 degrees, 32 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 52 minutes longitude. The FOX vehicle detected blister agents at levels below IMMEDIATE threat to personnel (levels below ICt50). It was determined at the time that the rapid movement through the breach sites would not pose a threat to continued combat operations or require decontamination. Exposure time for individuals was not tracked or limited."
"The next detection happened the evening of the first day of the ground attack." (Note: Since the ground war began at night, this would have been the second evening of the ground war.) "As Task Force Ripper held positions around the Ahmed Al Jaber Airbase (N. 28 degrees, 56 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 50 minutes longitude), the FOX vehicle detected Lewisite blister vapors. This report was produced by the vehicle operator and given to myself. I reported the findings to division headquarters and requested directions in regards to the chemical agent printout. I was told to forward the tape up the chain of command which I did. A report came back that the FOX had alerted on the oil smoke. That was checked against the FOX. The computer had separated the petroleum compound from the chemical agent. The computer tape has been lost."
The only other detection CW03 Cottrel was aware of occurred around a bunker complex in the vicinity of N. 29 degrees, 14 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 54 minutes longitude. The FOX crew was directed to check the area for chemical munitions. A report that some chemical vapors were found was reported. Shortly thereafter, Task Force Ripper was ordered back to the division support area and further detection operations were not carried out by the Task Force Ripper NBC Unit.
Witness 02: According to Sergeant Robert A. Maison, Task Force Ripper detected chemical agents on the second night of the ground war. Sergeant Maison reported that as a nuclear, biological, and chemical recon team member, "our team observed an artillery attack to our northwest, at a distance of approximately four kilometers. About five to six minutes later an alarm was sounded by our detection equipment (a mass spectrometer) which is used specifically for that purpose. Taking into account the wind speeds that we were encountering (approximately 40 to 50 knots steady) the reading was not expected to last for a long duration, as it did not (approx. three minutes). The specific agent detected was lewisite in a concentration considered to produce casualties but not death."
"A second [detection] occurred while performing an area recon of an orchard. The second agent type was benzyl-bromide. No liquid contamination was located but the vapor concentration was of casualty strength and documented by the specific ion concentration and identity being printed out by molecular weight on the spectrum analysis printout."
Witness 03: A source who requested confidentiality reported to Senate staff that, on the second night of the ground war, mustard gas was detected by three FOX vehicles at Ahmed Al Jaber Airfield.
He stated that, about 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. "gas, gas, gas" came in over the radio. His unit went to MOPP level 4 for two hours before they were given the "all clear." About a half hour later, they were told that three FOX vehicles had detected mustard agent. After that, he recalled, they were in and out of MOPP gear all night.
Witness 03: Ms. Patricia Williams of Nolanville, Texas was assigned to the 1st Calvary Division, near Hafir Al Batin, as a civilian mechanic. One late afternoon in mid- February, she recalled an explosion somewhere in the desert. She described it as a very powerful explosion that she both heard and felt. To her knowledge, no chemical alarms had been set up. Coincidentially, her unit was told that they were going to have a chemical practice; they were told to put on their chemical gear. They were kept at MOPP level 4 for about twenty minutes, but told that this was just a practice. They were also told that the sound they had just heard was a sonic boom. Five civilians were so frightened that they departed that night. She reports that of the forty people originally in her unit, only half are left. She said the rest were so scared that they went home. Ms. Williams said that she did not get sick in the Persian Gulf until this incident. After this incident, she experienced headaches, diarrhea, and photosensitivity.
Ms. Williams currently suffers from headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, lumps on her arms and neck, night sweats, insomnia, urinary argency, diarrhea, photosensitivity, gastrointestinal problems, deteriorating vision, shortness of breath, coughing, thyroid problems, abnormal hair loss, swollen lymph nodes, sinusitis, and chest pains. She is forty-four years old.
Witness 04: A confidential source told Senate staff that, on February 14, he was in traffic between KKMC and Hafir Al Batin, near KKMC. Although he did not see or hear this event himself, Military Police with whom he spoke while in traffic told him that a SCUD had been shot down near Hafir Al Batin. He was told that it was nothing to worry about. No one around him went to MOPP.
Event 6:
February 22, 1991, late afternoon or early evening Near King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Kindgom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Charlene Harmon Davis was a medical secretary with the 34th Aeromedical Patient Staging Station at KKMC. She reported that, on February 22, she was getting ready for work (her shift began at 7:00 p.m.) when three of what she believed to be SCUD missiles were intercepted over KKMC by Patriot missiles. Ms. Davis recalls that the chemical alarms went off. After these explosions, her face, eyes, and throat began to burn, her nose began to run, and she began to feel nauseous. There was a funny taste in her mouth. These immediate symptoms lasted for about twenty minutes, but she has gotten progressively more ill since that incident. When she sought medical attention after this event, the doctor told her that she might have had a contaminated gas mask, that the mask might have been contaminated by a previous user. Ms. Davis, however, said that she knew she was the first user of the mask because she broke the seal on it.
Ms. Davis currently suffers from migraine headaches, patellar syndrome, seborrheic dermatitis, hip pain, hair loss, insomnia, nightsweats, nightmares, numbness in toes, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, gastrointestinal problems, and dizziness. She also suffers recurring rashes which she says began after the first explosion, believed to be a SCUD missile attack, occurred near her location a few days after the beginning of the air war. Ms. Davis reports that these rashes continue to be a problem to this day. She has advised Senate staff that she is extremely concerned about her health as well as her prognosis. She is twenty-eight years old.
Witness 02: David Pena was a mechanic with the 63 Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), attached to the 3rd Armor Division. He was stationed at Camp Texas, near KKMC. He reports that on approximately February 22, 1991, he was leaving a meeting at about 5:30 p.m. when he heard an explosion, and saw a cloud. His unit went to MOPP level 4 for 1.5 - 2 hours. Mr. Pena recalls that he became nauseous and had blurry vision, lung disease, and skin problems.
Event 7:
Approximately January 20, 1991, early morning (pre-dawn hours). Vicinity of King Fahd International Airport
Mr. Rocky Gallegos was a Lance Corporal with Bravo Battery, 2nd Light Anti- aircraft Missile Battalion. He observed what he believed to be a SCUD missile shot out of the sky almost directly overhead by a Patriot missile while on the midnight-5:00 a.m. guard duty shift on approximately January 20. He reported that the explosion "blossomed like a flower." According to Mr. Gallegos, it exploded again when it hit the ground. Mr. Gallegos said that after the explosion he experienced a "very strong raunchy taste, like very bitter burnt toast" in his mouth. He also began experiencing headaches, nausea, diarrhea, and sensitivity to bright lights almost immediately after the attack. He did not hear the chemical alarms go off immediately. Approximately 10 minutes later, however, the alert alarms sounded and they were ordered to put on their masks.
Mr. Gallegos remained at his post until approximately 4:00 a.m., when he along with a lieutenant, a staff sergeant, and three other enlisted personnel, went on a patrol to investigate the incident. They drove in the general direction of the explosion, but were not able to find evidence of impact.
Mr. Gallegos remained outside until daylight, when he noticed that his hands were tingling and looked as though they were sunburned. During the events of the early morning, his hands had been the only exposed area; his face was covered by a hood, scarf, and glasses, but he removed his gloves to smoke a cigarette.
Later that morning, about a half hour after they returned from the patrol, Mr. Gallegos was assigned to drive the NBC NCO to check all of the chemical detection units. At the fourth or fifth unit, the NBC NCO came back with soimething written on a piece of paper. He shoved the paper in his pocket and told Mr. Gallegos: "get me back to camp -- Now!" Mr. Gallegos described him as "very excited about something," but when questioned the NBC NCO told Mr. Gallegos that it was none of his business.
Two days later, they again went out to patrol the area where the explosion occurred. According to Mr. Gallegos, they saw at least half a dozen dead sheep and a couple of camels that appeared to be very sick.
Unit officials would not tell Mr. Gallegos what had happened. He said that they told him that if it was of concern to him they would tell him. According to Mr. Gallegos, the wind was blowing from the northeast (southwesterly wind) at the time of the explosions.
Mr. Gallegos continued to suffer headaches, nausea, diarrhea, and photosensitivity during his tour of duty in the Saudi Arabia. He became more seriously ill about two weeks before leaving Saudi Arabia. He also suffers from sinus infections (bleeding), narcolepsy, blackouts, dizziness, rashes, hair loss, joint pains in his knees, elbows, and hands, dental problems, muscle pains and spasms, fatigue, night sweats, insomnia, nightmares, and blurred vision. Since his return from the Persian Gulf, his wife Laurie has had bladder surgery, mitral valve prolapse, disrupted menstruation, headaches, yeast infections, and a swollen thyroid. Her physician recently refused to continue treating her, according to Mr. Gallegos, telling her that she was so sick that he did not believe he could help her.
Event 8:
Early in the "Air War" -- Approximately January 20, 1991 Dhahran, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Witness 01: Ms. Patrecia Browning of New London, North Carolina, then a Staff Serveant assigned to the 227th Transportation Company, was at Khobar Towers in Dhahran when a Patriot missile intercepted what she believed to be a SCUD missile directly overhead. Her unit went to MOPP level 4 for 3 1/2 - 4 hours. Ms. Browning said that her eyes began to burn, and she smelled a strong odor that reminded her of ammonia. Shortly afterwards she broke out in a rash and began experiencing headaches, nausea, vomiting, and sensitivity to bright lights.
Ms. Browning also reports that she received the anthrax vaccine and the pyridostigmine bromide anti-nerve agent pretreatment pills. She reported that when the latter caused her to have episodes of bloody vomiting, she was told to cut the pills in half. The vomiting did not stop, however, until she stopped taking the pill.
Ms. Browning, who is thirty-seven years old, currently suffers from memory loss, severe recurring headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, recurring rashes, night sweats, sleepiness, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blurry vision and photosensitivity, coughing and shortness of breath, two duodenal ulcers, chest pains, heart arrhythmia, and erractic blood pressure. She said that many of these symptoms originated while she was still in Saudi Arabia.
Witness 02: Mr. Randall Vallee, a Sergeant with the 1113th Transportation Company, was at the "Expo," just north of Dhahran on January 20. He said that he remembers this incident well because it was the first time he came under attack. He heard two or three explosions and felt the concussion. He was outside at the time, with approximately fifteen others, getting ready to move to Tent City. It was nighttime, although he did not remember the exact time. They ran for cover in school buses parked nearby, but then officers began yelling at everyone to get back into the Expo center and go to MOPP level 4 immediately. While running back to the building, he recalled that the air raid sirens were not going off, but there were other alarms going off in the distance. He stated that he "did not think the alarms he heard were chemical alarms because he had been told that the chemical alarms didn't work; that they were just set up because it was standard operating procedure to have them." The air raid sirens went off after he got into the building. Once in the building, he put his chemical gear on and sat down. He recalled becoming nauseous, weak, dizzy, sweating profusely, his head throbbing, and becoming very, very thirsty, as though he were dehydrated. He stated that his vision became blurry, but at the time he thought it was either because of his mask or his sweating. The blurry vision didn't last long; the headache and nausea lasted about twenty minutes, and he continued to feel weak and dizzy for about forty-five minutes. When he went outside, after the all clear was given, he immediately noticed a "very suffocating smell, as though there wasn't enough air to breath," kind of like ammonia, but very strong." He recalled others commenting on the smell, which dissipated soon.
Afterwards, he took the nerve agent pre-treatment pill and boarded his bus for Tent City. Mr. Vallee recalled several attacks and the smell of ammonia several times while at Tent City. He said that the missiles were shot out of the sky so close to them that the fragments would land between the tents. Although his unit's chemical suits were used frequently, they were never replaced. He noticed as the days progressed that his chest "started getting tight," and he was getting flu symptoms." The nausea, fatigue headaches and respiratory problems continued off and on. Finally he became "so dizzy that he couldn't walk." He was diagnosed with an ear infection, and sent home on January 28.
Mr. Vallee currently suffers very severe recurring headaches, fatigue, respiratory problems, joint pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, depression and irritability, night sweats, insomnia, blood in his urine, constipation, nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath and coughing, thyroid problems, flu symptoms, sinus problems and sensitivity to smells. He always feels cold, and takes medication for pain. His wife suffers from fatigue, yeast infections and menstrual irregularities. Mr. Vallee is twenty-seven years old, his wife is twenty-six.
Event 9:
During ground war; Task Force Ripper
In September 1993, a copy of an excerpt from "NBC Survivability from a User's Perspective," by Brigadier General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC, Director, Training and Education Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia was received by the Committee. It states: "The most significant piece of detection equipment was the FOX NBC reconnaissance system. It demonstrated great detection and analysis capability and quickly moved. Its only disadvantage is that it looks like the Warsaw Pact BTR-60. To protect it from friendly fire, multiple U.S. markings were placed on the vehicle. The FOX was used primarily in mine field breaching operations. After the mine field was cleared, the FOX was sent through as the lead vehicle. Within minutes, the FOX could confirm or deny the presence of chemical contamination in the area. If a CAM alarm sounded while a unit was moving, the FOX was sent to that location to confirm or deny the CAM's reading. False CAM alarms were attributed to the massive numbers of burning oil wells. In the three-day offensive operation in Kuwait, the CAM alarm sounded four times. In three cases, the FOX confirmed a false alarm. In the fourth case, the FOX indicated a lewisite agent. In the opinion of the chemical experts, according to General Fulford, the lewisite reading was attributed to the burning oil wells." (emphasis added)
Based on this report, research was done on the method with which the FOX vehicle detects chemicals. It uses some of the same techniques that field alarms might employ to detect chemical agents. In addition, however, it takes multiple air and ground samples and analyzes them using mass spectrometry.
Witness 01: On November 12, 1993, a Committee staff member interviewed CW03 Joseph Cottrel, the chemical detection supervisor assigned to this vehicle -- a U.S. Marine Corps NBC warrant officer. During the interview, Mr. Cottrel said that he detected chemical agents on three occasions during the Gulf War. According to a memorandum written by Mr. Cottrel, "The first detection occurred near N. 28 degrees, 32 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 52 minutes longitude. The FOX vehicle detected blister agents at levels below IMMEDIATE threat to personnel (levels below ICt50). It was determined at the time that the rapid movement through the breach sites would not pose a threat to continued combat operations or require decontamination. Exposure time for individuals was not tracked or limited."
"The next detection happened the evening of the first day of the ground attack." (Note: Since the ground war began at night, this would have been the second evening of the ground war.) "As Task Force Ripper held positions around the Ahmed Al Jaber Airbase (N. 28 degrees, 56 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 50 minutes longitude), the FOX vehicle detected Lewisite blister vapors. This report was produced by the vehicle operator and given to myself. I reported the findings to division headquarters and requested directions in regards to the chemical agent printout. I was told to forward the tape up the chain of command which I did. A report came back that the FOX had alerted on the oil smoke. That was checked against the FOX. The computer had separated the petroleum compound from the chemical agent. The computer tape has been lost."
The only other detection CW03 Cottrel was aware of occurred around a bunker complex in the vicinity of N. 29 degrees, 14 minutes latitude, and E. 47 degrees, 54 minutes longitude. The FOX crew was directed to check the area for chemical munitions. A report that some chemical vapors were found was reported. Shortly thereafter, Task Force Ripper was ordered back to the division support area and further detection operations were not carried out by the Task Force Ripper NBC Unit.
Witness 02: According to Sergeant Robert A. Maison, Task Force Ripper detected chemical agents on the second night of the ground war. Sergeant Maison reported that as a nuclear, biological, and chemical recon team member, "our team observed an artillery attack to our northwest, at a distance of approximately four kilometers. About five to six minutes later an alarm was sounded by our detection equipment (a mass spectrometer) which is used specifically for that purpose. Taking into account the wind speeds that we were encountering (approximately 40 to 50 knots steady) the reading was not expected to last for a long duration, as it did not (approx. three minutes). The specific agent detected was lewisite in a concentration considered to produce casualties but not death."
"A second [detection] occurred while performing an area recon of an orchard. The second agent type was benzyl-bromide. No liquid contamination was located but the vapor concentration was of casualty strength and documented by the specific ion concentration and identity being printed out by molecular weight on the spectrum analysis printout."
Witness 03: A source who requested confidentiality reported to Senate staff that, on the second night of the ground war, mustard gas was detected by three FOX vehicles at Ahmed Al Jaber Airfield.
He stated that, about 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. "gas, gas, gas" came in over the radio. His unit went to MOPP level 4 for two hours before they were given the "all clear." About a half hour later, they were told that three FOX vehicles had detected mustard agent. After that, he recalled, they were in and out of MOPP gear all night.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
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CHAPTER 2, Part 3
Event 10:
Riyadh, date unknown.
Mr. Michael Kingsbury was a driver/mechanic with the 601st Transportation Company during the Gulf War. He was interviewed by Committee staff for this report. Mr. Kingsbury was in Riyadh for six hours rest and relaxation when the first SCUD missile attack took place. Although he does not remember the date of the attack, he was certain that it was the first SCUD attack on Riyadh. Mr. Kingbury reported that three SCUDs came in, the alarms went off, and they went to MOPP level 4. He immediately began to experience nausea and a sore throat. His nose began to run and his eyes burned a little. He reported seeing a rainbow in the sky after the attack.
The symptoms that began with the attack never went away. In addition, he began to suffer skin irritation after the attack. He began having stomach problems when he returned from the Gulf and currently suffers from memory loss, rashes, aching joints, headaches, rectal bleeding, nausea, sensitivity to light, abnormal hair loss, high fevers, clammy skin, lumps, bloody oral/nasal mucous, night sweats, sore muscles, and fatigue.
Event 11:
January 18, 1991, around midnight (poss. very early on January 19) Log Base Alpha
Mr. William Brady was the Battalion Logistics NCO with the 217th Maintenance Battalion. Around midnight on Janury 18, or possibly very early on the 19th, Mr. Brady was awakened by what he believed to be a SCUD intercepted by a Patriot directly over his unit's position. He said there was a deafening sound, a flash of light, and everything shook. Chemical alarms were going off everywhere, and there was sheer panic. He remembered the chemical litmus paper turning red, and a positive reading from an M- 256 kit. Mr. Brady said that his nose began to run, and he smelled and tasted sulfur. He began coughing up blood a couple of days after the attack, and continued to do so "the whole time we were there after the attack." They remained at MOPP level 4 for five or six hours. They radioed the 16th Support Group, but did not get a response for a couple of hours. Eventually they were told to come to Group Headquartrers (Hq.) for a message that Hq. didn't want to radio over. The message said that what they heard was a sonic boom, and instructed them to perform another test. The second test, performed several hours after the initial test, was negative. Members of the unit were told that the M9 paper had turned red as a result of exposure to diesel fumes. The message also gave the "all clear" for people to come out of MOPP level 4, but, Mr. Brady recalled, everyone was afraid to unmask.
After they got out of MOPP level 4, Mr. Brady went with Lt. Bryant to deliver gas masks and nerve agent pre-treatment pills to the 344th Maintenance Company. When they arrived back at their unit, everyone was dressed in their full chemical suits at MOPP level 4. They were told that while they were out riding around (without a radio), there had been another attack.
Beginning on January 22, Mr. Brady began getting too sick to work. He had been taking the nerve agent pre-treatment pills since about January 17, and had been getting severe headaches from them. Approximately three days after the attack, his eyes began to burn, he developed a high fever, and "taking a breath of air made his lungs feel like they were burning up." He also had diarrhea, sores, nausea, and a runny nose. On January 24, he went to the 13th Evacuation Hospital, which had no beds available for him. He described the hospital as completely filled with people that seemed to have the same illness that he had. His January 26 diary entry said: "I'd rather die than feel like this."
Mr. Brady stated during the interview that he "is convinced that there was a chemical attack." He reported that "everyone started getting pneumonia or flu-like symptoms after the attack", ... that the nerve agent pre-treatment pills "were useless," ... and that he is convinced that the PB tabs gave people headaches, but that they also "got hit with a nerve agent."
Mr. Brady currently suffers from severe recurring headaches, chronic fatigue, joint and muscle pain, rashes, depression, night sweats, insomnia, urinary urgency, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, lightheadedness, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, coughing, abnormal hair loss, sensitivity in his teeth, burning and itching everywhere, arthritis, worsening leg cramps, "flu symptoms all of the time," a tingling in his arms, and a "bulging disc" in his neck. He had a heart attack in May 1993. His wife is suffering from fatigue, yeast infections, a rash, sinus headaches, aching in her right arm and a loss of feeling in her thumb, and two ruptured discs in her neck. Mr. Brady is forty-seven years old, his wife is thirty-seven years old.
Event 12:
January 1991 (4-5 Days into the Air War) Near Ras Al Khafji
Mr. Norman Camp is a Staff Sergeant with the U.S. Marine Corps. He told Senate staff during an interview that he was near Ras Al Khafji several days into the air war when the chemical alarms went off, not only at their position, but also at their Division Supply Area, which was about 20 miles to their east. They went on 100% alert, but word was passed down from division not to go to MOPP. Sergeant Camp recalled that his whole platoon began falling ill the following night. He got headaches, nausea, and diarrhea for a day. Most others were sick for about a day and a half.
Sergeant Camp currently suffers from headaches, joint pain in knees and elbows, memory loss, night sweats, occasional insomnia, urinary urgency, dizziness, photosensivity, shortness of breath, coughing and heart problems. His wife suffers from fatigue, yeast infections, menstrual irregularities, joint and muscle pain, and chest pain. Sergeant Camp is thirty-six years old, his wife is thirty-two years old.
Event 13:
January 19 or 20, 1991, 3:30 a.m. 3-4 Kilometers West of Log Base Echo
Mr. Dale Glover was a Staff Sergeant with the 1165th Miliary Police Company. He recalled being awakened at 3:30 a.m. The Battalion NBC NCO was announcing that they were under chemical attack. An M-256 kit registered a positive reading for a chemical agent. They went to MOPP level 4 for four hours. Afterward, all of them had runny noses.
When asked if people were made sick from the attack, Mr. Glover responded that most people were already sick from the pyridostigmide bromide pills. He said that they had been taking them for two or three days before the attack and that "a lot of people got sick and three or four had to be medevaced out."
Mr. Glover currently suffers from headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, an inability to concentrate, recurring rashes, irritability, night sweats, insomnia, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blackouts, excessive photosensitivity, sore gums, swollen lymph nodes, and a spot on his brain. His wife is suffering from fatigue, menstrual irregularities, yeast infections, joint pain, some memory loss, and hair loss. Mr. Glover is thirty years old, his wife is 28 years old.
Event 14:
February 25, 1991 In Iraq, near the Kuwait Border
Mr. John Jacob, a mechanic with the 1st Infantry Division, was on a road march with Task Force 216. He was sitting in the driver's seat in his humvee when he detected what he believed to be gas. He recalled "getting a whiff of" a sweet, almond-like taste and smell, accompanied by a sudden burning in his throat and lungs, watering eyes, blurry vision and photosensitivity, nausea, dizziness and diarrhea. He donned his mask and gloves, and sounded an alarm. He recalled that whatever it was seemed to come through the driver's side window, as though something was caught in the wind and just drifted into his face. Although no one else seemed to be affected - Mr. Jacob said the others looked at him as thought he were crazy - his symptoms never went away. Afterward, he began to get headaches as well. His coordination was "messed up" for a couple of days after this incident. Mr. Jacob said that he later heard that a couple of people in his convoy detected something, but does not have any additional information. He says his M9 did not register anything.
Mr. Jacob says that he has been sick ever since that incident, and in addition to those symptoms already described, currently suffers from fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, lumps at joint areas, night sweats, depression and irritability, insomnia, urinary urgency, gastrointestinal problems, shortness of breath, coughing, abnormal hair loss, dental problems, swollen lymph nodes, and a foot fungus that will not go away. Mr. Jacob is thirty-two years old.
How these events occurred is a matter for legitimate debate. But given the absence of a credible explanation -- one which explains what occurred during these events, methodical and detailed testing and analysis of the causes of the symptoms these individuals are experiencing and how these symptoms are transmitted must be undertaken. This is not only a matter of providing medical care to veterans and their families, but also a matter of national security. Many of the servicemen and women interviewed believe the foregoing events occurred as a result of SCUD or FROG missile attacks. Since the first staff report was issued last September, however, it has been learned that there are other methods by which Iraqi chemical and biological materials might have been dispersed.
A number of troops who were assigned to perimeter security posts have described to Committee staff individuals, persons who appeared to be Bedouins, who would leave canisters of what they believed to be chemicals outside perimeter fences and would then speed off in their four wheel drive vehicles. In these cases unit NBC NCOs would be assigned to check the canisters. Others talk about indigenous peoples leaving dead animals laying on airstrips used by U.S. personnel or about their tossing dead animals over perimeter walls in protest of the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. Still others have told of snipers and other Iraqi special operations missions that occurred as far south as Dhahran during the war.
Event 10:
Riyadh, date unknown.
Mr. Michael Kingsbury was a driver/mechanic with the 601st Transportation Company during the Gulf War. He was interviewed by Committee staff for this report. Mr. Kingsbury was in Riyadh for six hours rest and relaxation when the first SCUD missile attack took place. Although he does not remember the date of the attack, he was certain that it was the first SCUD attack on Riyadh. Mr. Kingbury reported that three SCUDs came in, the alarms went off, and they went to MOPP level 4. He immediately began to experience nausea and a sore throat. His nose began to run and his eyes burned a little. He reported seeing a rainbow in the sky after the attack.
The symptoms that began with the attack never went away. In addition, he began to suffer skin irritation after the attack. He began having stomach problems when he returned from the Gulf and currently suffers from memory loss, rashes, aching joints, headaches, rectal bleeding, nausea, sensitivity to light, abnormal hair loss, high fevers, clammy skin, lumps, bloody oral/nasal mucous, night sweats, sore muscles, and fatigue.
Event 11:
January 18, 1991, around midnight (poss. very early on January 19) Log Base Alpha
Mr. William Brady was the Battalion Logistics NCO with the 217th Maintenance Battalion. Around midnight on Janury 18, or possibly very early on the 19th, Mr. Brady was awakened by what he believed to be a SCUD intercepted by a Patriot directly over his unit's position. He said there was a deafening sound, a flash of light, and everything shook. Chemical alarms were going off everywhere, and there was sheer panic. He remembered the chemical litmus paper turning red, and a positive reading from an M- 256 kit. Mr. Brady said that his nose began to run, and he smelled and tasted sulfur. He began coughing up blood a couple of days after the attack, and continued to do so "the whole time we were there after the attack." They remained at MOPP level 4 for five or six hours. They radioed the 16th Support Group, but did not get a response for a couple of hours. Eventually they were told to come to Group Headquartrers (Hq.) for a message that Hq. didn't want to radio over. The message said that what they heard was a sonic boom, and instructed them to perform another test. The second test, performed several hours after the initial test, was negative. Members of the unit were told that the M9 paper had turned red as a result of exposure to diesel fumes. The message also gave the "all clear" for people to come out of MOPP level 4, but, Mr. Brady recalled, everyone was afraid to unmask.
