by admin » Wed Jan 25, 2017 1:59 am
Minority Report Cont'd.
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Messages serving as guides to procedure in the matter of this 14-part message follow:
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Urgent Very Important)
#907 To be handled in Government Code
Re my #902. [a]
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th, your time.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
Army 25850
[a] S.I.S. #25843 text of Japanese reply.
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
#904
Re my #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person. Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.
Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
Army 25844
JD: 7144
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Extremely Urgent)
#910
After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and 909 d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
The "pilot message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 *a. m*. Washington time December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 a. m. Washington time December 6, and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated, and distributed about 3 p. m., Washington time, by the Army, to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the Far Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Miles (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Wilkinson received the so-called "pilot message" prior to 6 p. m., Washington time, on December 6 (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the "pilot message" was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, received the "pilot message" in the evening of December 6 (Tr., Vol.
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30, pp. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each denies that on December 6 he had knowledge of the "pilot message" (Tr., Vol. 21, p. 3473, and Vol. 32, p. 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the "pilot message" was delivered to General Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 21, pp. 3589-3590, and Vol. 62, pp. 12019-12050).
In late afternoon or early evening of December 6, American Naval Communications intercepted, decoded, and translated the first 13 parts of this memorandum from the Japanese Government to the State Department the answer to the United States note to Japan on November 26. The translation of these 13 parts was presented to President Roosevelt between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening. After he had read the 13 parts, the President said in substance, "This means war."
The evidence indicated that the first 13 parts were read on the evening of December 6 by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton.
Owing to the practice of making decisions by war cabinets, councils, joint committees, and individuals, official responsibility of each man was so blurred that each man became indifferent to his own individual responsibility. A good example of this is Admiral Turner's assumption that so long as Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox had seen the 13-part message, "I did not believe it was my function to take any action." No one took action that night; all waited for the next day. [1]
When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning at 10 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 a. m. Sunday morning the following information:
"Compilation of men-of-war in Far East: British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet*, with locations, with a *list* of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13,988; italics inserted)."
Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that
[1] On many occasions the obligation of an officer was weakened by intermeddling of superiors. President Roosevelt, himself, often directed detailed operations for which field commanders were responsible. An example of this occurred in connection with an order on December 2, 1941, which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, commencing as follows:
"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within 2 days if possible after receipt this despatch" (exhibit 37, p. 39).
The President's directions were that the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." The minimum requirements to establish these ships as United States men of war would suffice in manning them. These requirements were command by a naval officer and the mounting of a small gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the minimum number naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe and report by radio Japanese movements to the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The President prescribed the point at which each vessel was to be stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques, one off Pointe De Camau (exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the Japanese advance down the coast of Indochina, and toward the Gulf of Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351) The Navy Department would not have directed it to be done unless the President had specifically ordered it (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351) Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11350). So far as the Navy Department was concerned, sufficient information was being received from this air reconnaissance (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11351). Had the Japanese fired upon any one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an overt act on the part of Japan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11352). Interferences such as these by superior officers, however, permitted by the line of authority, breed indifference to responsibility on the part of the officer who is superseded.
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the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday, December 7, (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13989). This was done. The compilation showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 176, p. 2).
In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 a. m. Washington time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. m., Washington time, was available in the Navy Department in Washington (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10694-10701). This was 8 1/2 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4675; Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148; Vol. 55, p. 10469). This was 5 1/2 hours after it had been received in the Navy Department. It was about 3 hours before the attack.
The relation of 1 p. m. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was pointed out to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148, 9154-9156, 9236-9254; Vol. 26, pp. 4679, 4685). It meant dawn in Hawaii the strategic time at which to launch an attack. Admiral Stark was urged by the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the fleet (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the "1 p. m. message" by 9 a. m. Washington time, immediately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in bringing to General Marshall's attention until nearly several hours later (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12077- 12078, 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 p. m. message and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl Harbor attack (Tr., Vol. 18, pp. 2935-2939, Vol. 45, p. 8396). Admiral Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (Tr., Vol. 32, pp. 5814-5816).
Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 p. m. message at their conference about 10:30 a. M. Washington time, December 7 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the Philippines was brought to their attention (Tr., Vol. 5, pp. 10473- 10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference state:
"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14428)."
The 1 p. m. message was delivered to the White House about 10:30 m. Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10476).
On the morning of December 7, before 8 o'clock, Navy Intelligence had ready for high authorities of the United States Government a translation of its intercept of the fourteenth and final part of the Japanese memorandum.
