Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka
Posted: Sun Oct 13, 2013 9:43 am
PART 19 OF 27 (Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)
XII. Development of Interrogation Policy in Iraq (U)
[Delete] On March 20, 2003, a month before Lt Gen DeLong's request, the United States and its coalition partners had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the initial stages of OIF, conventional ground forces were directed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Combined Joint Task Force 7 CJTF-7 replaced CFLCC in the summer of 2003. As had been the case in Afghanistan, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Iraq to [big delete] [1218]
(U) As previously described, for more than a year after the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the only written guidance for interrogators appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52). When written policies were finally established for interrogators in Afghanistan in January 2003, those policies included some interrogation techniques that were not listed in the Field Manual but had been previously authorized for use at Guantanamo Bay.
(U) By comparISGn, the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq had an interrogation policy in place before the beginning of OIF. This policy was identical to the February 2002 policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Afghanistan and reflected the influence of techniques authorized for use at GTMO. [1219] The first policy to guide interrogations conducted by conventional forces in Iraq, however, was not established until September 2003, more than five months after that war began. That September 2003 policy was also influenced by techniques authorized for use at GTMO.
A. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Policies (U)
1. SMU Task Force Uses Afghanistan Interrogation Policy (U)
[Delete] The SMU TF in Iraq [big delete] conducted screening and battlefield interrogations [delete] [1220] SMU TF interrogators questioned detainees for intelligence [big delete].
(U) According to a review completed by the DoD Inspector General in August 2006, the SMU TF based its first interrogation policy on the SOP used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. The DoD Inspector General stated:
[Delete] Specifically, in February 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March, the SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the interrogation SOP in use by the SMU personnel in Afghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim. [1224] This SOP, which included stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs, governed SMU interrogations in Iraq from the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until it was replaced later that year. [1225]
2. OGA Comments on SMU TF Interrogation Techniques (U)
[Delete] In May 2003, CAPT Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent an email to CENTCOM lawyers stating that CIA General Counsel Scott Muller had called Jim Haynes and told him that the techniques used by military interrogators at the SMU TF facility in Iraq were "more aggressive" than techniques used by CIA to interrogate the same detainees. [1226]
[Delete] The email requested that CENTCOM provide a list of interrogation techniques in use at Bagram in Afghanistan and at the SMU Task Force facility in Iraq. On June 8, 2003, the [delete] Legal Advisor provided CENTCOM with a list of interrogation techniques in use by the SMU TF in Iraq and Afghanistan. [1227] That list included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions (called comfort positions in the memo), sleep management, loud music and light control, and 20 hour interrogations. [1228] [Delete] Legal Advisor did not recall receiving any feedback about the list of interrogation techniques submitted to CENTCOM. [1229] Despite the presence of aggressive techniques in the JSOC Legal Advisor's June 8 memo, on June 10, 2003 CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent a message to the Director of the Joint Staff LTG George Casey stating that "I have confirmed that the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF direction." [1230]
3. July 2003 Interrogation SOP Drafted/or Iraq SMU TF (U)
[Delete] [delete] A July 15, 2003 SMU interrogation SOP appears to have been the first interrogation policy drafted specifically by the SMU TF in Iraq. [1231] The list of interrogation techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone); presence of military working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1232]
(U) While the SOP described some techniques as having a "foundation" in Army Field Manual 34-52, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay, who conducted an investigation into the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib, described techniques in the July 15, 2003 SMU SOP as "inconsistent with Army doctrine on detainee treatment or interrogation tactics." [1233]
[Delete] [delete] The July 15, 2003 policy contained the signature block of the SMU TF Commander [big delete] but was unsigned. [1234] [Delete] told the Committee that he did not think he ever approved or even saw an interrogation policy. [1235] He stated, however, that he was aware that the SMU TF used sleep deprivation, loud music, light control, isolation, "comfort positions," and military working dogs. [1236] The SMU Task Force Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003 stated that he was sure [delete] [delete] saw the policy, that he asked him to sign it, and that a copy of the policy sat in the Commander's inbox during the Legal Advisor's deployment to the Task Force. [1237]
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Task Force's Legal Advisor who arrived at the TF facility in late August 2003 likewise said that his predecessor had tried, without success, to get [delete] [delete] to sign the policy. [1238] That same Legal Advisor stated that he too tried numerous times, also unsuccessfully, to get the Commander to sign the policy. The Legal Advisor added that it got to the point where he would print out a fresh copy of the policy every night and give it to [delete] aide. The Legal Advisor said that he knew the Commander had received copies of the policy from his aide, but that he had a habit of repeatedly "losing" the draft policy. [1239] He said that the exercise became "laughable" and eventually, he was forced to raise the issue with the [delete] legal Advisor. [1240] In the absence of [delete] [delete] guidance, the Legal Advisor told the Committee that his direction to SMU personnel was that the unsigned SOP applied to SMU TF interrogations.
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches was posted on a wall at the SMU TF facility. [1241] He specifically recalled stress positions, loud music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogations. He stated that, although military working dogs were not typically present at the SMU TF facility, he recalled making a phone call to arrange for a military working dog to be present for an interrogation.
[Delete] [delete] While neither the January 10, 2003 nor the July 15, 2003 SMU policies included "removal of clothing" there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at the SMU TF. [Big delete] who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003, stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee." [1242] [Delete] stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was uncomfortable with stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique." [1243] [Delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. [1244]
[Delete] However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU TF from December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by [delete] [delete] in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of interrogations. [1245] The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that the technique was 'widespread" at that time. [1246] He said that he advised the Commander that, if stripping were to be authorized, it should be limited to males only and that naked detainees should not be paraded through the Task Force facility. The Legal Advisor stated that two SMU TF behavioral scientists who also attended the meeting advised [delete] not to permit interrogators to strip detainees because of the implications of nudity in Arab culture. The Legal Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would continue to use nudity as an interrogation technique though the Legal Advisor stated that he thought [delete] may have said that he [delete] have to approve its use.
[Delete] Both LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), and COL Thomas Pappas, the Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205th MI BDE) in Iraq told the Committee that they were unaware of what interrogation techniques were authorized for use at the SMU TF facility. [1247] Interrogators from the 205th MI BDE, however, served at the SMU TF in support of interrogation operations there. In mid-June 2003, at the request of the SMU TF, CJTF-7 assigned two Arabic-speaking interrogators to the SMU. [1248] COL Pappas recalled sending a second set of approximately two to four interrogators from the 205th MI BDE to the SMU TF around November 2003 to replace the 205th MI BDE personnel already serving at the SMU. [1249]
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 would have retained UCMJ authority over the interrogators and the interrogators would have been required to conduct interrogations under the CJTF-7 authorities rather than those at the SMU TF. [1250] COL Pappas, however, believed that once his interrogators were sent to the SMU TF, that they were bound by the rules of the SMU TF and not CJTF-7 interrogation guidance. [1251]
4. Iraq Survey Group Concerns with SMU TF Detainee Treatment (U)
(U) The Iraq Survey Group was established in June 2003. According to its first Commander MG Keith Dayton, the ISG's mission was to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of WMD and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor on WMD. [1252] MG Dayton reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid. As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG debriefed and interrogated high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of those detainees had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF and other operational units before being handed over to the ISG. From the onset, ISG personnel had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.