After they got out of MOPP level 4, Mr. Brady went with Lt. Bryant to deliver gas masks and nerve agent pre-treatment pills to the 344th Maintenance Company. When they arrived back at their unit, everyone was dressed in their full chemical suits at MOPP level 4. They were told that while they were out riding around (without a radio), there had been another attack.
Beginning on January 22, Mr. Brady began getting too sick to work. He had been taking the nerve agent pre-treatment pills since about January 17, and had been getting severe headaches from them. Approximately three days after the attack, his eyes began to burn, he developed a high fever, and "taking a breath of air made his lungs feel like they were burning up." He also had diarrhea, sores, nausea, and a runny nose. On January 24, he went to the 13th Evacuation Hospital, which had no beds available for him. He described the hospital as completely filled with people that seemed to have the same illness that he had. His January 26 diary entry said: "I'd rather die than feel like this."
Mr. Brady stated during the interview that he "is convinced that there was a chemical attack." He reported that "everyone started getting pneumonia or flu-like symptoms after the attack", ... that the nerve agent pre-treatment pills "were useless," ... and that he is convinced that the PB tabs gave people headaches, but that they also "got hit with a nerve agent."
Mr. Brady currently suffers from severe recurring headaches, chronic fatigue, joint and muscle pain, rashes, depression, night sweats, insomnia, urinary urgency, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, lightheadedness, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, coughing, abnormal hair loss, sensitivity in his teeth, burning and itching everywhere, arthritis, worsening leg cramps, "flu symptoms all of the time," a tingling in his arms, and a "bulging disc" in his neck. He had a heart attack in May 1993. His wife is suffering from fatigue, yeast infections, a rash, sinus headaches, aching in her right arm and a loss of feeling in her thumb, and two ruptured discs in her neck. Mr. Brady is forty-seven years old, his wife is thirty-seven years old.
Event 12:
January 1991 (4-5 Days into the Air War) Near Ras Al Khafji
Mr. Norman Camp is a Staff Sergeant with the U.S. Marine Corps. He told Senate staff during an interview that he was near Ras Al Khafji several days into the air war when the chemical alarms went off, not only at their position, but also at their Division Supply Area, which was about 20 miles to their east. They went on 100% alert, but word was passed down from division not to go to MOPP. Sergeant Camp recalled that his whole platoon began falling ill the following night. He got headaches, nausea, and diarrhea for a day. Most others were sick for about a day and a half.
Sergeant Camp currently suffers from headaches, joint pain in knees and elbows, memory loss, night sweats, occasional insomnia, urinary urgency, dizziness, photosensivity, shortness of breath, coughing and heart problems. His wife suffers from fatigue, yeast infections, menstrual irregularities, joint and muscle pain, and chest pain. Sergeant Camp is thirty-six years old, his wife is thirty-two years old.
Event 13:
January 19 or 20, 1991, 3:30 a.m. 3-4 Kilometers West of Log Base Echo
Mr. Dale Glover was a Staff Sergeant with the 1165th Miliary Police Company. He recalled being awakened at 3:30 a.m. The Battalion NBC NCO was announcing that they were under chemical attack. An M-256 kit registered a positive reading for a chemical agent. They went to MOPP level 4 for four hours. Afterward, all of them had runny noses.
When asked if people were made sick from the attack, Mr. Glover responded that most people were already sick from the pyridostigmide bromide pills. He said that they had been taking them for two or three days before the attack and that "a lot of people got sick and three or four had to be medevaced out."
Mr. Glover currently suffers from headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, an inability to concentrate, recurring rashes, irritability, night sweats, insomnia, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blackouts, excessive photosensitivity, sore gums, swollen lymph nodes, and a spot on his brain. His wife is suffering from fatigue, menstrual irregularities, yeast infections, joint pain, some memory loss, and hair loss. Mr. Glover is thirty years old, his wife is 28 years old.
Event 14:
February 25, 1991 In Iraq, near the Kuwait Border
Mr. John Jacob, a mechanic with the 1st Infantry Division, was on a road march with Task Force 216. He was sitting in the driver's seat in his humvee when he detected what he believed to be gas. He recalled "getting a whiff of" a sweet, almond-like taste and smell, accompanied by a sudden burning in his throat and lungs, watering eyes, blurry vision and photosensitivity, nausea, dizziness and diarrhea. He donned his mask and gloves, and sounded an alarm. He recalled that whatever it was seemed to come through the driver's side window, as though something was caught in the wind and just drifted into his face. Although no one else seemed to be affected - Mr. Jacob said the others looked at him as thought he were crazy - his symptoms never went away. Afterward, he began to get headaches as well. His coordination was "messed up" for a couple of days after this incident. Mr. Jacob said that he later heard that a couple of people in his convoy detected something, but does not have any additional information. He says his M9 did not register anything.
Mr. Jacob says that he has been sick ever since that incident, and in addition to those symptoms already described, currently suffers from fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, lumps at joint areas, night sweats, depression and irritability, insomnia, urinary urgency, gastrointestinal problems, shortness of breath, coughing, abnormal hair loss, dental problems, swollen lymph nodes, and a foot fungus that will not go away. Mr. Jacob is thirty-two years old.
How these events occurred is a matter for legitimate debate. But given the absence of a credible explanation -- one which explains what occurred during these events, methodical and detailed testing and analysis of the causes of the symptoms these individuals are experiencing and how these symptoms are transmitted must be undertaken. This is not only a matter of providing medical care to veterans and their families, but also a matter of national security. Many of the servicemen and women interviewed believe the foregoing events occurred as a result of SCUD or FROG missile attacks. Since the first staff report was issued last September, however, it has been learned that there are other methods by which Iraqi chemical and biological materials might have been dispersed.
A number of troops who were assigned to perimeter security posts have described to Committee staff individuals, persons who appeared to be Bedouins, who would leave canisters of what they believed to be chemicals outside perimeter fences and would then speed off in their four wheel drive vehicles. In these cases unit NBC NCOs would be assigned to check the canisters. Others talk about indigenous peoples leaving dead animals laying on airstrips used by U.S. personnel or about their tossing dead animals over perimeter walls in protest of the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. Still others have told of snipers and other Iraqi special operations missions that occurred as far south as Dhahran during the war.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
by admin » Thu Dec 17, 2015 10:00 pm
CHAPTER 2, Part 4.
Reports by Coalition Forces of Iraqi Chemical Mines Located During Breaching Operations
The following accounts provide additional evidence of exposure to chemical warfare agents.
Event 15:
February 24, 1991
The first encounter with chemical mines came at 6:31 a.m. on February 24, 1991, during the initial mine field breaching operation by the 2nd Marine Division. According to the Chicago Tribune, which interviewed officers and enlisted marines involved in the operation, a FOX vehicle confirmed positive readings for a nerve agent and for mustard gas. A second detecting device gave the same positive reading. General Keys, the 2nd Division commander, and Col. Livingston, commander of the 6th Marine Regiment, told reporters that they believe it is possible that a chemical mine was blown up or hit.
On April 20, 1994, Committee staff received the Battle Assessment Documentation of the 6th Marine Regiment, Operations Desert Storm. [3]
According to that report:
24 Feb 1991 G Day
0630 B Co., 1/6 [Regiment] blows line charge across first mine field in Lane
Red 1. C Co., 1/6 engages possible BMPs with M60A1 main tank
gun. Target missed due to poor visibility.
0631 B Co., 1/6 reports possible nerve agent in first minefield in Lane Red 1.
0635 B Co., 1/6 is at MOPP level 4. Fox vehicle confirms positive sarin
nerve agent and lewisite mustard gas, vic Lane Red 1.
0650 1/6 reports possible nerve agent/mustard agent between obstacle belts.
0730 Rgmt S-2 reports to the 2nd Marine Division that Lane Red 1 is
considered contaminated for the first 300m only.
1210 Rgmt S-2 reports TACC reported large number of dead sheep near
King Khalid, possible anthrax. MAG-13 reports enemy forces moving
rapidly south along highway from Kuwait City. Unknown number of
tanks.
26 Feb 1991 G+ 2
1537 3/23rd under NBC attack, in MOPP 4; remainder 8th Marin MOPP 2.
1640 B Co., 1/6 clears Army stores camp, finds large number of weapons
and ammo, to include 155 arty shells painted completely yellow. Fox
vehicle reports negative findings.
During the war, General Schwarzkopf told reporters he considered the reports of chemical agent detection on 24 February 1991 "bogus." [4]
Event 16:
During the Ground War
British troops discovered Iraqi chemical mines on the gulf battlefield, according to Gannett News Service. An official said that the incident was reported to Prime Minister John Major's war cabinet; no details were given. [5]
Other Combat-Related Reports
Event 17:
January 21, 1991 Taif, Saudi Arabia
Sergeant Thomas House served with the 2953rd Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS), attached to the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing in Taif. Sergeant House's duties included the decontamination of U.S. Air Force F-111s that returned from bombing raids against Iraqi chemical and biological warfare facilities. According to the unit's records, the unit aircraft bombed 32 chemical targets, 113 bunkers, 11 Scud Missile sites, and 4 mine entrances.
Sergeant House and several others in his unit assigned to perform decontamination duties had worn only MOPP suits and had used water to decontaminate the aircraft. Sergeant House, whole primary duties are as an aircraft mechanic, later learned that chemical decontamination solutions were supposed to be used and that special suits were supposed to be worn.
On the evening of January 21, 1991, after decontaminating several aircraft that had returned from a bombing raid, Sergeant House's face began to burn and swell. He also noted a pungent odor. The following day, Sergeant House went to a U.S. Air Force medical facility. His U.S. Air Force medical records confirm this report. Shortly after the incident he began to experience headaches, coughing, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.
Sergeant House is currently suffering from recurring headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, lumps under the skin, depression, irritability, night sweats, insomnia, urinary urgency, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blurry vision, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, coughing, bleeding gums, swollen lymph nodes, seizures, shaking, vomiting, fevers, chest pains, sinus infections and sinus growths. He is 32 years old. His wife currently suffers from nearly all of the same symptoms.
Seven other members of this unit have reported to Committee staff that they experienced similar exposures. They also currently suffer from similar symptoms.
Conclusions
• Iraq intended to use weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces and had the means to deliver these weapons.
• Events did not occur until the air war began.
• There are multiple witnesses to what appear to be best explained as chemical or mixed agent attacks. Symptoms appeared simultaneously with alarms going off, Patriots intercepting Scuds, alert alarms going off, etc.
• Smells, tastes, burning, stinging, numbness are all consistent with chemical or mixed agent attacks.
• Removal and replacement of MOPP gear is consistent with SOP for contaminated equipment.
• Sonic booms are not explosions associated with fireballs and it is unlikely that a commander would order troops not to discuss sonic booms.
• Rates of illnesses are reportedly high in these units.
• Servicemen and women have not received credible explanations of the events from commanding officers.
• The Department of Defense has consistently denied that there is evidence of exposure to chemical and biological warfare agents by U.S. forces, altering its position on specific aspects of this issue only when challenged with evidence that is difficult to dispute.
• The fact that the "sonic boom" explanation was utilized in units subordinate to different services to describe suspicious events and was followed by orders not to discuss the event, suggests that this explanation originated at least at the theater level. Visual observations reported by field forces suggest this explanation was unrelated to the actual nature of these events.
Map: Approximate Locations of Direct Exposure Events
_______________
Notes:
3. Battle Assessment Documentation of the 6th Marine Regiment, Operation Desert Storm.
4. John Harwood and David Dahl, "Allies Overrun Iraqis; Capture Thousands," Times Publishing Company, St Petersburg Times, (February 25, 1991), 1A.
5. "British Report Finding Iraqi Chemical Mines," Reuters (February 28, 1991), BC Cycle.
Reports by Coalition Forces of Iraqi Chemical Mines Located During Breaching Operations
The following accounts provide additional evidence of exposure to chemical warfare agents.
Event 15:
February 24, 1991
The first encounter with chemical mines came at 6:31 a.m. on February 24, 1991, during the initial mine field breaching operation by the 2nd Marine Division. According to the Chicago Tribune, which interviewed officers and enlisted marines involved in the operation, a FOX vehicle confirmed positive readings for a nerve agent and for mustard gas. A second detecting device gave the same positive reading. General Keys, the 2nd Division commander, and Col. Livingston, commander of the 6th Marine Regiment, told reporters that they believe it is possible that a chemical mine was blown up or hit.
On April 20, 1994, Committee staff received the Battle Assessment Documentation of the 6th Marine Regiment, Operations Desert Storm. [3]
According to that report:
24 Feb 1991 G Day
0630 B Co., 1/6 [Regiment] blows line charge across first mine field in Lane
Red 1. C Co., 1/6 engages possible BMPs with M60A1 main tank
gun. Target missed due to poor visibility.
0631 B Co., 1/6 reports possible nerve agent in first minefield in Lane Red 1.
0635 B Co., 1/6 is at MOPP level 4. Fox vehicle confirms positive sarin
nerve agent and lewisite mustard gas, vic Lane Red 1.
0650 1/6 reports possible nerve agent/mustard agent between obstacle belts.
0730 Rgmt S-2 reports to the 2nd Marine Division that Lane Red 1 is
considered contaminated for the first 300m only.
1210 Rgmt S-2 reports TACC reported large number of dead sheep near
King Khalid, possible anthrax. MAG-13 reports enemy forces moving
rapidly south along highway from Kuwait City. Unknown number of
tanks.
26 Feb 1991 G+ 2
1537 3/23rd under NBC attack, in MOPP 4; remainder 8th Marin MOPP 2.
1640 B Co., 1/6 clears Army stores camp, finds large number of weapons
and ammo, to include 155 arty shells painted completely yellow. Fox
vehicle reports negative findings.
During the war, General Schwarzkopf told reporters he considered the reports of chemical agent detection on 24 February 1991 "bogus." [4]
Event 16:
During the Ground War
British troops discovered Iraqi chemical mines on the gulf battlefield, according to Gannett News Service. An official said that the incident was reported to Prime Minister John Major's war cabinet; no details were given. [5]
Other Combat-Related Reports
Event 17:
January 21, 1991 Taif, Saudi Arabia
Sergeant Thomas House served with the 2953rd Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS), attached to the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing in Taif. Sergeant House's duties included the decontamination of U.S. Air Force F-111s that returned from bombing raids against Iraqi chemical and biological warfare facilities. According to the unit's records, the unit aircraft bombed 32 chemical targets, 113 bunkers, 11 Scud Missile sites, and 4 mine entrances.
Sergeant House and several others in his unit assigned to perform decontamination duties had worn only MOPP suits and had used water to decontaminate the aircraft. Sergeant House, whole primary duties are as an aircraft mechanic, later learned that chemical decontamination solutions were supposed to be used and that special suits were supposed to be worn.
On the evening of January 21, 1991, after decontaminating several aircraft that had returned from a bombing raid, Sergeant House's face began to burn and swell. He also noted a pungent odor. The following day, Sergeant House went to a U.S. Air Force medical facility. His U.S. Air Force medical records confirm this report. Shortly after the incident he began to experience headaches, coughing, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.
Sergeant House is currently suffering from recurring headaches, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, memory loss, recurring rashes, lumps under the skin, depression, irritability, night sweats, insomnia, urinary urgency, diarrhea, gastrointestinal problems, dizziness, blurry vision, photosensitivity, shortness of breath, coughing, bleeding gums, swollen lymph nodes, seizures, shaking, vomiting, fevers, chest pains, sinus infections and sinus growths. He is 32 years old. His wife currently suffers from nearly all of the same symptoms.
Seven other members of this unit have reported to Committee staff that they experienced similar exposures. They also currently suffer from similar symptoms.
Conclusions
• Iraq intended to use weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces and had the means to deliver these weapons.
• Events did not occur until the air war began.
• There are multiple witnesses to what appear to be best explained as chemical or mixed agent attacks. Symptoms appeared simultaneously with alarms going off, Patriots intercepting Scuds, alert alarms going off, etc.
• Smells, tastes, burning, stinging, numbness are all consistent with chemical or mixed agent attacks.
• Removal and replacement of MOPP gear is consistent with SOP for contaminated equipment.
• Sonic booms are not explosions associated with fireballs and it is unlikely that a commander would order troops not to discuss sonic booms.
• Rates of illnesses are reportedly high in these units.
• Servicemen and women have not received credible explanations of the events from commanding officers.
• The Department of Defense has consistently denied that there is evidence of exposure to chemical and biological warfare agents by U.S. forces, altering its position on specific aspects of this issue only when challenged with evidence that is difficult to dispute.
• The fact that the "sonic boom" explanation was utilized in units subordinate to different services to describe suspicious events and was followed by orders not to discuss the event, suggests that this explanation originated at least at the theater level. Visual observations reported by field forces suggest this explanation was unrelated to the actual nature of these events.
Map: Approximate Locations of Direct Exposure Events
_______________
Notes:
3. Battle Assessment Documentation of the 6th Marine Regiment, Operation Desert Storm.
4. John Harwood and David Dahl, "Allies Overrun Iraqis; Capture Thousands," Times Publishing Company, St Petersburg Times, (February 25, 1991), 1A.
5. "British Report Finding Iraqi Chemical Mines," Reuters (February 28, 1991), BC Cycle.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
by admin » Thu Dec 17, 2015 10:00 pm
Chapter 3, Part 1
Reports of Exposure of Coalition Forces Resulting from the Fallout of the Bombings of Iraqi Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Facilities (Group II)
There were serious concerns expressed prior to the Persian Gulf War about the fallout that would be caused by the bombing of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons production facilities, storage depots, and bunkers. Certainly these bombings were a necessary part of the conflict, but the consequences as well as the necessity must be acknowledged.
U.S. military doctrine warns that, according to its calculations, the use of a nerve agent against a target area of no more than a dozen hectares (a hectare is about 2.47 acres) can, under certain weather conditions, create a hazard zone downwind of up to 100 kilometers in length. Within this downwind area, friendly military units would have to take protective measures. [1] The amount of agent and materials targeted during the Coalition bombings in Iraq exceeded the amounts cited in the example above certainly by multiples and possibly by orders of magnitude.
The dispersal of the chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by factors such as topography, wind velocity, direction, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient and atmospheric humidity. These factors will all contribute to the size and type of dispersal pattern which will be observed. [2] Unclassified U.S. satellite imagery confirms that debris from the Coalition bombings was upwardly dispersed, rather than downwardly dispersed as would occur in offensive use, causing chemical agents to be carried by upper atmospheric currents and distributing "trace amounts" of chemical fallout over "down weather" positions. Material distributed from the destruction of the ammunition bunkers and storage depots also travelled upward and outward as confirmed in videotaped records of the destruction of these bunkers obtained by Committee staff. These concerns relating to the fallout from the destruction of these materials were expressed by several credible soruces as noted below:
1. As a result of these concerns prior to the war, several of the U.S. national laboratories were consulted and/or prepared reports for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Energy, advising of the hazards which were associated with bombing these facilities. [3]
2. Prior to the war, Soviet chemical weapons expert I. Yevstafyev publicly advocated withholding information from the Coalition forces on chemical weapons and military facilities supplied by Moscow to Iraq, on the grounds of national security. "Strikes on chemical and biological weapons facilities on Iraq's territory could rebound on us and cause damage to the population of our country." [4]
3. On February 4, 1991, media sources reported that General Raymond Germanos, a spokesperson for the French Ministry of Defense, confirmed that chemical fallout -- "probably neurotoxins" -- had been detected in small quantities, "a little bit everywhere," from allied air attacks of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities and the depots that stored them. [5]
4. In late July, 1993, the Czech Minister of Defense confirmed that a Czechoslovak Federative Republic military chemical decontamination unit assigned to an area near the Saudi-Iraqi border had detected the chemical nerve agent Sarin in the air during the early stages of the Gulf War. In this unit, 18 of 169 individuals are believed to be suffering from Gulf War illnesses. [6] While the report goes to some length to refute any allegations of the detection being the result of a direct chemical attack, it does defend the ability of the Czech chemical detection equipment to irrefutably confirm traces of chemical warfare agents. Further, the U.S. Government, in the November 10, 1993, briefing only referenced the detection of the nerve agent Sarin (GB) by the Czech forces on January 19, 1991. The Czech document, however, states that both Sarin and Yperite (HD) were detected that day. The fact that multiple agents were detected in measurable airborne concentrations suggests ! that t he agents may have emanated from fallout from Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical weapons plants or storage bunkers, or from a direct mixed agent attack.
The Czechoslovak Chemical Defense Unit in the Persian Gulf and the Results of the Investigations of the Military Use of Poisonous Gases.
This section contains the main body of the translated Czech government report, prepared by the Czech Ministry of Defense in response to requests from Members of the Congress of the United States. Following this translation of the report are related accounts from independent sources.
The unit of 169 Czechoslovak military specialists was dispatched into the Gulf on the basis of an agreement between the governments of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) and the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) regarding their activities and the conditions of their stay in Saudi Arabia. This Agreement was signed in Prague on November 19, 1990 and amended in Riyadh on November 22, 1990. The Federal Assembly of the CFSR ratified this Agreement. Resolution 97 was modified by an amendment by the Federal Assembly, authorizing the government of the CFSR to accept a provision of the agreement to permit the crossing of the international borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Government gave its approval through Resolution 71, dated January 31, 1991.
By executive order of the Commander of the Northern Region of the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the unit was assigned on the 22nd of December, in accordance with Article IV of the Agreement, to the military configuration of that region. As of January 1, 1991, the two chemical defense platoons were assigned to the 4th and 20th Brigades of the Army of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The remainder of the unit was assigned to the base camp and to the headquarters.
Dislocation and strategic command of the unit was completely within the power of the Army of Saudi Arabia. Colonel Jan Valo, commander of the unit, provided specific assignment orders. His duty was to assure that in the course of fulfilling their duties, no Czechoslovak law or basic standard of international law was violated.
Beginning on January 27, 1991, the two chemical defense platoons were assigned to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia brigades, crossing the border into Kuwait. They participated actively in assuring the anti-chemical defenses of the allied units during their execution of the operational plan. On February 5, 1991, the unit was supplemented, bringing its total numbers to 198 people.
The Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit primarily performed the following tasks:
1. Anti-chemical defense of the headquarters of the northern region troops located in the area of King Khalid Military City;
2. Anti-chemical defense of the 4th and 20th Brigades of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
3. In the case of chemical attack of personnel, provide on their behalf facilities for chemical treatment and decontamination.
A part of the anti-chemical defense provisions was continuous chemical intelligence and surveillance, with the objective to identify the use of poisonous substances, provide data for alerting forces, and assist commanders in their decision making.
During the period after the commencement of the war on January 17, 1991, borderline concentration of poisonous substances were identified in the air by our chemical surveillance. In the Commander's Report, covering the anti-chemical defense battalions' activities during the period from January 1, 1991 until February 28, 1991, it specifically stated.
"During this period borderline life threatening concentrations of the chemical agents yperite [HD] and sarin [GB] were identified several times in both areas of the brigades and in King Khalid Military City (i.e., in the military encampment where the unit was stationed) probably the result of the Allies' air attacks on the storage facilities of chemical ammunition in the territory of Iraq." This information had been published at the time in the Czechoslovak media."
This aforementioned fact was confirmed by members of the battalion, chemical defense specialists who evaluated and ordered measures for personal protection. (see Attachments - pages from the book of the Operations Unit of the General Command of the Czechoslovak Army in prague, record #56), and all means of anti-chemical defenses were employed. After about two hours the alert was called off when repeated confirmation tests provided negative results.
The concentrations found, "0.002 grams of yperite per cubic meter and 0.003 mg per liter of an unspecified poisonous substance," [later identified by DoD as Sarin] are at the border of the maximum permitted threshold concentration affecting human organisms. These, however, were only one-time positive results from chemical surveillance which were not confirmed by anyone from the other participating countries. This was supported by the report on January 31, 1991:
"Since January 19th, the Czechoslovak unit has not found any other chemical substances."
The Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit had at its disposal all modern chemical surveillance and control technology. These are able to identify borderline levels (levels that do not affect the functions of human organisms) of suspected toxic substances and they can differentiate the nerve agents, such as sarin, from "V" agents.
The assertion that the chemicals were of very low concentrations that do not even cause temporary or minute changes in human organisms can be supported by the following facts:
• The results of the aforementioned surveillance;
• No signs of exposure to toxic materials were traced to personnel on site (toxic nerve agents, like sarin, cause instant reactions; for example: myosis. In the case of yperite, the first clinical signs of poisoning usually appear within 4 to 6 hours exposure);
• None of the personnel present had any later effects (related to exposure).
All of the chemical specialists were professional soldiers (there were 56 of them assigned over the length of the conflict). They are all graduates of military colleges and middle schools with a chemical defense major, and according to the curriculum, worked with highly toxic substances both in the laboratories and in field training. The training of anti-chemical specialists with selected types of poisonous materials had been conducted practically since the beginning of the anti-chemical defense program in 1956 until February 1990, when such training was halted because of complaints of destruction of the environment from environmental protection movements and the mayors of communities.
The anti-chemical defense specialists who had undergone this training are professionals, and they are able to identify the presence of toxic materials in the terrain, on military equipment, and in the air within the sensitivity ranges of the instruments used. Therefore, there is a high probability that the identified presence of poisonous materials is an objective analysis. At the same time, concentrations that are used at chemical field exercises and in laboratories are several times higher than the concentrations that were measured in the Persian Gulf.
It has been proven that military use of chemical weapons by Iraq did not occur and any such fact would have already have been subjecfted to extensive investigation by agencies of world peace organizations. One can consider that the data measured could have had origins from industrial facilities or even storage facilities of chemical ammunition that were hit by allied bombardment. This is supported by a report of the unit's copmmander, by my statements, and by other direct participants. All members of the unit were equipped with the most modern means of protection against toxic substances. They were fully comparable with the current world standard. Any kind of exposure by these types of toxic substances would manifest itself immediately or in a very short time, and nothing of this kind has been reported. Latent damage, if it can even be considered in this group, would surely have been uncovered during exit examinations.
On the basis of the abovementioned facts, one can conclude that the event cannot in any way be connected with the use of chemical weapons or their use in battlefield activities, and harm to the Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit due to the military use of toxic substances could not have occurred.
These conclusions also are supported by health care specialists. Neither at the time of identification of the toxic substances, nor later, was any member of the unit put under medical care as a result of exposure at this event. All members of the unit were subjected to a complex examination in military hospitals after their return from the Persian Gulf -- primarily in the Central Military Hospital in Prague. Even there, no serious changes caused by demanding climatic conditions or by exposure to toxic substances were identified.
