Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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V. On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, and of the Brahmens Especially


[From the Asiatic Researches, vol. vii. p. 288-311, Calcutta, 1801. 4to.] Hospitality has been already mentioned in the preceding Essay, as one of the five great sacraments which constitute the daily duty of a Hindu. The formal reception of such guests as are entitled to peculiar honour was reserved for the subject of the present tract. The religious rites, intermixed with acts of courtesy, which are practised by way of formal hospitality, are nearly the same, whether it be high rank, a venerable profession, or cordial friendship, which entitles the guest to be welcomed with distinction. They chiefly consist in presenting to him a stool to sit on, water for ablutions, and honey mixed with other food for refreshment. It seems to have been anciently the custom to slay a cow on this occasion; and a guest was therefore called goghna, or cow-killer. Imperfect traces of this custom remain in the hospitable ceremonies which I shall now describe from the ritual of Brahmanas who use the Samaveda. As the marriage ceremony opens with the solemn reception of the bridegroom by the father of the bride, this part of the nuptial solemnity may be fitly chosen as an example of hospitable rites. It will furnish occasion too, for proceeding to describe the whole of the marriage ceremony.

Having previously performed the obsequies of ancestors, as is usual upon any accession of good fortune, the father of the bride sits down to await the bridegroom's arrival, in the apartment prepared for the purpose; and at the time chosen for it, according to the rules of astrology. The jewels and other presents intended for him are placed there; a cow is tied on the northern side of the apartment; and a stool or cushion, and other furniture for the reception of the guest, are arranged in order. On his approach, the bride's father rises to welcome him, and recites the following prayer, while the bridegroom stands before him: "May she [who supplies oblations for] religious worship, who constantly follows her calf, and who was the the milch cow when Yama was [the votary], abound with milk, and fulfil our wishes, year after year.''

This prayer is seemingly intended for the consecration of the cow, which is let loose in a subsequent stage of the ceremony, instead of slaying her, as appears to have been anciently the custom. The commentator, whose gloss has been followed in this version of the text, introduces it by the remark, that a guest entitled to honourable reception is a spiritual preceptor, a priest, an ascetic, a prince, a bridegroom, a friend, or in short any one, to welcome whose arrival a cow must be tied for the purpose of slaying her, whence a guest is denominated goghna, or cow-killer. The prayer seems to contain an allusion, which I cannot better explain than by quoting a passage from Calidasa's poem entitled Raghuvansa, where Vasisht'ha informs the king Dilipa that the cow Surabhi, who was offended by his neglect, cannot be now appeased by courtesy shown to herself, because she remains in a place inaccessible to him: "prachetas is performing a tedious sacrifice; to supply the oblations of which, SURABHI now abides in the infernal region, whose gates are guarded by huge serpents.''

After the prayer above-mentioned has been meditated, the bridegroom sits down on a stool or cushion, which is presented to him. He first recites a text of the Yajurveda: "I step on this for the sake of food and other benefits, on this variously splendid footstool." The bride's father presents to him a cushion made of twenty leaves of cusa grass, holding it up with both hands, and exclaiming, "The cushion! the cushion! the cushion!" The bridegroom replies, "I accept the cushion," and, taking it, places it on the ground under his feet, while he recites the following prayer: "May those plants over which soma presides, and which are variously dispersed on the earth, incessantly grant me happiness while this cushion is placed under my feet." Another is presented to him, which he accepts in the same manner, saying, "May those numerous plants over which SOMA presides, and which are salutary a hundred different ways, incessantly grant me happiness while I sit on this cushion." Instead of these prayers, which are peculiar to the Brahmanas that use the Samaveda, the following text is commonly recited: "I obscure my rivals, as the sun does other luminaries; I tread on this, as the type of him who injures me."

The bride's father next offers a vessel of water, thrice exclaiming, "Water for ablutions!" The bridegroom declares his acceptance of it, and looks into the vessel, saying, "Generous water! I view thee; return in the form of fertilizing rain from him, from whom thou dost proceed:" that is, from the sun; for it is acknowledged, says the commentator, that rain proceeds from vapours raised by the heat of the sun. The bridegroom takes up water in the palms of both hands joined together, and throws it on his left foot, saying, "I wash my left foot, and fix prosperity in this realm:'' he also throws water on his other foot, saying, "I wash my right foot, and introduce prosperity into this realm:" and he then throws water on both feet, saying, "I wash first one and then the other, and lastly both feet, that the realm may thrive and intrepidity be gained." The following is the text of the Yajush, which is generally used instead of the preceding prayers: "Thou dost afford various elegance; I accept thee, who dost so: afford it for the ablution of my feet."

An arghya (that is, water, rice, and durva grass, in a conch, or in a vessel shaped like one, or rather like a boat) is next presented to the bridegroom in a similar manner, and accepted by him with equal formality. He pours the water on his own head, saying, "Thou art the splendour of food; through thee may I become glorious." This prayer is taken from the Yajush: but the followers of that Veda use different texts, accepting the arghya with this prayer, "Ye are waters (ap); through you may I obtain (ap) all my wishes:" and pouring out the water with this text, "I dismiss you to the ocean: return to your source, harmless unto me, most excellent waters! but my beverage is not poured forth."

A vessel of water is then offered by the bride's father, who thrice exclaims, "'Take water to be sipped:" the bridegroom accepts it, saying, "Thou art glorious, grant me glory;" or else, "Conduct me to glory, endue me with splendour, render me dear to all people, make me owner of cattle, and preserve me unhurt in all my limbs."

The bride's father fills a vessel with honey, curds, and clarified butter; he covers it with another vessel, and presents it to the bridegroom, exclaiming three times, "Take the mad'huparca." The bridegroom accepts it, places it on the ground, and looks into it, saying, "Thou art glorious; may I become so." He tastes the food three times, saying, "Thou art the sustenance of the glorious; thou art the nourishment of the splendid: thou art the food of the fortunate; grant me prosperity." He then silently eats until he be satisfied.

Although these texts be taken from the Yajush, yet other prayers from the same Veda are used by the sects which follow it. While looking into the vessel, the bridegroom says, "I view thee with the eye of the sun [who draws unto himself what he contemplates]." On accepting the mad'huparca the bridegroom says, "I take thee with the assent of the generous sun; with the arms of both sons of Aswini; with the hands of the cherishing luminary.'' He mixes it, saying, "May I mix thee, venerable present! and remove whatever might be hurtful in the eating of thee." He tastes it three times, saying, "May I eat that sweet, best, and nourishing form of honey; which is the sweet, best, and nourishing form of honey; and may I thus become excellent, sweet-tempered, and well nourished by food." After eating until he be satisfied, and after sipping water, be touches his mouth and other parts of his body with his hand, saying, "May there be speech in my mouth, breath in my nostrils, sight in my eye-balls, hearing in my ears, strength in my arms, firmness in my thighs; may my limbs and members remain unhurt together with my soul."

Presents suitable to the rank of the parties are then presented to the guest. At the marriage ceremony, too, the bride is formally given by her father to the bridegroom, in this stage of the solemnity according to some rituals, but later according to others. The hospitable rites are then concluded by letting loose the cow at the intercession of the guest. A barber who attends for that purpose, exclaims, "The cow! the cow!" Upon which the guest pronounces this text: "Release the cow from the fetters of Varuna. May she subdue my foe: may she destroy the enemies of both him (the host) [and me]. Dismiss the cow, that she may eat grass and drink water." When the cow has been released the guest thus addresses her: "I have earnestly entreated this prudent person [or, according lo another interpretation of the text, each docile person], saying, kill not the innocent harmless cow, who is mother of Rudras, daughter of Vasus, sister of Adityas, and the source of ambrosia." In the Yajurveda the following prayer is added to this text: "May she expiate my sins and his (naming the host). Release her that she may graze." It is evident that the guest's intercessions imply a practice, become obsolete, of slaying a cow for the purpose of hospitality.

While the bridegroom is welcomed with these ceremonies, or more properly before his arrival, the bride bathes during the recital of the following texts. Three vessels of water are severally poured on her head, with three different prayers. 1. "Love! I know thy name. Thou art called an intoxicating beverage. Bring [the bridegroom] happily. For thee was framed the inebriating draught. Fire! thy best origin is here. Through devotion wert thou created. May this oblation be efficacious." 2. "Damsel! I anoint this thy generative organ with honey, because it is the second mouth of the Creator: by that thou subduest all males, though unsubdued; by that thou art lively, and dost hold dominion. May this oblation be efficacious." 3. "May the primeval ruling sages, who framed the female organ, as a fire that consumeth flesh, and thereby framed a procreating juice, grant the prolific power, that proceeds from the three-horned [bull] and from the sun. May this oblation be efficacious." To elucidate the first of these texts the commentator cites the following passage: "The sage Vasisht'ha, the regent of the moon, the ruler of heaven, the preceptor of the Gods, and the great forefather of all beings, however old in the practice of devotion and old by the progress of age, were deluded by women. Liquors distilled from sugar, from grain, and from the blossoms of Bassia, are three sorts of intoxicating drinks: the fourth is woman, by whom this world is deluded. One who contemplates a beautiful woman becomes intoxicated, and so does he who quaffs an inebriating beverage: woman is called an inebriating draught, because she intoxicates by her looks." To explain the second text, the same author quotes a passage of the Veda, intimating that Brahma has two mouths; one containing all holiness, the other allotted for the production of all beings: 'for they are created from his mouth.'

After the bridegroom has tasted the Mad'huparca presented to him, as above-mentioned, the bride's right hand is placed on his, both having been previously rubbed with turmeric or some other auspicious drug. A matron must bind both hands with cusa grass amidst the sound of cheerful music. To this part of the ceremony the author of the poem entitled Naishadhiya has very prettily alluded, in describing the marriage of Nala and Damayanti (b. xvi. v. 13 & 14.) 'As he tasted the Mad'huparca, which was presented to him, those spectators who had foresight reflected, "He has begun the ceremonies of an auspicious day, because he will quaff the honey of Bhaimi's lip. The bridegroom's hand exults in the slaughter of foes; the bride's hand has purloined its beauty from the lotos; it is for that reason probably that, in this well-governed realm of Viderbha, both [guilty] hands are fast bound with strong cusa.'"

The bride's father, bidding the attendant priests begin their acclamations, such as "happy day! auspicious be it! prosperity attend! blessings!" &c., takes a vessel of water containing tila [Sesamuni Indicum.] and cusa [Poa cynosuroides.] grass, and pours it on the hands of the bride and bridegroom, after uttering the words, "Om tat sat! "God the existent!" and after repeating at full length the names and designations of the bridegroom, of the bride, and of himself; and then solemnly declaring, "I give unto thee this damsel adorned with jewels and protected by the lord of creatures." The bridegroom replies, "Well be it!" The bride's father afterwards gives him a piece of gold, saying, "I this day give thee this gold, as a fee for the purpose of completing the solemn donation made by me." The bridegroom again says, "Well be it!" and then recites this text: "Who gave her? to whom did he give her? Love (or free consent) gave her. To love he gave her. Love was the giver. Love was the taker. Love! may this be thine! With love may I enjoy her!" The close of the text is thus varied in the Samaveda: "Love has pervaded the ocean. With love I accept her. Love! may this be thine," In the common rituals another prayer is directed to be likewise recited immediately after thus formally accepting the bride: "May the ethereal element give thee. May earth accept thee."

Being thus affianced, the bride and bridegroom then walk forth, while he thus addresses her: "May the regents of space, may air, the sun, and fire, dispel that anxiety which thou feelest in thy mind, and turn thy heart to me." He proceeds thus, while they look at each other: "Be gentle in thy aspect and loyal to thy husband; be fortunate in cattle, amiable in thy mind, and beautiful in thy person; be mother of valiant sons; be fond of delights; be cheerful, and bring prosperity to our bipeds and quadrupeds. First [in a former birth] SOMA received thee; the sun next obtained thee; [in successive transmigrations] the regent of fire was thy third husband; thy fourth is a human being, soma gave her to the sun; the sun gave her to the regent of fire; fire gave her to me; with her he has given me wealth and male offspring. May she, a most auspicious cause of prosperity, never desert me," &c. [I omit the remainder of the text, which it would be indecorous to translate into a modern language. The literal sense of it is here subjoined in a Latin version: "Illa redamans accipito fascinum meum, quod ego peramans intromittam in cam, multae qua illecebrae sistunt."]

It should seem that, according to these rituals, the bridegroom gives a waistcloth and mantle to the bride before he is affianced to her; and the ceremony of tying the skirts of their mantles precedes that of her father's solemnly bestowing her on the bridegroom. But the ritual of the Samavedi priests makes the gift of the damsel precede the tying of the knot; and, inconsistently enough, directs the mantles to be tied before the bridegroom has clothed the bride. After the donation has been accepted as abovementioned, the bride's father should tie a knot in the bridegroom's mantle over the presents given with the bride, while the affianced pair are looking at each other. The cow is then released in the manner before described; a libation of water is made; and the bride's father meditates the Gayatri, and ties a knot with the skirts of the bride's and bridegroom's mantles, after saying, "Ye must be inseparably united in matters of duty, wealth, and love." The bridegroom afterwards clothes the bride with the following ceremonies.

He goes to the principal apartment of the house, prepares a sacrificial fire in the usual mode, and hallows the implements of sacrifice. A friend of the bridegroom walks round the fire, bearing a jar of water, and stops on the south side of it: another does the same, and places himself on the right hand of the first. The bridegroom then casts four double handfuls of rice, mixed with leaves of sami, [Adenanthera aculeata.] into a flat basket: near it he places a stone and mullar, after formally touching them, and then entering the house, he causes the bride to be clothed with a new waistcloth and scarf, while he recites the subjoined prayers: "May those generous women who spun and wound the thread, and who wove the warp and weft of this cloth, generously clothe thee to old age: long-lived woman! put on this raiment." "Clothe her: invest her with apparel: prolong her life to great age, Mayest thou live a hundred years. As long as thou livest, amiable woman! revere [that is, carefully preserve] beauty and wealth. " The first of these prayers is nearly the same with that which is used by the followers of the Yajush, when the scarf is put on the bride's shoulder. It is preceded by a different one, which is recited while the waistcloth is wrapped round her: "Mayest thou reach old age. Put on this raiment. Be lovely: be chaste. Live a hundred years. Invite [that is, preserve and obtain] beauty, wealth, and male offspring. Damsel! put on this apparel." Afterwards the following prayer is recited: "May the assembled gods unite our hearts. May the waters unite them. May air unite us. May the creator unite us. May the god of love unite us."

But, according to the followers of the Samavedu, the bridegroom, immediately after the scarf has been placed on the bride's shoulder, conducts her towards the sacrificial fire, saying, "soma [the regent of the moon] gave her to the sun: [Gunavishnu here explains Gandharba by the word Aditya, which may signify the sun, or a deity in general.] the sun gave her to the regent of fire: fire has given her to me, and with her, wealth and male offspring." The bride then goes to the western side of the fire and recites the following prayer, while she steps on a mat made of Virana grass [Andropogon aromaticum or muricatum.] and covered with silk: "May our lord assign me the path by which I may reach the abode of my lord." She sits down on the edge of the mat; and the bridegroom offers six oblations of clarified butter, reciting the following prayers, while the bride touches his shoulder with her right hand. 1. "May fire come, first among the gods; may it rescue her offspring from the fetters of death; may Varuna, king [of waters], grant that this woman should never bemoan a calamity befalling her children." 2. "May the domestic perpetual fire guard her; may it render her progeny long-lived; may she never be widowed; may she be mother of surviving children; may she experience the joy of having male offspring." 3. "May heaven protect thy back; may air, and the two sons of Aswini, protect thy thighs; may the sun protect thy children while sucking thy breast; and Vrihaspati protect them until they wear clothes; and afterwards may the assembled gods protect them." 4. "May no lamentation arise at night in thy abode; may crying women enter other houses than thine; mayest thou never admit sorrow to thy breast; mayest thou prosper in thy husband's house, blest with his survival, and viewing cheerful children." 5. "I lift barrenness, the death of children, sin, and every other evil, as I would lift a chaplet off thy head; and I consign the fetters [of premature death] to thy foes." 6. "May death depart from me, and immortality come; may [Yama] the child of the sun, render me fearless. Death! follow a different path from that by which we proceed, and from that which the gods travel. To thee who seest and who hearest, I call, saying, hurt not our offspring, nor our progenitors. And may this oblation be efficacious. " The bridegroom then presents oblations, naming the three worlds, separately and conjointly, and offers either four or five oblations to fire and to the moon. The bride and bridegroom then rise up, and he passes from her left side to her right, and makes her join her hands in a hollow form.

The rice, [From this use of raw rice at the nuptial ceremony, arises the custom of presenting rice, tinged with turmeric, by way of invitation to guests whose company is requested at a wedding.] which had been put into a basket, is then taken up, and the stone is placed before the bride, who treads upon it with the point of her right foot, while the bridegroom recites this prayer: "Ascend this stone; be firm like this stone; distress my foe, and be not subservient to my enemies." The bridegroom then pours a ladleful of clarified butter on her hands; another person gives her the rice, and two other ladlefuls of butter are poured over it. She then separates her hands, and lets fall the rice on the fire, while the following text is recited: "This woman, casting the rice into the fire, says. May my lord be long lived, may we live a hundred years, and may all my kinsmen prosper: be this oblation efficacious.'' Afterwards the bridegroom walks round the fire, preceded by the bride, and reciting this text: "The girl goes from her parents to her husband's abode, having strictly observed abstinence [for three days from factitious salt, &c.] Damsel! by means of thee we repress foes, like a stream of water." The bride again treads on the stone and makes another oblation of rice, while the subjoined prayer is recited: "The damsel has worshipped the generous sun and the regent of fire; may he and the generous sun liberate her and me from this [family]; be this oblation efficacious." They afterwards walk round the fire as before. Four or five other oblations are made with the same ceremonies and prayers, varying only the title of the sun who is here called Pushan, but was entitled Aryaman in the preceding prayer. The bridegroom then pours rice out of the basket into the fire, after pouring one or two ladlefuls of butter on the edge of the basket; with this offering he simply says, "May this oblation to fire be efficacious."

The oblations and prayers directed by the Yajurveda, previous to this period of the solemnity, are very different from those which have been here inserted from the Samaveda; and some of the ceremonies, which will be subsequently noticed, are anticipated by the priests, who follow the Yajush.

Twelve oblations are made with as many prayers. 1. "May this oblation be efficacious, and happily conveyed to that being who is fire in the form of a celestial quirister, who is accompanied by truth, and whose abode is truth; may he cherish our holy knowledge and our valour. " 2. "Efficacious be this oblation to those delightful plants, which are the nymphs of that being who is fire in the form of a celestial quirister, who is accompanied by truth, and whose abode is truth." 3. and 4. The foregoing prayers are thus varied: "To that being who is the sun, in the form of a celestial quirister, and who consists wholly of the Samaveda." "Those enlivening rays, which are the nymphs of that sun." 5. and 6. "That being who is the moon in the form of a celestial quirister, and who is a ray of the sun, and named Sushmana." "Those asterisms which are the nymphs of the moon, and are called Bhecuri." [This term is not expounded by the commentator. Bha signifies an asterism: but the meaning of the compound term is not obvious. Sushmana bears some affinity to Sushumna, mentioned in a former essay; but neither of these names is explained in the commentaries which I have consulted.] 7. and 8. "That being who is air, constantly moving and travelling every where." "Those waters which are the nymphs of air, and are termed invigorating." 9. and 10. "That being who is the solemn sacrifice in the form of a celestial quirister; who cherishes all beings, and whose pace is elegant." "Those sacrificial fees, which are the nymphs of the solemn sacrifice, and are named thanksgivings." 11. and 12. "That being who is mind in the form of a celestial quirister, who is the supreme ruler of creatures, and who is the fabricator of the universe." "Those holy strains (Rich and Saman) who are the nymphs of mind, and are named the means of attaining wishes."

Thirteen oblations are next presented, during the recital of as many portions of a single text. "May the supreme ruler of creatures, who is glorious in his victories over [hostile] armies, grant victory to INDRA, the regent of rain. All creatures humbly bow to him; for he is terrible: to him are oblations due. May he grant me victory, knowledge, reflection, regard, self-rule, skill, understanding, power, [returns of] the conjunction and opposition of the sun and moon, and holy texts (Vrihat and Rat'hantara)." [Texts of the Samaveda so named.]

Eighteen oblations are then offered, while as many texts are meditated;  they differ only in the name of the deity that is invoked. 1. "May fire, lord of [living] beings, protect me in respect of holiness, valour, and prayer, and in regard to ancient privileges, to this solemn rite, and to this invocation of deities. " 2. "May Indra, lord or regent of the eldest (that is, of the best of beings) protect me," &c. 3. "Yama, lord of the earth." 4. "Air, lord of the sky." 5. "The sun, lord of heaven." 6. "The moon, lord of stars. " 7. "VRIHASPATI, lord [that is, preceptor] of Brahma [and other deities]." 8. "Mitra (the sun), lord of true beings." 9. "Varuna, lord of waters." 10. "The ocean, lord of rivers." 11. "Food, lord of tributary powers." 12. "soma (the moon), lord of plants." 13. "Savitri (the generative sun), lord of pregnant females." 14. "Rudra (Siva), lord of [deities, that bear the shape of] cattle." 15. "The fabricator of the universe, lord of forms." 16. "Vishnu, lord of mountains." 17. "Winds (Maruts), lords of (ganas) sets of divinities." 18. "Fathers, grandfathers, remoter ancestors, more distant progenitors, their parents, and grandsires."

Oblations are afterwards made, with prayers corresponding to those which have been already cited from the Samaveda. 1. "May fire come, first among the gods," &c. 2. "May the domestic perpetual fire guard her," &c. 3. "Fire, who dost protect such as perform sacrifices! grant us all blessings in heaven and on earth: grant unto us that various and excellent wealth, which is produced on this earth and in heaven." 4. "O best of luminaries! Come, show us an easy path, that our lives may be uninjured. May death depart from me, and immortality come. May the child of the sun render me fearless." 5. "Death! follow a different path," &c.

The bride offers the oblations of rice mixed with leaves of sami, [Adenanthera aculeata.] letting fall the offerings on the fire in the manner beforementioned, and with the same prayers, but recited in a reversed order and a little varied. 1. "The damsel has worshipped the generous sun in the form of fire; may that generous sun never separate her from this husband. " 2. "This woman, casting the rice into the fire, says, May my lord be long-lived; may my kinsmen reach old age." 3. "I cast this rice into the fire, that it may become a cause of thy prosperity: may fire assent to my union with thee." [This version is conformable to a different commentary from that which was followed in the former translation.]

According to the followers of the Yajurveda, the bridegroom now takes the bride's right hand, reciting a text which will be subsequently quoted. The bride then steps on a stone while this text is recited: "Ascend this stone: be firm like this stone. Subdue such as entertain hostile designs against me, and repel them." The following hymn is then chanted. "Charming Saraswati, swift as a mare! whom I celebrate in face of this universe, protect this [solemn rite]. O thou! in whom the elements were produced, in whom this universe was framed, I now will sing that hymn [the nuptial text] which constitutes the highest glory of women." The bride and bridegroom afterwards walk round the fire, while the following test is recited: "Fire! thou didst first espouse this female sun (this woman, beautiful like the sun); now let a human being again espouse her by thy means. Give her, fire! with offspring, to a [human] husband." The remainder of the rice is then dropped into the fire as an oblation to the god of love.

The next ceremony is the bride's stepping seven steps. It is the most material of all the nuptial rites; for the marriage is complete and irrevocable, so soon as she has taken the seventh step, and not sooner. She is conducted by the bridegroom, and directed by him to step successively into seven circles, while the following texts are uttered: 1. "May Vishnu cause thee to take one step for the sake of obtaining food. " 2. " May Vishnu cause thee to take one step for the sake of obtaining strength. '' 3. " Three steps for the sake of solemn acts of religion. " 4. "Four steps for the sake of obtaining happiness." 5. "Five steps for the sake of cattle." 6. "Six stops for the sake of increase of wealth. " 7. "Seven steps for the sake of obtaining priests to perform sacrifices." [In the Vajurveda the texts are varied, so that the third step is for increase of wealth, and the sixth for obtaining happy seasons.] The bridegroom then addresses the bride, "Having completed seven steps, be my companion. May I become thy associate. May none interrupt thy association with me. May such as are disposed to promote our happiness, confirm thy association with me." The bridegroom then addresses the spectators: " This woman is auspicious: approach and view her; and having conferred [by your good wishes] auspicious fortune on her, depart to your respective abodes."

Then the bridegroom's friend, who stood near the fire bearing a jar of water, advances to the spot where the seventh step was completed, and pours water on the bridegrooms head, and afterwards on the bride's, while a prayer abovementioned is recited: "May waters and all the Gods cleanse our hearts; may air do so; may the creator do so; may the divine instructress unite our hearts." [It is here translated according to the gloss of Gunavishnu; in the former version I followed the commentary of Helayud'ha.]

The bridegroom then puts his left hand under the bride's hands, which are joined together in a hollow form, and taking her right hand in his, recites the six following texts: 1. "I take thy hand for the sake of good fortune, that thou mayest become old with me, thy husband: may the generous, mighty, and prolific sun render thee a matron, that I may be a householder.'' 2. "Be gentle in thy aspect and loyal to thy husband; be fortunate in cattle, amiable in thy mind, and beautiful in thy person; be mother of surviving sons; be assiduous at the [five] sacraments; be cheerful; and bring prosperity to our bipeds and quadrupeds." 3. "May the lord of creatures grant its progeny, even unto old age; may the sun render that progeny conspicuous. Auspicious deities have given thee to me: enter thy husband's abode, and bring health to our bipeds and quadrupeds." 4. "O Indra, who pourest forth rain! render this woman fortunate and the mother of children: grant her ten sons; give her eleven protectors." 5. "Be submissive to thy husband's father, to his mother, to his sister, and to his brothers. " 6. " Give thy heart to my religious duties: may thy mind follow mine; be thou consentient to my speech. May Vrihaspati unite thee unto me."

The followers of the Yajurveda enlarge the first prayer and omit the rest, some of which, however, they employ at other periods of the solemnity. "I take thy hand for the sake of good fortune, that thou mayest become old with me, thy husband; may the deities, namely, the divine sun (Aryaman), and the prolific being (Savatri), and the god of love, give thee as a matron unto me, that I may be a householder. I need the goddess of prosperity. Thou art she. Thou art the goddess of prosperity. I need her. I am the Saman [veda]: thou art the Rich [veda]. I am the sky: thou art the earth. Come; let us marry: let us hold conjugal intercourse: let us procreate offspring: let us obtain sons. May they reach old age. May we, being affectionate, glorious, and well disposed, see during a hundred years, live a hundred years, and hear a hundred years."

According to the ritual, which conforms to the Samaveda, the bridegroom sits down near the fire with the bride, and finishes this part of the ceremony by making oblations, while he names the three worlds severally and conjointly. The taking of the bride's hand in marriage is thus completed. In the evening of the same day, so soon as the stars appear, the bride sits down on a bull's hide, which must be of a red colour, and must be placed with the neck towards the east and the hair upwards. The bridegroom sits down near her, makes oblations while he names the three worlds as usual, and then makes six oblations with the following prayers, and each time pours the remainder of the clarified butter on the bride's head. 1. "I obviate by this full oblation all ill marks in the lines [of thy hands], in thy eyelashes, and in the spots [on thy body]." 2. "I obviate by this full oblation all the ill marks in thy hair; and whatever is sinful in thy looking, or in thy crying. " 3. "I obviate by this full oblation all that may be sinful in thy temper, in thy speaking, and in thy laughing." 4. "I obviate by this full oblation all the ill marks in thy teeth, and in the dark intervals between t hem; in thy hands, and in thy feet." 5. "I obviate by this full oblation all the ill marks on thy thighs, on thy privy part, on thy haunches, and on the lineaments of thy figure." 6. "Whatever natural or accidental evil marks were on all thy limbs, I have obviated all such marks by these full oblations of clarified butter. May this oblation be efficacious."

The bride and bridegroom rise up; and he shews her the polar star, reciting the following text: "Heaven is stable; the earth is stable; this universe is stable; theses mountains are stable; may this woman be stable in her husband's family." [Dhruva, the pole, also signifies stable, fixed, steady, firm.] The bride salutes the bridegroom, naming herself and family, and adding a respectful interjection. The bridegroom replies, "Be long-lived and happy." Matrons then pour water, mixed with leaves, upon the bride and bridegroom, out of jars which had been previously placed on an altar prepared for the purpose; and the bridegroom again makes oblations with the names of the worlds, by way of closing this part of the ceremony.

The bridegroom afterwards eats food prepared without factitious salt. During this meal he recites the following prayers: 1. "I bind with the fetters of food thy heart and mind to the gem [of my soul]; I bind them with nourishment, which is the thread of life; I bind them with the knot of truth." 2. "May that heart, which is yours, become my heart; and this heart, which is mine, become thy heart." 3. "Since food is the bond of life, I bind thee therewith." The remainder of the food must be then given to the bride.

During the three subsequent days the married couple must abstain from factitious salt, live chastely and austerely, and sleep on the ground. On the following day, that is, on the fourth exclusively, [The Muslemans of India do not scruple to borrow from the Hindus superstitious ceremonies that are celebrated with festivity. They take an active part in the gambols of the Holi, and even solicit the favours of the Indian Plutus, at the Diwali. The bridal procession, on the fourth day, with all the sports and gambols of the Chant'hi (Chaturt'hi), is evidently copied from the similar customs of the Hindus. In Bengal the Muslemans have even adopted the premature marriage of infant brides and bridegrooms.] the bridegroom conducts the bride to his own house on a carriage or other suitable conveyance. He recites the following text when she ascends the carriage: " wife of the sun! ascend this vehicle resembling the beautiful blossoms of the cotton-tree [Bombax heptaphyllum.] and butea, [Butea frondosa.] tinged with various tints and coloured like gold, well constructed, furnished with good wheels, and the source of ambrosia [that is, of blessings]: bring happiness to thy husband." Proceeding with his bride, he, or some other person for him, recites the following text on their coming to a cross road: "May robbers, who infest the road remain ignorant [of this journey]; may the married couple reach a place of security and difficult access, by easy roads; and may foes keep aloof."

Alighting from the carriage, the bridegroom leads the bride into the house, chanting the hymn called Vamadevya. Matrons welcome the bride, and make her sit down on a bull's hide of the same colour, and placed in the same manner as before. The bridegroom then recites the following prayer: "May kine here produce numerous young; may horses and human beings do so; and may the deity sit here, by whose favour sacrifices are accomplished with gifts a thousand fold."

The women the place a young child in the bride's lap; they put roots of lotos, or else fruit of different kinds, in his hand. The bridegroom takes up the child, and then prepares a sacrificial fire in the usual manner, and makes eight oblations with the following prayers, preceded and followed by the usual oblations to the three worlds. 1. "May there be cheerfulness here." 2. "May thine own [kindred] be kind here. " 3. " May there be pleasure here. " 4. "Sport thou here." 5. "May there be kindness here with me.'' 6. "May thine own [kindred] be here, benevolent towards me.'' 7. "May there be here delight towards me." 8. "Be thou here joyous towards me." The bride then salutes her father-in-law and the other relatives of her husband.

Afterwards the bridegroom prepares another sacrificial fire, and sits down with the bride on his right hand. He makes twenty oblations with the following prayers, preceded and followed as usual by oblations to the three worlds. The remainder of each ladleful is thrown into a jar of water, which is afterwards poured on the bride's head. 1. "Fire, expiator of evil! thou dost atone evils for the gods themselves. I, a priest, approach thee, desirous of soliciting thee to remove any sinful taint in the beauty of this woman." 2. "Air, expiator of evil!" &c. 3. "Moon, expiator of evil! " &c. 4. "Sun, expiator of evil!" &c. 5. "Fire, air, moon, and sun, expiators of evil! ye do atone evils for the gods. I, a priest, approach thee, desirous of soliciting thee to remove any sinful taint in the beauty of this woman." 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. "soliciting thee to remove any thing in her person which might destroy her husband." 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, "any thing in her person which might make her negligent of cattle."

The priests who use the Yajurveda, make only five oblations with as many prayers addressed to fire, air, the sun, the moon, and the Gandharba or celestial quirister; praying them to remove any thing in the person of the bride which might be injurious to her husband, to her offspring, to cattle, to the household, and to honour and glory. The following text is recited while the water is poured on the bride's head: "That blameable portion of thy person which would have been injurious to thy husband, thy offspring, thy cattle, thy household, and thy honour, I render destructive of paramours: may thy body [thus cleared from evil] reach old age with me." The bride is then fed with food prepared in a caldron, and the following text is recited: "I unite thy breath with my breath; thy bones with my bones; thy flesh with my flesh; and thy skin with my skin."

The ceremonies of which the nuptial solemnity consists may be here recapitulated. The bridegroom goes in procession to the house where the bride's father resides, and is there welcomed as a guest. The bride is given to him by her father in the form usual at every solemn donation, and their hands are bound together with grass. He clothes the bride with an upper and lower garment, and the skirts of her mantle and his are tied together. The bridegroom makes oblations to fire, and the bride drops rice on it as an oblation. The bridegroom solemnly takes her hand in marriage. She treads on a stone and mullar. They walk round the fire. The bride steps seven times, conducted by the bridegroom, and he then dismisses the spectators, the marriage being now complete and irrevocable. In the evening of the same day the bride sits down on a bull's hide, and the bridegroom points out to her the polar star as an emblem of stability. They then partake of a meal. The bridegroom remains three days at the house of the bride's father: on the fourth day he conducts her to his own house in solemn procession. She is there welcomed by his kindred; and the solemnity ends with oblations to fire.

Among Hindus, a girl is married before the age of puberty. The law even censures the delay of her marriage beyond the tenth year. For this reason, and because the bridegroom too may be an infant, it is rare that a marriage should be consummated until long after its solemnization. The recital of prayers on this occasion constitutes it a religious ceremony; and it is the first of those that are performed for the purpose of expiating the sinful taint which a child is supposed to contract in the womb of his mother. They shall be described in a future essay.

On the practice of immature nuptials, a subject suggested in the preceding paragraph, it may be remarked, that it arises from a laudable motive; from a sense of duty incumbent on a father, who considers as a debt the obligation of providing a suitable match for his daughter. This notion, which is strongly inculcated by Hindu legislators, is forcibly impressed on the minds of parents. But in their zeal to dispose of a daughter in marriage, they do not perhaps sufficiently consult her domestic felicity. By the death of an infant husband, she is condemned to virgin widowhood for the period of her life. If both survive, the habitual bickerings of their infancy are prolonged in perpetual discord.

Numerous restrictions in the assortment of matches impose on parents this necessity of embracing the earliest opportunity of affiancing their children to fit companions. The intermarriages of different classes, formerly permitted with certain limitations, are now wholly forbidden. The prohibited degrees extend to the sixth of affinity; and even the bearing of the same family name is a sufficient cause of impediment.

To conclude the subject of nuptials, I shall only add, that eight forms are noticed by Hindu legislators. (Menu, c. iii.) But one only, which has been here described from the Indian rituals, is now used.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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VI. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.


[Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, June 21, 1823.]

[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society vol. i. p. 19-43.]


The Hindus, as is well known, possess various ancient systems of philosophy, which they consider to be orthodox, as consistent with the theology and metaphysics of the Vedas; and have likewise preserved divers systems deemed heretical, as incompatible with the doctrines of their holy books.

The two Mimansas (for there are two schools of metaphysics under this title) are emphatically orthodox. The prior one (purva), which has JAIMINI for its founder, teaches the art of reasoning, with the express view of aiding the interpretation of the Vedas. The latter (uttara), commonly called Vedanta, and attributed to Vyasa, deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.

The Nyaya, of which Gotama is the acknowledged author, furnishes a philosophical arrangement, with strict rules of reasoning, not unaptly compared to the dialectics of the Aristotelian school. Another course of philosophy connected with it bears the denomination of Vaiseshica. Its reputed author is Canade; who, like Democritus, maintained the doctrine of atoms.

A different philosophical system, partly heterodox, and partly conformable to the established Hindu creed, is the Sanc'hya: of which also, as of the preceding, there are two schools; one usually known by that name; the other commonly termed Yoga. A succinct exposition of the Sanc'hya doctrines is the design of the present essay: they are selected for that purpose, on account of the strong affinity which they manifestly bear to the metaphysical opinions of the sects of Jina and Budd'ha.

Though not strictly orthodox, both Sanc'hyas and the Vaiseshica, as well as the Nyaya, are respected and studied by very rigid adherents of the Vedas, who are taught, however, to reject so much as disagrees, and treasure up what is consonant to their scriptures. "In Canade's doctrine, in the Sanc'hya, and in the Yoga, that part which is inconsistent with the Vedas, is to be rejected by those who strictly adhere to revelation. In Jaimini's doctrine, and in Vyasa's, there is nothing whatsoever at variance with scripture." [Quotation in Vijnyana-Bhicshu's Capila-bhashya.]

Heretical treatises of philosophy are very numerous: among which that of CHARVACA, which exhibits the doctrine of the Jaina sect, is most conspicuous; and next to it, the Pasupata.

To them, and to the orthodox systems beforementioned, it is not intended here to advert, further than as they are noticed by writers on the Sanc'hya, citing opinions of other schools of philosophy, in course of commenting on the text which they are engaged in expounding. It is not my present purpose to exhibit a contrasted view of the tenets of different philosophical schools, but to present to this Society a summary of the doctrine of a single sect; which will serve, however, to elucidate that of several more.

Of other philosophical sects, the received doctrines in detail may be best reserved for separate notice, in distinct essays to be hereafter submitted to the Society. I must be clearly understood, however, not to pledge myself definitively for that task.

I proceed without further preface to the immediate subject of the present essay:

A system of philosophy, in which precision of reckoning is observed in the enumeration of its principles, is denominated Sanc'hya; a term which has been understood to signify numeral, agreeably to the usual acceptation of sanc'hya, number: and hence its analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed. But the name may be taken to imply, that its doctrine is founded in the exercise of judgment: for the word from which it is derived signifies reasoning or deliberation; [Am. Cosh. 1, I, 4, 11.] and that interpretation of its import is countenanced by a passage of the Bharata, where it is said of this sect of philosophers: "They exercise judgment (sanc'ya), and discuss nature and [other] twenty-four principles, and therefore are called Sanc'hya.''

The commentator who has furnished this quotation, expounds sanc'hya, as here importing 'the discovery of soul by means of right discrimination.' [Capita-bhashya.]

The reputed founder of this sect of metaphysical philosophy was Capila; an ancient sage, concerning whose origin and adventures the mythological fables, which occupy the place of history with the Hindus, are recounted variously. In Gaudapa'da's commentary on the Sanc'hya-carica, he is asserted to have been a son of Brahma; being one of the seven great Rishis, or saints, named in Puranas or theogonies as the offspring of that deity. His two most distinguished disciples, Asuri and Panchasic'ha, are there exalted to the same rank and divine origin with himself. Another commentator maintains that Capila was an incarnation of Vishnu. It had been affirmed by a writer on the Vedanta, upon the authority of a passage quoted by him, wherein Capila, the founder of the Sanc'hya sect, is identified with AGNI (fire), that he was an incarnation, not of Vishnu, but of AGNI. The commentator is not content with the fiery origin conceded to the author. He denies the existence of more than one Capila; and insists, that the founder of this sect was an incarnation of Vishnu, born as the son of Devaduti. [VIJNYANA in Cap. bhash.]

In fact, the word Capila, besides its ordinary signification of tawny colour, bears likewise that of fire: and upon this ambiguity of sense many legends in the Indian theogonies, concerning the saint of the name, have been grounded; a sample of which will be found quoted by Col. Wilford, in the Asiatic Researches. [Vol. iii. p. 355.]

A passage which is cited in the commentaries of Gaudapada and VACHESPATI on the Carica, assigns to Capila intuitive knowledge and innate virtue, with transcendent power and other perfections born with him at the earliest creation; and this is taken by those scholiasts as relating to the founder of the Sanc'hya sect. But another commentator of the Carica, Ramacrishna, who belongs to the theistical branch of this sect, affirms that the passage in question concerns Iswara, or God, acknowledged by that school.

A text quoted in Vyasa's commentary on Patanjali's Yogasastra, [PATANJ. Sanc'h. prav, 1, 25.] and referred by the annotator Vachespati, as well as a modern scholiast of the Yoga-sastra, Nagoji, to Panchasic'ha the disciple of Asuri, describes Capila as an incarnation of the Deity: "The holy and first wise one, entering a mind by himself framed, and becoming the mighty sage (Capila), compassionately revealed this science to Asuri." [Panch, sutra, quoted in Vyasa's bhashya.]

It may be questioned whether Capila be not altogether a mythological personage, to whom the true author of the doctrine, whoever he was, thought fit to ascribe it.

A collection of sutras, or succinct aphorisms, in six lectures, attributed to Capila himself, is extant under the title of Sanc'hya pravachana. As an ancient work (whoever may have been really its author), it must doubtless have been expounded by early scholiasts. But the only commentary, which can at present be referred to by name is the Capila-bhashya: or, as the author himself cites it in his other works, Sanc'hya-bhashya. The title at full length, in the epigraph of the book, is Capila-sanc'hya-pravachana-sastra-bhasya. It is by VIJNYANA-BHICSHU, a mendicant ascetic (as his designation imports), who composed a separate treatise on the attainment of beatitude in this life, entitled Sanc'hya-sara, and wrote many other works; particularly the Yoga-vartica, consisting of scholia on Patanjali's Yoga-sastra, and the Brahme-mimansa-bhashya, which is a commentary on a treatise of Vedanti philosophy.

It appears from the preface of the Capila-bhashya, that a more compendious tract, in the same form of sutras or aphorisms, bears the title of Tatwa-samasa, and is ascribed to the same author, CAPILA. The scholiast intimates that both are of equal authority, and in no respect discordant: one being a summary of the greater work, or else this an amplification of the conciser one. The latter was probably the case; for there is much repetition in the Sanc'hya-pravachana.

It is avowedly not the earliest treatise on this branch of philosophy: since it contains references to former authorities for particulars which are but briefly hinted in the sutras; [Cap. 3, 30.] and it quotes some by name, and among them Panchasic'ha, [Cap 6.] the disciple of the reputed author's pupil: an anachronism which appears decisive.

The title of Sanc'hya-pravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali's Yoga-sastra.

If the authority of the scholiast of Capila may be trusted, the Tatwa-samasa is the proper text of the Sanc'hya: and its doctrine is more fully, but separately set forth, by the two ampler treatises, entitled Sanc'hya-pravachana, which contain a fuller exposition of what had been there succinctly delivered; Patanjali's work supplying the deficiency of Capila's, and declaring the existence of God, which for argument's sake, and not absolutely and unreservedly, he had denied.

Of the six lectures or chapters into which the sutras are distributed, the three first comprise an exposition of the whole Sanc'hya doctrine. The fourth contains illustrative comparisons, with reference to fables and tales. The fifth is controversial, confuting opinions of other sects; which is the case also with part of the first. The sixth and last treats of the most important parts of the doctrine, enlarging upon topics before touched.

The Carica, which will be forthwith mentioned as the text book or standard authority of the Sanc'hya, has an allusion to the contents of the fourth and fifth chapters, professing to be a complete treatise of the science, exclusive of illustrative tales and controversial disquisitions. [Car. 72.] The author must have had before him the same collection of sutras, or one similarly arranged. His scholiast [Narayana-Tirt'ha.] expressly refers to the numbers of the chapters.

Whether the Tatwa-samasa of Capila be extant, or whether the sutras of Panchasic'ha be so, is not certain. The latter are frequently cited, and by modern authors on the Sanc'hya: whence a presumption, that they may be yet forthcoming.

The best text of the Sanc'hya is a short treatise in verse, which is denominated Carica, as memorial verses of other sciences likewise are. The acknowledged author is Iswara-Crishna, described in the concluding lines or epigraph of the work itself, as having received the doctrine, through a succession of intermediate instructors, from Panchasic'ha, by whom it was first promulgated, and who was himself instructed by Asuri, the disciple of Capila. [Car. 70 and 71.]

This brief tract, containing seventy-two stanzas in arya metre, has been expounded in numerous commentaries.

One of these is the work of Gaudapada, the celebrated scholiast of the Upanishads of the Vedas, and preceptor of Govinda, who was preceptor of Sancara-Acharya, author likewise of numerous treatises on divers branches of theological philosophy. It is entitled Sanc'hya bhashya.

Another, denominated Sanc'hya-chandrica, is by Narayana-Tirt'ha, who seems from his designation to have been an ascetic. He was author likewise of a gloss on the Yoga-sastra, as appears from his own references to it.

A third commentary, under the title of Sanc'hya-tatwa-caumudi, or more simply Tatwa-caumudi (for so it is cited by later commentators), is by Vachespati-Misra, a native of Tirhut, author of similar works on various other philosophical systems. It appears from the multiplicity of its copies, which are unusually frequent, to be the most approved gloss on the text.

One more commentary, bearing the analogous but simpler title of Sanc'hya-caumudi, is by Rama-Crishna, Bhattacha'rya, a learned and not ancient writer of Bengal; who has for the most part followed preceding commentators, borrowing frequently from Narayana Tirt'ha, though taking the title of his commentary from Vachespati's.

The scholiasts of the Carica have, in more than one place, noticed the text of the sutras: thus formally admitting the authority of the aphorisms. The excellence of the memorial verses (Carica), with the gloss of GAUDAPADA and that of Vachespati-Misra, has been the occasion of both collections of aphorisms (Tatwu-samasa and Sanc'hya-pravachana) falling into comparative neglect. They are superseded for a text book of the sect by Iswaua-Crishna's clearer and more compendious work Both sutras and carted may be considered to be genuine and authoritative expositions of the doctrine; and the more especially, as they do not, upon any material point, appear to disagree.

The several works beforementioned are the principal works in which the Sanc'hya philosophy may be now studied. Others, which are cited by scholiasts, may possibly be yet forthcoming. But they are at least scarce, and no sufficient account of them can be given upon the strength of a few scattered quotations. Among them, however, may be named the Rajavartica, to which reference is made, as to a work held in much estimation, and which appears to comprise annotations on the sutras; and the Sangraha, which is cited for parallel passages explanatory of the text, being an abridged exposition of the same doctrines, in the form of a select compilation.

Concerning the presumable antiquity of either Capila's aphorisms or Iswara-Crishna's memorial couplets, I shall here only remark, that notices of them, with quotations from both, do occur in philosophical treatises of other schools, whereby their authenticity is so far established.

Besides the Sanc'hya of Capila and his followers, another system, bearing the same denomination, but more usually termed the Yogasastra or Yuga-sutra, as before remarked, is ascribed to a mythological being, Patanjali, the supposed author of the great grammatical commentary emphatically named the Mahabhashya: and likewise of a celebrated medical treatise termed Characa, and other distinguished performances.