(U) MG Dayton told the DoD Inspector General that "as our interrogators started getting into the swing of things at Camp Cropper... some of the prisoners were alleging that they had been roughed up" by the SMU TF. [1253] MG Dayton stated that his Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Chief [delete] had described the situation as "a disaster waiting to happen" and believed that ISG needed to "slam some rules on this place right away to basically keep ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated properly." [1254]
(U) [Delete] said that he first became aware of allegations of detainee mistreatment while at the ISG facilities in the first week in June 2003. [1255] At that time, a Chief Warrant Officer told him that a detainee she was interrogating had alleged physical abuse during his capture and subsequent interrogation by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that "by mid-June 2003. a pattern of reports of abuse of prisoners (abuse primarily attributed to [the SMU TF] during their capture and interrogation of [high value targets] and other detainees, was coming to me..." [1256]
[Delete] MG Dayton described what he called a "notorious case" of alleged detainee abuse, in which a badly burned detainee was brought to the ISG facility. [1257] MG Dayton stated that according to the "special forces guys," the detainee had been captured on a very hot day, was thrown down on the metal floor on the Humvee, and during the long drive back from the operation, the detainee had "burned himself lying on the floor of the Humvee." [1258]
(U) Throughout the summer and autumn of 2003, ISG personnel continued to be concerned about the treatment of detainees by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that, during the last week in June 2003, a British interrogator reported to him that a detainee who had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF "was beaten so severely, that he had the MPs at Camp Cropper note the [detainee's] condition." [1259] [Delete] said he was told that the detainee's "back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black eyes, plus multiple contusions on his face." [1260]
[Delete] According to the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003, during one of the nightly briefings held at the SMU TF Joint Operations Center, [delete] the SMU TF Commander, said "continue to work him over" and "work him hard" in reference to a particular detainee being interrogated at the SMUTF. [1261] The Legal Advisor said that about 50 people were present when [delete] made that statement, that he (the Legal Advisor) was concerned about the message it conveyed, and that he subsequently spoke to the Commander about it. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] made a similar statement on a video teleconference,
[Delete] MG Dayton recalled that [delete] sought to address reports of SMU TF detainee mistreatment with him. According to MG Dayton, [delete] heard that "rumors" of detainee mistreatment were circulating and "he wanted to set [MG Dayton's] mind at rest." [1262] MG Dayton recalled that he spoke to [delete] a few times and that [delete] [delete] told him "You're going to hear rumors, but it's all -- it's all untrue." [1263]
(U) In addition to allegations of mistreatment by the SMU TF, [delete] the JIDC Chief said that he was informed in early June that the ICRC had visited a facility run by the 323 MI Battalion where high value detainees were undergoing interrogations. [1264] [Delete] said that the ICRC had subsequently prepared an inspection report [delete]. (He said that he understood the abuse had allegedly taken place while the detainees were under the control of the 115th MP Battalion.) [Delete] said he was told [delete]:
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B. Interrogation Policies for Conventional Forces in Iraq (U)
1. CJTF-7 Stands Up (Summer 2003) (U) (U) In May 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) began preparations to take over from CFLCC as the operational headquarters for all conventional ground units in the Iraqi theater. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, stated that during summer 2003, the general belief was that the number of forces in Iraq had to shrink as quickly as possible and that, accordingly, CENTCOM and CFLCC reduced troop levels "very, very rapidly." [1266] LTG Sanchez said that the drawdown left insufficient personnel behind for CJTF-7 to fulfill its mission as well as inadequate command structures, planning capacities, and intelligence capabilities. He said that during the handover "there were no intelligence structures that were transferred to [CJTF-7] from CFLCC" and, as a result, the remaining intelligence structure did not enable CJTF-7 to address the requirements of a Combined Joint Task Force operating at a "strategic, operational, and tactical level." [1267]
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that by July 2003, it was evident "that CJTF-7 was engaged in a counterinsurgency operation that would be difficult if not impossible to win without significant improvements in the intelligence capabilities of [CJTF-7]." [1268] LTG Sanchez said that he was particularly concerned about his HUMINT capabilities, including the level of interrogation expertise within CJTF-7, and that he "seriously questioned the training and experience of our interrogators." [1269]
(U) LTG Sanchez said he posed a challenge to his staff: "How do we ensure that we have the right mechanisms in place that allow our interrogators to push the limit of our authorities yet prevent a violation of the Geneva Convention and our duty to treat detainees humanely?" [1270] He said that "references to the [Field Manuals] and doctrine were common responses but the issues being faced were beyond the scope of the Army's limited doctrine." [1271] LTG Sanchez added that there was frustration about the ability to get a handle on the insurgency and that he put a tremendous amount of pressure on his intelligence officers. [1272]
(U) The Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Pappas, said that soon after arriving in theater in July 2003, CJTF-7's Chief of Staff BG Daniel Hahn directed him to attend a meeting to brief LTG Sanchez on interrogation operations. [1273] COL Pappas told the Committee that he learned at that meeting that LTG Sanchez was concerned that interrogations had not generated the expected intelligence information. [1274] COL Pappas said that LTG Sanchez "believed that if the brigade improved its interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, that we would get the information necessary to stop the insurgency." [1275] COL Pappas agreed and told LTG Sanchez that his interrogators would need the authority to use additional interrogation techniques to accomplish that goal. [1276]
2. Interrogation Operations Begin at Abu Ghraib (U)
(U) In mid-Summer 2003, the 205th MI BDE began preparing for Operation Victory Bounty, an undertaking designed to track down remaining elements of the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary organization loyal to Saddam Hussein. [1277] In late July 2003, ten to twelve members of the 519th MI Battalion went to Abu Ghraib to establish interrogation operations in anticipation of receiving individuals captured during Victory Bounty. [1278] On August 4, 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the 519th MI Battalion Assistant Operations Officer, assumed duties as the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at the facility. [1279] In late 2002, she had served as the Interrogation Operations Officer at the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan.
(U) According to CPT Wood, no SOP was in place for interrogations when she took command, but interrogations were conducted "within the approved approaches within the Field Manual 34-52 only, with the possible addition of stress positions." [1280] CPT Wood stated that interrogators had used sleep deprivation and stress positions in Afghanistan and that she "perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan." [1281] She said that she used her "best judgment and concluded [the techniques] would be effective tools for interrogations at [Abu Ghraib]." [1282] She also said that she later put together a request for additional interrogation options because "the winds of war were changing" and there was "mounting pressure from higher for 'actionable intelligence' from interrogation operations." [1283] CPT Wood said that she did not want to repeat her experience in Afghanistan, where interrogators lacked written guidance. [1284]
3. 519th MI Battalion at Abu Ghraib Seeks Additional Guidance (U)
(U) CPT Wood said that guidance for interrogators about the rules for interrogations was important because the interrogators in the 519th Battalion had come to Abu Ghraib with a range of different experiences:
(U) COL Pappas, CPT Wood's superior officer, said he knew that CPT Wood believed she needed additional techniques and told her to submit a request. [1286]
4. 519th MI BN Proposes Interrogation Policy (U)
(U) On July 26, 2003, CPT Wood submitted a proposed interrogation policy to her chain of command. The proposed policy was based on the interrogation policy in use at the SMU TF facility in Iraq. [1287] CPT Wood said that she and her staff simply "cleaned up some of the grammar, changed the heading and signature block, and sent it up" to CJTF-7 as a proposed policy for the 519th MI BDE. [1288]
[Delete] Mirroring the SMU TF policies, CPT Wood's proposed policy included sleep management, ''vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone), presence of military working dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1289] The proposed policy stated that "EPWs that refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." [1290] The prohibition against threats, insults and exposure to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment, however, was limited to EPWs and CPT Wood stated that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. [1291]
(U) CPT Wood stated that submitting the proposed interrogation policy seemed a "natural progression" to her as she understood the techniques were already approved for use at the SMU TF in Iraq, and the policy was "similar to that of a document that was drafted in Afghanistan for the [Bagram Collection Point] as well as ... GTMO." [1292] CPT Wood did not hear back from CJTF-7 at that time. [1293] Just a few weeks later CJTF-7 itself solicited a "wish list" of interrogation techniques.
5. CJTF-7 Solicits "Wish List" of Interrogation Techniques (U)
(U) On August 14, 2003, CPT William Ponce, the Battle Captain in the CJTF-7 HUMINT and Counterintelligence office (CJ2X), sent out an email to subordinate intelligence elements (including the 205th MI BDE and the 519th MI BN) requesting that they submit their "interrogation techniques wish list[s]." [1294] CPT Ponce wrote:
CPT Ponce added:
(U) The Commander of the 205th MI BDE, COL Pappas, said he thought that CPT Ponce's email soliciting "interrogation techniques wish lists" was the result of the meeting he attended with LTG Sanchez shortly after arriving in theater. [1297] He called the Battle Captain's use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off" a "dumb" thing to say and a "poor choice of words." [1298] LTG Sanchez told the Committee that he expected his intelligence staff to send out the request for interrogation techniques, but stated that the use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off' was "not good." [1299] LTG Sanchez believed that the email reflected frustration on the part of intelligence personnel at not being able to meet his intelligence requirements.
(U) Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Lewis Welshofer, who was with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment responded to CPT Ponce's email with his own assessment of the interrogation situation:
(U) Maj. Nathan Hoepner, the Operations Officer (S-3) of the 501st MI Battalion took issue with the language in CPT Ponce email, stating in an email of his own:
6. Interrogation OIC at Abu Ghraib Resubmits the Proposed Interrogation Policy for 519th MI BN (U)
(U) On August 27, 2003, CPT Wood re-submitted the proposed interrogation policy that she had previously sent in July. She said she thought the issue came up because CJTF-7 headquarters "want[ed] these guys broken" and said her August submission may have been a response to CPT Ponce's email. [1302]
[Delete] Though largely the same as the proposed policy submitted on July 26, 2003, the August 27, 2003 proposed policy included one additional interrogation technique - "sensory deprivation," which the proposed policy described as a "combination use of isolation and sleep management [big delete]." [1303] The proposed interrogation policy also inserted the term "stress positions" in place of "vary comfort positions" and limited use of sleep deprivation to 72 hours. [1304]
(U) CPT Wood said that two days after she submitted the proposed policy, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib with a copy of her memo. [1305] According to CPT Wood, the two attorneys said that "they did not see anything wrong with it and that they would add their approval and forward it higher to CJTF-7 for consideration and review." [1306]
(U) Techniques in CPT Wood's proposed policy can be traced back though the SMU TF in Iraq to Afghanistan and, ultimately, to techniques authorized for use at GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002. The GTMO techniques were, in turn, influenced by techniques used by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the military service SERE schools to train U.S. personnel to resist illegal enemy interrogations. In the summer of 2003, as CPT Wood was seeking approval for her proposed policy, the SMU TF in Iraq was soliciting JPRA's advice on interrogations.
