by admin » Sun Dec 20, 2015 11:11 pm
APPENDIX B-17
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 1700 ARMY PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700
29 July 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Biological Matters (OASD(CBM))
SUBJECT: Suspect Chemical Container Found in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991.
1 . REFERENCES a. OASD Letter, undated, no subject, from Mr. Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy ASD for Chemical/Biological Matters to Senator Donald H. Riegel Jr., (designating himself as POC for all Operation DESERT STORM chemical /biological weapons matters and discussing information concerning the suspect chemical container found in Kuwait city. Kuwait in August 1991).
b. British Ministry of Defense Letter, Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, 14 July 1994, Subject: Suspect Chemical Container: Kuwait city; August 1991 (Draft).
c. Memorandum For Director, CATD, 4 January 1994, Subject: Iraqi Chemical agents -Information Paper.
d. Task Force Victory Memorandum, AETSBGC-V, 7 August 1991, Subject: Tasking Number 91-047.
e. British EOD Squadron GP Document, 7 August 1991, Subject: Initial Report Suspected Chemical container.
1. PURPOSE. At the request of the OASD(CBM), to present information concerning the suspect chemical container fund in Kuwait City, Kuwait in August 1991.
2 . BACKGROUND
a. I served as Division Chemical Officer (DCMLO) for the Third Infantry Division (3ID) Weurtzburg, Germany from April 1989 until December 1991.
b. As the DCMLO I had Command and Control of the Division Chemical Company (the 92d) . For example, I rated the Company Commander. The 92d's Reconnaissance (Recon) Platoon was one of two chemical platoons in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) assigned to deploy to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM (OpDS/S) , receive training on the FOX NBC Recon Vehicle (at the Germany NBC School in Sonthofen, Germany), and receive the FOX NBC Recon Vehicles. The 92d Chemical Company Recon Platoon was the first USAREUR unit to deploy in support of OpDS/S.
c. The 3ID was also assigned the mission to coordinate FOX NBC Recon Vehicle training at the Germany NBC School. Our Division Chemical Section received that mission. As a result of the Recon Platoon deployment and our coordination of training at Sonthofen, I was thoroughly familiar with the FOX's employment, capabilities, and peculiarities.
d. In about early 1990, at the request of the 3ID Commander (MG Wilson A. Shoffner), I began serving as the acting Division Chief of Staff (CofS) when the CofS was not available for duty.
e. Once OpDS/S began and Seventh U.S. Corp, First Armored Division, and Third Armored Division were deployed in support, 3ID was assigned the mission of rear support (3ID was attached to Fifth U.S. Corp) for USAREUR Army units in Germany.
f . Along with the mission of rear support, came many "new" mission requirements. The 3ID Commander assigned me the title of Deputy CofS for Rear Operations and the mission to coordinated numerous aspects of that mission.
g. In spring 1991, a decision was made to relieve First Brigade, Third Armored Division in Kuwait City with the Eleventh Armored Cavalry Regiment (11ACR), Fulda, Germany. The deployment of the 11ACR included a General Officer (GO) Headquarters (HQ) to act as a command level between the 11ACR and Army Central Headquarters (ARCENT) Forward and provide coordination with the Kuwaiti Military, Gulf Coalition forces, Kuwaiti Ministers, and the U.S. Embassy (de facto).
h. 3ID was given the mission to provide that GO HQ. The GO HQ plus the 11ACR, an Evacuation Hospital, and 18 tenant activities became Task Force Victory (TFV). The 3ID Commander assigned BG Robert A. Goodbarry as TFV Commander. I was assigned as TFV CofS.
i. I (and other 3ID staff officers) was sent TDY to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in mid May 1991 to coordinate the deployment of TFV. I returned to 3ID for a few days, briefed the Division Commander, proposed a staff, and returned to Kuwait as part of the forward deployment on 2 June 1991. The rest of the TFV staff followed in about two weeks. I remained in Kuwait City (as TFV CofS) until otir 3ID GO HQ was relieved. I redeployed to 3ID on 9 September 1991. I returned on Permanent Change of Station (PCS) to the Department of the Amy Inspector General (DAIG) around 16 December 1991.
j . Although I was the senior chemical branch officer in Kuwait during this time frame, I was the TFV CofS, not chemical officer. The TFV chemical officer was the 11ACR chemical officer.