Many veterans of the Persian Gulf conflict later participated in, and still participate in, activities of the unit in the Czech Republic Army in Yugoslavia. Even at the time of their departure, no one mentioned any problems.
Despite this, as of 31 August 1993, military doctors had examined 18 Persian Gulf veterans who suffered certain health problems, and three of them remain under a doctor's supervision. So far, in their cases, nothing has been identified beyond 'routine' problems related to similar long-term stays abroad.
Other Related Information:
On October 8, 1993, U.S. Senate staff interviewed Joseph Boccardi, who initially came forward with information about the detection of chemical agents by the Czechoslovak chemical detection unit prior to the release of the Czech report quoted above. According to this witness, a former member of the U.S. Army assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division as an M1A1 tank crewmember (driver/loader/gunner), he was injured when he fell off a tank during his service in the Gulf War. He was sent to a medical holding area in northern Saudi Arabia. While there, he was befriended by a lieutenant assigned to the holding unit (Lt. Babika). The lieutenant came to him one day and told him to come along with him.
According to Mr. Boccardi, he and the lieutenant drove about 15-20 minutes to a facility that he was told had been used as a Saudi basic training camp. Mr. Boccardi described the facility as beautiful and palace-like (near King Khalid Military City). Once inside, the lieutenant began speaking a foreign language which Mr. Boccardi believed to be Russian to two soldiers armed with AK-47s standing at the top of a staircase. The soldiers answered. The lieutenant explained that he was speaking Czech and that these soldiers were also Czech.
Mr. Boccardi said that he and lieutenant went into a room where there were about nine soldiers, smoking, drinking vodka, and playing cards. He learned that they were a NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) team. He asked someone there "if we were kicking their butts so bad, why didn't they hit us with chemicals?" At that, everyone in the room got quiet and the Czech colonel spoke in "broken English" for the first time. He said, according to Mr. Boccardi, "they did hit us with chemicals." According to the Czech colonel, a SCUD hit where they were staying. As soon as they learned that the Patriot had missed the SCUD, they put on their chemical gear and went out onto a balcony near the railing. The Czech colonel said they detected traces of Sarin and another gas which Mr. Boccardi believed began with the letter T.
According to Mr. Boccardi, the Czech colonel said that he called U.S. command officials about the result of their tests. He, the Czech colonel, said that he was told not to say anything about it. The colonel also said that he later heard that a number of the soldiers in the area developed skin rashes shortly after this incident.
After this part of the conversation, the individuals discussed in general terms why they were not supposed to discuss the incident. This Czech colonel was identified as the commanding officer of this unit.
On December 5, 1993, according to published press reports, Jean Paul Ferrand, a logistics officer with the French contingent, told Senator Richard Shelby that nerve agents and mustard agents were detected on January 24 or 25, 1991, in an area south of King Khalid Military City. According to an Agency France Press report on that date, Ferrand said that two chemical weapons alarms went off when a storm blew wind from Iraq. Ferrand was also attributed as having said that special badges worn on the troops protective suits also registered the presence of chemical weapons. [7]
On Monday, March 28, 1994, Committee staff were contacted by a member of the 371st Chemical Company, located in Greenwood, South Carolina. This individual said that during the Gulf War, he served with the 1st platoon of this unit in the vicinity of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). According to this individual and several other members of his platoon interviewed by Committee staff, two days after an Iraqi Scud missile warhead had exploded in the desert, his platoon was sent to a site in the desert a few miles south of KKMC to train with the Czech chemical detection team that had conducted tests. They also were trained on the Czech equipment. According to two additional members of the platoon who trained with the Czech team, and were interviewed by Committee staff on April 4, 1994 in the Army Reserve Center in Greenwood, South Carolina, the Czech colonel who commanded the unit had told them that his unit had detected measurable quantities of chemical nerve agent immediat! ely af ter the Scud attack. Unit members were not able to determine the exact date of the incident, but believe it was sometime in mid to late January 1991.
The members of the unit described the facility where the Czechoslovak team lived as the "glass palace." They believed that it had previously been used as a Saudi military engineering training facility. The members of the U.S. unit who trained with the Czechs, all NBC specialists, said that the Czech equipment appeared to be more reliable than their own.
The unit Executive officer and first sergeant, while not present during the training mission, confirmed that they too were aware of the training, the missile attack, and the reported detection of the chemicals. The unit first sergeant said that this information had been recorded in the units logs, but that he received a message to send the logs to Washington, D.C. for historical purposes shortly after they returned from the Persian Gulf.
When asked if their unit did biological agent testing after incoming missiles had detonated, members of the unit said that they had no biological agent testing capability. While there were several other NBC units in the area, they were unaware of any unit that was conducting biological agent tests.
Finally, the unit said that they had been deployed on several occasions to decontaminate the buses and other vehicles that were used to transport Iraqi enemy prisoners of war to detention facilities.
One member of the unit estimated that as many as 85% of the members of this unit are currently suffering from many of the symptoms associated with Gulf War Syndrome.
U.S. Unofficial Reports of Downwind Exposure Due to Coalition Bombings of Iraqi Chemical and Biological Facilities
1. During the early phases of the air war, there was extensive media coverage of the coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. ABC News reported that on January 27, 1991, near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division went through a chemical alert drill that was more than an exercise. According to ABC News coverage, their sensors actually registered traces of chemicals in the air, the result, it appeared, of allied bombing of chemical plants in Iraq. A U.S. medical corpsman told reporters, "When the Air Force bombers hit all the gas places there in Iraq, there's a lot of contamination in the air. Some may have filtered down and set these things off. They're very, very sensitive." [8]
2. Brian Martin, of Niles, Michigan, a Gulf War veteran of the 37th Airborne Combat Engineer Battalion, 20th Airborne Brigade, 18th Airborne Corps, arrived in Saudi Arabia on October 8, 1990. According to Martin, in late January 1991, while assigned to an area between Rafha and Naryian about six miles south of the Iraqi border, he recorded in his journal and on videotape that chemical "false alarms" were going off almost every day. At first, according to Martin, the alarms were explained as being caused by vapors coming off the sand. Later, since the alarms kept going off and the troops no longer believed that they were being caused by the vapors, Martin said he was informed by both his battalion commander and the battalion NBC NCO that the alarms were sounding because of "minute" quantities of nerve agent in the air, released by the coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities. The troops were assured that there was no danger.
Mr. Martin believes that he witnessed a Patriot intercept of an incoming SCUD missile between Khafji and Wadi Al Batin during the air war period. He was also given the anti-chemical warfare medication pyridostigmine bromide, and suffered some adverse side effects. He says the drug made him jittery and made his vision "jiggle." Since returning from Saudi Arabia, Mr. Martin has experienced memory loss, swollen and burning feet, joint disorders, muscle weakness, heart palpitations, shortness of breath, rashes, fatigue, headaches, insomnia, bleeding from the rectum, chronic coughing, running nose, burning eyes, and uncontrollable shaking on his right-side extremeties. [9]
3. Mr. Troy Albuck, former anti-tank platoon leader with the 82nd Airborne Division, reported to Committee staff that his unit was told that the chemical alarms were going off because of what was drifting down from the Coalition bombings. He explained that his understanding of the situation was that "it was a lot like the effect of gasoline funes," in that non-lethal exposure was not harmful and would be counteracted by fresh air. [10]
4. Another source who requested confidentiality reported that he was located approximately 40 miles due east of King Khalid Military City (KKMC), when at one position, every M-8 alarm went off -- over 30 at once. The date was between January 20th and February 1, 1991. The NBC NCO radioed in that a nerve agent plant had been bombed about 150 miles away. The source recalled that they were told to take no action and they did not. [11]
Weather Reports, Climatic Information, and Imagery Smoke Plume Data
Operation Desert Storm
Weather reports during this period were censored by the U.S. and Saudi governments. But environmental groups monitoring an oil spill in the Persian Gulf confirm that the winds were at times blowing from the northwest to the southeast. The chemical and biological warfare agent production plants heavily bombed by the coalition forces during this period are located in Iraq to the north and northwest of coalition troop deployments along the Saudi-Iraqi and Saudi-Kuwaiti border. [12]
As cited above, the dispersal of chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by other factors in addition to wind direction and velocity, such as topography, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient, and atmospheric humidity. These factors all contribute to the size and type of dispersal that will be observed.
In March 1992, the U.S. Air Force Environmental Technical Application Center published a compendium of the weather during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The following is a summary of relevant data for January 17, 1991 through March 2, 1991, excerpted from Gulf War Weather. The report documents the changing weather conditions, detailing the wind and rain patterns that could easily have delivered chemical and biological agents to Coalition troop emplacements. On many dates, this report notes the smoke and dust from the bombings and from the burning oil wells. The notation of visible smoke plumes is not intended to depict the actual fallout from the bombed chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities, but rather to generally reflect the direction of movement of debris from the bombings.
_______________
Notes:
1. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: US Army, August 1982), 7-13, Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 142-143.
2. Ibid.
3. Interviews with representatives of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
4. Stephen Handelman, "Kremlin Growing Frustrated with Outsider," Toronto Star (February 10, 1991), H4.
5. "Chemical Fallout Detected in Iraq," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (February 4, 1991).
6. Dave Parks, "Czechs: Nerve Gas Detected During Gulf War," The Times Picayune (July 30, 1993), A6, Stanislav Mundil, Czech News Agency and Mlada Fronta Dnes (July 29, 1993).
7. "Senator Says France Detected Chemical Agents in Gulf War; Report," Dateline; Birmingham, Agency France Presse (December 5, 1993), "France Says Gulf Troops Detected Chemicals," The Washington Post, from the Associated Press (December 5, 1993), A24.
8. Sam Donaldson, "This Week With David Brinkley," ABC News (January 27, 1991).
9. Telephone interview of Brian Martin by Committee staff on August 31, 1993.
10. Staff Interviews.
11. Staff Interviews.
12. Ronald A. Taylor, "Air Masses Battle Over Desert Also," Washington Times (January 24, 1991); "Skies Could Clear in Gulf by Sunday," Reuters, (January 25. 1991).
Reports of Exposure of Coalition Forces Resulting from the Fallout of the Bombings of Iraqi Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Facilities (Group II)
There were serious concerns expressed prior to the Persian Gulf War about the fallout that would be caused by the bombing of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons production facilities, storage depots, and bunkers. Certainly these bombings were a necessary part of the conflict, but the consequences as well as the necessity must be acknowledged.
U.S. military doctrine warns that, according to its calculations, the use of a nerve agent against a target area of no more than a dozen hectares (a hectare is about 2.47 acres) can, under certain weather conditions, create a hazard zone downwind of up to 100 kilometers in length. Within this downwind area, friendly military units would have to take protective measures. [1] The amount of agent and materials targeted during the Coalition bombings in Iraq exceeded the amounts cited in the example above certainly by multiples and possibly by orders of magnitude.
The dispersal of the chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by factors such as topography, wind velocity, direction, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient and atmospheric humidity. These factors will all contribute to the size and type of dispersal pattern which will be observed. [2] Unclassified U.S. satellite imagery confirms that debris from the Coalition bombings was upwardly dispersed, rather than downwardly dispersed as would occur in offensive use, causing chemical agents to be carried by upper atmospheric currents and distributing "trace amounts" of chemical fallout over "down weather" positions. Material distributed from the destruction of the ammunition bunkers and storage depots also travelled upward and outward as confirmed in videotaped records of the destruction of these bunkers obtained by Committee staff. These concerns relating to the fallout from the destruction of these materials were expressed by several credible soruces as noted below:
1. As a result of these concerns prior to the war, several of the U.S. national laboratories were consulted and/or prepared reports for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the Department of Energy, advising of the hazards which were associated with bombing these facilities. [3]
2. Prior to the war, Soviet chemical weapons expert I. Yevstafyev publicly advocated withholding information from the Coalition forces on chemical weapons and military facilities supplied by Moscow to Iraq, on the grounds of national security. "Strikes on chemical and biological weapons facilities on Iraq's territory could rebound on us and cause damage to the population of our country." [4]
3. On February 4, 1991, media sources reported that General Raymond Germanos, a spokesperson for the French Ministry of Defense, confirmed that chemical fallout -- "probably neurotoxins" -- had been detected in small quantities, "a little bit everywhere," from allied air attacks of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities and the depots that stored them. [5]
4. In late July, 1993, the Czech Minister of Defense confirmed that a Czechoslovak Federative Republic military chemical decontamination unit assigned to an area near the Saudi-Iraqi border had detected the chemical nerve agent Sarin in the air during the early stages of the Gulf War. In this unit, 18 of 169 individuals are believed to be suffering from Gulf War illnesses. [6] While the report goes to some length to refute any allegations of the detection being the result of a direct chemical attack, it does defend the ability of the Czech chemical detection equipment to irrefutably confirm traces of chemical warfare agents. Further, the U.S. Government, in the November 10, 1993, briefing only referenced the detection of the nerve agent Sarin (GB) by the Czech forces on January 19, 1991. The Czech document, however, states that both Sarin and Yperite (HD) were detected that day. The fact that multiple agents were detected in measurable airborne concentrations suggests ! that t he agents may have emanated from fallout from Coalition bombings of Iraqi chemical weapons plants or storage bunkers, or from a direct mixed agent attack.
The Czechoslovak Chemical Defense Unit in the Persian Gulf and the Results of the Investigations of the Military Use of Poisonous Gases.
This section contains the main body of the translated Czech government report, prepared by the Czech Ministry of Defense in response to requests from Members of the Congress of the United States. Following this translation of the report are related accounts from independent sources.
The unit of 169 Czechoslovak military specialists was dispatched into the Gulf on the basis of an agreement between the governments of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) and the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) regarding their activities and the conditions of their stay in Saudi Arabia. This Agreement was signed in Prague on November 19, 1990 and amended in Riyadh on November 22, 1990. The Federal Assembly of the CFSR ratified this Agreement. Resolution 97 was modified by an amendment by the Federal Assembly, authorizing the government of the CFSR to accept a provision of the agreement to permit the crossing of the international borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Government gave its approval through Resolution 71, dated January 31, 1991.
By executive order of the Commander of the Northern Region of the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the unit was assigned on the 22nd of December, in accordance with Article IV of the Agreement, to the military configuration of that region. As of January 1, 1991, the two chemical defense platoons were assigned to the 4th and 20th Brigades of the Army of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The remainder of the unit was assigned to the base camp and to the headquarters.
Dislocation and strategic command of the unit was completely within the power of the Army of Saudi Arabia. Colonel Jan Valo, commander of the unit, provided specific assignment orders. His duty was to assure that in the course of fulfilling their duties, no Czechoslovak law or basic standard of international law was violated.
Beginning on January 27, 1991, the two chemical defense platoons were assigned to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia brigades, crossing the border into Kuwait. They participated actively in assuring the anti-chemical defenses of the allied units during their execution of the operational plan. On February 5, 1991, the unit was supplemented, bringing its total numbers to 198 people.
The Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit primarily performed the following tasks:
1. Anti-chemical defense of the headquarters of the northern region troops located in the area of King Khalid Military City;
2. Anti-chemical defense of the 4th and 20th Brigades of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
3. In the case of chemical attack of personnel, provide on their behalf facilities for chemical treatment and decontamination.
A part of the anti-chemical defense provisions was continuous chemical intelligence and surveillance, with the objective to identify the use of poisonous substances, provide data for alerting forces, and assist commanders in their decision making.
During the period after the commencement of the war on January 17, 1991, borderline concentration of poisonous substances were identified in the air by our chemical surveillance. In the Commander's Report, covering the anti-chemical defense battalions' activities during the period from January 1, 1991 until February 28, 1991, it specifically stated.
"During this period borderline life threatening concentrations of the chemical agents yperite [HD] and sarin [GB] were identified several times in both areas of the brigades and in King Khalid Military City (i.e., in the military encampment where the unit was stationed) probably the result of the Allies' air attacks on the storage facilities of chemical ammunition in the territory of Iraq." This information had been published at the time in the Czechoslovak media."
This aforementioned fact was confirmed by members of the battalion, chemical defense specialists who evaluated and ordered measures for personal protection. (see Attachments - pages from the book of the Operations Unit of the General Command of the Czechoslovak Army in prague, record #56), and all means of anti-chemical defenses were employed. After about two hours the alert was called off when repeated confirmation tests provided negative results.
The concentrations found, "0.002 grams of yperite per cubic meter and 0.003 mg per liter of an unspecified poisonous substance," [later identified by DoD as Sarin] are at the border of the maximum permitted threshold concentration affecting human organisms. These, however, were only one-time positive results from chemical surveillance which were not confirmed by anyone from the other participating countries. This was supported by the report on January 31, 1991:
"Since January 19th, the Czechoslovak unit has not found any other chemical substances."
The Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit had at its disposal all modern chemical surveillance and control technology. These are able to identify borderline levels (levels that do not affect the functions of human organisms) of suspected toxic substances and they can differentiate the nerve agents, such as sarin, from "V" agents.
The assertion that the chemicals were of very low concentrations that do not even cause temporary or minute changes in human organisms can be supported by the following facts:
• The results of the aforementioned surveillance;
• No signs of exposure to toxic materials were traced to personnel on site (toxic nerve agents, like sarin, cause instant reactions; for example: myosis. In the case of yperite, the first clinical signs of poisoning usually appear within 4 to 6 hours exposure);
• None of the personnel present had any later effects (related to exposure).
All of the chemical specialists were professional soldiers (there were 56 of them assigned over the length of the conflict). They are all graduates of military colleges and middle schools with a chemical defense major, and according to the curriculum, worked with highly toxic substances both in the laboratories and in field training. The training of anti-chemical specialists with selected types of poisonous materials had been conducted practically since the beginning of the anti-chemical defense program in 1956 until February 1990, when such training was halted because of complaints of destruction of the environment from environmental protection movements and the mayors of communities.
The anti-chemical defense specialists who had undergone this training are professionals, and they are able to identify the presence of toxic materials in the terrain, on military equipment, and in the air within the sensitivity ranges of the instruments used. Therefore, there is a high probability that the identified presence of poisonous materials is an objective analysis. At the same time, concentrations that are used at chemical field exercises and in laboratories are several times higher than the concentrations that were measured in the Persian Gulf.
It has been proven that military use of chemical weapons by Iraq did not occur and any such fact would have already have been subjecfted to extensive investigation by agencies of world peace organizations. One can consider that the data measured could have had origins from industrial facilities or even storage facilities of chemical ammunition that were hit by allied bombardment. This is supported by a report of the unit's copmmander, by my statements, and by other direct participants. All members of the unit were equipped with the most modern means of protection against toxic substances. They were fully comparable with the current world standard. Any kind of exposure by these types of toxic substances would manifest itself immediately or in a very short time, and nothing of this kind has been reported. Latent damage, if it can even be considered in this group, would surely have been uncovered during exit examinations.
On the basis of the abovementioned facts, one can conclude that the event cannot in any way be connected with the use of chemical weapons or their use in battlefield activities, and harm to the Czechoslovak anti-chemical defense unit due to the military use of toxic substances could not have occurred.
These conclusions also are supported by health care specialists. Neither at the time of identification of the toxic substances, nor later, was any member of the unit put under medical care as a result of exposure at this event. All members of the unit were subjected to a complex examination in military hospitals after their return from the Persian Gulf -- primarily in the Central Military Hospital in Prague. Even there, no serious changes caused by demanding climatic conditions or by exposure to toxic substances were identified.
Many veterans of the Persian Gulf conflict later participated in, and still participate in, activities of the unit in the Czech Republic Army in Yugoslavia. Even at the time of their departure, no one mentioned any problems.
Despite this, as of 31 August 1993, military doctors had examined 18 Persian Gulf veterans who suffered certain health problems, and three of them remain under a doctor's supervision. So far, in their cases, nothing has been identified beyond 'routine' problems related to similar long-term stays abroad.
Other Related Information:
On October 8, 1993, U.S. Senate staff interviewed Joseph Boccardi, who initially came forward with information about the detection of chemical agents by the Czechoslovak chemical detection unit prior to the release of the Czech report quoted above. According to this witness, a former member of the U.S. Army assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division as an M1A1 tank crewmember (driver/loader/gunner), he was injured when he fell off a tank during his service in the Gulf War. He was sent to a medical holding area in northern Saudi Arabia. While there, he was befriended by a lieutenant assigned to the holding unit (Lt. Babika). The lieutenant came to him one day and told him to come along with him.
According to Mr. Boccardi, he and the lieutenant drove about 15-20 minutes to a facility that he was told had been used as a Saudi basic training camp. Mr. Boccardi described the facility as beautiful and palace-like (near King Khalid Military City). Once inside, the lieutenant began speaking a foreign language which Mr. Boccardi believed to be Russian to two soldiers armed with AK-47s standing at the top of a staircase. The soldiers answered. The lieutenant explained that he was speaking Czech and that these soldiers were also Czech.
Mr. Boccardi said that he and lieutenant went into a room where there were about nine soldiers, smoking, drinking vodka, and playing cards. He learned that they were a NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) team. He asked someone there "if we were kicking their butts so bad, why didn't they hit us with chemicals?" At that, everyone in the room got quiet and the Czech colonel spoke in "broken English" for the first time. He said, according to Mr. Boccardi, "they did hit us with chemicals." According to the Czech colonel, a SCUD hit where they were staying. As soon as they learned that the Patriot had missed the SCUD, they put on their chemical gear and went out onto a balcony near the railing. The Czech colonel said they detected traces of Sarin and another gas which Mr. Boccardi believed began with the letter T.
According to Mr. Boccardi, the Czech colonel said that he called U.S. command officials about the result of their tests. He, the Czech colonel, said that he was told not to say anything about it. The colonel also said that he later heard that a number of the soldiers in the area developed skin rashes shortly after this incident.
After this part of the conversation, the individuals discussed in general terms why they were not supposed to discuss the incident. This Czech colonel was identified as the commanding officer of this unit.
On December 5, 1993, according to published press reports, Jean Paul Ferrand, a logistics officer with the French contingent, told Senator Richard Shelby that nerve agents and mustard agents were detected on January 24 or 25, 1991, in an area south of King Khalid Military City. According to an Agency France Press report on that date, Ferrand said that two chemical weapons alarms went off when a storm blew wind from Iraq. Ferrand was also attributed as having said that special badges worn on the troops protective suits also registered the presence of chemical weapons. [7]
On Monday, March 28, 1994, Committee staff were contacted by a member of the 371st Chemical Company, located in Greenwood, South Carolina. This individual said that during the Gulf War, he served with the 1st platoon of this unit in the vicinity of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). According to this individual and several other members of his platoon interviewed by Committee staff, two days after an Iraqi Scud missile warhead had exploded in the desert, his platoon was sent to a site in the desert a few miles south of KKMC to train with the Czech chemical detection team that had conducted tests. They also were trained on the Czech equipment. According to two additional members of the platoon who trained with the Czech team, and were interviewed by Committee staff on April 4, 1994 in the Army Reserve Center in Greenwood, South Carolina, the Czech colonel who commanded the unit had told them that his unit had detected measurable quantities of chemical nerve agent immediat! ely af ter the Scud attack. Unit members were not able to determine the exact date of the incident, but believe it was sometime in mid to late January 1991.
The members of the unit described the facility where the Czechoslovak team lived as the "glass palace." They believed that it had previously been used as a Saudi military engineering training facility. The members of the U.S. unit who trained with the Czechs, all NBC specialists, said that the Czech equipment appeared to be more reliable than their own.
The unit Executive officer and first sergeant, while not present during the training mission, confirmed that they too were aware of the training, the missile attack, and the reported detection of the chemicals. The unit first sergeant said that this information had been recorded in the units logs, but that he received a message to send the logs to Washington, D.C. for historical purposes shortly after they returned from the Persian Gulf.
When asked if their unit did biological agent testing after incoming missiles had detonated, members of the unit said that they had no biological agent testing capability. While there were several other NBC units in the area, they were unaware of any unit that was conducting biological agent tests.
Finally, the unit said that they had been deployed on several occasions to decontaminate the buses and other vehicles that were used to transport Iraqi enemy prisoners of war to detention facilities.
One member of the unit estimated that as many as 85% of the members of this unit are currently suffering from many of the symptoms associated with Gulf War Syndrome.
U.S. Unofficial Reports of Downwind Exposure Due to Coalition Bombings of Iraqi Chemical and Biological Facilities
1. During the early phases of the air war, there was extensive media coverage of the coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. ABC News reported that on January 27, 1991, near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division went through a chemical alert drill that was more than an exercise. According to ABC News coverage, their sensors actually registered traces of chemicals in the air, the result, it appeared, of allied bombing of chemical plants in Iraq. A U.S. medical corpsman told reporters, "When the Air Force bombers hit all the gas places there in Iraq, there's a lot of contamination in the air. Some may have filtered down and set these things off. They're very, very sensitive." [8]
2. Brian Martin, of Niles, Michigan, a Gulf War veteran of the 37th Airborne Combat Engineer Battalion, 20th Airborne Brigade, 18th Airborne Corps, arrived in Saudi Arabia on October 8, 1990. According to Martin, in late January 1991, while assigned to an area between Rafha and Naryian about six miles south of the Iraqi border, he recorded in his journal and on videotape that chemical "false alarms" were going off almost every day. At first, according to Martin, the alarms were explained as being caused by vapors coming off the sand. Later, since the alarms kept going off and the troops no longer believed that they were being caused by the vapors, Martin said he was informed by both his battalion commander and the battalion NBC NCO that the alarms were sounding because of "minute" quantities of nerve agent in the air, released by the coalition bombing of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities. The troops were assured that there was no danger.
Mr. Martin believes that he witnessed a Patriot intercept of an incoming SCUD missile between Khafji and Wadi Al Batin during the air war period. He was also given the anti-chemical warfare medication pyridostigmine bromide, and suffered some adverse side effects. He says the drug made him jittery and made his vision "jiggle." Since returning from Saudi Arabia, Mr. Martin has experienced memory loss, swollen and burning feet, joint disorders, muscle weakness, heart palpitations, shortness of breath, rashes, fatigue, headaches, insomnia, bleeding from the rectum, chronic coughing, running nose, burning eyes, and uncontrollable shaking on his right-side extremeties. [9]
3. Mr. Troy Albuck, former anti-tank platoon leader with the 82nd Airborne Division, reported to Committee staff that his unit was told that the chemical alarms were going off because of what was drifting down from the Coalition bombings. He explained that his understanding of the situation was that "it was a lot like the effect of gasoline funes," in that non-lethal exposure was not harmful and would be counteracted by fresh air. [10]
4. Another source who requested confidentiality reported that he was located approximately 40 miles due east of King Khalid Military City (KKMC), when at one position, every M-8 alarm went off -- over 30 at once. The date was between January 20th and February 1, 1991. The NBC NCO radioed in that a nerve agent plant had been bombed about 150 miles away. The source recalled that they were told to take no action and they did not. [11]
Weather Reports, Climatic Information, and Imagery Smoke Plume Data
Operation Desert Storm
Weather reports during this period were censored by the U.S. and Saudi governments. But environmental groups monitoring an oil spill in the Persian Gulf confirm that the winds were at times blowing from the northwest to the southeast. The chemical and biological warfare agent production plants heavily bombed by the coalition forces during this period are located in Iraq to the north and northwest of coalition troop deployments along the Saudi-Iraqi and Saudi-Kuwaiti border. [12]
As cited above, the dispersal of chemical agents and other hazardous substances is controlled by other factors in addition to wind direction and velocity, such as topography, temperature, precipitation, vertical temperature gradient, and atmospheric humidity. These factors all contribute to the size and type of dispersal that will be observed.