C. JPRA Provides "Offensive" SERE Training in Iraq (U)
1. Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq Seeks Assistance from JPRA (U)
[Delete] In the summer of 2003 the Commander of the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq, [delete] called the Commander of JPRA, Col Randy Moulton, to request assistance with Task Force interrogations. [1307]
[Delete] On August 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA "interrogation team." [1308] The request asked that JPRA send two or more individuals to the TF for three weeks to "provide assistance to current interrogation efforts of key [high value targets]." [1309] On August 27, 2003, [big delete] request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to support the request. [1310] That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF.
[Delete] Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operations Support Office (OSO) subsequently selected three JPRA personnel for the mission. As Team Chief, Mr. Wirts chose Lt Col Steven Kleinman, a reserve officer who happened to be a trained interrogator. Mr. Wirts also chose Terrence Russell, JPRA's manager for research and development who was also a SERE specialist. Though Mr. Russell had no formal interrogation training or experience, he had previously conducted interrogation-related training for [delete] JTF-GTMO personnel. To complete the team, Mr. Wirts chose Lenny Miller, a contract SERE instructor who also lacked interrogation experience but who the SMU TF had specifically requested. The team's deployment date was set for September 1, 2003. [1311]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that, before being deployed, he thought he was being sent to Iraq to identify problems in the TF interrogation program. [1312] More than a year earlier, Lt Col Kleinman had drafted a paper identifying challenges faced by interrogators at GTMO. [1313] In the draft paper, Lt Col Kleinman identified "fundamental systemic problems" at GTMO that undermined operational effectiveness. [1314]
[Delete] Chief among the problems identified in the draft paper was the lack of trained personnel with experience in strategic interrogations. [1315] Lt Col Kleinman recommended a number of options in his draft paper to enhance DoD's ability to conduct strategic interrogation, including additional training. [1316] He recommended having experienced "survival, intelligence, and human factors specialists" conduct an "in-depth assessment" of operations at GTMO and provide a "comprehensive report that would set forth concrete steps to improve operational effectiveness and security." [1317] Lt Col Kleinman's paper did not recommend teaching interrogators at GTMO how to use SERE techniques in interrogations and he said that he did not believe that was the purpose of the Iraq trip. [1318]
2. Awareness of the JPRA Trip to Iraq at Headquarters, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (U)
[Delete] JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF request. [1319] JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton told the Committee that he was pretty sure he also conducted a briefing for the JFCOM Director for Operations (J-3) about JPRA's support to interrogation efforts at the SMU TF, although he could not recall when that briefing occurred. [1320] The JFCOM J-3, BG Thomas Moore, who was involved in coordinating at least one of JPRA's previous "offensive" training sessions completed his assignment as the J-3 at JFCOM in early to mid-August and was replaced by RADM John Bird. [1321]
(U) On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in Iraq, Col Moulton emailed a JPRA "Weekly Report" to the JFCOM Command Group and others stating:
(U) In response, the JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Robert Wagner, questioned whether JPRA was operating within its charter. He wrote: "I'm not sure I see the connection between your assigned responsibilities and this task ... [W]hat charter places JPRA in the business of intelligence collection?" [1323] Col Moulton responded "There is nothing in our charter or elsewhere that points us towards the offensive side of captivity conduct nor are we requesting to take this on as a new responsibility." [1324] He added, however, that JPRA had a role to play in helping to educate and assist offensive operations, stating:
(U) In a subsequent email to RADM Bird, Col Moulton stated that while he was concerned about "mission creep" and departing too far from JPRA's traditional role, it was his view that "no DoD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation." [1326] Col Moulton wrote:
(U) Col Moulton testified to the Committee that before he sent the JPRA team to Iraq he talked to the SMU Task Force commander and was told that SMU TF detainees "were detained unlawful combatants and not covered under the Geneva Conventions." [1328] Col Moulton later said, referring to a subsequent call with the SMU TF Commander, that he did not know if the SMU TF Commander had "specifically" told him that. [1329]
3. JPRA Provides Interrogation Support to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq (U) [1330]
[Delete] On September 5, 2003, after their arrival in Iraq, the three-member JPRA team met with SMU TF personnel at the TF facility. [1331] According to U Col Kleinman, the JPRA Team Chief, the team was told that interrogators were having trouble gaining actionable intelligence information from detainees in TF custody. [1332] Lt Col Kleinman felt that the SMU TF's lack of success was a result of a poor screening process, which resulted in the TF holding some detainees with no information. [1333]
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, the team also met that day with the SMU TF Commander [delete] and discussed [delete] expectations for the JPRA team. [1334] Mr. Russell said that [delete] "expected [the JPRA team] to become fully engaged in interrogation operations" and "encouraged [the team] to receive modified" rules of engagement (ROEs) from JPRA, since their ROEs at that time permitted the team to "advise and assist" but not to "engage in direct interrogations." [1335]
[Delete] Over the next week, Lt Col Kleinman spoke by phone with Col Moulton at least twice. While accounts by the three JPRA team members of those calls differed in some respects, all agree that the calls resulted in Col Moulton (1) authorizing the team to participate in SMU Task Force interrogations and (2) authorizing the team to use the full range of SERE school physical pressures in those interrogations. Col Moulton confirmed that the team's understanding of his guidance was correct. [1336]
4. JPRA Team Authorized to Participate in Interrogations (U)
[Delete] According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton on September 5, 2003 to discuss the team's ROEs and, the following day, Col Moulton gave the team permission to "become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1337] That account is consistent with Col Moulton's recollection, which was that Lt Col Kleinman called him after arriving in Iraq to discuss a request from the SMU TF that team members actually participate in interrogations. [1338]
[Delete] Col Moulton said that, after getting the call from Lt Col Kleinman, he called [delete] [delete] "to confirm and inquire about the new request." [1339] In subsequent interviews and communications, Col Moulton has consistently stated that he relayed [delete] request to JFCOM and got JFCOM's authorization to permit the JPRA team to participate in interrogations. Col Moulton's recollection of who at JFCOM provided that authority, however, has varied.
(U) According to a memorandum of a September 2005 interview with the JPRA Commander, Col Moulton "relayed the request to the [JFCOM] J3 and got the verbal OK to allow active participation, but only for one or two demonstrations and then the team was to go back to its role as observers." [1340]
(U) In a 2006 email to the DoD IG, however, Col Moulton could not recall exactly whom at JFCOM he had spoken with, stating:
[Delete] In interviews with Committee staff in 2007, Col Moulton said that he had tried but had been unable to reach BGen Moore, so instead he called LTG Wagner whom he reached at home. [1342] According to that account, LTG Wagner told Col Moulton that he needed approval from his boss, JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, to approve the JPRA request. [1343] According to Col Moulton, LTG Wagner called him back and gave his approval. [1344]
[Delete] BGen Moore, whom Col Moulton referenced in his September 2005 interview, was no longer assigned to JFCOM in September 2003. [1345] RADM Bird, who replaced BGen Moore, stated that he did not recall receiving a call from the JPRA Commander. RADM Bird said that he thought it unlikely he would have received the call on the weekend as it would have had to have occurred over a secure line and he did not have that capability at home. LTG Wagner told the Committee that he could not recall if he received a call from Col Moulton. [1346]
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, one of the JPRA team in Iraq, the JPRA team received permission from Col Moulton "to become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1347] The next day, team members met with the SMU TF staff and "outlined the exploitation cycle and how [the staff] could incorporate [SERE Training, Tactics, and Procedures] to support their current interrogation operations." [1348]
[Delete] While it is not known when it occurred, the Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence (J-2X) for the SMU stated that members of the JPRA team demonstrated interrogation techniques, including the "attention slap," which he said was described as an openhanded slap to focus the detainee on the interrogation, and walling, which was described as a push up against the wall. [1349] The J-2X could not recall if all members of the JPRA team were present during that lesson. [1350] Lt Col Kleinman said that he was not aware of such a lesson. [1351]
[Delete] The J-2X stated that he was unsure if techniques taught to the staff were permitted under SMU TF policy and that, after the JPRA demonstration, he raised this matter with the SMU TF J2, which at the time was [delete]. [1352]
5. JPRA Present as Interrogator Uses Stress Positions and Slaps (U)
[Delete] On September 6, 2003, JPRA team members were present in the interrogation booth when a SMU TF interrogator used "selected physical pressures" on a detainee. [1353] According to Terrence Russell, the SMU TF interrogator "put the detainee on his knees and later began to use insult slaps every 3-4 seconds for an extended period of time." [1354]
(U) Lt Col (now Colonel) Kleinman described that same interrogation in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Lt Col Kleinman said:
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that his two JPRA colleagues, who were present during the interrogation, "didn't seem to think there [was] a problem, because in SERE training... there's a facial slap, but it's conducted in very specific ways... This was not conducted in that fashion." [1356] In fact, Lt Col Kleinman described the environment at the Task Force facility as ''uncontrolled." [1357]
[Delete] Members of the JPRA team had differing views on the appropriate response to the interrogator's use of those techniques. Mr. Russell stated that he and Mr. Miller "saw nothing wrong with" the interrogator forcing the detainee to kneel or his slapping the detainee during the interrogation. [1358] Lt Col Kleinman had a different reaction.