3. SITUATION.
a. Pre 8 August 1991.
(1) On about 6 August 1991 (evening), I received a telephone call from Col Macel, the U.S. Army Liaison Officer, Kuwait (USALOK). Col Macel informed me that a British Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team had found what they thought might be a container of chemical agent near a Kuwaiti school south of Kuwait City. Col Macel stated that there was going to be a meeting at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (MOD) the next morning and would I attend. I said yes.
(2) The meeting was attended by Kuwaiti personnel, British personnel, Col Macel, and myself. These were the major players. Others may have been represented but I can not state for fact they were.
(3) The British EOD personnel stated what they had found an approximately one ton container immediately behind the rear fence (wall) of the Sabbaniyah High School for girls. This High School is south of Kuwait City, outside Seventh Ring Road. They further stated:
(a) That the container had been found by their EOD personnel but that a caretaker at the school had stated that the container had been there since he returned after the war.
(b) That the container had been struck by a 7.62 mm round (approximately) which had penetrated the container.
(c) That they had gotten positive readings for mustard agent (H) with their chemical agent monitors (CAM), positive color changes with their detector paper (although not always exactly as they expected), and positive readings from their detector kits (however, there was a shelf life concern with some components).
(d) That the container was "leaking" a noticeably brown colored vapor.
(e) That during the sampling process one soldier had received some apparent burns on his wrist and that the injury appeared to be more of a burn than the result of vesication.
(f) That their protective gloves appeared to have been "softened" by the material from the container.
(g) That they had sealed the container with silicon and a plaster of paris patch and that the container was not presently leaking.
(4) The British further proposed that the container be removed from the city (out in the desert) and destroyed (blown up). Either Col Macel or I stated that this may be premature since a United Nations (UN) Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team was currently in Iraq attempting to determine the Iraqi chemical posture. Destroying a container that might contain Iraqi chemical agent might not be wise. I suggested that we use the FOX NBC Recon Vehicles (assigned to the 11ACR) to see if the FOX could confirm or deny the presence of agent in the container. If we could confirm that there was no agent, then the situation became much "easier".
(5) All agreed that this was the best course of action and agreed to resample the container and analyze the materiel with the FOX vehicles. I stated that we would employ two FOXs in order to confirm their readings. The British stated that they would handle the area set up, hot line, decon support, medical, and all sampling.
(6) Col Macel stated that he would inform the Ambassador and attempt to contact the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team.
(7) I returned to TFV HQ, briefed BG Goodbarry, and suggested that we support the operation and be prepared to provide security for the site if we confirmed the presence of chemical agent. BG Goodbarry agreed. I told our G3 to task the 11ACR to provide two Fox vehicles to support the analysis operation and be prepared for follow on missions should we confirm the presence of chemical agent. I contacted our Provost Marshall and told him to be prepared to provided site security should it be required. I called the 11ACR and briefed the Executive Officer and Chemical Officer of the situation and their mission requirements.
(8) Later that evening Col Hacel called and stated that the mission was "a go" for tomorrow and that we would meet at the British EOD compound south of Kuwait City. I informed BG Goodbarry, the 11ACR, and our staff.
b. 8 August 1991.
(1) All parties met at the British EOD compound. Participants included Col Macel, British EOD personnel, 11ACR personnel (two FOX vehicle crews and their company commander), a TFV security representative, and myself.
(2) We proceeded to Sabbaniyah High School and established the operation (i.g. the command post, hot line, decon operations, medical support, FOX vehicle operations, sampling operations, and contingencies), and executed "practice runs".