The fact that General Marshall decided on the basis of the intercepts of Japanese messages made available on or before 11:25 o'clock on the morning of December 7, to send an urgent war warning to the outpost commanders is itself evidence that, despite previous messages to outpost commanders, Washington authorities recognized that their
530 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
knowledge of these intercepts and their minute direction of affairs placed an obligation on them to convey precise information to outpost commanders and to make sure that they were on an all-out alert for war. Owing to inexcusable delays in Washington this final warning to General Short did not reach him until after the Japanese attack.
General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk to call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, nearly 2 hours before the attack, and give him the same information which he sent in the delayed telegram which reached General Short after the attack. General Marshall testified that among the possible factors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act (Tr., Vol. 20, pp. 3389-3390).
"The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3193)."
This explanation is no excuse for the failure to put the Hawaiian commanders on the full alert for defense. Such an alert could not be considered a hostile or aggressive act on the part of the United States.
11. *The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941*.
The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack or attacks (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) was recognized by the President and his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare war was vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Minister Churchill, who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Conference (conclusion 1) again suggested to President Roosevelt, on November 30, 1941, that the President inform the Japanese that further aggression on their part would compel him "to place the gravest issues before Congress" (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roosevelt must have given serious thought to the constitutional difficulty during the several days prior to December 7, while he was considering plans for a special message to Congress (conclusions 3 and 4).
After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress it then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warning messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly formulated as to mean to them an all-out alert of the forces under their command.
12. *Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and, operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate instructions to the latter in language not open
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 531
to misinterpretations as to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions*.
Since Washington authorities knew that vital information in their possession diplomatic, military, and naval was not being sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that this was because of Washington's own decision, it was obligatory for them to give particular care to the formulation of messages to the commanders which revealed the growing war tension, the menacing imminence of the breach in American-Japanese relations, and the resolve of those high authorities to wait for an attack, while still carrying on maneuvering (conclusions 1-5 and below, conclusion 20).
The increasing assumption of the detailed direction of affairs by high authorities in Washington added to the obligation of those high authorities to give precise instructions to the outpost commanders.
For information in possession of Washington authorities not sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, see Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry reports, top secret reports, and top secret memoranda. It is true that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of information as to Japanese designs and operations which was not in the messages sent to them by the War Department and the Navy Department. It is also true that there were differences of opinion among high authorities in Washington over the nature of the information conveyed by certain intercepts; for example, the so-called "winds message" and the activating "winds message." But it is beyond all question that Washington authorities had a large volume of information, particularly as to vital diplomatic decisions and Japanese intentions which was not transmitted to the Hawaiian commanders. This withholding of information from General Short and Admiral Kimmel was in part due to general policy adopted in Washington.
General Sherman Miles, at the hearing of November 30, testified at neither the intercepted messages nor essential information derived from them had been sent to Hawaii, although in exceptional cases the substance of some messages had been transmitted in naval code. The exceptional practice of sending the substance in some messages was stopped in July 1941 and General Miles testified that, so far as he knew, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not notified of this change this discontinuance of sending even the substance of some intercepts. (Tr., Vol. 13, pp. 2140-2142.)
Admiral Kimmel had requested all information and was assured by Admiral Stark he would get it. A few messages were sent up until December 7, but he had no notice that he was not getting all the information available.
From among the numerous items of crucial information in possession of Navy Intelligence and Washington authorities and *not* transmitted to General Short one may be selected as particularly pertinent to Pearl Harbor. Through its intelligence sources in the Fourteenth Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, the Navy discovered the presence at Jaluit, in the Marshall Islands, of a Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers and other vessels, but lost track of it about December 1. Jaluit is 1,500 miles nearer to Pearl Harbor than is the mainland of Japan. The Japanese fleet there was a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii. Information about this
532 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese fleet was delivered to the War Department, but it was not transmitted to General Short. General Short testified during the Army board hearings on Pearl Harbor that knowledge of the Japanese fleet at Jaluit would have materially modified his point of view and actions (Army Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 146-147).
Japan had fixed a dead-line date of November 25 (Exhibit 1, p. 100), extended to November 29 (Exhibit 1, p. 165) (see Japanese messages), for reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at least six messages. If the dead-line date passed without agreement, the Japanese Government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are automatically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the dead- line date was stressed by Japan in these terms:
"The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days; (and also) we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die (Exhibit 1, p. 137, 93)."