[Delete] Lt Col Kleinman considered forcing the detainee to kneel and repeatedly slapping him to be "direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and [actions that] could constitute a war crime." [1359] Upon witnessing the abusive conduct, Lt Col Kleinman sought out the SMU TF J- 2X. [1360] Lt Col Kleinman told the J-2X what he had witnessed and recommended ''that the session be halted immediately." [1361] Lt Col Kleinman said the J-2X told him "[y]our judgment is my judgment. Do what you think. is right." [1362]
[Delete] Following his conversation with the J-2X, Lt Col Kleinman asked the two members of his team to step out of the interrogation booth. According to Mr. Russell:
[Delete] Over the objections of the other two members of JPRA team. Lt Col Kleinman then asked the SMU TF interrogator to step out of the booth. He explained to the interrogator "how and why [the interrogator's] methods were a violation of the Geneva Convention and TF [Policy]." [1364] According to Lt Col Kleinman, "[the interrogator] accepted my direction without reservation." [1365]
[Delete] With respect to Lt Col Kleinman's actions, Mr. Russell stated:
[Delete] In subsequent testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell claimed that the use of the "insult slap" was consistent with the facility's operating instructions:
Under their operating instructions at that BIF, at that time and place, we did not see anything wrong with [the use of physical pressures]. It may not have been applied the way we would have done it, but we didn't see anything wrong with it. We advised [Lt Col] Kleinman of the same. He disagreed with us. [1367]
[Delete] SMU TF SOPs reviewed by the Committee do not include slapping as an authorized technique and the SMU TF J-2X told the Committee that he was unaware of any operating instructions that would have permitted an interrogator to repeatedly slap a detainee. [1368]
[Delete] Despite Mr. Russell's previous statement that he "saw nothing wrong with what was going on," he testified to the Committee that he found the SMU TF interrogator's repeated use of the insult slap to be "odd" and "in excess" of what would be used in resistance training at JPRA [1369] Mr. Russell also testified that the technique, as applied by the TF interrogator, was ineffective:
[Delete] While he did not raise any objection to their use in the interrogation, Mr. Russell stated that the techniques used at the SERE school, such as the insult slap, were not designed to elicit information from individuals but rather to "guide the student" to an appropriate resistance posture. [1371] According to his testimony, "history has shown us that physical pressures are not effective for compelling an individual to give information or to do something" and are not useful in gaining accurate, actionable intelligence. [1372] There is no indication in Mr. Russell's trip report, however, that he told anyone on the J-2X staff that the SMU TF's use of repeated slaps would be ineffective or that use of other SERE physical pressures, such as ''walling'', which were reportedly described for the J-2X staff, would be ineffective.
[Delete] Mr. Russell stated that when physical pressures are applied in the resistance phase of SERE training, medical and psychological personnel are present to observe interrogations and protect SERE school students, [1373] Mr. Russell testified that there were no medical or psychological personnel present during the interrogations he witnessed while at the SMU TF facility. [1374]
6. JPRA Team Authorized to Use SERE Techniques (U)
(U) At some point shortly after he intervened to stop the interrogation where the detainee was placed on his knees and slapped, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton. [1375] Lt Col Kleinman testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team was "being asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees." [1376] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he also told Col Moulton that he had intervened to stop interrogations at the Task Force and that the use of SERE techniques "were violations of the Geneva Convention, they weren't authorized, and we should not do them." [1377]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he also told the SMU TF Commander that the use of SERE techniques in interrogations was ''unlawful'' and "a violation of the Geneva Convention." [1378] He said that the SMU TF Commander agreed with him but there were "no orders ever issued" by the Commander not to use the techniques. [1379]
[Delete] [delete] According to Lt Col Kleinman's trip report, after he spoke with Col Moulton, Col Moulton subsequently spoke to the SMU TF Commander, and then called him back to tell him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot" to use ''the full range of JPRA methods" on detainees, specifically including "walling, sleep deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach slaps, and finger pokes to the chest), space/time disorientation, [and] white noise." [1380]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that Col Moulton told him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot to use SERE methods" in interrogations. [1381] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Col Moulton that he considered this instruction to be an illegal order and that he would not carry it out. Col Moulton said that Lt Col Kleinman "was adamant about that he thought it was against the Geneva Convention." [1382]
7. JPRA Team Chief Seeks Legal Guidance (U)
[Delete] Following his conversation with the JPRA Commander, Lt Col Kleinman consulted with the SMU TF lawyer who advised him that the SERE tactics "fell outside the parameters of acceptability under the [Geneva Conventions] and [Task Force] policy." [1383] Lt Col Kleinman then met with the other two members of the JPRA team to inform them of the JPRA Commander's order that they could use ''the normal and usual range of physical pressures" during interrogations and to alert them of his concerns about the legality of that order. [1384] Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report:
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that he relayed his conversation with Col Moulton to his two JPRA colleagues, informing them that he told Col Moulton that the authority to use SERE techniques "was an unlawful order" and that he "wasn't going to have any involvement with it, and [he] didn't think that they should either." [1386]
[Delete] Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, the JPRA contractor, disagreed with Lt Col Kleinman's assessment. [1387] According to Mr. Russell, the two "indicated that the use of these moderate physical pressures, when used appropriately, were consistent with proper handling and interrogation." [1388] In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell added that he understood that the individuals held by the Task Force were considered "detained unlawful combatants" and "not automatically provided the protections of the Geneva Conventions," though he could not recall who told him this. [1389]
[Delete] [delete] Shortly after Col Moulton told Lt Col Kleinman that the team was "cleared hot" to employ the full range of JPRA methods, Lt Col Kleinman recommended that the TF Legal Advisor arrange a formal briefing with the SMU TF interrogation staff and the JPRA team [1390] In that meeting, Lt Col Kleinman reported that the TF Legal Advisor "set forth legal limitations that essentially excluded most of the [JPRA methods] (with the use of certain stress positions, such as kneeling on a hard floor for up to 30 minutes, cited as an acceptable method)." [1391]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that although the SMU TF lawyer agreed with him that it was unlawful to use SERE techniques in interrogations, when the lawyer later briefed interrogators on the techniques, there was no longer "any clarity" about whether or not they were illegal. [1392]
[Delete] Mr. Russell also described the TF Legal Advisor's briefing in his trip report:
[Delete] The TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that the SMU TF did not make status determinations for detainees, but that he advised in his briefing that the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to those detainees under the control of the SMU TF. [1394]
XII. Development of Interrogation Policy in Iraq (U)
[Delete] On March 20, 2003, a month before Lt Gen DeLong's request, the United States and its coalition partners had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the initial stages of OIF, conventional ground forces were directed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Combined Joint Task Force 7 CJTF-7 replaced CFLCC in the summer of 2003. As had been the case in Afghanistan, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Iraq to [big delete] [1218]
(U) As previously described, for more than a year after the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the only written guidance for interrogators appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52). When written policies were finally established for interrogators in Afghanistan in January 2003, those policies included some interrogation techniques that were not listed in the Field Manual but had been previously authorized for use at Guantanamo Bay.
(U) By comparISGn, the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq had an interrogation policy in place before the beginning of OIF. This policy was identical to the February 2002 policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Afghanistan and reflected the influence of techniques authorized for use at GTMO. [1219] The first policy to guide interrogations conducted by conventional forces in Iraq, however, was not established until September 2003, more than five months after that war began. That September 2003 policy was also influenced by techniques authorized for use at GTMO.
A. Special Mission Unit Task Force Interrogation Policies (U)
1. SMU Task Force Uses Afghanistan Interrogation Policy (U)
[Delete] The SMU TF in Iraq [big delete] conducted screening and battlefield interrogations [delete] [1220] SMU TF interrogators questioned detainees for intelligence [big delete].