In March 1992, the U.S. Air Force Environmental Technical Application Center published a compendium of the weather during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The following is a summary of relevant data for January 17, 1991 through March 2, 1991, excerpted from Gulf War Weather. The report documents the changing weather conditions, detailing the wind and rain patterns that could easily have delivered chemical and biological agents to Coalition troop emplacements. On many dates, this report notes the smoke and dust from the bombings and from the burning oil wells. The notation of visible smoke plumes is not intended to depict the actual fallout from the bombed chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities, but rather to generally reflect the direction of movement of debris from the bombings.
_______________
Notes:
1. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: US Army, August 1982), 7-13, Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine Military and Historical Experience. 1915-1991. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), 142-143.
2. Ibid.
3. Interviews with representatives of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
4. Stephen Handelman, "Kremlin Growing Frustrated with Outsider," Toronto Star (February 10, 1991), H4.
5. "Chemical Fallout Detected in Iraq," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (February 4, 1991).
6. Dave Parks, "Czechs: Nerve Gas Detected During Gulf War," The Times Picayune (July 30, 1993), A6, Stanislav Mundil, Czech News Agency and Mlada Fronta Dnes (July 29, 1993).
7. "Senator Says France Detected Chemical Agents in Gulf War; Report," Dateline; Birmingham, Agency France Presse (December 5, 1993), "France Says Gulf Troops Detected Chemicals," The Washington Post, from the Associated Press (December 5, 1993), A24.
8. Sam Donaldson, "This Week With David Brinkley," ABC News (January 27, 1991).
9. Telephone interview of Brian Martin by Committee staff on August 31, 1993.
10. Staff Interviews.
11. Staff Interviews.
12. Ronald A. Taylor, "Air Masses Battle Over Desert Also," Washington Times (January 24, 1991); "Skies Could Clear in Gulf by Sunday," Reuters, (January 25. 1991).
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
by admin » Thu Dec 17, 2015 10:00 pm
Chapter 3, Part 2
Gulf War Weather
17 January 1991
There were extensive early morning clouds over the entire area. These clouds gradually moved southward during the day as their bases raised to 8,000 feet. Broken to overcast high clouds from the approaching frontal system began to move in after 1200Z, quickly spreading over the entire area with ceilings from 20,000 to 25,000 feet. The high cloud base thickened and lowered to 10,000 to 15,000 feet by the end of the day.
Winds were from the south or southwest at 6-20 knots, becoming southeasterly after 1200Z and 3-12 after sunset.
Early morning visibilities were as low as 3,200 meters with patchy ground fog in west central Iraq. Blowing sand and suspended dust reduced visibiilty to 3,200 meters during the afternoon on the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border.
High temperatures were 13-22 degrees celsius; lows 6-10 degrees celsius.
18 January 1991
The entire area was covered by clouds with bases at 10,000-15,000 feet. These quickly lowered to 3,000 feet and, in some places, as to low as 1,500 feet. The western part of the area began clearing in the afternoon, but 200 foot ceilings formed throughout the area by the end of the day. Clouds were layered to 30,000 feet from central Iraq to southeastern Kuwait.
Light rain fell throughout the area, beginning as early as 0500Z and lasting past 1800Z in eastern Iraq.
Winds were east to southwesterly at 5-15 knots.
Visibilities were 5km in morning ground fog and 3,200 meters in rain. After the rain passed, visibilities were as low as 4,800 meters in haze and fog, falling to 1,600 meters by the end of the day.
High temperatures were 16-22 degrees C; lows, 8-13 degrees C.
19 January 1991
High pressure was centered in central Iraq and central Saudi Arabia. The stationary frontal system over the area became active when an upper-air disturbance crossed it. A low pressure cell developed and moved the front southward.
The entire area was covered with low clouds with bases at 100-200 feet. By 1200Z the northern part, including Baghdad had cleared. Ceilings in the southern section rose briefly at midday to 1,000-1,500 feet, then returned to 500-1,000 feet for the rest of the day. After sunset the clouds spread northward into the Baghdad area, where ceilings were 1,500 feet. Middle and high clouds, layered to 25,000 feet with bases at 10,000 feet, were also present over the southern area throughout the day.
Winds were east to southeasterly at 5-15 knots, becoming north to northeasterly at 10-20 knots in the afternoon and diminishing to 3-10 knots after sunset."
Morning visibilities were near zero in dense fog throughout the area. The northern section cleared by 1200Z. Visibilities in the south rose to 3,200 meters at midday, then returned to as low as 800 meters for the rest of the day. Visibilities in the northern section were as low as 1,600 meters after sunset.
Temperatures fell in response to northerly winds. Highs were 10-18 degrees C; lows, 0-10 degrees C.
The Czechoslovak chemical detection team detected the nerve agent Sarin (GB) in two separate locations during the morning hours. In addition, Yperite (HD) was also detected. As noted above, the frontal patterns during this period moved to the south-southeast.
20 January 1991
A weakening low-pressure area moved southeastward down the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz. Cool moist low-level air moved southwest and west over the northeastern half of Saudi Arabia and extreme southwestern Iraq. Mid-level disturbances across the subtropical jet stream resulted in extensive middle and high cloudiness over northern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq. By day's end another low had crossed Syria toward western Iraq.
At 0000Z broken low clouds at 1,500-4,000 feet covered Baghdad and the Tigris-Euphrates river valley. These clouds slowly cleared from the northwest; by 2100Z, only broken middle and high clouds from 10,000 to 30,000 feet covered the southern half of the Valley. The northern half, including Baghdad saw only thin high clouds. Broken clouds were layered from 1,500 through 25,000 feet over the western slopes of the Zagros mountains. Over the southern Zagros, tops reached 30,000 feet. Isolated afternoon and evening thunderstorms reached 35,000 feet in the extreme southeast near the Zagros mountains. After 2100Z, patchy broken low clouds formed again over the northern part of the Tigris Valley and the immediate Baghdad area; bases were 1,000 to 1,500 feet; tops, 3,000 feet.
Light rain or showers fell over the southern half of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley and southwestern Iraq. There were isolated afternoon and evening thundershowers over the extreme southeast. Intermittent drizzle fell in the cool air moving west away from the northern Persian Gulf.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly over the Baghdad area, becoming northeasterly over the southern Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Over Kuwait and extreme southern Iraq, winds were northeasterly to easterly. Speeds dimished from 10-15 knots in the morning to 5-10 knots by mid-evening.
Visibilities in southern and southwestern Iraq and in extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia were near zero in fog during the night, but as high as 2,000 meters in southern Iraq and Kuwait during mid-afternoon. After dark, they dropped rapidly to less than 500 meters. Visibilities in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley, northwest of the low clouds, improved to 10 km by late morning. Patchy dense river fog formed after 2100Z, dropping visibilities to less than 500 meters.
High temperatures were 7-10 degrees Centigrade in the north and 18 degrees Centigrade in the south. There were freezing temperatures in Iraq and north Saudi Arabia, and subfreezing temperatures above 6,000 feet in the mountains of southeastern Turkey and northeastern Iraq. Central Saudi Arabian lows were 5-12 degrees C.
21 January 1991
Mid-level disturbances continued to move east-northeastward along the subtropical jet stream, crossing northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait into Iran.
Patchy dense fog and low clouds again plagued southwestern Iraq and extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia until they dissipated in late morning. Cloud bases were from zero to 1,000 feet; visibilities, from near zero to 500 meters. Layered middle and high clouds persisted from 10,000 to 32,000 feet over most of northern and central Saudi Arabia and the central Red Sea.
Extensive fog and low clouds also prevailed in this area. Cloud bases were from near zero to 500 meters, and tops reached 2,000 feet. The clouds and fog slowly dissipated by late morning over southwestern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia as far east as Rafha and King Khalid Military City. Over northeastern Saudi Arabia, the low clouds and fog became broken with bases near 3,000 feet and tops at 6,000 feet by early afternoon. On the Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf coast, early morning ceilings were also near zero, but by late morning, most clouds had become scattered. Patchy fog and low clouds reformed throughout all of northeastern Saudi Arabia and extreme southwestern Iraq shortly after dark. Ceilings dropped to 200-500 feet by 2100Z. Layered middle and high clouds from 10,000-32,000 feet moved slowly southeastward over southern Iraq, northwestern Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; by 2100Z, they were over central and northeastern Saudi Arabia just southeast of Kuwait. Inf! rared satellite imagery taken just before sunrise in Kuwait shows these layered decks.
Precipitation, outside of thunderstorms and showers, was limited to light drizzle in areas of dense fog and low clouds.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots in southeastern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia; they slowly became southeasterly at 5-10 knots in southwestern Iraq and in north-central and northwestern Saudi Arabia.
Early morning visibilities in the fog and low cloud area ranged from zero to 500 meters, improving to 1,000-3,000 meters by late morning and to 5-5 km by late afternoon. Visibilities were as low as 100 meters in denser fog patches. Patchy dense fog again formed after dark. The thickset fog was found along the Persian Gulf coastline and in shallow depressions inland where sand was still moist or where showers had occurred earlier in the day. On the Persian Gulf coast, visibilities improved from near zero at dawn to 1,000-2,000 meters by 0900Z, but dropped below 500 meters in fog by 1900Z. Patchy dense fog over and near the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers northwest of Basrah dissipated by 0600Z, but reformed after 1900Z
22 January 1991
Easterly to east-northeasterly low-level winds continued to bring moisture to west-central and northwest Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream slowly weakened, but it continued to bring middle and high clouds northeastward across the Arabian peninsula into Kuwait and southwestern Iran.
Multilayered broken middle and high clouds persisted over southwestern Iraq, the southern Persian Gulf, and central Saudi Arabia from 10,000 to 28,000 feet. Visibilities remained good except where mountains were obscured by cloud.
Fog and low clouds again persisted all night over northeastern Saudi Arabia, the northern Saudi Arabian Persian Gulf coast, and extreme southwestern Iraq. Ceilings were again from near zero to 500 feet. Low clouds slowly lifted and dissipated, moving to a small area southwest of Kuwait by late morning. Bases were now 3,000 feet, with tops to 7,000 feet. Isolated thunderstorms, with bases as low as 2,000 feet, formed in late morning and early afternoon in extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the northern Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iraq. Tops reached 40,000 feet. Layered broken middle and high clouds persisted from 10,000 to 27,000 feet throughout the day over central and northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and extreme southwestern Iraq. Iraq northwest of Basrah was clear. A visual DMSP satellite image taken shortly after sunrise in Kuwait, shows layered clouds with embedded thunderstorms over northern Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iran.
By sunset, low clouds and fog began to reform along the Iraqi-Saudi Arabia border northwest as far as Rafha. By late evening, the fog had lifted into broken low clouds with bases from 1,000 to 2,000 feet and tops to 5,000 feet. These clouds had spread north and northeast as far as the central Tigris-Euphrates river valley by 2100Z.
Showers and thunderstorms fell over northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the northern Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iran. Patchy nighttime drizzle fell in area of dense fog and low clouds.
Winds were northeasterly at 5 knots, becoming southeasterly at 5-10 knots after 0900Z.
Visibilities dropped to less than 100 meters in fog before dawn.
23 January 1991
By mid-afternoon, the frontal system had moved south of Baghdad. A weak high pressure center formed over Kuwait early in the day and moved slowly southeast in the northern Persian Gulf. The weak stationary frontal system in central Saudi Arabia weakened further. The southwest to northeast subtropical jet stream over central Saudi Arabia moved southeastward to Qatar by 2100Z.
Isolated blowing dust reduced visibilities to as low as 3,200 meters in western Iraq.
Extensive broken to overcast low clouds, with bases of 500-1,000 feet and tops to 1,500-2,000 feet, covered northeastern and central Saudi Arabia. By early afternoon, skies were scattered to broken and bases had lifted to 3,000 feet. This layer dissipated shortly before sunset over northeastern Saudi Arabia, but reformed by 2000Z. In early evening, broken low clouds from 3,000 to 5,000 feet moved north and northeastward over Kuwait and the southern Tigris-Euphrates river valley in advance of the southward moving cold front. By 1200Z, the leading edge of broken to overcast frontal cloud layers had moved south of Baghdad, with bases from 3,000 to 4,000 feet; tops were 12,000-15,000 feet with broken high clouds above. Isolated rainshowers along and just ahead of the front reached 20,000 feet. By 2000Z, the leading edge of the frontal clouds had moved to near An Najaf in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley--the trailing edge was 60 miles north of Baghdad. Figure 3-8, a vis! ual sa tellite image taken at 1037Z, shows these layered clouds well.
Isolated moderate to heavy rain showers fell in central Iraq along and within 100 miles either side of the southeastward moving cold front. Patch light drizzle fell in northeastern Saudi Arabia before 0500Z.
Winds were easterly at 5-7 knots before dawn, becoming southeasterly at 5-10 knots by late morning in extreme southern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia. By 1700Z, wind had veered to southerly at 10-15 knots. In central Iraq, winds were light and variable until 1200Z, becoming southerly at 10-20 knots after 1500Z.
24 January 1991
At 1200Z, heavy rain fell in extreme northern Saudi Arabia near the western Iraq border. Fog formed during the night and through the morning in north-central Saudi Arabia, along the western Saudi Arabia-Iraq border, in northern Jordan, and in southern Syria.
Winds were westerly to northwesterly at 10 knots during the first 12 hours, becoming northerly to northeasterly at 10 knots later in the day.
Visibilities in fog were as low as 5 km from 0000 to 1000Z in Saudi Arabia./I>
25 January 1991
A low moved east-northeast across Syria and Iraq, producing light snow and rain showers, blowing dust, and extensive cloudiness. Conditions improved toward the end of the day as the system moved into Iran. By the end of the day, another low had developed along the eastern Mediterranean coast, increasing cloudiness in western Iraq.
The low produced light snow over western Iraq, northeastern Jordan, and Syria; light rainshowers fell in northwestern Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Winds to 20 knots in northern Saudi Arabia produced duststorms from 0900 to 1500Z as far south as 28 degrees north.
Cloud cover was extensive until evening, by which time the system had moved into Iran. Broken to overcast low and middle clouds, along with some high clouds, preceded the low and its cold front. Scattered to broken low clouds followed the front; ceilings were 2,000-3,000 feet, but as low as 500 feet in rainshowers.
Precipitation consisted of light rainshowers that developed with the frontal system. At Z, Baghdad skies were overcast with rainshowers.
From 0400 to 1100Z in Saudi Arabia, fog reduced visibility to as low as 3,600 meters. Fog redeveloped in the evening. Some dust may have been advected into the area from storms farther west.
26 January 1991
By 1800Z, a weak secondary low had formed along the front in Saudi Arabia near 27 degrees North, 44 degrees East, and drifted slowly east.
The low pressure system produced light snow over southern Syria and light rainshowers in northern Saudi Arabia and western Iraq. Blowing dust south of the rain in Saudi Arabia reduced visibilities to 5 km. Winds were 20 knots around the low, but reached 30 knots with rain in northwestern Saudi Arabia.
The low moving across southern Iraq produced extensive cloudiness, as well as thunderstorms with bases at 2,000 feet and tops to 35,000 feet. Ceilings were as low as 800 feet in rainshowers.
Precipitation fell as light rain and rainshowers in Saudi Arabia around the low. Rainshowers also fell in Iraq.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-15 knots most of the day, becoming northeasterly as the storm system approached and northwesterly again as it passed. Peak speeds were 23 knots, probably higher in Iraq.
Visibilities in eastern Iraq were 6 km in haze early in the day through 0600Z. Later in the day, visibilities on the south sides of showers and duststorms were reduced to 8 km.
27 January 1991
A low moving eastward from northeastern Saudi Arabia to the Persian Gulf coast produced extensive cloudiness over most of southeastern Iraq. The low gradually weakened throughout the day, leaving only some low clouds in the vicinity of the Gulf by late evening. A cold front extended west-southwest from the low across Saudi Arabia. A strong high moved into northwestern Saudi Arabia, driving the cold front into southern Saudi Arabia; strong winds behind the front produced duststorms.
The storm system produced significant weather over large parts of Saudi Arabia. Light rain and rainshowers moving east with the low persisted at some Gulf coastal stations until 1900Z. The low produced multilayered clouds the first half of the day, but only low cloud the second half. A low overcast with fog developed behind the front in northwestern Saudi Arabia; fog dropped visibilities to as low as 200 meters. Skies improved by mid-morning and cleared by afternoon. Strong winds behind the front produced duststorms. Visibilities in northwestern Saudi Arabia was near zero in early evening because of blowing dust in 35 knot winds.
Skies were initially overcast in the southeastern two-thirds of the area, but Baghdad and vicinity was clear. Middle and high clouds were only present the first half of the day; they dissipated and moved off to the east by 1200Z. The low clouds moved southeast during the day and were out of Iraq by 1500Z. After 1500Z, the low cloud remaining over Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was broken to overcast.
Precipitation fell from 0000 to 0600Z as light drizzle, rain, rainshowers.
Winds were initially southeasterly at 10-15 knots ahead of the low, by northerly to northwesterly across Iraq behind the front. Winds shifted across the area by 1200Z; northerly to northwesterly winds were 10-20 knots with peak gusts to 30 knots. Speeds dropped to less than 10 knots during the evening.
Visibilities dropped to 9 km under the cloud cover in rain, fog, and haze.
28 January 1991
High pressure began to dominate the weather over Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia, but parts of Saudi Arabia were still affected by weather left in the wake of the low pressure system that prevailed on the 27th.
Morning fog and low clouds north of Riyadh lowered ceilings and visibility to 2,000 feet and 8km. There were some scattered to broken low clouds in the western Persian Gulf and at coastal stations. There was broken fog and stratus, with blowing dust, in southern Saudi Arabia.
Skies were generally clear except for thin scattered high cloud at 22,000-28,000 feet over northern Iraq and heavy black smoke over southern Iraq--see Figure 3-14. Winds were northwesterly at 3-10 knots, becoming more northerly toward the end of the day. Visibilities were as low as 1,500 meters over southern Iraq in the heavy smoke.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible originating in an area just south of the two large lakes west of Baghdad and extending to the southeast. Available NOAA thermal imagery details smoke plumes in eastern Iraq moving to the southeast.
29 January 1991
A high pressure area over Saudi Arabia weakened as it moved southeast toward Qatar. A mid to upper level disturbance moved across the northern part of the region, resulting in extensive cloudiness over northern Iraq and Turkey.
The disturbance produced light rain and snow in Syria and snow in Turkey. There was extensive black smoke along the Persian Gulf coast. Suspended dust still reduced visibility in southern Saudi Arabia.
Isolated evening thunderstorms from 3,000 to 35,000 feet developed over southeastern Iraq. Some formed southwest of Baghdad at 1800Z.
Winds were near calm during the night, becoming east-southeasterly at 5-10 knots in the morning and increasing 10-20 knots during the afternoon. On the Persian Gulf coast, however, winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots for the first half of the day before switching to east-southeast.
Visibilities were 8 km in blowing dust in the afternoon as the winds picked up. Black smoke reduced visibilities along the Persian Gulf coast--one station reported 9 km.
30 January 1991
A low pressure system developed in the eastern Mediterranean and moved eastward across Syria, reaching western Iraq by the end of the day.
Low clouds moved into western Iraq during the day with ceilings around 3,000 feet. The subtropical jet stream produced high clouds across central Saudi Arabia.
Cloud cover from the previous day's disturbance remained over eastern Iraq and Kuwait; broken low clouds at 3,000-6,000 feet in the north around Baghdad dissipated by 1100Z. Over Kuwait, broken middle clouds from 8,000 to 14,000 feet moved off to the east by 0600Z. Broken to overcast low clouds with 3,000 foot ceilings and 6,000 foot tops entered the western part of the area in the evening.
With the storm system approaching, winds were southerly to southeasterly at 5-10 knots.
Visibilities were restricted, primarily by haze and smoke from burning oil. Morning fog reduced visibility to 5 km in some spots; most haze restrictions were reported at 8 km. Some dust was raised during the day with increasing winds from the approaching system.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes originating in an area west of the two large lakes west of Baghdad and extending to the southeast. The plume splits into two plumes, one extending to the east and the other to the SSE just south of the southernmost lake.
31 January 1991
A slow moving low in the eastern Mediterranean Sea spread stormy weather throughout the Middle East as an associated frontal system passed through Iraq. At 0600Z, a secondary low pressure cell was centered southwest of Baghdad. It rapidly moved northeast while the cold front moved south and weakened. In north-central Saudi Arabia, the strong subtropical jet stream spread extensive high clouds.
Broken to overcast low clouds extended over the area until about 1600Z, with ceilings over Iraq as low as 3,000 feet and tops to 6,000 feet. Baghdad was affected between 0200 and 0900Z. Skies became clear in central Iraq and Kuwait after 1600Z as the front moved southward.
Isolated thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet passed northeast of Baghdad near 1100Z. Rain fell in western Iraq when the low pressure cell moved through.
Winds were southwesterly at 5-10 knots before the front and westerly to northerly at 15-20 knots immediately behind it.
Visibilities were reduced to 4,000 meters by duststorms in Kuwait and southern Iraq as the front passed. Ground fog lowered visibilities to about 6 km in northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq.
1 February 1991
High pressure was centered over northwestern Saudi Arabia, keeping central Iraq cloud-free. A weak cold front extended from a low centered in north-central Iran. The front spread middle clouds from Qatar southwestward across Saudi Arabia. A slow moving low-pressure system centered on the Turkey-Syria border caused rainshowers in western Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. By 1800Z, middle clouds from this low reached Baghdad. A weak low developed on the central Red Sea coast in response to an upper air distrubance.
Middle clouds covered the mountains to Iraq's west and north. Light rain fell in Syria and northern Iraq between 1800 and 2100Z. Extensive areas of mountain-wave turbulence developed in the west between 0300Z and 1500Z and reached as far east as 43 degrees east. Early-morning ground fog formed in low lying areas over most of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Lowest visibilities were 2,000-4,000 meters.
Skies were clear to scattered before about 0900Z, except in the extreme northeast. Broken low clouds from the low in Turkey spread southward; by 1600Z, they had reached Baghdad, with 3,000 foot ceilings. Thin broken or scattered cirrus spread northeastward from the northern Red Sea, covering the area south of 31 degrees North by 1100Z.
Winds were northeasterly at 5-10 knots in the south, westerly to the north. Afternoon winds were light and variable over central Iraq. Visibilities were generally good, but morning ground fog reduced them to about 6 km in northeast Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq.
2 February 1991
A trough of low pressure formed to the east of a high pressure cell centered over eastern Saudi Arabia, causing low clouds in southern Iraq. A frontal systrem with low centers in the southern Caspian Sea and in east-central Syria extended along the northern Iraq border. The strong subtropical jet stream spread high and middle clouds over central Saudi Arabia.
Low and middle clouds prevailed over northern and western Iraq. Early morning ground fog formed in low-lying areas over most of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Extensive areas of mountain-wave turbulence developed near the Syria-Iraq border between 0300 and 1500Z and reached to 43 degrees East.
The subtropical jet stream caused layered middle and high clouds over the area south of 32 degrees North throughout the day. Ceilings were between 15,000 and 25,000 feet, with the lowest along the northern Persian Gulf. Frontal low clouds stretched along the Syria-Iraq border. The broken low clouds southwest of Baghdad included 4,000 foot ceilings and 6,000 foot tops. These clouds gradually moved east; by 2000Z, they were on the Kuwait coast. Another layer of low clouds with ceilings of about 3,000 feet formed over the Tigris-Euphrates river valley north of 31 degrees North during the night.
Winds were easterly at 10-15 knots south of 30 degrees North, southerly in the central area, and westerly north of 33 degrees North. They were gusty in the southern areas.
Duststorms reduced visibilities in the northern Nafud Desert eastward to southern Kuwait between 1200 and 2000Z. Minimum visibility was about 2,400 meters. Dense smoke was reported in northwestern Kuwait before 0800Z--visibilities were probably below 2,000 meters.
High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 2-11 degrees Celsius.
3 February 1991
The frontal system in eastern Syria began to move slowly eastward and break up, resulting in lowered ceilings and gusty winds. The nearly dry front passed Baghdad at 2000Z. A weak front extended from central Iraq to near Riyadh, spreading low clouds to Iraq's eastern section. The subtropical jet stream became more westerly than northwesterly, leaving the northern Persian Gulf cloud-free but spreading scattered to broken middle and high clouds across Saudi Arabia.
Sustained winds to 25 knots were reported in extreme northwestern Saudi Arabia as the front passed. Extensive duststorms reduced visibilities to 1,000 meters near the front in the Syrian and Nafud Deserts. Duststorms were also reported at 1500Z between Riyadh and Kuwait.
Middle and high clouds from the subtropical jet stream had moved out of the area by 1000Z. In the morning, scattered to broken low clouds covered Iraq east of 43 degrees East and all of Kuwait, some locations reported 3,000 foot ceilings. By 1200Z, the clouds had moved eastward to the Iraq-Turkey border. A small area of low clouds with 3,000 foot ceilings formed about 100 miles west of Baghdad at 1600Z.
Winds were westerly at 10-25 knots west of 45 degrees East, but southeasterly at 10-15 knots to the east. There were gusts to 35 knots near the front.
Duststorms reduced visibilities to as low as 500 meters at about 1500Z in southern Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere, visibilities were above 6 km. High temperatures were 8-20 degrees Celsius; lows 3-16 degrees Celsius.
4 February 1991
High pressure centered in southeastern Egypt strengthened and built into northwestern Saudi Arabia. The low pressure system that had been affecting northern Iraq continued to move eastward. By 0900Z, the trough had moved southeastward to the south of Qatar. The subtropical jet stream continued to spread high and middle clouds over the central Arabia Peninsula.
In the early morning, middle clouds produced 10,000 foot ceilings in a triangular area between 30 degrees North and a southwest-northeast line running from 60 miles south of Baghdad, then eastward to the Iraqi border. These clouds rapidly moved southeastward. By 0600Z, they affected only the coast of Kuwait. The area was almost cloud free by 1000Z.