The collection of Yoga-sutras, bearing the common title of Sanc'hya pravachana, is distributed into four chapters or quarters (pada): the first, on contemplation (samad'hi); the second, on the means of its attainment; the third, on the exercise of transcendent power (vibhuti); the fourth, on abstraction or spiritual insulation (caiwalya).

An ancient commentary on this fanatical work is forthcoming, entitled Patanjala-bhashya. It is attributed to Veda-Vyasa, the compiler of the Indian scriptures and founder of the Vedanti school of philosophy, Vachespati Misra has furnished scholia on both text and gloss. This scholiast has been already noticed as an eminent interpreter of the Carica: and the same remark is here applicable, that the multiplicity of copies indicates the estimation in which his gloss is held above other scholia.

Another commentary is by Vijnyana-Bhicshu beforementioned. He refers to it in his other works under the name of Yoga-vartica. It probably is extant; for quotations from it occur in modern compilations.

A third commentary, denominated Raja-martanda, is ascribed in its preface and epigraph to Rana-Rangamalla, surnamed Bhojaraja or Bhoja-Pati, sovereign of Dhara, and therefore called Dhareswara. It was probably composed at his court, under his auspices; and his name has been affixed to it in compliment to him, as is no uncommon practice. It is a succinct and lucid exposition of the text.

An ampler commentary by a modern Maharashtriya Brahman, named Nagoji-Bhatta Upad'hyaya, bears the title of Patanjali-sutravritti. It is very copious and very clear.

The tenets of the two schools of the Sanc'hya are on many, not to say on most, points, that are treated in both, the same; differing however upon one, which is the most important of all: the proof of existence of supreme God.

The one school (Patanjali's) recognising God, is therefore denominated theistical (Seswara sanc'hya). The other (Capila's) is atheistical (NirIswara sanc'hya), as the sects of Jina and Buddha in effect are, acknowledging no creator of universe nor supreme ruling providence. The Gods of Capila are beings superior to man; but, like him, subject to change and transmigration.

A third school, denominated Pauranica sanc'hya, considers nature as an illusion; conforming upon most other points to the doctrine of PATANJALI, and upon many, to that of Capila. In several of the Puranas, as the Matsya, Carina and Vishnu, in particular, the cosmogony, which is an essential part of an Indian theogony, is delivered consonantly to this system. That which is found at the beginning of Menu's institutes of law is not irreconcileable to it. [MENU, 1. 14—10.]

Doctrine of the Sanc'hya.

The professed design of all the schools of the Sanc'hya, theistical, atheistical, and mythological, as of other Indian systems of philosophy, is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it.

In a passage of the Vedas it is said, "Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from nature: thus it does not come again; it does not come again." [GAUD, on Car.] Consonantly to this and to numberless other passages of a like import, the whole scope of the Vedanta is to teach a doctrine, by the knowledge of which an exemption from metempsychosis shall be attainable; and to inculcate that as the grand object to be sought, by moans indicated.

Even in the aphorisms of the Nyaya [Got sutr.] the same is proposed as the reward of a thorough acquaintance with that philosophical arrangement.

In like manner the Grecian philosophers, and Pythagoras and Plato in particular, taught that "the end of philosophy is to free the mind from incumbrances which hinder its progress towards perfection, and to raise it to the contemplation of immutable truth," and "to disengage it from all animal passions, that it may rise above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence. " [Enfield's Hist, of Phil. I. 382 and 233.]

In all systems of the Sanc'hya the same purpose is propounded, "Future pain," says Patanjali, "is to be prevented. A clear knowledge of discriminate truth is the way of its prevention." [Pat. 2. 16. and 26.]

It is true knowledge, as Capila and his followers insist, [Cap. 1. 1. Car. 1.] that alone can secure entire and permanent deliverance from evil: whereas temporal means, whether for exciting pleasure or for relieving mental and bodily sufferance, are insufficient to that end; and the spiritual resources of practical religion are imperfect, since sacrifice, the most efficacious of observances, is attended with the slaughter of animals, and consequently is not innocent and pure; and the heavenly meed of pious acts is transitory. [Car. 1.]

In support of these positions, passages are cited from the Vedas declaring in express terms the attainment of celestial bliss by celebration of sacrifices: "Whoever performs an aswamed'ha (or immolation of a horse) conquers all worlds; overcomes death; expiates sin; atones for sacrilege." In another place, Indra and the rest of the subordinate deities are introduced exulting on their acquisition of bliss. "We have drunk the juice of asclepias [Soma, the moon-plant: Asclepias acida.] and are become immortal; we have attained effulgence; we have learned divine truths. How can a foe harm us? How can age affect the immortality of a deathless being?'' [GAUD. on Car. 2.] Yet it appears in divers parts of the Indian scriptures, that, according to Hindu theology, even those deities, though termed immortal, have but a definite duration of life, perishing with the whole world at its periodical dissolution. "Many thousands of Indras and of other Gods have passed away in successive periods, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome." [Ibid.]

Complete and perpetual exemption from every sort of ill is the beatitude which is proposed for attainment by acquisition of perfect knowledge. "Absolute prevention of all three sorts of pain," as an aphorism of" the Sanc'hya intimates, "is the highest purpose of soul." [San. prav. 1. 1.] Those three sorts are evil proceeding from self, from external beings, or from divine causes: the first is either bodily, as disease of various kinds; or mental, as cupidity, anger, and other passions: the two remaining sorts arise from external sources; one excited by some mundane being; the other, by the agency of a being of a superior order, or produced by a fortuitous cause.

True and perfect knowledge, by which deliverance from evil of every kind is attainable, consists in rightly discriminating the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle which is the immaterial soul. Thus the Carica premises, that "the inquiry concerns means of precluding the three sorts of pain: for pain is embarrassment. Nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist; for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished. The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual: for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method, different from both, is preferable; consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul." [Car. 1 and 2 with Scholia.]

The revealed mode, to which allusion is here made, is not theological doctrine with the knowledge of first principles, insuring exemption from transmigration; but performance of religious ceremonies enjoined in the practical Vedas, and especially the immolation of victims, for which a heavenly reward, a place among the Gods, is promised.

It is not pure, observes the scholiast, for it is attended with the slaughter of animals, which if not sinful in such cases, is, to say the least, not harmless. The merit of it, therefore, is of a mixed nature. A particular precept expresses, "slay the consecrated victim:" but a general maxim ordains, "hurt no sentient being." It is defective, since even the Gods, Indra and the rest, perish at the appointed period. It is in other respects excessive, since the felicity of one is a source of unhappiness to another.

Visible and temporal means, to which likewise reference is made in the text, are medicine and other remedies for bodily ailment; diversion alleviating mental ills; a guard against external injury; charms for defence from accidents. Such expedients do not utterly preclude sufferance. But true knowledge, say Indian philosophers, does so; and they undertake to teach the means of its attainment.

By three kinds of evidence, exclusive of intuition, which belongs to beings of a superior order, demonstration is arrived at, and certainty is attained, by mankind: namely, perception, inference, and affirmation. [Car. 4. Pat. 1. 7. Cap. 1.] All authorities among the Sanc'hyas, (Patanjali and CAPILA, as well as their respective followers) concur in asserting these. Other sources of knowledge, admitted in different systems of philosophy, are reducible to these three. Comparison, or analogy, which the logicians of Gotama's school add to that enumeration, and tradition and other arguments, which Jaimini maintains (viz. capacity, aspect, and privation of four sorts, antecedent, reciprocal, absolute, and total), are all comprehended therein. Other philosophers, who recognise fewer sources of knowledge, as Charvaca, who acknowledges perception only, and the Vaiseshicas, who disallow tradition, are rejected as insufficient authorities. [Com. on Car. 5.]

Inference is of three sorts, equally admitted by the schools of the Sanc'hya and Gotama's Nyaya, and in all distinguished by the same denominations. The consideration of them more properly belongs to the dialectic philosophy than to this, and may therefore be postponed. It will be here sufficient to state the simplest explanation furnished by scholiasts of the Carica and Sutras, without going into the differences which occur in their expositions.

One sort, then, is the inference of an effect from a cause; the second is that of a cause from an effect; the third is deduced from a relation other than that of cause and effect. Examples of them are, 1st. Rain anticipated from a cloud seen gathering. 2d. Fire concluded on a hill, whence smoke ascends. 3d. A flower's appropriate colour presumed where its peculiar scent is noticed; or motion of the moon's orb, deduced from observation of it in different aspects; or saltness of the sea, concluded from that of a sample of seawater; or bloom surmised on mangoe-trees in general, when an individual mangoe-tree is found in blossom.

In regard to the third kind of evidence, tradition or right affirmation, [Pat. 1. 7.] explained as intending true revelation, [Car. 4 and 5.] commentators understand it to mean the Vedas or sacred writ, including the recollections of those gifted mortals, who remember passages of their former lives, and call to mind events which occurred to them in other worlds; and excluding, on the other hand, pretended revelations of impostors and barbarians.

In a dialogue cited from the Vedas, one of the interlocutors, the holy Jaigishavya, asserts his presence, and consequent recollection of occurrences, through ten renovations of the universe (Mahasarga).

In a more extended sense, this third kind of evidence is the affirmation of any truth, and comprises every mode of oral information or verbal communication whence knowledge of a truth maybe drawn.

From these three sources, by the right exercise of judgment and due application of reasoning, true knowledge is derived, consisting in a discriminative acquaintance with principles; which, in the Sanc'hya system, are reckoned to be not less than twenty-five; viz.

1. Nature, Pracrlti or Mula-pracriti, the root or plastic origin of all: termed Prad'hana, the chief one: the universal, material cause; identified by the cosmogony of the Puranas (in several of which the Sanc'hya philosophy is followed) with Maya or illusion; and, by mythologists, with Brahmi, the power or energy of Brahma. It is eternal matter, undiscrete; undistinguishable, as destitute of parts; inferrible, from its effects: being productive, but no production.

2. Intelligence, called Budd'hi and Mahat or the great one: the first production of nature, in create, prolific; being itself productive of other principles. It is identified by the mythological Sanc'hya with the Hindu triad of Gods. A very remarkable passage of the Matsya-purana cited in the Sanc'hya-sara, after declaring that the great principle is produced "from modified nature," proceeds to affirm, "that the great one becomes distinctly known as three Gods, through the influence of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness; 'being one person, and three Gods,' (eca murtis, trayo devah), namely, Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheswara. In the aggregate it is the deity; but, distributive, it appertains to individual beings.''

3. Consciousness, termed Ahancara, or more properly egotism, which is the literal sense of the term. The peculiar and appropriate function of it is (abhimana) selfish conviction; a belief that, in perception and meditation, "I" am concerned; that the objects of sense concern me; in short, that I am. It proceeds from the intellectual principle, and is productive of those which follow.

4 — 8. Five subtile particles, rudiments, or atoms, denominated Tanmatra: perceptible to beings of a superior order, but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind: derived from the conscious principle, and themselves productive of the five grosser elements, earth, water, fire, air, and space.

9 — 19. Eleven organs of sense and action, which also are productions of the conscious principle. Ten are external: viz. five of sense and five of action. The eleventh is internal, an organ both of sense and of action, termed manas or mind. The five instruments of sensation are, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The five instruments of action are, 1st, voice, or the organ of speech; 2d, the hand; 3d, the feet; 4th, the excretory termination of the intestines; 5th, the organ of generation. Mind, serving both for sense and action, is an organ by affinity, being cognate with the rest.

These eleven organs, with the two principles of intelligence and consciousness, are thirteen instruments of knowledge: three internal, and ten external, likened to three warders and ten gates. [Car. 32— 35.]

An external sense perceives; the internal one examines; consciousness makes the selfish application 5 and intellect resolves: an external organ executes.

20 — 24. Five elements, produced from the five elementary particles or rudiments. 1st. A diffused, etherial fluid (acasa), occupying space: it has the property of audibleness, being the vehicle of sound, derived from the sonorous rudiment or etherial atom. 2d. Air, which is endued with the properties of audibleness and tangibility, being sensible to hearing and touch; derived from the tangible rudiment or aerial atom. 3d. Fire, which is invested with properties of audibleness, tangibility, and colour; sensible to hearing, touch, and sight: derived from the colouring rudiment or igneous atom. 4th. Water, which possesses the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour and savour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste: derived from the savoury rudiment or aqueous atom. 5th. Earth, which unites the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour; being sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell: derived from the odorous rudiment or terrene atom.

25. Soul, termed Purusha, Pumas, or Atman; which is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial.

The theistical Sanc'hya recognises the same principles; understanding, however, by Purusha, not individual soul alone, but likewise God (Iswara), the ruler of the world.

These twenty-five principles are summarily contrasted in the Carica. "Nature, root of all, is no production. Seven principles; the GREAT or intellectual one, &c. are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive." [Car. 3.]

To this passage a close resemblance will be remarked in one which occurs at the beginning of Erigena's treatise De Divisione Naturae, where he distinguishes these four: "That which creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created and creates not; and that which neither creates nor is created." [J. Scoti Erigenae de div. nat. lib. 5.]

In several of the Upanishads of the Vedas a similar distribution is affirmed, viz. "eight productive principles and sixteen productions." [Garbha, Prasna and Maitreya Upanishads.]

It is for contemplation of nature, and for abstraction from it, that union of soul with nature takes place, as the halt and the blind join for conveyance and for guidance (one bearing and directed; the other borne and directing). By that union of soul and nature, creation, consisting in the development of intellect and the rest of the principles, is effected.

The soul's wish is fruition or liberation. For either purpose, it is in the first place invested with a subtile person, towards the formation of which the evolution of principles proceeds no further than the elementary rudiments. [Car. 40.] This is composed then of intellect, consciousness, and mind, as well as the rest of the organs and instruments of life, conjoined with particles, or elementary rudiments, of five sorts: thus seventeen principles enter into its composition. [Cap. 3. 8.]

This person or subtile frame, termed linga, linga-sarira, or sucshma-sarira, is primeval, produced from original nature at the earliest or initial development of principles. It is unconfined; too subtile for restraint or hindrance (and thence termed ativahica, surpassing the wind in swiftness); incapable of enjoyment until it be invested with a grosser body, affected nevertheless by sentiments.

This is termed the rudimental creation (tanmatra-sarga).

The notion of an animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter.

The grosser body, with which a soul clad in its subtile person is invested for the purpose of fruition, is composed of the five elements; or of four, excluding the etherial, according to some authorities; or of one earth alone, according to others. [Cap. 3. 16—18.] That grosser body, propagated by generation, is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, transmigrating through successive bodies, which it assumes, as a mimic shifts his disguises to represent various characters.

According to CAPILA, [Car. 3, 10, 11.] as he is interpreted by his scholiast, there is intermediately a corporeal frame composed of the five elements, but tenuous or refined. It is termed anusht'hana sarira, and is the vehicle of the subtile person.

It is this, rather than the subtile person itself, which in Patanjali's Yoga-sastra is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull.

The corporeal creation (bhautica-sarga), consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, comprises eight orders of superior beings and five of inferior; which, together with man, who forms a class apart, constitute fourteen orders of beings, distributed in three worlds or classes.

The eight superior orders of beings bear appellations familiar to Hindu theology; Brahma, Prajapatis, Indras, Pitris, Gand'harvas, Yacshas, Racshasas, and Pisachas; Gods or demi-Gods, demons and evil spirits.

The inferior orders of beings are quadrupeds, distinguished in two orders; birds, reptiles, fishes, and insects; vegetables and unorganic substances.

Above is the abode of goodness, peopled by beings of superior orders; virtue prevails there, and consequent bliss, imperfect however, inasmuch as it is transient. Beneath is the abode of darkness or illusion, where beings of an inferior order dwell; stolidity or dulness is prevalent. Between is the human world, where foulness or passion predominates, attended with continual misery.

Throughout these worlds, sentient soul experiences ill arising from decay and death, until it be finally liberated from its union with person.

Besides the grosser corporeal creation and the subtile or personal, all belonging to the material world, the Sanc'hya distinguishes an intellectual creation (pratyaya-sarga or bhava-sarga), consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties, which are enumerated in four classes, as obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding, and amount to fifty.

Obstructions of the intellect are error, conceit, passion, hatred, fear: which are severally denominated obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness. These again are subdivided into sixty-two sorts; error comprising eight species; illusion, as many; extreme illusion, ten; gloom, eighteen; and utter darkness, the same number.

Error, or obscurity, mistakes irrational nature, intellect, consciousness, or any one of the five elementary atoms, for the soul, and imagines liberation to consist in absorption into one of those eight prolific principles.

Conceit, termed illusion, imagines transcendent power, in any of its eight modes, to be deliverance from evil. Thus beings of a superior order, as Indra and the rest of the Gods, who possess transcendent power of every sort, conceive it to be perpetual, and believe themselves immortal.

Passion, called extreme illusion, concerns the five objects of sense; sound, tact, colour, savour, and odour; reckoned to be twice as many, as different to man and to superior beings.

Envy or hatred, denominated gloom, relates to the same ten objects of sense, and to eight-fold transcendent power, furnishing the means of their enjoyment.

Fear, named utter darkness, regards the same eighteen subjects, and consists in the dread of ill attendant on their loss by death or by deprivation of power.

Disability of intellect, which constitutes the second class, comprising twenty-eight species, arises from defect or injury of organs, which are eleven: and to these eleven sorts are added the contraries of the two next classes, containing the one nine, and the other eight species, making a total of twenty-eight. Deafness, blindness, deprivation of taste, want of smell, numbedness, dumbness, handlessness, lameness, costiveness, impotence, and madness, are disabilities preventing performance of functions.

Content or acquiescence, which forms the third class, is either internal or external: the one four-fold, the other five-fold; viz. internal, 1st. Concerning nature; as, an opinion that a discriminative knowledge of nature is a modification of that principle itself, with a consequent expectation of deliverance by the act of nature. 2d. Concerning the proximate cause; as a belief that ascetic observances suffice to ensure liberation. 3d. Concerning time; as a fancy that deliverance will come in course, without study. 4th. Concerning luck; as a supposition that its attainment depends on destiny. External acquiescence relates to abstinence from enjoyment upon temporal motives; namely, 1st, aversion from the trouble of acquisition; or, 2d, from that of preservation; and, 5d, reluctance to incur loss consequent on use; or, 4th, evil attending on fruition; or, 5th, offence of hurting objects by the enjoyment of them.

The perfecting of the intellect is the fourth class, and comprises eight species. Perfection consists in the prevention of evil; and this being three-fold, its prevention is so likewise; as is the consequent perfection of the understanding. This is direct. The remaining five species are indirect, viz. reasoning; oral instruction; study; amicable intercourse; and purity, internal and external (or according to another interpretation, liberality). They are means of arriving at perfection.

The Sanc'hya, as other Indian systems of philosophy, is much engaged with the consideration of what is termed the three qualities (guna): if indeed quality be here the proper import of the term; for the scholiast of Capila understands it as meaning, not quality or accident, but substance, a modification of nature, fettering the soul; conformably with an other acceptation of guna, signifying a cord. [Vijnyan, on Cap. 1.]

The first, and highest, is goodness (sattwa). It is alleviating, enlightening, attended with pleasure and happiness; and virtue predominates in it. In fire it is prevalent; wherefore flame ascends, and sparks fly upwards. In man, when it abounds, as it does in beings of a superior order, it is the cause of virtue.

The second and middlemost is foulness or passion (rajas or lejas). It is active, urgent, and variable; attended with evil and misery. In air it predominates, wherefore wind moves transversely. In living beings it is the cause of vice.

The third and lowest is darkness (tamas). It is heavy and obstructive; attended with sorrow, dulness, and illusion. In earth and water it predominates, wherefore they fall or tend downwards. In living beings it is the cause of stolidity.

These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition. "We speak of the qualities of nature as we do of the trees of a forest," say the Sanc'hyas. [Sanc'hya-sara.] In the Vedas they are pronounced to be successive modifications, one of the other: "All was darkness: commanded to change, darkness took the taint of foulness; and this, again commanded, assumed the form of goodness."

They co-operate for a purpose, by union of opposites: as a lamp, which is composed of oil, a wick, and flame, [Car. 13.] substances inimical and contrary.

Taking the three qualities by which nature is modified, for principles or categories, the number, before enumerated, is raised to twenty-eight; as is by some authorities maintained. [Vijnyana-Bhicshu in Sanc'hya sara and Capita-bhashya.]

To the intellect appertain eight modes, effects, or properties: four partaking of goodness; namely, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power; and four which are the reverse of those, and partake of darkness, viz. sin, error, incontinency, and powerlessness.

Virtue here intends moral or religious merit. Knowledge is either exterior or interior; that is, temporal or spiritual. Interior or spiritual knowledge discriminates soul from nature, and operates its deliverance from evil. Exterior or temporal knowledge comprehends holy writ, and every science but self-knowledge.

Dispassion likewise is either exterior or interior; as proceeding from a temporal motive, aversion from trouble; or a spiritual impulse, the conviction that nature is a dream, a mere juggle and illusion.

Power is eight-fold: consisting in the faculty of shrinking into a minute form, to which every thing is pervious; or enlarging to a gigantic body; or assuming levity (rising along a sunbeam to the solar orb); or possessing unlimited reach of organs (as touching the moon with the tip of a finger); or irresistible will (for instance, sinking into the earth, as easily as in water); dominion over all beings animate or inanimate; faculty of changing the course of nature; ability to accomplish every thing desired.

The notion, that such transcendent power is attainable by man in this life, is not peculiar to the Sanc'hya sect: it is generally prevalent among the Hindus, and amounts to a belief of magic. A Yogi, imagined to have acquired such faculties, is, to vulgar apprehension, a sorcerer, and is so represented in many a drama and popular tale.

One of the four chapters of Patanjali's Yoga-sastra (the third), relates almost exclusively to this subject, from which it takes its title. It is full of directions for bodily and mental exercises, consisting of intensely profound meditation on special topics, accompanied by suppression of breath and restraint of the senses, while steadily maintaining prescribed postures. By such exercises, the adept acquires the knowledge of every thing past and future, remote or hidden; he divines the thoughts of others 5 gains the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the wind; flies in the air, floats in water, dives into the earth, contemplates all worlds at one glance, and performs other strange feats.

But neither power, however transcendent, nor dispassion, nor virtue, however meritorious, suffices for the attainment of beatitude. It serves but to prepare the soul for that absorbed contemplation, by which the great purpose of deliverance is to be accomplished.

The promptest mode of attaining beatitude through absorbed contemplation, is devotion to God; consisting in repeated muttering of his mystical name, the syllable om, at the same time meditating its signification. It is this which constitutes efficacious devotion; whereby the deity, propitiated, confers on the votary the boon that is sought; precluding all impediments, and effecting the attainment of an inward sentiment that prepares the soul for liberation.

"God, ISWARA, the supreme ruler," according to Patanjali, [Yoga-sastra 1. 23—24, and 26—29.] "is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls; unaffected by the ills with which they are beset; unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythology); himself infinite, unlimited by time."

CAPILA, on the other hand, denies an Iswara, ruler of the world by volition: alleging that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. [Cap. 1. 91—98; 3. 52—55; 5. 2—12; and 6. 64—78.] He acknowledges, indeed, a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute; source of all individual intelligences, and origin of other existences successively evolved and developed. He expressly affirms, "that the truth of such an Iswara is demonstrated:" [Cap. 3, 55.] the creator of worlds, in such sense of creation: for "the existence of effects," he says, "is dependent upon consciousness, not upon Iswara;" and "all else is from the great principle, intellect." [Cap. 6. 65 and 66.] Yet that being is finite; having a beginning and an end; dating from the grand development of the universe, to terminate with the consummation of all things. But an infinite being, creator and guide of the universe by volition, Capila positively disavows. [Cap. 1.] "Detached from nature, unaffected therefore by consciousness and the rest of nature's trammels, he could have no inducement to creation; fettered by nature, he could not be capable of creation. Guidance requires proximity, as the iron is attracted by the magnet; and, in like manner, it is by proximity that living souls govern individual bodies, enlightened by animation as hot iron is by heat."

Passages of admitted authority, in which God is named, relate, according to Capila and his followers, either to a liberated soul or to a mythological deity, or that superior, not supreme being, whom mythology places in the midst of the mundane egg.

Such is the essential and characteristic difference of CAPILA's and PATANJALI's, the atheistical and deistical, Sanc'hyas.

In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning  and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's Yoga-sastra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Capila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions.

The manner in which a knowledge of those principles or categories that are recognised by the Sanc'hyas may be acquired, is set forth in the Carica: "Sensible objects become known by perception. It is by inference or reasoning, that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained: and a truth, which is neither to be directly perceived nor to be inferred by reasoning, is deduced from revelation. For various causes, things may be imperceptible or unperceived; distance, nearness, minuteness; confusion, concealment; predominance of other matters; defect of organs or inattention. It is owing to the subtlety of nature, not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; whence it is concluded as their cause; in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar." [Car. 6. 8.]

"Effect subsists antecedently to the operation of cause:" a maxim not unlike the ancient one, that "nothing comes of nothing;" for it is the material, not the efficient, cause, which is here spoken of.

The reasons alleged by the Sanc'hyas [Car. 9.] are, that "what exists not, can by no operation of a cause be brought into existence:" that is, effects are educts, rather than products. Oil is in the seed of sesamum before it is expressed; rice is in the husk before it is peeled; milk is in the udder before it is drawn. ''Materials, too, are selected, which are apt for the purpose:" milk, not water, is taken to make curds. "Every thing is not by every means possible:" cloth, not earthen ware, may be made with yarn. "What is capable, does that to which it is "competent:" a potter does not weave cloth, but makes a jar, from a lump of clay, with a wheel and other implements. "The nature of cause and effect is the same:" a piece of cloth does not essentially differ from the yarn of which it is wove; as an ox does from a horse: barley, not rice or peas, grows out of barley-corns.

"There is a general cause, which is undistinguishable." [Car. 15. 16.] This position is supported by divers arguments. "Specific objects are finite;" they are multitudinous and not universal: there must then be a single all pervading cause. Another argument is drawn from affinity; "homogeneousness indicates a cause." An earthen jar implies a lump of clay of which it is made; a golden coronet presumes a mass of gold of which it was fabricated: seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, it is readily concluded, says the scholiast, that his parents are of the sacerdotal tribe. There must then be a cause bearing affinity to effects which are seen. Another reason is "existence of effects through energy:" there must be a cause adequate to the effects. A potter is capable of fabricating pottery: he makes a pot, not a car, nor a piece of cloth. The main argument of the Sanc'hyas on this point is "the parting or issuing of effects from cause, and the re-union of the universe." A type of this is the tortoise, which puts forth its limbs, and again retracts them within its shell. So, at the general destruction or consummation of all things, taking place at an appointed period, the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, and ether, constituting the three worlds, are withdrawn in the inverse order of that in which they proceeded from the primary principles, returning step by step to their first cause, the chief and undistinguishable one, which is nature.

It operates by means of the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. It does so by mixture; as the confluence of three streams forms one river; for example, the Ganges: or as threads interwoven constitute a piece of cloth: and as a picture is a result of the union of pigments. It operates "by modification" too: as water, dropped from a cloud, absorbed by the roots of plants, and carried into the fruit, acquires special flavour, so are different objects diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively. Thus, from one chief cause, which is nature, spring three dissimilar worlds, observes the scholiast, peopled by Gods enjoying bliss, by men suffering pain, by inferior animals affected with dulness. It is owing to prevalence of particular qualities. In the Gods, goodness prevails, and foulness and darkness are foreign; and therefore are the Gods supremely happy. In man, foulness is prevalent, and goodness and darkness are strangers; wherefore man is eminently wretched. In animals, darkness predominates, and goodness and foulness are wanting; and therefore are animals extremely dull.

The existence of soul is demonstrated by several arguments: [Car. 17.] "The assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; " as a bed is for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter: that other, who uses it, must be a sensitive being; and the sensitive being is soul. The converse of sensible objects endued with the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, indiscriminate, common, inanimate, and prolific, must exist, devoid of qualities, discriminate, and so forth: that is soul. "There must be superintendence;" as there is a charioteer to a car: the superintendent of inanimate matter is soul. "There must be one to enjoy" what is formed for enjoyment: a spectator, a witness of it: that spectator is soul. "There is a tendency to abstraction:" the wise and unwise alike desire a termination of vicissitude: holy writ and mighty sages tend to that consummation; the final and absolute extinction of every sort of pain: there must then be a being capable of abstraction, essentially unconnected with pleasure, pain, and illusion: and that being is soul.

There is not one soul to all bodies, as a string on which pearls are strung; but a separate soul for each particular body. "Multitude of souls" is proved by the following arguments. [Car. 18.] "Birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally:" if one soul animated all bodies, one being born, all would be born; one dying, all would die; one being blind, or deaf, or dumb, all would be blind, or deaf, or dumb; one seeing, all would see; one hearing, all would hear; one speaking, all would speak. Birth is the union of soul with instruments, namely, intellect, consciousness, mind and corporeal organs; it is not a modification of soul, for soul is unalterable. Death is its abandonment of them; not an extinction of it, for it is unperishable. Soul then is multitudinous. "Occupations are not at one time universally the same:" if one soul animated all beings, then all bodies would be stirred by the same influence, but it is not so: some are engaged in virtue, others occupied with vice; some restraining passions, others yielding to them; some involved in error, others seeking knowledge. Souls therefore are numerous. "Qualities affect differently:" one is happy; another miserable; and again, another stupid. The Gods are ever happy; man, unhappy; inferior animals, dull. Were there but one soul, all would be alike. The attributes of the several principles, material and immaterial, discrete and undiscrete, perceptible and imperceptible, are compared and contrasted. "A discrete principle," as is affirmed by the Sanc'hyas, [Car. 10, 11.] "is causable:" it is uneternal, "inconstant," one while apparent, at another time evanescent: it is "unpervading," not entering into all; for effect is possessed with its cause, not cause with its effect: it is acted upon, and "mutable," changing from one body to another: it is "multitudinous;" for there are so many minds, intellects, &c. as there are souls animating bodies: it is "supported," resting upon its cause: it is involvable, "merging" one into another, and implying one the other: it is "conjunct," consisting of parts or qualities; as sound, taste, smell, &c.: it is "governed,'' or dependent on another's will.

"The undiscrete principle" is in all these respects the reverse: it is causeless, eternal, all pervading, immutable, or unacted upon; single, as being the one cause of three orders of beings; unsupported (relying but on itself); uninvolvable (not merging or implying); unconjunct; consisting of no parts; self-ruled.

Discrete principles, as well as the undiscrete one, have the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness: the one (nature) having them in its own right, as its form or properties; the rest, because they are its effects: as black yarn makes black cloth. They are undiscriminating or "indiscriminate;" not distinguishing quality from quality, and confounding nature with qualities: for nature is not distinct from itself, nor are qualities separate from it. They are "objects" of apprehension and enjoyment for every soul, external to discriminative knowledge, but subjects of it. They are "common," like an utensil, or like a harlot. They are "irrational" or unsentient; unaware of pain or pleasure: from an insensible lump of clay comes an insensible earthen pot. They are "prolific;" one producing or generating another: nature producing intellect, and intellect generating consciousness, and so forth.

Soul, on the contrary, is devoid of qualities; it is discriminative; it is no object of enjoyment; it is several or peculiar; it is sensitive, aware of pain and pleasure; unprolific, for nothing is generated by it.

In these respects it differs from all the other principles. On certain points it conforms with the undiscrete principle, and differs from the discrete: in one regard it agrees with these and disagrees with the other: for it is not single, but on the contrary multitudinous; and it is causeless, eternal, pervading, immutable, unsupported, unmerging or unimplying, unconjunct (consisting of no parts), self-governed.

The attributes of the perceptible, discrete principles and of the undiscrete, indefinite one, are considered to be proved [Car. 14.] by the influence of the three qualities in one instance, and their absence in the converse; and by conformity of cause and effect: an argument much and frequently relied upon. It concerns the material, not the efficient, cause.

From the contrast between soul and the other principles, it follows, as the Carica [Car. 19, 20.] affirms, that "soul is witness, bystander, spectator, solitary and passive. Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible: and, though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent."

"Though inanimate, nature performs the office of preparing the soul for its deliverance, in like manner as it is a function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf." [ Car. 75.]

Nature is likened to a female dancer, exhibiting herself to soul as to an audience, and is reproached with shamelessness for repeatedly exposing herself to the rude gaze of the spectator. "She desists, however, when she has sufficiently shown herself. She does so, because she has been seen; he desists, because he has seen her. There is no further use for the world: yet the connexion of soul and nature still subsists." [Car. 59, 61, 66.]

By attainment of spiritual knowledge through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, single truth is learned: so the Carica declares [Car. 64.] that "neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor I exist."

"All which passes in consciousness, in intellect is reflected by the soul, as an image which sullies not the crystal, but appertains not to it. Possessed of this self-knowledge, soul contemplates at ease nature thereby debarred from prolific change, and precluded therefore from every other form and effect of intellect, but that spiritual saving knowledge." [Car. 65.]

"Yet soul remains awhile invested with body; as the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished." [Car. 67, 68.]

"Thus," concludes the Carica, "this abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint. The sage compassionately taught it to Asuri, who communicated it to Panchas'ic'ha, and by him it was promulgated to mankind." [Car. 69, 70.]
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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VII. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.


[Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Feb. 21, 1824.]

[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. p. 92-118.]

In the preceding essay, the Sanc'hya, theistical as well as atheistical, was examined. The subject of the present essay will be the dialectic philosophy of GOTAMA, and atomical of Canade, respectively called Nyaya "reasoning," and Vaiseshica "particular." The first,, as its title implies, is chiefly occupied with the metaphysics of logic; the second with physics: that is, with "particulars" or sensible objects; and hence its name. They may be taken generally as parts of one system, supplying each other's deficiencies; commonly agreeing upon such points as are treated by both, yet on some differing, and therefore giving origin to two schools, the Naiyayica and Vaiseshica.

From these have branched various subordinate schools of philosophy; which, in the ardour of scholastic disputation, have disagreed on matters of doctrine or of interpretation. The ordinary distinction between them is that of ancients and moderns; besides appellations derived from the names of their favourite authors, as will be more particularly noticed in another place.

The text of Gotama is a collection of sutras or succinct aphorisms, in five books or "lectures," each divided into two "days" or diurnal lessons; and these again subdivided into sections or articles, termed pracaranas, as relating to distinct topics. It is a maxim, that a section is not to consist of so little as a single sutra; and to make good the rule, some stress is occasionally put upon the text, either splitting an aphorism or associating it incongruously.

Canade's collection of sutras is comprised in ten lectures, similarly divided into two daily lessons, and these into pracaranas, or sections, containing two or more sutras relative to the same topic.

Like the text of other sciences among the Hindus, the sutras of GOTAMA and of Canade have been explained and annotated by a triple set of commentaries, under the usual titles of Bhashya, Vartica, and Tica. These (the Bhashya especially) are repeatedly cited by modern commentators, as well as by writers of separate treatises; but (so far as has come under my immediate notice) without naming the authors; and I cannot adventure, having no present opportunity of consulting the original scholia in a collective form, to assign them to their proper authors, from recollection of former researches.

They are of high authority, and probably of great antiquity; and it frequently becomes a question with the later commentators, whether a particular passage is to be taken for a sutra and part of the text, or for a gloss of the ancient scholiast.

Commentaries which are now at hand, and which have been consulted in the course of preparing the present treatise, are the Vartica-tatparya-parisudd'hi of the celebrated Udayanacharya, and the Vartica-tatparya-'tica of the no less celebrated Vachespati-Misra. The more modern scholia of Viswanat'ha upon Gotama's text, and Sancara-Misra upon Canade's, are those to which most frequent reference has been made for the present purpose.

Separate treatises of distinguished authors teach, and amply dis- cuss, the elements of the science. Sucli are the Nyaya-Uldvati of ballabha-a'cha'rya, following chiefly Canade's system. An easier, and more concise introduction than these abstruse and voluminous works afford, is found requisite to the initiatory study of the science. One of the most approved elementary treatises is the Tarca-bhasha of Cesava-Misra, author of many other tracts. Though adapted to the comprehension of the learner without the aid of a gloss, it has nevertheless employed the labour of many commentators, expounding and illustrating it. Among others may be named, in order of seniority, Goverd'hana-Mis'ra in the Tarca- bhasha-pracasa; Gauricanta (author likewise of the Sadyuctimuctavali) in the Bhavart'hadipica; Mad'havadeva (author of the Nyayasara) in the Tarca-bhasha-sara manjari: besides Ramalinga-Criti in the Nyaya-sangraha, whose relative antiquity is less certain; and Balibhadra, who is known to me only from Gauricanta's citations.

Another compendious introduction to the study of Indian logic is the Padart'ha-dipica by Conda-Bhatta, a noted grammarian, author of the Vaiyacarana bhushana, on the philosophy of grammatical structure. It does not appear to have had any commentator, and it needs none.

Metrical treatises, or memorial verses, comprising the elements of the science, bear the ordinary demonstration of Carica. A work of this description is the Cusumanjali, with its commentary, by Narayana-Tirt'ha; another, which likewise is expounded by its author, is the Nyaya-sancshepa of Govinda-Bhattacharya.

Elementary works only have been here spoken of. Distinct treatises on divers branches of the whole subject, and on various emergent  topics, are innumerable. No department of science or literature has more engaged the attention of the Hindus than the Nyaya; and the fruit of their lucubrations has been an infinity of volumes, among which are compositions of very celebrated schoolmen.

The order observed, both by Gotama and by Canade, in delivering the precepts of the science which they engage to unfold, is that which has been intimated in a passage of the Vedas cited in the Bhashya, as requisite steps of instruction and study: viz. enunciation, definition, and investigation. Enunciation (uddesa) is the mention of a thing by its name; that is, by a term signifying it, as taught by revelation: for language is considered to have been revealed to man. Definition (lacshana) sets forth a peculiar property, constituting the essential character of a thing. Investigation (paricsha) consists in disquisition upon the pertinence and sufficiency of the definition. Consonantly to this, the teachers of philosophy premise the terms of the science, proceed to the definitions, and then pass on to the examination of subjects so premised.

In a logical arrangement the "predicaments" (padart'ha), or "objects of proof," are six, as they are enumerated by Canade; [ C. 1. 3.] viz. substance, qualify, action, community, particularity, and aggregation or intimate relation: to which a seventh is added by other authors; privation or negation. [Tarc. Bhash. 1.] Thus augmented, they compose a two-fold arrangement, positive and negative (bhava and abhava); the first comprising six, the latter one. [Pad. Dip. 1.]

The Baudd'has, or followers of Budd'ha, are said to identify the predicaments with knowledge (jnyana); and according to the Vedantis, who are pantheists, the predicaments are identified with the universal being (Brahme) in whom all exists. [Tarc. Bhash. and N. Sang. 2, 4.]

Other categories are alleged by different authorities; as power or energy (sacti); similarity or resemblance (sadrisya); and many more. But the logicians of this school acknowledge but six, or at most seven, abovementioned.

Gotama enumerates sixteen heads or topics: among which, proof or evidence, and that which is to be proven, are chief; and the rest are subsidiary or accessory, as contributing to knowledge and ascertainment of truth. Disputation being contemplated in this arrangement, several among these heads relate to controversial discussion. They are, 1st, proof; 2d, that which is to be known and proven; 3d, doubt; 4th, motive; 5th, instance; 6th, demonstrated truth; 7th, member of a regular argument or syllogism; 8th, reasoning by reduction to absurdity; 9th, determination or ascertainment; 10th, thesis or disquisition; 11th, controversy; 12th, objection; 13th, fallacious reason; 14th, perversion; 15th, futility; 16th, confutation. [G. 1.]

The difference between these two arrangements is not considered to amount to discrepancy. They are held to be reconcileable: the one more ample, the other more succinct; but both leading to like results.

The Sanc'hya philosophy, as shewn in a former essay, [Ante, p. 153, &c.] affirms two eternal principles, soul and matter; (for pracriti or nature, abstracted from modifications, is no other than matter): and reckoning, with these two permanent principles, such as are transient, they enumerate twenty-five.

The Nyaya, as well as the Sanc'hya, concur with other schools of psychology in promising beatitude, or (nihsreyas) final excellence; and (mocsha) deliverance from evil, for the reward of a thorough knowledge of the principles which they teach; that is, of truth; meaning the conviction of the soul's eternal existence separable from body.

Soul then, as the Bhashya affirms, is that which is to be known and proven, Gotama, however, enumerates under this head, besides soul, its associate body, the external senses, things or the objects of sense (that is, the elements; and his followers here take occasion to introduce Canade's six categories), intellect or understanding, mind, or the eternal organ, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit or consequence of deeds, pain or physical evil, and lastly, liberation; making, together with soul, twelve (prameya) objects of proof, being topics of knowledge requisite for deliverance.

1. Evidence or proof (pramana) by which those objects are known and demonstrated, is of four kinds: perception; inference of three sorts (consequent, antecedent, and analogous); comparison, and affirmation (comprehending tradition, as well as revelation). Inference a priori concludes an effect from its cause; inference a posteriori deduces a cause from its effect: another ground of inference is analogy. Or one sort is direct and affirmative; another indirect or negative; and the third is both direct and indirect.

Proof (pramdana) is defined to be the efficient or especial cause of actual knowledge: and this intends right notion (anubhava); exclusive, consequently, of wrong notion; as error, doubt, and reduction to absurdity, and likewise exclusive of memory: for notion (anubhava) is knowledge other than remembrance.

Cause (carana) is that which is efficacious, necessarily preceding an effect that cannot else be: and conversely, effect (carya) is that which necessarily ensues and could not else be.

For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts of cause, connexion (sambandha) or relation, in general, must be considered. It is two-fold: simple conjunction (sanyoga), and aggregation or intimate and constant relation. (samavaya); the latter being the connexion of things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other: for example, parts and that which is composed of them, as yam and cloth; for so long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the connexion of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation; but that of the loom is simple conjunction. Consonantly to this distinction, cause is intimate or direct, producing aggregation or an intimately relative effect, as clay of pottery, or yam of cloth: or it is mediate or indirect, being proximate to the aggregating cause, as conjunction of yarn, serving for the production of cloth: or thirdly, it is neither direct nor indirect; but instrumental or concomitant, as the loom. Of positive things there must be three causes, and the most efficacious is termed the chief or especial cause: of negative there is but one, which is the third abovementioned.

This would be the place for an ample discussion of the several sorts of proof abovementioned. But they are topics embracing too great a scope of disquisition in the Hindu philosophy, to be adequately considered within the limits of the present essay. The subject, therefore, is reserved for future consideration, in a connected view of it, with relation to the various Indian systems of philosophising, after they shall have been severally examined.

II. 1. The first and most important of twelve objects of evidence or matters to be proven, enumerated by Gotama, is soul. [G. 1. 1. 3. 2. and 3. 1. 1—5. Tarc. Bhash. 2. 1.] It is the site of knowledge or sentiment: distinct from body and from the senses; different for each individual coexistent person; infinite; eternal; perceived by the mental organ; and demonstrated by its peculiar attributes, intellect, &c. For knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pain and pleasure, severally and collectively, argue the existence of soul: since these are not universal attributes, as number, quantity, &c. common to all substances; but are peculiar and characteristic qualities, apprehended exclusively by one organ, as colour and other peculiar qualities are; yet belonging not to apparent substances, as earth, and the rest; and arguing therefore a distinct substratum, other than space, time and mind, to which universal, not peculiar, qualities appertain. That distinct substance, which is the substratum of those peculiar qualities, is the soul.

This concerns the living soul (jivatma), the animating spirit of individual person. Souls then, as is expressly affirmed, are numerous. But the supreme soul (Paramatma) is one: the seat of eternal knowledge; demonstrated as the maker of all things. [Pad. Dip. 1. 8.]

The individual soul is infinite; for whithersoever the body goes there the soul too is present. It experiences the fruit of its deeds; pain or pleasure. It is eternal, because it is infinite; for whatever is infinite is likewise eternal; as the etherial element (acasa).

Being a substance, though immaterial, as a substratum of (qualities, it is placed in Canade's arrangement as one of nine substances which are there recognised. [G. 1.]

It has fourteen qualities: viz. number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and faculty of imagination.

2. The second among matters to be proven in Gotama's enumeration, is body. It is the site of effort, of organs of sensation, and of sentiment of pain or pleasure. [G. 1. 1. 3. 3.]

It is an ultimate compound; the seat of soul's enjoyment. It is a whole, composed of parts; a framed substance, not inchoative: associated with which, soul experiences fruition; that is, immediate presence of pain or of pleasure, in relation to itself.

It is the site of effort; not of motion simply, but of action tending to the attainment of what is pleasing, and to the removal of what is displeasing. [Tarc. Bhash. and Com.]

It is earthly; for the qualities of earth are perceived in it: (namely, smell, colour, solidity, &c. ): and it is expressly pronounced so by more than one passage of the Vedas. According to some opinions, it consists of three elements, earth, water, and light or heat; for the peculiar qualities of those elements are perceptible in it, since it has smell, clamminess, and warmth: or it consists of four, since there is inspiration as well as expiration of air: or of five, as indicated by odour, moisture, digestion, breath, and cavities. [G. 3. 1. 6. 1—5.] Those opinions are controverted by the Nyaya. It consists not of five, nor of four elements: else, as Canade argues, it would be invisible; for the union of visible with invisible objects is so: instance wind. Nor does it consist of three visible elements, nor of two: for there is no intimate inchoative union of heterogeneous substances. [Can. 4. 2. 1. and Com.] This last reason is alleged likewise by Capila: heterogeneous materials cannot enter into the same composition. [Cap. 3. 16—18 and 5. 99.]

Besides human and other bodies of this world, all which are terrene, there are, in other worlds, aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies. In these, too, there is union with an element, for soul's fruition. [Bhashya on Got.]

Earthly body is two-fold; sexually bred, or not so bred: the first is either viviparous or oviparous: the second results from concurrence of particles by an unseen or predestined cause, and peculiar disposition of atoms. That such beings are, is proved from authority of the Vedas, which reveal creation of Gods and demi-Gods.

Or the distinction is between such as are propagated by sexes or are otherwise generated. The hitter comprehends equivocal generation of worms, nits, maggots, gnats, and other vermin, considered to be bred in sweat or fermented filth; and germination of plants sprouting from the ground. Accordingly, the distinct sorts of body are five: 1st, ungenerated; 2d, uterine or viviparous; 3d, oviparous; 4th, engendered in filth; 5th, vegetative or germinating. [Pad. Dip. and Madh. on Ces.]

3. Next, among objects of proof, are the organs of sensation. An organ of sense is defined as an instrument of knowledge, conjoined to the body and imperceptible to the senses. [Tarc. Bhash.]

There are five external organs: smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing. They are not modifications of consciousness (as the Sanc'hyas maintain), but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, respectively. [GOT. 1. 1. 3. 4-5 and 3. 1. 7 and 8.]

