Part 1 of 2
II. Deduction of Organic Functions from the Concept of Excitability
All organic activity already presupposes duplicity (since it is the effect of a cause that is active only under the condition of duplicity). Thus the question still remains: how does this duplicity inherently belong to the organism?
In order that one does not believe oneself able to get away with a mere appeal to the existence of opposed systems in the phenomenon of the organism it must be noted that this itself is already a product of duplicity (which is a condition of excitability) rather than a cause of it; thus, these systems are a product of excitability. In animal nature all formation proceeds from an excitable point. Sensibility is present before its organ has formed itself; brain and nerves, instead of being causes of sensibility, are themselves rather already its product.— The opposed systems (the irritable and the sensible) into which the organism is divided are only the theater of that organic force, not the force itself.—Not to speak of the fact that one cannot even demonstrate those opposed systems in one-half of organic nature unless one is able to ascribe to it the universal property of everything organic, excitability.
Therefore, excitability cannot be completely explained before the first origin of organic duplicity is explained.
1) We have ascertained that all organic activity exhibits itself in the organism as object. That which is the source of all organic activity cannot again appear in the organism as object. [i] Now, the original duplicity is condition of all organic activity and the source of all activity is therefore the cause of duplicity itself.
2) A cause that is acknowledged to be the direct source of another activity must be thought to be acting in the organism, and which is knowable only through activity, not knowable through and in objects like every other activity.
[181] A cause that does not again present itself directly objectively, but is recognized only as cause of another activity, can obviously only be a negative cause returning into its subject. But a negative cause [ii] is only thinkable as a cause of receptivity.
The cause of all organic duplicity is thus the cause through which an original receptivity belongs to the organism. [iii]
A cause by which the receptivity of the organism is antecedently determined must surely be accepted as cause of every organism. For, in terms of receptivity to external influences, it cannot be distinguished from the inorganic. In contrast, the living distinguishes itself from the dead only in that the latter is receptive to every impression, but the former is antecedently determined by its own nature to be a special sphere of receptivity. For the organism the sphere of its activity is also determined through the sphere of its receptivity. The sphere of its receptivity must be determined through the same cause by which its nature is determined in general.—
The cause of sensibility is thus the cause of every organism and sensibility itself is the source and origin of life. The spark of sensibility must have descended into everything organic, even if its existence cannot be demonstrated everywhere in Nature, [iv] for only the inception of sensibility is the inception of life.—Although without it no organism is possible, it will become clear in the following how it could be present in organic nature and yet be indemonstrable.
But how is sensibility demonstrable in Nature at all? The cause of sensibility is a cause reverting into its subject, thus it cannot be known directly in the object. As source of all other organic activity it can only be known through activity.—
(Most readers probably do not need to be reminded that sensibility is for me a completely physical phenomenon and that it is considered here only as such.—But even viewed physically sensibility is not something exterior that one could recognize in the organism [182] as object, but something reverting into the subject of the organism, indeed, even first constituting the latter—in a word, constituting the absolutely innermost reaches of the organism itself (and, therefore, one must conclude that its cause is something that can never become objective in Nature AT ALL. But then must there be something like that in Nature if Nature is a product of itself?). [v]
One can only reason to the existence of sensibility because it is clearly nothing outside the subject of the organism. Then on what basis does one know it?— Perhaps from the sense organs? [vi]—But how do you know that such organs are conditions of sensibility?—Only from inner experience. But here the organism is given merely as object. How do you recognize sensibility in the organism as object? This is the question. You know it only from the external effect which you see in the organism as object, you do not know it itself, but only its external appearance. [vii]
We can most likely state what this cause is in relation to its subject. It is a cause by means of which duplicity comes into an originally identical thing; but duplicity is not possible in an originally identical subject (A = A) except insofar as the identity itself again becomes product of duplicity [viii] (for where A = A, this means that A is the product of itself ).Duplicity or sensibility (for both are synonymous) only exists in the organism to the extent that it becomes its own object; therefore, the cause of sensibility is the cause by which the organism becomes its own object.
With this answer we know nothing more than we knew before. For to say “there is duplicity in the organism” and to say “the organism is its own object” is to say the same thing.
The question [ix] must have another sense, i.e., what is the cause of sensibility abstracted from its subject, what is it objectively or in itself?