Winds were northeasterly at 10-15 knots inland, but northerly at 15-20 knots on the Kuwait coast. Inland, winds became northerly at 5-10 knots aftrer 1800Z.
Visibilities were generally above 10 km, but scattered fires and smoke plumes reduced visibility in Kuwait to below 4 km. One smoke plume, originating in southern Kuwait, measured 35 miles long and 10-15 miles wide.
High temperatures were 3-13 degrees Celsius; lows, 2-8 degrees Celsius.
5 February 1991
High pressure centered in central Iraq kept skies clear or scattered most of the day, but clouds associated with the subtropical jet stream still spread high and middle clouds over the central Arabian Peninsula. These clouds were scattered in the morning, but denser clouds moved in from Egypt by 1000Z.
Morning haze reduced visibilities in central Saudi Arabia; Riyadh reported 4,800 meters at 0500Z, improving to 8 km by 0800Z. Duststorms after 2000Z were the result of 20 knot winds over the Syrian and Nafud Desert; they lowered visibility to 5 km.
Clouds were limited to scattered cirrus until about 1100Z, but the subtropical jet stream moved scattered to broken middle and high clouds into southwestern Iraq later in the day. These clouds had moved over Kuwait by 1600Z, producing 10,000 foot ceilings during the night.
Winds were northeasterly at 10-15 knots along the coast, but light and variable in Iraq. As the front shifted farther north after 0900Z, winds in the south became stronger and more easterly. Visibilities were above 10 km except in Kuwait, where scattered fires and smoke plumes reduced visibility to below 4 km. High temperatures were 9-17 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows small visible smoke plumes over Kuwait extending to the south and southeast.
6 February 1991
High pressure was centered in northwestern Iraq, with a weak low pressure trough to the southeast between central Saudi Arabia--near Riyadh--and Israel. The subtropical jet stream remained over the northern Arabian Peninsula; associated high clouds became increasingly scattered after 0600Z.
At 0000Z, there were only scattered low, middle, and high clouds throughout the area. By 0300Z, the middle cloud deck had thickened; ceilings as low as 12,000 feet, with tops at about 18,000 feet, had formed over the southwestern half of Iraq. These clouds drifted eastward, and by 1900Z they were east of Baghdad and Kuwait. Middle and high clouds from the subtropical jet stream affected Kuwait and southern Iraq between 0400 and 1100Z; bases were at or above 10,000 feet, with tops to 32,000 feet.
Winds were light and variable in Iraq, but easterly at 5-10 knots in Kuwait. Morning fog, smoke, and dust reduced visibilities in Kuwait and southern Iraq to as low as 3,200 meters in spots. Afternoon visibilities in areas not affected by smoke were above 6 km.
Afternoon high temperatures were between 5 and 13 degrees Celsius. High pressure and almost clear skies drove morning low temperatures down to -2 degrees Celsius in the north and 7 degrees Celsius in the south.
Gulf War Weather
17 January 1991
There were extensive early morning clouds over the entire area. These clouds gradually moved southward during the day as their bases raised to 8,000 feet. Broken to overcast high clouds from the approaching frontal system began to move in after 1200Z, quickly spreading over the entire area with ceilings from 20,000 to 25,000 feet. The high cloud base thickened and lowered to 10,000 to 15,000 feet by the end of the day.
Winds were from the south or southwest at 6-20 knots, becoming southeasterly after 1200Z and 3-12 after sunset.
Early morning visibilities were as low as 3,200 meters with patchy ground fog in west central Iraq. Blowing sand and suspended dust reduced visibiilty to 3,200 meters during the afternoon on the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border.
High temperatures were 13-22 degrees celsius; lows 6-10 degrees celsius.
18 January 1991
The entire area was covered by clouds with bases at 10,000-15,000 feet. These quickly lowered to 3,000 feet and, in some places, as to low as 1,500 feet. The western part of the area began clearing in the afternoon, but 200 foot ceilings formed throughout the area by the end of the day. Clouds were layered to 30,000 feet from central Iraq to southeastern Kuwait.
Light rain fell throughout the area, beginning as early as 0500Z and lasting past 1800Z in eastern Iraq.
Winds were east to southwesterly at 5-15 knots.
Visibilities were 5km in morning ground fog and 3,200 meters in rain. After the rain passed, visibilities were as low as 4,800 meters in haze and fog, falling to 1,600 meters by the end of the day.
High temperatures were 16-22 degrees C; lows, 8-13 degrees C.
19 January 1991
High pressure was centered in central Iraq and central Saudi Arabia. The stationary frontal system over the area became active when an upper-air disturbance crossed it. A low pressure cell developed and moved the front southward.
The entire area was covered with low clouds with bases at 100-200 feet. By 1200Z the northern part, including Baghdad had cleared. Ceilings in the southern section rose briefly at midday to 1,000-1,500 feet, then returned to 500-1,000 feet for the rest of the day. After sunset the clouds spread northward into the Baghdad area, where ceilings were 1,500 feet. Middle and high clouds, layered to 25,000 feet with bases at 10,000 feet, were also present over the southern area throughout the day.
Winds were east to southeasterly at 5-15 knots, becoming north to northeasterly at 10-20 knots in the afternoon and diminishing to 3-10 knots after sunset."
Morning visibilities were near zero in dense fog throughout the area. The northern section cleared by 1200Z. Visibilities in the south rose to 3,200 meters at midday, then returned to as low as 800 meters for the rest of the day. Visibilities in the northern section were as low as 1,600 meters after sunset.
Temperatures fell in response to northerly winds. Highs were 10-18 degrees C; lows, 0-10 degrees C.
The Czechoslovak chemical detection team detected the nerve agent Sarin (GB) in two separate locations during the morning hours. In addition, Yperite (HD) was also detected. As noted above, the frontal patterns during this period moved to the south-southeast.
20 January 1991
A weakening low-pressure area moved southeastward down the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz. Cool moist low-level air moved southwest and west over the northeastern half of Saudi Arabia and extreme southwestern Iraq. Mid-level disturbances across the subtropical jet stream resulted in extensive middle and high cloudiness over northern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq. By day's end another low had crossed Syria toward western Iraq.
At 0000Z broken low clouds at 1,500-4,000 feet covered Baghdad and the Tigris-Euphrates river valley. These clouds slowly cleared from the northwest; by 2100Z, only broken middle and high clouds from 10,000 to 30,000 feet covered the southern half of the Valley. The northern half, including Baghdad saw only thin high clouds. Broken clouds were layered from 1,500 through 25,000 feet over the western slopes of the Zagros mountains. Over the southern Zagros, tops reached 30,000 feet. Isolated afternoon and evening thunderstorms reached 35,000 feet in the extreme southeast near the Zagros mountains. After 2100Z, patchy broken low clouds formed again over the northern part of the Tigris Valley and the immediate Baghdad area; bases were 1,000 to 1,500 feet; tops, 3,000 feet.
Light rain or showers fell over the southern half of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley and southwestern Iraq. There were isolated afternoon and evening thundershowers over the extreme southeast. Intermittent drizzle fell in the cool air moving west away from the northern Persian Gulf.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly over the Baghdad area, becoming northeasterly over the southern Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Over Kuwait and extreme southern Iraq, winds were northeasterly to easterly. Speeds dimished from 10-15 knots in the morning to 5-10 knots by mid-evening.
Visibilities in southern and southwestern Iraq and in extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia were near zero in fog during the night, but as high as 2,000 meters in southern Iraq and Kuwait during mid-afternoon. After dark, they dropped rapidly to less than 500 meters. Visibilities in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley, northwest of the low clouds, improved to 10 km by late morning. Patchy dense river fog formed after 2100Z, dropping visibilities to less than 500 meters.
High temperatures were 7-10 degrees Centigrade in the north and 18 degrees Centigrade in the south. There were freezing temperatures in Iraq and north Saudi Arabia, and subfreezing temperatures above 6,000 feet in the mountains of southeastern Turkey and northeastern Iraq. Central Saudi Arabian lows were 5-12 degrees C.
21 January 1991
Mid-level disturbances continued to move east-northeastward along the subtropical jet stream, crossing northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait into Iran.
Patchy dense fog and low clouds again plagued southwestern Iraq and extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia until they dissipated in late morning. Cloud bases were from zero to 1,000 feet; visibilities, from near zero to 500 meters. Layered middle and high clouds persisted from 10,000 to 32,000 feet over most of northern and central Saudi Arabia and the central Red Sea.
Extensive fog and low clouds also prevailed in this area. Cloud bases were from near zero to 500 meters, and tops reached 2,000 feet. The clouds and fog slowly dissipated by late morning over southwestern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia as far east as Rafha and King Khalid Military City. Over northeastern Saudi Arabia, the low clouds and fog became broken with bases near 3,000 feet and tops at 6,000 feet by early afternoon. On the Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf coast, early morning ceilings were also near zero, but by late morning, most clouds had become scattered. Patchy fog and low clouds reformed throughout all of northeastern Saudi Arabia and extreme southwestern Iraq shortly after dark. Ceilings dropped to 200-500 feet by 2100Z. Layered middle and high clouds from 10,000-32,000 feet moved slowly southeastward over southern Iraq, northwestern Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; by 2100Z, they were over central and northeastern Saudi Arabia just southeast of Kuwait. Inf! rared satellite imagery taken just before sunrise in Kuwait shows these layered decks.
Precipitation, outside of thunderstorms and showers, was limited to light drizzle in areas of dense fog and low clouds.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots in southeastern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia; they slowly became southeasterly at 5-10 knots in southwestern Iraq and in north-central and northwestern Saudi Arabia.
Early morning visibilities in the fog and low cloud area ranged from zero to 500 meters, improving to 1,000-3,000 meters by late morning and to 5-5 km by late afternoon. Visibilities were as low as 100 meters in denser fog patches. Patchy dense fog again formed after dark. The thickset fog was found along the Persian Gulf coastline and in shallow depressions inland where sand was still moist or where showers had occurred earlier in the day. On the Persian Gulf coast, visibilities improved from near zero at dawn to 1,000-2,000 meters by 0900Z, but dropped below 500 meters in fog by 1900Z. Patchy dense fog over and near the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers northwest of Basrah dissipated by 0600Z, but reformed after 1900Z
22 January 1991
Easterly to east-northeasterly low-level winds continued to bring moisture to west-central and northwest Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream slowly weakened, but it continued to bring middle and high clouds northeastward across the Arabian peninsula into Kuwait and southwestern Iran.
Multilayered broken middle and high clouds persisted over southwestern Iraq, the southern Persian Gulf, and central Saudi Arabia from 10,000 to 28,000 feet. Visibilities remained good except where mountains were obscured by cloud.
Fog and low clouds again persisted all night over northeastern Saudi Arabia, the northern Saudi Arabian Persian Gulf coast, and extreme southwestern Iraq. Ceilings were again from near zero to 500 feet. Low clouds slowly lifted and dissipated, moving to a small area southwest of Kuwait by late morning. Bases were now 3,000 feet, with tops to 7,000 feet. Isolated thunderstorms, with bases as low as 2,000 feet, formed in late morning and early afternoon in extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the northern Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iraq. Tops reached 40,000 feet. Layered broken middle and high clouds persisted from 10,000 to 27,000 feet throughout the day over central and northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and extreme southwestern Iraq. Iraq northwest of Basrah was clear. A visual DMSP satellite image taken shortly after sunrise in Kuwait, shows layered clouds with embedded thunderstorms over northern Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iran.
By sunset, low clouds and fog began to reform along the Iraqi-Saudi Arabia border northwest as far as Rafha. By late evening, the fog had lifted into broken low clouds with bases from 1,000 to 2,000 feet and tops to 5,000 feet. These clouds had spread north and northeast as far as the central Tigris-Euphrates river valley by 2100Z.
Showers and thunderstorms fell over northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the northern Persian Gulf, and southwestern Iran. Patchy nighttime drizzle fell in area of dense fog and low clouds.
Winds were northeasterly at 5 knots, becoming southeasterly at 5-10 knots after 0900Z.
Visibilities dropped to less than 100 meters in fog before dawn.
23 January 1991
By mid-afternoon, the frontal system had moved south of Baghdad. A weak high pressure center formed over Kuwait early in the day and moved slowly southeast in the northern Persian Gulf. The weak stationary frontal system in central Saudi Arabia weakened further. The southwest to northeast subtropical jet stream over central Saudi Arabia moved southeastward to Qatar by 2100Z.
Isolated blowing dust reduced visibilities to as low as 3,200 meters in western Iraq.
Extensive broken to overcast low clouds, with bases of 500-1,000 feet and tops to 1,500-2,000 feet, covered northeastern and central Saudi Arabia. By early afternoon, skies were scattered to broken and bases had lifted to 3,000 feet. This layer dissipated shortly before sunset over northeastern Saudi Arabia, but reformed by 2000Z. In early evening, broken low clouds from 3,000 to 5,000 feet moved north and northeastward over Kuwait and the southern Tigris-Euphrates river valley in advance of the southward moving cold front. By 1200Z, the leading edge of broken to overcast frontal cloud layers had moved south of Baghdad, with bases from 3,000 to 4,000 feet; tops were 12,000-15,000 feet with broken high clouds above. Isolated rainshowers along and just ahead of the front reached 20,000 feet. By 2000Z, the leading edge of the frontal clouds had moved to near An Najaf in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley--the trailing edge was 60 miles north of Baghdad. Figure 3-8, a vis! ual sa tellite image taken at 1037Z, shows these layered clouds well.
Isolated moderate to heavy rain showers fell in central Iraq along and within 100 miles either side of the southeastward moving cold front. Patch light drizzle fell in northeastern Saudi Arabia before 0500Z.
Winds were easterly at 5-7 knots before dawn, becoming southeasterly at 5-10 knots by late morning in extreme southern Iraq and northeastern Saudi Arabia. By 1700Z, wind had veered to southerly at 10-15 knots. In central Iraq, winds were light and variable until 1200Z, becoming southerly at 10-20 knots after 1500Z.
24 January 1991
At 1200Z, heavy rain fell in extreme northern Saudi Arabia near the western Iraq border. Fog formed during the night and through the morning in north-central Saudi Arabia, along the western Saudi Arabia-Iraq border, in northern Jordan, and in southern Syria.
Winds were westerly to northwesterly at 10 knots during the first 12 hours, becoming northerly to northeasterly at 10 knots later in the day.
Visibilities in fog were as low as 5 km from 0000 to 1000Z in Saudi Arabia./I>
25 January 1991
A low moved east-northeast across Syria and Iraq, producing light snow and rain showers, blowing dust, and extensive cloudiness. Conditions improved toward the end of the day as the system moved into Iran. By the end of the day, another low had developed along the eastern Mediterranean coast, increasing cloudiness in western Iraq.
The low produced light snow over western Iraq, northeastern Jordan, and Syria; light rainshowers fell in northwestern Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Winds to 20 knots in northern Saudi Arabia produced duststorms from 0900 to 1500Z as far south as 28 degrees north.
Cloud cover was extensive until evening, by which time the system had moved into Iran. Broken to overcast low and middle clouds, along with some high clouds, preceded the low and its cold front. Scattered to broken low clouds followed the front; ceilings were 2,000-3,000 feet, but as low as 500 feet in rainshowers.
Precipitation consisted of light rainshowers that developed with the frontal system. At Z, Baghdad skies were overcast with rainshowers.
From 0400 to 1100Z in Saudi Arabia, fog reduced visibility to as low as 3,600 meters. Fog redeveloped in the evening. Some dust may have been advected into the area from storms farther west.
26 January 1991
By 1800Z, a weak secondary low had formed along the front in Saudi Arabia near 27 degrees North, 44 degrees East, and drifted slowly east.
The low pressure system produced light snow over southern Syria and light rainshowers in northern Saudi Arabia and western Iraq. Blowing dust south of the rain in Saudi Arabia reduced visibilities to 5 km. Winds were 20 knots around the low, but reached 30 knots with rain in northwestern Saudi Arabia.
The low moving across southern Iraq produced extensive cloudiness, as well as thunderstorms with bases at 2,000 feet and tops to 35,000 feet. Ceilings were as low as 800 feet in rainshowers.
Precipitation fell as light rain and rainshowers in Saudi Arabia around the low. Rainshowers also fell in Iraq.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-15 knots most of the day, becoming northeasterly as the storm system approached and northwesterly again as it passed. Peak speeds were 23 knots, probably higher in Iraq.
Visibilities in eastern Iraq were 6 km in haze early in the day through 0600Z. Later in the day, visibilities on the south sides of showers and duststorms were reduced to 8 km.
27 January 1991
A low moving eastward from northeastern Saudi Arabia to the Persian Gulf coast produced extensive cloudiness over most of southeastern Iraq. The low gradually weakened throughout the day, leaving only some low clouds in the vicinity of the Gulf by late evening. A cold front extended west-southwest from the low across Saudi Arabia. A strong high moved into northwestern Saudi Arabia, driving the cold front into southern Saudi Arabia; strong winds behind the front produced duststorms.
The storm system produced significant weather over large parts of Saudi Arabia. Light rain and rainshowers moving east with the low persisted at some Gulf coastal stations until 1900Z. The low produced multilayered clouds the first half of the day, but only low cloud the second half. A low overcast with fog developed behind the front in northwestern Saudi Arabia; fog dropped visibilities to as low as 200 meters. Skies improved by mid-morning and cleared by afternoon. Strong winds behind the front produced duststorms. Visibilities in northwestern Saudi Arabia was near zero in early evening because of blowing dust in 35 knot winds.
Skies were initially overcast in the southeastern two-thirds of the area, but Baghdad and vicinity was clear. Middle and high clouds were only present the first half of the day; they dissipated and moved off to the east by 1200Z. The low clouds moved southeast during the day and were out of Iraq by 1500Z. After 1500Z, the low cloud remaining over Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was broken to overcast.
Precipitation fell from 0000 to 0600Z as light drizzle, rain, rainshowers.
Winds were initially southeasterly at 10-15 knots ahead of the low, by northerly to northwesterly across Iraq behind the front. Winds shifted across the area by 1200Z; northerly to northwesterly winds were 10-20 knots with peak gusts to 30 knots. Speeds dropped to less than 10 knots during the evening.
Visibilities dropped to 9 km under the cloud cover in rain, fog, and haze.
28 January 1991
High pressure began to dominate the weather over Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia, but parts of Saudi Arabia were still affected by weather left in the wake of the low pressure system that prevailed on the 27th.
Morning fog and low clouds north of Riyadh lowered ceilings and visibility to 2,000 feet and 8km. There were some scattered to broken low clouds in the western Persian Gulf and at coastal stations. There was broken fog and stratus, with blowing dust, in southern Saudi Arabia.
Skies were generally clear except for thin scattered high cloud at 22,000-28,000 feet over northern Iraq and heavy black smoke over southern Iraq--see Figure 3-14. Winds were northwesterly at 3-10 knots, becoming more northerly toward the end of the day. Visibilities were as low as 1,500 meters over southern Iraq in the heavy smoke.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible originating in an area just south of the two large lakes west of Baghdad and extending to the southeast. Available NOAA thermal imagery details smoke plumes in eastern Iraq moving to the southeast.
29 January 1991
A high pressure area over Saudi Arabia weakened as it moved southeast toward Qatar. A mid to upper level disturbance moved across the northern part of the region, resulting in extensive cloudiness over northern Iraq and Turkey.
The disturbance produced light rain and snow in Syria and snow in Turkey. There was extensive black smoke along the Persian Gulf coast. Suspended dust still reduced visibility in southern Saudi Arabia.
Isolated evening thunderstorms from 3,000 to 35,000 feet developed over southeastern Iraq. Some formed southwest of Baghdad at 1800Z.
Winds were near calm during the night, becoming east-southeasterly at 5-10 knots in the morning and increasing 10-20 knots during the afternoon. On the Persian Gulf coast, however, winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots for the first half of the day before switching to east-southeast.
Visibilities were 8 km in blowing dust in the afternoon as the winds picked up. Black smoke reduced visibilities along the Persian Gulf coast--one station reported 9 km.
30 January 1991
A low pressure system developed in the eastern Mediterranean and moved eastward across Syria, reaching western Iraq by the end of the day.
Low clouds moved into western Iraq during the day with ceilings around 3,000 feet. The subtropical jet stream produced high clouds across central Saudi Arabia.
Cloud cover from the previous day's disturbance remained over eastern Iraq and Kuwait; broken low clouds at 3,000-6,000 feet in the north around Baghdad dissipated by 1100Z. Over Kuwait, broken middle clouds from 8,000 to 14,000 feet moved off to the east by 0600Z. Broken to overcast low clouds with 3,000 foot ceilings and 6,000 foot tops entered the western part of the area in the evening.
With the storm system approaching, winds were southerly to southeasterly at 5-10 knots.
Visibilities were restricted, primarily by haze and smoke from burning oil. Morning fog reduced visibility to 5 km in some spots; most haze restrictions were reported at 8 km. Some dust was raised during the day with increasing winds from the approaching system.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes originating in an area west of the two large lakes west of Baghdad and extending to the southeast. The plume splits into two plumes, one extending to the east and the other to the SSE just south of the southernmost lake.
31 January 1991
A slow moving low in the eastern Mediterranean Sea spread stormy weather throughout the Middle East as an associated frontal system passed through Iraq. At 0600Z, a secondary low pressure cell was centered southwest of Baghdad. It rapidly moved northeast while the cold front moved south and weakened. In north-central Saudi Arabia, the strong subtropical jet stream spread extensive high clouds.
Broken to overcast low clouds extended over the area until about 1600Z, with ceilings over Iraq as low as 3,000 feet and tops to 6,000 feet. Baghdad was affected between 0200 and 0900Z. Skies became clear in central Iraq and Kuwait after 1600Z as the front moved southward.
Isolated thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet passed northeast of Baghdad near 1100Z. Rain fell in western Iraq when the low pressure cell moved through.
Winds were southwesterly at 5-10 knots before the front and westerly to northerly at 15-20 knots immediately behind it.
Visibilities were reduced to 4,000 meters by duststorms in Kuwait and southern Iraq as the front passed. Ground fog lowered visibilities to about 6 km in northeastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq.
1 February 1991
High pressure was centered over northwestern Saudi Arabia, keeping central Iraq cloud-free. A weak cold front extended from a low centered in north-central Iran. The front spread middle clouds from Qatar southwestward across Saudi Arabia. A slow moving low-pressure system centered on the Turkey-Syria border caused rainshowers in western Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. By 1800Z, middle clouds from this low reached Baghdad. A weak low developed on the central Red Sea coast in response to an upper air distrubance.
Middle clouds covered the mountains to Iraq's west and north. Light rain fell in Syria and northern Iraq between 1800 and 2100Z. Extensive areas of mountain-wave turbulence developed in the west between 0300Z and 1500Z and reached as far east as 43 degrees east. Early-morning ground fog formed in low lying areas over most of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Lowest visibilities were 2,000-4,000 meters.
Skies were clear to scattered before about 0900Z, except in the extreme northeast. Broken low clouds from the low in Turkey spread southward; by 1600Z, they had reached Baghdad, with 3,000 foot ceilings. Thin broken or scattered cirrus spread northeastward from the northern Red Sea, covering the area south of 31 degrees North by 1100Z.
Winds were northeasterly at 5-10 knots in the south, westerly to the north. Afternoon winds were light and variable over central Iraq. Visibilities were generally good, but morning ground fog reduced them to about 6 km in northeast Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq.
2 February 1991
A trough of low pressure formed to the east of a high pressure cell centered over eastern Saudi Arabia, causing low clouds in southern Iraq. A frontal systrem with low centers in the southern Caspian Sea and in east-central Syria extended along the northern Iraq border. The strong subtropical jet stream spread high and middle clouds over central Saudi Arabia.
Low and middle clouds prevailed over northern and western Iraq. Early morning ground fog formed in low-lying areas over most of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Extensive areas of mountain-wave turbulence developed near the Syria-Iraq border between 0300 and 1500Z and reached to 43 degrees East.
The subtropical jet stream caused layered middle and high clouds over the area south of 32 degrees North throughout the day. Ceilings were between 15,000 and 25,000 feet, with the lowest along the northern Persian Gulf. Frontal low clouds stretched along the Syria-Iraq border. The broken low clouds southwest of Baghdad included 4,000 foot ceilings and 6,000 foot tops. These clouds gradually moved east; by 2000Z, they were on the Kuwait coast. Another layer of low clouds with ceilings of about 3,000 feet formed over the Tigris-Euphrates river valley north of 31 degrees North during the night.
Winds were easterly at 10-15 knots south of 30 degrees North, southerly in the central area, and westerly north of 33 degrees North. They were gusty in the southern areas.
Duststorms reduced visibilities in the northern Nafud Desert eastward to southern Kuwait between 1200 and 2000Z. Minimum visibility was about 2,400 meters. Dense smoke was reported in northwestern Kuwait before 0800Z--visibilities were probably below 2,000 meters.
High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 2-11 degrees Celsius.
3 February 1991
The frontal system in eastern Syria began to move slowly eastward and break up, resulting in lowered ceilings and gusty winds. The nearly dry front passed Baghdad at 2000Z. A weak front extended from central Iraq to near Riyadh, spreading low clouds to Iraq's eastern section. The subtropical jet stream became more westerly than northwesterly, leaving the northern Persian Gulf cloud-free but spreading scattered to broken middle and high clouds across Saudi Arabia.
Sustained winds to 25 knots were reported in extreme northwestern Saudi Arabia as the front passed. Extensive duststorms reduced visibilities to 1,000 meters near the front in the Syrian and Nafud Deserts. Duststorms were also reported at 1500Z between Riyadh and Kuwait.
Middle and high clouds from the subtropical jet stream had moved out of the area by 1000Z. In the morning, scattered to broken low clouds covered Iraq east of 43 degrees East and all of Kuwait, some locations reported 3,000 foot ceilings. By 1200Z, the clouds had moved eastward to the Iraq-Turkey border. A small area of low clouds with 3,000 foot ceilings formed about 100 miles west of Baghdad at 1600Z.
Winds were westerly at 10-25 knots west of 45 degrees East, but southeasterly at 10-15 knots to the east. There were gusts to 35 knots near the front.
Duststorms reduced visibilities to as low as 500 meters at about 1500Z in southern Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere, visibilities were above 6 km. High temperatures were 8-20 degrees Celsius; lows 3-16 degrees Celsius.
4 February 1991
High pressure centered in southeastern Egypt strengthened and built into northwestern Saudi Arabia. The low pressure system that had been affecting northern Iraq continued to move eastward. By 0900Z, the trough had moved southeastward to the south of Qatar. The subtropical jet stream continued to spread high and middle clouds over the central Arabia Peninsula.