The pupil of the eye is not the organ of sight (as the Baudd'has affirm); nor is the outer ear, or opening of the auditory passage, the organ of hearing: but a ray of light, proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed, is the visual organ; and ether, contained in the cavity of the ear, and communicating by intermediate ether with the object heard, is the organ of hearing. That ray of light is not ordinarily visible: just as the effulgence of a torch is unseen in meridian sunshine. But, under particular circumstances, a glimpse of the visual ray is obtained. For instance, in the dark, the eye of a cat or other animal prowling at night.

The organ of vision then is lucid; and, in like manner, the organ of hearing is etherial; and that of taste, aqueous (as saliva); and of feeling, aerial; and of smelling, earthly.

The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye; of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear; of the olfactory organ, the nostril or tip of the nose; of the taste, the tip of the tongue; of the feeling, the skin.

Objects apprehended by the senses, are odour, flavour, colour, touch (or temperature), and sound; which are qualities appertaining to earth, water, light, air, and ether. [Got. 1. 1. 3. 6.]

The existence of organs of sense is proved by inference, from the fact of the apprehension of those objects: for apprehension implies an instrument to effect it, since it is an act, in like manner as the act of cutting implies an instrument, as an axe or a knife.

The organs are six, including an internal organ, termed manas, or mind: not five only, as the followers of Budd'ha maintain, disallowing an internal sense; nor so many as eleven, which the Sanc'hyas affirm, comprehending with the senses the organs of action, which they reckon five. [GAU. on CES.]

Mind is the instrument which effects the apprehension of pain, pleasure, or interior sensations; and, by its union with external senses, produces knowledge of exterior objects apprehended through them, as colour, &c., but not independently of those senses, for outward objects.

Its existence is proved by singleness of sensation: since various sensations do not arise at one time to the same soul. They only seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire.

It is single; that is, for each soul, one: not so many minds as there are external senses. When it is conjoined with any one of the outward organs, knowledge is received through that organ: when not so conjoined, none comes through that sense, but through any other with which it then is associated. [GOT. 1. 1. 3. 8. and 3. 2. 6.]

It is not infinite, being imperceptible to the touch, like the etherial element, as the Mimansa maintains; [Pad. Dip.] but it is minutely small, as an atom. Were it infinite, it might be united with every thing at once, and all sensations might be contemporaneous. It is imperceptible to sight, touch, and other senses, and is inferred from reasoning, as follows: there must be an instrument of apprehension of pain and pleasure, which instrument must be other than the sight, or any external sense; for pain and pleasure are experienced though sight be wanting. Such instrument of painful or pleasureable sensation is termed mind (manas).

It is eternal, and is distinct from soul as well as from body, with which it is merely conjoined.

It is reckoned by Canade among substances; and is the substratum of eight qualities, none of which are peculiar to it, being all common to other substances: viz. number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty. [GAU on CES.]

4. Next in Gotama's arrangement are the (art'ha) objects of sense; that is, of the external senses: and he enumerates odour, taste, colour, feel, and sound, which are the peculiar qualities of earth, and the rest of the elements respectively. [GOT. 1. 3. 5.]

Under this head Cesava places the categories (padart'ha) of Canade, which are six; substance, quality, &c.

I. Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect or product: it is the site of qualities and of action; or that in which qualities abide, and in which action takes place. [CAN. 1. 1. 4. 1. CES. and Com. Pad. Dip.]

Nine are enumerated, and no more are recognised. Darkness has been alleged by some philosophers; but it is no substance; nor is body a distinct one; nor gold, which the Mimansacas affirm to be a peculiar substance.

Those specified by Canade are:

1. Earth, which besides qualities common to most substances (as number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, and faculty of velocity and of elasticity), has colour, savour, odour, and feel, or temperature. Its distinguishing quality is smell; and it is succinctly defined as a substance odorous. [CAN. 2. 1. 1.1.] In some instances, as in gems, the smell is latent; but it becomes manifest by calcination.

It is eternal, as atoms; or transient, as aggregates. In either, those characteristic qualities are transitory, and are maturative, as affected by light and heat: for by union with it, whether latent or manifest, former colour, taste, smell, and temperature are in earth of any sort annulled, and other colour, &c. introduced.

Aggregates or products are either organised bodies, or organs of perception, or unorganic masses.

Organised earthly bodies are of five sorts [see body]. The organ of smell is terreous. Unorganic masses are stones, lumps of clay, &c. The union of integrant parts is hard, soft, or cumulative, as stones, flowers, cotton, &c.

2. Water, which has the qualities of earth; excepting smell, and with the addition of viscidity. Odour, when observable in water, is adscititious, arising from mixture of earthly particles.

The distinguishing quality of water is coolness. It is accordingly defined as a substance cool to the feel.

It is eternal, as atoms; transient, as aggregates. The qualities of the first are constant likewise; those of the latter inconstant.

Organic aqueous bodies are beings abiding in the realm of Varuna. The organ of taste is aqueous: witness the saliva. Unorganic waters are rivers, seas, rain, snow, hail, &c.

It is by some maintained, that hail is pure water rendered solid by supervention of an unseen virtue: others imagine its solidity to be owing to mixture of earthy particles.

3. Light is coloured, and illumines other substances; and to the feel is hot: which is its distinguishing quality. It is defined as a substance hot to the feel. [Heat, then, and light, are identified as one substance.]

It has the qualities of earth, except smell, taste, and gravity. It is eternal, as atoms; not so, as aggregates.

Organic luminous bodies are beings abiding in the solar realm. The visual ray., which is the organ of sight, is lucid [see organs of perception]. Unorganic light is reckoned fourfold: earthy, celestial, alvine, and mineral. Another distinction concerns sight and feel; as light or heat may be either latent or manifest, in respect of both sight and feel, or differently in regard to either. Thus fire is both seen and felt; the heat of hot water is felt, but not seen; moonshine is seen, but not felt; the visual ray is neither seen nor felt. Terrestrious light is that, of which the fuel is earthy, as fire. Celestial is that, of which the fuel is watery, as lightning, and meteors of various sorts. Alvine is that, of which the fuel is both earthy and watery: it is intestinal, which digests food and drink. Mineral is that which is found in pits, as gold. For some maintain that gold is solid light; or, at least that the chief ingredient is light, which is rendered solid by mixture with some particles of earth. Were it mere earth, it might be calcined by fire strongly urged. Its light is not latent, but overpowered by the colour of the earthy particles mixed with it. In the Mimansa, however, it is reckoned a distinct substance, as before observed.

4. Air is a colourless substance, sensible to the feel; being temperate (neither hot, nor cold). Besides this its distinguishing quality, it has the same common qualities with light, except fluidity (that is number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty of elasticity and velocity).

Its existence as a distinct substance is inferred from feeling. The wind, that blows, is apprehended as temperate, independently of the influence of light: and this temperature, which is a quality, implies a substratum; for it cannot subsist without one: that substratum is air; different from water, which is cold; and from light, which is hot; and from earth, which is adventitiously warm by induction of light.

Air is either eternal as atoms, or transient as aggregates. Organic aerial bodies are beings inhabiting the atmosphere, and evil spirits (Pisachas, &c.) who haunt the earth. The organ of touch is an aerial integument, or air diffused over the cuticle. Unorganic air is wind, which agitates trees and other tremulous objects. To these may be added, as a fourth kind of aerial aggregates, the breath and other vital airs.

5. Ether (acasa), which is a substance that has the quality of sound. Besides that its peculiar and distinguishing quality, it has number (viz. unity), quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is infinite, one, and eternal.

The existence of an etherial element as a distinct substance is deduced, not from distinct perception, but from inference. Sound is a peculiar quality; for, like colour and other peculiar qualities, it is apprehended by only one external organ of such beings as men are: now a quality abides in a substance which is qualified; but neither soul, nor any one of the four elements, earth, water, light, and air, can be its substratum, for it is apprehended by the organ of hearing: the qualities of earth, and the rest are not apprehended by the hearing, but sound is; therefore it is not a quality of those substances; nor is it a quality of time, space, and mind; since it is a peculiar quality, and those three substances have none but such as are common to many: therefore a substratum, other than all these, is inferred; and that substratum is the etherial element. It is one; for there is no evidence of diversity; and its unity is congruous, as infinity accounts for ubiquity. It is infinite, because it is in effect found every where. It is eternal, because it is infinite.

It appears white, from connexion with a lucid white orb; as a rock-crystal appears red by association with a red object. The blue colour of a clear sky is derived, according to Patanjali, from the southern peak of the great mountain Sumeru, which is composed of sapphire. On other sides of Sumeru the colour of the sky is different, being borrowed from the hue of the peak which overlooks that quarter. Others suppose that the black colour of the pupil of the eye is imparted to the sky (blue and black being reckoned tinges of the same colour), as a jaundiced eye sees every object yellow.

The organ of hearing is etherial, being a portion of ether (acasa) confined in the hollow of the ear, and (as affirmed by the author of of the Padart'ha dipica) endued with a particular and unseen virtue. In the ear of a deaf man, the portion of ether which is there present is devoid of that particular virtue, and therefore it is not a perfect and efficient auditory organ.

6. Time is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of place. It is deduced from the notions of quick, slow, simultaneous, &c., and is marked by association of objects with the sun's revolutions.

Young is the reverse of old, as old is of young. This contrast, which does not concern place, is an effect, needing a cause other than place, &c. That cause is time.

It has the qualities of number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. It is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it takes numerous designations; as past, present, and future, with reference to acts that are so.

7. Place, or space, is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of time. It is deduced from the notions of here and there.

It has the same qualities as time; and like it, is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it receives various designations, as east, west, north, south, &c., by association with the sun's position.

8. Soul, though immaterial, is considered to be a substance, as a substratum of qualities. It is eighth in Canade's arrangement. In Gotama's it is first among things to be proven [see before].

9. Mind, according to Canade, is a ninth substance; and, in Gotama's arrangement, it recurs in two places, as one of the twelve matters to be proven; and again, under the distinct head of organs of sensation, being reckoned an internal sense [see before].

Material substances are by Canade considered to be primarily atoms; and secondarily, aggregates. He maintains the eternity of atoms; and their existence and aggregation are explained as follows: [CAN. 2. 2. 2. 1. CES. &c.]

The mote, which is seen in a sunbeam, is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and an effect, it must be composed of what is less than itself: and this likewise is a substance and an effect; for the component part of a substance that has magnitude must be an effect. This again must be composed of what is smaller, and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed; else the series would be endless: and, were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard-seed and a mountain, a gnat and an elephant, each alike containing an infinity of particles. The ultimate atom then is simple.

The first compound consists of two atoms: for one does not enter into composition; and there is no argument to prove, that more than two must, for incohation, be united. The next consists of three double atoms; for, if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size or number of particles; it cannot be their size, and therefore it must be their number. Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since three suffice to originate magnitude. [CES.] The atom then is reckoned to be the sixth part of a mote visible in a sunbeam. [Pad. Dip.]

Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of God, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and, by concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced; and, by concourse of four triple atoms, a quaternary atom; and so on, to a gross, grosser, or grossest mass of earth: thus great earth is produced; and in like manner, great water, from aqueous atoms; great light from luminous; and great air, from aerial. The qualities that belong to the effect are those which appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause: and conversely, the qualities which belong to the cause are found in the effect.

The dissolution of substances proceeds inversely. In the integrant parts of an aggregate substance resulting from composition, as in the potsherds of an earthen jar, action is induced by pressure attended with velocity, or by simple pressure. Disjunction ensues; whereby the union, which was the cause of incohation of members, is annulled; and the integral substance, consisting of those members, is resolved into its parts, and is destroyed; for it ceases to subsist as a whole.

II. Quality is closely united with substance; not, however, as an intimate cause of it, nor consisting in motion, but common; not a genus, yet appertaining to one. It is independent of conjunction and disjunction; not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities.

Twenty-four are enumerated. Seventeen only are, indeed, specified in Canade's aphorisms; [CAN. 1. 1. 2. 2. and 1. 1. 4. 2.] but the rest are understood.

1. Colour. It is a peculiar quality to be apprehended only by sight; and abides in three substances; earth, water, and light. It is a characteristic quality of the last; and, in that, is white and resplendent. In water, it is white, but without lustre. In the primary .atoms of both it is perpetual; in their products, not so. In earth it is variable; and seven colours are distinguished: viz. white, yellow, green, red, black, tawny (or orange), [One commentator (Madhavadeva) specifies blue in place of orange; another (Gauricanta) omits both, reducing the colours to six.] and variegated. The varieties of these seven colours are many, unenumerated. The six simple colours occur in the atoms of earth; and the seven, including variegated, in its double atoms, and more complex forms. The colour of integrant parts is the cause of colour in the integral substance.

2. Savour: It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by by the organ of taste; and abides in two substances, earth and water. It is a characteristic quality of the last; and in it is sweet. It is perpetual in atoms of water; not so in aqueous products. In earth it is variable; and six sorts are distinguished: sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid, and saline.

3. Odour. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of smell; and abides in earth alone, being its distinguishing quality. In water, odour is adscititious, being induced by union with earthy particles; as a clear crystal appears red by association with a hollyhock, or other flower of that hue. In air also it is adscititious: thus a breeze, which has blown over blossoms, musk, camphor, or other scented substances, wafts fragrant particles of the blossoms, &c. The flowers are not torn, nor the musk diminished; because the parts are replaced by a reproductive unseen virtue. However, camphor and other volatile substances do waste.

Two sorts of odour are distinguished, fragrance and stench.

4. Feel, and especially temperature. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the skin or organ of feeling. It abides in four substances: earth, water, light, and air; and is a characteristic quality of the last.

Three sorts are distinguished, cold, hot, and temperate. In water, it is cold; in light, hot; in earth and in air, temperate. Divers other sorts, likewise, are noticed; as hard and soft, and diversified, &c. These four qualities are latent in minute substances, as atoms and double atoms; manifest to perception in products or aggregates of greater magnitude. A mote in a sunbeam may be seen, though not felt. The colour of the visual ray, or organ of sight, is ordinarily imperceptible.

5. Number. It is the reason of perceiving and reckoning one, two, or many, to the utmost limit of numeration. The notion of number is deduced from comparison. Of two masses seen, this is one, and that is one: hence the notion of two, and so of more.

It is an universal quality, common to all substances without exception.

It is considered of two sorts, unity and multitude; or of three, monad, duad, and multitude. Unity is either eternal or transient: eternal unity regards eternal things; that which is uneternal, concerns effects or transitory substances.

6. Quantity. It is the special cause of the use and perception of measure.

It is an universal quality, common to all substances.

It is considered to be fourfold: great and small; long and short.

Extreme littleness and shortness are eternal; as mind, or as atoms, whether single or double, &c. Extreme length and greatness (termed infinite) are likewise eternal, as ether.

Within these extremes is inferior magnitude or finite quantity; which is uneternal. It is of various degrees in length and bulk, more or most; from the mote or tertiary atom, upwards, to any magnitude short of infinite.

The finite magnitude of products or effects results from number, size, or mass. Multitude of atoms, bulk of particles, and heap of component parts, constitute magnitude. The latter, or cumulation of particles, concerns a loose texture. The others, close or compact. Infinity transcends the senses. An object may be too great, as it may be too small, to be distinguished.

7. Individuality, severalty, or separateness, is a quality common to all substances.

It is of two sorts; individuality of one or of a pair; or it is manifold, as individuality of a triad, &c. Simple individuality is eternal, in respect of eternal things; transient, in regard to such as are transitory. Individuality, of a pair or triad, &c. is of course transitory: it results from comparison, as duad or triad does.

8. Conjunction is a transient connexion.

It is an universal quality incident to all substances and is transitory.

It implies two subjects, and is threefold: arising from the act of either or of both, or else from conjunction; being simple, or reciprocal, or mediate. The junction of a falcon perching, which is active, with the perch whereon it settles, which is passive, is conjunction arising from the act of one. Collision of fighting rams, or of wrestlers, is conjunction arising from the act of both. Contact of a finger with a tree occasions the conjunction of the body with the tree; and this is mediate.

9. Disjunction. It is the converse of conjunction; necessarily preceded by it, and like it, implying two subjects. It is not the mere negation of conjunction, nor simply the dissolution of it.

The knowledge of this quality, as well as of its counterpart, is derived from perception.

It is an universal quality incident to all substances and is simple, reciprocal, or mediate. A falcon taking flight from a rock, is an instance of disjunction arising from the act of one of two subjects; the active from the inactive. The parting of combatants, rams or wrestlers, is an example of disjunction arising from the act of both. Disjunction of the body and the tree, resulting from the disunion of the finger and the tree, is mediate.

10. — 11. Priority and posteriority. These qualities, being contrasted and correlative, are considered together. They are of two sorts, concerning place and time. In respect of place, they are proximity and distance; in regard to time, youth and antiquity. The one concerns (murta) definite bodies, consisting of circumscribed quantity; the other affects generated substances.

The knowledge of them is derived from comparison.

Two masses being situated in one place, nearness is deduced from the conjunction of one with place as associated by comparison, referring primarily to the person of the spectator; or, secondarily, to other correlatives of place. Where least conjunction of conjunct things intervenes, it is nearness; where most does, it is remoteness. Thus, Prayaga is nearer to Mat'hura than Casi, and Casi remoter from it than Prayaga.

In like manner, one of two masses, not restricted to place, is young, as deduced from the association of the object with time, by comparison discriminating that which is connected with least time. Another is old, which is connected with most time. Here time is determined by revolutions of the sun.

12. Gravity is the peculiar cause of primary descent or falling. [Tarc. Bhash, and Pad. Dip.]

It affects earth and water. Gold is affected by this quality, by reason of earth contained in it.

In the absence of a countervailing cause, as adhesion, velocity, or some act of volition . descent results from this quality. Thus a cocoa-nut is withheld from falling by adhesion of the foot-stalk; but, this impediment ceasing on maturity of the fruit, it falls.

According to Udayana Acharya, gravity is imperceptible, but to be inferred from the act of falling, Ballabha maintains, that it is perceived in the position of a thing descending to a lower situation.

Levity is a distinct quality, but the negation of gravity.

13. Fluidity is the cause of original trickling. [Tarc. Bhash. and Pad. Dip.]

It affects earth, light, and water. It is natural and essential in water; adscititious in earth and light; being induced by exhibition of fire in molten substances, as lac, gold, &c.

Fluidity is perceptible by the external senses, sight and touch.

In hail and ice, fluidity essentially subsists; but is obstructed by an impediment arising from an unseen virtue which renders the water solid.

14. Viscidity is the quality of clamminess and cause of agglutination. It abides in water only. In oil, liquid butter, &c., it results from the watery parts of those liquids. [Ibid and Siddh. Sang.]

15. Sound is a peculiar quality of the etherial element, and is to be apprehended by the hearing. It abides in that element exclusively, and is its characteristic quality. Two sorts are distinguished: articulate and musical. [Ibid.]

To account for sound originating in one place being heard in another, it is observed, that sound is propagated by undulation, wave after wave, radiating in every direction, from a centre, like the blossoms of a Nauclea. It is not the first, nor the intermediate wave, that is the sound heard, but the last which comes in contact with the organ of hearing; and therefore it is not quite correct to say, that a drum has been heard. Sound originates in conjunction, in disjunction, or in sound itself. The conjunction of cymbals, or that of a drum and stick, may serve to exemplify the first. It is the instrumental cause. The rustling of leaves is an instance of disjunction being the cause of sound. In some cases, sound becomes the cause of sound. In all, the conformity of wind, or its calmness, is a concomitant cause: for an adverse wind obstructs it. The material cause is in every case the etherial fluid; and the conjunction of that with the sonorous subject is a concomitant cause.

The Mimansa affirms the eternity of sound. This is contested by the Naiyayicas, who maintain, that were it eternal, it could not be apprehended by human organs of sense.

16 — 23. The eight following qualities are perceptible by the mental organ, not by the external senses. They are qualities of the soul, not of material substances.

16. Intelligence (budd'hi) is placed by Canade among qualities; and by Gotama, fifth among objects of proof. It will be noticed in that place.

17 and 18. Pleasure and pain are among qualities enumerated by CANADE. Pain or evil is placed by Gotama among objects of proof; where (under the head of deliverance) it will be further noticed, with its converse.

19 and 20. Desire and aversion are the two next in order among qualities. Desire is the wish of pleasure and of happiness, and of absence of pain. Passion is extreme desire; it is incident to man and inferior beings. The supreme being is devoid of passion. Neither does desire intend God's will, nor a saint's wish. Aversion is loathing or hatred.

21. Volition (yatna), effort or exertion, is a determination to action productive of gratification. Desire is its occasion, and perception its reason. Two sorts of perceptible effort are distinguished: that proceeding from desire, seeking what is agreeable; and that which proceeds from aversion, shunning what is loathsome. Another species, which escapes sensation or perception, but is inferred from analogy of spontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for a cause the vital unseen power.

Volition, desire, and intelligence, are in man transitory, variable, or inconstant. The will and intelligence of God are eternal, uniform, constant.

22 and 23. Virtue and vice (D'harma and Ad'harma), or moral merit and demerit, are the peculiar causes of pleasure and of pain respectively. The result of performing that which is enjoined, as sacrifice, &c. is virtue; the result of doing that which is forbidden, is vice. They are qualities of the soul; imperceptible, but inferred from reasoning.

The proof of them is deduced from transmigration. The body of an individual, with his limbs and organs of sense, is a result of a peculiar quality of his soul; since this is the cause of that individual's fruition, like a thing which is produced by his effort or volition. The peculiar quality of the soul, which does occasion its being invested with body, limbs, and organs, is virtue or vice: for body and the rest are not the result of effort and volition. [Tarc. Bhash.]

24. The twenty-fourth and last quality is faculty (sanscara). This comprehends three sorts.

Velocity (vega), which is the cause of action. It concerns matter only; and is a quality of the mental organ, and of the four grosser elements, earth, water, light, and air. It becomes manifest from the perception of motion.

Elasticity (st'hitist'havaca) is a quality of particular tangible, terrene objects; and is the cause of that peculiar action, whereby an altered thing is restored to its pristine state, as a bow unbends and a strained branch resumes its former position. It is imperceptible; but is inferred from the fact of the restitution of a thing to its former condition.

Imagination (bhavana) is a peculiar quality of the soul, and is the cause of memory. It is a result of notion or recollection; and being excited, produces remembrance: and the exciting cause is the recurrence of an association; that is, of the sight or other perception of a like object.

III. The next head in Canade's arrangement, after quality, is action (carme).

Action consists in motion, and, like quality, abides in substance alone. It affects a single, that is a finite substance, which is matter. It is the cause (not aggregative, but indirect) of disjunction, as of conjunction: that is, a fresh conjunction in one place, after annulment of a prior one in another, by means of disjunction. It is devoid of quality, and is transitory.

Five sorts are enumerated: to cast upward; to cast downward; to push forward; to spread horizontally; and, fifthly, to go on; including many varieties under the last comprehensive head.

IV. Community (Samanya), or the condition of equal or like things, is the cause of the perception of conformity. It is eternal, single, concerning more than one thing, being a property common to several. It abides in substance, in quality, and in action.

Two degrees of it are distinguished: the highest, concerning numerous objects; the lowest, concerning few. The first is existence, a common property of all. The latter is the abstraction of an individual, varying with age, in dimensions, yet continuing identical. A third, or intermediate degree, is distinguished, comprehended in the first, and including the latter. These three degrees of community correspond nearly with genus, species, and individual.

In another view, community is two-fold: viz. genus (jati) and discriminative property (upadhi), or species.

The Baudd'has are cited as denying this category, and maintaining that individuals only have existence, and that abstraction is false and deceptive. This, as well as other controverted points, will be further noticed at a future opportunity.

V. Difference (visesha), or particularity, is the cause of perception of exclusion. It affects a particular and single object, which is devoid of community. It abides in eternal substances. Such substances are mind, soul, time, place; and the etherial element; and the atoms of earth, water, light, and air.

VI. The sixth and last of Canade's categories is aggregation (samavaya), or perpetual intimate relation. It has been already briefly noticed.

VII. To the six affirmative categories of Canade, succeeding writers add a seventh, which is negative.

Negation or privation (abhava) is of two sorts; universal and mutual. Universal negation comprehends three species, antecedent, emergent, and absolute.

Antecedent privation (pragabhava) is present negation of that which at a future time will be. It is negation in the material cause previous to the production of an effect; as, in yarn, prior to the fabrication of cloth, there is antecedent privation of the piece of cloth which is to be woven. It is without beginning, for it has not been produced; and has an end, for it will be terminated by the production of the effect.

Emergent privation is destruction (dhwansa), or cessation, of an effect. It is negation in the cause, subsequent to the production of the effect: as, in a broken jar, (smashed by the blow of a mallet) the negation of jar in the heap of potsherds. It has a commencement, but no end; for the destruction of the effect cannot be undone.

Absolute negation extends through all times, past, present, and future. It has neither beginning nor end. For example, fire in a lake, colour in air.

Mutual privation is difference (bheda). It is reciprocal negation of identity, essence, or respective peculiarity.

5. To return to Gotama's arrangement. The fifth place, next after objects of sense, is by him allotted to intelligence (budd'hi), apprehension, knowledge, or conception; defined as that which manifests, or makes known, a matter.

It is two-fold; notion and remembrance. Notion (unubhava) includes two sorts; right and wrong. Right notion (prama) is such as is incontrovertible. It is derived from proof, and is consequently fourfold; viz. from perception, or inference, or comparison, or revelation: for example: 1st, ajar perceived by undisordered organs; 2d, fire inferred from smoke; 3d, a gayal [Bos gavoeus s. frontalis. As. Res. vol. viii. p. 487.] recognised from its resemblance to a cow; 4th, celestial happiness attainable through sacrifice, as inculcated by the Vedas.

Wrong notion deviates from truth, and is not derived from proof. It is threefold: doubt; premises liable to reduction to absurdity; and error (for example, mistaking mother-o'-pearl for silver).

Remembrance (smarana), likewise, is either right or wrong. Both occur, and right remembrance especially, while awake. But, in sleep, remembrance is wrong.

6. The sixth place among objects of proof is allotted to mind. It has been already twice noticed; viz. among organs of sense, and again among substances.

7. Activity (pravritti) is next in order. It is determination, the result of passion, and the cause of virtue and vice, or merit and demerit; according as the act is one enjoined or forbidden. It is oral, mental, or corporeal; not comprehending unconscious vital functions. It is the reason of all worldly proceedings.

8. From acts proceed faults (dosha): including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loathing; and error or delusion (moha). The two first of these are reckoned by Canade among qualities.

9. Next in Gotama's arrangement is (pretya-bhava) the condition of the soul after death; which is transmigration: for the soul, being immortal, passes from a former body which perishes, to a new one which receives it. This is a reproduction (punar-utpatti).

10. Retribution (p'hala) is the fruit accruing from faults which result from activity. It is a return of fruition (punarbhoga), or experience of pleasure or pain, in association with body, mind, and senses.

11. Pain, or anguish, is the eleventh topic of matters to be proven.

12. Deliverance from pain is beatitude: it is absolute prevention of every sort of ill; reckoned, in this system of philosophy, to comprehend twenty-one varieties of evil, primary or secondary: viz. 1, body; 2—7, the six organs of sense; 8 — 13, six objects (vishaya) of sensation; 14 — 19, six sorts of apprehension and intelligence (budd'hi); 20, pain or anguish; 21, pleasure. For even this, being tainted with evil, is pain; as honey drugged with poison is reckoned among deleterious substances.

This liberation from ill is attained by soul, acquainted with the truth (tatwa), by means of holy science; divested of passion through knowledge of the evil incident to objects; meditating on itself; and, by the maturity of self-knowledge, making its own essence present; relieved from impediments; not earning fresh merit or demerit, by deeds done with desire; discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit, by devout contemplation; and acquitting it through compressed endurance of its fruit; and thus (previous acts being annulled, and present body departed and no future body accruing), there is no further connexion with the various sorts of ill, since there is no cause for them. This, then, is prevention of pain of every sort; it is deliverance and beatitude.

III. After proof and matter to be proven, Gotama proceeds to other categories, and assigns the next place to doubt (sansaya).

It is the consideration of divers contrary matters in regard to one and the same thing; and is of three sorts, arising from common or from peculiar qualities, or merely from contradiction; discriminative marks being in all three cases unnoticed. Thus an object is observed, concerning which it becomes a question whether it be a man or a post: the limbs which would betoken the man, or the crooked trunk which would distinguish the post, being equally unperceived. Again, odour is a peculiar quality of earth: it belongs not to eternal substances, as the etherial element; nor to transient elements, as water; is then earth eternal or uneternal? So, one affirms that sound is eternal; another denies that position; and a third person doubts.

IV. Motive (prayojana) is that by which a person is actuated, or moved to action. It is the desire of attaining pleasure, or of shunning pain; or the wish of exemption from both; for such is the purpose or impulse of every one in a natural state of mind. [GOT. I. 1. 4, 1—3.]

V. Instance (drish'tanta) is, in a controversy, a topic on which both disputants consent. It is either concordant or discordant; direct or inverse: as the culinary hearth, for a direct instance of the argument of the presence of fire betokened by smoke; and a lake, for an inverse or contrary instance of the argument, where the indicating vapour is mist or fog. [GOT. 1. 1.5. 1—6.]

VI. Demonstrated truth (sidd'hanta) is of four sorts; viz. universally acknowledged; partially so; hypothetically; argumentatively (or, e concessu). [GOT. 1. 1. 6. 1, &c.]

Thus, existence of substance, or of that to which properties appertain, is universally recognised, though the abstract notion of it may not be so; for the Baudd'has deny abstraction. Mind is by the Naiyayicas considered to be an organ of perception, and so it is by the kindred sect of Vaiseshicas. The eternity of sound is admitted in the Mimansa, and denied in the Nyaya. Supposing the creation of the earth to be proved, omniscience of the creator follows. In JAIMINI's disquisition on the eternity, or the transitoriness, of sound, it is said, granting sound to be a quality.

On the appositeness of some of these examples, in the cases to which they are here applied, as instances of divers sorts of demonstration, there is a disagreement among commentators, which it is needless to go into.

VII. A regular argument, or complete syllogism (nyaya), consists of five members (avayava) or component parts. 1st, the proposition (pratijnya); 2d, the reason (hetu or apadesa); 3d, the instance (udaharana or nidarsana); 4th, the application (upanaya); 5th, the conclusion (nigamana). Ex.

1. This hill is fiery:

2. For it smokes.

3. What smokes, is fiery: as a culinary hearth.

4. Accordingly, the hill is smoking:

5. Therefore it is fiery.

Some [The followers of the Mimansa. Pad. Dip.] confine the syllogism (nyaya) to three members; either the three first, or the three last. In this latter form it is quite regular. The recital joined with the instance is the major; the application is the minor; the conclusion follows.

VIII. Next in this arrangement is (tarca) reduction to absurdity. It is a mode of reasoning, for the investigation of truth, by deduction from wrong premises, to an inadmissible conclusion which is at variance with proof, whether actual perception or demonstrable inference. The conclusion to which the premises would lead is in- admissible, as contrary to what is demonstrated, or as conceding what is disproved.

It is not to be confounded with doubt, to which there are two sides; but to this there is but one.

Five sorts are distinguished by the more ancient writers, to which the moderns have added six, or even seven more varieties. It is needless to enumerate them: one or two examples may suffice.

Ex. 1. Is this hill fiery, or not? On this question one delivers his opinion, that it is not fiery. The answer to him is, Were it not fiery, it would not smoke.

Ex. 2. If there be a jar in this place, it must look like the ground.

Fallacy of the same form, termed tarcabhasa, comprises the like number of sorts and varieties.

The designations by which they are distinguished are familiar to the Indian scholastic disputation. It would be tedious to enumerate and explain them.

IX. Ascertainment (nirneya), or determination of truth, is the fruit of proof, the result of evidence and of reasoning, confuting objections and establishing the position in question.

X. — XII. Disputation (cat' ha) is conference or dialogue of interlocutors maintaining adverse positions, whether contending for victory, or seeking the truth. It comprises three of the categories.

X. One is (jalpa) debate of disputants contending for victory; each seeking to establish his own position and overthrow the opponent's.

XI. Another is (vada) discourse, or interlocution of persons communing on a topic in pursuit of truth, as preceptor and pupil together with fellow-students.

XII. The third is (vitanda) cavil, or controversy wherein the disputant seeks to confute his opponent without offering to support a position of his own.

XIII. Next in Gotama's enumeration is fallacy, or, as it is termed, semblance of a reason (hetwabhasa)] it is the non causa pro causa of logicians. Five sorts are distinguished, embracing divers varieties or subdivisions. They need not be here set forth.

XIV. Fraud (ch'hala), or perversion and misconstruction, is of three sorts: 1st, verbal misconstruing of what is ambiguous; 2d, perverting, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one; 3d, generalizing what is particular.

XV. After all these is (jati) a futile answer, or self-confuting reply. No less than twenty-four sorts are enumerated.

XVI. The sixteenth, and last of Gotama's categories, is (nigraha-st'hana) failure in argument, or (parajaya-hetu) reason of defeat. It is the termination of a controversy. Of this, likewise, no fewer than twenty-two distinctions are specified; which are here passed by, as the present essay has already been extended to too great a length.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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VIII. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.

[Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, March 4th, 1826.]

[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society vol. i. p. 439 — 461.]


Of the six systems of philosophy received among learned Hindus, four have been noticed in the preceding parts of this essay, viz. the theistical and atheistical Sanc'hyas, the dialectic Nyaya, and the atomical Vaiseshica. The prior or practical Mimansa will be now considered; reserving the later or theological Mimansa, usually named Vedanta, for a future disquisition, should it appear requisite to pursue the subject, much concerning it being already before the public.

The object of the Mimansa is the interpretation of the Vedas. "Its purpose," says a commentator, [Somanat'ha in the Mayuc'ha, 2. 1. 17.] "is to determine the sense of revelation." Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty. Here duly intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the Vedas. The same term [dharma) likewise signifies virtue, or moral merit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one, (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion. [Medini cosha.] It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed; and its meaning is by commentators explained to be "the scope of an injunction; the object of a command; [Part'ha 1. 1. 2. Didh. ibid.] a purpose ordained by revelation with a view to a motive, such as sacrifice commanded by the Vedas, for the attainment of bliss;" [Apadeva; Nyaya-pracasa.] and such indeed is the main scope of every disquisition.

The prior (purva) Mimansa then is practical, as relating to works (carma) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly termed Carma-mimansa, in contradistinction to the theological, which is named Brahme-mimansa.

It is not directly a system of philosophy; nor chiefly so. But, in course of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation, it incidently touches upon philosophical topics; and scholastic disputants have elicited from its dogmas principles of reasoning applicable to the prevailing points of controversy agitated by the Hindu schools of philosophy.

Writers on the Mimansa.

The acknowledged founder of this school of scriptural interpretation is JAIMINI. He is repeatedly named as an authority in the sutras which are ascribed to him. Other ancient writers on the same subject, who are occasionally quoted in those aphorisms, as Atreya, Badari, Badarayana, [Author of the Brahme-sutras.] Labucayana, Aitisayana, &c. are sometimes adduced there for authority, but oftener for correction and confutation.

It is no doubt possible, that the true author of a work may speak in it of himself by name, and in the third person. Nor, indeed, is that very unusual. A Hindu commentator will, however, say, as the scholiasts of Menu's and of Yajnyawalcya's institutes of law do, that the oral instructions of the teacher were put in writing by some disciple; and, for this reason, the mention of him as of a third person is strictly proper.

The sutras, or aphorisms, thus attributed to Jaimini, are arranged in twelve lectures, each subdivided into four chapters, except the third, sixth, and tenth lectures, which contain twice as many; making the entire number sixty chapters. These again are divided into sections, cases, or topics (Adhicaranas), ordinarily comprising several sutras, but not uncommonly restricted to one; and instances may be noted where a single sentence is split into several adhicaranas; or, on the contrary, a single phrase variously interpreted becomes applicable to distinct cases; and sutras, united under the same head by one interpreter, are by another explained as constituting separate topics. The total number of sutras is 2,652, and of adhicaranas 915, as numbered by Mad'hava Acharya.

Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, those sutras are extremely obscure; or without a gloss utterly unintelligible. They must have been from the first accompanied by an oral or written exposition; and an ancient scholiast (Vritticara), is quoted by the herd of commentators for subsidiary aphorisms, supplying the defect of the text, as well as for explanatory comments on it.

Besides the work of the old scholiast, which probably is not extant in a complete form, the sutras have, as usual, been elucidated by a perpetual commentary, and by corrective annotations on it.

The author of the extant commentary is Sabara Swami Bhatta, from whom it takes the name of Sahara bhashya. He quotes occasionally the ancient scholiast, sometimes concurring with, sometimes dissenting from him.

The annotations (vartica) are by Bhatta Cumarila Swami, who is the great authority of the Mimansaca school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, Bhatta, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects Sabara's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, but in many instances passes entire sections without notice, as seeing no occasion for emendation or explanation of the commentary, which he must be considered therefore as tacitly ratifying. The ancient scholiast is sometimes cited by him, adopting or amending the scholia; and he criticises the text itself, and arrangement of Jaimini.

Next to him in celebrity is a writer usually cited under the title of Guru; more rarely under the designation of Prabhacara. [MADH. 1.1.3.] His work I have had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present essay, and he is known to me chiefly from references and quotations; as in Madhava's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with Cumarila's; and in the text and commentary of the Sastra-dipica, where his positions are canvassed and compared with those of numerous other writers.

Cumarila Bhatta figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sancara Acharya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the Vedas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. [Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xix.] He does, indeed, take every occasion of controverting the authority and doctrine of Sacya or BUDDHA, as well as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, Bod'hayana and Masaca; and he denies them any consideration, even when they do concur upon any point with the Vedas. [Mim. 1. 3. 4.] The age of Cumarila, anterior to Sancara, [Sabara Swami Acharya is expressly named by Sancara in his commentary on the latter Mimansa (see Brahma Sutra, 3. 3. 53); and there are allusions to Cumarila Bhatta, if no direct mention of him.] and corresponding with the period [of the persecution of the Bauddhas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand years. He is reputed to have been contemporary with Sudhanwa, but the chronology of that prince's reign is not accurately determined. [Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xviii.]

Next in eminence among the commentators of the Mimansa is Part'ha-Sarat'hi Misra, who has professedly followed the guidance of CUMARILA BHATTA. His Commentary, entitled Sastra-dipica, has been amply expounded in a gloss bearing the title of Mayuc'ha- mala, by Somanat'ha, a Carnataci-Brahman, whose elder brother was high priest of the celebrated temple at Vencatadri (or Vencatagiri). [135 miles west from Madras.] Part'ha-Sarat'hi is author likewise of the Nyaya-ratna- mala and other known works.

A compendious gloss on the text of Jaimini, following likewise the same guidance (that of Cumarila), is the Bhatta-dipica of C'handa-deva, author of a separate and ampler treatise, entitled Mimansa-caustubha, to which he repeatedly refers for a fuller elucidation of matters briefly touched upon in his concise but instructive gloss. This work is posterior to that of Madhava Acharya, who is sometimes quoted in it, and to Part'ha-Sarat'hi, who is more frequently noticed.

The Mimansa-nyaya-viveca is another commentary by a distinguished author, Bhavanat'ha Misra. I speak of this and of the foregoing as commentaries, because they follow the order of the text, recite one or more of the aphorisms from every section, and explain the subject, but without regularly expounding every word, as ordinary scholiasts, in a perpetual gloss.

Among numerous other commentaries on Jaimini's text, the Nyayavali-didhiti of Raghavananda is not to be omitted. It contains an excellent interpretation of the sutras, which it expounds word by word, in the manner of a perpetual comment. It is brief, but clear; leaving nothing unexplained, and wandering into no digressions.

It results from the many revisions which the text and exposition of it have undergone, with amendments, one while arriving by a different process of reasoning at the same conclusion, another time varying the question and deducing from an unchanged text an altered argument for its solution, that the cases (adhicaranas) assume a very diversified aspect in the hands of the many interpreters of the Mimansa.

A summary or paraphrase of Jaimini's doctrine was put into verse by an ancient author, whose memorial verses are frequently cited by the commentators of Jaimini, under the title of Sangraha.

Another metrical paraphrase is largely employed in the Vartica, or is a part of that work itself. An entire chapter occurs under the title of Sloca vartica: other whole chapters of Cumarila's performance are exclusively in prose. In many, verse and prose are intermixed.

The most approved introduction to the study of the Mimansa is the Nyaya-mala-vistara by Madhava Acharya. It is in verse, attended with a commentary in prose by the same author. It follows the order of Jaimini's text; not by way of paraphrase, but as a summary (though the title rather implies amplification) of its purport, and of approved deductions from it; sometimes explaining separately  the doctrine of Bhatta and of Guru, under each head; at other times that of the old scholiast; but more commonly confined to that of Bhatta alone; yet often furnishing more than one application to the same text, as Bhatta himself does.

MADHAVA ACHARYA was both priest and minister, or civil as well as spiritual adviser of Bucca-Raya and Harihara, sovereigns of Vidyanagara on the Godovari, as his father Mayana had been of their father and predecessor Sangama, who reigned over the whole peninsula of India.

Like the numerous other writings which bear his name, the Nyalamala was composed, not by himself, but by his directions, under the more immediate superintendence of his brother, Sayana-Acharya; and it appears from its preface to have been the next performance undertaken after the completion of their commentary on Parasara's institutes of law; and it suitably enough preceded the great commentary of the same authors on the whole of the Vedas.

According to history, confirmed by authentic inscriptions, Madhava flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century: the sovereigns whose confidence he enjoyed reigned from that time to the end of the century.

Analysis of the Mimansa.

From this brief notice of the principal writers on the Mimansa, I pass to the subject which has occupied them.

A complete adhicarana, or case, consists of five members, viz. 1, the subject, or matter to be explained; 2, the doubt, or question arising upon that matter; 3, the first side (purva-pacsha), or prima facie argument concerning it; 4, the answer (uttara) or demonstrated conclusion (siddhanta); 5, the pertinence or relevancy.

The last-mentioned appertains to the whole arrangement as well as to its subdivisions; and commentators are occupied with showing the relation and connexion of subjects treated in the several lectures and chapters, and their right distribution, and appropriate positions.

The text of Jaimini's aphorisms does not ordinarily exhibit the whole of the five members of an adhicarana. Frequently the subject, and the question concerning it, are but hinted, or they are left to be surmised; sometimes the disputable solution of it is unnoticed, and the right conclusion alone is set forth. The rest is supplied by the scholiasts; and they do not always concur as to the most apposite examples, nor concerning the presumed allusions of the text.

Its introductory sutras propose the subject in this manner. "Now then the study of duty is to be commenced. Duty is a purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must be inquired." [JAIM. l. 1. 1 — 3.]

That is, according to the interpretation of commentators, 'Next, after reading the Veda; and therefore, for the sake of understanding it; the duty enjoined by it is to be investigated. Duty is a meaning deduced from injunction: its ground must be sifted. A command is not implicitly received for proof of duty.'

The business of the Mimansa, then, being to investigate what is incumbent as a duty to be performed, the primary matter for inquiry is proof and authority (pramana). This, accordingly, is the subject of the first lecture, comprising four chapters, which treat of the following matters: 1st, precept and its cogency; 2, affirmation or narrative (art'havada), as well as prayer and invocation (mantra), their cogency as inculcating some duty; 3, law memorial (smrti), and usage (achara), their authority as presumption of some cogent revelation; 4, modifying ordinance and specific denomination, distinguished from direct or positive injunction.

Proceeding with the subject as above proposed, the Mimansa declares that perception or simple apprehension is no reason of duty, for it apprehends a present object only, whereas duty concerns the future. [JAIM. 1. 1. 4.] Simple apprehension is defined in these words: "when the organs of man are in contiguity with an object, that source of knowledge is perception.''

The ancient scholiast has here introduced definitions of other sources of knowledge which the author had omitted, viz. inference, verbal communication, comparison, presumption, and privation. None of these are reasons of duty except verbal communication; for the rest are founded on perception, which itself is not so. Verbal communication is either human, as a correct sentence (apta-vacya), or superhuman, as a passage of the Vedas. It is indicative or imperative; and the latter is either positive or relative: Ex. 1. "This is to be done:" 2. "That is to be done like this."

"On sight of one member of a known association, the consequent apprehension of the other part which is not actually proximate, is (anumana) inference. [Anc. Schol. Didh., Part'h., &c.] The association must be such as had been before directly perceived, or had become known by analogy.

"Comparison (upamana) is knowledge arising from resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one before observed: and likeness or similitude is concomitancy of associates or attributes with one object, which were associated with another.

"Presumption (art'hapatti) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.

"Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or subject to perception) derived through understood sound, that is through words the acceptation whereof is known, is (sastra) ordinance or revelation. It is (sabda) verbal communication."

These five sources of knowledge, or modes of proof, as here defined, are admitted by all Mimansacas: and the followers of Prabhacara are stated to restrict their admission to those five. [Vedanta-sic'hamani.] Bhatta with his disciples, guided by the ancient scholiast, adds a sixth, which is privation (abhava); and the Vedantis or Uttara Mimansacas concur in the admission of that number.

The Charvacas, as noticed in the first part of this essay, [Ante, p. 152.] recognise but one, viz. perception. The followers of Canade and those of Sugata (Buddha) acknowledge two, perception and inference. The Sanc'hyas reckon three, including affirmation. [Ante, p. 165 — 168.] The Naiyayicas, or followers of Gotama, count four, viz. the foregoing together with comparison. The Prabhacaras, as just now observed, admit five. And the rest of the Mimansacas, in both schools, prior and later Mimansa, enumerate six. [Vedanta sic'ham.] It does not appear that a greater number has been alleged by any sect of Indian philosophy.

The first six lectures of Jaimini's Mimansa treat of positive injunction: it is the first half of the work. The latter half, comprising six more lectures, concerns indirect command: adapting to a copy, with any requisite modifications, that which was prescribed for the pattern or prototype.

The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts (or appendant members, contrasted with the main act), and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next, and complete the subject of "that which is to be performed." The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth.

The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferrible changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth: that is, the co-operation of several acts for a single result is the subject of the one; and the incidental effect of an act, of which the chief purpose is different, is discussed in the other.

These which are the principal topics of each lecture are not, however, exclusive. Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main subject or its exceptions.

In the first chapter of the first lecture occurs the noted disquisition of the Mimansa on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense. [A passage cited by writers on the dialectic Nyaya from the disquisition on the perpetuity of sound (see ante, page 185), is not to be found in Jaimini's sutras: it must have been taken from one of his commentators.]

"It is a primary and natural connexion," Jaimini affirms, "not merely a conventional one. The knowledge of it is instruction, since the utterance of a particular sound conveys knowledge, as its enunciation is for a particular sense. It matters not whether the subject have been previously apprehended (the words being intelligible, or the context rendering them so). Precept is authoritative, independently of human communication." [JAIM. 1. 1. 5.]