If the question is posed in this way it is obvious that this cause, as cause of all organization, must fall outside the sphere of the organism itself. It can just as little fall within the sphere of mechanism, for the organism cannot be subordinated to the anorganic. Therefore, it must fall within a sphere that once more comprehends organism and mechanism [183] (both opposed principles) under itself and that is higher than both. That higher sphere is none other than Nature itself insofar as it is thought as absolutely unconditioned (as absolutely organic). [x] In other words, the cause of sensibility (or, what is the same, of organic duplicity in general) must be found in the ultimate conditions of Nature itself.—Sensibility as phenomenon stands on the boundary of all empirical appearances, and everything is connected to its cause as to the highest in Nature.—(One can also achieve this insight along another course.—That is, just as the organism is duplicity in identity, so too is Nature; one, equal to itself, and yet also opposed to itself. Therefore, the origin of organic duplicity must be one with the origin of duplicity in Nature generally, i.e., with the origin of Nature itself.—
Should that duplicity in identity really be recognizable only in organic nature?— If the origin of the organism is one with the origin of Nature itself, then it is evident a priori that in the anorganic, or rather in universal Nature, something analogous must become evident. But in universal Nature nothing of the kind shows itself except in the phenomena of magnetism—.) [xi]
3) Sensibility is known only in another activity. Activity is its product (not an object in which it is extinguished). It should be explained once more how sensibility could pass directly into activity.
An original opposition enters into the organism through original duplicity. The organism is opposed to itself, but it has to stand in equilibrium with itself so that it is able to produce a product. [xii] What we have previously called the “organism as object,” in a word, the product, [xiii] will fall in the point of equilibrium (or point of indifference). In this way rest belongs to the organism, its condition is a condition of homogeneity, it is a world to itself, resting in itself, complete in itself.
In this equilibrium all organic activity would dissolve, the organism would cease to be its own object, [xiv] would lose itself in itself.
That equilibrium (the state of indifference) must therefore be continually disturbed, but also continually reproduced. The question arises, how. [184] No cause lies in the organism for its becoming disturbed. The reason has to lie outside of the organism.—(Everything unorganized must be seen as lying outside the organism, thus also the fluids, e.g., that circulate in it [xv] — which accordingly do not belong to the subject of the organism, and thus also cannot be subject of disease, for example—whose existence can only be completely deduced in the following.)—
However, disturbed equilibrium is only recognizable in Nature through the tendency toward its restoration. [xvi] As certainly as it [xvii] is disturbed, a tendency to restoration must also exist in the organism. But this tendency can only proceed (like all activity) from the higher organism, thus the higher organism must be able to be determined to activity by the passivity of the lower. This is not possible unless a plus of activity (i.e., action) in the higher is conditioned by a minus of activity in the lower. The question arises how this activity is possible.
4) It is clear for the moment that it must be an activity that passes into the organism as object—(which does not revert into it again).—It is, in a word, an activity directed outward. Something outer for the organism (i.e., something different from it) is at all possible only through a higher influence [xviii] for which the external world of the organism is itself a different one, i.e., an outer world. Such an influence is actually acting (above p. 108) upon and through the organism. This influence is shown in experience such that it is active only under the condition of duplicity (above p. 109). It will thus be active in the organism only under the condition of duplicity. Duplicity will be the organic source of activity. But in the organism [xix] the duplicity is canceled. It remains in equilibrium with itself, there is rest in it, but there should be activity in it, and this can only be reproduced through continual restoration of the duplicity. This continual restoration can itself happen only by means of a third, and therefore that cause will appear active in the organism only under the condition of triplicity. [xx]
[185] (The necessary triplicity in galvanism is deduced in this way. The third body in the galvanic chain is only necessary so that the opposition between the two others may be sustained. Two bodies of opposite composition brought into contact establish an equilibrium between themselves entirely necessarily, and show no electricity except with the first contact and the separation following upon it. (This proceeds from Volta’s recent experiments from which it becomes clear that in order to produce electricity at all the mere contact and separation of two heterogeneous conductors is necessary; but the electrophore is already sufficient to prove this.) But the problem is: a connection of bodies [xxi] should be found through which an enduring action is conditioned without repeated touching and separation, thus one IN COMPLETE REST (for the organism is just rest in activity)—and this problem can only be solved through the galvanic chain, for in this chain an enduring action is conditioned through its being closed upon ITSELF and its remaining closed. Because, of the three bodies A B C, no two of them can establish an equilibrium among themselves without being disturbed by the third, since between three heterogeneous bodies no equilibrium is at all possible.)