(U) According to a review completed by the DoD Inspector General in August 2006, the SMU TF based its first interrogation policy on the SOP used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. The DoD Inspector General stated:
At the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the special mission unit forces used a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been developed for operations in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan SOP was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002. . . and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as 'unlawful combatants.' [1223]
[Delete] Specifically, in February 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March, the SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the interrogation SOP in use by the SMU personnel in Afghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim. [1224] This SOP, which included stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs, governed SMU interrogations in Iraq from the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until it was replaced later that year. [1225]
2. OGA Comments on SMU TF Interrogation Techniques (U)
[Delete] In May 2003, CAPT Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent an email to CENTCOM lawyers stating that CIA General Counsel Scott Muller had called Jim Haynes and told him that the techniques used by military interrogators at the SMU TF facility in Iraq were "more aggressive" than techniques used by CIA to interrogate the same detainees. [1226]
[Delete] The email requested that CENTCOM provide a list of interrogation techniques in use at Bagram in Afghanistan and at the SMU Task Force facility in Iraq. On June 8, 2003, the [delete] Legal Advisor provided CENTCOM with a list of interrogation techniques in use by the SMU TF in Iraq and Afghanistan. [1227] That list included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions (called comfort positions in the memo), sleep management, loud music and light control, and 20 hour interrogations. [1228] [Delete] Legal Advisor did not recall receiving any feedback about the list of interrogation techniques submitted to CENTCOM. [1229] Despite the presence of aggressive techniques in the JSOC Legal Advisor's June 8 memo, on June 10, 2003 CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent a message to the Director of the Joint Staff LTG George Casey stating that "I have confirmed that the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF direction." [1230]
3. July 2003 Interrogation SOP Drafted/or Iraq SMU TF (U)
[Delete] [delete] A July 15, 2003 SMU interrogation SOP appears to have been the first interrogation policy drafted specifically by the SMU TF in Iraq. [1231] The list of interrogation techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone); presence of military working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1232]
(U) While the SOP described some techniques as having a "foundation" in Army Field Manual 34-52, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay, who conducted an investigation into the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib, described techniques in the July 15, 2003 SMU SOP as "inconsistent with Army doctrine on detainee treatment or interrogation tactics." [1233]
[Delete] [delete] The July 15, 2003 policy contained the signature block of the SMU TF Commander [big delete] but was unsigned. [1234] [Delete] told the Committee that he did not think he ever approved or even saw an interrogation policy. [1235] He stated, however, that he was aware that the SMU TF used sleep deprivation, loud music, light control, isolation, "comfort positions," and military working dogs. [1236] The SMU Task Force Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003 stated that he was sure [delete] [delete] saw the policy, that he asked him to sign it, and that a copy of the policy sat in the Commander's inbox during the Legal Advisor's deployment to the Task Force. [1237]
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Task Force's Legal Advisor who arrived at the TF facility in late August 2003 likewise said that his predecessor had tried, without success, to get [delete] [delete] to sign the policy. [1238] That same Legal Advisor stated that he too tried numerous times, also unsuccessfully, to get the Commander to sign the policy. The Legal Advisor added that it got to the point where he would print out a fresh copy of the policy every night and give it to [delete] aide. The Legal Advisor said that he knew the Commander had received copies of the policy from his aide, but that he had a habit of repeatedly "losing" the draft policy. [1239] He said that the exercise became "laughable" and eventually, he was forced to raise the issue with the [delete] legal Advisor. [1240] In the absence of [delete] [delete] guidance, the Legal Advisor told the Committee that his direction to SMU personnel was that the unsigned SOP applied to SMU TF interrogations.
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches was posted on a wall at the SMU TF facility. [1241] He specifically recalled stress positions, loud music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogations. He stated that, although military working dogs were not typically present at the SMU TF facility, he recalled making a phone call to arrange for a military working dog to be present for an interrogation.
[Delete] [delete] While neither the January 10, 2003 nor the July 15, 2003 SMU policies included "removal of clothing" there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at the SMU TF. [Big delete] who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003, stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee." [1242] [Delete] stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was uncomfortable with stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique." [1243] [Delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. [1244]
[Delete] However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU TF from December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by [delete] [delete] in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of interrogations. [1245] The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that the technique was 'widespread" at that time. [1246] He said that he advised the Commander that, if stripping were to be authorized, it should be limited to males only and that naked detainees should not be paraded through the Task Force facility. The Legal Advisor stated that two SMU TF behavioral scientists who also attended the meeting advised [delete] not to permit interrogators to strip detainees because of the implications of nudity in Arab culture. The Legal Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would continue to use nudity as an interrogation technique though the Legal Advisor stated that he thought [delete] may have said that he [delete] have to approve its use.
[Delete] Both LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), and COL Thomas Pappas, the Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205th MI BDE) in Iraq told the Committee that they were unaware of what interrogation techniques were authorized for use at the SMU TF facility. [1247] Interrogators from the 205th MI BDE, however, served at the SMU TF in support of interrogation operations there. In mid-June 2003, at the request of the SMU TF, CJTF-7 assigned two Arabic-speaking interrogators to the SMU. [1248] COL Pappas recalled sending a second set of approximately two to four interrogators from the 205th MI BDE to the SMU TF around November 2003 to replace the 205th MI BDE personnel already serving at the SMU. [1249]
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 would have retained UCMJ authority over the interrogators and the interrogators would have been required to conduct interrogations under the CJTF-7 authorities rather than those at the SMU TF. [1250] COL Pappas, however, believed that once his interrogators were sent to the SMU TF, that they were bound by the rules of the SMU TF and not CJTF-7 interrogation guidance. [1251]
4. Iraq Survey Group Concerns with SMU TF Detainee Treatment (U)
(U) The Iraq Survey Group was established in June 2003. According to its first Commander MG Keith Dayton, the ISG's mission was to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of WMD and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor on WMD. [1252] MG Dayton reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid. As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG debriefed and interrogated high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of those detainees had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF and other operational units before being handed over to the ISG. From the onset, ISG personnel had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.
(U) MG Dayton told the DoD Inspector General that "as our interrogators started getting into the swing of things at Camp Cropper... some of the prisoners were alleging that they had been roughed up" by the SMU TF. [1253] MG Dayton stated that his Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Chief [delete] had described the situation as "a disaster waiting to happen" and believed that ISG needed to "slam some rules on this place right away to basically keep ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated properly." [1254]
(U) [Delete] said that he first became aware of allegations of detainee mistreatment while at the ISG facilities in the first week in June 2003. [1255] At that time, a Chief Warrant Officer told him that a detainee she was interrogating had alleged physical abuse during his capture and subsequent interrogation by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that "by mid-June 2003. a pattern of reports of abuse of prisoners (abuse primarily attributed to [the SMU TF] during their capture and interrogation of [high value targets] and other detainees, was coming to me..." [1256]
[Delete] MG Dayton described what he called a "notorious case" of alleged detainee abuse, in which a badly burned detainee was brought to the ISG facility. [1257] MG Dayton stated that according to the "special forces guys," the detainee had been captured on a very hot day, was thrown down on the metal floor on the Humvee, and during the long drive back from the operation, the detainee had "burned himself lying on the floor of the Humvee." [1258]
(U) Throughout the summer and autumn of 2003, ISG personnel continued to be concerned about the treatment of detainees by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that, during the last week in June 2003, a British interrogator reported to him that a detainee who had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF "was beaten so severely, that he had the MPs at Camp Cropper note the [detainee's] condition." [1259] [Delete] said he was told that the detainee's "back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black eyes, plus multiple contusions on his face." [1260]
[Delete] According to the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003, during one of the nightly briefings held at the SMU TF Joint Operations Center, [delete] the SMU TF Commander, said "continue to work him over" and "work him hard" in reference to a particular detainee being interrogated at the SMUTF. [1261] The Legal Advisor said that about 50 people were present when [delete] made that statement, that he (the Legal Advisor) was concerned about the message it conveyed, and that he subsequently spoke to the Commander about it. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] made a similar statement on a video teleconference,
[Delete] MG Dayton recalled that [delete] sought to address reports of SMU TF detainee mistreatment with him. According to MG Dayton, [delete] heard that "rumors" of detainee mistreatment were circulating and "he wanted to set [MG Dayton's] mind at rest." [1262] MG Dayton recalled that he spoke to [delete] a few times and that [delete] [delete] told him "You're going to hear rumors, but it's all -- it's all untrue." [1263]
(U) In addition to allegations of mistreatment by the SMU TF, [delete] the JIDC Chief said that he was informed in early June that the ICRC had visited a facility run by the 323 MI Battalion where high value detainees were undergoing interrogations. [1264] [Delete] said that the ICRC had subsequently prepared an inspection report [delete]. (He said that he understood the abuse had allegedly taken place while the detainees were under the control of the 115th MP Battalion.) [Delete] said he was told [delete]:
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B. Interrogation Policies for Conventional Forces in Iraq (U)
1. CJTF-7 Stands Up (Summer 2003) (U) (U) In May 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) began preparations to take over from CFLCC as the operational headquarters for all conventional ground units in the Iraqi theater. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, stated that during summer 2003, the general belief was that the number of forces in Iraq had to shrink as quickly as possible and that, accordingly, CENTCOM and CFLCC reduced troop levels "very, very rapidly." [1266] LTG Sanchez said that the drawdown left insufficient personnel behind for CJTF-7 to fulfill its mission as well as inadequate command structures, planning capacities, and intelligence capabilities. He said that during the handover "there were no intelligence structures that were transferred to [CJTF-7] from CFLCC" and, as a result, the remaining intelligence structure did not enable CJTF-7 to address the requirements of a Combined Joint Task Force operating at a "strategic, operational, and tactical level." [1267]
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that by July 2003, it was evident "that CJTF-7 was engaged in a counterinsurgency operation that would be difficult if not impossible to win without significant improvements in the intelligence capabilities of [CJTF-7]." [1268] LTG Sanchez said that he was particularly concerned about his HUMINT capabilities, including the level of interrogation expertise within CJTF-7, and that he "seriously questioned the training and experience of our interrogators." [1269]
(U) LTG Sanchez said he posed a challenge to his staff: "How do we ensure that we have the right mechanisms in place that allow our interrogators to push the limit of our authorities yet prevent a violation of the Geneva Convention and our duty to treat detainees humanely?" [1270] He said that "references to the [Field Manuals] and doctrine were common responses but the issues being faced were beyond the scope of the Army's limited doctrine." [1271] LTG Sanchez added that there was frustration about the ability to get a handle on the insurgency and that he put a tremendous amount of pressure on his intelligence officers. [1272]
(U) The Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Pappas, said that soon after arriving in theater in July 2003, CJTF-7's Chief of Staff BG Daniel Hahn directed him to attend a meeting to brief LTG Sanchez on interrogation operations. [1273] COL Pappas told the Committee that he learned at that meeting that LTG Sanchez was concerned that interrogations had not generated the expected intelligence information. [1274] COL Pappas said that LTG Sanchez "believed that if the brigade improved its interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, that we would get the information necessary to stop the insurgency." [1275] COL Pappas agreed and told LTG Sanchez that his interrogators would need the authority to use additional interrogation techniques to accomplish that goal. [1276]
2. Interrogation Operations Begin at Abu Ghraib (U)
(U) In mid-Summer 2003, the 205th MI BDE began preparing for Operation Victory Bounty, an undertaking designed to track down remaining elements of the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary organization loyal to Saddam Hussein. [1277] In late July 2003, ten to twelve members of the 519th MI Battalion went to Abu Ghraib to establish interrogation operations in anticipation of receiving individuals captured during Victory Bounty. [1278] On August 4, 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the 519th MI Battalion Assistant Operations Officer, assumed duties as the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at the facility. [1279] In late 2002, she had served as the Interrogation Operations Officer at the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan.