On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "dead line" date, the United States Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating proposal," impossible of acceptance (Exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (Exhibit 1, p. 195). To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious Japan instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (Exhibit 1, p.208).
A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated to the Navy in Washington on December 1 (Exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to
"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of development. * * * Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."
The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the intercepted messages (Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).
On December 2, 1941, elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise detail with the method of interment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States" (Exhibit 1, p. 198).
None of these messages showing the imminence of war was sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short.
13. *The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high authorities in Washington during November were couched in such conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting the particular actions to be taken orders that were beyond all reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.
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On this subject the Committee has before it hundreds of pages of testimony, exhibits, and documents in which conflicting views are expressed by men presumably of competence and understanding as to he sufficiency or insufficiency of the war warnings to General Short and Admiral Kimmel. According to the obligations conferred upon the Committee by the joint resolution creating it, as explained by Senator Barkley in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, the Committee is bound to weigh all messages and information available to General Short and Admiral Kimmel.
A full review of all the testimony, exhibits, and papers relative to the so-called war-warning messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel would fill a volume of at least 500 pages, so we content ourselves with presenting the following facts in respect to the conflicting, imprecise, and insufficient character of these messages.
It should be here observed that Washington had taken unto itself such a minute direction of affairs as regards outposts that the usual discretion of outpost commanders was narrowly limited.
First of all, it is to be noted that the four reports by the Army and Navy boards created to investigate Pearl Harbor found the warning messages insufficient to put the Hawaiian commanders on a full war alert; and the President's Commission on Pearl Harbor, while finding the commanders guilty of dereliction of duty, itself places neglect on the part of the War Department, in respect to such orders, as among the contributory causes of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor; thus qualifying its own conclusions.
The President's Commission, though limited by his instructions to a search for derelictions of duty and errors of judgment on the part of the Army and Navy personnel, made a point of declaring that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy had fulfilled their obligations with regard to matters bearing in the situation at Pearl Harbor and that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations had fulfilled their command responsibilities in issuing warning messages to the two commanders.
But the Commission includes among the grounds for charging General Short and Admiral Kimmel with dereliction of duty their failure "to consult and confer" with each other "*respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings*." Thus the Commission in effect concedes that the war warning messages were couched in language so imprecise that the commanders would have to consult and confer in order to discover what the messages meant.
Having made this statement, the Commission goes on to lay some of the blame for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe on the War Department and the Navy Department (that is, upon Secretary Stimson. Secretary Knox, and/or General Marshall and Admiral Stark, whom the Commission had earlier in its report exculpated). The Commission declared that among the
"causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were: Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures. Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti- sabotage measures instituted by the commanding General Hawaiian Department."
Had the Commission been in a mind to do so, it might have added: Failure of the War and Navy Departments to mention in these messages the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
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Secretary Stimson apparently was not considering the attack at Pearl Harbor when the message of November 27 was prepared, for he said: "The main question has been over the message that have shall send to MacArthur" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14422). General MacArthur, having the magic intercepts, was in a better position to judge the situation than was Admiral Kimmel who had to rely upon the inadequate and ambiguous information from Washington.
Finally, it is to be noted that the Commission also places among the "contributory causes" the "non-receipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941." As a matter of fact the "non-receipt" of this warning message was due to inexcusable delays of high authorities in Washington (conclusion 20).
Hence, it appears that the President's Commission, by direct statements and by implication, admits definitely that the war-warning messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel were imprecise, indefinite, and constituted no sufficient warning for an all-out alert, particularly the messages to General Short, whose primary duty it was to defend Pearl Harbor and protect the fleet while in the harbor.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, after a careful examination and comparison of the war-warning messages, concluded that the messages of November 27 were "conflicting" and that the statements in the message to General Short were "inadequate" and "misleading" (APHB, pp. 229, 129-133). The Army Board also criticized the War Department for failure to send "specific directives" to outpost commanders (Ibid; p. 159).
Despite its conclusion that General Short had displayed lack of judgment, the Army Board laid against him no charge of dereliction of duty and made no recommendations in that respect. The Navy Court of Inquiry likewise criticized the war-warning messages for lack of directives as to actions at Pearl Harbor (1-34) and concluded that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service." It recommended no further proceedings be had in the matter (1-46,1-47).
In the testimony and other evidence presented to this Committee there is no proof that warrants traversing the judgment reached by the President's Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or the Navy Pearl Harbor Court to the effect that the war-warning messages were not in fact clear and unmistakable directives for an all-out alert against a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The fundamental messages in the nature of "war warnings" were those of November 24 and 27.