(3) Medical support was a major concern. By the time we were prepared to commence operations, it was approaching 1100 hours. The weather conditions were approximately 140 degrees Fahrenheit, 30 knot winds, and fine blowing sand. Since we would have soldiers in full protective gear, heat stress was a high priority. The FOX crews were not a particular concern since the vehicles were air conditioned.
(4) The operation proceeded as the FOX vehicles were positioned; British EOD personnel proceeded beyond the hot line, unsealed the container, obtained samples, presented the samples to the FOX vehicles, obtained backup samples in glass containers, resealed the suspected agent container, and returned to the hot line. The FOX vehicles returned to the hot line, were checked for contamination, deconed if required, and cleared through the hot line. All British personnel were checked for contamination, deconed if required, and cleared through the hot line.
(5) The FOX vehicles both indicated the presence of H agent and Phosgene (CX). During the sampling operation the first sample presented to the first Fox vehicle evaporated prior to introduction to the FOX. Additional samples (of more volume) were successfully analyzed by both FOXs. The harsh weather conditions did bring into question the accuracy of the FOX vehicle's Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) analysis because the rate of evaporation could realistically effect the indicated volumes of components in the sample (i.g. not all components in the sample would evaporate at the same rate, the "lighter" components could evaporate first).
(6) It was my original intention to maintain custody of at least one set of samples (I had access to a walk-in freezer at TFV) ; however, after the indication of possible CX, I felt it was unwise to transport the samples back to TFV in my vehicle. The British EOD personnel maintained the samples. I instructed the FOX crews to give me the GCMS tapes from their analyses. They did.
(7) The operation had occurred without incident. The only incident was one British EOD soldier who was processed through the hot line early because of heat stress. The soldier was "cooled off" and was not a casualty. There were no other casualties.
(8) We established our TFV security forces to secure the area. Col Macel stated he would contact the Kuwaiti MOD in order to get them to assume the security mission. This occurred in a "couple of days". The operation ended and I returned co TFV.
(9) I briefed BG Goodbarry and suggested that I contact the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC) Aberdeen, MD and relay the situation to them. He agreed. I contacted CRDEC by telephone (I do not remember the point of contact), briefed the situation, and suggested I fax them the FOX GCMS tapes for analysis. They agreed. I prepared a brief paper describing the operation and faxed the paper with copies of the FOX tapes to chem. I do not have copies of the paper or the tapes.
(10) Later that evening Col Macel called to state that he had contacted the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team (they were in Bahrain for rest), that they would be at the British EOD compound tomorrow morning, and would I attend the meeting. I agreed.
c. Post August 1991. (1) All parties met at the British EOD compound. Participants included Col Hacel, five (or six) members of the UN Chemical Weapons Evaluation Team, British EOD personnel, and myself . The UN team was composed of officers and civilians with the civilians being from the British Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down, UK.
(2) The situation was briefed to the UN team. The UN team stated that the UN would take custody of the container, container materiel samples, and provide any further analysis required. I think the UN team and British EOD personnel returned to the container and resampled in order to maintain custody of the samples; however I do not know that for a fact. I told the UN team that I had contacted CRDEC and provided them copies of the FOX GCHS tapes. I think I provided the UN team the original FOX GCMS tapes; however, I can not remember for sure. If not the original tapes, they did receive copies. I do not currently know the status or location of the original tapes. The meeting ended.
(3) After the meeting. Col Hacel stated that the container was now in custody of the UN and that we did not have to "worry" about it any more. I returned to TFV, briefed GB Goodbarry, and called CRDEC and told them that the UN team had custody of the container and samples. I told CRDEC that the samples were going to Porton Down and suggested that CRDEC contact Porton Down for further consultation. CRDEC agreed.
(4) I continued my mission as TFV CofS, redeployed to 3ID, PCSed to DAIG. and did not hear any more about the suspect chemical materiel until I was contacted by the OASD(CBM) in July 1994.