Now, since the organism is not absolute rest but only rest in activity, that triplicity must be assumed to be constantly present in the organism. [xxii] But if it is constantly present, then activity indeed exists in the organism; a homogeneous, uniform activity. Homogeneous, uniform activity appears in the object (from the outside) generally as rest. [xxiii]
Now an activity is postulated that passes into the organism as object (see 3. and 4.), i.e., which presents itself in the organism through an external alteration. That triplicity must be assumed not to be constantly present in the organism.
This contradiction can only be resolved this way: the triplicity must constantly become (arise and disappear, disappear and arise again), never be. How this continual becoming and disappearing is possible does not need to be investigated here (undoubtedly [186] because the one factor in it is an alterable and constantly altered one [xxiv).—The condition of that activity is a constantly evolving triplicity whose possibility it was our task to demonstrate.
5) But there is yet another problem: through which effect (which alteration) will that activity be presented in the organism as object?
It is an activity whose original condition is duplicity. But an activity whose condition is duplicity can only be such as proceeds toward intussuception (because the condition of intussusception is duality). That activity will appear externally as a tendency toward intussusception. But no intussusception is possible without a transition toward a common occupation of space, and this transition does not happen without density or shrinking of volume. That activity will appear externally as an activity of shrinking in volume, and the effect itself as contraction. [xxv]
(Much has been devised to explain the mechanism of contraction but which upon closer inspection dissolves into nothing. The opinion that with each contraction a transition from a vaporous into a liquid or from a fluid into a solid state (and therefore a solidification) is exhibited has a few things going for it, namely, that Nature even in such transitions is bound to show great force [xxvi]—that the animal and the plant, seen objectively, are really nothing other than a continual leap from the fluid into the solid form (just as all organisms are like amphibians, placed between the solid and the fluid)—that with age the fixity of the organs of movement increases, and so forth. [xxvii]—But all of these mechanical modes of representation remain far from reality; in particular, a plethora of phenomena which galvanism approaches cannot even be conceived by means of them.—Undoubtedly, the ingenious mode of representation of Erasmus Darwin (in his Zoonomia [xxviii]) is closer to the truth—at least to the extent that an alternation of attraction and repulsion is observed in electrical phenomena just as an alternation of contraction and expansion takes place in the phenomena of irritability, and here too the restoration [187] of a homogeneous state is the condition of reexpansion. [xxix]—Although it is certain that both can only be analogically compared with one another (like the phenomena of electricity and of irritability in general) in the way the higher can be compared with the lower.) [xxx]
6) But the tendency of that activity is intussusception, and precisely because every activity is extinguished in its product it would be extinguished in intussusception. Thus intussusception cannot be reached.—The question arises how this is possible.
Only in the following way. The condition of intussusception must again be negated by the tendency to intussusception itself. (In what way this happens is, again, not to be investigated here. [xxxi] It could happen, e.g., that the third body in that conflict is always and necessarily a fluid one through which the contraction itself would be propagated. For then its condition would be recanceled by every contraction—mere duplicity would exist once more, and no longer triplicity.)
However, if the condition is canceled, then the conditioned (activity) also ceases. This mere cessation of activity cannot be the cause of the restoration of the former state of the organ. Rather, an opposite action has to step in with the cessation of the action that is the cause of contraction, which becomes the cause of the opposite state of the organ.—This action is not admissible so long as an action opposed to it maintains the equilibrium, but it must come forth just as its opposite disappears, i.e., it must be an always present action and must be grounded in the subject of the organism itself.
Its effect is the opposite of contraction, i.e., restoration of the volume or expansion.
That activity [xxxii] would be exhibited in the organism as object by an alternation of contraction and expansion.
Remark.