On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message marked for action:
"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT *A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY (Ex. No. 37, p. 32)."
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On the next day, November 25, Admiral Stark confused the directions in this message and diluted its effectiveness by sending a letter to Admiral Kimmel in which Admiral Stark concluded "I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I'll be damned if I know. I wish I did." The postscript of this letter read:
"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. Have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From any angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.
"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing I think it is more likely to be "anything" (Exhibit No. 106)."
If any candid person has doubt about their insufficiency to constitute orders for an all-out alert to meet a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he can allay his doubt by examining carefully the messages of November 27 to General Short and Admiral Kimmel printed below in parallel columns: [1] [but not in the ASCII version, LWJ]
To General Short*
Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated *to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable* but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary *but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken*. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. *Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
To Admiral Kimmel*
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific *have ended*. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces*. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. [2] *Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department*. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.
*Italics supplied.
The use of the term "war warning" in constant reference to this message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel creates a wrong im-
[1] In addition to the above messages General Short was sent during the last week in November two other messages relating solely to sabotage.
Admiral Kimmel also received several messages assigning his carriers to the movement of planes to other islands.
[2] WPL 46 was an over-all plan of action to be placed in effect by United States forces, in association with the British and Dutch, when war finally broke out.
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pression. The entire message is of the utmost importance and should be read as a whole rather than adopt two words from it which when taken alone create the wrong impression.
In response to the message to him, General Short soon replied that he had alerted his command against sabotage:
"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage Liaison with the Navy. Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh (Exhibit 32, p. 12)."
The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army, General Leonard T. Gerow, saw General Short's reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit 46). General Marshall saw General Short's reply, initialed the document to which it was appended, and routed it to the Secretary of War (exhibit 46) (Tr., Vol. 22, pp. 3722-3723). The Secretary of War saw, noted, and initialed General Short's reply (Exhibit 46).
General Marshall had in May 1941 taken with him to the President an aide memoire concerning the defense of Hawaii. It contained the following sentence:
"In point of sequence sabotage is first to be expected and may within a very limited time cause great damage. On this account and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East. (Committee Exhibit No. 59.)"
To General Short's response, the War Department made no answer whatever. The President's Commission on Pearl Harbor took note of this failure on the part of the War Department and placed it among the contributory causes of the catastrophe. In their testimony before this Committee, General Marshall and General Gerow admitted that the failure to inform General Short immediately as to the insufficiency of his anti-sabotage alert was a mistake on their part and General Marshall took full responsibility upon himself for this failure (Tr., Vol. 19, pp. 3126 and 3164). Reasonably conclusive evidence that the war warning messages which had been sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel on November 27 were insufficient to constitute a proper and adequate war warning is provided by General Marshall's decision to send another warning message to General Short on the morning of December 7, despite the insistence of other high authorities in Washington that the previous messages were sufficient.
Two points in the message of November 27 to General Short deserve special consideration. It informed him that "the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act," if hostilities cannot be avoided. And it also informed him that such measures as he deemed necessary to adopt "should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent." A limitation on dissemination was to "minimum essential officers."
As to "overt act," it is to be emphasized that an all-out alert for defense against a possible or probable attack by an enemy is not an overt act of war. Nor did the Government of the United States regard it as such, for, on the basis of reports respecting a probable Japanese attack, General Marshall, on June 17, 1940, instructed General Herron, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to order an all-out, full, war alert and the armed forces were set in motion immediately and kept alerted for six weeks (testimony Tr., Vol. 17, pp. 2775 ff.). This message reads:
"Immediately alert complete defense organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria
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or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."
No United States official then regarded this action as an overt act against Japan. Moreover, when in this 1940 case Washington authorities were worried about hostile Japanese action, they ordered the commanding general at Hawaii to an immediate "complete defense organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid" in language that was crystal clear.
The fact is that the War Department and Navy Department did not instruct General Short and Admiral Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war alert, and the War Department was informed by General Short that he had actually put into effect the alert against sabotage. Furthermore, the actions of the War Department in instructing General Short in November and December as the Army Pearl Harbor Board correctly stated, showed "a lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its actions" (APHB, p. 240).
The War Department failed to reply to General Short's anti-sabotage report. It failed to give him further instructions for a stronger alert. These failures, it is reasonable to say, contributed heavily to the unpreparedness existing at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck.