In the early morning, middle clouds produced 10,000 foot ceilings in a triangular area between 30 degrees North and a southwest-northeast line running from 60 miles south of Baghdad, then eastward to the Iraqi border. These clouds rapidly moved southeastward. By 0600Z, they affected only the coast of Kuwait. The area was almost cloud free by 1000Z.
Winds were northeasterly at 10-15 knots inland, but northerly at 15-20 knots on the Kuwait coast. Inland, winds became northerly at 5-10 knots aftrer 1800Z.
Visibilities were generally above 10 km, but scattered fires and smoke plumes reduced visibility in Kuwait to below 4 km. One smoke plume, originating in southern Kuwait, measured 35 miles long and 10-15 miles wide.
High temperatures were 3-13 degrees Celsius; lows, 2-8 degrees Celsius.
5 February 1991
High pressure centered in central Iraq kept skies clear or scattered most of the day, but clouds associated with the subtropical jet stream still spread high and middle clouds over the central Arabian Peninsula. These clouds were scattered in the morning, but denser clouds moved in from Egypt by 1000Z.
Morning haze reduced visibilities in central Saudi Arabia; Riyadh reported 4,800 meters at 0500Z, improving to 8 km by 0800Z. Duststorms after 2000Z were the result of 20 knot winds over the Syrian and Nafud Desert; they lowered visibility to 5 km.
Clouds were limited to scattered cirrus until about 1100Z, but the subtropical jet stream moved scattered to broken middle and high clouds into southwestern Iraq later in the day. These clouds had moved over Kuwait by 1600Z, producing 10,000 foot ceilings during the night.
Winds were northeasterly at 10-15 knots along the coast, but light and variable in Iraq. As the front shifted farther north after 0900Z, winds in the south became stronger and more easterly. Visibilities were above 10 km except in Kuwait, where scattered fires and smoke plumes reduced visibility to below 4 km. High temperatures were 9-17 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows small visible smoke plumes over Kuwait extending to the south and southeast.
6 February 1991
High pressure was centered in northwestern Iraq, with a weak low pressure trough to the southeast between central Saudi Arabia--near Riyadh--and Israel. The subtropical jet stream remained over the northern Arabian Peninsula; associated high clouds became increasingly scattered after 0600Z.
At 0000Z, there were only scattered low, middle, and high clouds throughout the area. By 0300Z, the middle cloud deck had thickened; ceilings as low as 12,000 feet, with tops at about 18,000 feet, had formed over the southwestern half of Iraq. These clouds drifted eastward, and by 1900Z they were east of Baghdad and Kuwait. Middle and high clouds from the subtropical jet stream affected Kuwait and southern Iraq between 0400 and 1100Z; bases were at or above 10,000 feet, with tops to 32,000 feet.
Winds were light and variable in Iraq, but easterly at 5-10 knots in Kuwait. Morning fog, smoke, and dust reduced visibilities in Kuwait and southern Iraq to as low as 3,200 meters in spots. Afternoon visibilities in areas not affected by smoke were above 6 km.
Afternoon high temperatures were between 5 and 13 degrees Celsius. High pressure and almost clear skies drove morning low temperatures down to -2 degrees Celsius in the north and 7 degrees Celsius in the south.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
by admin » Thu Dec 17, 2015 10:00 pm
Chapter 3, Part 3
Gulf War Weather (Continued)
7 February 1991
A low pressure system over northeastern Saudi Arabia resulted in afternoon and evening rainshowers and thunderstorms over Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and upper cloudiness to central Saudi Arabia. Weak high pressure was centered over Iraq.
Scattered low clouds, with some middle and high clouds that were occasionally broken, extended across central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Ceilings varied from 10,000 to 25,000 feet. Broken low clouds with bases at 2,000 feet were evident early in the morning over western Iraq. Light afternoon rainshowers fell over east-central Saudi Arabia. Isolated late evening thunderstorms were reported over the west-central part of the Persian Gulf. Tops were about 30,000-35,000 feet. Visibilities in northwestern Saudi Arabia were 7-9 km in haze and suspended dust. Suspended dust also reduced early morning visibilities in east-central Saudi Arabia to 4,800 meters.
Early morning skies were generally clear, but scattered middle clouds from the west moved into central Iraq and Kuwait by mid-morning. The middle clouds over central Iraq went scattered to broken at 10,000 feet by late morning. Skies became scattered by early afternoon. By early evening, cloud cover over Kuwait and southeast Iraq became scattered, variable to broken, at 10,000-18,000 feet. Isolated evening thunderstorms developed over extreme northern Kuwait; tops reached 30,000 feet.
Early morning winds were light and variable, becoming northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots by late morning. Haze and suspended dust reduced visibilities over central Iraq to 7-9 km. Smoke, haze, and suspended dust reduced visibilities in northern Kuwait to 5-7 km and to 1,600 meters in southern Kuwait.
High temperatures were 7-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows visible smoke plumes extending in varying directions from the northeast to the south. Imagery captioned: "Smoke from Kuwait is being blown southward into northeast Saudi Arabia. [13]
8 February 1991
The low pressure system was now located over southeastern Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and high clouds across eastern Saudi Arabia. Weak high pressure was centered over Iraq.
Although skies were generally clear, broken middle clouds at 10,000 to 12,000 feet were observed over east-southeastern Saudi Arabia during early morning. Skies were broken to overcast at 4,000-5,000 feet between 0500 and 1300Z over northwestern and north-central Saudi Arabia. Scattered middle clouds were observed over western Iraq in the morning and afternoon, becoming broken at 10,000-12,000 feet during the evening. Blowing sand and dust lowered visibilities to 5-7 km in east-central Saudi Arabia.
Skies were generally clear, but scattered middle clouds were observed over southeastern Iraq during early morning. By mid-afternoon, there were scattered middle clouds over central Iraq. By late night, these became scattered to broken at 10,000-12,000 feet.
Winds were light and variable in the morning, becoming northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in smoke over southern Kuwait and southeast Iraq was less than 1,600 meters. High temperatures were 7-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows visible smoke plumes over southeast Iraq and southern Kuwait, extending to the south and southeast.
9 February 1991
High pressure dominated the region -- skies were generally clear.
Skies were clear except for scattered low clouds over northwestern Saudi Arabia and western Iraq. Winds increased to 15 knots with gusts of 25 knots across northern Saudi Arabia, where afternoon visibilities decreased to 4,800 meters in blowing sand and dust.
Early morning skies over central Iraq were broken at 10,000-12,000 feet. The clouds slowly moved into southeastern Iraq and dissipated during the day.
Winds were westerly to northwesterly at 10-20. Smoke and haze lowered visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km. High temperatures were 12-20 degrees Celdius; lows, 2-8 degrees Celsius.
10 February 1991
High pressure continued to dominate. Skies over Saudi Arabia and Iraq were clear during the day, but scattered to broken mid-level clouds with bases at 10,000-12,000 feet moved into western Iraq by late evening.
Skies were clear during the day, but by late evening, scattered to broken mid-level clouds with bases at 10,000-12,000 feet moved into central Iraq.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots. Thick smoke over east and southeast Iraq began to show in satellite photos by 0600Z and lasted until early evening. Smoke from southern Kuwait was also still visible; visibilities in the smoke were 800-1,600 meters. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over western, eastern, and southeastern Iraq. Direction: SSE; Smoke plumes are also visible over southern Kuwait. Direction: South.
11 February 1991
High pressure was centered over southeastern Saudi Arabia, but low pressure formed over western Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream brought increased moisture in the mid and upper-levels to Iraq and nothern Saudi Arabia. A mid-level disturbance moving over Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia caused isolated thunderstorms and rainshowers.
Scattered high clouds over western Iraq became broken with bases at 20,000 feet from mid-morning through afternoon. There were scattered low clouds over northwestern and east-central Saudi Arabia during the day.
Scattered to broken upper clouds with bases at 22,000-25,000 feet were present during the morning and mid-afternoon over central Iraq. Morning skies were clear over Kuwait and southeastern Iraq, but smoke plumes were visible. Cloudiness decreased in central Iraq during the day, but increased in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait. Skies became scattered to broken, occasionally overcast, at 4,000-6,000 feet. By late afternoon, thunderstorms (tops 35,000 feet) and rainshowers had formed over Kuwait; they moved off to the east and dissipated by late evening.
Winds acompanying the thunderstorms in Kuwait reached 25-35 knots, but over the rest of the area, they were northwesterly at 10-15 knots.
Smoke and haze lowered morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Rain and rainshowers reduced evening visibilities to 1,600-3,200 meters. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows were 0-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over Kuwait. Direction: South; Smoke plumes are also visible over southeastern Iraq. Direction: SSE.
12 February 1991
High pressure dominated, but a low-pressure system moved into the eastern Mediterranean by the end of the day, increasing cloudiness over western Iraq.
Broken middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet were present over northeast, east and central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf during the morning. By late evening, there were scattered to broken high clouds at 20,000-25,000 feet over western Iraq.
Broken middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet remained over Kuwait until mid-morning. Scattered upper clouds moved into central Iraq by late evening.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-5 degrees Celsius. Visibilities in Kuwait were 5-7 km due to smoke and haze.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over eastern Iraq and Kuwait. direction: S-SSE.
13 February 1991
High pressure dominated the Saudi Arabian peninsula, but low pressure centered over the eastern Mediterranean sent moisture into Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. The low moved to the northeast as high pressure intensified behind it.
Scattered skies became broken to overcast over western and northern Iraq. The 25,000 foot ceilings prevailing in the morning became 8,000-10,000 feet during the day. By the end of the day, skies were scattered again. Over northern Saudi Arabia, skies were scattered, but occasionally broken, at 20,000-25,000 feet.
Scattered skies became gradually broken over central, east-central, and southeast Iraq and Kuwait. Smoke plumes were visible over southern Kuwait and the northern Saudi Arabian Gulf Coast. (see below)
Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait were 5-7 kilometers in smoke and haze. High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 1-4 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over southern Kuwait. Plume directions appear to be to the S-SSE.
14 February 1991
High pressure over Iran and Syria resulted in fair weather across most of the region.
Morning skies over northern Iraq were overcast with middle and high clouds; ceilings were as low as 10,000 feet. The clouds moved eastward and were over Iran by 1200Z. Broken low and middle clouds over central and southern Saudi Arabia produced 5,000 foot ceilings with scattered light rainshowers and 9 km visibilities. The clouds moved southeastward and became scattered after 1200Z. Visibilities in western and southern Iraq were as low as 6 km where 20 knot winds resulted in localized suspended and blowing dust.
Cloud cover consisted only of thin scattered high clouds over eastern Iraq and Kuwait: bases were 20,000 feet; tops 25,000 feet. The high clouds moved east into Iran by 1200Z. Winds were light and variable in the early morning, becoming northerly to easterly at 5-15 knots during the day.
Morning visibilities along the Persian Gulf coast near Kuwait were 8 km in fog. Widespread haze over northern Saudi Arabia produced visibilities of 8 km. High temperatures were 16-18 degrees Celsius; lows were 2-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over southern Iraq. Plume directions appear to be to the SE.
15 February 1991
High pressure over Iran and Turkey extended southward across most of the region. Broken high clouds passed through western Iraq to the east during the afternoon, followed in the evening by a large shield of high cloud entering from the west. Scattered to broken high clouds over parts of central and southern Saudi Arabia--with bases between 9,000 and 12,000 feet--dissipated partially during the day. Blowing dust in northern and western Saudi Arabia reduced visibilities to as low as 5 km.
Broken high clouds passed through the area between 1300Z and 2100Z with bases at 24,000 feet and tops to 32,000 feet. There were followed by scattered high clouds that moved into central Iraq from the west by the end of the day. Scattered bases were at 24,000 feet with tops to 32,000 feet.
Winds were northerly at 5-10 knots through the morning, gradually shifting to easterly at 5-15 knots in the afternoon and evening. Smoke that is clearly visible restricted visibility up to 14,000 feet. Evening ground fog developed along the Kuwait coast, dropping visibility to 8 km. High temperatures were near 20 degrees Celsius; lows varied from 2 degrees Celsius in the north to 8 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait extending to the south over Saudi Arabia.
16 February 1991
High pressure over Iran weakened as a strong frontal system approached from the west. The polar jet stream dipped southward into the eastern Mediterranean as the subtropical jet stream crossed Egypt and brought in upper level moisture. A new low pressure center formed on the front over Syria by 1500Z and moved southeast. The low and its accompanying cold front reached western Iraq by 1800Z.
Multiple cloud layers covered the region southward to 25 degrees North with scattered to broken low clouds and broken to overcast middle and high clouds. Light rain and rainshowers lowered ceilings to 1,000 feet and visibilities to 1,100 meters. The blowing dust already present in northwestern Saudi Arabia at 0000Z spread to include much of northern Saudi Arabia, especially south of the rain. Winds up to 30 knots produced duststorms with visibilities as low as 200 meters in northern Saudi Arabia, Syria, and western Iraq.
Cloud cover increased and ceilings lowered during the day. Skies were initially scattered with high clouds from 27,000 to 30,000 feet, but became broken to overcast by morning, with multiple layers between 25,000 and 35,000 feet. Bases lowered to 20,000 feet by 0700Z. Broken middle clouds reached central Iraq at about 1100Z with 12,000 foot bases and 18,000 foot tops. Scattered low clouds moved in by early evening with 2,000 foot bases and 6,000 foot tops; middle-cloud ceilings were down to 8,000 feet by then. Low clouds increased in the evening. Light rain and rainshowers lowered ceilings to 1,000 feet.
Winds varied from easterly to southerly with the approaching frontal system. Initial 5 to 10 knot speeds increased during the day. The highest reported sustained speed was 30 knots.
Visibilities worsened throughout the day. Dense black smoke over the southern half of Kuwait reduced visibilities to 6 km--some pilots reported certain areas as "unworkable." Duststorms developed as wind speeds reached 20 knots around 0900Z; speeds to 30 knots dropped visibilities to as low as 200 meters later in the day. Local evening visibilities were as low as 1,100 meters. High temperatures increased to 20-25 degrees Celsius as the front brought warm air into the region; lows were 6-8 degrees Celsius.
17 February 1991
A low pressure area moved northeast from central Iraq across Iran as its cold front moved through most of Iraq. A weak secondary low formed along the front in south-central Iraq near the Saudi Arabian border. The cold front continued southward into central Saudi Arabia and weakened. High pressure intensified behind the front.
Rain fell along the front in northern Saudi Arabia early in the day, but moved into central Saudi Arabia by evening. Visibilities were 8 km, but dropped to 4,700 meters in a 1500Z thunderstorm in west-central Saudi Arabia. Blowing dust ahead of the front reduced visibilities to as low as 1,700 meters. Duststorms behind the front dropped visibility as low as 900 meters in western Iraq. Skies over central Saudi Arabia were scattered at 4,000 feet, and broken to overcast at 10,000 feet.
Cloud cover from 0000Z to 1100Z was broken to overcast with layered low and middle clouds; ceilings were 3,000 feet, tops to 15,000 feet. Skies over southern Iraq and Kuwait were overcast at between 20,000 and 35,000 feet. Skies in Iraq began to clear by 1100Z, leaving scattered low clouds from 3,000 to 6,000 feet that continued moving east and south; all of Iraq, except for its extreme northern border, was clear after 1600Z.
Rain and rainshowers fell over northeastern Saudi Arabia, southeastern Iraq, and Kuwait. The bases of late morning thunderstorms near the Saudi Arabia border were 3,000 feet, with tops to 35,000 feet. The rain moved eastward by evening.
Winds were southerly to southeasterly at 5-15 knots ahead of the low and cold front, and northerly to northwesterly at 5-20 knots behind it. Speeds diminished to 5-10 knots in the evening.
Visibility in rain was 4,700 meters. Blowing dust in some areas of northeastern Saudi Arabia that had remained dry lowered visibilities to 6 km. Evening fog formed locally where rain had fallen, lowering visibilities to 6 km.
Daytime temperatures were highest (20 degrees Celsius) in the west where skies cleared first, but highs in the east were as low as 14 degrees Celsius. Daily lows were in the evening after the cold front had passed. Low ranged from 6 degrees Celsius in the north to 12 degrees Celsius in the south.
18 February 1991
A high pressure cell moved over Iraq and dominated much of the region's weather. Morning fog developed over north-central and northwestern Saudi Arabia but dissipated by early afternoon. Clouds associated with yesterday's cold front were over central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where they produced scattered light rain through the morning until moving into the Arabian Sea in the afternoon. Skies were scattered from 3,000 to 6,000 feet, broken from 10,000 to 18.000 feet, and broken from 28,000 to 33,000 feet.
Thick morning ground fog lifted to form 1,000 foot ceilings that dissipated by about 1000Z. Broken middle clouds over southern Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia moved off to the southeast during the first 6 hours of the day; ceilings were 7,000 feet with tops to 12,000 feet. Middle and high clouds moved into the region from the northwest during the second half of the day; scattered to broken middle clouds were from 8,000 to 18,000 feet, and thin broken high clouds were from 29,000 to 35,000 feet.
Winds were generally light and variable in the north, but northerly to northeasterly at 5-10 knots in the south. Visibilities ranged from near zero to 2,000 meters in thick and extensive morning fog across portions of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The fog, which was concentrated over (and to the west of) the Tigris-Euphrates river valley in Iraq, didn't burn off until about 1000Z. Fog formed again in the evening over northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, dropping visibilities to 4,800 meters. High temperatures were 17-20 degrees Celsius; lows ranged from 5 degrees Celsius in clear areas to 11 dcgrees Celsius under the fog.
19 February 1991
A low pressure area developed over Syria and moved eastward into northwestern Iraq. A secondary low developed in northwestern Saudi Arabia and moved eastward into northern Saudi Arabia. Two lines of strong thunderstorms--one over northern Saudi Arabia, one over Iraq--developed between 1500 and 1800Z and continued well into the next day.
Scattered low clouds over western Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia early in the day were from 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Thin high clouds moved in that afternoon. Thunderstorm bases were at 3,000 feet, tops to 35,000 feet. Rain and rainshowers began after 1500Z. In central Saudi Arabia, scattered to broken low and middle clouds, with bases at 4,000 and 10,000 feet, produced scattered evening rainshowers.
Cloud cover in the first 6 hours was limited to southeastern Iraq and Kuwait, where skies were scattered at 3,000 and 5,000 feet and then broken from 20,000 to 25,000 feet. After these had cleared out in the afternoon, a new high thin broken layer at 22,000 to 25,000 feet moved in. Convective activity from the west entered the area at about 1800Z, producing bases that were generally 3,000 feet, but as low as 1,000 feet in thunderstorms; tops were to 35,000 feet. Convective cells consolidated to form a nearly solid, north-south line in central Iraq as another, similar line formed in northern Saudi Arabia. Middle-cloud ceilings outside showers were at 10,000 feet.
Thunderstorms produced localized moderate to heavy rain after 1800Z. Light rain and rainshowers fell outside the areas of strong convection.
Winds were east-southeasterly at 5-10 knots during the first half of the day, increasing to 15-20 knots by afternoon. Isolated gusts to 30 knots occurred with thunderstorms. Visibilities were less than 1,000 meters in rain associated with thunderstorms, but 7 and 9 km elsewhere in rainshowers, black smoke from Kuwait, fog, and/or blowing dust. High temperatures were 19-21 Celsius; lows, 7-11 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait and extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia.
20 February 1991
The low over Iraq moved eastward into Iran as the secondary low over northern Saudi Arabia moved southeast along the Persian Gulf coast. Thunderstorm activity that started the day before continued across eastern Iraq, Kuwait, and northeastern Saudi Arabia. Lines of thunderstorms moved graduallay eastward as new cells developed on their southwestern ends.
A cold front moved southeast across central and eastern Saudi Arabia, producing scattered rain showers and visibilities as low as 800 meters in blowing dust. Skies were scattered from 4,000 to 6,000 feet and broken from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Thunderstorms that had been in northern Iraq earlier in the day moved into Iran, followed by broken to overcast low and middle clouds with ceilings at 3,500 feet.
Thunderstorms moved across the area from west to east. Bases were at 1,000 feet and tops reached 40,000 feet. Cloud cover outside thunderstorms was broken to overcast, and multilayered from 3,000 to 35,000 feet. Surface moisture helped produce low broken clouds west of the front in central Iraq; ceilings were 3,500 feet, with tops to 6,000 feet. There were also broken middle clouds from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Parts of south-central Iraq and north-central Saudi Arabia cleared as thunderstorms moved east.
Precipitation was moderate to heavy in thunderstorms, but light away from the strong cells.
Winds were east-southeasterly at 10-20 knots, becoming west-northwesterly at 10-25 knots as the storm moved through. Isolated thunderstorms were above 30 knots.
Visibilities were 9 km outside thunderstorms, but less than 1,000 meters in heavy thundershowers. Blowing dust in areas along the front that had not received much rain lowered visibilities to 7 km. Evening fog formed along the Persian Gulf coast, lowering visibilities to 1,500 meters by 2300Z.
High temperatures ranged from 24 degrees Celsius in the southeast ahead of the cold front to as low as 15 degrees Celsius in the northwest behind it. Lows were 9 degrees Celsius in the north and 14 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
21 February 1991
A low pressure system moving south along the Persian Gulf neared Dhahran by 0300Z; by 1500Z, it was on the United Arab Emirates coast near 53 degrees East. Its cloudless cold front extended southwest across the Arabian Peninsula. By 0900Z, an area of high pressure had formed in northwestern Saudi Arabia near the Iraqi border.
The low pressure system spread a wide area of clouds, rain, and isolated thunderstorms over the Persian Gulf and along the coast as it passed. Ceilings were generally 10,000 feet in rainshowers, but ceilings in thunderstorms were reported at 3,000 feet. Inland, the front caused duststorms as it passed, reducing visibilities in some places to 800 meters. Fog blanketed northern Saudi Arabia in the wake of the low pressure system, but dissipated by 0800Z at most locations; visibilities were as low as 2,800 meters along the coast, but much lower in protected wadis. Along the eastern Saudi Arabian coast, visibilities were 4,800 meters in dense haze. Between 0500 and 1300Z, sporadic duststorms reduced visibilities to 6 km in the Syrian Desert.
An overcast layer of low clouds resulted in 500 foot ceilings over Kuwait and Iraq south of Baghdad. Clouds tops were about 1,200 feet. The clouds lifted to 1,000-3,000 feet by 0500Z and dissipated by 0700Z. South of 29 degrees North, broken middle clouds with 10,000 foot bases persisted until about 0700Z. Skies were clear after 0900Z.
Winds were northeasterly or northerly at 10 knots in the south, easterly at 10-15 knots in the north. Central Iraq's winds were light and variable. Highest speeds--20 knots along the northeastern Saudi Arabian border--were reported at 1500Z.
Fog and visibilities of 500 meters were common. The fog dissipated in the northwest first, but lingered until 0800Z in Kuwait and Iraq south of 32 degrees North. Dense smoke reduced visibilities in southern Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia. The afternoon high temperature was 15 degrees Celsius. Morning lows were 6-11 degrees Celsius, but by evening, temperatures in the north had fallen to about 3 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes in southern Kuwait extending southward in Saudi Arabia.
22 February 1991
High pressure was centered over east-central Saudi Arabia. A cold front extending from a low in the eastern Mediterranean spread scattered to broken high clouds across Syria and northwestern Iraq. The system had moved into eastern Syria by 1600Z. A low pressure system near the Strait of Hormuz brough low cloudiness and rain to the southeastern Arabian Peninsula.
A dense band of smoke aloft extended from the northern Persian Gulf along the Saudi Arabian coast into the Rub al Khali. Bases were about 10,000 feet, tops to 18,000 feet. Skies were clear to scattered, but scattered to broken middle and high clouds moved over the extreme northeast by 1800Z. Ceilings, where present, were 10,000 feet with tops to 15,000 feet. The middle and high clouds were nearing Baghdad by 2300Z.
Visibilities were unrestricted except for areas affected by smoke, where they were generally about 6 km. Pilots reported smoke tops to about 15,000 feet and inflight visibilities as low as 1,000 feet. Dense smoke over and south of Kuwait.
Winds were light and variable before 1500Z, becoming southeasterly to easterly at 5-10 knots to the east of the front after 1500Z. Elsewhere, winds remained light. After sunset, winds were nearly calm. High temperatures were 13-18 degrees Celsius; lows, 1-8 degrees Celsius. The lowest temperatures were in the eastern Nafud Desert.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait moving southward over coastal Saudi Arabia.
23 February 1991
High pressure centered over the eastern Arabian peninsula moved southeastward into the Rub al Khali by 2000Z. Even though the frontal system dissipated as it moved across northwest Saudi Arabia, it still caused isolated light showers and duststorms. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and high clouds eastward over the area after 0900Z. Low pressure formed over the Red Sea.
Fog reduced visibilities along the central Persian Gulf to about 1,000 meters between 0100 and 0400Z and reformed after 2000Z. Scattered to broken low and middle clouds with light isolated rainshowers reduced visibilities to 10km along the weak low pressure system in the west. Duststorms caused 4,000 meter visibilities in the Syrian and Nafud Deserts between 0900 and 1700Z. Middle and high clouds produced 10,000 foot ceilings over northwestern Saudi Arabia after 0900Z. Smoke from the Kuwaiti oilfields had reached Qatar; although concentrated at 10,000-12,000 feet, the smoke mixed with haze at lower levels to produce 6 km visibilities.
In the west, the low pressure system caused scattered to broken clouds at 10,000 feet until about 0600Z, when they became scattered. By 1200Z, middle and high clouds began to move into the area south of 31 degrees North, causing broken to overcast ceilings at 10,000 to 12,000 feet. These clouds were east of 45 degrees East by 1900Z. Between 0400 and 1600Z, another band of middle and high clouds formed along the Iran-Iraq border north of 32 degrees North. Ceilings were about 8,000 feet, with tops to 32,000 feet. Isolated thunderstorms formed over Kuwait by 2000Z, with 2,500 foot bases and tops to 35,000 feet.
Winds were northerly to northwesterly at 10-15 knots east of 45 degrees East. Elsewhere, winds were easterly at 5-10 knots. Duststorms reduced visibilities to 8 km along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border between 0800 and 1500Z. Dense smoke covered Eastern Kuwait and reduced visibilities generally to less than 8 km, with isolated cases as low as 1,000 meters. High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-13 degrees Celsius.
_______________
Notes:
13. U.S. Air Force. ETAC, Gulf War Weather (March 1992), 3-53.
Gulf War Weather (Continued)
7 February 1991
A low pressure system over northeastern Saudi Arabia resulted in afternoon and evening rainshowers and thunderstorms over Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and upper cloudiness to central Saudi Arabia. Weak high pressure was centered over Iraq.