Irritability (in the narrow sense of the word) has not only been deduced in general by the preceding, its conditions of possibility have also been provided.
a) Its ultimate condition is organic duplicity. It is thereby explained why irritability appears connected to the existence of opposed systems (the nerve and muscle systems) in the phenomenon of the organism. I say appears, for no experience reaches to the first origin of duplicity itself.—Just as everything visible is only the manifestation of an invisible, that higher system only represents that which will never itself become an object in the organism. In that system (the nervous system) the organic force can only present itself to its object externally because it is itself simply the bridge over which that force reaches into the world of sense. (The organism is the mediator of two worlds.) Just as the Sun, through rays thrown out in all directions (the image of itself ), only indicates the direction of its higher influence, so the nerves are only the rays of that organic force, as it were, through which it indicates its transition into the external world. Since the nerves are also its first product, that force is as if chained to the nerves and not to be separated from them. Because the cause of life has also identified itself with them, it is impossible that they present themselves externally to themselves—(as if this is what happens in contraction, a shallow representation that now is beginning to become universal).
Now, according to the preceding, what is sensibility as such? All connotations that are attached to this word must now be excluded, and nothing is to be thought under it except the dynamic source of activity which we must posit in the organism as necessarily as in universal Nature generally. But it also results from our deduction of irritability that sensibility actually disappears in irritability as its object, and that it is therefore impossible to say what it is in itself, since it is itself nothing in appearance. Only the positive is known, the [189] negative is reached by reasoning. Sensibility is not itself activity but is source of activity, i.e., sensibility is only condition of all irritability. Sensibility is not in itself knowable, it is knowable only in its object (of irritability), and therefore surely where the latter exists so must the former, although where it immediately passes into irritability only it is knowable.—Incidentally, how sensibility passes into irritability is explained precisely by the fact that it is nothing other than organic duplicity itself. The external stimulus has no other function than to restore this duplicity. But as soon as duplicity is restored, so too all conditions of motion are restored.
Just as sensibility is the condition of irritability, conversely, irritability is the condition of sensibility, for without activity directed outward there is also no activity reverting into the subject. It was ascertained above that the organism as object would fall into the point of indifference without excitation from outside. Thus all excitation from the outside occurs only by the disturbance of that state of indifference. But this state of indifference is itself only a product of irritability. The activity whose tendency is homogeneity is just that which manifests itself in irritability as an activity of intussusception. Thus irritability, or rather the activity which is active in it, is conversely not at all the positive, but the negative condition of sensibility. Every sensation is only thinkable as the disturbance of a homogeneous state.
(Therefore, because a homogeneous activity is disturbed by every excitation from outside and, as it were, dissociated into opposites, in every SENSE there is a necessary duality, for to me sensation means precisely nothing other than the disturbance of a homogeneous state of the organism. Therefore, for the sense of sight the polarity of colors (the opposition between warm and cold colors) is the duality that becomes objective in the prismatic spectrum [xxxiii]—(just as it is quite certain that in Hunter’s experiment the negative lightning is not a mere privation but a real opposition to the other; although in every duality aside from the actual opposition [190] there is still a more and less, as, e.g., the prismatic colors of one pole are also the darker colors, one pole of the magnet is also the weaker). For the sense of hearing the major and minor tones are the duality, for the sense of taste the acidic and alkaline tastes (for all other kinds of taste are only mixtures of both of these in various proportions). For the sense of smell there undoubtedly exists a similar opposition which is not clearer only because this sense is generally the darkest (thus most fitted for associations of ideas) and (on account of its thanklessness) the least cultivated.—One can employ this necessary duality in every sense as a principle of distinction for the senses generally. Therefore, the feeling of heat, e.g., does not serve as the name of a sense, because there is no opposition possible in it, but only a mere more or less.—(Opposition only exists where factors in the connection neutralize themselves, like the opposed colors of the prism, the acidic and alkaline taste, and so forth.)—For the sexual sense, its opposition does not fall within it but outside of it.) [xxxiv]
If irritability (or rather its product) is a homogeneous state (a negative condition of sensibility) and the former is proper only to the lower organism, then we have explained how the organism itself becomes the medium of external influences (above p. 107). Galvanism finally makes it obvious, for in it the irritable system appears only as the armor of the sensible, solely as the middle term by means of which the latter is in connection with its outer world.
7) Irritability (by which the organic appears to be moved inwardly) is still something inner, but the activity must totally become an external one, must present itself completely in the external product, and, when it is presented in it, dissolve in it. But this activity (in which it passes over completely into the product as an external one) is nothing other than the productive activity itself (the activity of the formative drive). Irritability must pass directly into formative drive or force of production.