Grammarians assume a special category, denominated sp'hota, for the object of mental perception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word. Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption. [Didh., Part'h, and Madh.] They insist, however, that "sound is an effect, because it is perceived as the result of effort; because it endures not, but ceases so soon as uttered; because it is spoken of as made or done; because it is at once apprehended in divers places at the same instant, uttered by divers persons; because it is liable to permutation; and because it is subject to increase of intensity with the multitude of utterers." To all which the answer is, that " the result of an effort is uniform, the same letters being articulated. Sound is unobserved though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended). [Didh.] Sound is not made or done, but is used; it is uttered, not called into existence. Its universality is as that of the sun (common to all). The permutation of letters is the substitution of a different one (as a semivowel for a vowel), not the alteration of the same letter. Noise, not sound, is increased by a multitude of voices. Sound is perpetual, intended for the apprehension of others: it is universal, a generic term being applicable to all individuals. Its perpetuity is intimated by a passage of the Veda, which expresses "Send forth praise, with perpetual speech." [JAIM. 1. 1. 6. 1—18 and Com.]

The first chapter terminates with an inquiry into the authority of the Veda, which is maintained to be primeval and superhuman; although different portions of it are denominated from names of men, as Cat'haca, Caut'huma, Paishpala, &c. and although worldly incidents and occurrences are mentioned. Those denominations of particular portions, it is affirmed, have reference to the tradition by which a revelation has been transmitted. They are named after the person who uttered them, as to him revealed.

The eternity of the Veda, or authenticity of its revelation, is attempted to be proved by showing that it had no human origin; and for this purpose, the principal argument is, that no human author is remembered. In the case of human compositions, it is said, contemporaries have been aware that the authors of them were occupied in composing those works: not so with the Veda, which has been handed down as primeval, and of which no mortal author was known.

It is, however, acknowledged, that a mistake may be made, and the work of a human author may be erroneously received as a part of the sacred book by those who are unacquainted with its true origin. An instance occurs among those who use the Bahvrich, a sac'ha of the Rigveda, by whom a ritual of Aswalayana has been admitted, under the title of the fifth Aranyaca, as a part of the Rigveda.

The Veda received as holy by orthodox Hindus consists of two parts, prayer and precept (mantra and brahmana). Jaimini has attempted to give a short definition of the first, adding that the second is its supplement; "whatever is not mantra, is brahmaha." [Mim. 2. 1. 7.] The ancient scholiast has endeavoured to supply the acknowledged defect of Jaimini's imperfect definition, by enumerating the various descriptions of passages coming under each head. Later scholiasts have shown, that every article in that enumeration is subject to exceptions; and the only test of distinction, finally acknowledged, is admission of the expert, or acceptance of approved teachers, who have taught their disciples to use one passage as a prayer, and to read another as a precept, Jaimini's definition, and his scholiast's enumeration, serve but to alleviate "the task of picking up grains."

Generally, then, a mantra is a prayer, invocation, or declaration. It is expressed in the first person, or is addressed in the second. It declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object. It asks a question or returns an answer; directs, inquires, or deliberates; blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates, &c.

Here is to be remarked, that changes introduced into a prayer to adapt it, mutalis mutandis, to a different ceremony from that for which primarily it was intended, or the insertion of an individual's personal and family names where this is requisite, are not considered to be part of the mantra.

It is likewise to be observed, although mantras of the Vedas are ordinarily significant, that the chants of the Samaveda are unmeaning. They consist of a few syllables, as ira ayira, or gira gayira, repeated again and again, as required by the tune or rhythm. Nevertheless, significant mantras are likewise chanted; and two of the books of the Samuveda are allotted to hymns of this description. The hymns consist of triplets {inch) or triple stanzas.

The first, or pattern verse or stanza, is found, with the name of the appropriate tune, in the Chhandas or Yonigrant'ha; and the two remaining verses or stanzas, to complete the triplet, are furnished in the supplementary book called Uttara-grant'ha.

Mantras are distinguished under three designations. Those which are in metre are termed rich, those chanted are saman, and the rest are yajush, sacrificial prayers in prose (for yajush imports sacrifice). Nevertheless, metrical prayers occur in the Yajurveda, and prose in the Samaveda.

Metrical prayers are recited aloud: those termed saman with musical modulation; but the prose inaudibly muttered. [Mim. 3. 3. 1.] Such, however, as are vocative, addressed to a second person, are to be uttered audibly, though in prose: for communication is intended. [Ib. 2. 1. 7—14.]

Metrical prayers, however, belonging to the Yajurveda are inaudibly  recited; and so are chants belonging to the same inaudibly chanted: for prayers take the character of the rite into which they are introduced; and where the same rite is ordained in more than one Veda, it appertains to that with which it is most consonant, and the prayer is either audibly or inaudibly chanted accordingly. [Ib. 3. 3. 1— 3. Instances of the same prayer recurring either word for word, or with very slight variation, in more than one Veda, are innumerable. An eminent example is that of the celebrated Gayatri, of which the proper place is in the Rig-veda (3. 4. 10.), among hymns of Viswamitra. It is, however, repeated in all the Vedas, and particularly in the 3d, 22d and 36th chapters of the white Yajush. (3, § 35; 22, § 9; and 36, § 3.) Another notable instance is that of the Purusha-sucta, of which a version was given, from a ritual in which it was found cited (ante, p. 104). It has a place in the Rig-veda (8. 4. 7.) among miscellaneous hymns; and is inserted, with some little variation, among prayers employed at the Purusha-medha, in the 31st chapter of the white Vajur-veda. On collation of those two Vedas and their scholia, I find occasion to amend one or two passages in the version of it formerly given: but for this I shall take another opportunity. That remarkable hymn is in language, metre, and style, very different from the rest of the prayers with which it is associated. It has a decidedly more modern tone; and must have been composed after the Sanscrit language had been refined, and its grammar and rhythm perfected. The internal evidence which it furnishes, serves to demonstrate the important fact, that the compilation of the Vedas, in their present arrangement, took place after the Sanscrit tongue had advanced, from the rustic and irregular dialect in which the multitude of hymns and prayers of the Veda was composed, to the polished and sonorous language in which the mythological poems, sacred and prophane (puranas and cavyas), have been written.]

The prayers termed rich and saman are limited by the metre and the chant respectively; but those which are in prose are regulated as to their extent by the sense. A complete sentence constitutes a single yajush: the sense must be one, and would be deficient were the phrase divided. Nevertheless, the sentence which constitutes a prayer may borrow, from a preceding or from a subsequent one, terms wanting to perfect the sense, unless an intervening one be incompatible with that construction. [Mim. 2. 1. 14—18.]

The brahmum of the Veda is in general a precept; or it expresses praise or blame, or a doubt, a reason, or a comparison; or intimates a derivation; or narrates a fact or an occurrence: and a characteristic sign of it is that it very generally contains the particle "so" (iti or itiha); as a mantra usually does the pronoun of the second person "thee," either expressed or understood, "(thou) art." [Sab. &c. on Mim. 1. 4. 1. and 2. 1. 7.]

In a still more general view the brahmana is practical, directing religious observances, teaching the purpose, time, and manner of performing them, indicating the prayers to be employed, and elucidating their import. The esoteric brahmana comprises the upanishads, and is theological.

It becomes a question which the Mimansa examines at much length, whether those passages of the Veda which are not direct precepts, but are narrative, laudatory, or explanatory, are nevertheless cogent for a point of duty. In this inquiry is involved the further question, whether a consciousness of the scope of an act is essential to its efficacy for the production of its proper consequence. The Mimansa maintains that narrative or indicative texts are proof of duty, as concurrent in import with a direct precept. There subsists a mutual relation between them. One enjoins or forbids an act; the other supplies an inducement for doing it or for refraining from it: "Do so, because such is the fruit." The imperative sentence is nevertheless cogent independently of the affirmative one, and needs not its support. The indicative phrase is cogent, implying injunction by pronouncing benefit.

It virtually prescribes the act which it recommends. [Mim. 1. 2. 1-3.] Inference, however, is not to be strained. It is not equally convincing as actual perception: a forthcoming injunction or direct precept has more force than a mere inference from premises. [Ib. 1. 2. 3.]

A prayer, too, carries authority, as evidence of a precept bearing the like import. This is a visible or temporal purpose of a prayer; and it is a received maxim, that a perceptible purpose being assignable, prevails before an imperceptible one. But the recital of a particular prayer at a religious rite, rather than a narrative text of like import, is for a spiritual end, since there is no visible purpose of a set form of words. [Mim. 1. 2. 4.]

Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (sruti) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (smriti) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the Veda, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents. Nor was it superfluous to compose anew what was there to be found; for a compilation, exhibiting in a succinct form that which is scattered through the Veda, has its use. Nor are the prayers which the smrti directs unauthorized, for they are presumed to have been taken from passages of revelation not now forthcoming. Those recollections have come down by unbroken tradition to this day, admitted by the virtuous of the three tribes, and known under the title of Dharma-sastra, comprising the institutes of law, civil and religious. Nor is error to be presumed which had not, until now, been detected. An express text of the Veda, as the Mimansa maintains, [lb. 1. 3. 1.] must then be concluded to have been actually seen by the venerable author of a recorded recollection (smrti).

But if contradiction appear, if it can be shown that an extant passage of the Veda is inconsistent with one of the smriti, it invalidates that presumption. An actual text, present to the sense, prevails before a presumptive one. [lb. 1. 3. 2.]

Or though no contrary passage of the Veda be actually found, yet if cupidity, or other exceptionable motive may be assigned, revelation is not to be presumed in the instance, the recollection being thus impeached. [1b. 1 3. 3.]

The 'Sacyas (or Bauddhas) and Jainas (or Arhatas), as Cumarila acknowledges, are considered to be Cshatriyas. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their recollections were founded upon a Veda which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in revelation, for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the Sacyas are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice, [lb. 1. 3. 4.] tainting what else is virtuous. The entire Veda which is directed to be studied is the foundation of duty; and those only who are conversant with it are capable of competent recollections.

Usage generally prevalent among good men, and by them practised as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, evidence of duty: but it is not valid if it be contrary to an express text. From the modern prevalence of any usage, there arises a presumption of a correspondent injunction by a holy personage who remembered a revelation to the same effect. Thus usage presumes a recollection, which again presupposes revelation. Authors, however, have omitted particulars, sanctioning good customs in general terms: but any usage which is inconsistent with a recorded recollection is not to be practised, so long as no express text of scripture is found to support it.

In like manner, rituals which teach the proper mode of celebrating religious rites, and are entitled Calpa-sutra or Grihya-grant'ha, derive their authority, like the Dharma-sastra, from a presumption that their authors, being persons conversant with the Veda, collected and abridged rules which they there found. The Calpa-sutras neither are a part of the Veda, nor possess equal nor independent authority. It would be a laborious enterprise to prove a superhuman origin of them; nor can it be accomplished, since contemporaries were aware of the authors being occupied with the composition of them. [GURU on Mim. 1. 3. 7.] Whenever a sutra (whether of the culpa or grihya) is opposed to an extant passage of the Veda, or is inconsistent with valid reason, it is not to be followed; nor is an alternative admissible in regard to its observance in such case, unless a corroborative text of the Veda can be shown. [C'handa-Deva.]

Neither are usages restricted to particular provinces, though certain customs are more generally prevalent in some places than in others: as the Holaca (vulg. Huli) or festival of spring in the east; the worship of local tutelary deities hereditarily, by families, in the south; the racing of oxen on the full moon of Jyesht'ha, in the north; and the adoration of tribes of deities (matri-gana), in the west. Nor are rituals and law institutes confined to particular classes: though some are followed by certain persons preferably to others; as Vasisht'ha, by the Bahvrich sac'ha of the Rigveda: Gautama, by the Gobhiliya of the Samaveda; Sanc'ha and Lic'hita, by the Vajasaneyi; and Apastamba and Baudhayana, by the Taittiriya of the Yajurveda. There is no presumption of a restrictive revelation, but of one of general import. The institutes of law, and rituals of ceremonies, were composed by authors appertaining to particular sac'has, and by them taught to their fellows belonging to the same, and have continued current among the descendants of those to whom they were so taught.

A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the Mimansa, [1. 3. 5.] on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are yava, signifying in Sanscrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named priyangu: varaha, in the one a hog, and in the other a cow; pitu, a certain tree, [The name is in vocabularies assigned to many different trees.] but among barbarians an elephant; vetusa, a rattan cane and a citron. The Mimansa concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (aryas), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (Mlech'ha), who are apt to confound words or their meanings.

Concerning these instances, Cumarila remarks that the words have no such acceptation, in any country, as is by the scholiast alleged. He. is wrong in regard to one, at least, for pitu is evidently the Persian fit or pit. Modern vocabularies [JATADHARA, &c.] exhibit the word as a Sanscrit one in the same sense; erroneously, as appears from this disquisition.

Then follows, in Cumarila's Vartica, much upon the subject of provincial and barbaric dialects; which, adverting to the age in which he flourished, is interesting, and merits the attention of philologists. He brings examples from the Andhra and Dravida dialects, and specifies as barbaric tongues the Parasica, Yavana, Raumaca, and Barbara, but confesses his imperfect acquaintance with these.

Jaimini gives an instance of a barbaric term used in the Veda, viz., pica, a black cuckow (cuculus indicus); to which his scholiasts add nema, half, tamarasa, a lotus, and sata a wooden colander; but without adducing examples of the actual use of them in any of the Vedas. Such terms must be taken in their ordinary acceptation, though barbarous; and the passage quoted from the Veda where the word pica occurs, must be interpreted "sacrifice a black cuckow at night." It will here be remarked, that pica corresponds to the Latin picus, and that nem answers to the Persic nim.

On the other hand, a barbaric word, or a provincial corruption, is not to be employed instead of the proper Sanscrit term. Thus go (gauh), and not gawi, is the right term for a cow. [Vart. 1. 3. 4.] Orthography, likewise, is to be carefully attended to; else by writing or reading aswa for aswa in the directions for the sacrifice of a horse, the injunction would seem to be for the sacrifice of a pauper (a-swa, destitute of property).

Generally, words are to be applied in strict conformity with correct grammar. The Sacyas, and other heretics, as Cumarila in this place remarks, [Vart. 1. 3. 7.] do not use Sanscrit (they employ Pracrit). But Brahmanas should not speak as barbarians. Grammar, which is primeval, has been handed down by tradition. Language is the same in the Vedas and in ordinary discourse, notwithstanding a few deviations: the import of words is generic, though the application of them is specific.

The peculiarities of the dialect of the Veda are not to be taken for inaccuracies. Thus, tman stands for atman, self or soul; and Brahmanasah for Brahmanah, priests; with many other anomalies of the sacred dialect. [Mim. 1. 3. 10.]

When the ordinary acceptation of a term is different from that which it bears in an explanatory passage, this latter import prevails in the text likewise, else the precept and its supplement would disagree. Thus trivrit, triplet, is specially applied to a hymn comprising three triplets or nine stanzas, which is the peculiar sense it bears in the Vedas.

Again, charu, which in ordinary discourse signifies boiler or cauldron, is in the Vedas an oblation of boiled food, as rice, &c. So aswabala, which literally means horse-hair, is a designation of a species of grass (saccharum spontaneum) into which it is said the tail of a consecrated horse was once transformed; and of that grass a cushion is made for certain religions rites.

It will be observed, as has been intimated in speaking of the members of an adhicarana in the Mimansa, that a case is proposed, either specified in Jaimini's text or supplied by his scholiasts. Upon this a doubt or question is raised, and a solution of it is suggested, which is refuted, and a right conclusion established in its stead. The disquisitions of the Mimansa bear, therefore, a certain resemblance to juridical questions; and, in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. The logic of the Mimansa is the logic of the law; the rule of interpretation of civil and religious ordinances. Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law: and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the Mimansa. Jaimini's arrangement, however, is not philosophical; and I am not acquainted with any elementary work of this school in which a better distribution has been achieved. I shall not here attempt to supply the defect, but confine the sequel of this essay to a few specimens from divers chapters of Jaimini, after some more remarks on the general scope and manner of the work.

Instances of the application of reasoning, as taught in the Mimansa, to the discussion and determination of juridical questions, may be seen in two treatises on the Law of Inheritance, translated by myself, and as many on Adoption, by a member of this Society, Mr. J. C. C. Sutherland (See Mitacshara on Inheritance, 1. 1. 10, and 1. 9. 11, and 2. 1. 34; Jimuta Vahana, 11, 5. 16 -19. Datt. Mim. on Adoption, 1. 1. 35-41, and 4. 4. 65-66 and 6. 6. 27-31. Datt. Chand. 1. 1. 24 and 2. 2. 4).

The subject which most engages attention throughout the Mimansa, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect.

That unseen virtue is termed apurva, being a relation superinduced, not before possessed.

Sacrifice (yaga), which, among meritorious works, is the act of religion most inculcated by the Vedas, and consequently most discussed  in the prior Mimansa, consists in parting with a thing that it may belong to a deity, whom it is intended to propitiate. [Mim. 4. 4.12.] Being cast into the fire for that purpose, it is a burnt offering (homa). Four sorts are distinguished; a simple oblation (ish'ti), the immolation of a victim (pasu), the presenting of expressed juice of the soma plant (asclepias acida), and the burnt-offering above-mentioned. [lb. 4. 4. 1.] The object of certain rites is some definite temporal advantage; of others, benefit in another world. Three ceremonies, in particular, are types of all the rest: the consecration of a sacrificial fire, the presenting of an oblation, and the preparation of the soma. The oblation which serves as a model for the rest, is that which is offered twice in each month, viz. at the full and change of the moon. It is accompanied, more especially at the new moon, with an oblation of whey from new milk. Accordingly, the Yajurveda begins with this rite. It comprehends the sending of selected cows to pasture after separating their calves, touching them with a leafy branch of palasa (butea frondosa) cut for the purpose, and subsequently stuck in the ground in front of the apartment containing the sacrificial fire, for a protection of the herd from robbers and beasts of prey: the cows are milked in the evening and again in the morning; and, from the new milk, whey is then prepared for an oblation.

Concerning this ceremony, with all its details, numerous questions arise, which are resolved in the Mimansa: for instance, the milking of the cows is pronounced to be not a primary or main act, but a subordinate one; and the parting of the calves from their dams is subsidiary to that subordinate act. [lb. 4. 3. 10.] The whey, which in fact is milk modified, is the main object of the whole preparation; not the curd, which is but incidentally produced, not being sought nor wanted. [Mim. 4. 1. 9.]

In the fourth chapter of the first book, the author discriminates terms that modify the precept from such as are specific denominations. Several of the instances are not a little curious. Thus it is a question, whether the hawk-sacrifice (syena-yaga), which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim, that "a term intimating resemblance is denominative." Hawk, then, is the name of that incantation: "it pounces on the foe as a falcon on his prey." [Ib. 1. 4. 5. and 3. 7. 23.] So tongs is a name for a similar incantation, "which seizes the enemy from afar as with a pair of tongs;" and cow, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations.

It is fit to remark in this place, that incantations for destruction of hated foes, though frequent in the Vedas (and modes of performing them, with greater or less solemnity, are there taught), cannot be deemed laudable acts of religion; on the contrary, they are pronounced to be at least mediately criminal; and pains in hell, as for homicide, await the malevolent man who thus practices against the life of his enemy.

Another instance, discussed in the same chapter, is chitra, applied to a sacrifice performed for acquisition of cattle. It is questioned whether the feminine termination, joined to the ordinary signification of the word, indicates a female victim of a varied colour. It intends, however, an offering termed various, as consisting of no less than six different articles: honey, milk, curds, boiled butter, rice in the husk as well as clean, and water. [1b. 1. 4. 3.]

In like manner, udbhid is the name of a sacrifice directed to be performed for the like purpose: that is, by a person desirous of possessing cattle. The sense approaches to the etymology of the term: it is a ceremony "by which possession of cattle is, as it were, dug up." It does not imply that some tool for delving, as a spade or hoe for digging up the earth, is to be actually employed in the ceremony.

A question of considerable interest, as involving the important one concerning property in the soil in India, is discussed in the sixth lecture. [lb. 6. 7. 2.] At certain sacrifices, such as that which is called viswajit, the votary, for whose benefit the ceremony is performed, is enjoined to bestow all his property on the officiating priests. It is asked whether a paramount sovereign shall give all the land, including pasture-ground, highways, and the site of lakes and ponds; an universal monarch, the whole earth; and a subordinate prince, the entire province over which he rules? To that question the answer is: the monarch has not property in the earth, nor the subordinate prince in the land. By conquest kingly power is obtained, and property in house and field which belonged to the enemy. The maxim of the law, that "the king is lord of all excepting sacerdotal wealth," concerns his authority for correction of the wicked and protection of the good. His kingly power is for government of the realm and extirpation of wrong; and for that purpose he receives taxes from husbandmen, and levies fines from offenders. But right of property is not thereby vested in him; else he would have property in house and land appertaining to the subjects abiding  in his dominions. The earth is not the king's, but is common to all beings enjoying the fruit of their own labour. It belongs, says JAIMINI, to all alike: therefore, although a gift of a piece of ground to an individual does take place, the whole land cannot be given by a monarch, nor a province by a subordinate prince 5 but house and field, acquired by purchase and similar means, are liable to gift." [SAB. MADH. and C'HANDA, ad locum.]

The case which will be here next cited, will bring to recollection the instance of the Indian Calanus, [Calyana.] who accompanied Alexander's army, and burnt himself at Babylon after the manner of his country.

This particular mode of religious suicide by cremation is now obsolete; as that of widows is in some provinces of India, and it may be hoped will become so in the rest, if no injudicious interference by direct prohibition arouse opposition and prevent the growing disuse. Other modes of religious suicide not unfrequently occur; such as drowning, burying alive, falling from a precipice or under the wheels of an idol's car, &c. But they are not founded on the Vedas, as that by burning is.

Self-immolation, in that ancient form of it, is a solemn sacrifice, performed according to rites which the Vedas direct, by a man desirous of passing immediately to heaven without enduring disease. He engages priests, as at other sacrifices, for the various functions requisite to the performance of the rites, being himself the votary for whose benefit the ceremony is undertaken. At a certain stage of it, after wrapping a cloth round a branch of udumbara (ficus glomerata), which represents a sacrificial stake, and having appointed the priests to complete the ceremony, he chants a solemn hymn, and casts himself on a burning pile wherein his body is consumed. Afterwards, whatever concerns the rite as a sacrificial ceremony, is to be completed by the attendant priests: Omitting, however, those matters which specially appertain to the votary, and which, after his death, there is no one competent to perform. [Mim. 10, 2. 23.]

In like manner, if the principal die by a natural death, after engaging Brahmanas to co-operate with him in the celebration of certain rites requiring the aid of several priests, his body is to be burnt, and his ashes kept to represent him; and the ceremony is completed for his benefit, according to one opinion, but for theirs according to another. The ashes, it is argued, do not perform the ceremony, but the priests do. Being inanimate, the bones cannot fulfil the prescribed duties peculiar to the principal: as utterance of certain prayers, shaving of hair and beard, measure of his stature with a branch of udumbara, &c. These and similar functions are not practicable by an inanimate skeleton, and therefore are unavoidably omitted. [Mim. 10. 2. 17-20.]

The full complement of persons officiating at a great solemnity is seventeen. This number, as is shown, includes the votary or principal, who is assisted by sixteen priests engaged by him for different offices, which he need not personally discharge. His essential function is the payment of their hire or sacrificial fee. [lb 3. 7. 8-17.]

They rank in different gradations, and are remunerated proportionably. Four, whose duties are most important, receive the full perquisite; four others are recompensed with a half; the four next with a third; and the four last with a quarter.

On occasions of less solemnity four priests only are engaged, making with the principal five officiating persons. A question is raised, whether the immolator of a victim at the sacrifice of an animal (usually a goat) be a distinct officiating person: the answer is in the negative. No one is specially engaged for immolator independently of other functions; but some one of the party, who has other duties to discharge, slays the victim in the prescribed manner, and is accordingly termed immolator. [Ib. 3. 7. 13.]

The victims at some sacrifices are numerous: as many as seventeen at the vajapeya, made fast to the same number of stakes; and at an aswamed'ha not fewer than six hundred and nine of all descriptions, tame and wild, terrestrial and aquatic, walking, flying, swimming, and creeping things, distributed among twenty-one stakes and in the intervals between them; the tame made fast to the stakes, and the wild secured in cages, nets, baskets, jars, and hollow canes, and by various other devices. The wild are not to be slain, but at a certain stage of the ceremony let loose. The tame ones, or most of them (chiefly goats), are to be actually immolated.

The various rites are successively performed for each victim; not completed for one before they are commenced for another. But the consecration of the sacrificial stakes is perfected for each in succession, because the votary is required to retain hold of the stake until the consecration of it is done. [Ib. 5. 2. 1-5.]

The foregoing instances may suffice to give some idea of the nature of the subjects treated in the Mimansa, and of the way in which they are handled. They have been selected as in themselves curious,  rather than as instructive specimens of the manner in which very numerous and varied cases are examined and questions concerning them resolved. The arguments would be tedious, and the reasons of the solution would need much elucidation, and after all would, in general, be uninteresting.

A few examples of the topics investigated, and still fewer of the reasoning applied to them, have therefore been considered as better conveying in a small compass a notion of the multifarious subjects of the Mimansa.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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Part 1 of 2

IX. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.

[Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, April 7, 1827.]

[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. ii. p. 1-39.]


A PRECEDING essay on Indian philosophy contained a succinct account of the Carma-mimansa. The present one will be devoted to the Brahma mimansa; which, as the complement of the former, is termed uttara, later, contrasted with purva, prior, being the investigation of proof, deducible from the Vedas in regard to theology, as the other is in regard to works and their merit. The two together, then, comprise the complete system of interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of the Vedas, both practical and theological. They are parts of one whole. The later Mimansa is supplementary to the prior, and is expressly affirmed to be so: but, differing on many important points, though agreeing on others, they are essentially distinct in a religious as in a philosophical view.

The ordinary designation of the Uttara-mimansa is Vedanta, a term likewise of more comprehensive import. It literally signifies "conclusion of the Veda,'' and bears reference to the Upanishads, which are, for the most part, terminating sections of the Vedas to which they belong. It implies, however, the doctrine derived from them, and extends to books of sacred authority, in which that doctrine |is thence deduced; and in this large acceptation, it is "the end and scope of the Vedas."

The followers of the Vedanta have separated in several sects, as 'ancient' and 'modern' Vedantins, and bearing other designations. The points on which they disagree, and the difference of their opinions, will not be a subject of the present essay, but may be noticed in a future one.

Among numerous Upanishads, those which are principally relied upon for the Vedanta, and which accordingly are most frequently cited, are the Ch'handogya, Caushitaci, Vrihad aranyaca, Aitareyaca, Taittiriyaca, Cat'haca, Cat'havalli, Mundaca, Prasna, Swetaswatara; to which may be added the Isa-vasya, Cena, and one or two more.

Certain religious exercises, consisting chiefly in profound meditation, with particular sitting postures rigorously continued, are inculcated as preparing the student for the attainment of divine knowledge, and promoting his acquisition of it. Directions concerning such devout exercises are to be found in several of the Upanishads, especially in the Swetaswatara; and likewise in other portions of the Vedas, as a part of the general ritual. These are accordingly cited by the commentators of the Vedanta, and must be considered to be comprehended under that general term; [For instance, the Agni rahasya brahmana of the Canwas and of the Vajins (or Vajasaneyins); the Rashasya brahmana of the Tandins and of the Paingins.] and others from different sac'has of the Vedas, as further exemplified in a note below. [The Udgit'ha brahmana of the Vajasaneyins, the Panchagni-vidya pracarana of the same, the C'hila grant'ha of the Ranayainyas, the Prana-samvada or Prana-vidya. Dahara-vidya, Harda vidya, Paramatma vidya Satya-vidya, Vaiswanara-vidya, Sandilya vidya, Vamadevya vidya, Upacosala vidya, Paryanca-vidya, Madhu-vidya, Shodasacala-vidya, Samvarga-vidya, &c.]

Besides the portion of the Vedas understood to be intended by the designation of Vedanta, the grand authority for its doctrine is the collection of sutras, or aphorisms, entitled Brahme-sutra or Sariraca-mimansa, and sometimes Sarira-sutra or Vedanta-sutra. Sarira, it should be observed, signifies embodied or incarnate (soul).

Other authorities are the ancient scholia of that text, which is the standard work of the science; and didactic poems comprehended under the designation of smriti, a name implying a certain degree of veneration due to the authors. Such are the Bhagavad gita and Yoga-vasisht'ha, reputed to be inspired writings.

Writers on the Vedanta.

The Sariraca-mimansa or Brahme sutra, above-mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms attributed to Badarayana, who is the same with Vyasa or Veda-vyasa; also called Dwaipayana or Crishna-dwaipayana. According to mythology, he had in a former state, being then a brahmana bearing the name of Apantara-ta-mas. [SANC. &c. on Br. Sutr. 3. 3. 32.] acquired a perfect knowledge of revelation and of the divinity, and was consequently qualified for eternal beatitude. Nevertheless, by special command of the deity, he resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was compiler of the Vedas, as his title of Vyasa implies.

In the Puranas, and by Parasara, he is said to be an incarnation (avatara) of Vishnu. This, however, is not altogether at variance with the foregoing legend; since Apantara-Tamas, having attained perfection, was identified with the deity; and his resumption of the human form was a descent of the God, in mythological notions.

Apart from mythology, it is not to be deemed unlikely, that the person (whoever he really was) who compiled and arranged the Vedas, was led to compose a treatise on their scope and essential doctrine. But Vyasa is also reputed author of the Mahabharata, and most of the principal puranas; and that is for the contrary reason improbable, since the doctrine of the puranas, and even of the Bhagavad gita and the rest of the Mahabharata, are not quite consonant to that of the Vedas, as expounded in the Brahme-sutras. The same person would not have deduced from the same premises such different conclusions.

The name of Badarayana frequently recurs in the sutras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the reputed author of the Purvamimansa, in his. I have already remarked, in the preceding essay, [See p. 189, of this volume.] on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in literature or science of other nations: but a Hindu commentator will account for it, by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher.

Besides Badarayana himself, and his great predecessor Jaimini, several other distinguished names likewise occur, though less frequently: some which are also noticed in the Purva-mimansa, as Atrieyi and Badari; and some which are not there found, as Asmarat'hya, Audulomi, Carshnajini, and Casacritsna; and the Yoga of Patanjali, which consequently is an anterior work; as indeed it must be, if its scholiast, as generally acknowledged, be the same Vyasa who is the author of the aphorisms of the Uttara-mimansa.

The Sariraca is also posterior to the atheistical Sanc'hya of Capila, to whom, or at least to his doctrine, there are many marked allusions in the text.

The atomic system of Canade (or, as the scholiast of the Sariraca, in more than one place, contumeliously designates him, Cana-Bhuj or Canabhacsha) is frequently adverted to for the purpose of confutation; as are the most noted heretical systems, viz. the several sects of Jainas, the Bauddhas, the Pasupalas with other classes of Maheswaras, the Pancharatras or Bhagavatas, and divers other schismatics.

From this, which is also supported by other reasons, there seems to be good ground for considering the Sariraca to be the latest of the six grand systems of doctrine (darsana) in Indian philosophy: later, likewise, than the heresies which sprung up among the Hindus of the military and mercantile tribes (cshatriya and vaisya) and which, disclaiming the Vedas, set up a Jina or a Buddha for an object of worship; and later even than some, which, acknowledging the Vedas, have deviated into heterodoxy in their interpretation of the text.

In a separate essay, [See p. 243, of this volume.] I have endeavoured to give some account of the heretical and heterodox sects which the Sariraca confutes: and of which the tenets are explained, for the elucidation of that confutation, in its numerous commentaries. I allude particularly to the Jainas, Bauddhas, Charvacas, Pasupatas, and Pancharatras.

The sutras of Badarayana are arranged in four books or lectures (adhyaya), each subdivided into four chapters or quarters (pada). Like the aphorisms of the prior Mimansa, they are distributed very unequally into sections, arguments, cases, or topics (adhicarana). The entire number of sutras is 555; of adhicaranas 191. But in this there is a little uncertainty, for it appears from Sancara, that earlier commentaries subdivided some adhicaranas, where he writes the aphorisms in one section.

An adhicarana in the later, as in the prior Mimansa, consists of five members or parts: 1st, the subject and matter to be explained; 2d, the doubt or question concerning it; 3d, the plausible solution or prima facie argument; 4th, the answer, or demonstrated conclusion and true solution; 5th, the pertinence or relevancy and connexion.

But in Badarayana's aphorisms, as in those of Jaimini, no adhicarana is fully set forth. Very frequently the solution only is given by a single sutra, which obscurely hints the question, and makes no allusion to any different plausible solution, nor to arguments in favour of it. More rarely the opposed solution is examined at some length, and arguments in support of it are discussed through a string of brief sentences.

Being a sequel of the prior Mimansa, the latter adopts the same distinctions of six sources of knowledge or modes of proof [Vedanta paribhasha.] which are taught by Jaimini, supplied where he is deficient by the old scholiast. There is, indeed, no direct mention of them in the Brahme-sutras, beyond a frequent reference to oral proof, meaning revelation, which is sixth among those modes. But the commentators make ample use of a logic which employs the same terms with that of the Purva-mimansa, being founded on it, though not without amendments on some points. Among the rest, the Vedantins have taken the syllogism (nyaya) of the dialectic philosophy, with the obvious improvement of reducing its five members to three. [Vedanta paribhasha.] "It consists," as expressly declared, "of three, not of five parts; for as the requisites of the inference are exhibited by three members, two more are superfluous. They are either the proposition, the reason, and the example; or the instance, the application, and the conclusion."

In this state it is a perfectly regular syllogism, as I had occasion to remark in a former essay: [See p. 185, of this volume.] and it naturally becomes a question, whether the emendation was borrowed from the Greeks, or being sufficiently obvious, may be deemed purely Indian, fallen upon without hint or assistance from another quarter. The improvement does not appear to be of ancient date, a circumstance which favours the supposition of its having been borrowed. The earliest works in which I have found it mentioned are of no antiquity. [Sanc. 3. 3. 53.]

The logic of the two Mimansas merits a more full examination than the limits of the present essay allow, and it has been reserved for a separate consideration at a future opportunity, because it has been refined and brought into a regular form by the followers, rather than by founders of either school.

The Sariraca-sutras are in the highest degree obscure, and could never have been intelligible without an ample interpretation. Hinting the question or its solution, rather than proposing the one or briefly delivering the other, they but allude to the subject. Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, they must from the first have been accompanied by the author's exposition of the meaning, whether orally taught by him or communicated in writing.

Among ancient scholiasts of the Brahme-sutras the name of BAUDHAYANA occurs: an appellation to which reverence, as to that of a saint or rishi, attaches. He is likewise the reputed author of a treatise on law. An early gloss, under the designation of vritti, is quoted without its author's name, and is understood to be adverted to in the remarks of later writers, in several instances, where no particular reference is however expressed. It is apparently Baudhayana's. An ancient writer on both mimansas (prior and later) is cited, under the name of upavarsha, with the epithet of venerable (bhagavat), [In the Vedanta paribhasha and Padart'ha dipica.] implying that he was a holy personage. He is noticed in the supplement to the Amera-cosha [Tricanda sesha.] as a saint (muni), with the titles or additions of Hala-bhriti, Crita-coti, and Ayachita. It does not appear that any of his works are now forthcoming.

The most distinguished scholiast of these sutras, in modern estimation, is the celebrated Sancara Acharya, the founder of a sect among Hindus which is yet one of the most prevalent. I have had a former occasion of discussing the antiquity of this eminent person; and the subject has been since examined by Rama Mohen Raya and by Mr. Wilson. [Sanscrit Dict., first edit,, pref. p. xvi.] I continue of opinion, that the period when he flourished may be taken to have been the close of the eighth or beginning of the ninth century of the Christian era; and I am confirmed in it by the concurring opinions of those very learned persons.

How much earlier the older scholia were, or the text itself, there is no evidence to determine. If the reputed author be the true one, it would be necessary to go back nearly two thousand years, to the era of the arrangement of the Vedas by Vyasa.

Sancara's gloss or perpetual commentary of the sutras bears the title of Sariraca-mimansa-bhashya. It has been annotated and interpreted by a herd of commentators; and among others, and most noted, by Vachespati Misra, in the Bhamati or Sariraca-bhashya-vibhaga.

This is the same Vachespati, whose commentaries on the Sanc'hya-carica of Iswara Chandra, and on the text and gloss of Patanjali's Yoga and Gotama's Nyaya, were noticed in former essays. [See pp. 147, 148, 166, of this volume.] He is the author of other treatises on dialectics (Nyaya), and of one entitled Tatwa-vindu on the Purva-mimansa, as it is expounded by BHATTA. All his works, in every department, are held in high and deserved estimation.

Vachespati's exposition of Sancara's gloss, again, has been amply annotated and explained in the Vedanta-calpataru of ANALANANDA, sumamed Vyasasrama; whose notes, in their turn, become the text for other scholia: especially a voluminous collection under the title of Parimala, or Vedanta-calpataru-parimala, by Apyayadicshita (author of several other works); and an abridged one, under that of Vedanta calpataru-manjari, by Vidyanat'ha Bhatta.

Other commentaries on Sancara's gloss are numerous and esteemed, though not burdened with so long a chain of scholia upon scholia: for instance, the Brahma-vidya-bharana by Adwaitananda, [It is by Mr. Ward named Vedanta sutra vyac'hya by Brahma-vidyabha-rana, mistaking the title of the work for the appellation of the author. Yet it is expressly affirmed in the rubric and colophon to be the work of Adwaitananda, who abridged it from an ampler commentary by Ramananda Tirt'ha. The mistake is the more remarkable, as the same Adwaitananda was preceptor of SADANANDA, whose work, the Vedanta-sara, Mr. Ward attempted to translate; and the only part of Sadananda's preface, which is preserved in the version, is that preceptor's name. Mr. Ward's catalogue of treatises extant belonging to this school of philosophy exhibits other like errors. He puts Madhava for Madhusudana, the name of an author; converts a commentary (the Muctavali) into an abridgment; and turns the text (mula) of the Vedanta-sara into its essence. Ward's Hindus, vol., iv. pp. 172, 173.] and the Bhashya-ratnaprabha by Govindananda; both works of acknowledged merit.

These multiplied expositions of the text and of the gloss furnish an inexhaustible fund of controversial disquisition, suited to the disputatious schoolmen of India. On many occasions, however, they are usefully consulted, in succession, for annotations supplying a right interpretation of obscure passages in Sancara's scholia or in Vyasa's text.

Another perpetual commentary on the sutras of the Sariraca by a distinguished author, is the work of the celebrated Ramanuja, the founder of a sect which has sprung as a schism out of the Vedantin. The points of doctrine, on which these great authorities differ, will be inquired into in another place. It may be readily supposed that they are not unfrequently at variance in the interpretation of the text, and I shall, therefore, make little use of the scholia of Ramanuja for the present essay. For the same reason, I make no reference to the commentaries of Ballabha Acharya, Bhatta Bhascara, ANANTA Tirt'ha surnamed Madhu, and Nilacant'ha, whose interpretations differ essentially on some points from Sancara's.

Commentaries on the Sariraca-sutras by authors of less note are extremely numerous. I shall content myself with naming such only as are immediately under view, viz. the Vedanta-sutra-muctavati by Brahmananda-Saraswati; [Mr. Ward calls this an abridgment of the Vedanta-sutras. It is no abridgment, but a commentary in ordinary form.] the Brahma-sutra-bhashya or Mimansa- bhashya, by Bhascaracharya; the Vedanta-sutra-vyac'hya-chandrica, by BHAVADEVA Misra; the Vyasa-sutra-vritti, by RANGANAT'HA; the Subodhini or Sarira-sutra-sarart'ha-chandrica, by Gangadhara; and the Brahmamritra-vershini, by Ramananda.

This list might with ease be greatly enlarged. Two of the commentaries, which have been consulted in progress of preparing the present essay, are without the authors name, either in preface or colophon, in the only copies which I have seen; and occasions have occurred for noticing authors of commentaries on other branches of philosophy, as well as on the Brahma-mimansa (for instance Vijnyana Bhicshu, author of the Sanc'hya-sara and Yoga-vartica). [See p. 146, 148, of this volume.]

To these many and various commentaries in prose, on the text and on the scholia, must be added more than one in verse. For instance, the Sancshepa-sariraca, which is a metrical paraphrase of text and gloss, by Sarvajnyatmagiri a sannyasi: it is expounded by a commentary entitled Anwayart'ha-pracasica, by Rama Tirt'ha, disciple of Crishna Tirt'ha, and author of several other works; in particular, a commentary on the Upadesa-sahasri, and one on the Vedanta-sara.

Besides his great work, the interpretation of the sutras, Sancara wrote commentaries on all the principal or important Upanishads. His preceptor, Govinda, and the preceptor's teacher, Gaudapada, had already written commentaries on many of them.

Sancara is author, likewise, of several distinct treatises; the most noted of which is the Upadesa-sahasri, a metrical summary of the doctrine deduced by him from the Upanishads and Brahma-sutras, in his commentaries on those original works. The text of the Upadesa-sahasri has been expounded by more than one commentator; and among others by Rama Tirt'ha, already noticed for his comment  on the Sancshepa-sariraca. His gloss of the Upadesa-sahasri is entitled Pada-yojanica.

Elementary treatises on the Vedanta are very abundant. It may suffice to notice a few which are popular and in general use, and which have been consulted in the preparation of the present essay.

The Vedanta-paribhasha of Dharma-raja Dicshita explains, as its title indicates, the technical terms of the Vedanta; and, in course of doing so, opens most of the principal points of its doctrine. A commentary on this work by the author's son, Rama-Crishha Dicshita, bears the title of Vedanta-sic'hamani. Taken together, they form an useful introduction to the study of this branch of Indian philosophy.

The Vedanta-sara is a popular compendium of the entire doctrine of the Vedanta. [Mr. Ward has given, in the fourth volume of his View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus (third edition) a translation of the Vedanta-sara. I wish to speak as gently as I can of Mr. Ward's performance; but having collated this, I am bound to say it is no version of the original text, and seems to have been made from an oral exposition through the medium of a different language, probably the Bengalese. This will be evident to the oriental scholar on the slightest comparison: for example, the introduction, which does not correspond with the original in so much as a single word, the name of the author's preceptor alone excepted; nor is there a word of the translated introduction countenanced by any of the commentaries. At the commencement of the treatise, too, where the requisite qualifications of a student are enumerated, Mr. Ward makes his author say, that a person possessing those qualifications is heir to the Veda (p. 176). There is no term in the text, nor in the commentaries, which could suggest the notion of heir; unless Mr. Ward has so translated adhicari (a competent or qualified person), which in Bengalese signifies proprietor, or, with the epithet uttara (uttaradhicari) heir or successor. It would be needless to pursue the comparison further. The meaning of the original is certainly not to be gathered from such translations of this and (as Mr. Ward terms them) of other principal works of the Hindus, which he has presented to the public. I was not aware, when preparing the former essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus which have been inserted in the first volume of the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, that Mr. Ward had treated the same topics: but I think it now unnecessary to revert to the subject, for the purpose of offering any remarks on his explanation of other branches of Indian philosophy.] It is the work of Sadananda, disciple of Adwayananda or ADWAITANANDA before-mentioned, and has become the text for several commentaries; and, among the rest, the Vidwanmano-ranjini, by RAMA-TIRT'HA, who has been already twice noticed for other works; and the Subodhini, by Nrisinha Saraswati, disciple of Crishnananda.

A few other treatises may be here briefly noticed.

The Sastra-siddhanta-lesa-sangraha, by Apyaya or (Apyai) or CSHITA, son of Ranganat'ha or RANGARAJA DICSHITA, and author of the Parimala on the Siddhanta calpataru, before-mentioned, as well as of other works, has the benefit of a commentary, entitled Crishnalancara, by Achyuta Crishnananda Tirt'ha, disciple of SWAYAMPRACASANANDA SARASWATi. The Vedanta-siddhanta-vindu, by MADHUSUDANA, disciple of VISWEWA-RANANDA SARASWATI, and author of the Vedanta-calpalatica, and of other works, is in like manner commented on by BRAHMANANDA, disciple of Narayana Tirt'ha.


[In this analysis of the sutras, a portion of the scholia or explanations of commentators is blended with the text, for a brief abstract and intelligible summary of the doctrine.]

The Uttara-mimansa opens precisely as the Purva, announcing the purport in the same terms, except a single, but most important word, brahme instead of dharma. 'Next, therefore, the inquiry is concerning God.' [Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 1.] It proceeds thus: '[He is that] whence are the birth and [continuance, and dissolution] of [this world]: [He is] the source of [revelation or] holy ordinance.' [1b. § 2 and 3.] That is, as the commentators infer from these aphorisms so expounded, 'He is the omnipotent creator of the world and the omniscient author of revelation.' It goes on to say, 'This appears from the import and right construction of holy writ.' [1b. § 4.]

The author of the sutras next [1b. § 5. (sutr. 5. 11.)] enters upon a confutation of the Sanc'hyas, who insist that nature, termed prad'hana, which is the material cause of the universe, as they affirm, is the same with the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the world recognised by the Vedas. It is not so; for 'wish' (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause, which moreover is termed (atman) soul: 'He wished to be many and prolific, and became manifold.' And again, 'He desired to be many, &c.' [Ch'handogya, 6.] Therefore he is a sentient rational being; not insensible, as the pracriti (nature) or pradhana (matter) of Capila is affirmed to be.

In the sequel of the first chapter [§ § 6 to § 11.] questions are raised upon divers passages of the Vedas, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes are seemingly assigned to the world's cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are shown to intend the supreme one.

The cases (adhicaranas) or questions arising on them are examined and resolved concisely and obscurely in the sutras, fully and perspicuously  in the scholia.

'The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is (anandamaya) essentially happy. [Taittiriya.] He is the brilliant, golden person, seen within (antar) the solar orb and the human eye. [Ch'handogya, 1.] He is the etherial element (acasa), from which all things proceed and to which all return. [Ch'handogya, I.] He is the breath (prana) in which all beings merge, into which they all rise. [Udgit'ha.] He is the light (Jyotish) which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, everywhere throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the breath (prana) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, with which Indra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, identifies himself.' [Caushitaci.]

The term prana, which is the subject of two of the sections just quoted (§ 9 and 11), properly and primarily signifies respiration, as well as certain other vital actions (inspiration, energy, expiration, digestion, or circulation of nourishment); and secondarily, the senses and organs. [Br. Sutr. 2. 4. § 1, 6. (S. 1, 13.)] But, in the passages here referred to, it is employed for a different signification, intending the supreme Brahme; as also in divers other texts of the Vedas: and, among the rest, in one where the senses are said to be absorbed into it during profound sleep; [SANC. &c. on Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 9.] for 'while a man sleeps without dreaming, his soul is with Brahme. '

Further cases of the like nature, but in which the indications of the true meaning appear less evident, are discussed at length in the second and third chapters of the first book. Those in which the distinctive attributes of the supreme being are more positively indicated by the passage whereon a question arises, had been considered in the foregoing chapter: they are not so clearly denoted in the passages now examined, such as concern God as the object of devout meditation and worship, are for the most part collected in the second chapter; those which relate to God as the object of knowledge, are reserved for the third. Throughout these cases, completed where requisite by the scholiast, divers interpretations of a particular term or phrase are first proposed, as obvious and plausible, and reasons favourable to the proposed explanation set forth; but are set aside by stronger arguments, for a different and opposite construction. The reasoning is here omitted, as it would need much elucidation; and the purpose of this analysis is to exhibit the topics treated, and but summarily the manner of handling them.