Scattered low clouds, with some middle and high clouds that were occasionally broken, extended across central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Ceilings varied from 10,000 to 25,000 feet. Broken low clouds with bases at 2,000 feet were evident early in the morning over western Iraq. Light afternoon rainshowers fell over east-central Saudi Arabia. Isolated late evening thunderstorms were reported over the west-central part of the Persian Gulf. Tops were about 30,000-35,000 feet. Visibilities in northwestern Saudi Arabia were 7-9 km in haze and suspended dust. Suspended dust also reduced early morning visibilities in east-central Saudi Arabia to 4,800 meters.
Early morning skies were generally clear, but scattered middle clouds from the west moved into central Iraq and Kuwait by mid-morning. The middle clouds over central Iraq went scattered to broken at 10,000 feet by late morning. Skies became scattered by early afternoon. By early evening, cloud cover over Kuwait and southeast Iraq became scattered, variable to broken, at 10,000-18,000 feet. Isolated evening thunderstorms developed over extreme northern Kuwait; tops reached 30,000 feet.
Early morning winds were light and variable, becoming northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots by late morning. Haze and suspended dust reduced visibilities over central Iraq to 7-9 km. Smoke, haze, and suspended dust reduced visibilities in northern Kuwait to 5-7 km and to 1,600 meters in southern Kuwait.
High temperatures were 7-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows visible smoke plumes extending in varying directions from the northeast to the south. Imagery captioned: "Smoke from Kuwait is being blown southward into northeast Saudi Arabia. [13]
8 February 1991
The low pressure system was now located over southeastern Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and high clouds across eastern Saudi Arabia. Weak high pressure was centered over Iraq.
Although skies were generally clear, broken middle clouds at 10,000 to 12,000 feet were observed over east-southeastern Saudi Arabia during early morning. Skies were broken to overcast at 4,000-5,000 feet between 0500 and 1300Z over northwestern and north-central Saudi Arabia. Scattered middle clouds were observed over western Iraq in the morning and afternoon, becoming broken at 10,000-12,000 feet during the evening. Blowing sand and dust lowered visibilities to 5-7 km in east-central Saudi Arabia.
Skies were generally clear, but scattered middle clouds were observed over southeastern Iraq during early morning. By mid-afternoon, there were scattered middle clouds over central Iraq. By late night, these became scattered to broken at 10,000-12,000 feet.
Winds were light and variable in the morning, becoming northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in smoke over southern Kuwait and southeast Iraq was less than 1,600 meters. High temperatures were 7-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-6 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows visible smoke plumes over southeast Iraq and southern Kuwait, extending to the south and southeast.
9 February 1991
High pressure dominated the region -- skies were generally clear.
Skies were clear except for scattered low clouds over northwestern Saudi Arabia and western Iraq. Winds increased to 15 knots with gusts of 25 knots across northern Saudi Arabia, where afternoon visibilities decreased to 4,800 meters in blowing sand and dust.
Early morning skies over central Iraq were broken at 10,000-12,000 feet. The clouds slowly moved into southeastern Iraq and dissipated during the day.
Winds were westerly to northwesterly at 10-20. Smoke and haze lowered visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km. High temperatures were 12-20 degrees Celdius; lows, 2-8 degrees Celsius.
10 February 1991
High pressure continued to dominate. Skies over Saudi Arabia and Iraq were clear during the day, but scattered to broken mid-level clouds with bases at 10,000-12,000 feet moved into western Iraq by late evening.
Skies were clear during the day, but by late evening, scattered to broken mid-level clouds with bases at 10,000-12,000 feet moved into central Iraq.
Winds were northwesterly at 5-10 knots. Thick smoke over east and southeast Iraq began to show in satellite photos by 0600Z and lasted until early evening. Smoke from southern Kuwait was also still visible; visibilities in the smoke were 800-1,600 meters. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over western, eastern, and southeastern Iraq. Direction: SSE; Smoke plumes are also visible over southern Kuwait. Direction: South.
11 February 1991
High pressure was centered over southeastern Saudi Arabia, but low pressure formed over western Saudi Arabia. The subtropical jet stream brought increased moisture in the mid and upper-levels to Iraq and nothern Saudi Arabia. A mid-level disturbance moving over Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia caused isolated thunderstorms and rainshowers.
Scattered high clouds over western Iraq became broken with bases at 20,000 feet from mid-morning through afternoon. There were scattered low clouds over northwestern and east-central Saudi Arabia during the day.
Scattered to broken upper clouds with bases at 22,000-25,000 feet were present during the morning and mid-afternoon over central Iraq. Morning skies were clear over Kuwait and southeastern Iraq, but smoke plumes were visible. Cloudiness decreased in central Iraq during the day, but increased in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait. Skies became scattered to broken, occasionally overcast, at 4,000-6,000 feet. By late afternoon, thunderstorms (tops 35,000 feet) and rainshowers had formed over Kuwait; they moved off to the east and dissipated by late evening.
Winds acompanying the thunderstorms in Kuwait reached 25-35 knots, but over the rest of the area, they were northwesterly at 10-15 knots.
Smoke and haze lowered morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Rain and rainshowers reduced evening visibilities to 1,600-3,200 meters. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows were 0-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over Kuwait. Direction: South; Smoke plumes are also visible over southeastern Iraq. Direction: SSE.
12 February 1991
High pressure dominated, but a low-pressure system moved into the eastern Mediterranean by the end of the day, increasing cloudiness over western Iraq.
Broken middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet were present over northeast, east and central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf during the morning. By late evening, there were scattered to broken high clouds at 20,000-25,000 feet over western Iraq.
Broken middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet remained over Kuwait until mid-morning. Scattered upper clouds moved into central Iraq by late evening.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. High temperatures were 10-15 degrees Celsius; lows, 0-5 degrees Celsius. Visibilities in Kuwait were 5-7 km due to smoke and haze.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over eastern Iraq and Kuwait. direction: S-SSE.
13 February 1991
High pressure dominated the Saudi Arabian peninsula, but low pressure centered over the eastern Mediterranean sent moisture into Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. The low moved to the northeast as high pressure intensified behind it.
Scattered skies became broken to overcast over western and northern Iraq. The 25,000 foot ceilings prevailing in the morning became 8,000-10,000 feet during the day. By the end of the day, skies were scattered again. Over northern Saudi Arabia, skies were scattered, but occasionally broken, at 20,000-25,000 feet.
Scattered skies became gradually broken over central, east-central, and southeast Iraq and Kuwait. Smoke plumes were visible over southern Kuwait and the northern Saudi Arabian Gulf Coast. (see below)
Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait were 5-7 kilometers in smoke and haze. High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 1-4 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over southern Kuwait. Plume directions appear to be to the S-SSE.
14 February 1991
High pressure over Iran and Syria resulted in fair weather across most of the region.
Morning skies over northern Iraq were overcast with middle and high clouds; ceilings were as low as 10,000 feet. The clouds moved eastward and were over Iran by 1200Z. Broken low and middle clouds over central and southern Saudi Arabia produced 5,000 foot ceilings with scattered light rainshowers and 9 km visibilities. The clouds moved southeastward and became scattered after 1200Z. Visibilities in western and southern Iraq were as low as 6 km where 20 knot winds resulted in localized suspended and blowing dust.
Cloud cover consisted only of thin scattered high clouds over eastern Iraq and Kuwait: bases were 20,000 feet; tops 25,000 feet. The high clouds moved east into Iran by 1200Z. Winds were light and variable in the early morning, becoming northerly to easterly at 5-15 knots during the day.
Morning visibilities along the Persian Gulf coast near Kuwait were 8 km in fog. Widespread haze over northern Saudi Arabia produced visibilities of 8 km. High temperatures were 16-18 degrees Celsius; lows were 2-5 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
Imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes clearly visible over southern Iraq. Plume directions appear to be to the SE.
15 February 1991
High pressure over Iran and Turkey extended southward across most of the region. Broken high clouds passed through western Iraq to the east during the afternoon, followed in the evening by a large shield of high cloud entering from the west. Scattered to broken high clouds over parts of central and southern Saudi Arabia--with bases between 9,000 and 12,000 feet--dissipated partially during the day. Blowing dust in northern and western Saudi Arabia reduced visibilities to as low as 5 km.
Broken high clouds passed through the area between 1300Z and 2100Z with bases at 24,000 feet and tops to 32,000 feet. There were followed by scattered high clouds that moved into central Iraq from the west by the end of the day. Scattered bases were at 24,000 feet with tops to 32,000 feet.
Winds were northerly at 5-10 knots through the morning, gradually shifting to easterly at 5-15 knots in the afternoon and evening. Smoke that is clearly visible restricted visibility up to 14,000 feet. Evening ground fog developed along the Kuwait coast, dropping visibility to 8 km. High temperatures were near 20 degrees Celsius; lows varied from 2 degrees Celsius in the north to 8 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait extending to the south over Saudi Arabia.
16 February 1991
High pressure over Iran weakened as a strong frontal system approached from the west. The polar jet stream dipped southward into the eastern Mediterranean as the subtropical jet stream crossed Egypt and brought in upper level moisture. A new low pressure center formed on the front over Syria by 1500Z and moved southeast. The low and its accompanying cold front reached western Iraq by 1800Z.
Multiple cloud layers covered the region southward to 25 degrees North with scattered to broken low clouds and broken to overcast middle and high clouds. Light rain and rainshowers lowered ceilings to 1,000 feet and visibilities to 1,100 meters. The blowing dust already present in northwestern Saudi Arabia at 0000Z spread to include much of northern Saudi Arabia, especially south of the rain. Winds up to 30 knots produced duststorms with visibilities as low as 200 meters in northern Saudi Arabia, Syria, and western Iraq.
Cloud cover increased and ceilings lowered during the day. Skies were initially scattered with high clouds from 27,000 to 30,000 feet, but became broken to overcast by morning, with multiple layers between 25,000 and 35,000 feet. Bases lowered to 20,000 feet by 0700Z. Broken middle clouds reached central Iraq at about 1100Z with 12,000 foot bases and 18,000 foot tops. Scattered low clouds moved in by early evening with 2,000 foot bases and 6,000 foot tops; middle-cloud ceilings were down to 8,000 feet by then. Low clouds increased in the evening. Light rain and rainshowers lowered ceilings to 1,000 feet.
Winds varied from easterly to southerly with the approaching frontal system. Initial 5 to 10 knot speeds increased during the day. The highest reported sustained speed was 30 knots.
Visibilities worsened throughout the day. Dense black smoke over the southern half of Kuwait reduced visibilities to 6 km--some pilots reported certain areas as "unworkable." Duststorms developed as wind speeds reached 20 knots around 0900Z; speeds to 30 knots dropped visibilities to as low as 200 meters later in the day. Local evening visibilities were as low as 1,100 meters. High temperatures increased to 20-25 degrees Celsius as the front brought warm air into the region; lows were 6-8 degrees Celsius.
17 February 1991
A low pressure area moved northeast from central Iraq across Iran as its cold front moved through most of Iraq. A weak secondary low formed along the front in south-central Iraq near the Saudi Arabian border. The cold front continued southward into central Saudi Arabia and weakened. High pressure intensified behind the front.
Rain fell along the front in northern Saudi Arabia early in the day, but moved into central Saudi Arabia by evening. Visibilities were 8 km, but dropped to 4,700 meters in a 1500Z thunderstorm in west-central Saudi Arabia. Blowing dust ahead of the front reduced visibilities to as low as 1,700 meters. Duststorms behind the front dropped visibility as low as 900 meters in western Iraq. Skies over central Saudi Arabia were scattered at 4,000 feet, and broken to overcast at 10,000 feet.
Cloud cover from 0000Z to 1100Z was broken to overcast with layered low and middle clouds; ceilings were 3,000 feet, tops to 15,000 feet. Skies over southern Iraq and Kuwait were overcast at between 20,000 and 35,000 feet. Skies in Iraq began to clear by 1100Z, leaving scattered low clouds from 3,000 to 6,000 feet that continued moving east and south; all of Iraq, except for its extreme northern border, was clear after 1600Z.
Rain and rainshowers fell over northeastern Saudi Arabia, southeastern Iraq, and Kuwait. The bases of late morning thunderstorms near the Saudi Arabia border were 3,000 feet, with tops to 35,000 feet. The rain moved eastward by evening.
Winds were southerly to southeasterly at 5-15 knots ahead of the low and cold front, and northerly to northwesterly at 5-20 knots behind it. Speeds diminished to 5-10 knots in the evening.
Visibility in rain was 4,700 meters. Blowing dust in some areas of northeastern Saudi Arabia that had remained dry lowered visibilities to 6 km. Evening fog formed locally where rain had fallen, lowering visibilities to 6 km.
Daytime temperatures were highest (20 degrees Celsius) in the west where skies cleared first, but highs in the east were as low as 14 degrees Celsius. Daily lows were in the evening after the cold front had passed. Low ranged from 6 degrees Celsius in the north to 12 degrees Celsius in the south.
18 February 1991
A high pressure cell moved over Iraq and dominated much of the region's weather. Morning fog developed over north-central and northwestern Saudi Arabia but dissipated by early afternoon. Clouds associated with yesterday's cold front were over central Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where they produced scattered light rain through the morning until moving into the Arabian Sea in the afternoon. Skies were scattered from 3,000 to 6,000 feet, broken from 10,000 to 18.000 feet, and broken from 28,000 to 33,000 feet.
Thick morning ground fog lifted to form 1,000 foot ceilings that dissipated by about 1000Z. Broken middle clouds over southern Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia moved off to the southeast during the first 6 hours of the day; ceilings were 7,000 feet with tops to 12,000 feet. Middle and high clouds moved into the region from the northwest during the second half of the day; scattered to broken middle clouds were from 8,000 to 18,000 feet, and thin broken high clouds were from 29,000 to 35,000 feet.
Winds were generally light and variable in the north, but northerly to northeasterly at 5-10 knots in the south. Visibilities ranged from near zero to 2,000 meters in thick and extensive morning fog across portions of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The fog, which was concentrated over (and to the west of) the Tigris-Euphrates river valley in Iraq, didn't burn off until about 1000Z. Fog formed again in the evening over northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, dropping visibilities to 4,800 meters. High temperatures were 17-20 degrees Celsius; lows ranged from 5 degrees Celsius in clear areas to 11 dcgrees Celsius under the fog.
19 February 1991
A low pressure area developed over Syria and moved eastward into northwestern Iraq. A secondary low developed in northwestern Saudi Arabia and moved eastward into northern Saudi Arabia. Two lines of strong thunderstorms--one over northern Saudi Arabia, one over Iraq--developed between 1500 and 1800Z and continued well into the next day.
Scattered low clouds over western Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia early in the day were from 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Thin high clouds moved in that afternoon. Thunderstorm bases were at 3,000 feet, tops to 35,000 feet. Rain and rainshowers began after 1500Z. In central Saudi Arabia, scattered to broken low and middle clouds, with bases at 4,000 and 10,000 feet, produced scattered evening rainshowers.
Cloud cover in the first 6 hours was limited to southeastern Iraq and Kuwait, where skies were scattered at 3,000 and 5,000 feet and then broken from 20,000 to 25,000 feet. After these had cleared out in the afternoon, a new high thin broken layer at 22,000 to 25,000 feet moved in. Convective activity from the west entered the area at about 1800Z, producing bases that were generally 3,000 feet, but as low as 1,000 feet in thunderstorms; tops were to 35,000 feet. Convective cells consolidated to form a nearly solid, north-south line in central Iraq as another, similar line formed in northern Saudi Arabia. Middle-cloud ceilings outside showers were at 10,000 feet.
Thunderstorms produced localized moderate to heavy rain after 1800Z. Light rain and rainshowers fell outside the areas of strong convection.
Winds were east-southeasterly at 5-10 knots during the first half of the day, increasing to 15-20 knots by afternoon. Isolated gusts to 30 knots occurred with thunderstorms. Visibilities were less than 1,000 meters in rain associated with thunderstorms, but 7 and 9 km elsewhere in rainshowers, black smoke from Kuwait, fog, and/or blowing dust. High temperatures were 19-21 Celsius; lows, 7-11 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait and extreme northeastern Saudi Arabia.
20 February 1991
The low over Iraq moved eastward into Iran as the secondary low over northern Saudi Arabia moved southeast along the Persian Gulf coast. Thunderstorm activity that started the day before continued across eastern Iraq, Kuwait, and northeastern Saudi Arabia. Lines of thunderstorms moved graduallay eastward as new cells developed on their southwestern ends.
A cold front moved southeast across central and eastern Saudi Arabia, producing scattered rain showers and visibilities as low as 800 meters in blowing dust. Skies were scattered from 4,000 to 6,000 feet and broken from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Thunderstorms that had been in northern Iraq earlier in the day moved into Iran, followed by broken to overcast low and middle clouds with ceilings at 3,500 feet.
Thunderstorms moved across the area from west to east. Bases were at 1,000 feet and tops reached 40,000 feet. Cloud cover outside thunderstorms was broken to overcast, and multilayered from 3,000 to 35,000 feet. Surface moisture helped produce low broken clouds west of the front in central Iraq; ceilings were 3,500 feet, with tops to 6,000 feet. There were also broken middle clouds from 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Parts of south-central Iraq and north-central Saudi Arabia cleared as thunderstorms moved east.
Precipitation was moderate to heavy in thunderstorms, but light away from the strong cells.
Winds were east-southeasterly at 10-20 knots, becoming west-northwesterly at 10-25 knots as the storm moved through. Isolated thunderstorms were above 30 knots.
Visibilities were 9 km outside thunderstorms, but less than 1,000 meters in heavy thundershowers. Blowing dust in areas along the front that had not received much rain lowered visibilities to 7 km. Evening fog formed along the Persian Gulf coast, lowering visibilities to 1,500 meters by 2300Z.
High temperatures ranged from 24 degrees Celsius in the southeast ahead of the cold front to as low as 15 degrees Celsius in the northwest behind it. Lows were 9 degrees Celsius in the north and 14 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
21 February 1991
A low pressure system moving south along the Persian Gulf neared Dhahran by 0300Z; by 1500Z, it was on the United Arab Emirates coast near 53 degrees East. Its cloudless cold front extended southwest across the Arabian Peninsula. By 0900Z, an area of high pressure had formed in northwestern Saudi Arabia near the Iraqi border.
The low pressure system spread a wide area of clouds, rain, and isolated thunderstorms over the Persian Gulf and along the coast as it passed. Ceilings were generally 10,000 feet in rainshowers, but ceilings in thunderstorms were reported at 3,000 feet. Inland, the front caused duststorms as it passed, reducing visibilities in some places to 800 meters. Fog blanketed northern Saudi Arabia in the wake of the low pressure system, but dissipated by 0800Z at most locations; visibilities were as low as 2,800 meters along the coast, but much lower in protected wadis. Along the eastern Saudi Arabian coast, visibilities were 4,800 meters in dense haze. Between 0500 and 1300Z, sporadic duststorms reduced visibilities to 6 km in the Syrian Desert.
An overcast layer of low clouds resulted in 500 foot ceilings over Kuwait and Iraq south of Baghdad. Clouds tops were about 1,200 feet. The clouds lifted to 1,000-3,000 feet by 0500Z and dissipated by 0700Z. South of 29 degrees North, broken middle clouds with 10,000 foot bases persisted until about 0700Z. Skies were clear after 0900Z.
Winds were northeasterly or northerly at 10 knots in the south, easterly at 10-15 knots in the north. Central Iraq's winds were light and variable. Highest speeds--20 knots along the northeastern Saudi Arabian border--were reported at 1500Z.
Fog and visibilities of 500 meters were common. The fog dissipated in the northwest first, but lingered until 0800Z in Kuwait and Iraq south of 32 degrees North. Dense smoke reduced visibilities in southern Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia. The afternoon high temperature was 15 degrees Celsius. Morning lows were 6-11 degrees Celsius, but by evening, temperatures in the north had fallen to about 3 degrees Celsius.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes in southern Kuwait extending southward in Saudi Arabia.
22 February 1991
High pressure was centered over east-central Saudi Arabia. A cold front extending from a low in the eastern Mediterranean spread scattered to broken high clouds across Syria and northwestern Iraq. The system had moved into eastern Syria by 1600Z. A low pressure system near the Strait of Hormuz brough low cloudiness and rain to the southeastern Arabian Peninsula.
A dense band of smoke aloft extended from the northern Persian Gulf along the Saudi Arabian coast into the Rub al Khali. Bases were about 10,000 feet, tops to 18,000 feet. Skies were clear to scattered, but scattered to broken middle and high clouds moved over the extreme northeast by 1800Z. Ceilings, where present, were 10,000 feet with tops to 15,000 feet. The middle and high clouds were nearing Baghdad by 2300Z.
Visibilities were unrestricted except for areas affected by smoke, where they were generally about 6 km. Pilots reported smoke tops to about 15,000 feet and inflight visibilities as low as 1,000 feet. Dense smoke over and south of Kuwait.
Winds were light and variable before 1500Z, becoming southeasterly to easterly at 5-10 knots to the east of the front after 1500Z. Elsewhere, winds remained light. After sunset, winds were nearly calm. High temperatures were 13-18 degrees Celsius; lows, 1-8 degrees Celsius. The lowest temperatures were in the eastern Nafud Desert.
Visible Smoke Plumes
NOAA visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes visible over Kuwait moving southward over coastal Saudi Arabia.
23 February 1991
High pressure centered over the eastern Arabian peninsula moved southeastward into the Rub al Khali by 2000Z. Even though the frontal system dissipated as it moved across northwest Saudi Arabia, it still caused isolated light showers and duststorms. The subtropical jet stream brought middle and high clouds eastward over the area after 0900Z. Low pressure formed over the Red Sea.
Fog reduced visibilities along the central Persian Gulf to about 1,000 meters between 0100 and 0400Z and reformed after 2000Z. Scattered to broken low and middle clouds with light isolated rainshowers reduced visibilities to 10km along the weak low pressure system in the west. Duststorms caused 4,000 meter visibilities in the Syrian and Nafud Deserts between 0900 and 1700Z. Middle and high clouds produced 10,000 foot ceilings over northwestern Saudi Arabia after 0900Z. Smoke from the Kuwaiti oilfields had reached Qatar; although concentrated at 10,000-12,000 feet, the smoke mixed with haze at lower levels to produce 6 km visibilities.
In the west, the low pressure system caused scattered to broken clouds at 10,000 feet until about 0600Z, when they became scattered. By 1200Z, middle and high clouds began to move into the area south of 31 degrees North, causing broken to overcast ceilings at 10,000 to 12,000 feet. These clouds were east of 45 degrees East by 1900Z. Between 0400 and 1600Z, another band of middle and high clouds formed along the Iran-Iraq border north of 32 degrees North. Ceilings were about 8,000 feet, with tops to 32,000 feet. Isolated thunderstorms formed over Kuwait by 2000Z, with 2,500 foot bases and tops to 35,000 feet.
Winds were northerly to northwesterly at 10-15 knots east of 45 degrees East. Elsewhere, winds were easterly at 5-10 knots. Duststorms reduced visibilities to 8 km along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border between 0800 and 1500Z. Dense smoke covered Eastern Kuwait and reduced visibilities generally to less than 8 km, with isolated cases as low as 1,000 meters. High temperatures were 13-16 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-13 degrees Celsius.
_______________
Notes:
13. U.S. Air Force. ETAC, Gulf War Weather (March 1992), 3-53.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
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Chapter 3, Part 4
Gulf War Weather (Continued)
24 February 1991
A low pressure system moved slowly eastward along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border. High pressure was still centered over the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. The subtropical jet stream's middle and high clouds moved eastward over the Persian Gulf. They were out of the area by about 1900Z, but another upper level disturbance brought more high and middle clouds eastward. At 1500Z, these clouds were in north-central Saudi Arabia.
Morning fog again blanketed the central Persian Gulf coast between Dhahran and the Strait of Hormuz. Visibility was poorest (2,000 meters) south of Qatar. Gust winds and blowing dust accompanied the low near the northern Saudi Arabian border where 15 to 20 knot winds raised dust that reduced visibilities to 6 km. Broken to overcast middle clouds produced 8,000 foot ceilings over the northern Persian Gulf, but embedded low clouds resulted in isolated ceilings at 3,000 feet. Isolated rainshowers fell near the low, reducing visibilities to 8 km. Isolated thunderstorms, with bases at 2,500 feet and tops to 30,000 feet, developed southwest of Riyadh between 1500 and 2200Z. Smoke reduced visibilities and obscured skies along the Persian Gulf as far south as 23 degrees North.
In Kuwait and southern Iraq, skies were broken to overcast with 8,000 foot ceilings until about 0500Z. Tops of these multiplayered clouds reached 35,000 feet. There were isolated 2,500 foot ceilings. By 0500Z, the higher clouds had moved east, leaving scattered to broken low clouds over Kuwait. In the evening, more middle and high clouds began to move into the southern half from the west. They reached western Kuwait by 2000Z, bringing 9,000 foot ceilings and tops to 30,000 feet.
Isolated rainshowers and thunderstorms affected Kuwait and southeastern Iraq unti 0600Z. Rain, heavy at time, reduced visibility to 5 km. Winds in Saudi Arabia and western Iraq were southwesterly to westerly at 10-15 knots, increasing to 15-25 knots by 0900Z south of 32 degrees North, with gusts to 30 knots. By 2100Z, speeds had diminished to 10-15 knots. Winds in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley were southeasterly at 10-20 knots, but dropped to 3-5 knots after sunset.
Duststorms reduced visibilities to as low as 1,000 meters in Kuwait and southern Iraq between 0900 and 2100Z. Dense smoke from the Kuwaiti oil fires moved northwestward. Visibilities just south of Baghdad were less than 3,000 meters. Fog formed after 2100Z in Kuwait and southern Iraq, reducing visibilities to less than 4,000 meters. Afternoon high temperatures were 10-21 degrees Celsius; morning lows ranged from 1 degree Celsius in the northeast to 15 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes from Kuwait moving westward into Iraq.
(As the ground war began, Iraqi forces set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, resulting in extremely heavy smoke concentrations over the entire region.)
25 February 1991
An upper air disturbance moving northeastward spread stormy weather over the northern Arabian Peninsula; by 0900Z, most of the region was covered with clouds. A low pressure system lingered over northwestern Saudi Arabia as the high pressure cell in the southeast moved eastward. Low pressure moving east from the northeastern Mediterranean spread clouds southeastward over northern Iraq.