With what, then, does all formation in organic nature begin other than irritability, i.e., with an alternation of expansion [191] and contraction? By what means does the metamorphosis of plants occur if not by such an alternation of expansion and contraction (Goethe on the metamorphosis of plants4)? And is not this alternation of expansion and contraction almost more evident in the metamorphosis of insects than in plants?
If irritability appears only at its extreme in the force of production—in direct transition into its object—then irritability must totally dissolve as soon as the production is completed. But the production must be completed because it is a finite production. If it is to endure after the completion of the product, then it must be finite in one respect, in another infinite. It must have an infinite production at least within its determinate sphere—the existence of organization has to be a constant being-reproduced, in a word, the force of production must be force of reproduction.
8) The question arises, how does the force of production pass into the reproductive force?
For the moment it is not thinkable otherwise than as a constant rekindling of irritability and (through irritability) force of production. [xxxv] This rekindling (because the condition of all irritability is heterogeneity [xxxvi]) is not possible otherwise than through an ever-renewed heterogeneity sustained in the organism, and the means to always renew and to sustain this heterogeneity—is nutrition.
Thus, the aim of nutrition can be neither the universally accepted one, replacement of the parts abraded and used-up through friction, nor even the maintenance of the chemical life-processes (like the flame) by an ever-renewed influx of material.
Others have already shown how highly inconceivable the loss of solid parts through friction is. [xxxvii] Then where is the friction in, e.g., plants, who need nutrition too? And what an unfitting means to this end! If one further ventures that with stimulation the requirement for nourishment is actually increased in every living being, that in the same [192] proportion in which nutrition is increased the respiration becomes faster and heavier, and that every animal most corrupts pure air in its state of digestion, and so forth—if one ventures this, then one is led far sooner to the thought that the aim of nutrition is the constant rekindling of the process of life.
It is by no means proven [xxxviii] that the process of life is actually chemical (for that it is chemical in tendency we ourselves assert, and thereby we explain the superficial appearance of truth which the arguments of the chemical physiologists have); it could perhaps be said that that process which appears in irritability as a process of a yet higher kind finally becomes chemical in the processes of nutrition and assimilation (according to their tendency). At most apparent grounds for this assertion can be adduced, but then they are refuted upon first inspection. It is not as if the products of nutrition and assimilation were not chemical products (for what natural product is not chemical? only that which is not even a PRODUCT of Nature any longer is nonchemical, that which is first cause), but that the emergence of these products in the organism is not explicable through a chemical process.—That chemical products are produced, i.e., products susceptible of chemical analysis, surely every physiologist has recognized; but they have not known the cause by which they are produced.
If life is not a chemical process, then no function (including nutrition) can have the chemical process as its aim.
The aim of nutrition must be something totally different, namely, the following. What comes into the organism by its means acts as a stimulating potency, thus acts only indirectly in a chemical manner. [xxxix] Its stimulating force is at any rate determined by its chemical quality, but for this reason this force is not itself of a chemical kind, just as little as the electrical force of a body (because it is determined through its chemical constitution) would for that reason itself be of a chemical kind.—And even the mode in which it acts as stimulating force is physically explicable since the discovery that the activity of the members in the galvanic chain is determined by their chemical quality. [xl]
[193] The aim of nutrition is the ever-renewed stimulation of the organism, i.e., determination of the organism to constant self-reproduction (above p. 106); but the organism is itself again a whole of systems, every system in this whole has its own, proper function, so each must also be stimulated in its own way. [xli] As many different products (causes of excitation) as there are different systems in the organism (secretion) would have to emerge from the homogeneous material, [xlii] but also conversely, the emergence of these different products is conditioned by the existence of the different systems and their special activity. This process thus flows back into itself. One need not ask any further about its aim. It is itself the end, and sustains and reproduces itself. [xliii] There are really two propositions contained in this assertion which require special consideration.
a) There are individual systems of specialized excitability in the system of the organism. We thus deny the absolute identity of excitability throughout the whole organism; but not because we deny that that which acts as stimulant on the organ would also act as stimulant on the whole organism. [xliv] It does not happen that every excitation of the part propagates itself to the whole organism [xlv] on account of the absolute intensity of excitability, [xlvi] but is due to the synthetic relation of individual systems of the organism to one another, in which they must all be thought in reciprocal relations of causality. We do not think any occult quality by the concept “specialized excitability.” The excitability of any organic system is determined through the (chemical, better dynamical ) quality of its factors, which provides that it can only be excited through such and no other cause [xlvii] (just as the power of excitation of a metal in a determinate galvanic chain is determined through the chemical quality of the remaining factors of the chain); [xlviii] e.g., the power of excitation of bile for the system of the liver is also determined in this way through the quality of the remaining factors of this system. There is thus nothing inexplicable or physically indeterminable here.