It is not the embodied (sarira) and individual soul, but the supreme Brahme himself, [Brahman is, in this acceptation, a neuter noun (nom. Brahme or Brahma); and the same term in the masculine (nom. Brahma) is one of the three Gods who constitute one person. But it is more conformable with our idiom to employ the masculine exclusively, and many Sanscrit terms of the same import are masculine; as Paramatman(-tma), Paramesnara &c.] on whom devout meditation is to be fixed, as enjoined in a passage which declares: 'this universe is indeed Brahme; [Ch'handogya, 3. 'Sanditya-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 1, (S. 1, 8.)] for it springs from him, merges in him, breathes in him: therefore, serene, worship him. Verily, a devout man, as are his thoughts or deeds in this world, such does he become departing hence [in another birth]. Frame then the devout meditation, "a living body endued with mind ..."' [Cat'havalli, 2. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 2. (8. 9, 10).]

It is neither fire nor the individual soul, but the supreme being, who is the 'devourer' (attri) described in the dialogue between YAMA and Nachicetas: [Cat'havalli. 3. Br. S. 1. 2. § 3. (S. 11, 12.)] ' who, then, knows where abides that being, whose food is the priest and the soldier (and all which is fixt or moveable), and death is his sauce?'

In the following passage, the supreme spirit, and not the intellectual faculty, is associated with the individual living soul, as "two occupying the cavity or ventricle of the heart" (guham pravish'tau atmanau). 'Theologists, as well as worshippers maintaining sacred fires, term light and shade the contrasted two, who abide in the most excellent abode, worthy of the supreme, occupying the cavity (of the heart), dwelling together in the worldly body, and tasting the certain fruit of good (or of evil) works.' [Ch'handogya 4. Upacosala-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 4. (S. 13, 17.)]

In the following extract from a dialogue, [Vrihad aranyaca, 5. Br. Sutr. 1 . 2. § 5. (S 18, 20.)] in which Satyacama instructs Upacosala, the supreme being is meant; not the reflected image in the eye, nor the informing deity of that organ, nor the regent of the sun, nor the individual intelligent soul. 'This being, who is seen in the eye, is the self (atman): He is immortal, fearless Brahme. Though liquid grease, or water, be dropped therein, it passes to the corners (leaving the eye-ball undefiled).'

So, in a dialogue, in which Yajnyawalcya instructs Uddalaca, [Mundaca, an Upanishad of the At'harvana. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 6. (S. 21, 23.)] "the internal check" (antaryamin) is the supreme being; and not the individual soul, nor the material cause of the world, nor a subordinate deity, the conscious informing regent of the earth, nor a saint possessing transcendent power: where premising, 'he who eternally restrains (or governs) this and the other world, and all beings therein,' the instructor goes on to say: 'who standing in the earth is other than [the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who interiorly restrains (and governs) the earth: the same is thy soul (and mine), the "internal check" (antaryamin), immortal, &c,'

Again, in another dialogue, Angiras, in answer to Mahasala, who with SAUNACA visited him for instruction, declares 'there are two sciences, one termed inferior, the other superior. The inferior comprises the four Vedas, with their appendages, grammar, &c.' (all of which he enumerates): 'but the superior (or best and most beneficial) is that by which the unalterable (being) is comprehended, who is invisible (imperceptible by organs of sense), ungrasped (not prehensible by organs of action), come of no race, belonging to no tribe, devoid of eye, ear (or other sensitive organ), destitute of hand, foot (or other instrument of action), everlasting lord, present every where, yet most minute. Him, invariable, the wise contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the head and body grows from the living man, so does the universe come of the unalterable... ' Here it is the supreme being, not nature or a material cause, nor an embodied individual soul, who is the invisible (adresya) ungrasped source of (all) beings (bhuta-yoni).

In a dialogue between several interlocutors, Prachinasala, UDDALACA, and ASWAPATi, king of the Caiceyis, (of which a version at length was inserted in an essay on the Vedas, [ See p. 50, of this volume.] the terms vaiswanara and atman occur (there translated universal soul). The ordinary acceptation of vaiswanara is tire: and it is therefore questioned, whether the element of fire be not here meant, or the regent of tire, that is, the conscious, informing deity of it, or a particular deity described as having an igneous body, or animal heat designated as alvine fire; and whether likewise atman intends the living, individual soul, or the supreme being. The answer is, that the junction of both general terms limits the sense, and restricts the purport of the passage to the single object to which both terms are applicable: it relates, then, to the supreme being. [Ch'handogya, 5. Br. Sutr. 1. 2. § 7. (S. 24, 32.)]

Under this section the author twice cites Jaimini: [1b. S. 28 and 31.] once for obviating any difficulty or apparent contradiction in this place, by taking the term in its literal and etymological sense (universal guide of men), instead of the particular acceptation of fire; and again, as justifying, by a parallel passage in another Veda, [Vajasaneyi brahmana.] an epithet intimating the minute size of the being in question (pradesa-matra), a span long. [By an oversight, the expression relative to diminutive dimension was omitted in the translated passage.] On this last point other ancient authors are likewise cited: one, Asmarat'hya, who explains it as the result of shrinking or condensation; the other, Badari, as a fruit of imagination or mental conception. [Br Sutr. I. 2. 29. 30.] Reference is also made to another sac'ha of the Veda, [Jabala.] where the infinite, supreme soul is said to occupy the spot between the eye-brows and nose.

'That on which heaven and earth and the intermediate transpicuous region are fixt, mind, with the vital airs (or sensitive organs), know to be the one soul (atman): reject other doctrines. This alone is the bridge of immortality.' [Mundaca. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 1. (S. 1, 7.)] In this passage of an Upanishad of the At'harvana, Brahme is intended, and not any other supposed site (ayatana) of heaven, earth, &c.

In a dialogue between Nareda and Sanatcumara, the (bhuman) 'great' one, proposed as an object of inquiry for him who desires unlimited happiness, since there is no bliss in that which is finite and small, is briefly defined. 'He is great, in whom nought else is seen, heard, or known, but that wherein ought else is seen, heard, or known, is small.' [Ch'handogya. 7. Bhumavidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 2. (S. 8, 9.)] Here the supreme being is meant; not breath (prana), which had been previously mentioned as greatest, in a climax of enumerated objects.

So, in a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and his wife Gargi, [Vrihad arany. 5. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 3. (S. 10, 12.)] being asked by her, 'the heaven above, and the earth beneath, and the transpicuous region between, and all which has been, is, and will be, whereon are they woven and sewn?' answers, the ether (acasa); and being further asked, what it is on which ether is woven or sewn? replies, 'the unvaried being, whom Brahmanas affirm to be neither coarse nor subtile, neither short nor long ...' It is the supreme being who is here meant.

The mystic syllable om, composed of three elements of articulation, is a subject of devout meditation; and the efficacy of that meditation depends on the limited or extended sense in which it is contemplated. The question concerning this mode of worship is discussed in a dialogue between Pippalada and Satyacama. [Prasna, an Upanishad of the At'harvana. Br, Sutr. 1. 3. § 4. (S. 13.)]

If the devotion be restricted to the sense indicated by one element, the effect passes not beyond this world; if to that indicated by two of the elements, it extends to the lunar orb, whence however the soul returns to a new birth; if it be more comprehensive, embracing the import of the three elements of the word, the ascent is to the solar orb, whence, stripped of sin, and liberated as a snake which has cast its slough, the soul proceeds to the abode of Brahme, and to the contemplation of (purusha) him who resides in a corporeal frame: that is, soul reposing in body (purisaya).

That mystic name, then, is applied either to the supreme Brahme, uniform, with no quality or distinction of parts; or to Brahme, not supreme, but an effect (carya) diversified, qualified; who is the same with the Viraj and Hiranya-Garbha of mythology, born in the mundane egg.

It appears from the latter part of the text, that it is the supreme Brahme to whom meditation is to be directed, and on whom the thoughts are to be fixed, for that great result of liberation from sin and worldly trammels.

In a passage descriptive of the lesser ventricle of the heart, it is said: 'within this body (Brahme-pura) Brahme's abode, is a (dahara) little lotus, a dwelling within which is a (dahara) small vacuity occupied by ether (acasa). What that is which is within (the heart's ventricle) is to be inquired, and should be known.' [Ch'handogya, 8. Dahara-vidya. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 5. (S. 14, 21.)] A question is here raised, whether that 'ether' (acasa) within the ventricle of the heart be the etherial element, or the individual sensitive soul, or the supreme one; and it is pronounced from the context, that the supreme being is here meant.

'The sun shines not therein, nor the moon, nor stars: much less this fire. All shines after his effulgence (reflecting his light), by whose splendour this whole (world) is illumined.' [Mundaca, Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 6. (S. 22, 23.)] In this passage it is no particular luminary or mine of light, but the (prajnya) intelligent soul (supreme Brahme) which shines with no borrowed light.

In the dialogue between Yama and Nachicetas, before cited, are the following passages. [Cat'ha. 4. Br. Sutr. 1 . 3. § 7. (S. 24, 25.)] 'A person (purusha) no bigger than the thumb abides in the midst of self;' and again, 'the person no bigger than the thumb is clear as a smokeless flame, lord of the past (present) and future; he is to-day and will be to-morrow: such is he ( concerning whom you inquire ).' This is evidently said of the supreme ruler, not of the individual living soul.

Another passage of the same Upanishad [Cat'ha. 6. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 10. (S. 39.)] declares: 'this whole universe, issuing from breath (prana), moves as it impels: great, terrible, as a clap of thunder. They, who know it, become immortal.' Brahme, not the thunderbolt nor wind, is here meant.

'The living soul (samprasada) rising from this corporeal frame, attains the supreme light, and comes forth with his identical form.' [Ch'handogya 8. Prajapati-vidya, Br. Sutr. I. 3. § 11. (S. 40.)] 'It is neither the light of the sun, nor the visual organ, but Brahme, that is here meant.

'Ether (acasa) is the bearer (cause of bearing) of name and form. That in the midst of which they both are, is Brahme: it is immortality; it is soul.' [Ch'handogya 8 ad finem. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 12. (S. 41.)] Acasa here intends the supreme being, not the element so named.

In a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and Janaca, [Vrihad aranyaca, 6. Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 13. (S. 42. 43.)] in answer to an inquiry 'which is the soul?' the intelligent internal light within the heart is declared to be so. This likewise is shown to relate to the supreme one, unaffected by worldly course.

It had been intimated in an early aphorism of the first chapter, that the Vedas, being rightly interpreted, do concur in the same import, as there expressed concerning the omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. [Br. S. 1. 1. § 4.] An objection to this conclusion is raised, upon the ground of discrepancy remarked in various texts of the Vedas, [Ch'handogya. Taittiriya. and Aitareya.] which coincide, indeed, in ascribing the creation to Brahme, but differ in the order and particulars of the world's development. The apparent contradiction is reconciled, as they agree on the essential points of the creator's attributes; omnipotent and omniscient providence, lord of all, soul of all, and without a second, &c.: and it was not the object of the discrepant passages to declare the precise succession and exact course of the world's formation.

Two more sections are devoted to expound passages which define Brahme as creator, and which are shown to comport no other construction. In one, [Caushitaci brahmana. Br. S. 1. 4. §5. (S. 16-18.)] cited from a dialogue between Ajatasatru and Balaci, surnamed Gargya, the object of meditation and worship is pronounced to be, 'he who was the maker of those persons just before mentioned (regents of the sun, moon, &c.), and whose work this universe is.'

In the other, cited from a dialogue between Yajnyawalcya and MAITREYI, [Vrihad aranyaca, Maitreyi brahmana. Br. Sutr. 1. 4. § 6. (S. 19-22.)] soul, and all else which is desirable, are contrasted as mutual objects of affection: 'it is for soul (atman) that opulence, kindred, and all else which is dear, are so; and thereunto soul reciprocally is so; and such is the object which should be meditated, inquired, and known, and by knowledge of whom all becomes known.' This, it is shown, is said of the supreme, not of the individual soul, nor of the breath of life.

Under this last head several authorities are quoted by the author, for different modes of interpretation and reasoning, viz. Asmarat'hya, Audulomi and Casacritsna, as Jaimini under the next preceding (§ 5).

The succeeding section [Br. Sutr. 1.4. § 7. (S. 23-27.)] affirms the important tenet of the Vedanta, that the supreme being is the material, as well as the efficient, cause of the universe; it is a proposition directly resulting from the tenour of passages of the Vedas, and illustrations and examples adduced.

The first lecture is terminated by an aphorism, [Br. Sutr. 1. 4. § 8. (S. 28.)] intimating that, in the like manner as the opinion of a plastic nature and material cause (termed by the Sanc'hyas, pradhana) has been shown to be unsupported by the text of the Veda, and inconsistent with its undoubted doctrine, so, by the like reasoning, the notion of atoms (anu or paramanu) and that of an universal void (sunya), and other as unfounded systems, are set aside in favour of the only consistent position just now affirmed. (Br. Sutr. 1. 1. § 5 and 1. 4. § 7.)

Not to interrupt the connexion of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digression, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this chapter, [Br. Sutr. 1. 3. § 8, 9. (S. 26-38.)] wherein it is inquired whether any besides a regenerate man (or Hindu of the three first tribes) is qualified for theological studies and theognostic attainments; and the solution of the doubt is, that a sudra, or man of an inferior tribe, is incompetent; [Br. Sutr. 1. 3. (S. 28-29.)] and that beings superior to man (the Gods of mythology) are qualified.

In the course of this disquisition the noted question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favourite topic in both Mimansas, being intimately connected with that of the eternity of the Veda, or revelation acknowledged by them.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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Part 2 of 2

I shall not, however, enter into the matter further, in this place, though much remain to be added to the little which was said on it in a former essay. [See p. 195, of this volume.]

In the fourth chapter of the first lecture, the author returns to the task of confuting the Sanc'hya doctrine; and some passages of the Vedas, apparently favouring that doctrine, are differently interpreted by him: 'the indistinct one (avyacta) is superior to the great one (mahat), and embodied soul (purusha) is superior to the indistinct.' [Cat'ha, 3, Br. Sutr. 1.4. § 1. (S. 1-7.)] Here the very same terms, which the Sanc'hyas employ for 'intelligence,  nature, and soul,' are contrasted, with allusion seemingly to the technical acceptations of them. This passage is, however, explained away; and the terms are taken by the Vedantins in a different sense.

The next instance is less striking and may be briefly dismissed, as may that following it: one relative to aja, alleged to signify in the passage in question [Swetaswatara. B. S. 1. 4. § 2. (S. 8-10.)] the unborn sempiternal nature (pracriti), but explained to intend a luminous nature (pracriti) noticed in the Ch'handogya; (there is in the text itself an evident allusion to the ordinary acceptation of the word, a she-goat): the other concerning the meaning of the words pancha-panchajanah, in a passage of the Vrihad aranyaca, [Vrihad aran. 6. Br. Sutr. 1. 4. § 3. (S. 11-13.)] which a follower of the Sanc'hya would construe as bearing reference to five times five (twenty-five) principles; but which clearly relates to five objects specified in the context, and figuratively termed persons (pancha-jana).

It is because the Sanc'hya doctrine is, in the apprehension of the Vedantins themselves, to a certain degree plausible, and seemingly countenanced by the text of the Vedas, that its refutation occupies so much of the attention of the author and his scholiasts. More than one among the sages of the law (Devala in particular is named) have sanctioned the principles of the Sanc'hyu; and they are not uncountenanced by Menu. [Menu's Institutes, ch. xii., v. 50.] Capila himself is spoken of with the reverence due to a saint (Maha-rishi) and inspired sage; and his most eminent disciples, as Panchasic'ha, &c. are mentioned with like veneration; and their works are dignified with the appellations of tantra and smriti as holy writings, by the Vedantins, at the same time that these oppose and refute the doctrine taught by him.

Capila, indeed, is named in the Veda itself as possessing transcendent knowledge: but here it is remarked, that the name has been borne by more than one sage; and in particular by Vasudeva, who slew the sons of Sagara. [SANC. on Br. Sutr. 2. 1. § 1. (S. 1-2.)] This mythological personage, it is contended, is the Capila named in the Veda.

The second lecture continues the refutation of Capila's Sanc'hya, which, it is observed, is at variance with the smritis, as with the Vedas: and here the name of Menu is placed at the head of them, although the institutes, which bear his name, will be found, as just now hinted, and as subsequently admitted in another section, to afford seeming countenance to Sanc'hya doctrines. Such passages are, however, explained away by the Vedantins, who rely in this instance, as they do in that of the Veda itself, on other texts, which are not reconcileable to the Sanc'hya.

The same argument is in the following section, [Br. Sutr. 2. 1. § 2. (S. 3.)] applied to the setting aside of the Yoga-smriti of Patanjali (Hairanya-garbha), so far as that is inconsistent with the orthodox tenets deduced from the Vedas: and, by parity of reasoning, to Canade's atomical scheme; and to other systems which admit two distinct causes (a material and an efficient one) of the universe.

The doctrine derived from the tenour of the Vedas is to be supported, likewise, by reasoning independently of authority. 'The objection, that the cause and effect are dissimilar, is not a valid one: instances of such dissimilarity are frequent. Hair and nails, which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal body; and sentient vermin (scorpions, &c.) spring from inanimate sources (cow-dung, &c.) The argument, too, might be retorted; for, according to the adverse position, sentient beings are produced from an insensible plastic nature. [Br. Sutr. 2. 1. § 3. (S. 4. 11.)] On these and other arguments the orthodox doctrine is maintainable by reasoning: and by like arguments opinions concerning atoms and an universal void, which are not received by the best persons, may be confuted.' [ Ibid. § 4. (S. 12.)]

'The distinction relative to fruition, discriminating one who enjoys and that which is enjoyed, does not invalidate the singleness and identity of Brahme as cause and effect. [Ibid. 2. 1. § 5. (S. 13.)] The sea is one and not other than its waters; yet waves, foam, spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it, differ from each other. '

'An effect is not other than its cause. Brahme is single without a second. He is not separate from the embodied self. He is soul; and the soul is he. [Ibid. §6. (S. 14-20.) and §7. (S. 21-23.)] Yet he does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rock crystals, red orpiment, &c.; the same soil produces a diversity of plants; the same food is converted into various excrescences, hair, nails, &c.

'As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so is Brahme variously transformed and diversified, without aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. [Ibid. § 8. (S. 24-25.)] In like manner, the spider spins his web out of his own substance; spirits assume various shapes; cranes (valaca) propagate without the male; and the lotus proceeds from pond to pond without organs of motion. That Brahme is entire without parts, is no objection: he is not wholly transformed into worldly appearances. Various changes are presented to the same dreaming soul. Differs illusory shapes and disguises are assumed by the same spirit.' [Ibid. § 9. (S. 26-29.)]

'Brahme is omnipotent, able for every act, without organ or instrument. [Ibid. § 10. (S. 30-31.)] No motive or special purpose need be assigned for his creation of the universe, besides his will.' [Ibid. § 11. (S. 32-33.)]

'Unfairness and uncompassionateness are not to be imputed to him, because some (the Gods) are happy, others (beasts and inferior beings) are miserable, and others again (men) partake of happiness and unhappiness. Every one has his lot, in the renovated world, according to his merits, his previous virtue or vice in a former stage of an universe, which is sempiternal and had no beginning in time. So the rain-cloud distributes rain impartially; yet the sprout varies according to the seed.' [Br. Sutr. 2. 1. §. 12. (S. 34-36.)]

'Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, &c.) exists in Brahme, who is devoid of qualities. ' [Ibid. § 13. (S. 37.)]

The second chapter of the second lecture is controversial. The doctrine of the Sanc'hyas is confuted in the first section; that of the Vaiseshicas in two more; of the Bauddhas in as many; of the Jainas in one; of the Pasupatas and Pancharatras, likewise, in one each. These controversial disquisitions are here omitted; as a brief abstract would hardly be intelligible, and a full explanation would lead to too great length. They have been partly noticed in a separate treatise on the Philosophy of Indian Sects. [See p. 243, of this volume.] It is remarkable, that the Nyaya of Gotama is entirely unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the Vedanta-sutras.

In the third chapter of the second lecture, the task of reconciling seeming contradictions of passages in the Vedas is resumed.

'The origin of air and the etherial element (acasa), unnoticed in the text of the Veda (Ch'handogya), where the creation of the three other elements is described, has been affirmed in another (Taittiriyaca). [Ibid. 2. 3. §. 1 and 2. (S. 1-7 and 8.)] The omission of the one is supplied by the notice in the other; there is no contradiction, as the deficient passage is not restrictive, nor professes a complete enumeration. Ether and air are by Brahme created. But he himself has no origin, no procreator nor maker, for he is eternal, without beginning as without end. [Br. Sutr. 2. 3 § 3. (S. 9.)] So fire, and water, and earth, proceed mediately from him, being evolved successively, the one from the other, as fire from air, and this from ether, [Ibid. § 4-6. (S. 10-12.)] The element of earth is meant in divers passages where food (that is, esculent vegetable) is said to proceed from water: for rain fertilizes the earth. It is by his will, not by their own act, that they are so evolved; and conversely, they merge one into the other, in the reversed order, and are re- absorbed at the general dissolution of worlds, previous to renovation of all things.' [Ibid § 7-8. (S. 13-14.)]

'Intellect, mind, and organs of sense and action, being composed of the primary elements, are evolved and re-absorbed in no different order or succession, but in that of the elements of which they consist.' [Ibid. § 9. (S. 15.)]

'The same course, evolution and re-absorption, or material birth and death, cannot be affirmed of the soul. Birth and death are predicated of an individual, referring merely to his association with body, which is matter fixed or moveable. Individual souls are, in the Veda, compared to sparks issuing from a blazing fire; but the soul is likewise declared expressly to be eternal and unborn. Its emanation is no birth, nor original production. [Br. Sutr. § 10-11 (S. 16-17.)] It is perpetually intelligent and constantly sensible, as the Sanc'hyas too maintain; not adventitiously so, merely by association with mind and intellect, as the disciples of Canade insist. It is for want of sensible objects, not for want of sensibility or faculty of perception, that the soul feels not during profound sleep, fainting, or trance.

'The soul is not of finite dimensions, as its transmigrations seemingly indicate; nor minutely small abiding within the heart, and no bigger than the hundredth part of a hundredth of a hair's point, as in some passages described; but, on the contrary, being identified with supreme Brahme, it participates in his infinity.' [Ibid. 2. 3. § 13. (S. 19-32.)]

'The soul is active; not as the Sanc'hyas maintain, merely passive. [Ibid. § 14. (S. 33-39.)]  Its activity, however, is not essential, but adventitious. As the carpenter, having his tools in hand, toils and suffers, and laying them aside, rests and is easy, so the soul in conjunction with its instruments (the senses and organs) is active, and quitting them, reposes. [Ibid. § 15. (S. 40.)]

'Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in its actions and fruition, in its attainment of knowledge, and consequent liberation and bliss, by the supreme ruler of the universe, [Ibid. § 16. (S. 41-42.)] who causes it to act conformably with its previous resolves: now, according to its former purposes, as then consonantly to its yet earlier predispositions, accruing from preceding forms with no retrospective limit; for the world had no beginning. The supreme soul makes the individuals act relatively to their virtuous or vicious propensities, as the same fertilizing rain-cloud causes various seeds to sprout multifariously, producing diversity of plants according to their kind.

'The soul is a portion of the supreme ruler, [Ibid. § 17. (S. 43—53.)] as a spark is of fire. The relation is not as that of master and servant, ruler and ruled, but as that of whole and part. In more than one hymn and prayer of the Vedas [Rigveda, 8. 4. 17. Yajurveda (Vajasaneyi) 31. 3.] it is said, "All beings constitute one quarter of him; three quarters are imperishable in heaven:" and in the Iswara-gita [SANCARA cites by this name the Bhagavad gita.] and other smritis, the soul, that animates body, is expressly affirmed to be a portion of him. He does not, however, partake of the pain and suffering of which the individual soul is conscious, through sympathy, during its association with body; so solar or lunar light appears as that which it illumines, though distinct therefrom.

'As the sun's image reflected in water is tremulous, quaking with the undulations of the pool, without however affecting other watery images nor the solar orb itself; so the sufferings of one individual affect not another, nor the supreme ruler. But, according to the doctrine of the Sanc'hyas, who maintain that souls are numerous, each of them infinite, and all affected by one plastic principle, nature (pradhana or pracriti), the pain or pleasure, which is experienced by one, must be felt by all. The like consequence is objected to the doctrine of Canade, who taught that souls, numerous and infinite, are of themselves insensible; and mind, the soul's instrument, is minute as an atom, and by itself likewise unsentient. The union of one soul with a mind would not exclude its association with other souls, equally infinite and ubiquitary; and all, therefore, would partake of the same feeling of pain or pleasure. '

The fourth chapter of the second book proceeds in the task of reconciling apparent contradictions of passages in the Vedas. [Br. Sutr. 2. 4. § 1. (S. 1-4.)]

'The corporeal organs of sense and of action, designated by the term prana in a secondary acceptation (it is noticed in its proper signification further on, § 4), have, like the elements and other objects treated of in the foregoing chapter, a similar origin, as modifications of Brahme; although unnoticed in some passages concerning the creation, and mentioned in others as pre-existent, but expressly affirmed in others to be successively evolved. [Ibid. 2. 4. § 1. (S. 1-4.)] The deficiency or omission of one text does not invalidate the explicit tenor of another.

'In various passages, the number of corporeal organs is differently stated, from seven to thirteen. The precise number is, however, eleven: [Ibid. § 2. (S. 5-6.)] the five senses, sight, &c.; five active organs, the hand, &c.; and lastly, the internal faculty, mind, comprehending intelligence, consciousness, and sensation. Where a greater number is specified, the term is employed in its most comprehensive sense; where fewer are mentioned, it is used in a more restricted acceptation:  thus seven sensitive organs are spoken of, relatively to the eyes, ears, and nostrils (in pairs), and the tongue.

'They are finite and small: not, however, minute as atoms, nor yet gross, as the coarser elements. [Ibid. § 3. (S. 7.)]

'In its primary or principal signification, prana is vital action, and chiefly respiration. This, too, is a modification of Brahme. It is not wind (vayu) or the air which is breathed, though so described in numerous passages of the Vedas and other authorities; nor is it an operation of a corporeal organ; but it is a particular vital act, and comprehends five such: 1st, respiration, or an act operating upwards; 2d, inspiration, one operating downwards; 3d, a vigorous action, which is a mean between the foregoing two; 4th, expiration, or passage upwards, as in metempsychosis; 5th, digestion, or circulation  of nutriment throughout the corporeal frame.' [Br. Sutr. 2. 4. § 4. (S. 8.) § 5. (S. 9-12.) § 6. (S. 13.)]

'Here, too, it must be understood of a limited, not vast or infinite act, nor minutely small. The vital act is not so minute as not to pervade the entire frame, as in the instance of circulation of nourishment; yet is small enough to he imperceptible to a bystander, in the instance of life's passage in transmigration.

'Respiration and the rest of the vital acts do not take effect of themselves by an intrinsic faculty, but as influenced and directed by a presiding deity and ruling power, yet relatively to a particular body, to whose animating spirit, and not to the presiding deity, fruition accrues. [Ibid. § 7. (S. 14-16.)]

'The senses and organs, eleven in number, as above mentioned, are not modifications of the principal vital act, respiration, but distinct principles. [Ibid. § 8. (S. 17-19.)]

'It is the supreme ruler, not the individual soul, who is described in passages of the Vedas as transforming himself into divers combinations, assuming various names and shapes, deemed terrene, aqueous, or igneous, according to the predominancy of the one or the other element. When nourishment is received into the corporeal frame, it undergoes a threefold distribution, according to its fineness or coarseness: corn and other terrene food becomes flesh; but the coarser portion is ejected, and the finer nourishes the mental organ. Water is converted into blood; the coarser particles are rejected as urine; the finer supports the breath. Oil or other combustible substance, deemed igneous, becomes marrow; the coarser part is deposited as bone, and the finer supplies the faculty of speech.' [Ibid. § 9. (S. 20-22.)]

The third lecture treats on the means whereby knowledge is attainable, through which liberation and perpetual bliss may be achieved: and, as preliminary thereto, on the passage of the soul furnished with organs into the versatile world and its various conditions; and on the nature and attributes of the supreme being.

'The soul is subject to transmigration. It passes from one state to another, invested with a subtile frame consisting of elementary particles, the seed or rudiment of a grosser body. Departing from that which it occupied, it ascends to the moon; where, clothed with an aqueous form, it experiences the recompense of its works; and whence it returns to occupy a new body with resulting influence of its former deeds. But evil-doers suffer for their misdeeds in the seven appointed regions of retribution. [Ibid. 3. 1. § 1-3. (S. 1-7 and 8-11 and 12-21.)]

'The returning soul quits its watery frame in the lunar orb, and passes successively and rapidly through ether, air, vapour, mist, and cloud, into rain; and thus finds its way into a vegetating plant, and thence, through the medium of nourishment, into an animal embryo.' [Br. Sutr. 3. 1. §4-6. (S. 22-23 and 24-27.)]

In the second chapter of this lecture the states or conditions of the embodied soul are treated of. They are chiefly three; waking, dreaming, and profound sleep: to which may be added for a fourth, that of death; and for a fifth, that of trance, swoon, or stupor, which is intermediate between profound sleep and death (as it were half-dead), as dreaming is between waking and profound sleep. In that middle state of dreaming there is a fanciful course of events, and illusory creation, which however testifies the existence of a conscious soul. In profound sleep the soul has retired to the supreme one by the route of the arteries of the pericardium. [Ibid. 3. 2. § 1-4. (S. 1-6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.)]

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the consideration of the nature and attributes of the supreme being. 'He is described in many passages of the Veda, as diversified and endued with every quality and particular character; but in other and very numerous texts, as without form or quality. The latter only is truly applicable, not the former, nor yet both. He is impassible, unaffected by worldly modifications; as the clear crystal, seemingly coloured by the red blossom of a hibiscus, is not the less really pellucid. He does not vary with every disguising form or designation, for all diversity is expressly denied by explicit texts; and the notion of variableness relative to him is distinctly condemned in some sac'has of the Veda. [Ibid. 3.2. § 5. (S. 11-13.)]

'He is neither coarse nor subtile, neither long nor short, neither audible nor tangible; amorphous, invariable. '

'This luminous immortal being, who is in this earth, is the same with the luminous, immortal, embodied spirit, which informs the corporeal self, and is the same with the [supreme] soul.' 'He is to be apprehended by mind alone, there is not here any multiplicity. Whosoever views him as manifold dies death after death. [Passages of the Veda cited among others by the scholiasts commenting on the above.]

'He is amorphous, for so he is explicitly declared to be; but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moonlight, impinging on an object, appears straight or crooked.' [Br. Sutr. 3. 2. (S. 14.)]

'He is pronounced to be sheer sense, mere intellect and thought: as a lump of salt is wholly of an uniform taste within and without, so is the soul an entire mass of intelligence.' This is affirmed both in the Vedas and in the smritis: and, as such, he is compared to the reflected images of sun and moon, which fluctuate with the rise and fall of the waters that reflect them. [Ibid. 3. 2. (S. 15-20.)] 'The luminous sun, though single, yet reflected in water, becomes various; and so does the unborn divine soul by disguise in divers modes.'

The Veda so describes him, as entering into and pervading the corporeal shapes by himself wrought. [Br. Sutr. 3. 2. S. 21.] 'He framed bodies, biped and quadruped; and becoming a bird, he passed into those bodies, filling them as their informing spirit. '

In the Vrihad aranyaca, after premising two modes of Brahme, morphous and amorphous; one composed of the three coarser elements, earth, water, and fire; the other consisting of the two more subtile, air and ether; it is said, 'next then his name is propounded,' "neither so nor so; for there is none other but he, and he is the supreme. " Here the finite forms premised are denied; for his existence as the supreme being is repeatedly affirmed in this and in other passages. [Ibid. § 6. (S. 22.)]

'He is imperceptible; yet during devout meditation is, as it were, apprehended by perception and inference, through revelation and authentic recollections. [Ibid. S. 23-24.]

'Like the sun and other luminaries, seemingly multiplied by reflection though really single, and like ether (space) apparently subdivided in vessels containing it within limits, the (supreme) light is without difference or distinction of particulars, for he is repeatedly declared so to be. [Ibid. S. 25.] Therefore is one, who knows the truth, identified with the infinite being; for so revelation indicates. But since both are affirmed, the relation is as that of the coiled serpent fancied to be a hoop; or as that of light and the luminary from which it proceeds, for both are luminous. [Ibid. (S. 26-30.)]

'There is none other but he, notwithstanding the apparent import of divers texts, which seem to imply differences, various relations, and aliquot parts. He is ubiquitary and eternal; for he is pronounced to be greater than etherial space, which is infinite. [Ibid. § 7.]

'The fruit or recompense of works is from him, for that is congruous; and so it is expressly affirmed in the Vedas. Jaimini alleges virtue or moral merit; but the author of the sutras (Badarayana Vyasa) maintains the former, because the supreme being is in the Vedas termed the cause of virtue and of vice, as of every thing else.' [ Ibid. § 8.]

The two last chapters of the third lecture relate chiefly to devout exercises and pious meditation, the practice of which is inculcated as proper and requisite to prepare the soul and mind for the reception of divine knowledge, and to promote its attainment. I pass rapidly over this copious part [The third chapter contains thirty-six sections, comprising sixty-six aphorisms; the fourth includes eighteen, comprehending fifty-two sutras; and the subject is pursued in the eight first sections of the fourth lecture.] of the text, for the same reason for which I restricted myself to a very brief notice of the Yoga or theistical Sanc'hya of Patanjali; because religious observances are more concerned than philosophy with the topics there treated, and the ritual of the Yoga according to both systems, Sanc'hya and Vedanta, would be a fitter subject of a separate treatise, rather than to be incidentally touched on while investigating the philosophical doctrines of both schools.

Various questions arise on the modes, forms, and object of meditation taught in the Upanishads and in other portions of the Vedas, as well as on exterior observances either immediately or mediately connected therewith, and likewise on the direct efficacy of knowledge, which are all considered and solved at much length. In general, but not always, the same divine knowledge, the same worship, and like meditations, are intended by the same designations in different Vedas, the omissions and obscurities of one being supplied and explained by another, and even under various designations. By the acquisition of such knowledge, attainable as it is in the present or in a future birth, in lifetime, or to take effect after death, the influence of works is annulled, and consequent deliverance is single, not varying in degree and inducing different gradations of bliss, but complete and final happiness.

The fourth lecture relates chiefly to the fruit and effect of pious meditation properly conducted, and the consequent attainment of divine knowledge. The beginning of the first chapter is, however, supplemental to the foregoing lecture, treating of devout exercises, and the posture (a sitting one) in which devotion and contemplation should be practised, with constant repetition of those observances, and persisting therein during life. [Br. Sutr. 4. 1. § 1-8. (S. 1-12.)]

So soon as that knowledge is attained, past sin is annulled and future offence precluded. [Ibid. § 9. (S. 13.)] "As water wets not the leaf of the lotus, so sin touches not him who knows God: as the floss on the carding comb cast into the fire is consumed, so are his sins burnt away." [Ch'handogya, Brahme-vidya.]

'In like manner, the effect of the converse (that is, of merit and virtue) is by acquisition of knowledge annulled and precluded. It is at death that, these consequences take place. [Br. S. 4. 1. § 10. (S. 14.)] "He traverses both (merit and demerit) thereby." [Vrihad aranyaca.] "The heart's knot is broken, all doubts are split, and his works perish, when he has seen the supreme being." [Mundaca.] "All sins depart from him:" [Ch'handogya.] meaning good works as well as misdeeds; for the confinement of fetters is the same, whether the chain be of gold or iron.' [Anon. com.]

'But only such antecedent sin and virtue are annulled, as had not begun to have effect: for their influence lasts until his deliverance, and then does he merge in the supreme Brahme. [Br. Sutr. 4. 1. § 11. (S. 15.) Ch'handogya.] Those which were in operation are not annulled, as the arrow, which has been shot completes its flight, nor falls till its speed is spent; and the potter's wheel, once set in motion, whirls till the velocity which has been communicated to it is exhausted.'

'However, the maintenance of a perpetual fire, and certain other religious observances enjoined as conducive to the same end, are not rendered inefficacious: [Br. Sutr. 4. 1. § 12. (S. 16-17).] for it is declared that ''Brahmanas seek divine knowledge by holy study, sacrifice, liberality, and devotion:" [Vrihad aranyaca.] and according to some sac'has [Satyayana.] of the Veda, other merits remain likewise effectual; for sons succeed to the inheritance of their father's works; the affectionate share his good deeds; and the malignant participate of his ill actions. These sacrificial observances may be such as are conjoined with devout exercises, faith, and pious meditation; or unattended by those holy practices for attainment of divine knowledge, since they are pronounced most efficacious when so conjoined, which implies that they are not wholly inoperative by themselves.' [Br. Sutr. 4. 1. § 13. (S. 18.) Ch'handogya.]

'Having annulled by fruition other works which had begun to have effect; having enjoyed the recompense and suffered the pains of good and bad actions, the possessor of divine knowledge, on demise of the body, proceeds to a reunion with Brahme. [Br. Sutr. § 14. (S. 19.) Ch'handogya and Vrihad aranyaca.]

The fruit of divine knowledge having been shown in the first chapter, the second chapter of this lecture treats of the particular effect of devout exercises joined with appropriate meditation. It chiefly concerns the ascent of the soul, or mode in which it passes from the body.

'Of a dying person the speech, followed by the rest of the ten exterior faculties (not the corporeal organs themselves), is absorbed into the mind, for the action of the outer organ ceases before the mind's. This in like manner retires into the breath, [Ch'handogya. Br. Sutr. 4. 2. § 1-3.] attended likewise by all the other vital functions, for they are life's companions; and the same retreat of the mind is observable, also, in profound sleep and in a swoon. Breath, attended likewise by all other vital faculties, is withdrawn into the living soul which governs the corporeal organs, as the attendants of a king assemble around him when he is setting out upon a journey; for all vital functions gather about the soul at the last moment when it is expiring. [Vrihad aranyaca.] The living soul, attended with all its faculties, retires within a rudiment of body, composed of light with the rest of the five elements, in a subtile  state. "Breath," is, therefore, said to withdraw into "light;" not meaning that element (or fire) exclusively; nor intending direct transition, for a traveller has gone from one city to another, though he passed through an intermediate town.'

'This retirement from the body is common to ordinary uninformed people as to the devout contemplative worshipper, until they proceed further on their respective paths: and immortality (without immediate reunion with the supreme Brahme) is the fruit of pious meditation, though impediments may not be wholly consumed and removed. [Br. Sutr. 4. 2. § 4. (S. 7.)]

'In that condition the soul of the contemplative worshipper remains united to a subtile elementary frame, conjoined with the vital faculties, until the dissolution of worlds, when it merges in the supreme deity. That elementary frame is minute in its dimensions as subtile in its texture, and is accordingly imperceptible to bystanders when departing from the body: nor is it oppressed by cremation or other treatment which that body undergoes. It is by its warmth sensible so long as it abides with that coarser frame, which becomes cold in death when it has departed, [Ibid. § 5. (S. 8-11.) Cat'havalli, &c.] and was warm during life while it remained.

'But he who has attained the true knowledge of God does not pass through the same stages of retreat, proceeding directly to reunion with the supreme being, with which he is identified, as a river, at its confluence with the sea, merges therein altogether. His vital faculties and the elements of which his body consists, all the sixteen component parts which constitute the human frame, are absorbed absolutely and completely: both name and form cease; and he becomes immortal, without parts or members.' [Ibid. § 6-8. (S. 12-10.) Canwa, Madhyandina, Prasna, &c.]

In course of expounding the text, some of the commentators compare the ultimate absorption of the vital faculties to the disappearance of water sprinkled on a hot stone. [Ranganat'ha on Br. Sutr. 4. 2. § 6. (S. 12).] They seem to be unaware of its evaporation, and consider it to have sunk into the stone.

'The soul, together with the vital faculties absorbed in it, having retired within its proper abode, the heart, the summit of that viscus flashes, and lightens the passage by which the soul is to depart: the crown of the head in the case of the wise; and any other part of the body, in the instance of the ignorant. A hundred and one arteries issue from the heart, one of which passes to the crown of the head: it is named sushumna. By that passage, in virtue of acquired knowledge, and of recollection of the meditated way, the soul of the wise, graced by the favour of Brahme, whose dwelling is in the heart, issues and meets a solar ray; and by that route proceeds, whether it be night or day, winter or summer. [Br. Sutr. 4. 2. § 9-11. (S. 17-21.) Vrihad aran. Ch'handogya, &c.] The contact of a sunbeam with the vein is constant, as long as the body endures: rays of light reach from the sun to the vein, and conversely extend from this to the sun. The preferableness of summer, as exemplified in the case of bhishma, who awaited the return of that auspicious season to die, does not concern the devout worshipper, who has practised religious exercises in contemplation of Brahme, as inculcated by the Vedas, and has consequently acquired knowledge. But it does concern those who have followed the observances taught by the Sanc'hya Yoga; according to which, the time of day and season of the year are not indifferent.'

The further progress of the soul, from the termination of the coronal artery communicating with a solar ray to its final destination, the abode of Brahme, is variously described in divers texts of the Veda; some specifying intermediate stations which are omitted by others, or mentioned in a different order. [Ch'handogya, Caushitaci, Vrihad aranyaca, &c.] The seeming discrepancies of those passages are reconciled, and all are shown to relate to one uniform route, deduced from the text, for the divine journey (deva-yana) which the liberated soul travels. A question arises, whether the intermediate stations, which are mentioned, be stages of the journey, or scenes of fruition to be visited in succession, or landmarks designated for the course and direction of the route. [BHAVADEVA instances Pataliputra and the Sona river, as indicated for the direction of the route from Tirahhucti (Tirhut) to Varanasi (Benares). It is clear that he understands Pataliputra (the ancient Palibothra) to be Patna.] On this point the settled conclusion is, [Br. Sutr. 4. 3. § 1-4. (S. 1-6.)] that the presiding deities or regents of the places or regions indicated are guides to the soul, who forward it on its way in its helpless condition, destitute of exerted organs, all its faculties being absorbed and withdrawn; as a blind man is led, or a faint person is conducted, by a guide.

The route deduced from the tenour of texts compared, and from divers considerations set forth, [Br. Sutr. 4. 3. § 1-4. (S. 1-6.)] is by a solar ray to the realm of fire; thence to the regents of day, of the semilunation, of the summer six months, of the year; and thence to the abode of Gods; to air or wind, the regent of which forwards the journeying soul from his precincts, by a narrow passage compared to the nave of a chariot wheel, towards the sun: thence the transition is to the moon, whence to the region of lightning, above which is the realm of Varuna, the regent of water; for lightning and thunder are beneath the raincloud and aqueous region: the rest of the way is by the realm of INDRA, to the abode of Prajapati or Brahne.

A question arises, which is here discussed, whether Brahme, to whose dwelling and court the soul is conducted, be the supreme being, according to the ordinary and chief acceptation of the term, or be that effect of his creative will which is distinguished as carya brahme, identified with the mythological personage entitled HIRANYAGARBHA, as having been included within the golden mundane egg. JAIMINI affirms the supreme one to be meant: but Badari maintains the other opinion: which is that which the commentators of the sutras understand the author of them to adopt. [Br. Sutr. 4. 3. § 5. (S. 7-14.)]

The souls of those holy persons only, whose devout meditation was addressed to the pure Brahme himself, take the route described; [Ibid. § 6. (S. 15-16.)] not those whose contemplation was partial and restrictive: they have their special reward. Those, too, whose knowledge of God was more perfect, pass immediately, or by any route, to a reunion with the divinity, with whom they are identified.

The soul of him who has arrived at the perfection of divine knowledge, and is consequently liberated, "quitting its corporeal frame, ascends to the supreme light which is Brahme, and comes forth identified with him, conform and undivided;" [Ibid. § 1-2. (S. 1-4.)] as pure water, dropped into the limpid lake, is such as that is.

Concerning the condition of the liberated man, a difference of doctrine is noticed, [Ibid. § 3. (S. 5-7.)] Jaimini maintained, that he is endued with divine attributes, omniscience, ubiquitary power, and other transcendent faculties, Audulomi insisted, that he becomes sheer thought, sentient intelligence. The author of the sutras (Badarayana) accedes to the last-mentioned opinion; admitting, however, the practical or apparent possession of divine faculties by one who has attained perfection of knowledge.

By certain devout exercises and meditation [Harda-vidya or Dahara-vidya in the Ch'handogya.] a less perfect knowledge is acquired, which, as before mentioned, qualifies the possessor of it for reception at Brahme' s abode, though not for immediate re-union and identity with his being. In that condition transcendent power is enjoyed. The pitris, or shades of progenitors, may be called up by a simple act of the will; and other superhuman faculties may be similarly exerted. The possessor of these is independent, subject to no other's control. He may, at his option, be invested with one or more bodies, furnished with senses and organs, or be unincumbered with a corporeal frame. On this point, however, a difference of doctrine subsists, Jaimini maintained the indispensable presence of body; Badari, its absence; and the author (Badarayana) admits the option. In one case, the condition is that of a person dreaming; in the other case, as of one awake. [Br. Sutr. 4. 4. §. 4. 5. (S. 9—14.)]

'Master of several bodies, by a simple act of his will, the Yogi does not occupy one only, leaving the rest inanimate, like so many wooden machines. He may animate more than one, in like manner as a single lamp may be made to supply more than one wick.' [Ibid. § 6. (S. 15-16.)]

Liberation (mucti), besides its proper and strict sense, which is that of final deliverance through a perfect knowledge of Brahme, and consequent identification with the divinity and absorption into his essence, is likewise employed in a secondary acceptation for that which takes effect in life time (jivan-mucti)] or which conducts the soul after death to dwell with Brahme; not, however, divested of a subtile corporeal frame. The more complete deliverance is incorporeal (videha mucti). [BHAVADEVA on Br. Sutr. 4. 4. S. 22.] The less perfect liberation appertains to a Yogi, similar, in respect of the faculties and powers possessed by him, to one who has accomplished the like by the observances taught in the Sanc'hya or Yoga of Patanjali.

Such a Yogi, uncontrolled and independent as he has been pronounced to be, can exert every faculty and superior power analogous to that of the divinity's which may be conducive to enjoyment; but he has not a creative power. His faculties are transcendent for enjoyment, not for action. [Br. Sutr. 4. 4. § 7. (S. 17-22.)]