It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes, instead of being scattered, were bunched together wing to wing; ammunition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in storehouses; antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in their permanent quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl Harbor Board stated:
"Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti- sabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack, and the Japanese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp. 193-94). This was known to the War Department by General Short's reply to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action. The President's lack of power under the Constitution to meet the Japanese menace by an attack without a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. This they did not do.
14. *High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian commanders.
Washington authorities had before them prior to December 7 conclusive evidence that the Japanese Government and its agents were giving minute attention to American military and naval installations, ship movements, and preparedness in the Hawaiian area, as well as in other areas. But despite their knowledge of this fact, those authorities failed to emphasize, in orders to the Hawaiian commanders, the perils of an attack on Pearl Harbor. They did worse than fail in this respect. With poor judgment as to the effect of their own words upon the com-
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manders, they went out of their way to emphasize the probability of attack elsewhere. The following passage in the war-warning message of November 27 from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel reflected the loose thinking that prevailed widely in Washington:
"Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and by the organization of their naval forces."
These words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Washington authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but also gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression. Although the message of the War Department to General Short on the same day did not contain these misleading words, General Short, in conferring with Admiral Kimmel on "the meaning and intent" of their messages learned about this expectation that the Japanese attack would occur in the Far East.
Notwithstanding their apparent ignorance of the full meaning of Japanese movements in the Southeastern Pacific, Washington authorities knew or should have known from their understandings of parallel action with the British and Dutch, that a Japanese attack on the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula meant war with America. It also meant, in view of the strategic principle that the flank of an advancing force must be guarded, that Japan would not leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its left flank without doing something about it. This was the meaning to Washington of the Japanese move in the Southeastern Pacific. [1] Without having the benefit of these diplomatic understandings, it did not have the same meaning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to in no way traverse the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President's Commission which found:
"The *opinion* prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles and in the public press," was "that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East." [ Italics supplied.]
15. *The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation, unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in. Washington*.
The record before this Committee is crowded with items of evidence which sustains this conclusion.
As to delays, take for example section 13 of *Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc*. [Exhibit 2]. Pages 16-29 give "messages translated after December 7, 1941." Here are messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents
[1] Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable way possible. * * *
Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-China, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to Chiang Kai-shek).
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which were intercepted by American intelligence services before December 7, *but not translated until after December 7. Special attention should be drawn to the message from a Japanese agent in Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941, listing the ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor on that day and reporting to Tokyo:
"It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm"
a fact with which high authorities in Washington were not acquainted, if the testimony before this Committee is accepted as accurate and comprehensive.
One of the great tragedies was that a message sent from Honolulu to Tokyo December 6, 1941, was not translated until December 8, 1941, after the attack. The following appeared in the message "at the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places" (Exhibit 2, p. 27)
Another message intercepted and translated in the rough and available on the desk of a responsible officer in the Naval Intelligence on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, provided for land-sea signals at Hawaii. These signals were intended to disclose to Japanese the location of our ships in Pearl Harbor apparently nothing was done about the message either in evaluating it in Washington or transmitting it to the commanders in Hawaii (Exhibit 2, p. 22).
As to mismanagement, non-cooperation, unpreparedness, and negligence, the evidence cited in the following pages is sufficient (Conclusions 8, 10, and 16).
Since President Roosevelt was convinced as early as the middle of August that a clash with Japan was a matter of a few weeks, the responsible officers of his administration had ample time to strengthen, organize, and consolidate the agencies in Washington, especially the Army and Navy communication and intelligence services, in such a manner to assure the speedy translations of intercepts, prompt distribution to the appropriate officials, swift evaluation, and proper decisions based on such information and evaluation. Lack of time cannot be pleaded as an excuse for this failure, despite the difficulties involved in securing competent and reliable specialists.
General Miles admitted at the hearing on December 3, 1945, that there had been no meeting of the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee between October 11 and December 8 or 9, 1941, and declared:
"I regret to say, Mr. Congressman there were still discussions and difficulties going on between the war and Navy Departments as to just what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetra."