[194] b) Now, however, the assertion that this specialized excitability is again cause of a specialized power of secretion particularly requires to be proven. [xlix]— The proof lies in the preceding.What is the power of secretion other than a specific power of reproduction? But the power of reproduction is originally not at all different from irritability, thus specific irritability specific power of reproduction.— And is this transition without example in organic nature? All infectious diseases act [l] only on irritability; [li] moreover, beyond their general agitating force, they act specifically, irritability is specifically affected by it—and the product of this specifically affected irritability is homogeneous with the affecting cause—is again the same poison.—Thus for the liver, e.g., the bile is a kind of contagion, [lii] it is a stimulating potency for the organ, and through this is the cause of its reproduction.
Thus, here there is a galvanism that reproduces itself. How that transition of specific excitation into specific force of reproduction occurs (for that it happens is understood) has been unexplained until now, merely because there is still no concept [liii] of that higher chemical process (for the product, but not the production). This process is an effect of galvanism, and for the time being can only be argued analogically from the action of galvanism on dead chemical substances (about which, moreover, still little is known) to the higher action. [liv]
Since the excitation in the object presents itself as a constant self-reproduction the excitation through the stimulating potencies of nutrition surely passes unavoidably into an annexation of mass through assimilation. Since the excitation becomes self-reproduction, the annexation of mass can only happen through assimilation, and the original form is not altered, but only the volume.—(Necessity of growth, the second stage of the organic power of reproduction.)
[195]
Remark.
The following elucidations are necessary.
a) I say that the annexation of mass is an unavoidable consequence of excitation. Thus neither assimilation nor growth are Nature’s aim in nutrition. The aim is just the excitation itself, the constantly renewed kindling of the higher process of life, and this process of life is not a means to something else, it is life itself. Annexation of mass and growth is simply an unavoidable result of that process, and to that extent is something contingent with respect to the process itself; so although the result itself is not to be denied, it is still not to be seen as the aim of nutrition.
b) It should be noted that it is only denied that assimilation occurs in a chemical fashion, not that its product is chemical and is open to chemical analysis. Thus all the discoveries of chemistry retain their value, e.g., that the mechanism of “animalization” consists in the separation of nitrogen from the remaining substances, and so on.5
c) Finally, a new view is established regarding the function of all fluids in the organism, namely, that they are stimulating causes both of the organism and of matter, through which it produces and reproduces itself.—The fluid oozing around the embryonic heart in the chicken egg is at once matter and (as stimulating potency) cause of formation; therefore, with the stasis of formation the matter is also exhausted at once.—Thus in blood (this powerful cause of excitation) the triplicity of all organs of life is simultaneously recognizable; for if the threadlike part contains the substance of the muscle, then to argue analogically, the serous part contains the substance of the nerve fibers, and finally the globulus part contains the substance of the brain (by which the contingency of these organs becomes perfectly clear, and that they are a product of force, not the force itself).
9) The force which appears as active in reproduction is a force infinite in its nature, for it is joined to the eternal order of the universe itself, and is active anywhere its [196] conditions are given. But its conditions are always given in the organism. It always has to produce more. This progressive production would
either be limited to the product, would not endeavor beyond it, i.e., an unlimited growth would have to take place since the organic form cannot be overstepped.
And such an unlimited growth is also actual in Nature, in animals and plants, to the extent that they are merely bud-bearing (gemmiferous); for all polyps in the world are only buds of an original stem (and under this category are arrayed a great many of the examples set out above (p. 36) concerning sexlessness in organic nature).—
Or, the production would endeavor beyond its product. But the condition of that force is duplicity. If it does go further, then there must be a duplicity in the product whose one factor would fall outside of the product. [lv]
If there were no such duplicity in the product (one of whose factors lies outside of it), then the productive force could indeed go further, but it could present itself only in products that (because the condition of everything organic is duplicity) by all accounts would be inorganic products—and these would be the products of the so-called technical drive.