The more perfect liberation is absolute and final: there is no return of the soul from its absorption in the divine essence, to undergo further transmigrations as before. [Ibid. S. 22.] But incomplete knowledge, which conducts to Brahme' s abode without qualifying the soul for such absorption into the divinity, exempts it from return during the subsisting calpa; but not at a future renovation of worlds, [On this point the commentators do not appear to agree.] unless by special favour of the deity.


In the foregoing summary of the Vedanta from the sutras of Vyasa, the interpretation by Sancara has been relied upon; and his gloss, with notes of his annotators and the commentaries of scholiasts who follow him, have been exclusively employed, lest the doctrine of separate schools and different branches of the Vedanta should be blended and confounded. Those commentaries are numerous, and explanations and elucidations of the text have been taken from one or from another indiscriminately, as they have been found pertinent and illustrative, without particular preference or selection. This should be borne in mind in comparing that summary with its authorities, as it has not been judged necessary, nor generally practicable, to cite the particular commentary that is especially used in each instance.

Some remarks will be now added, in which other authorities are likewise employed, and chiefly the elementary works [Vedanta sara, Vedanta paribhasha, &c.] mentioned in the introduction of this essay.

The principal and essential tenets of the Vedanta are, that God is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the existence, continuance, and dissolution of the universe. Creation is an act of his will. He is both efficient and material cause of the world: creator and nature, framer and frame, doer and deed. At the consummation of all things, all are resolved into him: as the spider spins his thread from his own substance and gathers it in again; as vegetables sprout from the soil and return to it, earth to earth; as hair and nails grow from a living body and continue with it. The supreme being is one, sole-existent, secondless, entire, without parts, sempiternal, infinite, ineffable, invariable ruler of all, universal soul, truth, wisdom, intelligence, happiness.

Individual souls, emanating from the supreme one, are likened to innumerable sparks issuing from a blazing fire. From him they proceed, and to him they return, being of the same essence. The soul which governs the body together with its organs, neither is born; nor does it die. It is a portion of the divine substance; and, as such, infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient, true.

It is governed by the supreme. Its activity is not of its essence, but inductive through its organs: as an artisan, taking his tools, labours and undergoes toil and pain, but laying them aside reposes; so is the soul active, and a sufferer by means of its organs; but, divested of them, and returning to the supreme one, is at rest and is happy. It is not a free and independent agent, but made to act by the supreme one, who causes it to do in one state as it had purposed in a former condition. According to its predisposition for good, or evil, for enjoined or forbidden deeds, it is made to do good or ill, and thus it has retribution for previous works. Yet God is' not author of evil; for so it has been from eternity: the series of preceding forms and of dispositions manifested in them has been infinite.

The soul is incased in body as in a sheath, or rather in a succession of sheaths. The first or inner case is the intellectual one (vijnyanamaya): it is composed of the sheer (tan-matra), or simple elements uncombined, and consists of the intellect (buddhi) joined with the five senses.

The next is the mental (manomaya) sheath, in which mind is joined with the preceding. A third [sheath or case comprises the organs of action and the vital faculties, and is termed the organic or vital case. These three sheaths (cosa) constitute the subtile frame (sucshma-sarira or linga-sarira) which attends the soul in its transmigrations. The interior rudiment confined to the inner case is the causal frame (carana-sarira).

The gross body (st'hula-sarira) which it animates from birth to death in any step of its transmigrations, is composed of the coarse elements, formed by combinations of the simple elements, in proportions of four-eighths of the predominant and characteristic one with an eighth of each of the other four: that is, the particles of the several elements, being divisible, are, in the first place, split into moieties; whereof one is subdivided into quarters; and the remaining moiety combines with one part (a quarter of a moiety) from each of the four others, thus constituting coarse or mixed elements. [Ved. Sara. 136.] The exterior case, composed of elements so combined, is the nutrimentitious (annamaya) sheath; and being the scene of coarse fruition is therefore termed the gross body.

The organic frame assimilates the combined elements received in food, and secretes the finer particles and rejects the coarsest: earth becomes flesh; water, blood; and inflammable substances (oil or grease), marrow. The coarser particles of the two first are excreted as feces and urine; those of the third are deposited in the bones. The finer particles of the one nourish the mind; of the other, supply respiration; of the third, support speech.

Organized bodies are arranged by the Vedantins in either four or three classes: for both which arrangements the authority of passages of the Veda is cited. Their four classes are the same with those of other writers; but the threefold division appears to be peculiar to this school. It is, 1st, viviparous (jivaja), as man and quadrupeds; 2d, oviparous (andaja), as birds and insects; 3d, germiniparous (udbhijja). [Sanc., &c. on Br. Sutr. 3. 1. § 3. (S. 21.)] The latter, however, comprehends the two terminating classes of the fourfold distribution, vermin and vegetable; differing but as one sprouts from the earth, the other pullulates from water: the one fixed, the other locomotive. To both, equivocal and spontaneous generation, or propagation without union of parents, is assigned.

The order in which the five elements are enumerated is that of their development: 1st, the etherial element (acasa), which is deemed a most subtile fluid, occupying all space and confounded with vacancy; sound is Its particular quality. 2d. Wind (vayu), or air in motion: for mobility is its characteristic; sound and feel are sensible in it. 3d. Fire or light (tejas), of which heat is the characteristic; and by which sound, feel, and colour (or form) are made manifest. 4th. Water (ap), of which fluidity is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, and taste occur. 5th. Earth (prit'hivi or anna), of which hardness is characteristic; and in which sound, feel, colour, taste, and smell are discernible.

The notion of ether and wind as distinct elements, an opinion which this has in common with most of the other schools of Indian philosophy, seems to originate in the assumption of mobility for the essential character of the one. Hence air in motion has been distinguished from the aerial fluid at rest, which is acasa, supposed to penetrate and pervade all worldly space; and, by an easy transition, vayu (wind) and motion, come to be identified, as acasa (ether) and space likewise are confounded.

An organized body, in its most subtile state of tenuity, comprises sixteen members (avayava) or corporeal parts, viz. five organs of sense, as many instruments of action, and the same number of vital faculties; to which are added mind (including intelligence, consciousness, and sensation); or, distinguishing mind and intellect (buddhi) as separate parts, the number is seventeen.

The vital faculties, termed vayu, are not properly air or wind, but vital functions or actions. Considered, however, with a reference to the proper meaning of that term, they are by some explained to be, 1st, respiration, which is ascending and of which the seat is the nostril; 2d, inspiration (or otherwise explained, flatus), which is descending, and which issues from the lower extremity of the intestine; 3d, flatuousness, which is diffused through the body, passing by all the veins and arteries; 4th, expiration, ascending from the throat; 5th, digestion, or abdominal air, of which the seat is the middle of the body.

According to a different explanation, the first is respiration; the second, inspiration; the third, a mean between the two, pulsation, palpitation, and other vital movements; the fourth is expiration; and the fifth is digestion.

Three states of the soul in respect of the body are recognized; to which must be added a fourth, and even a fifth, viz. waking, dreaming, profoundly sleeping, half-dead, and dead. While awake, the soul, associated with body, is active under the guidance of providence, and has to do with a real (paramart'hici) and practical (vyavaharici) creation. In a dream there Is an illusory (mayamayi) and unreal creation: nevertheless, dreams prognosticate events. Dreaming is the mean (sandhya) between sleeping and waking. In profound sleep the soul is absent, having retired by the channel of the arteries, and being as it were enfolded in the supreme deity. It is not, however, blended with the divine essence, as a drop of water fallen into a lake, where it becomes undistinguishable; but, on the contrary, the soul continues discriminate, and returns unchanged to the body which it animates while awake. Swoon, or stupor, is intermediate between sleep and death. During insensibility produced by accident or disease, there is, as in profound sleep and lethargy, a temporary absence of the soul. In death it has absolutely quitted its gross corporeal frame.

Subject to future transmigration, it visits other worlds, to receive there the recompense of works or suffer the penalty of misdeeds. Sinners fall to various regions of punishment, administered by CHITRAGUPTA and other mythological persons in the realm of Yama. The virtuous rise to the moon, where they enjoy the fruit of their good actions; and whence they return to this world to animate new bodies, and act in them, under providence, conformably with their propensities and predispositions, the trace of which remains.

The wise, liberated from worldly trammels, ascend yet higher, to the abode and court of Brahme: or, if their attainment of wisdom be complete, they at once pass into a re-union with the divine essence.

Three degrees of liberation or deliverance (mucti) are distinguished: one incorporeal, which is that last-mentioned, and is complete; another imperfect, which is that before-mentioned, taking effect upon demise, when the soul passes to the highest heaven, the abode of Brahme. The third is effectual in life-time (jivan-mucti), and enables the possessor of it to perform supernatural actions; as evocation of shades of progenitors, translation of himself into other bodies called into existence by the mere force of his will, instantaneous removal to any place at his pleasure, and other wondrous performances.

These several degrees of deliverance are achieved by means of certain sacrifices, as that of a horse (aswamedha), or by religious exercises in various prescribed modes, together with pious meditation on the being and attributes of God: but the highest degree of it is attainable only by perfect knowledge of the divine nature, and of the identity of God with that which emanated from him, or was created of his substance and partakes of his essence.

Questions most recondite, which are agitated by theologians, have engaged the attention of the Vedantins likewise, and have been by them discussed at much length; such as free-will (swatantrya), divine grace (iswara-prasada), efficacy of works (carman) or of faith (sraddha), and many other abstruse points.

On the last-mentioned topic, that of faith, nothing will be found in the text of Badarayana, and little in the gloss of Sancara. Its paramount efficacy is a tenet of another branch of the Vedanta school, which follows the authority of the Bhagavad-gita. In that work, as in many of the Puranas, passages relative to this topic recur at every turn.

The fruit of works is the grand subject of the first Mimansa, which treats of religious duties, sacrifices, and other observances.

The latter Mimansa more particularly maintains the doctrine of divine grace. It treats of free-will, which it in effect denies; but endeavours to reconcile the existence of moral evil under the government of an all-wise, all-powerful, and benevolent providence, with the absence of free-will, by assuming the past eternity of the universe, and the infinite renewals of worlds, into which every individual being has brought the predispositions contracted by him in earlier states, and so retrospectively without beginning or limit.

The notion, that the versatile world is an illusion (maya), that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the Vedanta. I have remarked nothing which countenances it in the sutras of Vyasa nor in the gloss of Sancara, but much concerning it in the minor commentaries and in elementary treatises. I take it to be no tenet of the original Vedantin philosophy, but of another branch, from which later writers have borrowed it, and have intermixed and confounded the two systems. The doctrine of the early Vedanta is complete and consistent, without this graft of a later growth.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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Part 1 of 2

X. On the Philosophy of the Hindus.

PART V. [Read at a public meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Febr. 3, 1827.]


[From the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. i. p. 549 -579.] In the present essay, it is ray intention to treat of the heretical systems of Jina and Buddha, as proposed in the first essay of this series on the Philosophy of the Hindus; and to notice certain other Indian sects, which, like them, exhibit some analogy to the Sanc'hyas, or followers of Capila or of Patanjali.

The theological or metaphysical opinions of those sectaries, apart from and exclusive of mythology and ritual ceremonies, may be not inaptly considered as a branch of philosophy, though constituting the essense of their religion, comprehending not only their belief as to the divinity and a future state, but also certain observances to be practised in furtherance of the prescribed means for attaining perpetual bliss: which here, as with most other sects of Indian origin, is the meed proposed for true and perfect knowledge of first principles.

The Jainas and Bauddhas I consider to have been originally Hindus; [As. Res., vol. ix. p. 288.] and the first-mentioned to be so still, because they recognised, as they yet do, the distinction of the four castes. It is true, that in Hindust'han, if not in the peninsula of India likewise, the Jainas are all of one caste: but this is accounted for by the admission of their adversaries (Cumarila Bhatta, &c.), who affirm that they are misguided cshatriyas (Hindus of the second or military tribe): they call themselves vaisyas. On renouncing the heresies of the Jaina sect, they take their place among orthodox Hindus, as belonging to a particular caste (cshatriya or vaisya). The representative of the great family of Jagat Set'h, who with many of his kindred was converted some years ago from the Jaina to the orthodox faith, is a conspicuous instance. Such would not be the case of a convert, who has not already caste as a Hindu.

Both religions of Jina and Buddha are, in the view of the Hindu, who reveres the Veda as a divine revelation, completely heterodox; and that more on account of their heresy in denying its divine origin, than for their deviation from its doctrine. Other sects, as the Sanc'hyas and Vaiseshicas, though not orthodox, do not openly disclaim the authority of the Veda. They endeavour to reconcile their doctrine to the text of the Indian scripture, and refer to passages which they interpret as countenancing their opinions. The Mimansa, which professedly follows the Veda implicitly, is therefore applied, in its controversy with these half-heretics, to the confutation of such misinterpretations. It refutes an erroneous construction, rather than a mistaken train of reasoning. But the Jainas and Bauddhas, disavowing the Veda, are out of the pale of the Hindu church in its most comprehensive range; and the Mimansa (practical as well as theological) in controversy with these infidels, for so it deems them, argues upon general grounds of reasoning independent of authority, to which it would be vain to appeal.

The Uttara mimansa devotes two sections (adhicaranas) to the confutation of the Bauddhas, and one to that of the Jainas. They are the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections in the 2d chapter of the 2d lecture; and it proceeds in the same controversial chapter to confute the Pasupatas and other branches of the Maheswara sect; and the Pancharatra, a branch of the Vaishnava. The Charvacas are alluded to incidentally in a very important section concerning the distinction of body and soul, in the 3d chapter of the 3d lecture (§ 30). In the Purva mmansa, controversy is more scattered; recurring in various places, under divers heads: but especially in the 3d chapter of the first book (§ 4).

The Sanc'hya of Capila devotes a whole chapter to controversy; and notices the sect of Buddha, under the designation of Nasticas; and in one place animadverts on the Pasupatas; and in another, on the Charvacas.

It is from these and similar controversial disquisitions, more than from direct sources, that I derive the information, upon which the following account of the philosophy of Jainas and Bauddhas, as well as of the Charvacas, Pasupatas and Pancharatras, is grounded. A good collection of original works by writers of their own persuasion, whether in the Sanscrit language or in Pracrit or Pali, the language of the Jainas and that of the Bauddhas, is not at hand to be consulted. But, although the information be furnished by their adversaries and even inveterate enemies, it appears, so far as I have any opportunity of comparing it with their own representations, essentially correct.


The Jainas or Arhatas, followers of Jina or Arhat (terms of like import), are also denominated Vivasanas, Muctavasanas, Muctambaras or Digambaras, with reference to the nakedness of the rigid order of ascetics in this sect, who go "bare of clothing," "disrobed," or "clad by the regions of space." The less strict order of Swetambaras [Transact, of the Roy. Asiat. Soc, vol. i. p. 416.] "clad in white," is of more modern date and of inferior note. Among nicknames by which they are known, that of Lunchita-cesa occurs. It alludes to the practice of abruptly eradicating hair of the head or body by way of mortification, Parswanat'ha is described as tearing five handfuls of hair from his head on becoming a devotee. [Ibid. p. 433.]

According to the Digambara Jainas, the universe consists of two classes, "animate" and "inanimate" (jiva and ajiva), without a creator or ruling providence (iswara). [RAMANUJA on Br. Sutr.] They assign for the cause (carana) of the world, atoms, which they do not, as the Vaiseshicas, distinguish into so many sorts as there are elements, but consider these, viz. earth, water, fire, and air, the four elements by them admitted, as modified compounds of homogeneous atoms.

These gymnosophists distinguish, as already intimated, two chief categories: 1st, Jiva, intelligent and sentient soul (chaitana atma or bodhatma) endued with body and consequently composed of parts; eternal: 2d, Ajiva, all that is not a living soul; that is, the whole of (Jada) inanimate and unsentient substance. The one is the object of fruition, being that which is to be enjoyed (bhogya) by the soul; the other is the enjoyer (bhocta) or agent in fruition; soul itself.

This second comprehensive predicament admits a six-fold subdivision; and the entire number of categories (padart'ha), as distinguished with reference to the ultimate great object of the soul's deliverance, is consequently seven. [Sancara and other commentators on Br. Sutr., and annotators on their gloss.]

I. Jiva or soul, as before-mentioned, comprising three descriptions: 1st, nitya-siddha, ever perfect, or yoga-siddha, perfect by profound abstraction; for instance, Arhats or Jinas, the deified saints of the sect: 2d, mucti or muctatma, a soul which is free or liberated; its deliverance having been accomplished through the strict observance of the precepts of the Jinas: 3d, baddha or baddhatma, a soul which is bound, being in any stage antecedent to deliverance; remaining yet fettered by deeds or works (carma).

II. Ajiva taken in a restricted sense. It comprehends the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air; and all which is fixed (st'havara) as mountains, or moveable (jangama) as rivers, &c. In a different arrangement, to be hereafter noticed, this category is termed Pudgala matter.

III — VII. The five remaining categories are distributed into two classes, that which is to be effected (sadhya) and the means thereof (sadhana): one comprising two, and the other three divisions. What may be effected (sadhya) is either liberation or confinement: both of which will be noticed further on. The three efficient means (sadhana) are as follow:

III. Asrava is that which directs the embodied spirit (asravayati purusham) towards external objects. It is the occupation or employment (vritti or pravritti) of the senses or organs on sensible objects. Through the means of the senses it affects the embodied spirit with the sentiment of taction, colour, smell, and taste.

Or it is the association or connexion of body with right and wrong deeds. It comprises all the carmas: for they (asravayanti) pervade, influence, and attend the doer, following him or attaching to him.

It is a misdirection (mit'ya-pravritti) of the organs: for it is vain, as cause of disappointment, rendering the organs of sense and sensible objects subservient to fruition.

IV. Samvara is that which stops (samvrinoti) the course of the foregoing; or closes up the door or passage of it: and consists in self-command, or restraint of organs internal and external: embracing all means of self-control, and subjection of the senses, calming and subduing them.

It is the right direction (samyac pravritti) of the organs.

V. Nirjara is that which utterly and entirely (nir) wears and antiquates (Jarayati) all sin previously incurred, and the whole effect of works or deeds (carma). It consists chiefly in mortification (tapas): such as fasts, rigorous silence, standing upon heated stones, plucking out the hair by the roots, &c.

This is discriminated from the two preceding, as neither misdirection nor right direction, but non-direction (apravritti) of the organs towards sensible objects.

VI. Baddha is that which binds (badhnati) the embodied spirit. It is confinement and connexion, or association, of the soul with deeds. It consists in a succession of births and deaths as the result of works (carman).

VII. Mocsha is liberation; or deliverance of the soul from the fetters of works. It is the state of a soul in which knowledge and other requisites are developed.

Relieved from the bondage of deeds through means taught by holy ordinances, it takes effect on the soul by the grace of the ever-perfect ARHAT or JINA.

Or liberation is continual ascent. The soul has a buoyancy or natural tendency upwards, but is kept down by corporeal trammels. When freed from them, it rises to the region of the liberated.

Long immersed in corporeal restraint, but released from it; as a bird let loose from a cage, plunging into water to wash off the dirt with which it was stained, and drying its pinions in the sunshine, soars aloft; so does the soul, released from long confinement, soar high, never to return.

Liberation then is the condition of a soul clear of all impediments.

It is attained by right knowledge, doctrine and observances: and is a result of the unrestrained operation of the soul's natural tendency, when passions and every other obstacle are removed.

Works or deeds (for so the term carman signifies, though several among those enumerated be neither acts nor the effect of action) are reckoned eight; and are distributed into two classes, comprising four each: the first, ghatin, mischievous, and asadhu, impure, as marring deliverance: the second aghatin, harmless, or sadhu, pure, as opposing no obstacle to liberation.

I. In the first set is:

1st. Jnyana varaniya, the erroneous notion that knowledge is ineffectual; that liberation does not result from a perfect acquaintance with true principles; and that such science does not produce final deliverance.

2d. Darsana varaniya, the error of believing that deliverance is not attainable by study of the doctrine of the Arhats or Jinas.

3d. Mohaniya, doubt and hesitation as to particular selection among the many irresistible and infallible ways taught by the Tirt'hancaras or Jinas.

4th. Antaraya, interference, or obstruction offered to those engaged in seeking deliverance, and consequent prevention of their accomplishment of it.

II. The second contains: —

1st. Vedaniya, individual consciousness: reflection that "I am capable of attaining deliverance."

2d. Namica, individual consciousness of an appellation: reflection that "I bear this name."

3d. Gotrica, consciousness of race or lineage; reflection that "I am descendant of a certain disciple of Jina, native of a certain province."

4th. Ayushca, association or connexion with the body or person: that, (as the etymology of the term denotes), which proclaims (cayate) age (ayush), or duration of life.

Otherwise interpreted, the four carmas of this second set, taken in the inverse order, that is, beginning with ayushca, import procreation, and subsequent progress in the formation of the person or body wherein deliverance is attainable by the soul which animates it: for it is by connexion with white or immaculate matter that final liberation can be accomplished. I shall not dwell on the particular explanation respectively of these four carmas, taken in this sense.

Another arrangement, which likewise has special reference to final deliverance, is taught in a five-fold distribution of the predicaments or categories (asticaya). The word here referred to, is explained as signifying a substance commonly occurring; or a term of general import; or (conformably with its etymology), that of which it is said (cayate) that "it is" (asti): in other words, that of which existence is predicated.

I. The first is jivasticaya: the predicament, life or soul. It is, as before noticed, either bound, liberated, or ever-perfect.

II. Pudgalasticaya: the predicament, matter: comprehending all bodies composed of atoms. It is sixfold, comprising the four elements, and all sensible objects, fixed or moveable. It is the same with the ajiva or second of the seven categories enumerated in an arrangement before-noticed.

III. Dharmasticaya: the predicament, virtue; inferrible from a right direction of the organs. Dharma is explained as a substance or thing (dravya) from which may be concluded, as its effect, the soul's ascent to the region above.

IV. Adharmasticaya: the predicament, vice: or the reverse of the foregoing. Adharma is that which causes the soul to continue embarrassed with body, notwithstanding its capacity for ascent and natural tendency to soar.

V. Acasasticaya: the predicament acasa, of which there are two, Locacasa and Alocacasa.

1. Locacasa is the abode of the bound: a worldly region, consisting of divers tiers, one above the other, wherein dwell successive orders of beings unliberated.

2. Alocacasa is the abode of the liberated, above all worlds (locas) or mundane beings. Here acasa implies that, whence there is no return.

The Jaina gymnosophists are also cited [RAMANUJA on the Br. Sutr.] for an arrangement which enumerates six substances (dravya) as constituting the world: viz. —

1. Jiva, the soul.

2. Dharma, virtue; a particular substance pervading the world, and causing the soul's ascent.

3. Adharma, vice; pervading the world, and causing the soul's continuance with body.

4. Pudgala, matter; substance having colour, odour, savour, and tactility; as wind, fire, water, and earth: either atoms, or aggregates of atoms; individual body, collective worlds, &c.

5. Cala, time: a particular substance, which is practically treated, as past, present, and future.

6. Acasa, a region, one, and infinite.

To reconcile the concurrence of opposite qualities in the same subject at different times, and in different substances at the same times, the Jainas assume seven cases deemed by them apposite for obviating the difficulty (bhanga-naya): 1st. May be, it is; [somehow, in some measure, it so is]: 2d. May be, it is not: 3d. May be, it is, and it is not [successively]: 4th. May be, it is not predicable; [opposite qualities co-existing]: 5th. The first and fourth of these taken together: may be it is, and yet not predicable: 6th. The second and fourth combined: may be it is not, and not predicable; 7th. The third (or the first and second) and the fourth, united: may be it is and it is not, and not predicable.

This notion is selected for confutation by the Vedantins, to show the futility of the Jaina doctrine. 'It is,' they observe, 'doubt or surmise, not certainty nor knowledge. Opposite qualities cannot co-exist in the same subject. Predicaments are not unpredictable: they are not to be affirmed if not affirmable: but they either do exist or do not; and if they do, they are to be affirmed: to say that a thing is and is not, is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble.' [Sanc. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 6. (S. 33.)]

Another point, selected by the Vedantins for animadversion, is the position, that the soul and body agree in dimensions. [lb. S. 34-36.] 'In a different stage of growth of body or of transmigration of soul, they would not be conformable: passing from the human condition to that of an ant or of an elephant, the soul would be too big or too little for the new body animated by it. If it be augmented or diminished by accession or secession of parts, to suit either the change of person or corporeal growth between infancy and puberty, then it .is variable, and, of course, is not perpetual. If its dimensions be such as it ultimately retains, when released from body, then it has been uniformly such in its original and intermediate associations with corporeal frames. If it yet be of a finite magnitude, it is not ubiquitary and eternal.'

The doctrine of atoms, which the Jainas have in common with the Bauddhas and the Vaiseshicas (followers of Canade) is controverted by the Vedantins. [ Ibid. 2. 2. § 2. and § 3. (S. 11-17.)] The train of reasoning is to the following effect: 'Inherent qualities of the cause,' the Vaiseshicas and the rest argue, 'give origin to the like qualities in the effect, as white yarn makes white cloth: were a thinking being the world's cause, it would be endued with thought.' The answer is, that according to CANADE himself, substances great and long result from atoms minute and short: like qualities then are not always found in the cause and in the effect.

'The whole world, with its mountains, seas, &c., consists of substances composed of parts disposed to union: as cloth is wove of a multitude of threads. The utmost sub-division of compound substances, pursued to the last degree, arrives at the atom, which is eternal, being simple: and such atoms, which are the elements, earth, water, fire, and air, become the world's cause, according to CANADE: for there can be no effect without a cause. When they are actually and universally separated, dissolution of the world has taken place. At its renovation, atoms concur by an unseen virtue, which occasions action: and they form double atoms, and so on, to constitute air; then fire; next water; and afterwards earth; subsequently body with its organs; and ultimately this whole world. The concurrence of atoms arises from action (whether of one or both) which must have a cause: that cause, alleged to be an unseen virtue, cannot be insensible; for an insensible cause cannot incite action: nor can it be design, for a being capable of design is not yet existent, coming later in the progress of creation. Either way, then, no action can be; consequently no union or disunion of atoms; and these, therefore, are not the cause of the world's formation or dissolution.

'Eternal atoms and transitory double atoms differ utterly; and union of discordant principles cannot take place. If aggregation be assumed as a reason of their union, still the aggregate and its integrants are utterly different; and an intimate relation is further to be sought, as a reason for the aggregation. Even this assumption therefore fails.

'Atoms must be essentially active or inactive: were they essentially active, creation would be perpetual; if essentially inactive, dissolution would be constant.'

'Eternity of causeless atoms is incompatible with properties ascribed to them; colour, taste, smell, and tactility: for things possessing such qualities are seen to be coarse and transient. Earth, endued with those four properties, is gross; water, possessing three, is less so; fire, having two, is still less; and air, with one, is fine. Whether the same be admitted or denied in respect of atoms, the argument is either way confuted: earthy particles, coarser than aerial, would not be minute in the utmost degree; or atoms possessing but a single property, would not be like their effects possessing several.

'The doctrine of atoms is to be utterly rejected, having been by no venerable persons received, as the Sanc'hya doctrine of matter, a plastic principle, has been, in part, by Menu and other sages.' [Sanc, &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 3. (S. 17.)]

Points, on which the sectaries differ from the orthodox, rather than those on which they conform, are the subjects of the present treatise. On one point of conformity, however, it may be right to offer a brief remark, as it is one on which the Jainas appear to lay particular stress. It concerns the transmigration of the soul, whose destiny is especially governed by the dying thoughts, or fancies entertaining at the moment of dissolution. [See Transact, of the Roy. Asiat. Soc, vol. i. p. 437.] The Vedas, [Br. Sutr. 1. 2. 1.] in like manner, teach that the thoughts, inclinations, and resolves of man, and such peculiarly as predominate in his dying moments, determine the future character, and regulate the subsequent place, in transmigration. As was his thought in one body, such he becomes in another, into which he accordingly passes.


The Bauddhas or Sangatas, followers of Buddha or Sugata (terms of the same import, and corresponding to Jina or Arhat) are also called Mucta-cachha, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked. They are not unfrequently cited by their adversaries as (Nasticas) atheists, or rather, disowners of another world.

BUDDHA MUNI, so he is reverently named by the opponents of his religious system, is the reputed author of sutras, [Quotations from them in the Sanscrit language occur in commentaries on the Vedanta: (the Bhamati on Br. Sutr. 2, 2. 19.)] constituting a body of doctrine termed agama or sastra, words which convey a notion of authority and holiness. The Buddha here intended, is no doubt the last, who is distinguished by the names of Gautama and Sacya, among other appellations.

Either from diversity of instruction delivered by him to his disciples at various times, or rather from different constructions of the same text, more or less literal, and varying with the degree of sagacity of the disciple, have arisen no less than four sects among the followers of Buddha. Commentators of the Vedanta, giving an account of this schism of the Bauddhas, do not agree in applying the scale of intellect to these divisions of the entire sect, some attributing to acuteness or superior intelligence, that which others ascribe to simplicity or inferior understanding.

Without regarding, therefore, that scale, the distinguishing tenets of each branch of the sect may be thus stated. Some maintain that all is void, (sarva sunya) following, as it seems, a literal interpretation of Buddha's sutras. To these the designation of Madhyamica is assigned by several of the commentators of the Vedanta: and in the marginal notes of one commentary, they are identified with the Charvacas: but that is an error.

Other disciples of Buddha except internal sensation or intelligence (vijnyana) and acknowledge all else to be void. They maintain the eternal existence of conscious sense alone. These are called Yogacharas.

Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects, no less than of internal sensations: considering external as perceived by senses; and internal as inferred by reasoning.

Some of them recognise the immediate perception of exterior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them, through images, or resembling forms, presented to the intellect: objects they insist are inferred, but not actually perceived. Hence two branches of the sect of Buddha: one denominated Sautrantica: the other Vaibhashica.

As these, however, have many tenets in common, they may be conveniently considered together; and are so treated of by the scholiasts of Vyasa's Brahme-sutras: understanding one adhicarana (the 4th of the 2d chapter in the 2d lecture) to be directed against these two sects of Buddhists: and the next the following one (2. 2. 5.) to be addressed to the Yogacharas; serving, however, likewise for the confutation of the advocates of an universal void. [This schism among the Bauddhas, splitting into four sects, is anterior to the age of Sancara Acharya, who expressly notices all the four. It had commenced before the composition of the Brahme-sutras, and consequently before the days of Sabara Swami and Cumarila Bhatta; since two, at the least, of those sects, are separately confuted. All of them appear to have been indiscriminately persecuted, when the Bauddhas of every denomination were expelled from Hindust'han and the peninsula. Whether the same sects yet subsist among the Bauddhas of Ceylon, Thibet, and the trans-gangetic India, and in China, deserves inquiry.]

The Sautrantica and Vaibhashica sects, admitting then external (bahya) and internal (abhyantara) objects, distinguish, under the first head, elements (bhuta) and that which appertains thereto (bhahtica), namely, organs and sensible qualities; and under the second head, intelligence (chitta), and that which unto it belongs (chaitta).

The elements (bhuta or mahabhuta) which they reckon four, not acknowledging a fifth, consist of atoms. The Bauddhas do not, with the followers of Canade, affirm double atoms, triple, quadruple, &c. as the early gradations of composition; but maintain indefinite atomic aggregation, deeming compound substances to be conjoint primary atoms.

Earth, they say, has the nature or peculiar character of hardness; water, that of fluidity; fire, that of heat; and air, that of mobility. Terrene atoms are hard; aqueous, liquid; igneous, hot; aerial, mobile. Aggregates of these atoms partake of those distinct characters. One authority, however, states, that they attribute to terrene atoms the characters of colour, savour, odour, and tactility; to aqueous, colour, savour, and tactility; to igneous, both colour and tactilit; to aerial, tactility only. [BAHANUJA on Br. Sutr.]

The Bauddhas do not recognise a fifth element, acasa, nor any substance so designated; nor soul (Jiva or atman) distinct from intelligence (chitta); nor any thing irreducible to the four categories above-mentioned.

Bodies, which are objects of sense, are aggregates of atoms, being composed of earth and other elements. Intelligence, dwelling within body, and possessing individual consciousness, apprehends objects, and subsists as self; and, in that view only, is (atman) self or soul.

Things appertaining to the elements, (bhautica,) the second of the predicaments, are organs of sense, together with their objects, as rivers, mountains, &c. They are composed of atoms. This world, every thing which is therein, all which consists of component parts, must be atomical aggregations. They are external; and are perceived by means of organs, the eye, the ear, &c., which likewise are atomical conjuncts.

Images or representations of exterior objects are produced; and by perception of such images or representations, objects are apprehended. Such is the doctrine of the Sautranticas upon this point. But the Vaibhashicas acknowledge the direct perception of exterior objects. Both think, that objects cease to exist when no longer perceived: they have but a brief duration, like a flash of lightning, lasting no longer than the perception of them. Their identity, then, is but momentary; the atoms or component parts are scattered; and the aggregation or concourse was but instantaneous.

Hence these Buddhists are by their adversaries, the orthodox Hindus, designated as Purna — or Sarva-vainasicas, 'arguing total perishableness; ' while the followers of Canade, who acknowledge some of their categories to be eternal and invariable, and reckon only others transitory and changeable; and who insist that identity ceases with any variation in the composition of a body, and that a corporeal frame, receiving nutriment and discharging excretions, undergoes continual change, and consequent early loss of identity, are for that particular opinion, called Ardha-vainasicas, 'arguing half-perishableness.'
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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Part 2 of 2

The second head of the arrangement before-mentioned, comprising internal objects, viz. intelligence., and that which to it appertains, is again distributed into five scandhas, as follow: —

1st. Rupa-scandha; comprehending organs of sense and their objects considered in relation to the person, or the sensitive and intelligent faculty which is occupied with them. Colours and other sensible qualities and things are external; and, as such, are classed under the second division of the first head (bhautica), appurtenance of elements: but, as objects of sensation and knowledge, they are deemed internal, and therefore recur under the present head.

2d. Vijnyana-scandha consists in intelligence (chitta), which is the same with self (atman) and (vijnyana) knowledge. It is consciousness of sensation, or continuous course and flow of cognition and sentiment. There is not any other agent, nor being which acts and enjoys; nor is there an eternal soul: but merely succession of thought, attended with individual consciousness abiding within body.

3d. Vedana-scandha comprises pleasure, pain, or the absence of either, and other sentiments excited in the mind by pleasing or displeasing objects.

4th. Sanjnya-scandha intends the knowledge or belief arising from names or words: as ox, horse, &c.; or from indications or signs, as a house denoted by a flag; and a man by his staff.

5th. Sanscara-scandha includes passions; as desire, hatred, fear, joy, sorrow, &c., together with illusion, virtue, vice, and every other modification of the fancy or imagination. All sentiments are momentary.

The second of these five scandhas is the same with the first division of the second general head, chitta, or intelligence. The rest are comprehended under the second head, chaittica, appurtenance of intellect; and under the larger designation of adhyatmica, belonging to (atman) self. The latter term, in its most extensive sense, includes all the five scandhas, or branches, moral and personal.

The seeming but unreal course of events, or worldly succession, external and mental, or physical and moral, is described as a concatenation of causes and effects in a continual round.

Concerning the relation of cause and effect, it is to be premised that proximate cause (hctu) and concurrent occasion (pratyaya) are distinguished: and the distinction is thus illustrated in respect of both classes, external and personal.

From seed comes a germ; from this a branch; then a culm or stem; whence a leafy gem; out of which a bud; from which a blossom; and thence, finally, fruit. Where one is, the other ensues. Yet the seed is not conscious of producing the germ; nor is this aware of coming from seed; and hence is inferred production without a thinking cause, and without a ruling providence.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the seed, and coherence to the germ; water moistens the grain; fire warms and matures it; air or wind supplies impulse to vegetation; ether expands the seed; [So the commentaries on Sancara (the Bhamati, Abharana, and Prabha). But the fifth element is not acknowledged by the Bauddhas.] and season transmutes it. By concurrence of all these, seed vegetates, and a sprout grows. Yet earth and the vest of these concurrent occasions are unconscious; and so are the seed, germ, and the rest of the effects.

Likewise, in the moral world, where ignorance or error is, there is passion: where error is not, neither is passion there. But they are unconscious of mutual relation.

Again, earth furnishes solidity to the bodily frame; water affords to it moisture; fire supplies heat; wind causes inspiration; ether occasions cavities; [See the preceding note.] sentiment gives corporeal impulse and mental incitement. Then follows error, passion, &c.

Ignorance (avidya) or error, is the mistake of supposing that to be durable, which is but momentary. Thence comes passion (sanscara), comprising desire, aversion, delusion, &c. From these, concurring in the embryo with paternal seed and uterine blood, arises sentiment (vijnyana) or incipient consciousness. From concurrence of this with parental seed and blood, comes the rudiment of body; its flesh and blood; its name (naman) and shape (rupa). Thence the (shad-ayatana), sites of six organs, or seats of the senses, consisting of sentiment, elements, (earth, &c.), name and shape (or body), in relation to him whose organs they are. From coincidence and conjunction of organs with name and shape (that is, with body) there is feeling (sparsa) or experience of heat or cold, &c. felt by the embryo or embodied being. Thence is sensation (vedana) of pain, pleasure, &c. Follows thirst (trishna) or longing for renewal of pleasurable feeling and desire to shun that which is painful. Hence is (upadana) effort, or exertion of body or speech. From this is (bhava) condition of (dharma) merit, or (adharma) demerit. Thence comes birth (jati) or aggregation of the five branches (scandhas). [One commentary of the Vedanta (viz. the Abharana), explains bhava as corporeal birth; and Jati genus, kind. Other differences among the Vedantin writers, on various minor points of the Buddhist doctrine, are passed over to avoid tediousness.] The maturity of those five branches is (jara) decay. Their dissolution is (marana) death. Regret of a dying person is (soca) grief. Wailing is (paridevana) lamentation. Experience of that which is disagreeable is (duhc'ha) pain or bodily suffrance. But mental pain is (daurmanasya) discomposure of mind. Upon death ensues departure to another world. That is followed by return to this world. And the course of error, with its train of consequences, recommences. [SANC., VACH., &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. (S. 19.)]

Besides these matters, which have a real existence but momentary duration, the Bauddhas distinguish under the category and name of (nirupa) unreal, false, or nonexistent, three topics: 1st, wilful and observable destruction (pratisanc'hya-nirodha) of an existing thing, as the breaking of a jar by a stroke of a mallet; "2d, unobserved nullity or annihilation (apratisanc'hya-nirodha); and 3d, vacancy or space (acasa) unencompassed and unshielded, or the imaginary ethereal element.

The whole of this doctrine is formally refuted by the Vedantins. 'The entire aggregate, referred to two sources, external and internal, cannot be; nor the world's course dependent thereon: for the members of it are insensible; and its very existence is made to depend on the flash of thought; yet no other thinking permanent being is acknowledged, accumulating that aggregate, directing it, or enjoying; nor is there an inducement to activity without a purpose, and merely momentary.

'Nor is the alleged concatenation of events admissible: for there is no reason of it. Their existence depends on that of the aggregate of which they are alleged to be severally causes. The objections to the notion of eternal atoms with beings to enjoy, are yet more forcible against momentary atoms with none to enjoy. The various matters enumerated as successive causes, do not account for the sum of sensible objects. Nor can they, being but momentary, be the causes of effects: for the moment of the one's duration has ceased, before that of the other's existence commences. Being then a non-entity, it can be no cause. Nor does one last till the other begins, for then they would be contemporaneous.

'The ethereal element (acasa) is not a non-entity: for its existence is inferrible from sound.

'Nor is self or soul momentary: memory and recollection prove it: and there is no doubt nor error herein; for the individual is conscious that he is the same who to-day remembers what he yesterday saw.

'Nor can entity be an effect of non-entity. If the one might come of the other, then might an effect accrue to a stranger without effort on his part: a husbandman would have a crop of corn without tilling and sowing; a potter would have a jar without moulding the clay; a weaver would have cloth without weaving the yarn: nor would any one strive for heavenly bliss or eternal deliverance.' [Sanc. and other Com. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 4. (S. 18-27.)]

To confute another branch of the sect of Buddha, the Vedantins argue, that 'the untruth or non-existence of external objects is an untenable position; for there is perception or apprehension of them: for instance, a stock, a wall, ajar, a cloth; and that, which actually is apprehended, cannot be unexistent. Nor does the existence of objects cease when the apprehension does so. Nor is it like a dream, a juggle, or an illusion; for the condition of dreaming and waking is quite different. When awake a person is aware of the illusory nature of the dream which he recollects.

'Nor have thoughts or fancies an independent existence: for they are founded on external and sensible objects, the which, if unapprehended, imply that thoughts must be so too. These are momentary: and the same objections apply to a world consisting of momentary thoughts, as to one of instantaneous objects.

'The whole doctrine, when tried and sifted, crumbles like a well sunk in loose sand. The opinions advanced in it are contradictory and incompatible: they are severally untenable and incongruous. By teaching them to his disciples, Buddha has manifested either his own absurdity and incoherence, or his rooted enmity to mankind, whom he sought to delude.' [Com. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 5. (S. 28-32.)]

A few observations on the analogy of the doctrine, above explained, to the Grecian philosophy, may not be here out of place.

It has been already remarked, in former essays, that the Bauddhas, like the Vaiseshicas, admit but two sources of knowledge (p. 194 of this volume). Such likewise appears to have been the opinion of the more ancient Greek philosophers; especially the Pythagoreans: and accordingly Ocellus, in the beginning of his treatise on the universe, declares that he has written such things, concerning the nature of the universe, as he learned from nature itself by manifest signs, and conjectured as probable, by thought through reasoning: thereby intimating, as is remarked by his annotator, that the means of knowledge are two. [Opusc. mytholog. phys. et eth. p. 505.]

Concerning the atomic doctrine, maintained not only by the Vaiseshicas, or followers of Canade, surnamed Casyapa, [A remark may be here made, which was omitted in its proper place (Part 2 of this essay), that the followers of the atomic sect are sometimes contumeliously designated by their orthodox opponents, as Canabhuj (a) or Canabhacsha, in allusion to the founder's name. Cana signifies a crow; and the import of Cana-bhuj, synonymous with Canad, is crow-eater (cana ad). The original name, however, is derivable from cana little, (with ad to eat, or ada to receive) implying abstemiousness or disinterestedness of the person bearing the name. Conformably with the first of those derivations, Canade himself is sometimes called Canabhacsha or Canabhuj. (a) SANC, on Br. Sutr. 2. 3. § 12. (S. 18.)] but by the sect of BUDDHA, and likewise by several others as well heterodox as orthodox, no person needs to be told, that a similar doctrine was maintained by many among the ancient Greek philosophers; and in particular by Leucippus (if not previously by Moschus), and after him by Democritus; and likewise by Empedocles, who was of the Pythagorean school. They disagreed, as the Indian philosophers likewise do, respecting the number of elements or different kinds of atoms. Empedocles admitted five, developed in the following order: ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Here we have the five elements (bhuta) of the Hindus, including acasa. The great multitude of philosophers, however, restricted the number of elements to four; in which respect they agree with the Jainas, Bauddhas, Charvacas and some other sectaries, who reject the fifth element affirmed by the Hindus in general, and especially by the orthodox.

In published accounts of the religious opinions of Bauddhas and Jainas, derived principally from oral information, doubts have been expressed as to the sense attached by them to the term which they use to signify the happy state at which the perfect saints arrive. It has been questioned whether annihilation, or what other condition short of such absolute extinction, is meant to be described.

Both these sects, like most others of Indian origin, propose, for the grand object to which mail should aspire, the attainment of a final happy state, from which there is no return.

All concur in assigning to its attainment the same term, mucti or mocsha, with some shades of difference in the interpretation of the word: as emancipation, deliverance from evil, liberation from worldly bonds, relief from further transmigration, &c.

Many other terms are in use, as synonymous with it; and so employed by all or nearly all of these sects; to express a state of final release from the world: such as amrita, immortality; apavarga, conclusion, completion, or abandonment; sreyas, excellence; nihsreyasa, assured excellence, perfection; caiwalya, singleness; nihsarana, exit, departure. But the term which the Bauddhas, as well as Jainas, more particularly affect, and which however is also used by the rest, is nirvana, profound calm. In its ordinary acceptation, as an adjective, it signifies extinct, as a fire which is gone out; set, as a luminary which has gone down; defunct, as a saint who has passed away: its etymology is from va, to blow as wind, with the preposition nir used in a negative sense: it means calm and unruffled. The notion which is attached to the word, in the acceptation now under consideration, is that of perfect apathy. It is a condition of unmixed tranquil happiness or ecstacy (ananda). Other terms (as suc'ha, moha, &c.) distinguish different gradations of pleasure, joy, and delight. But a happy state of imperturbable apathy is the ultimate bliss (ananda) to which the Indian aspires: in this the Jaina, as well as the Bauddha, concurs with the orthodox Vedantin.

Perpetual uninterrupted apathy can hardly be said to differ from eternal sleep. The notion of it as of a happy condition seems to be derived from the experience of ecstacies, or from that of profound sleep, from which a person awakes refreshed. The pleasant feeling is referred back to the period of actual repose. Accordingly, as I had occasion to show in a preceding essay, the Vedanta considers the individual soul to be temporarily, during the period of profound sleep, in the like condition of re-union with the Supreme, which it permanently arrives at on its final emancipation from body.

This doctrine is not that of the Jainas nor Bauddhas. But neither do they consider the endless repose allotted to their perfect saints as attended with a discontinuance of individuality. It is not annihilation, but unceasing apathy, which they understand to be the extinction (nirvana) of their saints; and which they esteem to be supreme felicity, worthy to be sought by practice of mortification, as well as by acquisition of knowledge.

Charvacas and Locayaticas.

In my first essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus (p. 143, of this volume), it was stated upon the authority of a scholiast of the Sanc'hya, that Charvaca, whose name is familiar as designating a heretical sect called after him, has exhibited the doctrine of the Jainas. In a marginal note to a scholiast of the Brahma-sutras, one of the four branches of the sect of Buddha (the Madhyamica) is identified with the Charvacas. This I take to be clearly erroneous; and upon comparison of the tenets of the Jainas and Charvacas, as alleged by the commentators of the Vedanta in course of controversy, the other position likewise appears to be not correct.

For want of an opportunity of consulting an original treatise on this branch of philosophy, or any connected summary furnished even by an adversary of opinions professed by the Charvacas, no sufficient account can be yet given of their peculiar doctrine, further than that it is undisguised materialism. A few of their leading opinions, however, are to be collected from the incidental notice of them by opponents.

A notorious tenet of the sect, restricting to perception only the means of proof and sources of knowledge, has been more than once adverted to (p. 152 and 194, of this volume). Further research enables me to enlarge the catalogue of means of knowledge admitted by others, with the addition of probability (sambhavi) and tradition (aitihya) separately reckoned by mythologists (Pauranicas) among those means. [Padart'ha dipica.] The latter is however comprehended under the head of (sabda) oral communication. In regard to probability or possibility (for the term may be taken in this lower meaning) as a ground or source of notions, it must be confessed, that in the text of the mythologists (their Puranas) a very ample use is made of the latitude; and what by supposition might have been and may be, is put in the place of what has been and is to be.