(U) According to CPT Wood, no SOP was in place for interrogations when she took command, but interrogations were conducted "within the approved approaches within the Field Manual 34-52 only, with the possible addition of stress positions." [1280] CPT Wood stated that interrogators had used sleep deprivation and stress positions in Afghanistan and that she "perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan." [1281] She said that she used her "best judgment and concluded [the techniques] would be effective tools for interrogations at [Abu Ghraib]." [1282] She also said that she later put together a request for additional interrogation options because "the winds of war were changing" and there was "mounting pressure from higher for 'actionable intelligence' from interrogation operations." [1283] CPT Wood said that she did not want to repeat her experience in Afghanistan, where interrogators lacked written guidance. [1284]
3. 519th MI Battalion at Abu Ghraib Seeks Additional Guidance (U)
(U) CPT Wood said that guidance for interrogators about the rules for interrogations was important because the interrogators in the 519th Battalion had come to Abu Ghraib with a range of different experiences:
A lot of the interrogators and analysts also served in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan where some other techniques were approved for use ... I understood the Afghanistan rules were a little different because the detainees were not classified as EPWs. It was, ''use techniques in the spirit of the Geneva convention," not, ''you will apply the Geneva Convention." In order to use those similar techniques from GTMO and Afghanistan in Iraq, we sought approval from the higher command. [1285]
(U) COL Pappas, CPT Wood's superior officer, said he knew that CPT Wood believed she needed additional techniques and told her to submit a request. [1286]
4. 519th MI BN Proposes Interrogation Policy (U)
(U) On July 26, 2003, CPT Wood submitted a proposed interrogation policy to her chain of command. The proposed policy was based on the interrogation policy in use at the SMU TF facility in Iraq. [1287] CPT Wood said that she and her staff simply "cleaned up some of the grammar, changed the heading and signature block, and sent it up" to CJTF-7 as a proposed policy for the 519th MI BDE. [1288]
[Delete] Mirroring the SMU TF policies, CPT Wood's proposed policy included sleep management, ''vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone), presence of military working dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control. [1289] The proposed policy stated that "EPWs that refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." [1290] The prohibition against threats, insults and exposure to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment, however, was limited to EPWs and CPT Wood stated that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. [1291]
(U) CPT Wood stated that submitting the proposed interrogation policy seemed a "natural progression" to her as she understood the techniques were already approved for use at the SMU TF in Iraq, and the policy was "similar to that of a document that was drafted in Afghanistan for the [Bagram Collection Point] as well as ... GTMO." [1292] CPT Wood did not hear back from CJTF-7 at that time. [1293] Just a few weeks later CJTF-7 itself solicited a "wish list" of interrogation techniques.
5. CJTF-7 Solicits "Wish List" of Interrogation Techniques (U)
(U) On August 14, 2003, CPT William Ponce, the Battle Captain in the CJTF-7 HUMINT and Counterintelligence office (CJ2X), sent out an email to subordinate intelligence elements (including the 205th MI BDE and the 519th MI BN) requesting that they submit their "interrogation techniques wish list[s]." [1294] CPT Ponce wrote:
Immediately seek input from interrogation elements (Division / Corps) concerning what their special interrogation knowledge base is and more importantly, what techniques would they feel would be effective techniques that SJA could review (basically provide a list). [1295]
CPT Ponce added:
...The gloves are coming off gentleman regarding these detainees. Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks. [1296]
(U) The Commander of the 205th MI BDE, COL Pappas, said he thought that CPT Ponce's email soliciting "interrogation techniques wish lists" was the result of the meeting he attended with LTG Sanchez shortly after arriving in theater. [1297] He called the Battle Captain's use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off" a "dumb" thing to say and a "poor choice of words." [1298] LTG Sanchez told the Committee that he expected his intelligence staff to send out the request for interrogation techniques, but stated that the use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off' was "not good." [1299] LTG Sanchez believed that the email reflected frustration on the part of intelligence personnel at not being able to meet his intelligence requirements.
(U) Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Lewis Welshofer, who was with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment responded to CPT Ponce's email with his own assessment of the interrogation situation:
Today's enemy, particularly those in [Southwest Asia], understand force, not psychological mind games or incentives. I would propose a baseline interrogation technique that at a minimum allows for physical contact resembling that used by SERE schools (This allows open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection from a distance of about 18 inches. Again, this is open handed.) ...Other techniques would include close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litany of harsher fear-up approaches. . . fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off. [1300]
(U) Maj. Nathan Hoepner, the Operations Officer (S-3) of the 501st MI Battalion took issue with the language in CPT Ponce email, stating in an email of his own:
As for "the gloves need to come off..." we need to take a deep breath and remember who we are. Those gloves are most definitely NOT based on Cold War or WWII enemies -- they are based on clearly established standards of international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators. Those in turn derive from practices commonly accepted as morally correct, the so-called "usages of war." It comes down to standards of right and wrong -- something we cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient, any more than we can declare that we will "take no prisoners" and therefore shoot those who surrender to us simply because we find prisoners inconvenient.
"The casualties are mounting..." we have taken casualties in every war we have ever fought -- that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties, generally more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such things to us. Casualties are part of war -- if you cannot take casualties then you cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there. [1301]
6. Interrogation OIC at Abu Ghraib Resubmits the Proposed Interrogation Policy for 519th MI BN (U)
(U) On August 27, 2003, CPT Wood re-submitted the proposed interrogation policy that she had previously sent in July. She said she thought the issue came up because CJTF-7 headquarters "want[ed] these guys broken" and said her August submission may have been a response to CPT Ponce's email. [1302]
[Delete] Though largely the same as the proposed policy submitted on July 26, 2003, the August 27, 2003 proposed policy included one additional interrogation technique - "sensory deprivation," which the proposed policy described as a "combination use of isolation and sleep management [big delete]." [1303] The proposed interrogation policy also inserted the term "stress positions" in place of "vary comfort positions" and limited use of sleep deprivation to 72 hours. [1304]
(U) CPT Wood said that two days after she submitted the proposed policy, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib with a copy of her memo. [1305] According to CPT Wood, the two attorneys said that "they did not see anything wrong with it and that they would add their approval and forward it higher to CJTF-7 for consideration and review." [1306]
(U) Techniques in CPT Wood's proposed policy can be traced back though the SMU TF in Iraq to Afghanistan and, ultimately, to techniques authorized for use at GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002. The GTMO techniques were, in turn, influenced by techniques used by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the military service SERE schools to train U.S. personnel to resist illegal enemy interrogations. In the summer of 2003, as CPT Wood was seeking approval for her proposed policy, the SMU TF in Iraq was soliciting JPRA's advice on interrogations.
C. JPRA Provides "Offensive" SERE Training in Iraq (U)
1. Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq Seeks Assistance from JPRA (U)
[Delete] In the summer of 2003 the Commander of the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq, [delete] called the Commander of JPRA, Col Randy Moulton, to request assistance with Task Force interrogations. [1307]
[Delete] On August 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA "interrogation team." [1308] The request asked that JPRA send two or more individuals to the TF for three weeks to "provide assistance to current interrogation efforts of key [high value targets]." [1309] On August 27, 2003, [big delete] request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to support the request. [1310] That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF.