There was lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy regarding the fourteen parts of the Japanese final message between 9:30 p. m. on December 6 and the morning of December 7 about 10:30. The existence of the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message, which President Roosevelt received between 9 and 10 o'clock on Saturday evening and interpreted as meaning war, was known more or less accidentally to certain high Army and Navy authorities about the same time. But Admiral Stark testified before this Committee at the hearing on January 1, 1946, that the first thirteen parts and the di-
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rective for delivery to Secretary Hull at one o'clock Sunday, did not come to his attention until late on the morning of December 7. Admiral Stark *thought* that he went to his office between 10:30 and 11 o'clock that morning and that as nearly as he could remember he did not see the directive message for one o'clock delivery until about 10:40 that morning. It was the final part of the Japanese message, and the one o'clock directive that convinced General Marshall that war was immediately at hand and led him to send the warning dispatch which reached General Short after the Japanese attack.
For this non-cooperation and mismanagement, high authorities in Washington were fully responsible. The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were all in Washington or environs. It is true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark when they appeared before this Committee could not remember where they were during the evening and night of December 6 but they were at least accessible to officers of the Army and Navy Departments, or should have been; hence, there was no excuse for the failure of these high authorities to assemble on the evening of December 6, inquire into the defensive preparedness of outpost Commanders, and send peremptory directives to them.
The setting up of so many councils and committees, and the intermeddling of so many men created such a state of confusion in Washington that the high principle of *individual responsibility* was apparently lost to sight. The result was that no one among the President's chief subordinates was enough concerned on the night of December 6 to do anything about the 13 parts which indicated a crucial stage in Japanese- American relations. (See Conclusion No. 10.)
In the lower, operating echelons of the Army and Navy, on the other hand, men seemed to see or to sense the gathering crisis and even the immediate danger to Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet it but were discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident in the testimony of Captain Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on December 4, 1941, he prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific. He tried to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended by Admiral Stark, Ingersoll, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discouraged from doing so on the ground that the messages of November 24 and 27 to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient. He protested that it was not sufficient and that he would like to send his December 4 dispatch anyway. The dispatch he prepared and wanted to send was never sent, and the result was tragic. (See testimony of Captain McCollum, Tr., Vol. No. 49, p. 9132 ff.)
Finally, there is no excuse for the failure of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to be on the alert early Sunday morning or for their failure, after they did meet near the middle of the morning, to reach the outpost Commanders with a definite war-warning message before the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor. This failure was all the more inexcusable for the reason that some time in July 1941, the practice of sending intercepts to General Short and Admiral Kimmel had been abandoned.
16. *The President of the United States was responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff,
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and the Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people of the United States*.
As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of the President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Constitution and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil.
The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appointments and treaties by the Senate.
The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints high officers, civil and military.
He is Chief Magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to the maintenance and operation of the Military and Naval Establishments.
Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf the United States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretary of State, such duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his own instructions and authorizations.
Under the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and with the approval of the Senate he appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns them to their duties in his discretion except in the case of the Chief Staff and Chief of Naval Operations these appointments must approved by the Senate.
And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense powers in one magistrate not in a directory or a single official checked by a council, as was proposed in the Convention of 1787?
The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of *The Federalist*. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural executive was to assure "energy in the Executive," "a due dependence the people," and "a due responsibility." A plural Executive, it is there argued, "tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, *first*, the restraints of public opinion * * *; and, *secondly*, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct persons they trust * * *."
The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations, powers, and duties of the Military Establishments under the President particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation them; in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions the civil Secretaries and also directly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.
Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the Chief Executive.
From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt was President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States and in him was vested all Executive powers under the Constitution and the laws.
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He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and retained him in that office during this period.
He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this period.
He selected, or approved the choice of, all Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Naval Operations during this period.
He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and he assigned them to their posts of duty.
In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with supreme Executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we have more recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940, on a subject of administrative actions, President Roosevelt aid: "There were two or three cardinal principles; and one of them is the fact that you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him" (Public Papers, 1940 volume, p. 623).
Although there were two departments for the administration of military and naval affairs during this period, they were both under the supreme direction of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in all matters relative to separate and joint planning or defense and war, to disposition of forces and materiel, to preparedness for operation in case of an attack. In respect of the President's power, the two departments were one agency for over-all planning and operational purposes.
The President had power to issue directions and orders to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and indirectly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and on occasions used this power.
Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize the Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed it necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation between the Departments. Since he did not reorganize the two Departments under that act, he must have deemed them properly constructed as they were.
By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during this period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations of diplomatic decisions and war plans.
In fine, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Kimmel were all men of President Roosevelt's own choice not hang-over appointees from another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed and the President had ample power to direct them, coordinate their activities, and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies in the defense of the United States.
Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotiations, the President decided long before December 7, at least as early as the Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a