The Charvacas recognise four (not five) elements, viz. earth, water, fire, and wind (or air); and acknowledge no other principles (tatwa). [Varhaspatya sutra, cited by Bhascara.]

The most important and characteristic tenet of this sect concerns the soul, which they deny to be other than body. [SANCARA on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. 2. and 3. 3. 53.] This doctrine is cited for refutation in Vyasa's sutras, as the opinion of "some;" and his scholiasts, Bhavadeva Misra and Ranganat'ha, understand the Charvacas to be intended, Sancara, Bhascara, and other commentators, name the Locayaticas: and these appear to be a branch of the sect of Charvaca, Sadananda, in the Vedanta sara, calls up for refutation no less than four followers of Charvaca, asserting that doctrine under various modifications; one maintaining, that the gross corporeal frame is identical with the soul; another, that the corporeal organs constitute the soul; a third affirming, that the vital functions do so; and the fourth insisting, that the mind and the soul are the same. In the second of these instances, Sadananda's scholiast, Rama Tirt'ha, names the Locayatanas, a branch of the Charvaca, as particularly intended. No doubt they are the same with the Locayaticas of Sancara and the rest.

'Seeing no soul but body, they maintain the non-existence of soul other than body; and arguing that intelligence or sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire, and air, whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the same elements modified in a corporeal frame, they affirm that an organic body (caya) endued with sensibility and thought, though formed of those elements, is the human person (purusha). [Sancara, &c.]

'The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu, chewed together, have an exhilarating property, not found in those substances severally, nor in any one of them singly.

'So far there is a difference between animate body and inanimate substance. Thought, knowledge, recollection, &c., perceptible only where organic body is, are properties of an organised frame, not appertaining to exterior substances, or earth and other elements simple or aggregate, unless formed into such a frame.

'While there is body, there is thought, and sense of pleasure and pain; none when body is not; and hence, as well as from self-consciousness, it is concluded that self and body are identical.'

BHASCARA Acharya [On Br. Sutr. 3. 3. 53.] quotes the Varhaspatya-sutras (Vrihaspati's aphorisms), apparently as the text work or standard authority of this sect or school; and the quotation, expressing that "the elements are earth, water, fire and air; and from the aggregation of them in bodily organs, there results sensibility and thought, as the inebriating property is deduced from a ferment and other ingredients. "

To the foregoing arguments of the Locayaticas or Charvacas, the answer of the Vedantins is, that thought, sensation, and other properties of soul or consciousness, cease at the moment of death, while the body yet remains; and cannot therefore be properties of the corporeal frame, for they have ceased before the frame is dissolved. The qualities of body, as colour, &c. are apprehended by others: not so those of soul, viz. thought, memory, &c. Their existence, while body endures, is ascertained: not their cessation when it ceases. They may pass to other bodies. Elements, or sensible objects, are not sentient, or capable of feeling, themselves; fire, though hot, burns not itself; a tumbler, however agile, mounts not upon his own shoulders. Apprehension of an object must be distinct from the thing apprehended. By means of a lamp, or other light, objects are visible: if a lamp be present, the thing is seen; not so, if there be no light. Yet apprehension is no property of the lamp; nor is it a property of body, though observed only where a corporeal frame is. Body is but instrumental to apprehension.'

Among the Greeks, Dicsaearchus of Messene held the same tenet, which has been here ascribed to the Locayaticas, and other followers of Charvaca, that there is no such thing as soul in man; that the principle, by which he perceives and acts, is diffused through the body, is inseparable from it, and terminates with it.

Maheswaras and Pasupatas.

The devoted worshippers of Siva or maheswara, take their designation from this last-mentioned title of the deity whom they adore, and whose revelation they profess to follow. They are called Maheswaras, and (as it seems) 'Siva-bhagavatas.

The ascetics of the sect wear their hair braided, and rolled up round the head like a turban; hence they are denominated (and the sect after them) Ja'tdahari, 'wearing a braid.'

The Maheswara are said to have borrowed much of their doctrine from the Sanc'hya philosophy; following Capila on many points; and the theistical system of Patanjali on more.

They have branched into four divisions: one, to which the appellation of Saivas, or worshippers of Siva, especially appertains: a second, to which the denomination of Pasupatas belongs, as followers of Pasupati, another title of Maheswara: the third bears the name of Carunica-siddhantins: but Ramanuja [Com. on Br. Sutr, 2. 2. 37.] assigns to this third branch the appellation of Calamuc'has: the fourth is by all termed Capalas or Capalicas.

They appeal for the text of their doctrine to a book, which they esteem holy, considering it to have been revealed by Maheswara, SIVA, or PASUPATI: all names of the same deity. The work, most, usually bearing the latter title, Pasupati-sastra (Maheswara-siddhanta, or Sivagama), is divided into five lectures adhyaya), treating of as many categories (padart'has). The enumeration of them will afford occasion for noticing the principal and distinguishing tenets of the sect.

I. Carana, or cause. The Pasupatas hold, that Iswara, the Supreme Being, is the efficient cause of the world, its creator (carta) and superintending (adhist'hata) or ruling providence; and not its material cause likewise. They, however, identify the one supreme God, with SIVA, or Pasupati, and give him the title of Maheswara.

II. Carya or effect: which is nature (pracriti), or plastic matter (pradhana), as the universal material principle is by the Pasupatas denominated, conformably with the terminology of the Sanc'hyas; and likewise mahat, the great one, or intelligence, together with the further development of nature, viz. mind, consciousness, the elements, &c.

III. Yoga, abstraction; as perseverance in meditation on the syllable om, the mystic name of the deity; profound contemplation of the divine excellence, &c.

IV. Vidhi, enjoined rites; consisting in acts, by performance of which merit is gained; as bath, and ablutions, or the use of ashes in their stead; and divers acts of enthusiasm, as of a person overjoyed and beside himself.

V. Duhc'hanta, termination of ill, or final liberation (mocsha).

The purpose, for which these categories are taught and explained, is the accomplishment of deliverance from the bondage (bandha) or fetters (pasa), viz. illusion (maya), &c., in which the living soul (jiva or atma), by this sect termed pasu, is entangled and confined. For it is here maintained, that pasus (living souls) are individual sentient beings, capable of deliverance from evil, through the knowledge of GOD and the practice of prescribed rites, together with perseverance in profound abstraction.

The Pasupatas argue, that as a potter is the efficient, not the material, cause of the jar made by him; so the sentient being, who presides over the world, is the efficient, not the material, cause of it: for the superintendent, and that which is by him superintended, cannot be one and the same.  

In a more full exposition of their opinions [Vidhyabharana on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. 37.] they are stated as enumerating under the heads of effects and causes, those which are secondary; and as subdividing likewise the heads of prescribed rites and termination of ill.

I. They distinguish ten effects (carya): namely, five principles (tatwa), which are the five elements; earth, water, fire, air, and ether; and five qualities (guna) colour, &c.

II. They reckon thirteen causes or instruments (carana); viz. five organs of sense, and as many organs of action; and three internal organs, intelligence, mind, and consciousness. These thirteen causes or means are the same with the thirteen instruments of knowledge enumerated by Capila and his followers, the Sanc'hyas.

III. Yoga, abstraction, does not appear to admit any subdivision.

IV. Enjoined rules (vidhi) are distributed under two heads: 1st. vrata, 2d. dwara.

To the first head (vrata or vow) appertains the use of ashes in place of water for bath or ablutions: that is, first, in lieu of bathing thrice a day; at morning, noon, and evening: secondly, instead of ablutions for special causes, as purification from uncleanness after evacuation of urine, feces, &c.

To the same head belongs likewise the sleeping upon ashes: for which particular purpose they are solicited from householders, in like manner as food and other alms are begged.

This head, comprises also exultation (upahara), which comprehends laughter, dance, song, bellowing as a bull, bowing, recital of prayer, &c.

The second head (dwara) consists of, 1st, pretending sleep, though really awake; 2d, quaking, or tremulous motion of members, as if afflicted with rheumatism or paralytic affection; 3d, halting, as if lame; 4th, joy, as of a lover at sight of his beloved mistress; 5th, affectation of madness, though quite sane; 6th, incoherent discourse.

V. Termination of pain (duhc'hanta) or deliverance from evil, is twofold: one is absolute extinction of all ills; the other is acquisition of transcendent power, and exercise of uncontrolled and irresistible will. The last comprises energy of sense and energy of action.

The energy of sense (dric-sacti) varies according to the sense engaged, and is of five sorts: 1st, vision (darsana), or distinct and perfect perception of minute, remote, confused and undefined objects; 2d, (sravana) perfect hearing of sound; 3d, (manana) intuitive knowledge, or science without need of study; 4th, (vijnyana) certain and undoubted knowledge, by book or fact; 5th, (sarvajnyatwa) omniscience.

Energy of action (criya-sacti) is properly single of its kind. It admits nevertheless of a threefold subdivision; which, however, is not well explained, in the only work in which I have found it noticed. [Abharana (§ 39) 2. 2. 27. The only copy of it seen by me is in this part apparently imperfect.]

The opinions of the Pasupatas and other Maheswaras, are heretical, in the estimation of the Vedantins, because they do not admit pantheism, or creation of the universe by the deity out of his own essence.

The notion of a plastic material cause, termed pradhana, [That by which the world is accomplished (pradhiyate), and in which it is deposited at its dissolution, is first (pradhana) matter.] borrowed from the Sanc'hyas, and that of a ruling providence, taken from PATANJALI, are controverted, the one in part, the other in the whole, by the orthodox followers of the Vedanta.

'An argument drawn from the prevalence of pain, pleasure, and illusion in the universe, that the cause must have the like qualities and be brute matter, is incongruous,' say the Vedantins, 'for it could not frame the diversities, exterior and interior, which occur: these argue thought and intention, in like manner as edifices and gardens, which assuredly are not constructed without design. Nor could there be operation without an operator; clay is wrought by the potter who makes the jar; a chariot is drawn by horses yoked to it; but brute matter stirs not without impulse. Milk nourishes the calf, and water flows in a stream, but not spontaneously; for the cow, urged by affection, suckles her calf, which, incited by hunger, sucks the teat; a river flows agreeably to the inclination of the ground, as by providence directed. But there is not, according to the Sanc'hyas and Pasupatas, any thing besides matter itself to stir or to stop it, nor any motive: for soul is a stranger in the world. Yet conversions are not spontaneous: grass is not necessarily changed to milk; for particular conditions must co-exist: swallowed by a cow, not by an ox, the fodder is so converted. Or, granting that activity is natural to matter, still there would be no purpose. The halt, borne by the blind, directs the progress: a magnet attracts contiguous iron. But direction and contiguity are wanting to the activity of plastic matter. The three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which characterize matter, would not vary to become primary and secondary in the derivative principles of intelligence and the rest, without some external instigator whomsoever. Apart from the energy of a thinking being, those qualities cannot be argued to have a natural tendency to the production of such effects as are produced.' [SANC., &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § I. (S. 1-10.)]

'The Pasupatas' notion of Supreme God being the world's cause, as governing both (pradhana) matter and (purusha) embodied spirit, is incongruous,' say again the Vedantins, 'for he would be chargeable with passion and injustice, distributing good and evil with partiality. Nor can this imputation be obviated by reference to the influence of works: for instigation and instigator would be reciprocally dependent. Nor can the objection be avoided by the assumption of an infinite succession (without a beginning) of works and their fruits.

'Neither is there any assignable connexion by which his guidance of matter and spirit could be exercised: it is not conjunction, nor aggregation, nor relation of cause and effect. Nor can the material principle, devoid of all sensible qualities, be guided and administered. Nor can matter be wrought without organs. But, if the Supreme Being have organs, he is furnished with a corporeal frame, and is not God, and he suffers pain, and experiences pleasure, as a finite being. The infinity of matter and of embodied spirit, and God's omniscience, are incompatible; if he restrict them in magnitude and number, they are finite; if he cannot define and limit them, he is not omniscient (and omnipotent).' [SANC., &c. on Br. Sutr. 2. 2. § 7.]

A further objection to the Sanc'hya doctrine, and consequently to the Pasupata grounded on it, is 'its alleged inconsistencies and contradictions: [lb. 2. 2. § 1. (S. 2. and 10.)] one while eleven organs are enumerated, at another seven only, the five senses being reduced to one cuticular organ, the sense of feeling. The elements are in one place derived immediately from the great or intelligent principle; in another, from consciousness. Three internal faculties are reckoned in some instances, and but one in others.'

The grounds of this imputation, however, do not appear. Such inconsistencies are not in the text of Capila, nor in that of the Carted: and the Vedanta itself seems more open to the same reproach: for there is much discrepancy in the passages of the Veda, on which it relies.

The point on which the Pasupatas most essentially differ from the orthodox, the distinct and separate existence of the efficient and material causes of the universe, is common to them with the ancient Greek philosophers before Aristotle. Most of these similarly affirmed two, and only two, natural causes, the efficient and the material; the first active, moving: the second, passive, moved; one effective, the other yielding itself to be acted on by it. Ocellus terms the latter [x] generation, or rather production; the former its cause, [x]. [Ocellus de Universo, c. 2., in Opusc. Mythol. p. 505. Cicero, Academ.] Empedocles, in like manner, affirmed two principles of nature; the active, which is unity, or God; the passive, which is matter. [Sext. Empir. adv. Math. ix. 4.]

Here we have precisely the pracriti and carana of the Indian philosophers: their upadana and nimitta-carana, material and efficient causes. The similarity is too strong to have been accidental. Which of the two borrowed from the other I do not pretend to determine: yet, adverting to what has come to us of the history of Pythagoras, I shall not hesitate to acknowledge an inclination to consider the Grecian to have been on this, as on many other points, indebted to Indian instructors.

It should be observed, that some among the Greek philosophers, like the Sanc'hyas, who follow Capila, admitted only one material principle and no efficient cause. This appears to have been the doctrine of Heraclitus in particular. His psegmata correspond with the sheer (tanmatra) particles of Capila's Sanc'hya; his intelligent and rational principle, which is the cause of production and dissolution, is Capila's buddhi ox mahat; as his material principle is pradhana or pracriti: the development of corporeal existences, and their return to the first principle at their dissolution, [See p. 161 of this volume.] correspond with the upward and downward way, [x] and [x], of Heraclitus. [Diog. Laert. ix. 8 and 9.]

I shall not pursue the parallel further. It would not hold for all particulars, not was it to be expected that it should.

Pancharatras or Bhagavatas.

Among the Vaishnavas or special worshippers of Vishnu, is a sect distinguished by the appellation of Pancharatras, and also called Vishnu Bhagavatas, or simply Bhagavatas. The latter name might, from its similarity, lead to the confounding of these with the followers of the Bhagavad-gita, or of the 'Sri Bhagavata purana. The appropriate and distinctive appellation then is that of Pancharatra, derived from the title of the original work which contains the doctrine of the sect. It is noticed in the Bharata, with the Sanc'hya, Yoga and Pasupata, as a system deviating from the Vedas: and a passage quoted by Sancara-Acharya seems to intimate that its promulgator was Sandilya, who was dissatisfied with the Vedas, not finding in them a prompt and sufficient way of supreme excellence (para-sreyas) and final beatitude; and therefore he had recourse to this sastra. It is, however, by most ascribed to Narayana or VASUDEVA himself; and the orthodox account for its heresy, as they do for that of Buddha's doctrines, by presuming delusion wilfully practised on mankind by the holy or divine personage, who revealed the tantra, or agama, that is, the sacred book in question, though heterodox.

Some of its partisans nevertheless pretend, that it conforms with one of the sac'has of the Veda, denominated the Ecayana. This does not, however, appear to be the case; nor is it clear, that any such sac'ha is forthcoming, or has ever existed.

Many of this sect practise the (sanscaras) initiatory ceremonies of regeneration and admission to holy orders, according to the forms directed by the Vajasaneji-sac'ha of the Yajurveda. Others, abiding rigidly by their own rules, perform the initiatory rites, in a different, and even contrary mode, founded, as is pretended, on the supposed Ecayana-sac'ha. But their sacerdotal initiation is questioned, and their rank as Brahmanas contested, on the ground of the insufficiency of their modes unsanctioned by either of the three genuine and authoritative Vedas.

The religious doctrine of the sect is, by admission of Sancara and other commentators of the Vedanta, reconcileable on many points with the Veda; but in some essential respects it is at direct variance with that authority, and consequently deemed heretical; and its confutation is the object of the 8th or last adhicarana in the controversial chapter of the Brahme-sutras (2. 2. 8.)

Yet Ramanuja, in his commentary on those sutras, defends the superhuman origin and correct scope of the Pancharatra; the authority of which he strenuously maintains, and earnestly justifies its doctrine on the controverted points; and even endeavours to put a favourable construction on Badarayana's text, as upholding rather than condemning its positions.

Vasudeva, who is Vishnu, is by this sect identified with Bhagavat, the Supreme Being; the one, omniscient, first principle, which is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe: and is likewise its superintending and ruling providence. That being, dividing himself, became four persons, by successive production. From him immediately sprung Sancarshana, from whom came Pradyumna; and from the latter issued Aniruddha. Sancarshana is identified with the living soul (jiva); Pradyumna, with mind (manas); and Aniruddha, with (ahancara) egotism, or consciousness.

In the mythology of the more orthodox Vaishnavas, Vasudeva is Crishna; Sancarshana is his brother Balarama; Pradyumna is his son CAMA (Cupid); and Aniruddha is son of Cama.

Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, being supreme nature, and sole cause of all, the rest are effects. He has six especial attributes, being endued with the six pre-eminent qualities of

1st. Knowledge (jnyana), or acquaintance with everything animate or inanimate constituting the universe.

2d. Power (sacti), which is the plastic condition of the world's nature.

3d. Strength (bala), which creates without effort, and maintains its own creation without labour.

4th. Irresistible will (aiswarya), power not to be opposed or obstructed.

5th. Vigour (virya), which counteracts change, as that of milk into curds, and obviates alteration in nature.

6th. Energy (tejas), or independence of aid or adjunct in the world's creation, and capacity of subjugating others.

From the diffusion and co-operation of knowledge with strength, Sancarshana sprung; from vigour and irresistible will, Pradyumna; and from power and energy, Aniruddha. Or they may all be considered as partaking of all the six attributes.

Deliverance consisting in the scission of worldly shackles, is attainable by worship of the deity, knowledge of him, and profound contemplation; that is, 1st, by resorting to the holy temples, with body, thought, and speech subdued, and muttering the morning prayer, together with hymns and praise of (Bhagavat) the deity, and with reverential bowing and other ceremonies; 2dly. By gathering and providing blossoms, and other requisites of worship; 3dly. By actual performance of divine worship; 4thly. By study of the sacred text (Bhagavat-sastra) and reading, hearing, and reflecting on that and other holy books (puranas and agamas), which are conformable to it; 5thly. By profound meditation and absorbed contemplation after evening worship, and intensely fixing the thoughts exclusively on (Bhagavat) the deity.

By such devotion, both active and contemplative (criya-yoga and Jnyana-yoga), performed at five different times of each day, and persisted in for a hundred years, Vasudeva is attained; and by reaching his divine presence, the votary accomplishes final deliverance, with everlasting beatitude.

Against this system, which is but partially heretical, the objection upon which the chief stress is laid by Vyasa, as interpreted by Sancara [Br. Sutr. 2. 2, 8. (42-45.) Sanc., &c.] and the rest of the scholiasts, is, that 'the soul would not be eternal, if it were a production, and consequently had a beginning. Springing from the deity, and finally returning to him, it would merge in its cause and be re-absorbed; there would be neither reward nor punishment; neither a heaven, nor a hell: and this doctrine virtually would amount to (nasticya) denial of another world. Nor can the soul, becoming active, produce mind; nor again this, becoming active, produce consciousness. An agent does not generate an instrument, though he may construct one by means of tools; a carpenter does not create, but fabricate, an axe. Nor can four distinct persons be admitted, as so many forms of the same self- divided being, not springing one from the other, but all of thein alike endued with divine attributes, and consequently all four of them Gods. There is but one God, one Supreme Being. It is vain to assume more; and the Pancharatra itself affirms the unity of God.'

A few scattered observations have been thrown out on the similarity of the Greek and Indian philosophy, in this and preceding portions of the present essay. It may be here remarked by the way, that the Pythagoreans, and Ocellus in particular, distinguish as parts of the world, the heaven, the earth, and the interval between them, which they term lofty and aerial, [x] [Ocell. c. 3., in Opusc. Myth. p. 528.]

Here we have precisely the (swar, bhh, and antaricsha) heaven, earth, and (transpicuous) intermediate region of the Hindus.

Pythagoras, as after him Ocellus, peoples the middle or aerial region with demons, as heaven with Gods, and the earth with men. Here again they agree precisely with the Hindus, who place the Gods above, man beneath, and spiritual creatures, flitting unseen, in the intermediate region. The Vedas throughout teem with prayers and incantations to avert and repel the molestation of aerial spirits, mischievous imps, who crowd about the sacrifice and impede the religious rite.

Nobody needs to be reminded, that Pythagoras and his successors held the doctrine of metempsychosis, as the Hindus universally do the same tenet of transmigration of souls.

They agree likewise generally in distinguishing the sensitive, material organ (manas), from the rational and conscious living soul (Jivdatman): [Empedocles. See Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. 1117.] [x] and [x] of Pythagoras; one perishing with the body, the other immortal.

Like the Hindus, Pythagoras, with other Greek philosophers, assigned a subtle ethereal clothing to the soul apart from the corporeal part, and a grosser clothing to it when united with body; the sucshma (or linga) sarira and st'hula sarira of the Sanc'hyas and the rest. [See page 155 of this volume.]

They concur even in the limit assigned to mutation and change; deeming all which is sublunary, mutable, and that which is above the moon subject to no change in itself. [Ocellus. Opusc. Mythol. 527.] Accordingly, the manes doomed to a succession of births, rise, as the Vedas teach, no further than the moon: while those only pass that bourne who are never to return. But this subject rather belongs to the Vedanta: and I will therefore terminate this treatise; purposing to pursue the subject in a future essay, in which I expect to show that a greater degree of similarity exists between the Indian doctrine and that of the earlier than of the later Greeks; and, as it is scarcely probable that the communication should have taken place, and the knowledge been imparted, at the precise interval of time which intervened between the earlier and later schools of Greek philosophy, and especially between the Pythagoreans and Platonists, I should be disposed to conclude that the Indians were in this instance teachers rather than learners.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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[From the Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 53-67. Calcutta 1798. 4to.]

The permanent separation of classes, with hereditary professions assigned to each, is among the most remarkable institutions of India; and, though now less rigidly maintained than heretofore, must still engage attention. On the subject of the mixed classes, Sanscrit authorities, in some instances, disagree: classes mentioned by one, are omitted by another; and texts differ on the professions assigned to some tribes. A comparison of several authorities, with a few observations on the subdivisions of classes, may tend to elucidate this subject, in which there is some intricacy.

One of the authorities I shall use, is the Jatimala, or Garland of Classes; an extract from, the Rudra yamala tantra, which in some instances corresponds better with usage, and received opinions, than the ordinances of menu, and the great Dharma purana. [The texts are cited in the Vivadarnava setu, from the Vrihad dharma purdana. This name I therefore retain; although I cannot learn that such a purana exists, or to what treatise the quotation refers under that name [See p. 63 of the present work.]] On more important points its authority could not be compared with the Dharmasastra: but, on the subject of classes, it may be admitted; for the Tantras form a branch of literature highly esteemed, though at present much neglected. [See p. 125.] Their fabulous origin derives them from revelations of Siva to Parvati, confirmed by Vishnu, and therefore called Agama, from the initials of three words in a verse of the Todala tantra.

"Coming from the mouth of Siva, heard by the mountain-born goddess, admitted by the son of Vasudeva, it is thence called Agama."

Thirty-six are mentioned for the number of mixed classes; but, according to some opinions, that number includes the fourth original tribe, or all the original tribes, according to other authorities: yet the text quoted from the great Dharma purdana, in the digest of which a version was translated by Mr. Halhed, names thirty-nine mixed classes; and the Jatimala gives distinct names for a greater number.

On the four original tribes it may suffice, in this place, to quote the Jatimala, where the distinction of Brahmanas, according to the ten countries to which their ancestors belonged, is noticed: that distinction is still maintained.

"In the first creation, by Brahma, Brahmanas proceeded, with the Veda, from the mouth of Brahma. From his arms Cshatriyas sprung; so from his thigh, Vaisyas: from his foot Sudras were produced: all with their females.

"The Lord of creation viewing them, said, 'What shall be your occupations?' They replied, 'We are not our own masters, oh, God! command us what to undertake.'

"Viewing and comparing their labours, he made the first tribe superior over the rest. As the first had great inclination for the divine sciences, (Brahme veda,) therefore he was Brahmana. The protector from ill (cshayate) was Cshatriya. Him whose profession (vesa) consists in commerce, which promotes the success of wars, for the protection of himself and of mankind, and in husbandry, and attendance on cattle, he called Vaisya. The other should voluntarily serve the three tribes, and therefore he became a Sudra: he should humble himself at their feet."

And in another place:

"A chief of the twice-born tribe was brought by Vishnu's eagle from Saca dwipa: thus have Saca dwipa Brahmanas become known in Jambu dwipa.

"In Jambu dwipa, Brahmanas are reckoned tenfold; Sareswata, Canyacubja, Gauda, Mait'hita, Ulcala, Dravida, Maharash'tra, Tailanga, Gujjara, and Casmira, residing in the several countries whence they are named. [These several countries are, Sareswata, probably the region watered by the river Sersutty, as it is marked in maps; unless it be a part of Bengal, named from the branch of the Bhagirat'hi, which is distinguished by this appellation; Canyacubja or Canoj; Gauda, probably the western Gar, and not the Gaur of Bengal; Mit'hita, or Tirabhucli, corrupted into Tirhut; Utcala, said to be situated near the celebrated temple of Jaganndt'ha; Dravida, pronounced Dravira; possibly the country described by that name, as a maritime region south of Carnato, (As. Res. vol. u. p. 117); Maharashtra, or Marhatta; Telinga, or Telingana; Gujjara, or Guzrat; Casmira, or Cashmir.]

"Their sons and grandsons are considered as Canyucubja priests, and so forth. Their posterity, descending from menu, also inhabit the southern regions: others reside in Anga, Banga, and Calinga; some in Camarupa and Odra. Others are inhabitants of Sumbhadesa: and twice-born men, brought by former princes, have been established  in Rada, Magadha, Varendra, Chola, Swernagrama, China, Cula, Saca, and Berbera." [Anga includes Bhagalpur. Benga, or Bengal Proper, is a part only of the Suba. Varendra, the tract of inundation north of the Ganges, is a part of the present Zila of Rajeshahi. Calinga is watered by the Godaveri (As. Res. vol. iii. p. 48.) Camarupa, an ancient empire is become a province of Asam. Odra I understand to be Orisa Proper, Rada (if that be the true reading) is well known as the country west of the Bhagirat'ha. Magadha or Magadha, is Bahar Proper. Chola is part of Birbhum. Another region of this name is mentioned in the Asiatic Researches, vol. iii. p. 48. Swernagrama, vulgarly Sunargau, is situated east of Dacca. China is a portion of the present Chinese empire. On the rest I can offer no conjecture. Saca and Berbera, here mentioned, must differ from the Dwipa and the region situated between the Cusa and Sanc'ha dwipas.]

I shall proceed, without further preface, to enumerate the principal mixed classes, which have sprung from intermarriages of the original tribes.

1. Murdhabhishicta, from a Brahmana by a girl of the Cshatriya class; his duty is the teaching of military exercises. The same origin is ascribed in the great Dharma purana to the Cumbhacara, [Vulgarly, Cumar.] or potter, and Tantravaya, [Vulgarly, Tanti.] or weaver: but the Tantravaya, according to the Jatimala, sprung from two mixed classes, for he was begotten by a man of the Manibandha on a woman of the Manicara tribe.

2. Ambash'tha or Vaiaya, [Vulgarly, Baiaya.] whose profession is the science of medicine, was born of a Vaisya woman, by a man of the sacerdotal class. The same origin is given by the Dharma purana to the Cansacara, [ulgarly, Casera.] or brazier, and to the Sanc'hacara, [Vulgarly, Sac'hera.] or worker in shells. These again are stated in the tantra, as springing from the intermarriages of mixed classes; the Cansacara from the Tamracuta and the Sanc'hacara; also named Sanc'hadareca, from the Rajaputra and Gandhica: for Rajaputra not only denotes Cshatriyas as sons of kings, but is also the name of a mixed class, and of a tribe of fabulous origin.

Rudra yamala tantra: "The origin of Rajaputras is from the Vaisya on the daughter of an Ambash'tha. Again, thousands of others sprung from the foreheads of cows kept to supply oblations."

3. Nishada, or Parasava, whose profession is catching fish, was born of a Sudra woman by a man of a sacerdotal class. The name is given to the issue of a legal marriage between a Brahmana and a woman of the Sudra tribe. It should seem that the issue of other legal marriages in different ranks, were described by the names of mixed classes springing from intercourse between the several tribes. This, however, is liable to some question; and since such marriages are considered as illegal in the present age, it is not material to pursue the inquiry.

According to the Dharma purana, from the same origin with the Nishada springs the Varajiv, or astrologer. In the tantra, that origin is given to the Brahme-sudra, whose profession is to make chairs or stools used on some religious occasions. Under the name of Varajivi [Vulgarly, Baraiya.] is described a class springing from the Gopa and Tantravaya, and employed in cultivating betel. The profession of astrology, or, at least, that of making almanacks, is assigned in the tantra, to degraded Brahmanas.

"Brahmanas, falling from their tribe, became kinsmen of the twice-born class: to them is assigned the profession of ascertaining the lunar and solar days."

4. Mahishya is a son of a Cshatriya by a woman of the Vaisya tribe. His profession is music, astronomy, and attendance on cattle.

5. Ugra was born of a Sudra woman by a man of the military class. His profession, according to menu, is killing or confining such animals as live in holes: but, according to the tantra, he is an encomiast or bard. The same origin is attributed to the Napita [Vulgarly, Naya or Nai.] or barber; and to the Maudaca, or confectioner. In the tantra, the Napita is said to be born of a Cuverina woman by a man of the Patticara class.

6. Carana [Vulgarly, Caran.] from a Vaisya, by a woman of the Sudra class, is an attendant on princes, or secretary. The appellation of Cayast'ha [Vulgarly, Cait.] is in general considered as synonymous with Carana; and accordingly the Carana tribe commonly assumes the name of Cayast'ha: but the Cayast'has of Bengal have pretensions to be considered as true Sudras, which the Jatimala seems to authorize; for the origin of the Cayast'ha is there mentioned, before the subject of mixed tribes is introduced, immediately after describing the Gopa as a true Sudra.

One, named Bhutidatta, was noticed for his domestic assiduity; [ Literally, Staying at home, (caye sanst'hitah,) whence the etymology of Cayast'ha.] therefore the rank of Cayast'ha was by Brahmanas assigned to him. From him sprung three sons, Chitrangada, Chitrasena, and Chitragupta: they were employed in attendance on princes.

The Dharma purana assigns the same origin to the Tambuli, or betel-seller, and to the Tantica, or areca-seller, as to the Carana.

The six before enumerated are begotten in the direct order of the classes. Six are begotten in the inverse order.

7. Suta, begotten by a Cshatriya on a woman of the priestly class. His occupation is managing horses and driving cars. The same origin is given, in the puranas, to the Malacara, [Mali.] or florist; but he sprung from the Carmacara and Taitica classes, if the authority of the tantra prevails.

8. Magadha, born of a Cshatriya girl, by a man of the commercial class, has, according to the sastra, the profession of travelling with merchandize: but, according to the purana and tantra, is an encomiast. From parents of those classes sprung the Gopa [Gop.] if the purana may be believed; but the tantra describes the Gupa as a true Sudra, and names Gopajivi, [Giavid-Gop.] a mixed class, using the same profession, and springing from the Tantravaya and Manibandha tribes.

9 and 10. Vaideha and Ayogava. The occupation of the first, born of a Brahmani by a man of the commercial class, is waiting on women: the second, born of a Vaisya woman by a man of the servile class, has the profession of a carpenter.

11. Cshattri, or Cshatta, sprung from a servile man by a woman of the military class, is employed in killing and confining such animals as live in holes. The same origin is ascribed by the purana to the Carmacara, or smith, and Dasa, or mariner. The one is mentioned in the tantra without specifying the classes from which he sprung; and the other has a different origin according to the sastra and tantra.

All authorities concur in deriving the chandala from a Sudra father and Brahmani mother. His profession is carrying out corpses, and executing criminals; and officiating in other abject employments for the public service.

A third set of Indian classes originate from the intermarriages of the first and second set: a few only have been named by menu; and, excepting the Abhira, or milkman, they are not noticed by the other authorities to which I refer. But the purana names other classes of this set.

A fourth set is derived from intercourse between the several classes of the second: of these also few have been named by menu; and one only of the fifth set, springing from intermarriages of the second and third; and another of the sixth set, derived from intercourse between classes of the second and fourth, menu adds to these tribes four sons of outcasts.

The tantra enumerates many other classes, which must be placed in lower sets, and ascribes a different origin to some of the tribes in the third and fourth sets. To pursue a verbose comparison would be tedious, and of little use; perhaps, of none; for I suspect that their origin is fanciful; and, except the mixed classes named by MENU, that the rest are terms for professions rather than tribes, and they should be considered as denoting companies of artisans, rather than distinct races. The mode in which Amera Sinha mentions the mixed classes and the professions of artisans, seems to support this conjecture.

However, the Jatimala expressly states the number of forty-two mixed classes, springing from the intercourse of a man of inferior, with a woman of superior class. Though, like other mixed classes, they are included under the general denomination of Sudra, they are considered as most abject, and most of them now experience the same contemptuous treatment as the abject mixed classes mentioned by MENU. According to the Rudra yamala, the domestic priests of twenty of these tribes are degraded. "Avoid", says the tantra, "the touch of the Chandala, and other abject classes; and of those who eat the flesh of kine, often utter forbidden words, and perform none of the prescribed ceremonies; they are called Mlech'ha, and going to the region of Yavana, have been named Yavanas.

"These seven, the Rajaca, Carmacara, Na'ta, Baruda, Caiverta, and Medabhilla, are the last tribes. Whoever associates with them, undoubtedly falls from his class; whoever bathes or drinks in wells or pools which they have caused to be made, must be purified by the five productions of kine; whoever approaches their women, is doubtless degraded from his rank.

"For women of the Nata and Capala classes, for prostitutes, and for women of the Rajaca and Napita tribes, a man should willingly make oblations, but by no means dally with them."

I may here remark, that according to the Rudra yamala, the Nata and Nataca are distinct; but the professions are not discriminated in that tantra. If their distinct occupations, as dancers and actors, are accurately applied, dramas are of very early date.

The Pundraca and Pattasutracasa, or feeder of silk-worms, and silk-twister, deserve notice; for it has been said, that silk was the produce of China solely until the reign of the Greek Emperor JUSTINIAN, and that the laws of China jealously guarded the exclusive production. The frequent mention of silk in the most ancient Sanscrit books would not fully disprove that opinion; but the mention of an Indian class, whose occupation it is to attend silk-worms, may be admitted as proof, if the antiquity of the tantra be not questioned, I am informed, that the tantras collectively are noticed in very ancient compositions; but, as they are very numerous, they must have been composed at different periods; and the tantra which I quote, might be thought comparatively modern. However, it may be presumed that the Rudra yamala is among the most authentic, and by a natural inference, among the most ancient; since it is named in the Durga mehattwa where the principal tantras are enumerated. [Thus enumerated, "Cali tantra, Munamala, Tara, Nirvana tantra, Serva saran, Bira tantra, Singarchana, Bhuta tantra. Uddesan and Calica calpa, Bhairavi tantra, and Bhairavi calpa, Todala, Matribhedanaca, Maya tantra, Bireswara, Viswasdra, Samaya tantra, Brahma-yamala-tantra, Rudra-yamala-tantra, Sancu-yamala-tantra, Gaya-tri-tantra, Calicacula servaswa, Culdrnava, Yogini, tantra, and the Tantra Mahishamardini. These are here universally known, Oh Bhairavi, greatest of souls! And many are the tantras uttered by Sambhu."]

In the comparative tables to which I have referred, the classes are named, with their origin, and the particular professions assigned to them. How far every person is bound, by original institutions, to adhere rigidly to the profession of his class, may merit some enquiry. Lawyers have largely discussed the texts of law concerning this subject, and some difference of opinion occurs in their writings. This, however, is not the place for entering into such disquisitions. I shall therefore briefly state what appears to be the best established opinion, as deduced from the texts of menu, and other legal authorities.

The regular means of subsistence for a Brahmana, are assisting to sacrifice, teaching the Vedas, and receiving gifts; for a Cshatriya, bearing arms; for a Vaisya, merchandize, attending on cattle, and agriculture, for a Sudra, servile attendance on the higher classes. The most commendable are, respectively for the four classes, teaching the Veda, defending the people, commerce, or keeping herds or flocks, and servile attendance on learned and virtuous priests.

A Brahmana, unable to subsist by his own duties, may live by those of a soldier; if he cannot get a subsistence by either of these employments, he may apply to tillage, and attendance on cattle, or gain a competence by traffic, avoiding certain commodities. A Cshatriya, in distress, may subsist by all these means; but he must not have recourse to the highest functions. In seasons of distress, a further latitude is given. The practice of medicine, and other learned professions, painting and other arts, work for wages, menial service, alms, and usury, are among the modes of subsistence allowed to the Brahmana and Cshatriya. A Vaisya, unable to subsist by his own duties, may descend to the servile acts of a Sudra. And a Sudra, not finding employment by waiting on men of the higher classes, may subsist by handicrafts; principally following those mechanical occupations, as joinery and masonry; and practical arts, as painting and writing; by following of which he may serve men of superior classes: and, although a man of a lower tribe is in general restricted from the acts of a higher class, the Sudra is expressly permitted to become a trader or a husbandman.

Besides the particular occupations assigned to each of the mixed classes, they have the alternative of following that profession which regularly belongs to the class from which they derive their origin on the mother's side: those, at least, have such an option, who are born in the direct order of the tribes, as the Murdhabhishicta, Ambash'tha,  and others. The mixed classes are also permitted to subsist by any of the duties of a Sudra; that is, by a menial service, by handicraft, by commerce, or by agriculture.

Hence it appears that almost every occupation, though regularly it be the profession of a particular class, is open to most other tribes; and that the limitations, far from being rigorous, do, in fact, reserve only one peculiar profession, that of the Brahmana, which consists in teaching the Veda, and officiating at religious ceremonies.

The classes are sufficiently numerous; but the subdivisions of them have further multiplied distinctions to an endless variety. The subordinate distinctions may be best exemplified from the Brahmana and Cayast'ha, because some of the appellations, by which the different races are distinguished, will be familiar to many readers.

The Brahmanas of Bengal are descended from five priests, invited from Canyacubja, by Adiswara, king of Gaura, who is said to have reigned about nine hundred years after Christ. These were Bhatta NARAYANA, of the family of SANDILA, a son of Casyapa; Dacsha, also a descendant of Casyapa; Vedagarva, of the family of Vatsa; CHANDRA, of the family of Saverna, a son of Casyapa; and SRI HERSHA, a descendant of Bharadwaja.

From these ancestors have branched no fewer than a hundred and fifty-six families, of which the precedence was fixed by Ballala SENA, who reigned in the eleventh century of the Christian sera. One hundred of these families settled in Varendra, and fifty-six in Rara. They are now dispersed throughout Bengal, but retain the family distinctions fixed by Ballala Sena. They are denominated from the families to which their five progenitors belonged, and are still considered as Canyacubja Brahmanas.

At the period when these priests were invited by the king of Gaura, some Sareswata Brahmanas, and a few Vaidicas, resided in Bengal. Of the Brahmanas of Sareswata, none are now found in Bengal; but five families of Vaidicas are extant, and are admitted to intermarry with the Brahmanas of Rara.

Among the Brahmanas of Varendra, eight families have pre-eminence, and eight hold the second rank.
CULINA 8 Maitra. / Bhima, or Cali / Rudra- Vagisi / Sanyamini, or Sandyat Bhadara
Lahari / Bhaduri / Sadhu-Vagisi / Bhadara.
The last was admitted by election of the other seven.
Suddha Srotriya 8.
cashta Srotriya 84.
The names of these 92 families seldom occur in common intercourse.]

Among those of Rara six hold the first rank.
Muc'huti, Vulgarly, Muc'herja / Ganguli / Canjelata.
Ghoshala / Banayagati, Vulgarly, Banoji / Chatati, Vulgarly, Chatoji
Srotriya 50
The names of these 50 families seldom occur in common intercourse.]

The distinctive appellations of the several families are borne by those of the first rank; but in most of the other families they are disused; and serman, or serma, the addition common to the whole tribe of Brahmanas, is assumed. For this practice, the priests of Bengal are censured by the Brahmanas of Mit'hila, and other countries, where that title is only used on important occasions, and in religious ceremonies.

In Mit'hila the additions are fewer, though distinct families are more numerous; no more than three surnames are in use in that district, Thacusa, Misra, and Ojha, each appropriated to many families.

The Cayast'has of Bengal claim descent from five Cayast'has who attended the priests invited from Canyacubja. Their descendants branched into eighty-three families; and their precedence was fixed by the same prince Ballala Sena, who also adjusted the family rank of other classes.

In Benga and Dacshina Rara, three families of Cayast'has have pre-eminence; eight hold the second rank.
[Cayast'has of Dacshina Rara and Benga.
Culina 3.
Ghosha / Vasu. Vulg. Bose / Mitra
Sanmaulica 8
De / Datta / Cara / Palita
Sena / Sinha / Dasa / Guha
Maulica 72
Guhan / Gana / Heda / Huhin / Naga / Bhadre
Soma / Pui / Rudra / Pala / Aditya / Chandra
Sanya, or Sain / -- / -- / -- / -- / --
Syama, &c. / -- / -- / -- / -- / --
Teja, &c. / -- / -- / -- / -- / --
Chaci, &c. / -- / -- / -- / -- / --
The others are omitted for the sake of brevity; their names seldom occur in common intercourse.]

The Cayast'has of inferior rank generally assume the addition of Basa, common to the tribe of Sudras, in the same manner as other classes have similar titles common to the whole tribe. The regular addition to the name of a Cshatriya is Verman; to that of a Vaisya, Gupta: but the general title of Deva is commonly assumed; and, with a feminine termination, is also borne by women of other tribes.

The distinctions of families are important in regulating intermarriages. Genealogy is made a particular study; and the greatest attention is given to regulate the alliance according to established rules, particularly in the first marriage of the eldest son. The principal points to be observed are, not to marry within the prohibited degrees; nor in a family known by its name to be of the same primitive stock; nor in one of inferior rank; nor even in an inferior branch of an equal one; for within some families gradations are established. Thus, among the Culina of the Cayast'has, the rank has been counted from thirteen degrees; and in every generation, so long as the marriage has been properly assorted, one degree has been added to the rank. But, should a marriage be contracted in a family of a lower degree, an entire forfeiture of such rank would be incurred.
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Re: Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus

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XII. Observations on the Sect of Jains.

[From the Asiatic Researches, vol. ix. p. 287-322. Calcutta, 1807. 4to.]

The information collected by Major Mackenzie, concerning a religious sect hitherto so imperfectly known as that of the Jainas, and which has been even confounded with one more numerous and more widely spread (the sect of Buddha), may furnish the ground of further researches, from which an exact knowledge of the tenets and practice of a very remarkable order of people may be ultimately expected. What Major Mackenzie has communicated to the Society, comes from a most authentic source; the declaration of two principal priests of the Jainas themselves. It is supported by similar information, procured from a like source, by Dr. I. Buchanan, during his journey in Mysore, in the year following the reduction of Seringapatam. Having the permission of Dr. Buchanan to use the extracts which I had his leave to make from the journal kept by him during that journey, I have inserted in the preceding article the information received by him from priests of the Jaina sect.

I am enabled to corroborate both statements, from conversation with Jaina priests, and from books in my possession, written by authors of the Jaina persuasion. Some of these volumes were procured for me at Benares: others were obtained from the present JAGAT SET, at Morshedabad, who, having changed his religion, to adopt the worship of Vishnu, forwarded to me, at my request, such books of his former faith as were yet within his reach.

It appears, from the concurrent result of all the enquiries which have been made, that the Jainas constitute a sect of Hindus, differing, indeed, from the rest in some very important tenets; but following, in other respects, a similar practice, and maintaining like opinions and observances.

The essential character of the Hindu institutions is the distribution of the people into four great tribes. This is considered by themselves to be the marked point which separates them from Mlech'has or Barbarians. The Jainas, it is found, admit the same division into four tribes, and perform like religious ceremonies, termed sanscaras, from the birth of a male to his marriage. They observe similar fasts, and practise, still more strictly, the received maxims for refraining from injury to any sentient being. They appear to recognise as subordinate deities, some, if not all, of the gods of the prevailing sects; but do not worship, in particular, the five principal gods of those sects; or any one of them by preference; nor address prayers, or perform sacrifice, to the sun, or to fire: and they differ from the rest of the Hindus, in assigning the highest place to certain deified saints, who, according to their creed, have successively become superior gods. Another point in which they materially disagree is the rejection of the Vedas, the divine authority of which they deny; condemning, at the same time, the practice of sacrifices, and the other ceremonies which the followers of the Vedas perform, to obtain specific promised consequences, in this world or in the next.

In this respect the Jainas resemble the Bauddhas or saugatas, who equally deny the divine authority of the Vedas: and who similarly worship certain pre-eminent saints, admitting likewise, as subordinate deities, nearly the whole pantheon of the orthodox Hindus. They differ, indeed, in regard to the history of the personages whom they have deified; and it may be hence concluded, that they have had distinct founders; but the original notion seems to have been the same. In fact, this remarkable tenet, from which the Jainas and Bauddhas derive their most conspicuous peculiarities, is not entirely unknown to the orthodox Hindus. The followers of the Vedas, according to the theology, which is explained in the Vedanta, considering the human soul as a portion of the divine and universal mind, believe that it is capable of perfect union with the divine essence: and the writers on the Vedanta not only affirm that this union and identity are attained through a knowledge of God, as by them taught; but have hinted, that by such means the particular soul becomes God, even to the actual attainment of supremacy. [Vrihad aranyaca upanishad.]

So far the followers of the Vedas do not virtually disagree with the Jainas and Bauddhas. But they have not, like those sects, framed a mythology upon the supposed history of the persons, who have successively attained divinity; nor have they taken these for the objects of national worship. All three sects agree in their belief of transmigration. But the Jainas are distinguished from the rest by their admission of no opinions, as they themselves affirm, which are not founded on perception, or on proof drawn from that, or from testimony.

It does not, however, appear that they really withhold belief from pretended revelations: and the doctrines which characterize the sect, are not confined to a single tenet; but form an assemblage of mythological and metaphysical ideas found among other sects, joined to many visionary and fantastic notions of their own.