[Delete] Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operations Support Office (OSO) subsequently selected three JPRA personnel for the mission. As Team Chief, Mr. Wirts chose Lt Col Steven Kleinman, a reserve officer who happened to be a trained interrogator. Mr. Wirts also chose Terrence Russell, JPRA's manager for research and development who was also a SERE specialist. Though Mr. Russell had no formal interrogation training or experience, he had previously conducted interrogation-related training for [delete] JTF-GTMO personnel. To complete the team, Mr. Wirts chose Lenny Miller, a contract SERE instructor who also lacked interrogation experience but who the SMU TF had specifically requested. The team's deployment date was set for September 1, 2003. [1311]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that, before being deployed, he thought he was being sent to Iraq to identify problems in the TF interrogation program. [1312] More than a year earlier, Lt Col Kleinman had drafted a paper identifying challenges faced by interrogators at GTMO. [1313] In the draft paper, Lt Col Kleinman identified "fundamental systemic problems" at GTMO that undermined operational effectiveness. [1314]
[Delete] Chief among the problems identified in the draft paper was the lack of trained personnel with experience in strategic interrogations. [1315] Lt Col Kleinman recommended a number of options in his draft paper to enhance DoD's ability to conduct strategic interrogation, including additional training. [1316] He recommended having experienced "survival, intelligence, and human factors specialists" conduct an "in-depth assessment" of operations at GTMO and provide a "comprehensive report that would set forth concrete steps to improve operational effectiveness and security." [1317] Lt Col Kleinman's paper did not recommend teaching interrogators at GTMO how to use SERE techniques in interrogations and he said that he did not believe that was the purpose of the Iraq trip. [1318]
2. Awareness of the JPRA Trip to Iraq at Headquarters, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (U)
[Delete] JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF request. [1319] JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton told the Committee that he was pretty sure he also conducted a briefing for the JFCOM Director for Operations (J-3) about JPRA's support to interrogation efforts at the SMU TF, although he could not recall when that briefing occurred. [1320] The JFCOM J-3, BG Thomas Moore, who was involved in coordinating at least one of JPRA's previous "offensive" training sessions completed his assignment as the J-3 at JFCOM in early to mid-August and was replaced by RADM John Bird. [1321]
(U) On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in Iraq, Col Moulton emailed a JPRA "Weekly Report" to the JFCOM Command Group and others stating:
We deployed a Personnel Recovery Support Team to Baghdad in support of CENTCOM and [redacted] interrogation requirements. This is an issue that may merit Lessons Learned visibility, as there is currently no focal point within DoD for strategic debriefing / interrogation [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development (offensive). Currently, subject matter expertise on captivity environments, psychology, and maintenance resides almost solely within JPRA (defensive). [1322]
(U) In response, the JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Robert Wagner, questioned whether JPRA was operating within its charter. He wrote: "I'm not sure I see the connection between your assigned responsibilities and this task ... [W]hat charter places JPRA in the business of intelligence collection?" [1323] Col Moulton responded "There is nothing in our charter or elsewhere that points us towards the offensive side of captivity conduct nor are we requesting to take this on as a new responsibility." [1324] He added, however, that JPRA had a role to play in helping to educate and assist offensive operations, stating:
[Those conducting interrogations] have already demonstrated the need for our understanding and knowledge of captivity environment and psychology. We are also well aware of the problems associated with crossing the Rubicon into intel collection (or anything close). There may be a compromise position (my gut choice) whereby we could provide/assist in oversight, training, analysis, research, and [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development, while leaving the actual debriefing/interrogation to those already assigned the responsibility. [1325]
(U) In a subsequent email to RADM Bird, Col Moulton stated that while he was concerned about "mission creep" and departing too far from JPRA's traditional role, it was his view that "no DoD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation." [1326] Col Moulton wrote:
Our subject matter experts (and certain Service SERE psychologist[s]) currently have the most knowledge and depth within DoD on the captivity environment and exploitation. I think that JPRA/JFCOM needs to keep involved for reasons of TTP development and information sharing. We are NOT looking to expand our involvement to active participation. The current support was intended to be limited to advice, assistance, and observation. Our potential participation is predicated solely on the request of the Combatant Commander. [1327]
(U) Col Moulton testified to the Committee that before he sent the JPRA team to Iraq he talked to the SMU Task Force commander and was told that SMU TF detainees "were detained unlawful combatants and not covered under the Geneva Conventions." [1328] Col Moulton later said, referring to a subsequent call with the SMU TF Commander, that he did not know if the SMU TF Commander had "specifically" told him that. [1329]
3. JPRA Provides Interrogation Support to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq (U) [1330]
[Delete] On September 5, 2003, after their arrival in Iraq, the three-member JPRA team met with SMU TF personnel at the TF facility. [1331] According to U Col Kleinman, the JPRA Team Chief, the team was told that interrogators were having trouble gaining actionable intelligence information from detainees in TF custody. [1332] Lt Col Kleinman felt that the SMU TF's lack of success was a result of a poor screening process, which resulted in the TF holding some detainees with no information. [1333]
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, the team also met that day with the SMU TF Commander [delete] and discussed [delete] expectations for the JPRA team. [1334] Mr. Russell said that [delete] "expected [the JPRA team] to become fully engaged in interrogation operations" and "encouraged [the team] to receive modified" rules of engagement (ROEs) from JPRA, since their ROEs at that time permitted the team to "advise and assist" but not to "engage in direct interrogations." [1335]
[Delete] Over the next week, Lt Col Kleinman spoke by phone with Col Moulton at least twice. While accounts by the three JPRA team members of those calls differed in some respects, all agree that the calls resulted in Col Moulton (1) authorizing the team to participate in SMU Task Force interrogations and (2) authorizing the team to use the full range of SERE school physical pressures in those interrogations. Col Moulton confirmed that the team's understanding of his guidance was correct. [1336]
4. JPRA Team Authorized to Participate in Interrogations (U)
[Delete] According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton on September 5, 2003 to discuss the team's ROEs and, the following day, Col Moulton gave the team permission to "become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1337] That account is consistent with Col Moulton's recollection, which was that Lt Col Kleinman called him after arriving in Iraq to discuss a request from the SMU TF that team members actually participate in interrogations. [1338]
[Delete] Col Moulton said that, after getting the call from Lt Col Kleinman, he called [delete] [delete] "to confirm and inquire about the new request." [1339] In subsequent interviews and communications, Col Moulton has consistently stated that he relayed [delete] request to JFCOM and got JFCOM's authorization to permit the JPRA team to participate in interrogations. Col Moulton's recollection of who at JFCOM provided that authority, however, has varied.
(U) According to a memorandum of a September 2005 interview with the JPRA Commander, Col Moulton "relayed the request to the [JFCOM] J3 and got the verbal OK to allow active participation, but only for one or two demonstrations and then the team was to go back to its role as observers." [1340]
(U) In a 2006 email to the DoD IG, however, Col Moulton could not recall exactly whom at JFCOM he had spoken with, stating:
During the deployment I received a call from the Task Force commander requesting that our personnel participate in the debriefing. I notified JFCOM leadership of the request (either BG Moore or LTG Wagner I can't remember, but think it was [LTG] Wagner since this was late on a weekend night) and was told that they could support, but that any activities had to be approved through the task forces legal rep (we were chopped to them). [1341]
[Delete] In interviews with Committee staff in 2007, Col Moulton said that he had tried but had been unable to reach BGen Moore, so instead he called LTG Wagner whom he reached at home. [1342] According to that account, LTG Wagner told Col Moulton that he needed approval from his boss, JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, to approve the JPRA request. [1343] According to Col Moulton, LTG Wagner called him back and gave his approval. [1344]
[Delete] BGen Moore, whom Col Moulton referenced in his September 2005 interview, was no longer assigned to JFCOM in September 2003. [1345] RADM Bird, who replaced BGen Moore, stated that he did not recall receiving a call from the JPRA Commander. RADM Bird said that he thought it unlikely he would have received the call on the weekend as it would have had to have occurred over a secure line and he did not have that capability at home. LTG Wagner told the Committee that he could not recall if he received a call from Col Moulton. [1346]
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, one of the JPRA team in Iraq, the JPRA team received permission from Col Moulton "to become fully engaged in all BIF operations." [1347] The next day, team members met with the SMU TF staff and "outlined the exploitation cycle and how [the staff] could incorporate [SERE Training, Tactics, and Procedures] to support their current interrogation operations." [1348]
[Delete] While it is not known when it occurred, the Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence (J-2X) for the SMU stated that members of the JPRA team demonstrated interrogation techniques, including the "attention slap," which he said was described as an openhanded slap to focus the detainee on the interrogation, and walling, which was described as a push up against the wall. [1349] The J-2X could not recall if all members of the JPRA team were present during that lesson. [1350] Lt Col Kleinman said that he was not aware of such a lesson. [1351]
[Delete] The J-2X stated that he was unsure if techniques taught to the staff were permitted under SMU TF policy and that, after the JPRA demonstration, he raised this matter with the SMU TF J2, which at the time was [delete]. [1352]
5. JPRA Present as Interrogator Uses Stress Positions and Slaps (U)
[Delete] On September 6, 2003, JPRA team members were present in the interrogation booth when a SMU TF interrogator used "selected physical pressures" on a detainee. [1353] According to Terrence Russell, the SMU TF interrogator "put the detainee on his knees and later began to use insult slaps every 3-4 seconds for an extended period of time." [1354]
(U) Lt Col (now Colonel) Kleinman described that same interrogation in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Lt Col Kleinman said:
I walked into the interrogation room, all painted in black with [a] spotlight on the detainee. Behind the detainee was a military guard... with a[n] iron bar... slapping it in his hand. The interrogator was sitting in a chair. The interpreter was - was to his left... and the detainee was on his knees... A question was asked by the interrogator, interpreted, the response came back and, upon interpretation, the detainee would be slapped across the face... And that continued with every question and every response. I asked my colleagues how long this had been going on, specifically the slapping, they said approximately 30 minutes. [1355]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that his two JPRA colleagues, who were present during the interrogation, "didn't seem to think there [was] a problem, because in SERE training... there's a facial slap, but it's conducted in very specific ways... This was not conducted in that fashion." [1356] In fact, Lt Col Kleinman described the environment at the Task Force facility as ''uncontrolled." [1357]
[Delete] Members of the JPRA team had differing views on the appropriate response to the interrogator's use of those techniques. Mr. Russell stated that he and Mr. Miller "saw nothing wrong with" the interrogator forcing the detainee to kneel or his slapping the detainee during the interrogation. [1358] Lt Col Kleinman had a different reaction.