Fog reduced visibilities to as low as 1,500 meters from northeastern Saudi Arabia to the United Arab Emirates coast (and to as low as 500 meters in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley) before 0400Z and again after 2000Z. Broken middle and high multilayered clouds with tops to 30,000 feet spread 9,000 foot ceilings from the northern Red Sea to the northern Persian Gulf and along the Iran-Iraq border. Isolated thunderstorms and rainshowers formed over northwestern Saudi Arabia throughout the day. They were most intense and widespread at about 1600Z northwest of Riyadh, along the southern Iraq-Iran border, and in extreme western Iraq near the Jordan border. Some of these storms were dry, creating intense, localized duststorms that reduced visibilities to well below 1,000 meters. Widespread duststorms were reported in the northern Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert between 0900 and 2000Z with visibilities as low as 4,000 meters. Prevailing winds were as high as 30 kno! ts in northeastern Saudi Arabia.
At 0300Z, broken high clouds with 24,000 foot ceilings prevailed over Iraq and Kuwait; but as denser clouds continued to move in, a solid overcast from 7,000 to 33,000 feet formed throughout southern Iraq and Kuwait. After 1300Z, isolated thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet developed in the area's southern half; skies in the heaviest storms wree obscured. Conditions over southern Iraq and Kuwait improved after 1800Z. In southwestern Iraq between the Tigris River and the Iranian border, skies were scattered with isolated low clouds from 2,000 to 20,000 feet. South of 30 degrees North, skies wre broken to overcast with 20,000 foot ceilings; there were also isolated low clouds from 10,000 to 35,000 feet. Elsewhere, skies remained overcast between 8,000 and 35,000 feet.
At 0500Z, a line of rainshowers spread from west-central Saudi Arabia northeastward to the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border and eastward into southern Kuwait. The line expanded and intensified to cover most of Kuwait, southern Iraq, and north-central Saudi Arabia by 1600Z. Intermittent precipitation fell the rest of the day.
Winds were southeasterly at 5-10 knots until 0900Z. Afternoon winds were stronger at 15-20 knots, with gusts to 40. Fog and smoke reduced visibilities to below 2,000 meters in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Visibilities improved to 8 km by 0600Z, but sporadic duststorms in the afternoon reduced them to 4,000 meters. High temperatures were 14-21 degrees Celsius; lows, 3-16 degrees Celsius.
26 February 1991
As the upper air disturbance moved northeast, it continued to produce heavy rainshowers and duststorms over the area. A surface trough formed between the low pressure area in central Saudi Arabia and another moving through southern Turkey. By 2100Z, the trough stretched through Iraq along 43 degrees East. An area of high pressure was located in centrtal Iran and the extreme southeastern Arabian Peninsula.
Several lines of rainshowers and thunderstorms moved through the northern Arabian Peninsula throughout the day. Between 0000 and 0300Z, an area of thunderstorms spread from the Red Sea near 25 degrees North to the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border near 45 degrees East. Another formed in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. By 0900Z, a third area had formed over northeastern Saudi Arabia at 28 Degrees North, 47 degrees East. Bases were at 2,500 feet and tops reached 35,000 feet. Thunderstorms were embedded in scattered to broken middle clouds west of 45 degrees East. Multilayered clouds were broken to overcast from 8,000 to 33,000 feet north of 25 degrees North. By 1100Z, the northern area had spread southwestward and the southern areas had moved southeastward. Storm intensity and coverage increased throughout the day until 1600Z, when a line of isolated thunderstorms extended from the northern Persian Gulf to southwest of Riyadh. Areas west of 43 degrees East had clea! red. Clouds, rainshowers, and thunderstorms spread southeastward again in the evening, reaching as far southwest as 20 degrees North, 44 degrees East, by 1900Z.
Broken to overcast clouds between 8,000 and 20,000 feet covered the entire area before 0300Z. The lower cloud deck gradually dissipated in the northwest, leaving scattered skies over most of Iraq, and high clouds with tops to 32,000 feet over southern Iraq and Kuwait. Scattered to broken clouds between 4,000 and 6,000 feet formed over central Iraq between 0500 and 1600Z. At 1100Z, there were isolated thunderstorms or rainshowers embedded in these clouds in a line from 35 degrees North, 45 minutes East, to 31 degrees North, 41 minutes East. Thunderstorms also formed over eastern Kuwait and extreme southwestern Iraq after 1500Z. Cloud bases were 3,000 feet and tops reach 35,000 feet.
Intermittent rainshowers and thunderstorms fell southeast of a line extending from 34 degrees North, 46 minutes East, to 31 degrees North, 42 minutes East throughout the day.
Winds were southeasterly at 10-15 knots, but by 1200Z, speeds in the east reached 20-30 knots. Winds in the west shifted to northwesterly at 10-15 knots as the trough moved eastward. Fog and smoke reduced visibilities to below 2,000 meters from the central Tigris-Euphrates river valley to Kuwait. Visibilities improved to 8 km by 0600Z, but sporadic duststorms in the afternoon reduced visibilities to 4,000 meters. Visibilities in heavy rainshowers may have dropped to as low as 1,000 meters. High temperatures were 17-21 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-16 degrees Celsius.
27 February 1991
A low pressure cell that had been centered in southwestern Iraq at 1000Z slid southeastward into the Persian Gulf throughout the day. A weak frontal system in the eastern Mediterranean Sea moved onshore and was in central Iraq by the end of the day.
In western Iraq and northwestern Saudi Arabia, skies were scattered with bases at 10,000 feet throughout the morning. Clouds from the front approaching from the Mediterranean began moving in by 1100Z, forming ceilings rapidly. Rain began lowering visibilities to 5 km by 1300Z. Thunderstorms developed in the afternoon as the clouds moved eastward. By the end of the day, clouds and rain were confined to the western Saudi Arabia-Iraq border. In north-central and northeastern Saudi Arabia, broken clouds, multilayered from 3,000 to 25,000 feet with rainshowers and thunderstorms, prevailed. Visibilities were 4,800 meters in ground fog, rain and haze, but near zero in blowing dust from thunderstorms. Clouds moved slowly southeast to east-central Saudi Arabia by day's end.
Broken multilayered clouds from 3,000 to 25,000 feet covered the southern half of the area, but cleared from the northwest by noon, leaving scattered clouds at 3,000 feet and broken clouds at 6,000-8,000 feet over southeast Iraq and Kuwait. These also cleared by 1900Z. A smoke layer at 2,500 feet covered most of central and southern Kuwait throughout the day. A line of broken 4,000 foot clouds associated with the from the Mediterranean invaded the western part of the area by noon. The line was past Baghdad and into north-central Saudi Arabia by the end of the day. Rainshowers and thunderstorms were widespread in the southern half of the area through the morning. Light rain fell in the western half as the front passed.
Winds were northwesterly to northeasterly at 5-15 knots (but up to 25 knots in thunderstorms) in the southern half of the area. Winds became southwesterly at 5-15 knots as the front approached, and northwesterly at 8-20 knots behind it. Visibilities were near zero in dense fog along the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. There were also near zero in the southern half of the area, where thunderstorms produced blowing dust. Elsewhere, morning visibilities were 5 km in ground fog, rain, and haze. Rain lowered visibilities to 4,800 meters in the western half of the area as the front passed. Smoke limited visibility aloft to 1,600 meters over Kuwait. High temperatures were 13-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-16 degrees Celsius.
28 February 1991
Low pressure was centered over the southeastern part of the Saudi Arabian peninsula while high pressure intensified in the rest of the region. Remnants of a weak frontal system remained in northern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq.
Skies were broken to overcast over north-central, northeastern, east, and east-central Saudi Arabia. Ceiling heights were 3,000-4,000 feet. By evening, skies were mostly clear to scattered. Light rain and drizzle fell over north-central and eastern Saudi Arabia. Thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet were observed over east-central Saudi Arabia and the northern part of the Persian Gulf during early morning. Winds were northwesterly at 10-20 knots with gusts to 25 knots. Fog lowered morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in east-central Saudi Arabia. Fog reduced early afternoon visibilities to 3,200 meters in northeastern Saudi Arabia, which improved to 6-8 km in smoke and haze by late afternoon. A sandstorm in east-central Saudi Arabia, with winds speeds of 30-40 knots, reduced late afternoon and early evening visibilities to 1,600-4,000 meters, with isolated reports of 100 meters.
Skies wre broken to overcast over southern and southeastern Iraq and Kuwait--ceilings were 3,000 to 4,000 feet, but 800 feet in showers. By early evening, skies were cleared to scattered. Isolated afternoon thunderstorms (tops to 35,000 feet) and rainshowers were present over southeastern Iraq and Kuwait.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-20 knots, with gusts to 35 knots near thunderstorms. In Kuwait, visibilities were less than 3,200 meters in smoke and 2,000 meters in thunderstorms. High temperatures were 13-18 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
1 March 1991
High pressure dominated, but a low pressure system developed over the eastern Mediterranean by the end of the day, sending moisture into western areas. Skies were clear to scattered over most of the area, but scattered to broken at 1,000-2,000 feet over northeast and eastern Saudi Arabia due to smoke. Scattered to broken low clouds at 3,000 feet, with occasionally broken middle and high ceilings, moved into western Iraq and northwestern Saudi Arabia by mid-afternoon. Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in northeastern Saudi Arabia were 6-8 km in smoke and haze. Blowing sand and dust reduced early morning visibilities to 3,200 meters in east-central and eastern Saudi Arabia. Scattered, occasionally broken, middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet moved into central Iraq by mid-afternoon.
Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Smoke and haze reduced visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km, occasonally to 3,200 meters. High temperatures were 15-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
2 March 1991
High pressure dominated as a low pressure system moved northeast and brought moisture across Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. Skies were broken to overcast at 8,000-10,000 feet, but early morning ceilings were 3,000-5,000 feet in showers over western and northern Iraq. Smoke formed a broken layer at 2,000-3,000 feet over northeast and east-central Saudi Arabia during the morning. Skies over the rest of the area were clear to scattered. Isolated rainshowers and thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet developed during early morning in Northern Iraq. Visibilities were 6-8 km in precipitation. Haze reduced morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in east-central Saudi Arabia. Smoke reduced morning visibilities in eastern Saudi Arabia to 4,800 meters; in the afternoon and evening, to 4,000 meters.
Over central Iraq, skies were broken with middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet in the early morning, becoming scattered in early afternoon. Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Smoke reduced visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km, with isolated areas of less than 1,600 meters. High temperatures were 15-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
Gulf War Weather (Continued)
24 February 1991
A low pressure system moved slowly eastward along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border. High pressure was still centered over the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. The subtropical jet stream's middle and high clouds moved eastward over the Persian Gulf. They were out of the area by about 1900Z, but another upper level disturbance brought more high and middle clouds eastward. At 1500Z, these clouds were in north-central Saudi Arabia.
Morning fog again blanketed the central Persian Gulf coast between Dhahran and the Strait of Hormuz. Visibility was poorest (2,000 meters) south of Qatar. Gust winds and blowing dust accompanied the low near the northern Saudi Arabian border where 15 to 20 knot winds raised dust that reduced visibilities to 6 km. Broken to overcast middle clouds produced 8,000 foot ceilings over the northern Persian Gulf, but embedded low clouds resulted in isolated ceilings at 3,000 feet. Isolated rainshowers fell near the low, reducing visibilities to 8 km. Isolated thunderstorms, with bases at 2,500 feet and tops to 30,000 feet, developed southwest of Riyadh between 1500 and 2200Z. Smoke reduced visibilities and obscured skies along the Persian Gulf as far south as 23 degrees North.
In Kuwait and southern Iraq, skies were broken to overcast with 8,000 foot ceilings until about 0500Z. Tops of these multiplayered clouds reached 35,000 feet. There were isolated 2,500 foot ceilings. By 0500Z, the higher clouds had moved east, leaving scattered to broken low clouds over Kuwait. In the evening, more middle and high clouds began to move into the southern half from the west. They reached western Kuwait by 2000Z, bringing 9,000 foot ceilings and tops to 30,000 feet.
Isolated rainshowers and thunderstorms affected Kuwait and southeastern Iraq unti 0600Z. Rain, heavy at time, reduced visibility to 5 km. Winds in Saudi Arabia and western Iraq were southwesterly to westerly at 10-15 knots, increasing to 15-25 knots by 0900Z south of 32 degrees North, with gusts to 30 knots. By 2100Z, speeds had diminished to 10-15 knots. Winds in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley were southeasterly at 10-20 knots, but dropped to 3-5 knots after sunset.
Duststorms reduced visibilities to as low as 1,000 meters in Kuwait and southern Iraq between 0900 and 2100Z. Dense smoke from the Kuwaiti oil fires moved northwestward. Visibilities just south of Baghdad were less than 3,000 meters. Fog formed after 2100Z in Kuwait and southern Iraq, reducing visibilities to less than 4,000 meters. Afternoon high temperatures were 10-21 degrees Celsius; morning lows ranged from 1 degree Celsius in the northeast to 15 degrees Celsius in the southeast.
Visible Smoke Plumes
DMSP visual imagery in Gulf War Weather shows smoke plumes from Kuwait moving westward into Iraq.
(As the ground war began, Iraqi forces set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, resulting in extremely heavy smoke concentrations over the entire region.)
25 February 1991
An upper air disturbance moving northeastward spread stormy weather over the northern Arabian Peninsula; by 0900Z, most of the region was covered with clouds. A low pressure system lingered over northwestern Saudi Arabia as the high pressure cell in the southeast moved eastward. Low pressure moving east from the northeastern Mediterranean spread clouds southeastward over northern Iraq.
Fog reduced visibilities to as low as 1,500 meters from northeastern Saudi Arabia to the United Arab Emirates coast (and to as low as 500 meters in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley) before 0400Z and again after 2000Z. Broken middle and high multilayered clouds with tops to 30,000 feet spread 9,000 foot ceilings from the northern Red Sea to the northern Persian Gulf and along the Iran-Iraq border. Isolated thunderstorms and rainshowers formed over northwestern Saudi Arabia throughout the day. They were most intense and widespread at about 1600Z northwest of Riyadh, along the southern Iraq-Iran border, and in extreme western Iraq near the Jordan border. Some of these storms were dry, creating intense, localized duststorms that reduced visibilities to well below 1,000 meters. Widespread duststorms were reported in the northern Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert between 0900 and 2000Z with visibilities as low as 4,000 meters. Prevailing winds were as high as 30 kno! ts in northeastern Saudi Arabia.
At 0300Z, broken high clouds with 24,000 foot ceilings prevailed over Iraq and Kuwait; but as denser clouds continued to move in, a solid overcast from 7,000 to 33,000 feet formed throughout southern Iraq and Kuwait. After 1300Z, isolated thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet developed in the area's southern half; skies in the heaviest storms wree obscured. Conditions over southern Iraq and Kuwait improved after 1800Z. In southwestern Iraq between the Tigris River and the Iranian border, skies were scattered with isolated low clouds from 2,000 to 20,000 feet. South of 30 degrees North, skies wre broken to overcast with 20,000 foot ceilings; there were also isolated low clouds from 10,000 to 35,000 feet. Elsewhere, skies remained overcast between 8,000 and 35,000 feet.
At 0500Z, a line of rainshowers spread from west-central Saudi Arabia northeastward to the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border and eastward into southern Kuwait. The line expanded and intensified to cover most of Kuwait, southern Iraq, and north-central Saudi Arabia by 1600Z. Intermittent precipitation fell the rest of the day.
Winds were southeasterly at 5-10 knots until 0900Z. Afternoon winds were stronger at 15-20 knots, with gusts to 40. Fog and smoke reduced visibilities to below 2,000 meters in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Visibilities improved to 8 km by 0600Z, but sporadic duststorms in the afternoon reduced them to 4,000 meters. High temperatures were 14-21 degrees Celsius; lows, 3-16 degrees Celsius.
26 February 1991
As the upper air disturbance moved northeast, it continued to produce heavy rainshowers and duststorms over the area. A surface trough formed between the low pressure area in central Saudi Arabia and another moving through southern Turkey. By 2100Z, the trough stretched through Iraq along 43 degrees East. An area of high pressure was located in centrtal Iran and the extreme southeastern Arabian Peninsula.
Several lines of rainshowers and thunderstorms moved through the northern Arabian Peninsula throughout the day. Between 0000 and 0300Z, an area of thunderstorms spread from the Red Sea near 25 degrees North to the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border near 45 degrees East. Another formed in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. By 0900Z, a third area had formed over northeastern Saudi Arabia at 28 Degrees North, 47 degrees East. Bases were at 2,500 feet and tops reached 35,000 feet. Thunderstorms were embedded in scattered to broken middle clouds west of 45 degrees East. Multilayered clouds were broken to overcast from 8,000 to 33,000 feet north of 25 degrees North. By 1100Z, the northern area had spread southwestward and the southern areas had moved southeastward. Storm intensity and coverage increased throughout the day until 1600Z, when a line of isolated thunderstorms extended from the northern Persian Gulf to southwest of Riyadh. Areas west of 43 degrees East had clea! red. Clouds, rainshowers, and thunderstorms spread southeastward again in the evening, reaching as far southwest as 20 degrees North, 44 degrees East, by 1900Z.
Broken to overcast clouds between 8,000 and 20,000 feet covered the entire area before 0300Z. The lower cloud deck gradually dissipated in the northwest, leaving scattered skies over most of Iraq, and high clouds with tops to 32,000 feet over southern Iraq and Kuwait. Scattered to broken clouds between 4,000 and 6,000 feet formed over central Iraq between 0500 and 1600Z. At 1100Z, there were isolated thunderstorms or rainshowers embedded in these clouds in a line from 35 degrees North, 45 minutes East, to 31 degrees North, 41 minutes East. Thunderstorms also formed over eastern Kuwait and extreme southwestern Iraq after 1500Z. Cloud bases were 3,000 feet and tops reach 35,000 feet.
Intermittent rainshowers and thunderstorms fell southeast of a line extending from 34 degrees North, 46 minutes East, to 31 degrees North, 42 minutes East throughout the day.
Winds were southeasterly at 10-15 knots, but by 1200Z, speeds in the east reached 20-30 knots. Winds in the west shifted to northwesterly at 10-15 knots as the trough moved eastward. Fog and smoke reduced visibilities to below 2,000 meters from the central Tigris-Euphrates river valley to Kuwait. Visibilities improved to 8 km by 0600Z, but sporadic duststorms in the afternoon reduced visibilities to 4,000 meters. Visibilities in heavy rainshowers may have dropped to as low as 1,000 meters. High temperatures were 17-21 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-16 degrees Celsius.
27 February 1991
A low pressure cell that had been centered in southwestern Iraq at 1000Z slid southeastward into the Persian Gulf throughout the day. A weak frontal system in the eastern Mediterranean Sea moved onshore and was in central Iraq by the end of the day.
In western Iraq and northwestern Saudi Arabia, skies were scattered with bases at 10,000 feet throughout the morning. Clouds from the front approaching from the Mediterranean began moving in by 1100Z, forming ceilings rapidly. Rain began lowering visibilities to 5 km by 1300Z. Thunderstorms developed in the afternoon as the clouds moved eastward. By the end of the day, clouds and rain were confined to the western Saudi Arabia-Iraq border. In north-central and northeastern Saudi Arabia, broken clouds, multilayered from 3,000 to 25,000 feet with rainshowers and thunderstorms, prevailed. Visibilities were 4,800 meters in ground fog, rain and haze, but near zero in blowing dust from thunderstorms. Clouds moved slowly southeast to east-central Saudi Arabia by day's end.
Broken multilayered clouds from 3,000 to 25,000 feet covered the southern half of the area, but cleared from the northwest by noon, leaving scattered clouds at 3,000 feet and broken clouds at 6,000-8,000 feet over southeast Iraq and Kuwait. These also cleared by 1900Z. A smoke layer at 2,500 feet covered most of central and southern Kuwait throughout the day. A line of broken 4,000 foot clouds associated with the from the Mediterranean invaded the western part of the area by noon. The line was past Baghdad and into north-central Saudi Arabia by the end of the day. Rainshowers and thunderstorms were widespread in the southern half of the area through the morning. Light rain fell in the western half as the front passed.
Winds were northwesterly to northeasterly at 5-15 knots (but up to 25 knots in thunderstorms) in the southern half of the area. Winds became southwesterly at 5-15 knots as the front approached, and northwesterly at 8-20 knots behind it. Visibilities were near zero in dense fog along the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. There were also near zero in the southern half of the area, where thunderstorms produced blowing dust. Elsewhere, morning visibilities were 5 km in ground fog, rain, and haze. Rain lowered visibilities to 4,800 meters in the western half of the area as the front passed. Smoke limited visibility aloft to 1,600 meters over Kuwait. High temperatures were 13-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 7-16 degrees Celsius.
28 February 1991
Low pressure was centered over the southeastern part of the Saudi Arabian peninsula while high pressure intensified in the rest of the region. Remnants of a weak frontal system remained in northern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq.
Skies were broken to overcast over north-central, northeastern, east, and east-central Saudi Arabia. Ceiling heights were 3,000-4,000 feet. By evening, skies were mostly clear to scattered. Light rain and drizzle fell over north-central and eastern Saudi Arabia. Thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet were observed over east-central Saudi Arabia and the northern part of the Persian Gulf during early morning. Winds were northwesterly at 10-20 knots with gusts to 25 knots. Fog lowered morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in east-central Saudi Arabia. Fog reduced early afternoon visibilities to 3,200 meters in northeastern Saudi Arabia, which improved to 6-8 km in smoke and haze by late afternoon. A sandstorm in east-central Saudi Arabia, with winds speeds of 30-40 knots, reduced late afternoon and early evening visibilities to 1,600-4,000 meters, with isolated reports of 100 meters.
Skies wre broken to overcast over southern and southeastern Iraq and Kuwait--ceilings were 3,000 to 4,000 feet, but 800 feet in showers. By early evening, skies were cleared to scattered. Isolated afternoon thunderstorms (tops to 35,000 feet) and rainshowers were present over southeastern Iraq and Kuwait.
Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-20 knots, with gusts to 35 knots near thunderstorms. In Kuwait, visibilities were less than 3,200 meters in smoke and 2,000 meters in thunderstorms. High temperatures were 13-18 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
1 March 1991
High pressure dominated, but a low pressure system developed over the eastern Mediterranean by the end of the day, sending moisture into western areas. Skies were clear to scattered over most of the area, but scattered to broken at 1,000-2,000 feet over northeast and eastern Saudi Arabia due to smoke. Scattered to broken low clouds at 3,000 feet, with occasionally broken middle and high ceilings, moved into western Iraq and northwestern Saudi Arabia by mid-afternoon. Winds were northwesterly to northerly at 10-15 knots. Visibilities in northeastern Saudi Arabia were 6-8 km in smoke and haze. Blowing sand and dust reduced early morning visibilities to 3,200 meters in east-central and eastern Saudi Arabia. Scattered, occasionally broken, middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet moved into central Iraq by mid-afternoon.
Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Smoke and haze reduced visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km, occasonally to 3,200 meters. High temperatures were 15-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
2 March 1991
High pressure dominated as a low pressure system moved northeast and brought moisture across Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. Skies were broken to overcast at 8,000-10,000 feet, but early morning ceilings were 3,000-5,000 feet in showers over western and northern Iraq. Smoke formed a broken layer at 2,000-3,000 feet over northeast and east-central Saudi Arabia during the morning. Skies over the rest of the area were clear to scattered. Isolated rainshowers and thunderstorms with tops to 35,000 feet developed during early morning in Northern Iraq. Visibilities were 6-8 km in precipitation. Haze reduced morning visibilities to 4,800 meters in east-central Saudi Arabia. Smoke reduced morning visibilities in eastern Saudi Arabia to 4,800 meters; in the afternoon and evening, to 4,000 meters.
Over central Iraq, skies were broken with middle clouds at 8,000-10,000 feet in the early morning, becoming scattered in early afternoon. Winds were northwesterly at 10-15 knots. Smoke reduced visibilities in Kuwait to 5-7 km, with isolated areas of less than 1,600 meters. High temperatures were 15-20 degrees Celsius; lows, 5-10 degrees Celsius.
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Re: United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact
by admin » Thu Dec 17, 2015 10:01 pm
Chapter 3, Part 5
Conclusions
The following facts provide significant evidence that coalition forces were exposed to mixed chemical agents as a result of coalition bombings of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities and that the fallout from these bombings may be contributing to the health problems currently being suffered by Gulf War veterans.
• Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons plants and storage sites were priority targets for U.S. and Coalition forces and were repeatedly bombed.
• Chemical alarms began sounding and the servicemen were put on chemical alert simultaneous with the beginning of the air war.
The nature of diesel, oil, etc., did not alter during the air war, suddenly causing the alarms to sound. These substances were present before the initiation of the air war, and did not set off the chemical alarms. (The automatic alarms have no sensitivity control.)
These chemical alarms are battlefield instruments. Battlefields are full of fumes, propellants, explosives, and so forth. It is difficult to believe that they would have been procurred if they were ineffective in this environment.
• U.S. military personnel, and the Czech and French governments have confirmed that the chemical alarms were sounding as the result of nerve agent detection.
• The combination of prevailing wind directions, the open terrain, the lack of structural impediments, and other factors listed above, indicate that chemical and possibly nuclear and biological agents from allied bombings became airborne and were being blown and carried across coalition forces emplacements along the Saudi-Iraqi and Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
• Chemical nerve agents, such as Sarin and others, are known to have a cumulative effect, i.e., they have a slow rate of detoxification. Little is known about the long-term effects of continuous low levels of exposure. Many of the veterans claiming to be suffering from Gulf War Syndrome are exhibiting symptoms of neurophysical disorders.
Conclusions
The following facts provide significant evidence that coalition forces were exposed to mixed chemical agents as a result of coalition bombings of Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities and that the fallout from these bombings may be contributing to the health problems currently being suffered by Gulf War veterans.
• Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons plants and storage sites were priority targets for U.S. and Coalition forces and were repeatedly bombed.
• Chemical alarms began sounding and the servicemen were put on chemical alert simultaneous with the beginning of the air war.
The nature of diesel, oil, etc., did not alter during the air war, suddenly causing the alarms to sound. These substances were present before the initiation of the air war, and did not set off the chemical alarms. (The automatic alarms have no sensitivity control.)
These chemical alarms are battlefield instruments. Battlefields are full of fumes, propellants, explosives, and so forth. It is difficult to believe that they would have been procurred if they were ineffective in this environment.
• U.S. military personnel, and the Czech and French governments have confirmed that the chemical alarms were sounding as the result of nerve agent detection.
• The combination of prevailing wind directions, the open terrain, the lack of structural impediments, and other factors listed above, indicate that chemical and possibly nuclear and biological agents from allied bombings became airborne and were being blown and carried across coalition forces emplacements along the Saudi-Iraqi and Saudi-Kuwaiti border.
• Chemical nerve agents, such as Sarin and others, are known to have a cumulative effect, i.e., they have a slow rate of detoxification. Little is known about the long-term effects of continuous low levels of exposure. Many of the veterans claiming to be suffering from Gulf War Syndrome are exhibiting symptoms of neurophysical disorders.
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