Their belief in the eternity of matter, and perpetuity of the world, is common to the Sanc'hya philosophy, from which it was, perhaps, immediately taken. Their description of the world has much analogy to that which is given in the Puranas, or Indian theogonies: but the scheme has been rendered still more extravagant. Their precaution to avoid injuring any being is a practice inculcated in the orthodox religion, but which has been carried by them to a ludicrous extreme. [Jaina priests usually wear a broom adapted to sweep insects out of their way; lest they should tread on the minutest being.]

In their notions of the soul, and of its union with body, and of retribution for good and evil, some analogy is likewise observable. The Jainas conceive the soul (jiva) to have been eternally united to a very subtile material body, or rather to two such bodies, one of which is invariable, and consists (if I rightly apprehend their metaphysical notions) of the powers of the mind; the other is variable, and is composed of its passions and affections: (this, at least, is what I understand them to mean by the taijasa and carmana sariras). The soul, so embodied, becomes, in its successive transmigrations, united with a grosser body denominated audarica, which retains a definite form, as man and other mundane beings; or it is joined with a purer essence, varying in its appearance at pleasure, as the gods and genii. This last is termed Vaicarica. They distinguish a fifth sort of body, under the name of aharica, which they explain as a minute form, issuing from the head of a meditative sage, to consult an omniscient saint; and returning with the desired information to the person whence that form issued, or rather from which it was elongated; for they suppose the communication not to have been interrupted.

The soul is never completely separated from matter, until it obtain a final release from corporeal sufferance, by deification, through a perfect disengagement from good and evil, in the person of a beatified saint. Intermediately it receives retribution for the benefits or injuries ascribable to it in its actual or precedent state, according to a strict principle of retaliation, receiving pleasure or pain from the same individual, who, in a present or former state, was either benefitted or aggrieved.

Major Mackenzie's information confirms that which t had also received, concerning the distribution of these sectaries into clergy and laity. In Hindustan the Jainas are usually called Syauras; but distinguish themselves into Sravacas and Yatis. The laity (termed Sravaca) includes persons of various tribes, as indeed is the case with Hindus of other sects: but, on this side of India, the Jainas are mostly of the Vaisya class. [I understand that their Vaisya class includes eighty-four tribes: of whom the most common are those denominated Oswal, Agarval, Pariwar, and C'handewal.] The orthodox Hindus have a secular, as well as a regular clergy: a Brahmana, following the practice of officiating at the ceremonies of his religion, without quitting the order of a householder, may be considered as belonging to the secular clergy; one who follows a worldly profession, (that of husbandry  for example,) appertains to the laity; and so do people of other tribes: but persons, who have passed into the several orders of devotion, may be reckoned to constitute the regular clergy. The Jainas have, in like manner, priests who have entered into an order of devotion; and also employ Brahmanas at their ceremonies; and, for want of Brahmanas of their own faith, they even have re- course to the secular clergy of the orthodox sect. This subject is sufficiently explained by Major Mackenzie and Dr. Buchanan, I shall, however, add, for the sake of a subsequent remark, that the Jainas apply the terms Yati and Sramana, (in Pracrit and Hindi written Samana,) to a person who has devoted himself to religious contemplation and austerity; and the sect of Buddha uses the word Sramana for the same meaning. It cannot be doubted, that the Sommonacodom of Siam, is merely a corruption of the words 'Sramana Gautama, the holy Gautama or Buddha. [See As. Res. Veil vii. p. 415.]

Having been here led to a comparison of the Indian sects which follow the precepts of the Vedas, with those which reject their authority, I judge it necessary to notice an opinion, which has been advanced, on the relative antiquity of those religions; and especially the asserted priority of the Bauddhas before the Brahmanas.

In the first place, it may be proper to remark, that the earliest accounts of India, by the Greeks who visited the country, describe its inhabitants as distributed into separate tribes. [Seven tribes are enumerated: but it is not difficult to reconcile the distributions, which are stated by Arrian and Strabo, with the present distribution into four classes.] Consequently, a sect which, like the modern Bauddhas, has no distinction of cast, could not have been then the most prevalent in India.

It is indeed possible that the followers of Buddha may, like the Jainas, have retained the distribution into four tribes, so long as they continued in Hindustan. But in that case, they must have been a sect of Hindus; and the question, which is most ancient, the Brahmana or the Bauddha, becomes a solecism.

If it be admitted that the Bauddhas are originally a sect of Hindus it may be next questioned, whether that, or any of the religious systems now established, be the most ancient. I have on a former occasion, [As. Res. Vol. viii. p. 474. [Above, pp. 67. 68]] indicated the notions which I entertain on this point. According to the hypothesis which I then hinted, the earliest Indian sect of which we have any present distinct knowledge, is that of the followers of the practical Vedas, who worshipped the sun, fire, and the elements; and who believed the efficacy of sacrifices, for the accomplishment of present and of future purposes. It may be supposed that the refined doctrine of the Vedantas, or followers of the theological and argumentative part of the Vedas, is of later date: and it does not seem improbable that the sects of Jina and of Buddha are still more modern. But I apprehend that the Vaishnavas, meaning particularly the worshippers of RAMA and of CRISHNA, [In explanation of a remark contained in a former essay [p. 68] 1 take this occasion of adding, that the mere mention of Rama or Crishna, in a passage of the Vedas, without any indication of peculiar reverence, would not authorize a presumption against the genuineness of that passage, on my hypothesis; nor, admitting its authenticity, furnish an argument against that system. I suppose both heroes to have been known characters in ancient fabulous history; but conjecture that, on the same basis, new fables have been constructed, elevating those personages to the rank of Gods. On this supposition, the simple mention of them in genuine portions of the Vedas, particularly in that part of it which is entitled Brahmana, would not appear surprising. Accordingly, CRISHNA, son of DEVACI, is actually named in the Ch'handogya Upanishad (towards the close of the third chapter,) as having received theological information from Ghora, a descendant of Angiras. This passage, which had escaped my notice, was indicated to me by Mr. Speke, from the Persian translation of the Upanishad.] may be subsequent to those sects, and that the Saivas also are of more recent date.

I state it as an hypothesis, because I am not at present able to support the whole of this position on grounds which may appear quite satisfactory to others; nor by evidence which may entirely convince them. Some arguments will, however, be advanced, to show that the proposition is not gratuitous.

The long sought history of Cashmir, which in the original Sanscrit was presented to the Emperor Acber, as related by Abul-Iazil in the Ayin-Acberi, and of which a Persian translation exists, more ample than Abul-Iazil's brief extract, has been at length recovered in the original language. [The copy which I possess, belonged to a Brahmana, who died some months ago (1805) in Calcutta. 1 obtained it from his heirs.] A fuller account of this book will be hereafter submitted to the society: the present occasion for the mention of it is a passage which was cited by Dr. Buchanan, [As. Res. vol. vi. p. 165.] from the English translation of the Ayin Acberi, for an import which is not supported by the Persian or Sanscrit text.

The author, after briefly noticing the colony established in Cashmir by Casyapa, and hinting a succession of kings to the time of the Curus and Pandavas, opens his detailed history, and list of princes, with GONARDA, a contemporary of Yudhisht'hira. He describes Asoca (who was twelfth in succession from Gonarda) and his son JALOCA, and grandson Damodara, as devout worshippers of Siva; and JALOCA, in particular, as a conqueror of the Mlech'has, or barbarians. DAMODARA, according to this history, was succeeded by three kings of the race of Turushca; and they were followed by a Bodhisatwa, who wrested the empire from them by the aid of Sacyasinha, and introduced the religion of Buddha into Cashmir. He reigned a hundred years; and the next sovereign was Abhimanyu, who destroyed the Bauddhas, and re-established the doctrines of the Nila purana. This account is so far from proving the priority of the Bauddhas, that it directly avers the contrary.

From the legendary tales concerning the last Buddha, current in all the countries in which his sect now flourishes; [TACHARD, Voyage de Siam. Laloubere, Royaume de Siam.] and upon the authority of a life of Buddha in the Sanscrit language, under the title of Lalita purana, which was procured by Major Knox, during his public mission in Nepal, it can be affirmed, that the story of GAUTAMA BUDDHA has been engrafted on the heroic history of the lunar and solar races, received by the orthodox Hindus; an evident sign, that his sect is subsequent to that, in which this fabulous history is original.

The same remark is applicable to the Jainas, with whom the legendary story of their saints also seems to be engrafted on the pauranic tales of the orthodox sect. Sufficient indication of this will appear in the passages which will be subsequently cited from the writings of the Jainas.

Considerable weight might be allowed to an argument deduced from the aggravated extravagance of the fictions admitted by the sects of JINA and Buddha. The mythology of the orthodox Hindus, their present chronology adapted to astronomical periods, their legendary tales, their mystical allegories, are abundantly extravagant. But the Jainas and Bauddhas surpass them in monstrous exaggerations of the same kind. In this rivalship of absurd fiction, it would not be unreasonable to pronounce that to be most modern, which has outgone the rest.

The greater antiquity of the religion of the Vedas is also rendered probable, from the prevalence of a similar worship of the sun and of' fire in ancient Persia. Nothing forbids the supposition, that a religious worship, which was there established in times of antiquity, may have also existed from a remote period in the country between the Ganges and the Indus.

The testimony of the Greeks preponderates greatly for the early prevalence of the sect, from which the present orthodox Hindus are derived, Arrian, having said that the Brachmanes were the sages or learned among the Indians, [[x] Exp. Al. vi. 16.] mentions them under the latter designation ([x]) as a distinct tribe, which, though inferior to the others in number, is superior in rank and estimation: bound to no bodily work, nor contributing any thing from labour to the public use; in short, no duty is imposed on that tribe, but that of sacrificing to the gods, for the common benefit of the Indians; and, when any one celebrates a private sacrifice, a person of that class becomes his guide; as if the sacrifices would not else be acceptable to the gods? [[x] Arrian. Indic, c. 11.]

Here, as well as in the sequel of the passage, the priests of a religion consonant to the Vedas, are well described: and what is said, is suitable to them; but to no other sect, which is known to have at any time prevailed in India.

A similar description is more succinctly given by Strabo, 'It is said, that the Indian multitude is divided into seven classes; and that the philosophers are first in rank, but fewest in number. They are employed, respectively, for private benefit, by those who are sacrificing or worshipping, etc.' [[x] Strab. xv. c. 1. (p. 712, ed. Casaub.)]

In another place he states, on the authority of Megasthenes, 'two classes of philosophers or priests; the Brachmanes and Germanes: but the Brachmanes are best esteemed, because they are most consistent in their doctrine' [[x] Strab. xv. c. 1. (pag. 712. ed. Casaub.)] The author then proceeds to describe their manners and opinions: the whole passage is highly deserving of attention, and will be found, on consideration, to be more suitable to the orthodox Hindus than to the Bauddhas or Jainas: particularly towards the close of his account of the Brachmanes, where he says, 'In many things they agree with the Greeks; for they affirm that the world was produced and is perishable; and that it is spherical: that God, governing it as well as framing it, pervades the whole: that the principles of all things are various; but water is the principle of the construction of the world: that, besides the four elements, there is a fifth nature, whence heaven and the stars: that the earth is placed in the centre of all. Such and many other things are affirmed of reproduction, and of the soul. Like PLATO, they devise fables concerning the immortality of the soul, and the judgment in the infernal regions; and other similar notions. These things are said of the Brachmanes.'

STRABO notices likewise another order of people opposed to the Brachmanes, and called Pramnoe: he characterizes them as contentious cavillers, who ridiculed the Brachmanes for their study of physiology and astronomy.' [[x] Strab. XV. c. I. pag. 718, 719. ed. Casaub.]

PHILOSTRATUS, in the life of Apollonius, speaks of the Brachmanes as worshipping the sun. 'By day they pray to the sun respecting the seasons, which he governs, that he would send them in due time; and that India might thrive: and, in the evening, they intreat the solar ray not to be impatient of night and to remain as conducted from them.' [[x] lib. iii. cap. 4.]

PLINY and SOLINUS [PLIN., lib. vii. c. 2. Solin. i. 52.] also describe the Gymnosophists contemplating  the sun: and Hierocles, as cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, [[x] Stephan. de Urbibus, ad vocem Brachmanes.] expressly declares the Brachmanes to be particularly devoted to the sun.

This worship, which distinguishes the orthodox Hindus, does not seem to have been at any time practised by the rival sects of Jina and BUDDHA.

PORPHYRUS, treating of a class of religious men, among the Indians, whom the Greeks were accustomed to call Gymnosophists, mentions two orders of them; one, the Brachmanes, the other, the Samanoeans: 'the Brachmanes receive religious knowledge, like the priesthood, in right of birth; but the Samanoeans are select, and consist of persons choosing to prosecute divine studies.' He adds, on the authority of Bardesanes, that 'all the Brachmanes are of one race; for they are all descended from one father and one mother. But the Samanoeans are not of their race; being selected from the whole nation of Indians, as before mentioned. The Brachman is subject to no domination, and contributes nothing to others.' [PORPH. Abstinentia, lib. iv.]

In this passage, the Brachman, as an hereditary order of priesthood, is contrasted with another religious order; to which persons of various tribes were admissible: and the Samanoeans, who are obviously the same with the Germanes of STRABO, were doubtless Sannyasis; but may have belonged to any of the sects of Hindus. The name seems to bear some affinity to the Sramanas, or ascetics of the Jainas and Bauddhas.

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS does indeed hint, that all the Brachmanes revered their wise men as deities; [[x] &c. Strom. lib. I. c. 15. p. 130. ed. Sylb.] and in another place, he describes them as worshipping Hercules and Pan. [Strom. lib. iii. c. 7. p. 194. ed. Sylb.] But the following passage from Clemens is most in point. Having said, that philosophy flourished anciently among the barbarians, and afterwards was introduced among the Greeks, he instances the prophets of the Egyptians, the Chaldees of the Assyrians; the Druids of the Gauls (Galatae); the Samanaeans of the Bactrians; the philosophers of the Celts; the Magi of the Persians; the Gymnosophists of the Indians: and proceeds thus: — 'They are of two kinds, some called Sarmanes, others Brachmanes. Among the Sarmanes, those called Allobii, [Same with the Hylobii of Strabo.] neither inhabit towns, nor have houses; they are clad with the bark of trees, and eat acorns, and drink water with their hands. They know not marriage, nor procreation of children; like those now called Encratetai (chaste). There are likewise, among the Indians, persons obeying the precepts of Butta, whom they worship as a god, on account of his extreme venerableness.' [[x] Strom, lib. 1. c. 15, p. 131. ed. Sylb.]

Here, to my apprehension, the followers of Buddha are clearly distinguished from the Brachmanes and Sarmanes. [The passage has been interpreted differently, as if Clemens said, that the Allobii were those who worshipped Butto. (See Moreri, Art. Samaneens.) The text is ambiguous.] The latter, called Germanes by Strabo, and Samamoeans by Porphyrius, are the ascetics of a different religion: and may have belonged to the sect of JINA, or to another. The Brachmanes are apparently those who are described by Philostratus and Hierocles, as worshipping the sun; and by Strabo and by Arrian, as performing sacrifices for the common benefit of the nation, as well as for individuals. The religion which they practised, was so far conformable with the precepts of the Vedas: and their doctrine and observances, their manners and opinions, as noticed by the authors above cited, agree with no other religious institutions known in India, but the orthodox sect. In short, the Brahmanas are distinctly mentioned by Greek authors as the first of the tribes or casts, into which the Indian nation was then, as now, divided. They are expressly discriminated from the sect of Buddha by one ancient author, and from the Sarmanes, or Samanoeans, (ascetics of various tribes) by others. They are described by more than one authority, as worshipping the sun, as performing sacrifices, and as denying the eternity of the world, and maintaining other tenets incompatible with the supposition that the sects of Buddha or Jina could be meant. Their manners and doctrine, as described by these authors, are quite conformable with the notions and practice of the orthodox Hindus. It may therefore be confidently inferred, that the followers of the Vedas flourished in India when it was visited by the Greek under Alexander: and continued to flourish from the time of Megasthenes. who described them in the fourth century before Christ, to that of Porphyrius, who speaks of them, on later authority, in the third century after Christ.

I have thus stated, as briefly as the nature of the subject permitted, a few of the facts and reasons by which the opinion, that the religion and institutions of the orthodox Hindus are more modern than the doctrines of Jina and of Buddha, may, as I think, be successfully resisted. I have not undertaken a formal refutation of it, and have, therefore, passed unnoticed, objections which are founded on misapprehensions.

It is only necessary to remark, that the past prevalence of either of those sects in particular places, with its subsequent persecution there by the worshippers of Siva, or of Vishnu, is no proof of its general priority. Hindustan proper was the early seat of the Hindu religion, and the acknowledged cradle of both the sects in question. They were foreigners in the Peninsula of India; and admitting, as a fact, (what need not however be conceded,) that the orthodox Hindus had not been previously settled in the Carnataca and other districts, in which the Jainas or the Bauddhas have flourished, it cannot be thence concluded, that the followers of the Vedas did not precede them in other provinces.

It may be proper to add, that the establishment of particular sects among the Hindus who acknowledge the Vedas, does not affect the general question of relative antiquity. The special doctrines introduced by Sancara ACHARYA, by RAMANUJA, and by MADHAVACHARYA, and of course the origin of the sects which receive those doctrines, may be referred, with precision, to the periods when their authors lived: but the religion in which they are sectaries has undoubtedly a much earlier origin.

To revert to the immediate object of these observations, which is that of explaining and supporting the information communicated by Major Mackenzie: I shall, for that purpose, state the substance of a few passages from a work of great authority among the Jainas, entitled Calpa Sutra, and from a vocabulary of the Sanscrit language by an author of the Jaina sect.

The Abhidhana chintamani, a vocabulary of synonymous terms, by HEMACHANDRA ACHARYA, is divided into six chapters (candas,) the contents of which are thus stated in the author's preface. 'The superior deities (Devadhidevas) are noticed in the first chapter; the gods (Devas) in the second; men in the third; beings furnished with one or more senses in the fourth; the infernal regions in the fifth; and terms of general use in the sixth.' 'The earth,' observes this author, 'water, fire, air, and trees, have a single organ of sense (indriya)] worms, ants, spiders, and the like, have two, three, or four senses; elephants, peacocks, fish, and other beings moving on the earth, in the sky, or in water, are furnished with five senses: and so are gods and men, and the inhabitants of hell.'

The first chapter begins with the synonyma of a Jina or deified saint; among which the most common are Arhat, Jineswara, Tirt'hancara or Tirt'hacara: others, viz. Jina, Sarvajnya and Bhagayat, occur also in the dictionary of Amera as terms for a Jina or Buddha; but it is deserving of remark, that neither Buddha, not Sugata, is stated by HEMACHANDRA among these synonyma. In the subsequent chapter, however, on the subject of inferior gods, after noticing the gods of Hindu Mythology, (Indra and the rest, including Brahma &c.) he states the synonyma of a Buddha, Sugata, or Bodhisatwa; and afterwards specifies seven such, viz. Vipasyi, Sic'hi, Viswanna, Cucuch'handa, Canchana, and Casyapa, [Two of these names occur in Captain Mahony's and Mr. Joinville's lists of five Buddhas. As. Res. vol. vii. p. 32 and 414.] expressly mentioning as the seventh BUDDHA, Sacyasinha, also named Servart'Hasiddha, son of Sud DHODANA and MAYA, a kinsman of the sun, from the race of GAUTAMA.

In the first chapter, after stating the general terms for a Jina or Arhat, the author proceeds to enumerate twenty-four Arhats, who have appeared in the present Avasarpini age: and afterwards observes, that excepting Munisuvrata and Nemi, who sprung from the race of HARI, the remaining twenty-two Jinas were born in the line of Icshwacu. [I understand that the Jainas have a mythological poem entitled Harivansa purana, different from the Harivansa of the orthodox. Their Icsnwacu, likewise, is a different person; and the name is said to be a title of their first Jina, Rishabha Deva.] The fathers and mothers of the several Jinas are then mentioned; their attendants; their standards or characteristics; and the complexions with which they are figured or described.

The author next enumerates twenty-four Jinas who have appeared in the past Utsarpini period; and twenty-four others who will appear in the future age: and, through the remainder of the first book, explain terms relative to the Jaina religion. The names of the Jinas are specified in Major Mackenzie's communication. [[In the Asiatic Researches, vol. ix. p. 244, &c.]]  Wherever those names agree with Hemachandra's enumeration, I have added no remark; but where a difference occurs I have noticed it, adding in the margin the name exhibited in the Sanscrit text.

I shall here subjoin the information gathered from Hemachandra's vocabulary, and from the Calpa sutra and other authorities, relative to the Jinas belonging to the present period. They appear to be deified saints, who are now worshipped by the Jaina sect. They are all figured in the same contemplative posture, with little variation in their appearance, besides a difference of complexion: but the several Jinas have distinguishing marks or characteristic signs, which are usually engraved on the pedestals of their images, to discriminate them.

1. RISABHA, or VRISHABHA, of the race of Icshwacu, was son of NABHI by MARUDEVA: he is figured of a yellow or golden complexion; and has a bull for his characteristic. His stature, as is pretended, was 500 poles (dhanush;) and the duration of his life, 8,400,000 great years (purva varsha.) According to the Calpa sutra, as interpreted by the commentator, he was born at Cosala or Ayodhya (whence he is named Causalica), towards the latter part of the third age. He was the first king, first anchoret, and first saint; and is therefore entitled Prat'hama Raja, Prat'hama BhIcshacara, Prat'hama Jina, and Prat'hama Tirt'hancara. At the time of his inauguration as king, his age was 2,000,000 years. He reigned 6,300,000 years; and then resigned his empire to his sons: and having employed 100,000 years in passing through the several stages of austerity and sanctity, departed from this world on the summit of a mountain, named Ashtapada. The date of his apotheosis was 3 years and 8, months before the end of the third age, at the precise interval of one whole age before the deification of the last Jina.

2. AJITA was son of Jitasatru by Vijaya; of the same race with the first Jina, and represented as of the like complexion; with an elephant for his distinguishing mark. His stature was 450 poles; and his life extended to 7,200,000 great years. His deification took place in the fourth age, when fifty lacshas of crors of oceans of years had elapsed out of the tenth cror of crors. [The divisions of time have been noticed by Major Mackenzie, As. Res. vol. ix. p. 257, and will be further explained.]

3. SAMBHAVA was the son of Jitari by Sena; of the same race and complexion with the preceding; distinguished by a horse; his stature was 400 poles; he lived 6,000,000 years; and he was deified 30 lacshas of crors of Sagaras after the second Jina.

4. ABHINANDANA was the son of SAMBARA by Sidd'hart'ha; he has an ape for his peculiar sign. His stature was 300 poles; and his life reached to 5,000,000 years. His apotheosis was later by 10 lacshas of crors of Sagaras than the foregoing.

5. SUMATI was son of Megha by Mangala; he has a curlew for his characteristic; His life endured 4,000,000 years, and his deification was nine lacshas of crors of Sagaras after the fourth Jina.

6. Padmaprabha was son of SRIDHARA by SUSIMA; of the same race with the preceding, but described of a red complexion. He has a lotos for his mark: and lived 3,000,000 years, being 200 poles in stature. He was deified 90,000 crors of Sagaras after the fifth Jina.


7. Suparswa was son of Pratisht'ha by Prit'hwi; of the same line with the foregoing, but represented with a golden complexion; his sign is the figure called Swastica. He lived 2,000,000 years; and was deified 9,000 crors of Sagaras subsequent to the sixth Jina.

8. Chandraprabha was son of Mahasena by Lacshmana; of the same race with the last, but figured with a fair complexion; his sign is the moon; his stature was 150 poles, and he lived 1,000,000 years; and his apotheosis took place 900 crors of Sagaras later than the seventh Jina.

9. Pushpadanta, also surnamed Suvidhi, was son of Supriya by RAMA; of the same line with the preceding, and described of a similar complexion, his mark is a marine monster (macara); his stature was 100 poles, and the duration of his life 200,000 years. He was deified 90 crors of Sagaras after the eighth Jina.


10. SITALA was son of Dridharat'ha by Nanda; of the same race, and represented with a golden complexion; his characteristic is the mark called Srivatsa. His stature was 90 poles; and his life 100,000 great years; his deification dates 9 crors of Sagaras later than the preceding.

11. SREYAN (SREYAS) or SREYANSA, was son of VISHNU by Vishna; of the same race, and with a similar complexion; having a rhinoceros for his sign. He was 80 poles in stature, and lived 8,400,000 common years. His apotheosis took place more than 100 Sagaras of years before the close of the fourth age.

12. Va'upujya was son of Vasupujya by Jaya; of the same race, and represented with a red complexion, having a buffalo for his mark; and he was 70 poles high, lived 7,200,000 years, and was deified later by 54 Sagaras than the eleventh Jina.

13. VIMALA was son of Critavarman by Syama; of the same race; described of a golden complexion, having a boar for his characteristic; he was 60 poles high, lived 6,000,000 years, and was deified 30 Sagaras later than the twelfth Jina.

14. ANANTA, also named Anantajit, was son of Sinhasena by SUYASAH. He has a falcon for his sign; his stature was 50 poles, the duration of his life 3,000,000 years, and his apotheosis 9 Sagaras after the preceding.

15. DHARMA was don of Bhanu by Suvrata, characterised by the thunderbolt; he was 45 poles in stature, and lived 1,000,000 years; he was deified 4 Sagaras later than the foregoing.

16. SANTI was son of Viswasena by Achira, having an antelope for his sign; he was 40 poles high, lived 100,000 years, and was deified 2 Sagaras subsequent to the last mentioned. [The life of this Jina is the subject of a separate work entitled Santi purana.]

17. Cunt'hu was son of Sura, by SRI; he has a goat for his mark; his height was 35 poles, and his life 95,000 years. His apotheosis is dated in the last palya of the fourth age.


18. Ara was son of Sudarsana by Devi; characterised by the figure called Nandavarta: his stature was 30 poles, his life 84,000 years, and his deification 1,000 crors of years before the next Jina.

19. MALLI was son of Cumbha by PRABHAVATI; of the same race with the preceding; and represented of a blue complexion, having a jar for his characteristic; he was 25 poles high and lived 55,000 years; and was deified 6,584,000 years before the close of the fourth age.

20. MUNISUVRATA, also named Suvrata, or Muni was son of SUMITRA by PADMA, spruug from the race called Harivansa; represented with a black complexion, having a tortoise for his sign: his height was 20 poles, and his life extended to 30,000 years. His apotheosis is dated 1,184,000 years before the end of the fourth age.

21. Nimi was son of Vijaja by Vipra; of the race of Icshwacu; figured with a golden complexion; having for his mark a blue water-lily, (nilotpala); his stature was 15 poles; his life 10,000 years; and his deification took place 584,000 years before the expiration of the fourth age.

22. NEMI, also called Arishtanemi, was son of the king SAMUDRAJAYA by Siva; of the line denominated Harivansa; described as of a black complexion, having a conch for his sign. According to the calpa sutra, he was born at Soriyapura; and, when 300 years of age, entered on the practice of austerity. He employed 700 years in passing through the several stages of sanctity, and, having attained the age of 1,000 years, departed from this world at Ujjinta, which is described as the peak of a mountain, the same, according to the commentator, with Giranara. [I understand this to be a mountain situated in the west of India, and much visited by pilgrims.] The date of this event is 84,000 years before the close of the fourth age.

23. PARSWA (or Parswanat'ha) was son of the king Aswasena by Vama, or Bamadevi; of the race of Icshwacu; figured with a blue complexion, having a serpent for his characteristic. The life of this celebrated Jina, who was perhaps the real founder of the sect, is the subject of a poem entitled Parswanat'ha charitra. According to the Calpa stura, he was born at Banarasi, [Bhelupura, in the suburbs of Benares, is esteemed holy, as the place of his nativity.] and commenced his series of religious austerities at thirty years of age; and having completed them in 70 years, and consequently attained the age of 100 years, he died on Mount Sammeya or Samet. [Samet sic'hara, called in Major Rennel's map Parsonaut, is situated among the hills between Bihar and Bengal. Its holiness is great in the estimation of the Jainas: and it is said to be visited by pilgrims from the remotest provinces of India.] This ,happened precisely 250 years before the apotheosis of the next Jina; being stated by the author of the Calpa sutra at 1,230 years before the date of that book.

24. Vardhamana, also named Vira, Mahavira, &c. and surnamed Charama tirt'hacrit, or last of the Jinas: emphatically called Sramana, or the saint. He is reckoned son of Siddhart'ha by Trisala; and is described of a golden complexion, having a lion for his symbol.

The subject of the Calpa sutra, before cited, is the life and institutions of this Jina. I shall here state an abstract of his history as there given, premising that the work, like other religious books of the Jainas, is composed in the Pracrit called Magadhi; and that the Sanscrit language is used by the Jainas for translations, or for commentaries, on account of the great obscurity of the Pracrit tongue. [This Pracrit, which does not differ much from the language introduced by dramatic poets into their dramas, is formed from the Sanscrit. I once conjectured it to have been formerly the colloquial dialect of the Saraswata Brahmens [As. Res. vol. vii. p. 219.] but this conjecture has not been confirmed  by further researches. I believe it to be the same language with the Pali of Ceylon.]

According to this authority, the last Tirt'hancara, quitting the state of a deity, and relinquishing the longevity of a god, to obtain immortality as a saint, was incarnate towards the close of the fourth age (now past,) when 75 years and 8, months of it remained. He was at first conceived by Devananda, wife of Rishabhadatta, a Brahmana inhabiting Brahmanacunda grama, a city of Bharata varsha, in Jamba dwipa. The conception was announced to her by dreams. INDRA, [The Jainas admit numerous Indras; but some of the attributes, stated in this place by the Calpa sutra, belong to the Indra of the Indian mythology.] or SACRA, who is the presiding deity on the south of Meru, and abides in the first range of celestial regions, called Saudharma, being apprized of Mahavira's incarnation, prostrated himself, and worshipped the future saint; but reflecting that no great personage was ever born in an indigent and mendicant family, as that of a Brahmana, Indra commanded his chief attendant Harinai-Gumeshi to remove the fetus from the womb of Devananda to that of Trisala, wife of Siddhart'ha, a prince of the race of Icshwacu, and of the Casyapa family. This was accordingly executed, and the new conception was announced to Trisala by dreams, which were expounded by soothsayers, as foreboding the birth of a future Jina. In due time he was born, and his birth celebrated with great rejoicings.

His father gave him the name of Varduamana. But he is also known by two other names, Sramana and Mahavira. His father has similarly three appellations, Siddhart'ha, Sreyansa, and Yasaswi; and his mother likewise has three titles, Trisala, Videha-dinna, and Priticarini. His paternal uncle was Suparswa, his elder brother Nandivardhana, his sister (mother of Jamali) Sudarsana. His wife was Yasoda, by whom he had a daughter (who became wife of Jamali;) named Anojja and Priyadarsana. His granddaughter was called Seshavati and Yasovati.

His father and mother died when he was twenty-eight years of age; and ho continued two years with his elder brother: after the second year he renounced worldly pursuits, and departed amidst the applauses of gods and men, to practise austerities. The progress of his devout exercises, and of his attainment of divine knowledge, is related at great length. Finally, he became an Arhat or Jina, being worthy of universal adoration, and having subdued all passions; [So the commentator expounds both terms.]  being likewise omniscient and all-seeing: and thus, at the age of seventy-two years, he became exempt from all pain for ever. This event is stated to have happened at the court of king Hastipala, in the city of Pawapuri or Papapuri] [Near Rajagrihah, in Bihar. It is accordingly a place of sanctity. Other holy places, which have been mentioned to me are, Champapuri, near Bhagatpur, Chanaravati distant ten miles from Benares, and the ancient city Hastinapura in Hindustan: also Satrunjaya, said to be situated in the west of India.] and is dated three years and eight and a-half months before the close of the fourth age, (called Duhc'hama suc'hama) in the great period named avasarpini. The author of the Calpa sutra mentions, in several places, that, when he wrote, 980 years had elapsed since this apotheosis. [Samanassa bhagavau MAHABIRASSA java duhc'ha hinassa navabasa sayain bicwantain dasamassaya basa sayassa ayam asi ime sambach'hare cale gach'hai. "Nine hundred years have passed since the adorable Mahabira became exempt from pain; and of the tenth century of years, eighty are the time which is now elapsed."] According to tradition, the death of the last Jina happened more than two thousand four hundred years since; and the Calpa sutra appears therefore, to have been composed about fifteen hundred years ago. [The most ancient copy in my possession, and the oldest one which I have seen, is dated in 1614 samvat: it is nearly 250 years old.]

The several Jinas are described as attended by numerous followers, distributed into classes, under a few chief disciples, entitled Ganadharas or Ganadhipas. The last Jina had nine such classes of followers, under eleven disciples, Indrabhuti, Agnibhuti, Vayubhuti, Vyacta, Sudharma, Manditaputra, Mauryaputra, Acampita, Achalabhrata, Mevarya, Prabhasa. Nine of these disciples died with Mahavira; and two of them, Indrabhuti and Sudharma survived him, and subsequently attained beatitude. The Calpa sutra adds, that all ascetics, or candidates for holiness, were pupils in succession from Sudharma, none of the others having left successors. The author then proceeds to trace the succession from Sudharma to the different Sac'has, or orders of priests, many of which appear still to exist. This enumeration disproves the list communicated to Major Mackenzie by the head priest of Belligola.

The ages and periods which have been more than once alluded to in the foregoing account of the Jainas are briefly explained in Hemachandra's vocabulary. In the second chapter, which relates to the heavens and the gods, &c. the author, speaking of time, observes that it is distinguished into Avasarpini and Utsarpini, adding that the whole period is completed by twenty cotis of cotis of Sagaras] or 2,000,000,000,000,000 oceans of years. I do not find that he any where explains the space of time denominated Sagara or ocean. But I understand it to be an extravagant estimate of the time, which would elapse, before a vast cavity filled with chopped hairs could be emptied, at the rate of one piece of hair in a century: the time requisite to enter such a cavity, measured by a yojana every way, is a palya: and that repeated ten cotis of cotis of times [1,000,000,000,000,000 palyas = one Sagara, or sagaropama.] is a Sagara.

Each of the periods above-mentioned, is stated by Hemachandra, as comprising six aras; the names and duration of which agree with the information communicated to Major Mackenzie: In the one, or the declining period, they pass from the extreme felicity (ecanta suc'ha) through intermediate gradations, to extreme misery (ecanta duhc'ha). In the other, or rising period, they ascend in the same order, from misery to felicity. During the three first ages of one period, mortals lived for one, two, or three palyas; their stature was one, two, or three leagues (gavyutis); and they subsisted on the fruit of miraculous trees; which yielded spontaneously food, apparel, ornaments, garlands, habitation, nurture, light, musical instruments, and household utensils. In the fourth age, men lived ten millions of years; and their stature was 500 poles (dhanush): in the fifth age, the life of man is a hundred years: and the limit of his stature, seven cubits: in the sixth, he is reduced to sixteen years, and the height of one cubit. In the next period, this succession of ages is reversed, and afterwards they recommence as before.

Here we cannot but observe, that the Jainas are still more extravagant in their inventions than the prevailing sects of Hindus, absurd as these are in their fables.

In his third chapter, Hemachandra, having stated the term for paramount and tributary princes, mentions the twelve Chacravartis, and adds the patronymics and origin of them. Bharata is surnamed Arshabhi, or son of Rishabha; Maghavan is son of Vijaya; and Sanatcumara of ASWASENA. Santi, Cunt'hu and ARA are the Jinas so named, Sagara is described as son of Sumitra; Subhuma is entitled Cartavirya; Padma is said to be son of Padmottara; HARISHENA of HARI; JAYA of VIJAYA; BRAHMADATTA of BRAHME; and all are declared to have sprung from the race of Icshwacu.

A list follows, which, like the preceding, agrees nearly with the information communicated to Major Mackenzie. It consists of nine persons, entitled Vasudevas, and Crishnas. Here Triprisht'ha is mentioned with the patronymic Prajapatya; Dwiprisht'ha is said to have sprung from Brahme; Swayambhu is expressly called a son of Rudra; and Purushottama, of Soma, or the moon, Purusha- Sinha is surnamed SAIVI, or son of SIVA; Purushapundarica is said to have sprung from Mahasiras. Datta is termed son or Agnisinha; Narayana has the patronymic Das'rat'hi which belongs to Rama- Chandra; and Crishna is described as sprung from Vasudeva.

Nine other persons are next mentioned, under the designation of Sucla balas, viz. 1. Achala, 2. Vijaya, 3. Bhadra, 4. Suprabha, 5. Sudarsana, 6. ANANDA, 7. NANDANA, 8. PADMA, 9. RAMA.

They are followed by a list of nine foes of Vishnu: it corresponds nearly with one of the lists noticed by Major Mackenzie, viz. 1. Aswagriva, 2. Taraca, 3. Meraca, 4. Madhu, 5. Misumbha, 6. Bali, 7. PRAHLADA, 8. The king of Lanca (Ravana), 9. The king of Magadha (Jarasandha).

It is observed, that, with the Jinas, these complete the number of sixty-three eminent personages, viz. 24 Jinas, 12 Chacravartis, 9 Vasudevas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Prativasudevas.

It appears from the information procured by Major Mackenzie, that all these appertain to the heroic history of the Jaina writers. Most of them are also both known to the orthodox Hindus, and are the principal personages in the Puranas.

Hemachandra subsequently notices many names of princes, familiar to the Hindus of other sects. He begins with Prit'hu son of VENA, whom he terms the first king: and goes on to Mandhata, Harischandra Bharata, son of Dushyanta, &c. Towards the end of his enumeration of conspicuous princes, he mentions Carna, king of Champa and Anga: Hala or Salivahana; and CUMARAPALA, surnamed CHAULUCYA, a royal saint, who seems from the title Paramarhata, to have been a Jaina, and apparently the only one in that enumeration.

In a subsequent part of the same chapter, Hemachandra, (who was himself a theologian of his sect, and author of hymns to Jina, [A commentary on these hymns is dated in Saca 1214 (A. D. 1292); but how much earlier Hemachandha lived, is not yet ascertained.]) mentions and discriminates the various sects; viz. 1st. Arhatas, or Jainas, 2dly, Saugatas, or Bauddhas, and 3dly, six philosophical schools, viz. 1st. Naiyayica, 2d. Yoya, 3d, Capila's Sanc'hya, 4th. Vaiseshica, 5th. Varhaspatya, or Nastica, and 6th. Charvaca or Locayata. The two last are reputed atheistical, as denying a future state and a providence. If those be omitted, and the two Mimansas inserted, we have the six schemes of philosophy familiar to the Indian circle of the sciences.

The fourth chapter of Hemachandra's vocabulary relates to earth and animals. Here the author mentions the distinctions of countries which appear to be adopted by the Jainas; viz. the regions (varsha) named Bharata Airavata, and Videha, to which he adds Curu; noticing also other distinctions familiar to the Hindus of other sects, but explaining some of them according to the ideas of the Jainas. 'Aryavarta,' he observes, 'is the native land of Jinas, Chacris, and Aradhachacris, situated between the Vindhya and Himadri mountains.' This remark confines the theatre of Jaina history, religious and heroic, within the limits of Hindustan proper.

A passage in Bhascara's treatise on the sphere, will suggest further observations concerning the opinions of the Jainas on the divisions of the earth. Having noticed, for the purpose of confuting it, a notion maintained by the Bauddhas (whom some of the commentators,  as usual among orthodox Hindus, confound with the Jainas, respecting the descent or fall of the earth in space; he says, [Goladhyaya, § 3. v., 8 & 10.] the naked sectaries and the rest affirm, that two suns, two moons, and two sets of stars appear alternately: against them I allege this reasoning. How absurd is the notion which you have formed of duplicate suns, moons and stars, when you see the revolution of the polar fish.' [Ursa minor.]

The commentators [LACSHMIDASA, MUNISWARA, and the Vasanabhashya.] agree that the Jainas are here meant; and one of them remarks, that they are described as naked sectaries &c.; because the class of Digambaras is a principal one among these people.

It is true that the Jainas do entertain the preposterous notion here attributed to them: and it is also true that the Digambaras, among the Jainas, are distinguished from the Suclambaras, not merely by the white dress of the one, and the nakedness, (or else the tawny apparel) of the other; but also by some particular tenets and diversity of doctrine. However, both concur in the same ideas regarding the earth and planets, which shall be forthwith stated, from the authority of Jaina books: after remarking, by the way, that ascetics of the orthodox sect, in the last stage of exaltation, when they become Paramahansa, also disuse clothing.

The world, which according to the Jainas is eternal, is figured by them as a spindle resting on half of another; or as they describe it, three cups, of which the lowest is inverted; and the uppermost meets at its circumference the middle one. They also represent the world by comparison to a woman with her arms akimbo. [The Sangrahani ratna and Locanab sutra, both in Pracrit, are the authorities here used.] Her waist, or according to the description first mentioned, the meeting of the lower cups, is the earth. The spindle above, answering to the superior portion of the woman's person, is the abode of the gods; and the inferior part of the figure comprehends the infernal regions. The earth, which they suppose to be a flat surface, is bounded by a circle, of which the diameter is one raju. [This is explained to be a measure of space, through which the gods are able to travel in six months, at the rate of 2,057,152 yojanas, (of 2,000 crosa each), in the twinkling of an eye.] The lower spindle comprises seven tiers of inferior earths or hells, at the distance of a raju from each other, and its base is measured by seven rajus. These seven hells are Ratna prabha, 'Sarcara prabha, Baluca prabha, Panca prabha, Dhuma prabha, Tama prabha, Tamatama prabha. The upper spindle is also seven rajus high; and its greatest breadth is five rajus. Its summit, which is 4,500,000 yojanas wide is the abode of the deified saints: beneath that are five Vimanas, or abodes of gods: of which the centre one is named Sarvart'hasiddha: it is encompassed by the regions Aparajita, Jayanta, Vaijayanta and Vijaya. Next, at the distance of one raju from the summit, follow nine tiers of worlds, representing a necklace (graiveyaca), and inhabited by gods, denominated, from their conceited pretensions to supremacy, Ahamindra. These nine regions are, Aditya, Pritincara, Somanasa, Sumanasa, Suvisala, Sarvatobhadra, Manorama, Supravaddha,  and Suddarsana.

Under these regions are twelve (the Digambaras say sixteen) other regions, in eight tiers, from one to five rajus above the earth. They are filled with Vimanas, or abodes of various classes of gods, called by the general name of Calpavasis. These worlds, reckoning from that nearest the earth, are, Saudhama and Isana: Sanalcumara and Mahendra; Brahme: Lantaca; Sucra; Sahasrara; Anala and Pranata; Arana and Achyuta.

The sect of Jina distinguish four classes of deities, the Vaimanicas, Bhuvanapatis, Jyotishis, and Vyantaras. The last comprises eight orders of demigods or spirits, admitted by the Hindus in general, as the Racshanas, Pisacshas, Cinnaras, &c. supposed to range over the earth. The preceding class (Jyotishis) comprehends five orders of luminaries; suns, moons, planets, constellations, and stars, of which more hereafter. The Vaimanicas belong to the various Vimanas, in the twelve regions, or worlds, inhabited by gods. The class of Bhuvanapati includes ten orders, entitled Asuracumara, Nagacumara, &c.; each governed by two Indras. All these gods are mortal, except, perhaps, the luminaries.

The earth consists of numerous distinct continents, in concentric circles, separated by seas forming rings between them. The first circle is Jambu dwipa, with the mountain Sudarsa Meru in the centre. It is encompassed by a ring containing the salt ocean; beyond which is the zone, named Dhatuci dwipa; similarly surrounded by a black ocean. This is again encircled by Pushcara dwipa, of which only the first half is accessible to mankind: being separated from the remoter half by an impassable range of mountains, denominated Manushottara parvata. Dhatuci dwipa contains two mountains, similar to Sumeru, named Vijanga and Achala; and Pushcara contains two others, called Mandira and Vidyunmali.

The diameter of Jambu dwipa being 100,000 great yojanas, [Each great yojana contains 2000 cos.] if the 190th part be taken, or [y] 526-6/19, we have the breadth of Bharata varsha, which occupies the southern segment of the circle. Airavata is a similar northern segment. A band (33648 yojanas wide) across the circle, with Sudarsa Meru in the middle of it, is Videha varsha, divided by Meru (or by four peaks like elephant's teeth, at the four corners of that vast mountain) into east and west Videha. These three regions, Bharata, Airavata, and Videha, are inhabited by men who practice religious duties. They are denominated Carmabhumi, and appear to be furnished with distinct sets of Tirthancaras, or saints entitled Jina. The intermediate regions north and south of Meru are bounded by four chains of mountains; and intersected by two others: in such a manner, that the ranges of mountains, and the intermediate vallies, increase in breadth progressively. Thus Himavat is twice as broad as Bharata varsha [y] (or 1052-12/19); the valley beyond it is double its breadth [y] (2105-5/19); the mountain Mahahimavat is twice as much [y] (4210-10/19); its valley is again double [y] (8421-1/19); and the mountain Nishaddha has twice that breadth [y] (l6842-2/19). The vallies between these mountains, and between similar ranges reckoned from Airavata (viz. Sic'hari, Rucmi and Nila) are inhabited by giants (Yugala), and are denominated Bhogabhumi. From either extremity of the two ranges of mountains named Himaval and Sic'hari, a pair of tusks project over the sea; each divided into seven countries denominated Antara dwipas. There are consequently fifty-six such; which are called Cubhogabhumi, being the abode of evil doers. None of these regions suffer a periodical destruction, except Bharata and Airavata, which are depopulated, and again peopled at the close of the great periods before-mentioned.

We come now to the immediate purpose for which those notions of the Jainas have been here explained. They conceive the setting and rising of stars and planets to be caused by the mountain Sumeru: and suppose three times the period of a planet's appearance to be requisite for it to pass round Sumeru, and return to the place whence it emerges. Accordingly they allot two suns, as many moons, and an equal number of each planet, star, and constellation to Jambu dwipa, and imagine that these appear, on alternate days, south and north of Meru. They similarly allot twice that number to the salt ocean; six times as many to Dhatuci dwipa; 21 times as many, or 42 of each, to the Calodadhi; and 72 of each to Pushcara dwipa.

It is this notion, applied to the earth which we inhabit, that BHASCARA refutes. His argument is thus explained by his commentators.

'The star close to the north pole, with those near it to the east and west, forms a constellation figured by the Indian astronomers as a fish. In the beginning of the night (supposing the sun to be near Bharani or Musca); the fish's tail is towards the west; and his head towards the east; but at the close of the night, the fish's tail, having made a half revolution, is towards the east, and his head towards the west; and since the sun, when rising and setting, is in a line with the fish's tail, there is but one sun; not two.' This explanation is given by Muniswara and Lacshmidasa. But the Vasana bhashya reverses the fish, placing his head towards the west at sun-set, when the sun is near Bharani.
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