[Delete] Lt Col Kleinman considered forcing the detainee to kneel and repeatedly slapping him to be "direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and [actions that] could constitute a war crime." [1359] Upon witnessing the abusive conduct, Lt Col Kleinman sought out the SMU TF J- 2X. [1360] Lt Col Kleinman told the J-2X what he had witnessed and recommended ''that the session be halted immediately." [1361] Lt Col Kleinman said the J-2X told him "[y]our judgment is my judgment. Do what you think. is right." [1362]
[Delete] Following his conversation with the J-2X, Lt Col Kleinman asked the two members of his team to step out of the interrogation booth. According to Mr. Russell:
In the hallway [Lt Col] Kleinman asked us our impression of the use of the kneeling and slaps. We both indicated that we saw nothing wrong with what was going on. He asked us our opinion of the slapping and we said they were only insult slaps and were not inflicting any pain to the detainee. [Lt Col] Kleinman indicated his disagreement and that both the slaps and kneeling were direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and could constitute a war crime. He further indicated that he wanted to intervene and stop the interrogation at that point. [1363]
[Delete] Over the objections of the other two members of JPRA team. Lt Col Kleinman then asked the SMU TF interrogator to step out of the booth. He explained to the interrogator "how and why [the interrogator's] methods were a violation of the Geneva Convention and TF [Policy]." [1364] According to Lt Col Kleinman, "[the interrogator] accepted my direction without reservation." [1365]
[Delete] With respect to Lt Col Kleinman's actions, Mr. Russell stated:
I think the clear violation of the TF policy was of a minor nature - that being a 10-minute extension of the kneeling policy. The use of insult slaps was, in the opinion of [Lt Col] Kleinman, serious enough to stop the interrogation - an action I did not then or now feel warranted his direct intervention. [1366]
[Delete] In subsequent testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell claimed that the use of the "insult slap" was consistent with the facility's operating instructions:
Under their operating instructions at that BIF, at that time and place, we did not see anything wrong with [the use of physical pressures]. It may not have been applied the way we would have done it, but we didn't see anything wrong with it. We advised [Lt Col] Kleinman of the same. He disagreed with us. [1367]
[Delete] SMU TF SOPs reviewed by the Committee do not include slapping as an authorized technique and the SMU TF J-2X told the Committee that he was unaware of any operating instructions that would have permitted an interrogator to repeatedly slap a detainee. [1368]
[Delete] Despite Mr. Russell's previous statement that he "saw nothing wrong with what was going on," he testified to the Committee that he found the SMU TF interrogator's repeated use of the insult slap to be "odd" and "in excess" of what would be used in resistance training at JPRA [1369] Mr. Russell also testified that the technique, as applied by the TF interrogator, was ineffective:
[The] insult slap is just that, it's an insult. After you do it two or three times it loses its effectiveness because the [sic], in our world, the student is anticipating the slap. It loses its effectiveness if you do it more than two or three or four times. [1370]
[Delete] While he did not raise any objection to their use in the interrogation, Mr. Russell stated that the techniques used at the SERE school, such as the insult slap, were not designed to elicit information from individuals but rather to "guide the student" to an appropriate resistance posture. [1371] According to his testimony, "history has shown us that physical pressures are not effective for compelling an individual to give information or to do something" and are not useful in gaining accurate, actionable intelligence. [1372] There is no indication in Mr. Russell's trip report, however, that he told anyone on the J-2X staff that the SMU TF's use of repeated slaps would be ineffective or that use of other SERE physical pressures, such as ''walling'', which were reportedly described for the J-2X staff, would be ineffective.
[Delete] Mr. Russell stated that when physical pressures are applied in the resistance phase of SERE training, medical and psychological personnel are present to observe interrogations and protect SERE school students, [1373] Mr. Russell testified that there were no medical or psychological personnel present during the interrogations he witnessed while at the SMU TF facility. [1374]
6. JPRA Team Authorized to Use SERE Techniques (U)
(U) At some point shortly after he intervened to stop the interrogation where the detainee was placed on his knees and slapped, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton. [1375] Lt Col Kleinman testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team was "being asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees." [1376] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he also told Col Moulton that he had intervened to stop interrogations at the Task Force and that the use of SERE techniques "were violations of the Geneva Convention, they weren't authorized, and we should not do them." [1377]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he also told the SMU TF Commander that the use of SERE techniques in interrogations was ''unlawful'' and "a violation of the Geneva Convention." [1378] He said that the SMU TF Commander agreed with him but there were "no orders ever issued" by the Commander not to use the techniques. [1379]
[Delete] [delete] According to Lt Col Kleinman's trip report, after he spoke with Col Moulton, Col Moulton subsequently spoke to the SMU TF Commander, and then called him back to tell him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot" to use ''the full range of JPRA methods" on detainees, specifically including "walling, sleep deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach slaps, and finger pokes to the chest), space/time disorientation, [and] white noise." [1380]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that Col Moulton told him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot to use SERE methods" in interrogations. [1381] Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Col Moulton that he considered this instruction to be an illegal order and that he would not carry it out. Col Moulton said that Lt Col Kleinman "was adamant about that he thought it was against the Geneva Convention." [1382]
7. JPRA Team Chief Seeks Legal Guidance (U)
[Delete] Following his conversation with the JPRA Commander, Lt Col Kleinman consulted with the SMU TF lawyer who advised him that the SERE tactics "fell outside the parameters of acceptability under the [Geneva Conventions] and [Task Force] policy." [1383] Lt Col Kleinman then met with the other two members of the JPRA team to inform them of the JPRA Commander's order that they could use ''the normal and usual range of physical pressures" during interrogations and to alert them of his concerns about the legality of that order. [1384] Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report:
[Lt Col] Kleinman indicated that he felt [it was] '... an illegal order' and we were exposing ourselves to possible future difficulties if we used any pressure inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. [1385]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that he relayed his conversation with Col Moulton to his two JPRA colleagues, informing them that he told Col Moulton that the authority to use SERE techniques "was an unlawful order" and that he "wasn't going to have any involvement with it, and [he] didn't think that they should either." [1386]
[Delete] Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, the JPRA contractor, disagreed with Lt Col Kleinman's assessment. [1387] According to Mr. Russell, the two "indicated that the use of these moderate physical pressures, when used appropriately, were consistent with proper handling and interrogation." [1388] In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell added that he understood that the individuals held by the Task Force were considered "detained unlawful combatants" and "not automatically provided the protections of the Geneva Conventions," though he could not recall who told him this. [1389]
[Delete] [delete] Shortly after Col Moulton told Lt Col Kleinman that the team was "cleared hot" to employ the full range of JPRA methods, Lt Col Kleinman recommended that the TF Legal Advisor arrange a formal briefing with the SMU TF interrogation staff and the JPRA team [1390] In that meeting, Lt Col Kleinman reported that the TF Legal Advisor "set forth legal limitations that essentially excluded most of the [JPRA methods] (with the use of certain stress positions, such as kneeling on a hard floor for up to 30 minutes, cited as an acceptable method)." [1391]
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that although the SMU TF lawyer agreed with him that it was unlawful to use SERE techniques in interrogations, when the lawyer later briefed interrogators on the techniques, there was no longer "any clarity" about whether or not they were illegal. [1392]
[Delete] Mr. Russell also described the TF Legal Advisor's briefing in his trip report:
The [TF Legal Advisor] discussed the [TF Commander's] expectations versus the methods of exploitation and physical pressures he had heard were being used in the BIF - including those prior to his recent arrival (2-3 weeks on site). He also discussed the status of the detainees and the fact that the BIF's detainees were not identified to the ICRC. He discussed the assumption of risk being taken by the [SMU]. command if BIF personnel engaged in 'beat down' tactics or while 'engaging in torture.' [1393]
[Delete] The TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that the SMU TF did not make status determinations for detainees, but that he advised in his briefing that the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to those detainees under the control of the SMU TF. [1394]