4. ADDITIONAL FACTS
a. U.S. Army soldiers did not sample the materiel in the container at Sabbaniyah High School. No U.S. Army soldiers were downwind of the hot line other than the FOX vehicle crews who remained inside their vehicles.
b. The FOX GCMS tapes (of the materiel in question) were not clean tapes (i.g. there was not a pure materiel in the container). I was not sure what the materiel was: however, I did know that it was a complex materiel and that it was "nasty".
c. I did not see the injury to the British soldier. Although his injury was related as more of a burn than a vesication injury, the weather conditions in Kuwait City in August are harsh and could effect the action of any materiel.
d. I did not see the "softened" rubber gloves; however, their deterioration from agent (or agent degradation products) could not be absolutely disregarded.
e. The brown vapors from the container were not characteristic of pure H agent; however, I knew that whatever the materiel was, it was not pure. If it were some agent, I felt it might be a mixture of materiel (H and CX) and degradation products.
f. I thought it odd that the Iraqi would "mix" H and CX agent and that this one container was found where it was; however, many things the Iraqi did were odd.
g. The configuration of the container was interesting. The container had one large blind flange on top with three small blind flanges exiting the large flange. The container did not resemble any bulk chemical agent container I had ever heard about. The use of the three flanges could only be guessed at.
h. I can confirm (from personal photographs) that one FOX vehicle (involved in the operation) was 11ACR vehicle CML 23.
5. OPINION
a. One of the high priority Essential Elements of Information (EEI) in the U.S. Army is the first use of chemical agent. Where it is first used, how it is employed, against whom it is employed, and at what level it is employed by our adversary is extremely important to the defensive posture of our troops. There is a U.S. Amy system (the NBC Warning System) specifically designed to provide this information as fast as possible. Troops are trained to initiate this system automatically if a chemical attack occurs on their position or is observed in their area. NATO conducts exercises in Europe to specifically assess how fast the notification of a chemical attack can be relayed to Army level and higher. If an Iraqi chemical attack had occurred, the information would have been relayed to all command levels as soon as possible. Every Commander, Chemical Officer, and staff would have known about the attack quickly. That never happened in OpDS/S.
b. An attempt by the military to "cover up" a chemical attack would have been adverse to our training, tactically illogical, a disaster for our troops, and virtually impossible to do.
c. There appears to have been no political reason why an Iraqi chemical attack would need to be "covered up". The use of chemicals by Iraq would have further justified our mission and strengthened the coalition.
d. Prior to my deployment to Kuwait City I was privileged to receive Top Secret Special Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) Intelligence briefings as the 3ID Deputy CofS. I know of no use of chemicals by Iraq based on the above.
e. After my deployment to TFV, I was privileged to the same level of U.S. military information as well as information from the American Embassy (and their assets), Kuwaiti military, Gulf Coalition of Forces, and the significant EOD and oil well fire fighting efforts. I know of no use of chemicals by Iraq based on the above. To my knowledge, the container found at Sabbaniyah High School, was the only incident related to chemical agent or munitions that occurred in Kuwait from June until early September 1991.
f . During the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq held chemical agent release authority at a high level (normally the Corp). There is no reason to assume that release authority would have been at a lower level for OpDS/S.
g. In my opinion. Iraq never made the decision to deploy chemical munitions forward of depot level storage prior to the initiation of the air war. After the air war, deployment of these munitions became impossible.
h. In my opinion, Iraq did not employ chemical agents during OpDS/S.
6. DISCLAIMER. The information in this paper is as I remember the situation in August 1991 and is supported by the references at paragraph one.
7. CONCLUSION. A container of chemical materiel (approximately one ton in size) was found at Sabbaniyah High School, Kuwait City, Kuwait in summer 1991. In August 1991, chemical materiel from that container was subjected to field tests for chemical agent. Although some test results may have been questionable, the materiel did produce positive field tests for H and CX chemical agent. There was no confirmation of the materiel as chemical agent in Kuwait in August 1991. Custody of the container and contents were transferred to United Nation's control around 9 August 1991.
DON W. KILLGORE LTC, IG Technical Inspections Branch
CF: HQDA, DAMO-FDB